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DR SATKARI MOOKERJI FELICITATION VOLUME

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A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE CONTENTS

Prof. P. V. Bapat's article on Chinese Madhyamāgama is an interesting commentary on the work of Ven Dr. Thich Minch Chau.

Dr K. K. Datta in his article "Modern India and World Fellowship" has evaluated the contributions of modern Indian thinkers towards the development of the idea of world fellowship.

Prof. Askari's "Amir Khusraw and Music" is a very informative article on a subject not so long properly emphasised.

Mahamahopadhyaya Dr V. V. Mirashi discusses the author and date of Kundamālā. In his opinion the author is Dhiranaga and he is to be placed between 600 and 1100 A. D.

Dr D. C. Sircar throws new light on Narasiṁha cult on the basis of references in inscriptions to names such as Siṁhavarman, Narasiṁha-varman and Siṁha-datta.

Prof. J. N. Sarkar discusses the importance of Indigo as a form of commercial agriculture in India during the first half of 17th century.

Prof. Sudhakar Chattopadhyaya discusses the much-discussed subject of the cradle of Gautamīputra Sātakarṇi's power and extent of his empire.

Prof. B. P. Sinha has discussed the religious significance of some Buddhist sculptures showing humiliation to Hindu deities.

Prof. R. S. Sharma has discussed the main feature of Sātavāhana polity mainly on the basis of inscriptions. In his opinion the Sata-vahana system of administration appears to be a significant link between the Mauryas and the Guptas and between the North and South.

Dr Adris Banerji's "Cultural sequence in Haryana" breaks new ground.

P. C. Roy Choudhary's "What a Tribal woman can Teach U" is instructive.

Prof. Buddha Prakash on the basis of Greek sources throw interesting light on Cyrus the great and the Indus Valley region.

Dr V. P. Varma has contributed an illuminating article entitled "Early Buddhism and the Methodology of Social and Political Research".

Dr K. D. Barpai has brought to light many new points in his article on "Some interesting Sculptures from Tripurī".

Dr R. K. Diksit's article on "Law and Justice in Kāmandikīya Nītisāra" is a briliant comment on polity.

Prof. Dasrath Sharma's paper throws new light on the route of Mohammad Gazhanvī to Somanāth.

Dr P. L. Gupta discusses the nature and extent of Roman trade in India on the basis of Roman coins found in India.

Dr Upendra Thakur discusses the Hūṇa invasion of India under Tormana.

Dr B. P. Majumdar reconstructs the polity of the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇi Saṅgha on the basis of Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas.

Prof. R. K. Choudhary discusses the position of slaves and serfs in the mediaeval Cambodia.

An interesting aspect of British policy towards religions in India is discussed by Dr S. B. Singh.

Late Dr D. R. Chanana's article entiled "Kavindrāchārya Sarasvatī—a Problem of Scholarship and Personal integrity"—is illuminating.

Dr Lallanji Gopal contributes a very informative paper on the honey industry in ancient India.

Dr Om Prakash the author of "Food and Drink in Ancient India" has switched his attention to 'pleasures and pastimes in Ancient India. In his paper he confines himself to 11 and 12th Century A. D.

Drs A. B. L. Awasthi and A. Lal write on Ancient Indian Cartography and Numismatic gleanings from Sanskrit Buddhist literature respectively.

Dr M. S. Pandey discusses about the problem of Candra-Gupta-Kumāradevī coins.

Dr Bhagwant Sahai has introduced a rare dancing image of Bhairava in the Gaya Museum.

Dr Surendra Gopal has contributed a very interesting and original paper on Indian traders in Russia in 17th Century A. D.

Dr. B. N. Sharma introduces an unpublished Sapta-Mātṛkā relief from Rajasthan now in the National Museum.

Sri P. Sud writes on "General Education through Museum".

Dr A. Rashid's paper on "Merchant and artisans of Northern India" is based on original sources and contains many new information.

Dr B. Verma throws interesting light on Ahmad Shah Abdali's 9th invasion and its effect on East India Company.

Dr B. P. Roy has discussed in his paper some aspects of Upaniṣadic Educational System.

Sri B. K. Chattopadhyaya discusses Upaniṣads and Vedic rituals.

Sri O. P. Jaiswal has an interesting suggestion to make about the interpretation of Apratigha-type of coin.

Dr C. S. Upasak has contributed a learned paper on "The Editing of Manuscripts."

Sri Dilip Kumar Banerji gives a good cirtical evaluation of Pali Aṭṭhakathā.

Sri Angraj Choudhary writes on "Language and Culture".

There is an interesting article on Girls' boarding houses in Ancient India by Dr Sushil Malti Devi.

Dr S. N. Sahay contributes a technical paper on the technique of marking terracottas.

Dr Suvira Jaiswal discusses the doctrine of incarnation.

Sri Nityanand Banerji writes on "Peace through Hinduism".

Prof. Anukul Chandra Banerjee's article on "Buddhism in Tibet", is a good summary of the introduction of Buddhism and its earl[illegible] history in Tibet.

Dr Suresh Singh has written an article on so far unstudie[illegible] temples in Ranchi District.

Dr D. N. Jha discusses the theory of forced labour in Post mauryan period.

Dr K. S. Karamshil has discussed the political ideas of Caṇḍeśvara.

Sri Shakti Dhar Jha's paper on Hindu deities in Jain Purāṇa is informative.

Sri T. N. Sinha discusses the salient features of Local Government in ancient India.

Dr B. C. Law's paper on "Some Problem on Jaina Philosophy" is as thorough and suggestive as his other works.

Dr S. Bhattacharya's article "The Viśeṣa and the A-viśeṣa" is an attempt to elucidate two technical terms met with in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga systems.

Prof. T. M. P. Mahadevan discusses the advaita view of time and Dr Tatia discusses Jain logic.

We have an article in Sanskrit entitled "Atitānāgatajñānopāyaḥ" by Pandit Badri Nath Shukla.

Dr Jatil Coorwar Mookerjee's article "The Nature and Classification of Philosophical Inquiry" is an exposition of discussion in its threefold form : vāda, jalpa and vitaṇḍā.

Prof. Subramanyam Sastri in a Sanskrit article discusses Mīmāṁsā philosophy and theism.

Dr U. Dhammaratna studies the nature of dream consciousness in Pali literature.

Dr K.K. Dikshit's article "A Prospective for the Study of Indian Philosophy" is a suggestion to study Indian philosophy as an interdisciplinary venture.

Dr Sitānath Goswami's article "Self-luminosity" is an interesting examination of the theory that knowledge reveals its own self.

Dr Ramavadha Pandey's article 'सारस्वतोणादिपरिशीलनम्' is a vertical examination of the उणादि सुत्रs met with in the सारस्वत-व्याकरण.

Dr Mahesh Tiwari's article चित्तवीथि is an analysis of the Buddhist process of cognition.

Prof. Swami Brahmanand's article "वर्ण-स्फोट-निरूपणम्" is an exposition of an aspect of the स्फोटवाद of the grammarian,

Sri Srinarayana Misra's article "न्यायवैशेषिकयोः स्मृतेरप्रमात्वम्" is an exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika standpoint that memory is not a type of valid knowledge.

Dr Bhakti Sudha Mukhopadhyaya's article "सांख्यदर्शनसमीक्षा" is an examination of the catagories recognised by the Sāṁkhya system.

Dr Hem Chandra Joshi's article "Udayana's Arguments for God's Existence" is an elaboration of the arguments addressed by Udayana for the existence of God.

Dr Bhakti Bhattacharya's article "Bhakti Cult with special reference to Acintya-bhedābheda" is an exposition of the concept of devotion of the Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavism.

Dr O. P. Jaiswal's article "The Problem of Error" is a restatement of the Theories on error.

Dr M. L. Goswami's article "विधिस्वरूप-विमर्शनम्" is an exposition of the view of Udayana that an injunctive suffix means the motive of an authority.

Dr Aruna Haldar in her article "Common Assumption of Indian Systems" shows that in spite of diversity of Indian systems of philosophy, there is unity in postulates.

Dr Ramaranjan Mukherjee's article "Kuntaka's Approach to the Problem of Poetic Expression" is an exposition of Kuntaka's theory of वक्रोक्ति.

Dr Mangalpati Jha's article "Elucidation of the Figure, Self-comparison" is an exposition of अनन्वय अलंकार as treated in Poetics.

Dr P. Upadhyaya's article "An Exposition of the Essential Nature of Self-comparison" is a different approach to the same अलंकार, अनन्वय.

Sri Umakant Thakur's article "An Account of Vārāṇasī as Depicted in the Skanda-purāṇa" contains interesting materials for the study of ancient Banaras.

Dr Krishna Gopal Goswami's article "The Mānava Principle in Manu and Nietzche's Appraisal" shows that codes, laid down by Manu stand the test of modern scholarship.




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DR SATKARI MOOKERJEE

PROF. O. P. JAISWAL

Dr Satkari Mookerjee was born on the 16th of March, 1896, in a remote village of district Birbhum, West Bengal. He grew up in rural atmosphere till eleven. Thereafter he went to Rampur Hat and was admitted to the H. E. School. He had the benefit of learning English under the late Nilaratan Mukerjee, a unique personality and a strict disciplinarian. The outstanding characteristic of his English teaching was that not a single student could commit mistake in composition. Dr Mookherjee was his favourite pupil loved as his own son. For the time being Dr Mookerjee migrated to Hetampur for one year in the Raj Collegiate School. There he had the unique privilege of studying Sanskrit text and grammar with a pundit, Sri Ambika Charan Roychoudhary. The pundit had a fascinating mode of teaching and had the knack of making Sanskrit grammar as interesting as poetry. Dr Mookerjee learned to compose Sanskrit verses under his tutelage. Thereafter he came over to Rampur Hat again and passed the Matriculation Examination in the year 1912 in first division. On account of forced absence from school for several months, he could not fulfil the expectation of the Head Master by getting a scholarship.

Dr Mookerjee was keen to study with English Professors in a College and ultimately his father, though a very orthodox Brahmin, had to give him permission to read in the Wesley Mission College, Bankura. He spent two fruitful years at Bankura and was immensely benefited by the lectures of his Professors. Being a slow hand, Dr Mookerjee could not answer all the questions and so failed to compete in the Intermediate Examination. His father wanted him to take up Honours in Sanskrit. In the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, Prof. Shyama Charan Mukherjee held a written test in English. Pro[illegible] Mookerjee was highly pleased with his performance and advised hi[illegible] to take Honours in English in some other College. But his father's wish prevailed. That it was a very wise decision Dr Mookerjee no[illegible] realised. Unless he dedicated himself to Sanskrit at that age, he could not have mastered the difficult language with the treasure of

its literature and philosophy. He passed B. A. (Hons.) Examination in Sanskrit second in 1st Class in 1916. The first was Narendra Chandra Dhar who became a Sannyasi and now bears the name Srimat Anirvana. They became close friends in the post-graduate classes. According to Dr Mookerjee, Sri Dhar was a genius. But Anirvana desired that he (Dr Mookerjee) should stand first in the M. A. Examination. Anirvana secured first class in group 'B'. He has translated the *Life Divine* of Sri Arivindo into Bengali and is now engaged in writing a Bhāṣya on the Veda.

In M. A., Dr Mookerjee specialised in Pāṇini grammar and Sanskrit Poetics. From the very beginning he had strong desire for Nyāya and Vedānta but there was no provision for teaching these subjects in his time. He learnt Tibetan both classical and colloquial. At first he could not find satisfaction from the teaching of any Professor of Nyāya. Ultimately he was introduced to Dr S. N. Dasgupta, the great philosopher. Dr Mookerjee was then a Lecturer in Calcutta University in the Department of Sanskrit. Dr Dasgupta advised him to learn Chinese. But Dr Mookerjee demurred to spend further time on languages. Tibetan is the difficult language and he had to spend several years to acquire command over it. But after the demise of Sir Asutosh, Calcutta University did not appreciate the value of it and he was deprived of a special allowance. This accounts for his apathy towards the language. Dr Dasgupta, however, waxed him of the study of Buddhist philosophical classics. He read with Dr Dasgupta the Madhyamaka-kārikā with Candrakīrti's commentory. He finished it in about six months due to his sound knowledge of Tibetan. Being impressed by his insight and approach to the problems, Dr Dasgupta asked him to study Bradely's Appearance and Reality, Soachin's Nature of Truth and Mc. Taggart's The Nature of Existence.

By coincidence, Dr Mookerjee met late Pandit Rajendra Nath Ghose who became a monk under the name of Chidghanānanda Swāmī. Pandit Ghose advised him to study Nyāya and Vedānta. Dr Mookerjee was introduced to Mm. Dr Yogendra Nath Tarka-Vedānta-Tīrtha who initiated him to the intricacies of Nyāya and other systems of philosophy. Dr Yogendra Nath and Dr Dasgupta turned the course of his academic career. His knowledge of Pāṇini and Sanskrit Poetics stood in good stead in his plunging into diverse philosophical texts. At the instance of Dr S. N. Dasgupta, he took

up a thesis for Ph.D. of the Calcutta University. It was examined by Prof. La Vallée Poussin, Dr F. W. Thomas and Dr G. Tucci. It was highly lauded and he was awarded the degree in 1932.

Dr Mookerjee had insatiable lust for study. He guided some fifty scholars in their research. Many of them occupy high positions in different universities of India. A few names may be mentioned:— Dr Sitansu Shekhar Bagchi, Director, Mithila Research Institute, Darbhanga, Dr N. Tatia, Director, Prakrit Institute Vaishali, Dr N.N. Choudhary, ex-Prof. of Sanskrit, Delhi University, Dr Bechan Jha, Professor of Sanskrit, Patna University, Prof. Vishnupada Bhattacharya, Secretary, Bengal Sanskrit Parishad, West Bengal, Dr Ramaranjan Mookerjee, Prof. of Sanskrit, Jadavpur University and Dr Sitanath Goswami, Jadavpur University.

Dr Mookerjee lived a cloistered life in study and with his students. He had to wait long for Readership. But eventually he was made the Asutosh Professor of Sanskrit, in due recognition of his scholarship, by the then V.C., Sri P.N. Banerjee.

Dr. Mookerjee retired from the Calcutta University in the year, 1955. On the eve of his retirement, he was offered the post of Directorship of Mithila Sanskrit Institute, Darbhanga and then of Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, Nalanda. He accepted the post of Directorship of Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, Nalanda in 1955. He came to Nalanda on a contract for five years but due to the profundity of his scholarship, he was requested to continue till the end of June, 1964.

In the words of Dr Mookerjee, his service in Bihar for almost a decade was intellectual pleasure. The salubrious climate of Nalanda improved his health. He had the pleasure of guiding a lot of scholars. About a dozen got Doctorate degree. His intellectual association with Bihar has continued unabated. In the words of Dr Mookerjee "they have still an unfeigned love of value and are not ungrateful". The memories of Nalanda abide in him. At Nalanda, he had sincere friends and pupils belonging to Bihar and other States. Among them, the name of Mr. J.C. Mathur, I.C.S., the then Education Secretary, comes first. Mr. Siddheshwar Nath, Education under-Secretary and Tripurari Sharan are friends and well-wishers of Dr Mookerjee. Dr Parasuram Upadhyaya, and Prof. O.P. Jaiswal are among his noted pupils. Dr Mockerjee wrote a good number of

articles and monographs at Nalanda, which enabled Nava Nalanda Mahavihara to gain the stature of an International Academy.

Dr Mookherjee is back to his village. Away from the din of politics and the glare of official contacts, he is happy to court the peaceful life of a Vānaprastha. The recent Certificate of Honour, awarded by the Government of India, has left him unmoved. May he be spared long to serve as the fountain of inspiration both as a man and as a great Indologist.

His Contributions

(1) A scheme for the reorganisation of the Sanskrit Tols.

(2) Religion and Human Progress-Prof Yavain (Jan-Jun 1954) Vol II.

(3) The Jaina Conception of Time.

(4) The Application of the Law of Anekānta in Ethics, Religion, and Practical life.

(5) The Nature of the Ultimate Reality in the Schools of Asaṅga an Vasubandhu (Journal of the B. U. Vol. 3 Reprint No. 1957).

(6) Legacy of Buddhism—Journal of the B. U. Vol. Nov. 1957.

(7) Political Wisdom of Ancient India (Mother, Sept. 1960 Vol. 3 No.1).

(8) Message of Swami Vivekananda (Prabuddha Bharat, May 1939).

(9) The Place of Sanskrit Culture in the Scheme of National Regeneration in the Present Day, Scottish Church College Magazine, Vol, XX, No. 1 September, 1939.

(10) Spiritual Renaissance in Rajasthan, (Seth Chandmall Buttias' Trust).

(11) Obituary note on Dr S. N. Das Gupta 7. 12. 53.

(12) Varanaseya Sanskrit University, Baudha Darsana Parisad (President's address in Sanskrit 1961).

(13) The Role of Sanskrit in the Cultural Unification of India (Reprinted from the Journal of Bihar University Research Society, Buddha Jayanti Special Vol. II).

(14) Nyaya-Vaisesika (Cultural Heritage of India, Reprint).

(15) A dissertation of the identity of the Author of the Dhvanyāloka (Reprinted from B. C. Law Vol. pt, I) A supplementary note to the above article.

(16) The Influence of the Buddhism on Indian Life and Thought (Bulletin of the Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Culture Vol. VII November, 1236 No. II).

(17) The Grounds of Inference as Classified by Dharmakirti (Reprinted from Siddha Bharati Vishweshwaranand Vedic Research Society, Hosiarpur 1950).

(18) Impediments to Universalhood (Jati-bādhakas), reprinted from (Sarupa Bharati), Vishweshwaranand Vedic Research Society Hosiarpur 1954).

(19) The Significance of Sri Ramkrishna in the History of Religion (Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Cultural Bulletin Manuscripts.)

(20) The Significance of the Advent of Sri Ramkrishna.

(21) Buddhism in Indian life and Thought (The Cultural Heritage of India Vol. I).

(22) The Omniscient as the Founder of Religion (Nalanda Research Vol. II).

(23) The Philosophy of Jayanta Bhatta and his Humour.

(24) The Omniscient as the Founder of a Religion.

(25) The Nature of Ultimate Reality.

(26) The Buddhist Theory of Universal Flux.

Apart from these, there are many books and articles which are traceless to the author.

परमादरणीय-गुरुवर-डा० श्री सातकड़ि मुखोपाध्याय-महाशयानां
चरणकमलयोरात्मभावाभिनिवेदनम् ।

१

ज्ञानप्रभाभिरभितो भिन्दानं विततं तमः ।
वन्दे भक्तिभृतस्वान्तो गुरुदेवाभिधं महः ॥

२

विद्या प्रबोधमिव काव्यकलेव भाव-
मास्था समादरमिव प्रतियत्नहृद्यम् ।
प्राभातिकीव च रविं रमणीयवेला
विद्वन् ! भवन्तमधिगत्य धराऽस्ति धन्या ॥

३

केचित् क्वचिच्च विचरन्ति कृतप्रवेशाः
शास्त्रैकदेशविषये परमश्रमेण ।
शास्त्राणि यत्र निखिलानि सुखासिकाभि-
र्वृद्धानि स त्वमसि कस्य न विस्मयाय ॥

४

प्राचीनदर्शनसमुच्चितनव्यदृष्टि-
प्रांशुप्रकाशमधिगत्य समृद्धमेधाः ।
यत्र क्वचित्त्वमवतारयसि स्ववाच-
मञ्चत्यसौ सुरुचिमुज्ज्वविचारसञ्चः ॥

५

केचित्पठन्ति पठितञ्च समेधयन्ति
ते प्रायशो नहि परानवबोधयन्ति ।
येऽध्यापकाः स्वकृतिभिश्च भुवो नमस्या-
स्त्वं तेष्वपि प्रथमकोटिमसि प्रपन्नः ॥

६

वेदादरप्रगुणिताखिलदर्शनोत्थ-
विज्ञानबुद्धजिनशास्त्रचयं निषेव्य ।
आलोचनानिकषघृष्टगभीरतत्त्व-
चामीकरस्य तव कस्तुलनामुपैतु ॥

७

त्रिद्यार्थिवर्गहितचिन्तनमार्त्विजीन्यं
पूजासमाधिरथ तर्कतलप्रवेशः।
शास्त्राटवीविहरणं व्यसनं च यस्य
तस्याखिलैव तव रीतिरलोकतुल्या॥

८

न्यायाङ्गणभ्रमणसस्पृहमानसस्य
वेदान्तवादविविधाध्वसु सञ्चरिष्णोः।
भाट्टे नयेऽपि च कृतासमविभ्रमस्य
चित्रं न जात्वपि मनस्तव खिद्यते स्म॥

९

शस्त्रं पुराणमपि शाणमवाप्य तीक्ष्ण-
धारत्वमेति भुवि सुप्रथितोऽयमर्थः।
प्राचीनशास्त्रनिचयं निकषं नवीन-
मारोप्य दीपयति किं त्वयि न व्यलोकि॥

१०

प्राच्यशास्त्रचयसेवनेच्छया
ज्ञानमेव भवदाकृतिं गतम्।
वागवापदधुना पुमाकृतिं
पुण्यपाकवशतोऽथवा नृणाम्॥

११

तुङ्गता शिखरणीव, सौम्यता
शीतदीधितिगतेव, तीव्रता।
भानुगेव, शुचिता च मानसी
मानसीव तव राजतेतराम्॥

१२

ब्राह्मणोचित-निरन्तराहृत-
ज्ञानतृप्तिपदवीपरिग्रहात्।
निःस्पृहस्य भवतोऽर्थसञ्चयेऽ
सञ्जमाममनसस्तृणं जगत्॥

१३

निःसपत्नशुचिवैदुषीगुण-
प्रीणिताखिलविद्वत्कुलस्य ते ।
शिष्यतां वयमवाप्य गौरवा-
दुन्नतं निजशिरो वहामहे ॥

इति
विनयावनतस्य
वेचन झा शर्मणः
पटना विश्वविद्यालयाध्यापकस्य ।

DR. SATKARI MUKHERJI FELICITATION VOLUME

PART I

CHINESE MADHYAMĀGAMA AND THE LANGUAGE OF ITS BASIC TEXT

by

PROF. P. V. BAPAT, POONA

Ven Dr. Thich Minh Chau has made a valuable contribution to our knowledge by publishing his Doctorate thesis on "The Chinese Madhyama-Āgama and the Pali Majjhima-nikāya: A Comparative Study". He has established that the Chinese Madhyama-Āgama belonged to the Sarvāstivādi school. The Sarvāstivādins had adopted Sanskrit as their literary medium and therefore it is likely to be presumed that Saṅghadeva who translated this text about 397-98 A. D. had before him a Sanskrit text of the Madhyama-Āgama.

On p. 20 of his book, Dr. Chau has referred to my view of some basic Prakrit Canon, but he has not fully given the reasons why I think so. I thought it would be better to detail the reasons for my view in the matter. Here they are given below :

1. If the Sanskrit text represented by the fragmentary Upāli-sūtra & Śuka-sūtra, given by the author on pp. 356-58 had been his basic text, then we expect that he would have followed substantially that text. But we find that it is not so. In the Sanskrit fragment of the Upāli-sūtra, line 50 (p. 356) we have the word 'Śakrasya' which evidently is out of place and is a wrong Sanskritisation of the Pali-Prakrit original 'Sakkassa', which really stands for 'Śākyasya'. And this is more in consonance with the immediately following word 'Bhagavato'. This is an example of purely mechanical Sanskritisation, which we often notice in Buddhist Sanskrit books, where we find *cittī-karoti manasi karoti* is rendered as *citrī karoti manasi karoti*, irrespective of the sense involved. In line 8b (p. 356) we have '*Āhavanīyasya akṣasya*'. I am not sure about the correctness of this reading, when we pay attention to the preceding word '*āhavanīyasya*'. we cannot think of an eye (*akṣa*, which the author thinks to be an equivalent of the Chinese 'eye' (p. 190), irrespective of the correctness of the grammatical form in the Sanskrit language of this fragment) to be '*āhavanīya*' : fit to be given offerings to. I think the word must be '*Yakṣasya*'. This word need not be interpreted in a bad sense. The word

is often used in the sense of one who possesses divine or superhuman power. Buddhaghoṣa explains this word with reference to the Buddha in asmuchas he possessed miraculous power and in asmuchas he could make himself in-visible.

2. The fragmentary Śuka-sūtra which the author has given on pp. 357-58 agrees with the Chinese sūtra No. 170 in name but the contents given by the author on pp. 128-131 agree more with the Pali text, which the author also admits. There is nothing in the Chinese sūtra which corresponds to the sets of ten dharmas mentioned in the fragment, which also includes a reference to the making of images of the Buddha (*Tathāgatasya bimba-karaṇam*), Folio 56 obverse, line 4 (p. 357), which clearly suggests a later period in early Buddhism.

So evidently the Sanskrit text represented by these fragments could not have been the basic text of the Chinese translator. In addition to these, there are still stronger reasons found in the interpretations accepted by the Chinese translator, which point to a period earlier than the one to which the present Buddhist Sanskrit texts are supposed to belong. We may give here a few examples :—

3. *Nekkhamma*, freedom from desire. This word is used in early Buddhist texts as an opposite of *kāma*, desire, as is proved by the oft-recurring expression : *kāmanam ādīnavo, nekkhamme ānisaṃso* : dangers in desire and advantages in freedom from desire. I have already shown elsewhere* how this interpretation alone is applicable to earlier passages and how gradually this word changed its meaning in later times when renunciation or leaving the house (*pabbajjā*) came to be considered as more important than the moral quality of absence of desire (*naiṣkāmya*). I have shown there that this change we notice even in later Pali canonical texts, like the Cariyā-piṭaka, the Vibhaṅga, etc.

The available Buddhist Sanskrit texts translate this word not as *naiṣkāmya*, but as *naiṣkramya*, as if thinking that this word is derived from *nis-kram*. The old etymology is forgotten, because it appears that by that time importance had come to be attached more to the physical act of leaving the house, than to the moral act of keeping oneself free from desire. The use of this word *naiṣkramya* is found even in books of mixed Sanskrit like the Mahāvastu i. 107, 173 etc., or the verse-portion of the Lalita-vistara (136.8 :170.10 etc.).

* B. C. Law Volume (1946) part II, pp. 260-66.

Now our Chinese Madhyamāgama uses the expression wu-yu,[1] without desire, which corresponds to Pali *nekkhamma*, that is, *naiṣkāmya*, and not *naiṣkramya*, leaving one's house. Later Chinese translations use the Chinese characters ch'ü-yao[2], or Ch'ü li,[3] or only Ch'ü,[4] which all correspond to *naiṣkramya.*[2] Thus here it is seen that the Chinese translator was aware of the older etymology and interpretation and in his time the later interpretation had not yet developed, or even if it had developed, he was not prepared to accept the later interpretation of Buddhist Sanskrit texts. If a Sanskrit text had been his basic original, we expect that he would have used an expression corresponding to *naiṣkramya.*

4. The Sanskrit Buddhist texts recognise twelvefold division of Buddhist literature, though occasionlly it also refers to, as in the Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa (Mahāyānasūtra-saṅgraha ed. by P. L. Vaidya, p. 215 last line), the ninefold division accepted by Pali tradition. Among the twelve coustituents, there is one called Itivṛtta, or Itivṛttaka or Itivṛttika (according to the Abhisamayālaṅkāra-ālokā). The Sarvāstivādins also recognise this division with all its constituents. In the Chinese Madhyamāgama also we have this division and its constituents. But instead of Itivṛttaka, Saṅghadeva uses an expression which corresponds to Pali Itivuttaka, that is, Sanskrit Ityuktaka. He does not support the wrong Sanskritisation of Pali *vuttaka* into *vṛttaka*. As the text is a collection of words spoken by the Buddha, the correct title should be Ityuktaka and not Itivṛttaka. The Translator uses only Tz'u-shuo[5], corresponding to Pali Itivuttaka and not Tz'u-shuo t'a shi[6], or pen shi[7] as given in Mahāvyutpatti 1174, corresponding to Itivṛttaka. The Chinese translator follows the Pali texts and not Sanskrit texts.

5. Buddhist Sanskrit texts while describing the exposition of holy life (*brahmacarya*) use the word : *Svartham su-vyañjanaṃ kevalaparipūrṇaṃ pariśuddhaṃ brahmacaryaṃ prakāśayati* (Mahāvastu i. 255). The Pali description agrees with these words given above except in the use of the first word, where we have *sātthaṃ*, which corresponds to Sanskrit *sārthaṃ*, with meaning. The Chinese translator uses the words yu-i[8], which evidently corresponds to Pali tradition. If he had a Sanskrit text as his basic original, he would have naturally used an expression

1. Chinese words in notes 1-19 are given at the end of this paper.
2. For references to the use of these Chinese characters, see para. 6 of my article referred to in * note given above.

corresponding to Sanskrit *Svartham* (*su-artham*). See the word *sātthaṃ* in the glossary.

6. The Pali word *vohāra* stands for two Sanskrit words *vyāhāra* and *vyavahāra*, meaning respectively 'speech' and 'worldly transaction'. The Buddhist Sanskrit texts often make a confusion using *vyavahāra* even where it should be *vyāhāra*. The Sukhāvatī-vyūha (p. 42 Max Muller's ed.) uses : *anyatra saṃvṛt-vyavahāreṇa*, where *vyāhāreṇa* would be more appropriate. So also we have current expressions like *vyavahārika-satya* (corresponding to *saṃvṛti-satya*) and *Eka-vyavahārika* (one of the 18 Buddhist sects at time of the Third Council of Pāṭaliputra) where the more appropriate terms should have been *vyāhārika-satya* (corresponding to *Saṃvṛti*, Pali *sammuti*, a recognised form of speech) and *Ekavyāhārika*, corresponding to Ekabbohārika in Pali, where *bohāra* or *vohāra* corresponds to *vyāhāra* and not *vyavahāra*. The word *vyāhāra* was also current in early Sanskrit works like the Samādhirāja-sūtra (p. 70, verse 12), where we read *vyāhāramātreṇa ca vyoharāmi*.

The Chinese translator seems to be making a distinction between these two interpretations and he correctly uses Szu-shuo[9] for four *vyāhāras* and Haū-shi[10] for *vyavahāra*, (though the Pali word in both the places is *vohāra*), in Chinese sūtras Nos. 187 and 203 corresponding respectively to Pali 112 and 203 of the Pali Majjhima-nikāya.

7. Corresponding to the Pali expression *abhikkanta-vaṇṇa*, of lovely colour, in M. No 113, we have the Chinese expression (Tse. vii.. la. 8) Hsing-t'i-ch'i-miao-se[11] in Chinese sūtra No. 165. It does not follow the wrongly Sanskritised *abhikrānta-varṇa*, or *abhisaṅkrānta-varṇa* or *atisaṅkrānta-varṇa* found in the Lalita-vistara (398. 11) or the Vinayavastu, (iv. 58).

8. Following Pali commentaries, Saṅghadeva is also found to be wavering between the two interpretations of *antara-ghara*, in one and the same sūtra (Chinese No. 161). He gives once the interpretation as a'village', Ts'un[12] at another time in the same sūtra, he gives it as 'houses', chia[13]. He follows the Pāli commentators even in the wrong interpretation of *bhūnahu*, as 'one who destroys prosperity' (*bhūtihanaka, buddhināśaka*) by using the Chinese expression Huai-pai-t'i[14]. Dr. Chau, however, in contradiction to what he has said on pp. 61-62 translates the word correctly as 'foetus-killer' by substituting pai[15] for a similarly pronouncing word, PAI[16]. We do not know on what authority

he does it. Or is it merely the use of a wrong homo-phone ? Such mistakes are often seen in Chinese Buddhist books.

9. The Chinese translator has given sometimes wrong translations, because he did not understand correctly the dialectical variation in written or spoken forms of Prakrit. For instance. he misunderstands the word *prahāṇa* throughout and he wrongly translates it as Tuan,* which means to cut, to abandon. Following the Chinese rendering, Dr. Chau also translates it as 'eradication'. But from the explanation of this word given in Buddhist books like the Arthaviniścaya-sūtra (para. 14) Dharmasaṅgraha (para. 45), etc. it is clear that this word is only a dialectical variation of *pradhāna*, effort, exertion. Even Vasubandhu uses the same word clearly showing that it is used in the sense of Vīrya : *Vīryaṃ samyak prahāṇākhyam* (Kārikā VI. 69, or 70 according to another edition). From the explanation of the same in the Madhyamāgama (p. 95), it becomes clear that 'eradication' is not at all applicable to at least two of the clauses. One also wonders why Gayā-sīsa (Gayā-śīrṣa) is rendered by Saṅghadeva as Hsiang-ving.[18] Was it mis-understood as gaja-sīsa, elephant's head ? Similarly, should we imagine that he possibly heard the word 'damma' being pronounced as 'dhamma' and hence he gives '*purisa-dhamma* (Fa[18])-*sārathi* for *purisadamma-sārathi* (pp. 165-66) ?

10. Thus in the face of all this ovrerwhelming evidence given above, it is difficult to believe that the basic original of the Chinese translator was in the language of the present Buddhist Sanskrit texts. It is also noted that even the present Pali texts could not have been the basis as Dr. Chau has shown by his comparative study. The present Pali texts of the Canon are also the results of editing and re-editing at different saṅgītis. We have, therefeore, to assume that some form of Prakrit closer to Pali, or some imperfect or corrupt form of a language using Sanskrit orthography but dominated by Prakrit grammar, must have been used by the early Buddhists for writing their books. Later, these books were revised and re-edited in a purer form of Sanskrit language, which was in due course adopted by the Buddhists as their literary medium. Hence we note that the language of the verses quoted from older sources is dominated by the elements of Pali or Prakrit grammar.

The original of the Chinese Madhyamāgama must have belonged to such a category.

1. 無欲. 2. 出要. 3. 出離.

4. 出. 5. 此說. 6. 此說他事.

7. 本事. 8. 有義. 9. 四說.

10. 俗事. 11. 形體極妙色

12. 村. 13. 家. 14. 壞敗地.

15. 白. 16. 敗. 17. 斷.

18. 象. 19. 法.

MODERN INDIA AND WORLD FELLOWSHIP

By

DR. K. K. DATTA

A highly significant feature in the history of Indian civilisation, age after age, has been the catholicity of thought and culture. India's culture, with its keynote of universalism, exercised a supremely fruitful influence on human minds, far and wide, beyond the physical limits of her geography from the days of remote antiquity. "To know my country" observed Rabindranath, "one has to travel to that age when she realised her soul and then transcended her physical boundaries, when she revealed her being in a radiant magnanimity which illumined the eastern horizon, making her recognised as their own by those in alien shores who were awakened into new surprise of life". "I cannot but bring to your mind those days", he wrote, "when the whole of Eastern Asia from Burma to Japan was united with India in the closest tie of friendship, the very natural tie which can exist between nations. There was a living communication of hearts, a nervous system evolved through which messages ran between us about the deepest needs of humanity"[1]. Vivekananda very significantly emphasised on this historic mission of India in several lectures he delivered here and outside. "It has now become an historical fact", he observed in 1898, "that the spiritual ideas of the Indian people travelled towards both the East and the West in days gone by. Every body knows now how much the world owes to India's spirituality, and what a potent factor in the present and the past of humanity have been spiritual powers of India". Those that tell you", he expressed, "that Indian thoughts never went outside of India, those that tell you that I am the first Sannyasin who went to foreign lands to preach, do not know the history of their own race. Again and again this phenomenon has happened. Spiritual knowledge can only be given in silence, like the dew that falls unseen and unheard, yet bringing into bloom masses of roses. This has been the gift of India to the world again and again. This happened ages before Buddha was born, and remnants of it are still left in China, in Asia Minor, and in the

1. Rabindranath, Nationalism (1950 edition), p. 58.

heart of the Malayan Archipelago. This was the case when the Greek conqueror united the four corners of the then known world. Now the same opportunity has again come; the power of England has linked the nations of the world together as was never done before"[1].

The Upanishads proclaimed as the ideal of India: *sarve bhavantu sukhinaḥ sarve santu niramayāḥ*. It is well known how Buddhism preached to the world the gospel of love, liberalism and universal brotherhood. From this metropolis in the celebrated city of Patliputra, the royal missionary Asoka issued his famous rescripts in one of which he proclaimed: ta samavaya eva sadhu—concord is meritorious". The famous Universities of India at Nalanda, Vikramasila (near Colgong in the Bhagalpur District in Bihar) and Oddandapuri (near Bihar Sharif in the Patna District) which developed as international centres of learning, not only attracted to their seminaries scholars from different parts of India, but also sent out Savants well versed in different branches of knowledge as prophets of the sublime message of Indian culture and thought. Out of these Academies for higher studies and research flowed out creative currents of thought and knowledge which irrigated human minds in the most productive ways in the distant regions. Their influence was too strong to be effaced easily, and survived the political viccissitudes of centuries.

The medieval period of Indian history, marked by bitterness in political circles very much like what happened in the conflicts of interests in other ages and countries, witnessed, however, as assimilation of Hindu and Islamic civilisations, which produced brilliant effects in religion, literature, art and social habits. One of the most significant effects of this mingling was the rise of theistic movements with ideals of love and liberalism. The extent of influence of such ideals outside India is not yet fully known to us.. It is a subject which awaits patient investigations.

There is no doubt that in the modern world renaissant India has from its very dawn from the closing years of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth century played a supremely important role in holding before the world her historic ideals of international amity and world fellowship. This has happened chiefly through two sources.

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1. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. III, pp. 222-3.

In the first place, from the closing years of the eighteenth century, when India was passing through a period of intense agony due to the quickly succeeding changes in her political destiny and a havoc on her old economy, her thought and ancient lore made a splendid appeal to bands of European scholars, which served to effect a sort of cultural conquest of over many of the Western minds in Great Britain as well as in the Continental countries.[1] It is indeed a very fascinating story. In his Inaugural Address at the foundation of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Sir William Jones, a profoundly learned scholar and linguist, described India as, "a noble emphitheatre which has ever been esteemed the nurse of sciences, the inventress of delightful and useful arts, the scene of glorious actions, fertile in the productions of human genius, abounding in natural wonders and infinitely diversified in the forms of religion and Government, in the laws, manners, customs and language as well as in the features and complexions of man". "I feel in love with India", expressed Max Mullar. He observed in the Preface to his work, entitled Rammohan to Ramkrishna, "Though I have had but visions of the rivers, the mountains, the valleys, the forests and men and women of India, having never been allowed to visit that early paradise, I have known for many years the beauties of its literature, and bold flights of its native philosophy, the fervid devotion of its ancient religion and these together seem to give much truer picture of what India really was, and is still meant to be, in the history of the world than the bazars of Bombay or the Durbars of Rajas and Maharajas at Delhi". He observed in one of his lectures delivered at Cambridge in 1892 : "Whatever spheres of human mind you may select for your special study, whether it be language, or religion, or mythology or philosophy, whether it be laws or customs, premitive art or primitive science, everywhere you have to go to India, whether you like it or not, because some of the most valuable and most instructive materials in the history of man are treasured up in India and in India only".

Secondly, Message of world fellowship has been rescued from oblivion and majestically proclaimed to the world by the great apostles of awakened India, like Rammohan, Ramkrishna, Vivekananda, Rabindranath, Aurobindo and Gandhiji. Essentially Indian in spirit, all

1. Helmuth Von Glasenaff, The Influence of Indian Thought on German Science, Philosophy and Religion–(Journal of the Asiatic Society)–Letters, Vol. XXIII, 1957.

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of them have been ardent prophets of universalism and the best interpreters of Indian thought and intellect to the modern world to help in solving the crucial problem of securing harmony in international relationships.

When in the post Napoleonic period of history, the Metternich system was trying in vain to preserve the crumbling edifice of the *ancien regime* against the irresistible forces generated by the great Revolution of 1789, Rammohan who has been very rightly described by Acharya Brajendra Nath Seal as "the harbinger of the idea of Universal humanism...the humanist, pure and simple, watching the procession of Universal Humanity in Universal History", conceived of internationalism of the right type. In an intended correspondence to the Ministry of France, dated 1831, he observed : "It is new generally admitted that not only religion but unbiassed common sense as well as the accurate deductions of scientific research lead to the conclusion that all mankind are but one great family of which numerous nations and tribes existing are only various branches. Hence enlightened men in all countries feel a wish to encourage and facilitate human intercourse in every manner by removing as far as possible all impediments to it in order to promote the reciprocal advantage and enjoyment of the whole human race." Shrimati Sarojini Naidu thus emphasised this aspect of Rammohan's career in her own unique style : "For us, Indians, the river is the true symbol of our civilisation, the river that moves and moves with its epic rhythm towards the sea, carrying the tidings of life and freedom to the world. And Raja Rammohan Roy conveyed the message of this great civilisation to the world. He had no exclusion. He had the all-inclusiveness which is characteristic of the universal equality of theMission of India". As Rabindranath pointed out Rammohan "initiated us into the present era of world-wide cooperation of humanity. He knew that the ideal of human civilisation does not lie in the isolation of independence but in the brotherhood of inter-independence of individuals as well as of nations in all spheres of thought and activity".[1] We read in one of his writings : "Message of the dawn of the new age in the history of human mind today appeared in Bengal about eighty years back. In those days one country was fighting with another and one religion was in conflict with the

1. Address delivered by Rabindranath as President of the Preliminary Meeting of the Rammohan Roy Centenary, held at the Senate House, Calcutta, on the 18th February, 1933.

other; division (in human society) then reigned on the throne of scriptural injuctions and external formalism. When amidst the darkness within the walls of discord and strife Raja Rammohan Roy held before the world the light of oneness. Then he realised that India where Hinduism, Islam and Christianity were assembled together had extended her invitation to all her guests (that is those who come from outside)to sit together in one meeting in the days of remote antiquity. When the branches and sub-branches of new awakenings in the history of human civilisation in different countries spread themselves out, India again and again chanted the mantra—one, one and one. So far the lies that have appeared in the world are due only to the absence of the realisation of this sublime oneness. All the meanness, failures, and weaknesses have appeared on account of the divorce from this oneness. All great men have appeared to preach this oneness. All great revolutions have taken place to save this oneness[1]".

The Ram Krishna Mission has been a very potent force in the cultural history of the modern world and its contributions towards the promotion of the world fellowship have been remarkable with profound faith in 'oneness'.

Swami Vivekananda preached his gospel of universalism with wonderful efficacy through his soul-stirring speeches and writings. In his final address delivered at the Parliament of Religions at Chicago on the 27th September, 1893, he prescribed the following motto for the world, "Help and not fight, Assimilation and not Destruction", "Harmony and peace and not Dissension". In his discourse on '*What is Religion*' he spoke emphatically: "I am the universal. Stand up then; this is the highest worship. You are one with the universe"[2]. In another discourse on '*The Necessity of Religion*', he observed: "What is needed is a fellow-feeling between the different types of religion, seeing that they all stand or fall together, a fellow-feeling which springs from mutual esteem and mutual respect"[3]. In his lecture on 'Unity in Diversity', delivered in London, on the 3rd November, 1886, he expressed his conviction that "gradually these nations are joining, and I am sure that the day will come when separation will vanish and that

1. Rabindra Rachanavali, 14th Part, pp. 317-8.
2. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. I, p. 340.
3. Ibid, Vol. II, p. 68.

oneness to which we are all going will become manifest. A time must come when every man will be as intensely practical in the scientific world as in the spiritual, and then that oneness, the harmony of Oneness, will pervade the whole world"[1].

While replying to the Address of welcome Swami Vivekananda said "a great moral obligation rests on the sons of India to fully equip themselves for the work of enlightening the world on the problems of human existence"[2]. In his reply to the Address at Madura he observed: "It is not that we ought to learn everything from us, but each will have to supply and hand down to future generations what it has for the future accomplishment of that dream of ages—the harmony of nations, an ideal world"[3].

Swami Vivekananda wrote to a disciple from London on the 20th September, 1896 : "you must not forget that my interests are international and not India alone". He observed before a disciple in India in 1897 : "The Universal teaching that he (Shri Ramkrishna) offered, if spread all over the world will do good to humanity and to the world". In his famous Address at the Triplicane Literary Society, Madras, he boldly asserted: "Spirituality must conquer the West. Slowly they are finding out that what they want is spirituality to preserve them as nations. The whole of the Western world is on a valcano which may burst tomorrow, to pieces tomorrow. They have searched every corner of the World and have found no respite. They have drunk deep of the cup of pleasure and found its vanity. Now is the time to work so that India's spiritual ideas may conquer the World".[4] He wrote in his reply to the Calcutta Address written from New York on 18th November, 1894, to Raja Priya Mohan Mukherji, President of the Public Meeting held on the 5th September, 1894, at the Calcutta Town Hall: "Give-and-take is the law; and if India wants to raise herself once more, it is absolutely necessary that she brings out her treasures and throws them, broadcast among the nations of the earth, and in return be ready to receive what others have to give her. *Expansion is life, contraction is death. Love is life, and hatred is death.* We commence to die the day we began to hate the other races; and nothing can prevent our death unless we

1. Ibid, p. 188.
2. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. III, p. 139.
3. Ibid, p. 171.
4. Ibid, p. 277.

come to expansion which is life. We must mix therefore with all the races of the world". "Know, Rajaji", he spoke to the Maharaja of Khetri, "the greatest of all truths discovered by your ancestors, is that the universe is one."[1]

An equally firm conviction about international fellowship reigned in the mind of Shri Aurobindo. 'Our ideal of Swaraj', observed this saint-patriot of India in 1909, "involves no hatred of any other nation nor of the administration which is now established by Law in this country; we find a bureaucratic administration, we wish to make it democratic; we find an alien Government, we wish to make it indigenous; we find a foreign cotrol, we wish to render it Indian. They lie who say that this aspiration necessitates hatred and violence. Our ideal of patriotism proceeds on the basis of love and brotherhood and it looks beyond the unity of the nation and envisages the ultimate unity of mankind. But it is a unity of brothers and free men that we seek, not the unity of master and serf, of devourer and devoured." In his message on the inauguration of Indian freedom on the 15th August, 1947, Shri Aurobindo expressed : "August 15 is the birth-day of free India. It marks for her the end of an old era, the beginning of the new age. But it has a significance not only for us, but for Asia and the whole world; for it signifies the entry into the comity of nations of new power with untold potentialities which has a great part to play in determining the political, social and cultural future of humanity. For I have always held and said that India was arising not to serve her own material interests only, to achieve expansion, greatness, power, prosperity though these too she must not neglect— and certainly not like others to acquire domination of other peoples, but to live also for God and the world as a helper and leader of the whole human race."[2]

The architect of our freedom, Mahatma Gandhi, appeared also as the greatest prophet of modern humanity. Love of humanity was indeed the most burning passion of his soul. In him there was a most wonderful reconciliation between nationalism and internationalism.

"Indian nationalism", as he said, "is not exclusive, nor aggressive nor destructive". "My idea of nationalism", he once observed, "is that my country may become free, that if need be the whole of the

1. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. IV, p. 327.
2. Sisir Kumar Mitra, Shri Aurobindo and Indian Freedom, pp. 15-6.

country may die so that the human race may live. There is no room for race hatred here. Let that be our nationalism". "I do want to think", he emphatically expressed, "in terms of the whole world. My patriotism includes the good of mankind in general. Therefore my service of India includes the service of humanity. ....Isolated independence is not the goal of the world states. It is voluntary inter-dependence. The better mind of the world desires today not absolutely independent states warring against one another, but a federation of friendly inter-dependent states. The consummation of that event may be far off. I want to make no grand claim for our country. But I see nothing grand or impossible about expressing our readiness for universal inter-dependence rather than independence. I desire the ability to be totally independent without asserting the independence. Patriotism based on love giveth life."

Fully conscious of the numerous evils which Imperalism in modern times has inflicted on mankind, he considered it to be "a negation of God," and felt that "the greatest menace to the world to-day is the growing exploiting, irresponsible Imperialism".

Political opportunism or hatred for any power had no place in his mind. "I will not", he said, "hurt England or Germany to serve India," and also observed, "I do not want India to rise on the ruins of other nations." He preached and practised his unique cult of universalism and toleration even in moments of grave international crisis, and had instinctive sympathy for the struggling democracies of the West in the face of Nazi aggression. When on England's declaration of war against Nazi Germany on 3rd September, 1939, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, Lord Linlithgow, declared that India also was at war with Germany, Mahatmaji after his first interview with the Viceroy made the following significant statement on the 5th September, 1939:

"Having, therefore, made my position *vis-a-vis* the Congress quite clear, I told His Excellency that my own sympathies were with England and France from the purely humanitarian standpoint. I told him that I could not contemplate without being stirred to the very depth, the destruction of London which had hitherto been regarded as impregnable. And as I was picturing before him the Houses of Parliament and the Westminister Abbey and their possible destruction, I broke down. I have become disconsolate. In the secret of my heart, I am

in perpetual quarrel with God that he should allow such things to go on. My non-violence seems almost impotent. But the answer comes at the end of the daily quarrel that neither God nor non-violence is impotent. Impotence is in men. I must try on without losing faith even though I may break in the attempt.

And so, as though in anticipation of the agony that was awaiting me, I sent on July 23, from Abbottabad the following letter to Herr Hitler : 'Friends have been urging me to write to you for the sake of humanity. But I have resisted their request because of the feeling that any letter from me would be impertinence. Something tells me that I must not calculate and that I must make my appeal for whatever it is worth. It is quite clear that you are today the one person in the world who can prevent a war which may reduce humanity to the savage state. Must you pay that price for an object however worthy it may appear to you to be ? Will you listen to the appeal of one who has deliberately shunned the method of war not without considerable success ?'

'Any way I anticipate your forgiveness, if I have erred in writing to you.'

How I wish that even now he would listen to reason and the appeal from almost the whole of thinking mankind not excluding the German people themselves. I must refuse to believe that the Germans contemplate with equanimity the evacuation of big cities like London for fear of destruction to be wrought by man's inhuman ingenuity. They cannot contemplate with equanimity such destruction of themselves and their own monuments. I am not therefore just now thinking of India's deliverance. It will come, but what worth will it be if England and France fall, or if they come out victorious over Germany ruined and humbled ?

Yet it almost seems as if Herr Hitler knows no God but brute force and as Mr. Chamberlain says, he will listen to nothing else. It is in the midst of this catastrophe without parallel that Congressmen and all other responsible Indians individually and collectively have to decide what part India is to play in this horrible drama".

In an article published in the *Harijan* of 11th September, 1939 Mahatma Gandhi expressed : "my sympathy for England and France is not a result of momentary emotion, or in common language of hysteria.

It is derived from the never-drying fountain of non-violence which my breast has nursed for fifty years." Mahatma Gandhi believed that salvation for the bewildered and tormented world lay through right-mindedness, liberalism and humanitarian attitudes, for the growth and diffusion of which no other country would be so marvellously fitted as a free India." "India awakened and free", spoke Mahatmaji, "has a message of peace and goodwill, to give to a groaning world." "I would like to see India free and strong", he again observed, "so that she may offer herself as a willing and pure sacrifice for the betterment of the world". In answering a question at the Inter-Asian Relations Conference, held at Delhi in April 1947, Mahatmaji said, "I would not like to live in this world if it is not to be one." I should like to see this dream realised in my life time. In her closing Address at this Conference, Shrimati Sarojini Naidu thus referred to the message of Mahatma Gandhi and our country to the world: "Love and foregive, love and create, and love and be free. This is the message of India, take that message of Gandhi to your country."

To the sage of Shantiniketan Gurudev Rabindranath, the world owes an incalculable debt for propagation of the ideal of universalism in its truest sense. His Viswabharati stands as a grand monument of his cult of human brotherhood, promotion of which was one of the dearest objects of his heart and for which he has left a rich legacy of inspiring messages through his numerous writings. He observed in his essay on "*Nationalism in India*": "There is only one history—the history of man. All national histories are merely chapters in the larger one. And we are content in India to suffer for such a great cause. Man will have to exert all his power of love and charity of vision to make another great moral adjustment which will comprehend the whole world of men and not merely the fractional groups of nationality."[1] He spoke in 1915: "The hope and aspiration that Indian culture alone would solve at the present age, the problems and complexities of the varied phenomena that have appeared gradually in human history find eloquent expression today in a unique manner in the voice of mankind throughout the universe."[2]

Rabindranath always emphasised the cosmopolitan nature of Indian culture with its immense assimilative potentiality and had a

1. Rabindranath, Nationalism (1950 ed.), pp. 101-2.
2. Rabindra Rachanavali, 16th Part, pp. 377-8.

robust optimism about the marvellous role it was destined to play in reorienting human thoughts and outlook on rational lines for the betterment of the lot of man in the universe, which was one and the same for all.

"The same stream of life", wrote Rabindranath, "that runs through the world and dances in rhythmic measures".

It is the same life that shoots in joy through the dust of the earth in numberless blades of grass and breaks into tumultuous waves of leaves and flowers.

It is the same life that is rocked in the ocean-craddle of birth and death, in ebb and in flow.

I feel my limbs are made glorious by the touch of this world of life".

Rabindranath desired a lofty place for India, free from slavery, unreason and obscurantism, so that she might be on a better path for service of the world. Thus we read in his ***Naividya*** :

"Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high
Where knowledge is free ;
Where the world has not been broken up into fragments by narrow domestic cells ;
Where words come out from the depth of truth ;
Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection ;
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way into the dreary desert sand of dead habit;
Where the mind is led forward by thee into ever-widening thought and action.
Into the heaven of freedom, my father, let my country awake".
(Poet's translation)

With a true awakening India would embrace the world in her time-honoured ways. Thus he wrote in his immortal work, Gitanjali :

"O Heart of music, awake in this holy place of pilgrimage,
In this land of India, on the shore of vast humanity
Here do I stand with arms outstretched to salute man divine.
And sing his praise in many a gladsome paean.
These hills that are rapt in deep meditation,
These plains that clasp their rosaries of rivers,

3

Here will you find earth that is ever sacred,
In this land of India, on the shore of vast humanity.
We know not whence and at whose call, these myried streams of men,
Have come rushing forth impetuously to lose themselves in the sea.
Aryan and Non-Aryan, Dravidian and Chinese,
Scythian, Hun, Pathan and Moghul, all, all have merged into one body.
Now the West has opened her doors, and they are all bringing their offering.
They will give and take, unite and be united, they will not turn away.
In this land of India, on the shore of vast humanity.
Come Aryan, Non-Aryan, Hindus, Mussalmans, come,
Come Ye Parsees, O'Christians, come Ye one and all.
Come Brahmins, let your hearts be hallowed by holding all men by the hand.
Come all Ye who shunned and isolated, wipe out all dishonour.
Come to the crowning of the Mother, fill the sacred bowl,
With water that is sanctified by touch of all,
In this land of India, on the shore of vast humanity".

AMIR KHUSRAW AND MUSIC

BY

PROF. S. H. ASKARI,

Indian Muscic has a brilliant history of its own, and is said to have had a continuous development since the Vedic times. But there has been many phases of this development, and Indian Music seems to have undergone many changes before reaching its present stage. What was at first one and the same developed into apparently two separate schools or systems of music, known by the names of the Hindustani or Northern and Karnataki or Southern schools. Some say that the ancient or Sanskrit musical heritage has been better preserved in the Southern rather than in the Northern musical system because the South was comparatively immune from the exotic, that is the Arabo-Persian system, which the Muslims brought with them to India. This is disputed by others and Mr. Alain Danielou goes to the length of questioning the eminence of the foreign culture and even denying altogether the Persian influence on Northern Indian Music: "The oft-repeated[1] assumption that Northern Music evolved under Persian influence is obviously meaningless for one can vainly search in Persia and the whole of the Middle East for anything which could justify the possibility". Perhaps all will not agree with this bold assertion. For H. G. Farmer has shown in his books[2] and articles how old and developed Arabo-Persian music was at the time when the foreign and indigenous cultures came into contact with each other. Cultural interchange is usually not one way process, and it is futile to deny the force of reciprocal influences.

But we have to get down to concrete facts in dispute on the basis of firsthand, original and contemporary or near-temporary sources about the contributions of the early Muslims who are credited by many with having taken a liking for, adopting, patronising and popularising Indian Music. This should especially be the case with the 13th Century Turkish noble and savant, Amir Khusraw who being the son

1. Journal of the Indian Music Academy, Madras, Vol. XIX, P. 169.
2. Historical Facts for the Arabian Musical Instrument, Music and Musical Instruments of the Arabs; the Old Persian Musical Modes, J.R.A.S. 1926. History of Arabian Music: Studies in Oriental Musical Instruments. Papers published in J.R.A.S. Madras.

of an Indian mother was so very eulogistic of men and things Indian and who spoke of himself as the 'Parrot of Hind.' He was not only "one[1] of the most prolific poets that the world has ever produced", but has also been regarded as the most noted musicologist in the court of Alauddin Khilji, and his immediate predecessors and successors and as one of the earliest and the greatest exponent of a common and mixed culture. A good deal of traditions has gathered round his musicianship, both on the theoritical and practical sides. Are we justified in accepting at its face value all that the traditional account tells us about his innovations, modifications and contributions ?

Let us realise the exact position and assess the extent and value of his achievements in respect of melodic and rhythmic notes, forms and instrumentation in the light of what we find in his own writings, both prose and poetical. To understand better the claims that have been put forward on his behalf for giving an Arabo-Persian orientation to the indigenous Indian system and helping the establishment of what has been called Indo-Islamic music, it is worthwhile to consider very briefly, as a lay man, the chief features, nature and elements of the classical system of India which Amir Khusraw is supposed to have influenced.

Few nations of the world can claim to have such hoary and continuous traditions about the tastes for, and contributions to, the science of sweet sounds and the skilled knowledge of and performance on musical instrument envented to enhance the vocal charms, as the Indians. The well-preserved traditions about the Vedic Shlokas chanted in sweet sonorous plaintive but dignified voices by the ancient Indians to the accompaniment of the sacred Been or Vina (a kind of flute) which sent forth streams of rhapsody tell us not only of the antiquity but also of the source and nature of early Indian music. Music was regarded by the ancient Hindus as sacred and of Divine origin, religious and devotional rather than secular, profane and professional and not a mere source of enjoyment which was the case with that of the Muslims and others. Public concert was scarce as music of India has been essentially individualistic—a solo work. It has existed either as the devotional music of the temple or as chamber music of the aristocratic circles. The time-honoured legacy still persists, and we have many relics of the former times in the present

1. Elliot and Dowson's History of India as Told by its Own Historians, Vol.III.

system of Indian music, both vocal and instrumental. Sacred verses are still set to music and sung in cadence with beats of hand on Cymbals or with plectrums or finger-strokes on other bowed and stringed instruments in temples, or on sacred and ceremonial occasions and in social festivities, functions and performances. One can still get echoes of the old grāma, Mūrchanā, Jāti system which evolved out into the Sargam (gamut) Saptak (the scale of 7 notes) abridged gamut as, Sā, Re, Gā, Mā, Pā, Dhā Ni and 22 Śrutis 36 Rāgas and Rāginīs (melodic modes), 12 Svara or Sura (7 Śuddha and 5 Komala. Tones and Notes), Tāl (beats and time-measurement), Dhun (tunes), Alap (slow prelude to singing), Lay (symphonic or rhythmic modulations). Modifications and developments came with the march of time as a result of free and frank initiative enjoyed by the artists in their intellectual progress for melodic improvisations. There was no bar to the creation of new Ragas or melodic modes. The 'Jāti Gāen' of the ancient theorist and composer[1] Bharat was replaced by the Ragas of the times of Mātaṅga, Sāraṅgadhara, Somanātha etc. The 18 Jātis or fundamental harmonies receded into the background and the original 6 Ragas each with 5 or 6 Rāginīs or Bharias, and 48 Putras or Putrīs came in. These melodies were composed, fixed and classified according to particular seasons of the year and different periods of the day and night. Not only the melodic notes or Ragas which are a basic feature and an out-standing contribution of Indian Music, but also the musical scales increased at the hands of the musicians. The seven sounds or notes of the Saptaka originating in the Vedic aceent and called the Śuddha were augmented with five Vikṛta or Komala Svaras giving in all 12 Notes. There was also a number (21) of semi-tones called Mūrchanās[2] which were distributed over the various Rāgas and were made use of like what is done at the present time with the Thats, the source of the Rāgas. Then there was the relative position of the series of musical notes and the practice of combining sounds in different

1. The earliest detailed exposition of Indian Musical Theory is found in a Treatise called Nāṭya Śāstra, said to have been composed by the Sage Bharata. The date of the books is usually accepted as the early part of the 6th century. It contains a detailed exposition of svaras, Śrutis, Grāma, Mūrchanā, Jātis, (Popley's Music of India, p. 12) Sāraṅgadhara. The author of Saṅgīta Ratnākara, lived in the former half of the 13th century 1210-1247). Mātaṅga flourished in the 5th century A.D. Somanātha's work is dated 1609 A. D.

2. See Popley's Glossary of Musical Words and Phrases.

pitches, high and low, and sliding from notes to notes. We may also refer in passing to the four principal systems or Matas of music which Mirza Khan, the 17th Century author of Tohfat-ul-Hind, mentions probably on the authority of Somnātha who described them in his treatise, Rāga Vivodha or the Doctrines of the Musical Modes.

It is for the experts and the learned to say something about the nature, extent and prevalence of all these multifarious developments at the time of Amir Khusraw. We have to ransack his own writings to justify the assumptions about his awareness of the distinctive features of the classical system of Indian Music and about his contributions to the composite growth of Indian Cultures. Doubtlessly he gives ample proofs of his knowledge of and infatuation for the Arabo-Persian system of music[1], but he is completely silent about his own alleged innovations or assimilative efforts. He makes no mention of Sehtar (Sitar)[2] or the type of guitar (with three strings) or Tabla (small tambourine) nor of the Modes and Airs of a composite character such as Khiyāl, Qauls, Qalbanas, Naqsh, Nigār, Sanam, Ghanam, *Zilaf*, Ghārā, Sāzgiri, Aiman, Farodast etc., which a very late writer, Faqirullah, the author of Rāga Darpaṇa[3] attributes to him. Instead of referring even to a single ancient Indian theorist, his principles, practices, ideals and abiding legacies, he makes mention of Bārbad and Nikisa, the celebrated court ministrels and composers of the Sāssānid King of Persian, Khusraw Parwaiz (590-628 A.D.), and there is also a casual reference in the Risāil to Safiuddin Abdul Momin (D. 692=1294), the famous theorist of the systematic school of Eastern Arabs. Abdul Momin's treatises, Risālat-i-Sharafia and Kitāb-ul-Adwār have served as their principal authorities by the subsequent musicians. Amir Khusraw's long discourse in Risāil-i-Ijaz Khusrawi" entitled' "Inshiāb-i-Usul-o-Fero-i-Mausiqi' (Ramifications of the Roots or the fundamentals of the art of Music and their derivative

1. Music and Musical Instruments by Cap. C. R. Day, p. 14. The captain is not fair in his remarks about the responsibility of the Muslims for the deterioration and decay of Indian arts p. 14.
2. The Word Sitār as a musical instrument was not new in the time of Amir Khusraw. Nizāmi Ganjawi whose famous Khamsa Amir Khusraw tried to imitate writes in his Khusraw Shirin "Sitār-i-Bārbad Āwāz midād-Sama-i-Arghanun rā Saaz midād" (The sitār of Bārbad sent out its melodie notes kept itself in tune or harmony with the arghanun or organ).
3. Referred to by O. C. Gangoli in his Ragas and Rāginis, on the basis of Shibli's statement in Sher-ul-Ajam.

modes) has of course something about men, methods and things essentially Indian, as we shall see hereafter, and in his Masnawi, named Nuh Sipihar[1] (Nine Spheres) he pours forth his eulogium on Indian Music which he considered to be superior to that of the rest of the world. But in his two other Masnavis, Ishqia (love episodes of Khizr Khan and Deval Devi) and Qirān-us-Sāadain (Meeting of the Two Propitious Stars) all that we get is the Arabo-Persian descriptive terminology for Musical instruments, modes and notes. The Sāz or Ālat[2] (instruments) mentioned by him are Chang, Duff, Rabāb, Nāī, Tambur, Barbat, Rud, Ud, Tabla, Tāsā, Duhals, Karna, Nafir, Shahnāī etc. and the terms 'saut' (sound or verse set to music) 'Lehn' (Mode or melodies) 'Naghama' (melodic modes) 'Parda' (airs or tones) which he frequently makes use of give us an idea of the foreign culture sources with which he was saturated. The Hindi term 'Tāl' loses its meaning of time measurement and becomes in Amir Khusraw's Āshiqa a Persian word meaning an instrument[3] which was a sort of cymbal with bell metal and played with a stick. What attracts us more in Āshiqa is the mention of a few Indian instruments and artists but this also does not help us much. As regards the story of Amir Khusraw getting the coveted epithet of Nāyak because he outshone the celebrated southern musical savant, Gopal Nayak[4] in a poetic competition held for a number of days in the court of Alauddin Khilji, there is no reliable record to support it.

Amir Khusraw was justly famous for his poetic talents and effusions. But he was a man of versatile genius, aesthetic taste and many-sided activities. He was undoubtedly well-versed in liberal sciences including music. Poetry and Music went hand in hand and both evoked emotions. People set poetry to music so as to produce

1. Edited and published by Dr. Wahid Mirza. The Mirza's doctoral thesis entitled Amir Khusraw His Life and works gives the traditional view based on Rāga Darpaṇa.
2. Some more such as *Miskak, Nawālak, Bāilak, Bābagak, Chuma,* (now obsolete) *Dastak-i-Oawwal, Dastāh-i-Khishti, Dam-i-Surua Damdama-i-Nai, Tabira-i-Hind or Naggaro Kangari Duhal, Dholak,* have been mentioned in the Risāil. Amir Hasan, a great poet and a boon companian of Amir Khusraw has made mention of some of the instruments then in use in his Diwān.
3. "Digar Sāz-i-Beranjin Nāme-i-Āan Tāl—Nar angushte Pari Ruyān-i-Qattāl", p. 156.
4. Vide two articles on Gopal Nayak in J, I.M A., Madras.

the charming melodic notes and tones. There are[1] many Ghazals in Qirān-us-Sāadain and Ashiqa which, according to the author's own statement, were given to ministrels who tuned their verses and sang. Let us see what he says about the two. He had reasons to give preference to poetry on music as we find in the following verses, incorporated in his Kulliāt: (1) The Musician said "Oh Khusraw! the storehouse of poetry, the science of music is better than the poetic art (2) For the subtleties of this science are too difficult to be brought within the ken of pen, whereas it is not so difficult to put that (poetry) down on paper and in books. (3) I replied that I claim perfections in both, and have weighed and tested them in the scale as is due to them. (4) I have already written three volumes of poetry, and if you believe me, I can write three books on music too. (5) I do tell you the difference between the two in a way which is reasonable and correct and this can be justly appreciated by one who has expert acquaintance with both. (6) You should take it that the poetry is complete in itself, and does not depend on listening (Sama) nor on the voices of the ministrels. (7) If any one can recite verses with fine soft sound and the deepest tone (Ziro-Bam), it is permissible for there would be no loss or deficiency either in the meaning or in words. (8) On the other hand much as the singer may make use of "Haun[2] Haun" and "Hān Hān", as there is no poetic sense or eloquence in it, the whole of that would be meaningless and rotten. (9) In this sense the musician who requires sound and listening (Sama or audience) is in need of the verse-maker. (10) Look at the dancer who makes sound but has no speech-

1. "Guft Hami Zahra-i-Barbat Zanash—In Ghazal-i-Tār Ze Zehan-i-Man Ast" (The venus like Barbat player recited the beautiful Ghazal composed by me) "In Ghazal Az Mutrib-i-Mauzun Osul-Yāfta Dar Gosh-i-Humayun Qabul" etc.

2. In the preface of Ghurratul Kamāl we get this, among other things. In order to display the beauty of the bride of poetry, twelve screens (*Parda* or musical notes) have been stretched along (extracted from) the fine and thin silken chords fastened to the pegs of the *Rabāb*. If no trace of poetry is found in the woven structure of the silken chords of the *Chang* no one will take it to be complete or perfect, as there will be nothing worth except a simple sound and modulation. How fine is the utility of poetry that the science of silken chord (Music) despite its fineness (intricacies) is indescribable by pen and without being supplemented by it, it remains a mere melodic note (*lahn*). Every song which is not adorned with meaning and significance by poetry is absurd and nothing but *Hāan* and *Hāan*, *Hun* and *Hun*.

and therefore he is dependent for his speech (singing) on some body else. (11) Consider poetry to be like a bride and music as her ornaments. There is no blemish if the beautiful bride is without ornaments. (12) I would consider him as a real man who knows (appreciates) what is worthy and valuable, and if he does not know this he should ask me about it. If he does not do that he is a donkey."

Amir Khusraw's claim of proficiency and perfection in both poetry and music may not be questioned. That he wrote at least two other volumes of poetry afterwards which give us an idea of the time, he penned the above lines. Did he write a book on music and was it lost ? Certainly he did not consider music as a Malāhi or the forbidden pleasure as was laid down by the Islamic purists. He was a Sufi and a devoted disciple of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia who was well known for his fondness of music. Amir Khusraw had a very high notion about the attainments of the Indians, including their incomparable skill in music. Among the many points of superiority which the Indians enjoyed over the people of rest of the world, enumerated by him in his Masnawi, Nuh Sipihr, one was music.

He writes: (1) The 8th argument is that our sweet melodies are like the fire which burns the hearts and the souls (mind). (2) Nothing in this world known to us is similar to this (music) and this is not hidden from anybody that there is no such thing in the whole world. (3) Many musicians came from every direction and they also brought with them their excellent styles. (4) All of them took up this fine art and the intelligent ones amongst them (swift-paced onces ran fast) learnt it quickly. (5) To some extent they acquired it and thus they added something to their skill. (6) Although coming within the boundary of India they stayed here for more than 30 or 40 years, (7) yet they had not the capacity to warm themselves up (grapple with the principles thoroughly) by a single soft sound (Note) on account of their cool temperament. (8) The 9th argument is that the arrow-like swift soft sound strikes the heart of a wild antelope in such a way as it does not realise it. (10) As soon as the refreshing sound enters into the ears of the antelope, it is affected by it without being conscious of it. When it can not overcome its consciousness, the arrow strikes it. (11) It becomes transfixed without the use of bow and arrow and that very moment it gives up its life on account of the musical stroke.

4

It is unfortunate that Amir Khusraw, despite his great appreciation of Indian music, gives us little positive information about its nature and elements. Referring to the festivities held in the court of the young voluptuous grandson and successor of Balban, Sultan, Qaiqobad, the historian, Barni, tells us that "skilful musicians who are experts in the Persian and in the Indian Music (Pārsi wa Hindavi) set their songs in accord with every melodic note (Parda) and sing the praises of the Sultan." Amir Khusraw refers to the Osul or Principles and to the 12 Pardas, 6 Abraishams (tones or notes or melody and bars string of musical instruments) etc. But he does not explain what he meant by the 'Osul' and 'Fu' nor does he enumerate the names of the 12 Pardas or their off-shoots and says nothing about their nature. But we get much in his writings about the Arabo-Persian notes and instruments In fact we can get an idea of the nature, shape. and structure of the. musical instruments and the names of the prevalent Persian Pardas or Maqāmāts which were analogous to the Indian Rāgas, from his writings.

We may consider here some of the verses which occur in the Āshiqa: "(1) By every melodic note a man may die and may come back to life, for each one is capable of killing and restoring life. (2) Rythmic melody sent forth its voice to the Venus and the *Nawā* (sound) is a thing that gives and takes away life. (3) The bass string of the instrument (Abraisham) dispersed *Nawā* (Note) in the *Hawā* (air) and the bird flying in the air was brought down under halter. (4) As on account of the sound produced by it the harp (*Chang*) is the king of all musical instruments, it fastened its chord wood (*Tār*) with hair at ten-places. (5) In one of its legs the hair comes down to the earth, while the other leg is without hair-like palm of the hand. (6) The vein and hair are tied on both sides in such a way that you might say that hair has grown out of the vein. (7) The whole of '*Nai*' (flute) has become throat and windpipe. It is like an organ of Rum made by an Ethiopean. (8) It is black and yellow and a peculiar type of bow. A greenish thing has come out of an ebony wood. (9) The Tambourine (*Duff*) is like a strong fort because of its wall. The enclosure is of wood and its courtyard is made of parchments. (10) It is ever revolving between its handles. It is a peculiarly moving castle. (11) When the *Duff* player started playing on the instrument he effaced its surface with the stroke of his nails. (12) Look at the clear difference between the harp (*chang*) and the barbaton (*Barbat*). One is

swollen-headed and the other is meek and submissive. (13) When the string (*Rud*) of the *Barbat* sent out the sound, the duck-shaped flask was constantly weeping out blood (sounding plaintive notes). (14) The pandora (*Tumbura*) is heavy-headed (self-conceited) owing to its pumpkin. It is wallowing but is neither drunk nor is intoxicated. (15) After the fashion of the Hindus a variety of melodic hymns (Mazāmir), assuming several forms, enraptured the souls through the lowest and the highest strings (*Bam-o-Zir*). (16) The veins (strings) of *Alāwan*[1] (?) were extended beyond its body. The gourd (Kadu) is at the back and the veins are without blood. (17) Mark the novelty that it has placed the gourd on itself but lets out blood from the eyes of the audience. (18) There is an another brass instrument named *Tāl* (a sort of cymbol) with bell metal handled by the fingers by fairy-faced damsels of ravishing charms. (19) The two brazen bell metals or heroes (*Ruin Tan*) facing each other on the fighting ground looked like the two sides of the scale in Persian *Duff*, beaten with strokes. (20) When the Hindi *Tambuk*[2] (?) emitted its plaintive notes the *Tambuk* player became its interpreter. (21) The *Ajab-i-rud*[3] (?) shows its teeth from behind the curtain. Its life is like a *Nai* and its mouth is all smile. (22) The Indian melodic note (Lahn-i-Hindwi) has caused the Venus to lose its senses and Mars has forgotten its language (of machination). (23) The miracle-working fairy-faced Indian ministrel opened the door of frenzy through her (musical melody). (24) While she held the *Tāl* (cymbal) in a hand like a cup she became intoxicated by her own singing and not through the use of wine. (25) With pleasant tunes emitting from their lips the beautiful ones moved round and looked up in quick succession, beating their legs on the ground. (26) Their fine ensnaring Deogiri apparel looks like a shadow which captures the figures (bodies) of the fairies. (27) Some are attired in silken garments and their faces are like fine painted silk. It seems that the hair has entered the body of the silken body. (28) Merrily

1. The excess wire strings kept within the instrument. In Huh Siphar and Ijaz-i-Khusravi Amir Khusraw mentions Alāwan as an instrument. There is a descriptive line in Ashiqa "Alāwan rā Rag az Andām Birun-Kadu Par Pusht-o-Raghā-i-be Khun".
2. Is it tombi, the favourite instrument of the jugglers and snake charmers described by Popley. p. 180 ? Ghiyas-ul-Lughat tells us that Tumbuk was a small Drum (*Duhul*) which the Indians call Tabla (Tambourine).
3. Sometimes it means an instrument and sometimes musical sounds emitted by such instruments as *Chang* and *Rabāb*.

engaged in dancing the beautiful ones are playing with the breeze. It seems as if they are walking on the sound."

What the author says about music and dancing that was in vogue in his time in the above poetical piece is well worth our attention. Amir Khusraw was certainly interested in and was appreciative of the indigenous art and culture. But we have yet to discover the evidence in his own and other contemporary writings to justify the credit generally given to him for making a critical and constructive study of Indian music, synthesising that with the Arabo-Persian system with which he was thoroughly familiar, and inventing and evolving new styles of singing and new instruments. There are meaningful and graphic descriptions of lovely cup-bearers, dancers, musical instruments, tones, notes, melodies in eight pages of Qirān-us-Sāadain. We may consider some of the verses. The experts who know the forms, structure, functions of music and also the airs or melodic modulations will perhaps be able to understand and assess the value of Amir Khusraw's achievements and contributions better if what has been looked up so far in Persian is placed before them in an English garb.

First we get the description[1] of stringed instruments called *Chang*[2] (harp) "whose one leg is devoid of hair, while the hair of the other leg reaches the ground." (2) With its head cast down and also raised above the chang has its hair skilfully interwoven. (3) It is like a crescent with its head bent down. Thirty nights and thirty-days are mixed up with it. (4) It is a half arch and has four bow strings (*Zeh*). The stroke of the plectrum breaks up the hearts. (5) It is a boat of parchment with the river flowing over it, but the parchment does not become wet with the water. (6) Many notes are given birth to by the plectrum but its belly is empty up to its bottom. (7) The cover is of silk and the chord is of hair. Sometime it has silken strings and sometime luminous hair.

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1. It would be interesting to compare the description given by a younger contemporary in Basatin-ul-Uns. (See my paper in J.B.R.S., Patna) Vol. XIVIII, 1960 Pat LIV.
2. The harp which claims most respectable antiquity both in India and elsewhere was bow-shape stringed instrument. The old Indian harp was of Vina type with a gourd or gourds and the strings were struck with the fingers of the left hand. The term 'Chang' meant "bent or crooked" and this has been utilized by A. K.

This is followed by the description of another stringed or bowed instrument, the flat-chested *Rabāb*[1] (Rebec or Lyrå). (1) The soothing sound of the bowl-shaped *Rabāb* (Rebec) robs people of their heart or restores life in them. (2) The cup is empty, but it has many gifts of blessing. Many (beggerly) hands are stretched towards it bowl-like palm. (3) They feel its pulse, but it is not ill. They put a screen over it, but it is not veiled. (4) When the sharp plectrum is pared off or trimmed, it is the throat and not the sound which scratched. (5) The strings (*rud*) form the ruling lines (*Mister*) on the surface of its leaf, although melodic sounds (*sarod*) can not be inscribed or written down. (6. When it draws its sound of high pitch the note of the instrument reaches the Venus. (7) And when it emits its plaintive note which is devoid of loud noise it can not hear its own voice, although it has its ears. (8) Ass-like it is tied with the chain which is golden. What a wonder that the ass is dumb while the chord is speaking! (9) The ass usually runs away when it is pricked but this ass is sticking to its place although the lance is running over it. (10) The silken-clad child (*rabāb*) has four wires or strings, and out of these come two-six (twelve) notes (*Pardas*).

We next get the description of the wind instrument, *Nāi*[2] (reedpipe, flute or oboe) : (1) Every moment when it is blown, the cheek of the ministrel is puffed up with air like a clothes of bag or purse. (2) Although the mouth of the *Nai* is closed, yet it is very talkative. Do'nt say it is *Nai* but call it a snake because of its charm or incantation. (3) The black cobra has made its way through holes. You see one snake, but the holes are ten. (4) It is a sugar-eating (sweet voice) enchanting snake which becomes coquettish in the hands of others. (5) What a strange black thing has come out from Irāq ? It has come but its heart burns due to separation. (6) It has no mouth till you make a speech, and it has no speech till you put a note in its mouth. (7) It lays down its head before you (submit) if you breathe or blow

1. A handsome bowed instrument made of wood, with a belly of parchment. It was of several distinct types—flat-chested of the Hegaz, a long-necked globular-chested type of Egypt. The earliest viol-like Rebec were known to the Arabs long before the Prophet of Islam and have been regarded by Al. Farabi and the author of Ikh Wan-us-Safe.

2. The Arbian was *Mizmār* and Persian word *Nāi* stands for any instrument of wood-wind family of flute or reed-pipe, cylendrical or conical. There are two types of this instrument Nai Aswad or Siyah (black) and Nai Abyaz Sufaid (white) described by AK. here.

into it. It will not blow till you cut out its head. (8) When it feels disposed to produce sweet sounds, it banishes whatever is in its head. (9) The musician has control over its breath and works magic. He splits its head and again joins it. (10) Sometimes its speech (note) becomes all tongue and for producing sound its mouth becomes brimful of sweet sounds (*nawā*). (11) It opens its lips like an orator, but its tongue is in the control of the lips of others. (12) With every touch of hand it produces fresh melodies and under every finger there are hundreds of skills. (13) It is like an wooden house with pillars in the middle but for the passage of the wind inside, it is very niggardly. (14) Through the breath which the musician blows continuously there is an incessant flow of wind in its head.

We may now consider the descriptive verses relating to *Daff*[1] or *Duff* (small round tambourine) an instrument of vibrating membrance with metal plates: (1) The orbit of *Daff* has an enclosure made of wood and its area or plate is beaten by five fingers. (2) Through its circular motion the Venus comes out (of its orbit) to sing and its dome descends from the celestal globe. (3) It has ringing bells fastened here and there to its waist. Like the girdle of the firmament it displays so many grelots (*Jalājil*). (4) It is seated on the palm of the hand, sometimes being on the hand and sometimes being under it. (5) It has four tongues, two being in the mouth. It is eloquent in speech, but there is duality in its tongue. (6) All the excellent speech that it makes before its beloved is made from behind the curtain and through the skin (privately and secretly). (7) Apparently it has got two faces (sides) but when it is beaten in the face the artist makes it one-faced. (8) It has a face both on this side and that side, and it sings both from this and that sides. (9) The palm of the ministrel, according to the fine principle of the modes and tones, brings forth sometime heavy (*Saqīl*) sound and sometime light (*Khafīf*) sound. (10) Sometime moisture (sweating or perspiring) makes its skin tremble, and sometimes the flame of the sun becomes its friend. (11) Sometimes on account of dryness, it becomes very hot, and it will not emit fresh sounds (melodic notes) unless it receives water.

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1. An instrument of vibrating membrane family with metal plates or balls. The Muhammad said "Celebrate the wedding with Duff player" A rectangular or circular tambourine with a membrane on both sides of the frame beater by the hands.

The Indian and Iranian like the ancient Hebrew music being melodic and not harmonic, musical modes of melodies called variously as *Maqāmāt*, *Parda-i-Sarod*, *Nawa-i-Wa Lahn*, *Rag* or *Swara* are its outstanding features. The seven primary notes of Iran which were perhaps similar to the seven original Jātis of the Indian musicians became twelve after the time of Khusraw Perwaiz (590-628). The Arabs had also their national melodies and modes and their twelve *Naghmas* stood for notes and modes. But the airs of different countries have some distinctiveness of their own, being a reflex of moods and feelings, character and emotions of the people to which they belong and they are sometime named after the places and provinces of their origin. The twelve Maqām = Parda = Rāga had become a fixed number of notes and modes in the 18th and 14th centuries. The famous Persion poet, Badr Chach of the Tughlaq period who came just a little after Amir Khusraw says that "the basic modes are none except ten and two" (Asl Parda Bazuj Dah-o-Do neest) and he fixes each one of them to particular period of the day and night. Amir Khusraw also speaks of four Osuls, twelve Pardas, six Abraishams. The list given by these two poets and those found in works of lexicons and musical works do not wholly tally. Let us see what Amir Khusraw says in Oirān-us-Sāadain about the "description of the musical modes (Parda) and skilled knowers thereof who with every one of their hands brings forth hundreds (immense variety) of notes.

(1) The players on stringed instrument (*Rud*[1] Zanān) are all measures of fine delicate sounds and practice diligently on the silken chords. (2) They make the silken chords their life veins and bring out life from the veins at the harp. (3) This one (*Chang*) displays double colours like the cock (which produces different kinds of notes). Certainly it is cock (Murgh) but it is in the grip of the hawk (player). (4). When that one (player) emits the note of *Nawā* he becomes *Kunjishk* (sparrow), but he brings down the flying bird from the *Hawā* (air). (5) When he wanted to produce certain melodious notes he swung from the left (*chap*) to the right (*rāst*) path. (6) Sometimes when the instrumentalist plays the *Hussaini* note on his strings he displays that in a most beautiful (Hasan) manner. (7) Sometimes when the musician himself began to sing a whole world was drawn to and became en-

1. The word '*Rud*' occurs in Persian literature as the name of a musical instrument half of whose belly was of skin.

livened by note of *Nawā*. (8) Sometimes when he brought out the *Bu Salik* note the heart became like a silk-threaded pearl. (9) Sometimes he deludes the skilful artist and makes the area of *Nihāwand* too narrow for the music. (10) Sometimes with the musical notes (*naghma*) full of fresh modulations, he found his way into the land of *Bākharas*. (11) Sometimes when he hugged the *Chang* (harp) tightly to his bosom and held it in his lap the *Chang* divulged the note of *Ushshaq* (lovers). (12) Sometimes like the grief-affected lover, torn by pangs of separation, the *Nai* (lute) emitted its plaintive sounds in the way of *Iraq* note. (13) Sometimes when the player adjusted the adverse (*Mokhalif*) tone he became friendly although he sounded the *Mukhalif* note. (14) Sometimes with the full blow from the palate of the *Nai* (lute or reed pipe) it gave complete peace and happiness to *Farghāna*. (15) The *Tesi-i-Rāast* note came straight like an arrow and struck the heart of the lover who was fit to be killed. (16) The lance-wielder of *chang* who resembled *Tohamtan* (Rustam) ran his *Rakhsh* (Rustam's horse) from *Zabul* like Zaal (Rustam's father). (17) When the melodious music sentforth its fine soft and its deepest tones (*Zir-o-Bam*), it crossed from *Zir* to *Hussaini*. (18) The concert (*Zam Zama*) of *Saagari* (a soft musical air made up by *Iraq* and *Isfahān* note) in Iraq style was in accord with the Persian *Āhang* (modulation) of Iraq. (19) Every body wanted *Sāagāri* and its musical notes reached *Sipahān*. (20) Wisdom became a traveller from this manufactory (Kārgāh) and began to traverse rapidly the road towards *Bākhars*. (21) It returned to *Qaul* (a kind of song) sung by the Qawwals, sometimes in *Rāast* (full or straight) tone and sometime in *Neem Raast* (half tone). (22) The *Zanga* note produced in deep and soft sound by the plectrum became sometimes out of place and emitted the shrill sound of *Nafir* (brazen trumpet). (23) In the face of such a choice "Mantic-i-Tair" (voice of birds) in *Fakhtah* (dove) in the garden could sing according to Osul (Principles).

There are more than the twelve traditional melodic notes in the above, and yet some of the important melodies mentioned by Amir Khusraw himself in Ijāz-i-Khusravi, such as *Rehāvi*, *Muhayyar* (wrongly called Mujir and identified with Indian Todi) *Chakāwak*, *Shād-i-Rawān Marwārid*, *Arab*, *Ajam*, *Heiās* do not find a place in this poetical list. In another work, Masnavi-i-Hasht Bahisht, he again refers to the number but does not give the list. We are told that the *Barbat* player

who was so well-versed in Greek and Roman sciences, philosophy, Mathematics, Physics "took away and brought life to the body when he sounded his musical notes". He was fully acquainted with the secrets and mysteries of the melodic modes inducing laughter (*Mushik*), weeping (*mubki*), sleep (*Munawwim*) and he had fully mastered the four musical instruments (*Sāas*) and twelve musical key notes (*Parda*).

The paper having become too long, the most important and detailed observations of Amir Khusraw which cover 17 pages of his voluminous prose work on Epistolography, the above-mentioned Risāil-i-Ijāz-i-Khusravi, are to be held over for a subsequent separate treatment. Though couched in a highly rhetorical, figurative and allegorical language, the discourse is full of technical terms about music and musicians both indigenous and foreign, and it will enable us better to examine and judge the arguments for and against the traditional views about Amir Khusraw's Musicology. Though some of the men and matters mentioned may be taken as more imaginary than real, we can get a glimpse of 13th century state of things and the ideas about the musical art held in highest aristocratic circles at that distant time.

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1. Mark the underlined words which are the names of the melodic modes or Parda said to be analogous to Indian Rāgas. There is little or nothing of the Indian was them.
2. Journal of the Indian Music Academy, Madras, Vol. XIX p. 169.

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THE AUTHOR AND THE DATE OF THE KUNDAMĀLĀ

By

MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA DR. V. V. MIRASHI

The Sanskrit play *Kundamālā* was first published by Rāmakrishna Kavi and Rāmanātha Śāstri in the Dakshiṇabhāratī Series in 1923. The edition was mainly based on two fragmentary manuscripts in the Tanjore Palace Library and two similar ones in the Government Oriental Library, Mysore. The manuscripts were fragmentary and were written incorrectly. The edition had, therefore, a few lacunae. These two sets of manuscripts give the name of the author differently. The Mysore manuscripts say that the work was composed by Diṅnāga, an inhabitant of Arārālapura, while the Tanjore manuscripts give the author's name as Dhīranāga of Anūpurādha. The Editors first accepted the name of the author as Diṅnāga and printed it in their edition but later on they seem to have changed their opinion ; for they announced it as Dhīranāga in the advertisement of the work on the back side of the cover of the *Kaumudīmahotsava*, which they later edited in the same Series. No reasons for this change of opinion are known. Later, several editions of the *Kundamālā* appeared such as those by Jaya Chand Sastri, Veda Vyāsa and Bhanot, Kashinath Bhatnagar and Krishna Kumar Dhavan Sastri. In all of these, the play is ascribed to Diṅnāga. In 1935 the play was translated into Marathi by Pandit Rangacharya Raddi and Dr. R. C. Shrikhande, who also accepted the view that its author was Diṅnāga. Recently, Dr. Kali Kumar Dutt of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, has brought out a critical edition of the *Kundamālā* with an exhaustive introduction. He also has adopted the author's name as Diṅnāga. Some other scholars also, who have written on this play such as D. R. Mankad, R. V. Jagirdar and V. Varadachari, have subscribed to the same view. Dr. H. D. Sankalia has, latterly in a lengthy article, discussed the chronological relation of the *Kundamālā* and the *Uttararāmacharita*.[1] He also takes the play to be a work of Diṅnāga. So a large number of scholars are in favour of ascribing the *Kundamālā* to Diṅnāga.

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1. *J. O. I.*, Vol. XV, pp. 322 f.

As against this, some eminent scholars especially of the older generation uphold the reading Dhīranāga as the author of the *Kundamālā*. Dr. S. K. De, Prof. P. P. S. Sastri, Prof. K. A. Subrahmaniam Iyer and Dr. A. C. Woolner, who have written on the play[1] are all of the view that the real name of the author is Dhīranāga, not Diṅnāga.

Let us next consider the evidence of old Sanskrit works. The *Kundamālā* has been referred to by Bhoja (11th cen. A. D.) in his *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, but he does not give its author's name. Rāmachandra and Guṇachandra (12th cen. A. D.) refer in their *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* to the *Kundamālā* as a work of Vīranāga. Śāradātanaya (12th or 13th cen. A. D.) in his *Bhāvaprakāśa* and Viśvanātha (14th cen. A. D.) in his *Sāhityadarpaṇa*[2] refer to or quote from the *Kundamālā*, but do not mention its author's name.

So Diṅnāga, Dhīranāga and Vīranāga occur as the names of the author of the *Kundamālā* so far as the evidence of manuscripts and Sanskrit works goes. Of these, Vīranāga is likely to be due to a wrong reading of the author's name. It may be noted in this connection that the letters *va* and *dha* were closely similar in the 10th and 11th centuries A. D.; *va* had a short horizontal stroke at the top which was absent in *dha*.[3] *Vā* and *dhā* were so similar that to distinguish them, a horizontal stroke was used to join the two verticals of *dhā* but not those of *vā*.[4] In the 13th century A. D. *dha* developed a horn at the top on the left side of its vertical, which distinguished it from *va*.[5] So it is very likely that the author's name *Dhīranāga* was wrongly read by some scribes as *Vīranāga*.

Let us next consider the evidence of Sanskrit anthologies. No verses from the *Kundamālā* were noticed as cited in any anthologies. The *Subhāṣitāvalī* has the following verse (No. 3437) ascribed to Diṅnāga:—

तर्कोऽप्रतिष्ठः श्रुतयो विभिन्ना नासौ मुनिर्यस्य वचः प्रमाणम् ।
धर्मस्य मूलं निहितं गुहायां महाजनो येन गतः स पन्थाः ॥

1. For references, see K. K. Dutt's edition of the *Kundamālā* (Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series XVIII), Introduction, pp. 14-15.
2. For the dates of these authors, see P. V. Kane's *Introduction to the Sahityadarpaṇa*. (1951)
3. See the form of *va* and *dha* in plates XXIII f. in *C. I. I.*, Vol. IV.
4. See e. g. *bhūta-dhātryā* in line 3 of the Banaras plates of Karṇa, *C. I. I.* Vol. IV, pl. XXXVIII.
5. See the form of *dha* in the Bhera-Ghat Stone Inscription of Narasiṁha, *C. I. I.*, Vol. IV, pl. XLIX.

This verse, however, occurs in the Vanaparvan (Adhyāya 313, V. 317) of the *Mahābhārata* (Chitraśālā Press ed.), but K. K. Dutt points out that it is regarded as spurious in the Critical Edition of the Epic[1]. So he considers that its author may have been Diṅnāga. The last *pāda* of it is cited in the fifth *Tantra* of the *Pañcatantra* in the story of the foolish Pandits. The *Pañcatantra* was translated into Pehlavi in A. D. 570. So the verse is old, but looking to its sense and use in the *Pañchatantra*, it seems to belong to the stock of floating popular verses current in ancient times. ***Excepting this, there is no other verse, whether from the Kundamālā or any other work, ascribed to Diṅnāga in any Sanskrit anthology known so far.***[2] Dhīranāga, however, has some verses ascribed to him. The *Saduktikarṇāmṛta* of Śrīdharadāsa (A. D. 1205) has the following verse (No. II, 52, 3) ascribed to *Bhadanta* Dhīranāga :—

यास्यामीति गिरः श्रुता अवधिरप्यालम्बितश्चेतसा
गेहे यत्नवती भविष्यसि सदेत्येतत्समाकर्णितम् ।
मुग्धे मा शुच इत्युदीरिणवतः पत्युर्निरीक्ष्याननं
निःश्वस्य स्तनपायिनि स्वतनये दृष्टिश्चिरं पातिता ॥

This verse is also cited in the *Subhāṣitāvalī* of Vallabhadeva, but there it is said to be of Dhīranāga (without the epithet *Bhadanta*). That anthology includes four other verses which it ascribes to Dhīranāga (viz. Nos. 1142, 3387-3389), only one of which is ascribed to *Bhadanta* Dhīranāga and the others to Dhīranāga without the religious prefix. There is nothing Buddhistic about any of these verses. So they may have been composed by a non-Buddhist author. If he is identical with the author of the *Kundamālā*, he is not likely to have been a Buddhist as shown below.

Some verses from the *Kundamālā* have recently been noticed cited in Sanskrit anthologies under the name of Dhīranāga, Ravināga or Vīranāga, which shed welcome light on the vexed question of the authorship of the *Kundamālā*. The following verse from the *Kunda-*

1. K. K. Dutt, *Kundamālā* Introduction, p. 42, n. 155.
2. Rāmakrishna Kavi and Rāmanātha Śastri say that "in the manuscript copy of Vallabhadeva's *Subhāṣitāvalī*, which in the beginning contains a number of verses of various poets which are missing in the printed edition, the second verse of this drama (*Kundamālā*) is given under Diṅnāga." *Kundamālā* (1923) Introd., p. iii. These verses have however, not been published so far.

mālā (I, 2, being a maṅgala-śloka in the *prastāvanā*) is noticed in three anthologies viz. the recently published *Subhāṣita-ratna-kośa* of Vidyākara[1] the *Saduktikarṇāmṛta* of Śrīdharadāsa[2] and the *Prasanna-sāhitya-ratnākara* (an unpublished anthology) or Nandana.[3] It describes the mass of Śiva's matted hair.

ज्वालेवोर्ध्वंविसर्पिणी परिणतस्यान्तस्तपस्तेजसो
गङ्गातोयतरङ्गसर्पवसतिर्वल्मीकलक्ष्मीरिव ।
सन्ध्येवार्द्रमृणालकोमलतनोरिन्दोः सहस्थायिनी
पायाद्वस्तरुणारुणांशुकपिला शम्भोर्जटासंहृतिः ॥

The *Subhāṣita-ratnakośa* cites it anonymously, while the *Saduktikarṇāmṛta* ascribes it to Ravināga and the *Prasanna-sāhitya-ratnākara* to Vīranāga. As has been shown above, Vīranāga is probably a mislection for Dhīranāga and Ravināga also may be likewise. So this verse, taken as it is from the *Kundamālā,* shows that its author was Dhīranāga, not Diṅnāga. The evidence of another verse cited in the *Subhāṣitaratnakośa* (No. 764) is much more explicit and therefore far more important as it clinches the issue. The verse is as follows :—

द्यूते पणः प्रणयकेलिषु कण्ठपाशः क्रीडापरिश्रमहरं व्यजनं रतान्ते ।
शय्या निशीथकलहेषु मृगेक्षणायाः प्राप्तं मया विधिवशादिदमुत्तरीयम् ॥

—धीरनागस्य

This verse is explicitly referred to Dhīranāga in the *Subhāṣita-ratnakośa*, p. 141. It occurs in an interesting scene in the *Kundamālā* (Act IV, v. 20), in which Rāma snatches away the *uttarīya* of the invisible Sītā. As the description of the *uttarīya* in it is interesting, the verse is cited also in Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa,* but anonymously. It is also interpolated in the *Hanumannāṭaka* (IV, v. 21) and so it is attributed to Hanumat in the unpublished anthology *Prasanna-sāhitya-ratnākara*. The importance of this citation of the verse with the explicit mention of Dhīranāga as its author proves incontrovertibly that **the correct name of the author of the Kundamālā was Dhīranāga.**

Though this unimpeachable evidence about the authorship of the *Kundamālā* was available as early as 1957 in the *Subhāṣitaratna-*

1. See *Subhāṣitaratnakośa,* edited by Kosambi and Gokhale (Harward Oriental Series), p. 11.
2. *Saduktikarṇāmṛta* (Panjab Oriental Series, No. XV), ed. by Rāmāvatāra Śarmā and Haradatta Śarmā, p. 10.
3. See *Subhāṣitaratnakośa,* Introd., p. xxii and p. 11.

kośa published in the Harward Oriental Series in that year, it has been neglected by such scholars as K. K. Dutt and H. D. Sankalia, who have since then written on the problem. Scholars clung to the name Diṅnāga because 'it is a more familiar name than Dhīranāga'. This can hardly be sound reasoning.

It has thus been shown above that—

(1) The name of Diṅnāga occurs as the author of the *Kundamālā* only in two fragmentary manuscripts in the Mysore manuscript library.

(2) Diṅnāga is not known as the author of a Sanskrit poetical work, only one *subhāṣita* being ascribed to him in the *Subhāṣitāvalī* and that too being of a floating variety.

(3) Dhīranāga, on the other hand, is not only mentioned as the author of the *Kundamālā* in two manuscripts in the Tanjore Library, but is also cited as the author of several *subhāṣitas* collected in Sanskrit anthologies, two of which are taken from the *Kundamālā*. The controversy about the correct name of the author of the *Kundamālā* should now come to an end.

The Date of the Kundamālā—The question of the date of the play has also become controversal. It is in a way connected with the name of its author. Those who take Diṅnāga to be the author generally identify him with the well-known Buddhist philosopher of that name, the author of the *Pramāṇa-samuchchaya* and some other works. He is said to have flourished in the fourth or fifth century A. D. He is supposed to have been a contemporary of Kālidāsa whom he accused of plagiarism. Many scholars believe that he is referred in by Kālidāsa by means of a *double entendre* in the following verse (14) of the *Meghadūta* :—

अद्रेः शृङ्गं हरति पवनः किंस्विदित्युन्मुखीभि र्दृष्टोत्साहश्चकितचकितं मुग्धसिद्धाङ्गनाभिः ।
स्थानादस्मात्सरसनिचुलादुत्पतोदङ्मुखः खं दिङ्नागानां पथि परिहरन्स्थूलहस्तावलेपान् ॥

But, as Keith says,[1] the *double entendre* is rare indeed (in Kālidāsa's works) ; the instances of it are very few and they lend no credit whatever to the suggestion that this verse of the *Meghadūta* is an attempt obliquely to praise Nichula and damn Diṅnāga.' The *śleṣa* is not noticed by early commentators of the *Meghadūta* such as

1. *History of Sanskrit Literature*, pp. 106 f.

Sthiradeva and Vallabhadeva. It was pointed out first by Dakshiṇāvartanātha and was adopted thereafter by Mallinātha. Besides, such *śleṣa* is very unlikely. If Kālidāsa wanted to refer to his rival or vilifier Diṅnāga, he would not have used the plural number in *diṅnāgānām*. Again, the Cloud could not have brushed aside the hands of the captious critic Diṅnāga in the course of its northward flight from Rāmagiri (Rāmaṭeka near Nagpur) to Alakā; for the Buddhist philosopher was a resident of Kāñchī in South India.

Even supposing that Diṅnāga was the author of the *Kundamālā*, he cannot be identical with the homonymous Buddhist philosopher; for the former was a follower of Hinduism as he has praised the Pauranic Hindu gods Heramba (Gajānana) and Śiva in the initial verses in that play.

Even those who do not believe in this identification place the author Diṅnāga as early as the fifth century A. D. on other grounds such as the evidence of Prakrit used in the play and its imitation in plot-construction, thought and expression by Bhavabhūti in his *Uttararāmacarita*.[1] This evidence will have to be examined in detail, but the main objection to the author's contemporaneity with Kālidāsa in the praise of Heramba (Gajānana) in the *nāndī-śloka* of the *Kundamālā*. It is well known that Kālidāsa nowhere refers to Gajānana in any of his works. As Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar has pointed out,[2] there is no obeisance to that god in any inscription of the Gupta age. There is indeed a crude image of the *ūrdhva-meḍhra* elephant-headed Gaṇeśa in Cave VI at Udayagiri near Bhilsa, which contains also an inscription dated in the year 82 of the Gupta era (A. D. 401-02).[3] The image is thus described :—"The figure of Gaṇeśa in the cave is very crudely carved. It is shown nude and its elephantine face is very prominently shown suggesting the primitive feature of the god. There are no ornaments on the body of the figure, which appears to be absolutely free from symbolism."[4] On the other hand, the image of the god appears in the classic form with ornaments etc. in the temple at Bhumra constructed at the end of the Gupta period. His *devakulī* was near the porch.[5] This image shows that the worship of Gaṇeśa came

1. See K. K. Datt, *Kundamālā*, chapters IV and VII.
2. *Vaishṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems*, p. 148.
3. *C. I. I.*, Vol. III, pp. 21 f.
4. D. R. Patil, "Monuments of the Udayagiri Hill", *Vikrama Volume*, p. 412.
5. *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey*, No. 16, plate XV (a and b).

into vogue at the end of the Gupta period in *circa* A. D. 450-500. Varāhamihira (beginning of the sixth cen. A. D.) lays down directions for the form of the god in the following verse of the *Bṛhatsaṁhitā* (adhyāya 58)—

प्रमथाधिपो गजमुखः प्रलम्बजठरः कुठारधारी स्यात् ।
एकविषाणो बिभ्रन्मूलकन्दं सुनीलदलकन्दम् ॥

Dr. Sankalia says, "Recently, I noticed among the ruins of several temples of the early Gupta period at Tigowa (about 40 miles west of Jabalpur) two or three idols of Gaṇeśa, which are indeed precanonical that is before the 6th-7th century A. D."[1] The temples at Tigowa are *not* of the early Gupta period. There is one temple of the Gupta period still in a good condition at Tigowa, but it has no image of Gaṇeśa. It may be referred to about A. D. 450. As Sankalia himself has admitted, the images of Gaṇeśa discovered at Tigowa are not of the canonical type. They may be like that in the Udayagiri cave and may show that 'the god is here struggling into prominence out of his primitive obscurity.'[2] On the other hand the description of Heramba in the following *nāndī-śloka* of the *Kundamālā* is of the usual canonical type :—

जम्भारिमौलिमन्दारमालिकामधुचुम्बिनः ।
पिबेयुरन्तरायाब्धिं हेरम्बपदपांसवः ॥

Such descriptions of Gaṇeśa are noticed in Bāṇa's *Harṣacarita*[3] (7th cen. A. D.) and Bhavabhūti's *Mālatīmādhava*[4] (first quarter of the eighth century A. D.). So Dhīranāga, the author of the *Kundamālā* cannot be placed earlier than A. D. 600. This is the upper limit of the date of the *Kundamālā*.

As shown above, the *Kundamālā* has been mentioned or its verses have been cited with or without the author's name in several works such as Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, Vidyākara's *Subhāṣitaratnakośa*, Śrīdharadāsa's *Saduktikarṇāmṛta*, Sāgaranandin's *Nāṭakalakṣaṇaratnakośa*, Rāmachandra and Guṇachandra's *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* and Nandana's *Prasannasāhityaratnākara*. Of these Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* is the earliest work which cites from the *Kundamālā*. Bhoja

1. *J. O. R.*, Vol. XV, p. 323.
2. *Vikrama Volume*, pp. 412-13.
3. Ucchvāsa IV, v. 2.
4. Act I, v. 2.

flourished in the eleventh century A. D. (*circa* A. D. 1015-1055). So the date of *Kundamālā* lies between the seventh and the eleventh century A. D.[1]

Both the *Uttararāmacarita* of Bhavabhūti and the *Kundamālā* of Dhīranāga derive their plots from the Uttarakāṇḍa of the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki. There are several similarities in incidents, thoughts and expressions in these two plays. So their chronological relation has become extremely controversal. While Woolner and S. K. De place the *Uttararāmacarita* earlier than the *Kundamālā*, Bhanot, Veda Vyāsa, Mankad, K. K. Dutt, Sankalia and some others maintain the opposite view. For determining this question we shall have to examine critically the two plays. This can be done only in a separate paper.[2]

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1. This was also the conclusion of Woolner. Says he, "The author was not a contemporary of Kālidāsa, but might be dated anywhere between the seventh and the 11th century A. D." *Jasmine Garland*, Introd., pp. v f.

2. After this article was typed, I requested Dr. G. S. Gai, Government Epigraphist for India, whose Office has recently been shifted to Mysore, to verify the readings tn the Mysore manuscripts. He kindly informs me in reply as follows :—"The palm-leaf manuscript is damaged at the place where the name of the poet occurs, but the words Kaver-Diṅ[n].. are preserved. These are in the Grantha script. The other manuscript which is written on paper with an endorsement that it has been checked in 1905 gives the name of the poet as Diṅnāga only, though this name is written after scoring over the earlier reading Dadhīcināga. Whether this manuscript is copied from the other palm-leaf manuscript or whether both of them had a common source is not clear." This shows that the reading Diṅnāga of the author of the *Kundamālā* in the Mysore MSS. is extremely doubtful.

THE NARASIMHA CULT

By

D. C. SIRCAR

The theory of the Avatāra (Descent or Incarnation) of a god is based essentially on his identification with men and animals endowed, in old tales, with mysterious powers of assistance and molestation, an animal of the type being the modern tiger-god Dakṣiṇarāya of the Sundarbans in Lower Bengal. Many such divinities were identified with the god Viṣṇu at a later date[1].

The worship of the Avatāras of Viṣṇu is an important feature of Bhāgavatism in the Gupta age, the germ of the Avatāra conception having been traced in the later Vedic literature. While, however, the conception of the Vāmana (Dwarf) form associated with Viṣṇu and of the Varāha (Boar), Matsya (Fish) and Kūrma (Tortoise) forms not yet connected with the said god have been traced in the *Śatapatha* and other Brāhmaṇas, it is only in the late *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* that we have an allusion to the Narasiṁha (Man-lion) incarnation of Viṣṇu together with the Varāha. Of these two, Varāha has been the most popular Avatāra of Viṣṇu in all parts of India since the early centuries of the Christian era. But the *Mahābhārata* also points to the growing popularity of the Narasiṁha (Man-lion) form of the god[2] from about the same age.

The Nārāyaṇīya section of the *Mahābhārata* includes Narasiṁha in several lists of the Avatāras of Viṣṇu, e.g., (1) 4 Avatāras—Boar, Dwarf, Man-lion and Man (Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa); (2) 6 Avatāras—the said 4 together with Rāma-Bhārgava and Rāma-Dāśarathi; and (3) 10 Avatāras—the above 6 together with Haṁsa, Kūrma, Matsya and Kalki or Kalkin. It is well known that the number 10 for the Avatāras of Viṣṇu was gradually stereotyped in the Purāṇas, though the popular list of the 10 Avatāras consisted of (1) Matsya, (2) Kūrma, (3) Varāha, (4) Narasiṁha, (5) Vāmana, (6) Rāma-Bhārgava, (7) Rāma-

1. Cf. *The Classical Age*, ed. Majumdar, p. 415.
2. *Loc. cit.*

Dāśarathi, (8) Rāma-Saṅkarṣaṇa, (9) Buddha and (10) Kalkin[1]. The Puranic stanza giving these 10 names is quoted in a South Indian inscription of the 8th century A. D.[2], while the Daśāvatāra panel in the Sirpur Lakshmaṇa temple of the same age also represents the said 10 forms of the god Viṣṇu.[3]

The evidence discussed above would suggest that the Man-lion incarnation of Viṣṇu became popular in the early centuries of the Christian era. It is thus rather curious that writers on the history of Vaiṣṇavism have succeeded in tracing the mention of the Narasiṁha Avatāra in no inscription earlier than the Alina copper-plate inscription of the Maitraka dynasty of Valabhī in Kathiawar (Gujarat State), which was issued in the year 766 A.D.[4] It is, however, not generally noticed that the popularity of the cult of Narasiṁha is clearly indicated by a large number of personal names occurring in much earlier epigraphic records.

Just as we have in early inscriptions names like Varāha-dāsa ('slave of the Boar form of Viṣṇu)[5] or Varādinna = Varāhadatta (dedicated to the Boar') and Matsyagupta ('protected by the fish incarnation of Viṣṇu')[6], the names Sīhadata = Siṁhadatta ('dedicated to the Lion or Man-Lion form of Viṣṇu') and Sīharakhita = Siṁha-rakṣita ('protected by the Siṁha of Narasiṁha incarnation') in the Prakrit inscriptions of the first and second centuries A. D. from Sanchi, Mathura and other places[7]. A few of these records may probably be assigned even to earlier dates.

Names like Siṁhavarman ('one whose protector is the Lion or Man-lion'), Siṁhaviṣṇu ('Viṣṇu in the form of the Lion or Man-lion') and Narasiṁhavarman ('one whose protector is the Man-lion') were

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 415-16. The Puranic lists of the 10 Avatāras do not always contain the same names; e.g. the *Matsya Purāṇa* speaks of 3 divine Avatāra (viz Nārāyaṇa, Narasiṁha and Vāmana) and 7 human Avatāras (viz. Dattātreya, Māndhātā. Rāma-Jāmadagnya-Bhārgava, Rāma-Dāśarathi, Vedavyāsa, Buddha and Kalkin), while the *Harivaṁśa* omits Matsya, Kūrma, one Rāma and Buddha, but includes in their places Padma, Datta (Dattātreya), Keśava and Vyāsa.
2. Cf. *MASI*, No. 26, p. 5.
3. See *MASI*, No. 18, pp. 5-6.
4. *CII*, Vol. III, p. 188 and note 1; cf. *The Classical Age*, p. 417.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 124, 129, 134, 139, 156.
6. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXVIII, p. xi.
7. Lüders' List of Inscriptions, Nos. 48, 186, 228, 1090, etc.

popular in the Pallava dynasty of South India. The earliest name in the family of the Pallava kings is that of Sīhavamma = Siṁhavarman of the Manchikallu (Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh) inscription assigned to the fourth century A. D.[1] The founder of the greatness of the Pallava dynasty was Siṁhaviṣṇu, son of Siṁhavarman, both of whom flourished about the last quarter of the sixth century. Narasiṁhavarman I, also called Narasiṁhaviṣṇu, was the greatest of the Pallava kings, who flourished in 630-68 A. D., while his greatgrandson, Narasiṁhavarman. II (c-700-25 A.D.) was famous for his building activities. The Narasiṁha form Viṣṇu thus seems to have been a favourite deity with the Pallava dynasty, many of its rulers being Vaiṣṇavas in faith.[2]

Sewell's *Historical Inscriptions of Southern India*[3] enumerates no less than 40 kings of the early and medieval periods, who bore the name Narasiṁha. Most of these rulers flourished in South India, one distinguished king from the North in the said list being Narasiṁhagupta Bālāditya of the Vaiṣṇavite Gupta dynasty of Magadha, who reigned in the latter half of the fifth or the first quarter of the sixth century A. D. Epigraphic evidence thus points to the popularity of the Narasiṁha cult especially in South India.

Among the medieval kings of other parts of the country, who were devoted to the Man-lion form of Viṣṇu, king Lakṣmaṇasena of Eastern India is described in the epigraphic records of the Sena dynasty generally as *Paramavaiṣṇava* and particularly as *Parama-Nārasiṁha*.[4] He therefore appears to have been especially a devotee of the Narasiṁha Avatāra. It is of course difficult to say whether this has anything to do with the South Indian origin of the Sena dynasty.

Early images of Narasiṁha together with the Boar and Dwarf forms of Viṣṇu are found in the rock-cut temples at Udayagiri, Badami and Mamallapuram belonging respectively to the Gupta, Early Chālukya and Pallava periods.[5]

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1. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXXII, pp. 87.
2. Cf. *The Classical Age*, pp. 255 ff.; 175 ff.
3. See pp. 233-34.
4. Cf. N. G. Majumdar, *Ins. Beng.*, Vol. III, pp. 86, 101 (for *Paramavaiṣṇava*), pp. 95, 111 (for *Paramanārasiṁha*).
5. *The Classical Age*, pp. 425-26; T. A. Gopinatha Rao, *Elements of Hindu Iconography*, Vol. I, pp. 128 ff., Plates XXXVI ff.

INDIGO AS A FORM OF COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE IN INDIA DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

By

Dr. Jagadish Narayan Sarkar

1. Importance of Indigo Industry

"The story of the indigo industry is more entertaining historically and more pathetically instructive than that of almost any other Indian agricultural or industrial substance." (Watt).

Indigofera, the dye-yielding species, is one of 300 species of a genus of a plant grown in the tropical and warm temperate areas, of which India at one time had 40. Indigo was produced possibly from species other than the special dye-yielding species.[1]

Indigo was mentioned by the author of the *Periplus* of the 1st century A. D., by Marco Polo (1298) and the Russian Athanasins Nikitin as being associated respectively with Barbarikon on the Indus, Coilum (Quilon) and Kanbat (Cambay). But it was not referred to by Vasco Da Gama (1498), Varthema (1503) and Barbosa (1516), all of whom visited Gujrat and the west coast of Bombay. Nor was it mentioned by Babur in his Memoirs. During the second half of the 16th century it was mentioned by Garcia de Orta (1563) in western India, by Acosta (1578) in Gujrat, Barrett (1584), Linschoten (1598) in Cambay, Abul Fazl (c. 1590) at Agra.

It would appear that whatever might have been the importance of the manufacture of Indigo and the state of its production in ancient and medieval periods, it was from the commercial point of view, comparatively an unimportant industry in the 16th century depending mainly on internal use. Its manufacture, however, rose to almost unprecedented heights as a result of foreign demand, during the first half of the seventeenth century when it became a principal item of international commerce.

Indigo was needed both for internal and external consumption. It was used to dye various kinds of cloths. But it was also used to

1. Watt, *Commercial Products of India*, 668, 660.

dye the skin and hair. The refuse of indigo (seet) was often used as manure by cultivators. The indigo-yielding plant (especially the leaf) is rich in nitrogen and also contains a comparatively large amount of mineral matter, while its ash contains rather a high percentage of magnesia.[1] It is, however, not known, whether it was used for all these purposes in the seventeenth century. But it may reasonably be inferred that there was a large internal consumption of it, either as a dye or as manure or for bleaching purposes.

Indigo formed the basic material in washing and bleaching ordinary cotton cloths to a pure white colour. Thus cotton cloths were sent from the places of origin to central spots for washing e. g., Agra, Ahmadabad, Masulipattam, and certain places in Bengal probably Dacca and Qasimbazar. The Mughal Emperors maintained *Karkhanas* or factories of their own for manufacture of articles of different kinds including cotton, silks. Perhaps it was for use in the State-owned factories that indigo was seized in 1623 for 'king's use"[2].

The external consumption of indigo was due to its being used as a blue dye in the important woollen industry of western Europe, as substitute of woad, a plant growing around the Mediterranean. Hence the first European buyers in India eagerly sought indigo. The transition from woad to Indian indigo occurred about the end of the 16th century. The Portuguese carried moderate quantities of indigo from Western India to Lisbon and these were at first chiefly used in the West Mediterranean area. But they also sold them to the dyers of Holland. The rich prospects of this trade led Spain to monopolise it in 1587. The Dutch merchants were anxious to secure a more steady supply of the Indian dye. The Dutch (1601-7) at Surat considered Indigo to be the most important local product and tried to purchase it. Their success threatened to ruin the producers and merchants of woad in Germany, France and England. So import or use of indigo was made a capital offence. But Elizabethan England allowed the use of indigo along with woad. The art of indigo dyeing was learnt by England during the reign of James I (1608). It is not, therefore, surprising that early in the 17th century the English East India Company instructed its factors (1605-6) to purchase indigo from

1. Watt, 663, 679, 771; Christopher Rawson, *Report on Cultivation and Manufacture of Indigo* (1st ed.), 7-8 An indigo crop depleted the soil of much plant food. ibid.

2. Ball's Tavernier, II, 8; E. F.

Lahar (Lahore), Serchis (Sarkhej) and Belondri (Ballabi, a village 20 miles from Bhavnagar). But it was in the account of Finch (1609) that we get 'the first definite conception of the indigo industry' in India especially in the Agra-Fatehpur Sikri area. Sir Thomas Roe's description of indigo as the "prime commodity" indicates its importance in the development of East India Company's Indian trade. Indigo formed the chief lading of the *Hope* in 1615. Being in great demand in Europe for dyeing purposes, it was highly prized as an article of export[1].

2. Cultivation

Contemporary accounts of foreign travellers and factory correspondence enable us to get a clear picture of the manner of indigo cultivation and manufacture during the period under review.

(i) *Sowing* : Indigo was sown in the 'Prime June' i.e. with first rains in June, at the rate of 14 or 15 lb of seed to the bigha. With moderate rains, the crop was usually cut in three to four months' time—say by end of September or early October, (Pelsaert), in August or September after the rains (Finch), when it became fully ripe. Its leaves were round. It could not stand cold. In case of postponement of the harvest, sudden winter would destroy the colour (in manufacture ; brown without gloss). At the harvest the plants were cut a handbreadth from the ground, the stumps remaining. Plentiful grass (expensive weeding was necessary to protect the indigo roots and expedite growth) indicates heavy yield in the first crop.

(ii) *Kinds* : All contemporary sources refers to the three cuttings in two years.

Early in the 17th century—in the time of Finch and Pelsaert—the indigo crop was commonly retained. The crop once sown, used to remain on the ground for two years without being uprooted or resown. It used to yield annual cuttings, the second giving the best dye. With the extension of irrigation, a gradual change took place in agricultural practice until the crop became seasonal. The most important change was agricultural rather than industrial.

There were three kinds of crops.

(a) The first crop i.e., first year's cutting (June-October). It was called *Nauti* by Pelsaert, the Dutch factor at Agra,—brown in

1. Moreland, *Akbar to Aurangzeb*, 107-9; EP 1624-9, XXXV.

colour, coarse in quality and easily recognised by sight or touch,—more useful for dyeing woollens and other heavy goods, going further than the second crop or *jarhi* or *Ziarie.* Finch called it 'Notee'—tender, 'a weighty reddish Nill, sinking in water, not come to perfection'. Early factory correspondence mentions it as 'Newty' a good sort. The term was derived from *naudha,* young plant.

(b) The second crop i.e., second year's cuttings (October-August) was called the *jarhi* or *Ziarie*—by Pelsaert, the *Cyeree* by Finch, *Jerry* by Foster. The term was derived *jar* or root. The remaining stumps of the first year (in October) sprouted again and were cut early next August. It was superior to the *nauti* in quality, or violet infusion, lighter (Pelsaert) :—'rich', 'very light and of a perfect violet colour swimming on the water' (Finch) ; the best indigo (Foster).

To judge indigo, one had to look before midday in the sun. If pure, it would glisten like a rainbow. If sandy or dirty, the adulteration could be detected in the sunlight. Impurities were common, but these were often added wilfully to increase weight or caused by wind, if the soft balls were allowed to dry on sandy soil.

With favourable rain, the *jarhi* plants were luxuriant and three cuttings were made,—early August, early September and in October. Indigo would then be cheap.

(c) The final cutting or the last crop (August-October) called *Katel* by Pelsaert and Catteld by Finch. The stumps left after the second crop sprouted again and then cut in October. This was very bad, hard, dull, no gloss or colour, like charcoal—'Herb is declining, being a weighty, blackish *Nill,* the worst of the three' (Finch).

Speaking of these three varieties, Pelsaert wrote that *nauti* was like a growing lad, the *jarhi* a vigorous youth, and the *Katel,* a senile old man. The *nauti* was far better than the *katel* in substance and quality ; only a rupee a maund separated the *jarhi* and the *nauti* ; they were worth double the *katel.*

About Pelsaert's time many did not cut the *katel,* as though the cost of manufacture was the same for all kinds, the yield of *katel* was barely half that of *jarhi* (15 or 20 seers for each vat). So the *katel* crop was left to yield the seed for the following *nauti.* This is corroborated by factory correspondence, wherefrom we learn that

after the third cutting, the crop was allowed to grow to seed. (Foster)[1].

3. Manufacture of Indigo

The accounts of foreign travellers constitute an index to the gradual growth of the industry. A comparison of the accounts of Marco Polo (at Quilon, 1298) with those of Finch (1609), and Pelsaert (1620-6) throws light on the diversification of the manufacturing process.

Marco Polo says: "It is made of a certain herb which is gathered, and (after the roots have been removed) is put into great vessels upon which they pour water and then leave it till the whole of the plant is decomposed. They then put this liquid in the sun, which is tremendously hot there, so that it boils and coagulates and becomes such as we see it. (They then divide it into pieces of four ounces each, and in that form it is exported to our parts)".

The different stages of the preparation of the dye fit for the market from the crop in the seventeenth century in the Agra-Biana region are described below. Judging from the details it is reasonable to infer, as has been done by Dr. Habib, that it presupposed some form of co-operative enterprise among the cultivators of the villages:

(a) *Firstly*, the cuttings were placed in receptacles. Pelsaert says that the yield of one *bigha* was put into a *put* (hole, pool, pit, well or receptacle or vat) 38 ft. in perimeter, about 5-6 ft. deep). Finch speaks of a long cistern and says that the crop was pressed down with many stones. The *Letters received* also refer to a cistern of water.

(b) *Secondly*, soaking: All sources agree that the produce was steeped in water in order to enable it to absorb the substance or the dye of the herb. But they differ regarding the period of soaking. The process of steeping lasted for 'certain days' (according to Finch), for 16 or 17 hours (according to Pelsaert) and for 24 hours (according to *Letters received*).

(c) *Thirdly*, straining or refining: For purposes of refining the water was run down (i) to a lower round *put* (32 ft. in circumference and 6 ft. deep), according to Pelsaert, or (ii) to 'another round cistern,

1. Moreland and Goyl, *The Remonstrantie of F. Pelsaert*, 10-13; Foster, *Early Travels in India*, 152-3; Mundy, II. 221-3; Letters Received IV. 240-1,

in the midst of which another small cistern or centre', according to Finch.

(d) *Fourthly*, beating to enable the water to absorb the dark blue hue, the indigo was worked continuously back and forward. This was done by two three men (Pelseart) it was beat by 'men' for six hours forcibly with hands till it became blue'. (*Letters received*). According to Finch 'water being thus drawn forth, they labour with great staves, like batter or white starch'.

(e) *Fifthly*, sedimentation : After the water absorbed the colour, it was allowed to stand for 16 hours and the dye settled at the bottom of the round *put* (Pelsaert). According to Finch, after beating, the manufacturers then let it settle, scumming off the clear water on the top ; then labouring it afresh, and let it settle again, drawing forth the clear water, doing this oft, till nothing but a thick substance remain.

(f) *Sixthly*, drying : After running out the water the indigo was taken out and spread on cotton cloths and made into bales, when firm, as soap (Pelsaert) or to spread on cloth and dry in the sun (Finch). According to *Letters received* drying was done 'by degrees : first in cloths till the water be sunk from it and it be curdled ; afterwards they dry it in round gobbets'. According to Finch when the indigo was dried, and became "a little hardened they take it in their hands and making small balls, lay them on the sand to dry (for any other thing would drink up the colour) this is the cause of the sandy foot."

(g) *Seventhly*, storage : The bottom of the *vat* (or the ground under it) was spread with ashes, to help crust formation. The indigo was put into a tightly closed earthen vessel that it might not become too dry in light or wind ; indigo exposed to wind even for an hour will be drier than in the same period sunshine. The content of each *vat* (*dadera*) usually weighed 12-20 seers according to the yield, at the time of sale ; but it dried further by five seers in a maund during handling and in the bales.

These methods of manufacture described above were substantially the same as followed when the modern industry flourished.[1]

(b) *Dry Leaf Process of Manufacture* : As contrasted with the wet leaf or soak-pit manufacturing process referred to by several

1. Watt, op. cit; Pelsaert, Foster, E. T., *Letters received* IV, 241. Habib, *Agrarian System* 59n.

observers like Finch, Pelsaert in the Agra-Biana region, there was the dry-leaf process. It was found by Linschoten (1598) in Cambay and in Mandelslo in Ahmadabad in Gujrat. (a) According to Linschoten 'annil' or indigo was sown like other herbs and at the end of the season it was 'pulled (out) and dried then made wet and beaten, and so certain days after dried again and then prepared. (b) According to Linschoten the leaves were first dried in the sun and then the soaking was done. The rest of the process generally conforms to the wet leaf or Agra-Biana process. "The stalks are taken away and the leaves are set adrying in the sun, and that done, they are set asoaking, for four or five days, in a stone-trough, containing about six or seven foot water, which is ever and anon stirred, till such time as the water bath suckt out colour and virtue of the herb. That done they let out the water into another trough, where they suffer it to settle for one night. The next day, all the water is taken away, and what is left in the bottom of the trough is strained through a coarse cloth and is set adrying in the sun.

In 1646 the English factors at Surat tried an interesting experiment of manufacturing indigo themselves, evidently with hired labour. They purchased a quantity of indigo leaf and employed an experienced man to manufacture indigo. They sent a sample to the Company in January 1647. But the cost was high, Rs. 25 a maund. So they did not continue the scheme but waited for the Company's express orders'. Subsequently they seemed to have changed their mind and preferred to continue the process, in order to ensure manufacture of pure indigo and avoid purchasing from the market which was flooded with heavily adulterated indigo at Ahmadabad for the past few years. As regards the cost of production, we are told that "Tash, who had charge of the business, was confident that the cost would not exceed 19 or 19½ Rs. the maund."[1]

4. Testing of Indigo

Pure indigo, it was pointed out by Finch, had four characteristics or qualities : (i) 'a pure grain' (ii) 'a violet colour' (iii) 'gloss in the Sun' and (iv) dryness and lightness.

The purity of the dye could be tested by two processes as

1. EF. 1646-50, pp. 77-78, 189.

described by Garcia de Orta (1563) and Finch (1609) : (i) it would be so light that it may float or 'swim' on water ;

(ii) on burning it would cast 'a pure light, violet vapour and leave a few ashes, and 'no sand in the residue'. Mandelslo observes : 'The best indigo is almost of a violet colour, and hath somewhat of its smell, when burned'.[1]

5. Business Tricks.

The dealers adopted certain business tricks. Adulteration could be made either (i) by mixing the three crops together or (ii) by mixing pure indigo with dirt or sand or earth, and by pouring oil to such adulterated dye to enable it to float in water. The first trick was referred to by Finch and Pelsaert, the latter also prescribing remedies to counteract it. Finch remarks : "Some deceitfully will take of the herb of all three crops and steep them altogether, hard to be discerned, very knavishly'. Pelsaert not only refers to the trick but also its counterpoise. The *Katel* was bought from the sellers at half price and powdered with sticks. It was mixed with *jarhi* and *nauti* and made into bales. This was to be watched when opening the sacks and in the pots. The man buying in sacks or bales must want powdered *katel* or inferior *nauti*. The man buying indigo must see that the top and the bottom were uniform ; for *jarhi* was put on the top over *nauti*. The top was dry and light and the bottom wet and heavy. One should always possibly open indigo in the sun to weigh, and distinguish the good and the bad and also to lessen the weight,—indigo drying during (i) handling, and (ii) weighing in the sun.

The second trick, viz., mixing the pure indigo with dirt and sand is referred to in the *Letters received*. According to Mandelslo the country people used to adulterate the best indigo by mixing 'a certain earth of the same colour ; and as the goodness of the drug is discovered by its lightness, they have the cunning to put a little oil into it, to make it swim into the water.'

Adulteration was made not only by the producers but also by the English East India Company's factors. The Company issued orders against such orders. Accordingly the Surat President Breton assured the Company (January, 1647)—

1. ETI (Finch), Watt, *op. cit.*

'We have also, according to your instructions, inhibited that ancient custom of mixing sand with the Ahmadabad indigo; so that you will not find any amongst that now sent...cannot discover how it was that sand was mixed with the Agra indigo: have given strict orders to prevent a recurrence.

As regards the substitution of whole bales or chests of dirt for indigo, they are hoping to prevent any such abuse by weighing the bales or receipt at Rānder and against at Swally, and by affixing the the Company's seal to each.[1]

6. Accidents

Indigo was more liable to fall a victim to accidents of seasons than other crops.

(i) With scanty rains, the *nauti* seed used to wither e. g., Gujrat famine, drought in 1646.

(ii) With excessive rains (e. g., September, 1621) and less sunshine, the plants would decompose or be washed away. There was heavy rain in Biana, 1621, also 1640.

(iii) Even after a successful *nauti*, bitter cold (in December, January and February) might destroy it.

(iv) Late rains (i. e., with no fall in June or first half of July) would destroy the *jarhi* crop.

(v) Locusts might completely destroy the crops (about June, July or August, as in Biana for three years, 1623-25).

These accidents destroyed the chances of rich merchants and reduced them to poverty. The production in Biana region was reduced from 4000 bales to a little more than 2000 bales (Pelsaert).

7. Centres of Production of Indigo

Travernier says "Indigo comes from different localities of the Empire of the Great Moghul, and in these different localities it is of various qualities, which increase or diminish its price". In fact during the seventeenth century indigo was widely grown in India viz.,

1. ETI (Finch), Pelsaert, *Letters Received* IV. 241, Mandelslo, EF. 1646-50 pp. 76-78.

(A) The Ganga-Jamuna and Chambal area—(i) Agra-Biana area, (ii) The Ganga-Jamuna doab or Aligarh area, (iii) Mewat, (iv) Delhi, (v) Gwalior, (vi) Bihar, (vii) Bengal.

(B) Rajputana—(i) Ajmer area.

(C) Sind—Sehwan.

(D) Western India—Gujrat: (i) Ahmadnagar—Sarkhej area, (ii) Cambay—Baroda and Broach area.

(E) The Deccan—(i) Khandesh, (ii) Bijapur, (iii) Golkonda, (iv) The Coromondel coast, (v) Malabar coast.

According to Habib (43) the three principal indigo tracts in Mughal Empire were (i) Biyana-Doab-Mewat, (ii) Sarkhej and (iii) Sehwan.

(A) The Gangetic Plain—(a) Agra-Biana area

The most important centre was the neighbourhood of Agra including Biana. Reference to Agra as an indigo producing area has been made by Abul Fazl, Finch and Roe. Mundy says "The best and richer sort being commonly called by the name of Agra indigo". The producing villages in this area could be grouped under five heads: (i) Biana or Bayana, Byana of Mundy Beniana of Tavernier, South-west of Agra with a radius of 20 miles. It was the main centre of production of indigo in Northern India. All authorities testify to the superior quality of Biana indigo. At Biana the "best indigo in all India is made and hereabouts nothing inferior" (Mundy). The Biana indigo was considered to be the "best exported from India to Europe".

About 1612 Jourdain found that there were three kinds of Indigo of Biana, "commonly, called Lahore". (Lahori) :—the best rated at 36, second 30 and the third 28 rupees, the great man of 55 *li* allowing them 20% freight, custom and transport from Biana to Surat. Pelsaert (1620-26) found that the Biana indigo was purchased by the Dutch, the Armenians and the Moghuls who exported it to Ispahan, whence it was sent to Aleppo. (ii) Ghanowa or Chanowa of Pelsaert, Cannova of De Laet, Connoway (Khanwa) of Mundy, 20 miles west of Biana (Khanua), with a radius of 20 miles. According to Finch: "Cannowa is a small country town roundabout which is made very good *Nill* (nil, indigo) by the reason of the fatness of the soil and the brackishness of the water".

(iii) Bassoumer of Pelsaert, Bashavor (Bisaur) of Mundy (Baseri, 20 miles east by south from Biana), 20 miles east of Biana, with a radius of 12 miles.

(iv) Hindaun of Palsaert, Hindowne of Mundy, Hindoo or Indoua of Tavernier (20 miles from Biana), with a radius of 12 miles. It is also mentioned in the '*Ain I Akbari*'.

(v) *Tora* (Toda Bhim, 35 miles west of Biana) with several villages. It produced 200 bales a year (c. 1625).

(vi) Panchoona of Mundy or Patchiona of Pelsaert (Pichaouree of the Indian Atlas).

(b) The Ganga-Jamuna Doab or *Aligarh* area : *Koil* (Aligarh) or *Gorsa* or Corsa of Tavernier (Khurja, Bulandshahar dt). The annual output of *Koil* was 1000 bales.

Most of the *Koil* produce was bought up by Armenian, Lahore and Kabuli merchants. It was good but not so well as Biana. Hence it was not purchased by the Dutch or the English. The Dutch restricted their purchases only to Biana. Pelsaert suggested that *Koil* indigo should be given a trial.[1]

(c) *Mewat*, 60 miles from Agra, with many villages. It produced 1000 bales or more, but it was inferior and sandy. The price of Mewat indigo (Rs. 20 a maund) was lower than at Biana (Rs. 30) because only one receptacle was used and not two as at Biana or Gorsa.

Very little of Mewat indigo was exported, but it was distributed throughout N. India, where it was not produced.[2]

(d) Delhi. The indigo production in the neighbourhood of Delhi has been described in almost identical terms by Bernier and Thevenot. Bernier says ; 'The country in the neighbourhood of Delhi is extremely fertile. It produces corn, Sugar, *anil* or indigo' besides other articles. According to Thevenot 'the ground about the capital city is very fertile, growing, besides wheat and rice and sugar, "good Indigo, especially towards *Chalimar* (Shalimar) garden near village Haidarpur."[3]

1. Ain.; Sarkar, II. 194. ETI. 152-4; Pelsaert, 13-15; Bell's Tavernier I. 71-2; Mundy II. 222; Foster, Jourdain, 217; De Lact, Hoyland & Banerji, 44-45. Purchas, ed. Maclehose, IV. 44.
2. Pelsaert, 15.
3. Bernier, 283; Sen, *Indian Travels of Thevenot and Gemelli-Careri* 68.

(e) Gwalior, 40 kos, distant from Agra on the road to Burhanpur produced 'a bad and base sort of indigo, according to dyers. Its quality differed from that of Biana "whose substance, when extracted from the leaf, not being sufficiently conglutenous to be made into such gutters (cakes or balls), usual in Biana and other places, and continue the same firm when dry, but both crumble and suddenly break into small pieces, therefore, do the makers incorporate therewith rice water to make it hold together ; which is the reason it is so hard and flinty."[1]

(f) *Bihar* : Sir J. N. Sarkar thinks that there is no information if it was grown in Bihar. But its production in Bihar is referred to by Mundy, who says that indigo was available at Patna though better quality of its was avaialble elsewhere : "for any other of this countries commodities, as raw silk, indigo, Gum lack (lakh, lac) saltpetre" we can have it much better and better cheap elsewhere.'[2]

(g) *Bengal* : From Tavernier we know that indigo was grown in Bengal and largely exported therefrom. He tells us that the Bengal dye was carried to Masulipattam by the Dutch Co. and that the Bengal (also Gujrat) indigo cost 30% less than the Agra variety. This reference to Bengal indigo is indeed very remarkable. For William Hedges does not allude to Indigo production in his inspection reports in any of the districts of Hughli, Malda, Dacca, Balasore etc. (1681). We may reasonably, infer that indigo cultivation and manufacture (which later on became a very important industry) of Bengal did not exist about the end of the 17th century in the districts visited by Hedges.[3]

(B) Rajputana—Ajmer region :

A kind of 'base indigo' was cultivated at Lollsote (Lalsót) and Mozeabad (Mozabad) which was situated 7 *cos.* south of Sambhar in the Ajmer province. Peter Mundy tells us (5th March, 1632/3) that four to five hundred mds. of base indigo were produced annually at Mozabad.

Again, in some of the villages on the Bayana-Merta route Salbancke found 'store of course (coarse) indigo'.[4]

1. EF. 1646-50, 123.
2. Sarkar, Mundy, II. 151, 156. Habib, 42.
3. Ball, II. 8-12, Watt, CPI.
4. Mundy, II. 235, 239, 240; Purchas III. 84, 88.

(C) Sind:

Indigo of Sehwan in Sind is considered in many respects to be better than that of Sarkhej (Habib). Two references of the English factors seem to support this view:

(i) "The 'Scinda' indigo sent in the *Swan* was judged to be better than that of Sarkhej, though not so good as the Biana variety." (E. F. 1627-31, p. 274).

(ii) The indigo of the district round Sehwan was "preferred by these dyers before Ahmadabad, which they say looks well to the eye but in dying is not to be compared to the best of this here (Tutta) ... " (Tutta to Surat, 21 Feb., 1646, Ef. 1646-50, p. 29).

But this seems to be an overestimate both as regards quality and quantity as the following details will show. In fact the story of tapping Sind as a source of supply of indigo was one of expectations unfulfilled rather than of solid achievement.

The various places in Sind associated with the production of indigo were—Sehwan, Bubak, Sann; and in the upper regions—Derbella, Ckandara and Behrallah:

(i) Sehwan, 84 miles n. n. w. of Kotri, Seahwaun of English factory records. "The chiefest commodity there made and in the adjacent towns is indigo, in form like to that of Biana, yet nothing so good, because in the making they are accustomed to mingle sand with it, which not only makes it hard and heavy withal...".

The English factors however expected that the indigo might be made "pure and good, as that of Biana, if the merchants there resident would condescend to allow them somewhat more upon the maund.

(ii) Bubak, 9 miles west of Sehwan (Bubecke of factory records) and (iii) Sann, about 30 miles south of Sehwan (perhaps Sann of factory records) were also centres of manufacture of indigo which was transported for sale to Thattha. About its quality we learn: "Indigo, not good in appearance, indifferentlie esteemed and is by the Tuttah merchants transported to Barsora (Basra) where it readily vends to great profit; the quantity no doubt may be increased, if the quality cannot be bettered."

The annual outturn was about 2000 mds, the weight being 36 pice to the seer, and 40 pice at Thattah. Nicholas Willington wrote of

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it : "no city is by general report of greater trade in the Indies than Tutta ... indigo coarse not so good as Biana".

The reported annual outturn was not more than 1000 great mds, costing ('new and wet') Rs. 21 and 22 a md. (of 42 pice per seer). The charge of custom to the governor Rs. 4/- a md., to the town Re. 1/- and freight to Thattah Rs. 1/2.

Urged by the E. I. Company to increase the exports of indigo from Sind the Swally Marine factors endeavoured to procure larger quantities. They authorised Pauncefote to do this by a Commission dated Feb. 15, 1540. But "the excessive rains spoilt the crop and only small parcels were obtainable at Rs. 70 per double md. of Surat (73½ lb.). So they could only hope for a larger amount in 1641.

In 1645 the Swally Marine factors arranged a detailed reconnaissance of the possibilities of indigo supply in the "upper countries of Sehwan and the adjacent places" above Thattah. About four months' effort on the part of Spiller, Nicholas Screvener and a broker ended in frustration. Not only were the expectations of any large supply in future belied, but only the trifling amount of 6 out of 200 fardels could be procured for that year. This was due to the misgovernment in the country and poverty of the people. We read of "the country and people being very beggarly" ;

"The people are so exceedingly oppressed and kept so miserably poor that, not-withstanding the soil is fertile and proper and would produce large quantities of good indigoes, they have neither will nor means to manure and sow the ground, so that the small quantity the country produced not exceeding 400 mds. double (which is scarcely sufficient for the expense of those parts) rendered the commodity very dear, far beyond Rs. 40/-, the price we had limited. Yet were there no other buyers than the Tuttha dyers, which paid Rs. 41½, besides Rs. 3 a md. other charges."

As the indigo producing villages of Derbella and Ckandara (Sikandra) were near the site of the residence of the English factors, it was decided, however, to continue the experiment next year (1646) on the advice of Spiller who suggested the stationing of a man there "to encourage the people by impresting 800 or 1000 Rs. in small sums" and thereby to procure more than 100 fardels at reasonable prices.

Here we get an interesting example of the English E. I. C. playing the role of a capitalist to the poor indigo cultivators of Sind. But though the experiment was 'full', it proved to be 'fruitless' (To Company Jan 3, 1646). Again, "The indigo procured from Sind has not answered expectations either in goodness or in price ; and is moreover scarce." Spiller and his colleagues showed the perseverance of the spider in holding out "hopes of an improvement."

In 1645 the competition of the local dyers in Sind, who gave liberal advances to the producers and refused nothing of available supply stood in the way of the success of the English in procuring indigo. But in 1646-47 the prospects looked better, because that competition was absent as the local dyers had unsold stocks, and the English efforts at encouraging manufacture were expected to lead to some recovery. The advances of money given by the English led the people to improve irrigation facilities and indigo cultivation. As soon as the English factors came to Sunne on their way toKandiaro, "all the arbhaubs and indigo makers in that place came to welcome us, much desiring that we would leave a man there, for that they should have half so much again as last year ; which they said we could perceive by the addition of new wheels that they had set (upon) the river to bring up water to their grounds". The English encouraged them as much as possible and asked them to improve the quality of indigo.[1]

(D) Western India : Gujrat

Indigo production in Gujrat has been mentioned by a long line of foreign travellers during the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries. Athanasins Nikitin (1468), Garcia de orta (1563), Acosta (1578), Barrett (1584), Linschoten (1598), Francois Pyrard (1601-10), Finch (1608-11), Jourdain (1612), Terry (1622), Mandelslo (1638), Tavernier and Thevenot. Indigo has been called by them as (i) *Anil* of the Arabs and Turks, or *Annil* or *Nill*, (ii) the *gali* and *nil* or Gujrat

John Jourdain (1612) mentions that the three worst sorts of indigo were found at Sarquess (Sarkhej, Baradora (Baroda) and Seroll (Sārod) on the south side of the Mahi estuary in Broach district.

(i) at 14 }
(ii) —12 } Rs. the great man of Agra (55 *li*) allowing 10% for freight and charges.
(iii) — 8 }

1. EF. 1634-6, 129; 1637-41, 136-7, 274; 1646-50, 12-13, 28-29, 33, 119. Withington in ETI, 218.

Tavernier has referred to the production of indigo in Gujrat—Sarkhej, Ahmedabad, Surat and Broach.[1]

(i) Ahmadabad—Sarkhej area :

According to Mandelslo (1638) the indigo of Ahmadabad, manufactured at village Chirchees (Sarkhej) by the Dry leaf process, was 'the best indigo in the world' and it was known as such. But evidently Mandelslo seemed to have been unacquainted with Biana indigo, acclaimed universally to have been the finest.

Sarkhej, 6 or 7 miles north west Ahmadabad was the centre of the indigo industry in that area. Here the method of manufacture was different from that in Biana, only one *vat* being used in Sarkhej and not several as in Biana. The place gave its name to the indigo which was called Sarkhej indigo. Finch called it Cickell (i. e., Sarkhej) but he did not find it "so good as that of Biana. Tavernier mentions that flat indigo (i. e., indigo cakes) was made at Sarquess (Sarkhej). Thevenot found that all the indigo sold at Ahmadabad came from Sarkhej.

During normal years, Sarkhej indigo was procurable in plenty. In November, 1622, it was offered at from Rs. 8-9 a md. but the English factors at Ahmadabad held out for even lower rates. By December, however, they bargained for 2500 mds. at Rs. 8-8¾ a md., for there was "plenty to be had." By January, 1623, they purchased 7000 mds. of Sarkhej indigo and 1000 more at Ahmadabad. A large quantity of loose indigo was available at Sarkhej at Rs. 8½-8¾ a md, (November. 1623). By December, 1623 Leachland at Ahmadabad agreed for nearly 1200 fardels of indigo and was "in treaty" for 2500 more, and expected samples from Sarkhej by end of January 1624. He bargained for 1600 fardels more at Rs. 42¾ a fardel, which was the lowest price obtained. While the English purchased indigo at Cambay, the Dutch could not get it even at Rs. 43½ and they returned from Sarkhej (December 7. 1623) 'without doing anything, the price having risen to Rs. 10 and 10½ a md. By January, 1628 the samples of Sarkhej indigo were priced at Rs. 14-15 a md. and the rest at about Rs. 75 a fardels of 4 mds. 7 seers together with some old indigo. By January 31, 1628, indigo rose in price. That year the Sarkhej crop was estimated at 8000 mds.

1. Watt, CPI, Jourdain, 217, 173, 174n; Ball's Tavernier I. 54; Commissariat, Mandelslo, 15.

Sarkhej indigo was exported by the English to England. It was also sent to Kuhestek or Kuhistak, a small port on the Persian Coast about 40 miles s. w. of Ormuz. The Dutch also sent it to Holland.[1]

(ii) Cambay, Cambaia, Khambayat, Kanbat (Cambay) as a centre of indigo production and manufacture has been mentioned by several writers e. g., Athanasins Nikitin (1468) and Barrett (1584). Linschoten (1598) found indigo as growing and being manufactured only in Cambay, whence it was "carried throughout whole world", being 'a costly colour and much carried and trafficked into Portugal.

This is corroborated by Tavernier, who says: "In the parts adjacent to the city (Cambaya) they make indigo of the same nature as that of Sarquess; and it was famous for traffick at the time when the Protuguese flourished in India".[2]

(iii) Jambusar, a large village, 8 leagues or about 22 miles from Broach, on the road to Cambay, in Broach district, was formerly a centre of indigo export. It was "famous for its great production of indigo, an industry which flourished here till the end of the 18th century." Jambusar indigo (12 churls, costing 1, 132, M and 10½ P.) was included among goods sent to the Red Sea (1619). But it was not found suitable for England not worth the freight and its purchase was "against the Company's express orders."[3]

(iv) Dholka was under the jurisdiction of Ahmadabad factory. It was a centre of indigo and *dhutis*. Of the investment for 1623 the first caravan consisting of 671 bales of indigo and piece goods started on January 21, 1623. The indigo weighed 4,784 mds. and they hoped to raise it to 8000. The price was considered to be reasonable.[4]

(v) Rander (Ranel in Portuguese) 2 miles above Surat on the other side of the river, seems to have been the warehouse or godown of the E. I. Co. where the indigo was stored in five houses or godowns.[5]

The tradition of indigo manufacture continued in Gujrat. Even as late as 1787 Hove gives full particulars of several plantations.

1. Mandelslo, Finch (in ETI), 174; De Laet, 22.23; Pelsaert, Ball's Tavernier I.72. Sen's Thevenot 16; Moreland II. 109; EF. 1622–23, 23.1, 158, 162, 181, 328–9, 330–1, 331–2; 1624–29, 230, 232.
2. Watt, CPI; Ball's Tavernier, I. 69. Sen's Thevenot, 18.
3. EF. 1618-21, 64n, 291, 310; Commissariat, Mandelslo, 15.
4. EF. 1622-23, 172, 185, 187.
5. EF. 1622-23, 67, 66n.

(E) The Deccan – Khandesh

A coarse, cheap species of the dye was produced in the western border of Khandesh. Brampour (Burhanpur) was reported by Thevenot to bear plenty of rice and indigo.

In the beginning of the 17th century, Jourdian found both Bijapur and Golkonda yielding indigo. About Golkonda he says "These ships of Dabhol yearly sally out with very rich commodities as indigo of Golkonda..."[1]

(F) The Coromandel Coast:

Golkonda used to produce indigo in the time of Tavernier.

Sir J. N. Sarkar states that as no indigo was locally grown in Masulipattam, the cotton manufacturers of that region had to depend on Bengal exports of the dye. But we learn from Moreland that the Krishna delta was 'well supplied with the principal dyes, and indigo was grown in the villages near the sea ports on the East coast, and Petapoli itself was noted for the high quality of its Indian madder, or chay-root. Before the Dutch had access to Gujrat or Biana, stress was laid in 1613 on the importance of Masulipattam as a source of supply..

There are several references to indigo of Masulipattam in English factory correspondence of early 17th century. Sir Thomas Roe even suggested the seizure of the Masulipattam indigo which was carried to the South with licences (*Cartas*) of the Portuguese so as to forestall the Dutch.

The "indigo of this country" (Masulipattam) was exported to England by the English E. I. Company. The Dutch exported it not only to Holland but 'continually' i.e., frequently, to Bantam. In 1621 the Dutch bought Coromandel indigo at 30 pagodas the 12½ mds. (each md. being of 26 seers). The indigo of Masulipattam was good and cheaper than the ordinary Sarkhej indigo which has of late years improved in price, while that of Biana has fallen. Moreland has calculated, on the basis of some Dutch records that the cargoes of indigo from Masulipattam varied from 650 to 1000 cwt. not only during 1610-24 but also for many years. During the same period English exports from the East cost were not important. The price of

1. Sen's Thevenot, 101; Ball's Tavernier I, 1, 42, Jourdain, 198, 199n.

Coromandel indigo was very low. This low grade could be handled commercially owing to low land transport changes.[1]

Indigo was also an important crop in Southern Coromandel (T. Ray Ch. Dutch in Cor.)

(G) Malabar Coast:

A brief account of indigo industry of the Malabar coast was given by Rheede (1678).[9]

Comparative Quality :

The best indigo exported from India to Europe came from the Biana area in Agra province, the second best from Sarkhej in Gujrat and the third from Golkonda. The true Biana indigo was the best of its kind, due to heavy soiled and brackish water which made indigo easily broken up. Sweet water made indigo hard and coarse. Biana indigo sold at 50% higher than any other variety. Terry observes: "the best sort (of indigo) comes from Biana" and "a coarser sort is made at Cirkeese (Sarkhej) not far from Amadamaz." Tavernier also says that Hindoo and Baniana male round indigo plants, best of all indigoes and so it was double the price.

English factory correspondence throws ample light on the comparative quality and availability of Agra-Biana and Ahmadabad-Sarkhej indigoes. It seems there was some sort of competition between these varieties—in spite of the difference in their price—on account of fluctuations in price due to various factors.

Indigo was the most important item among the articles of investment to be purchased from the Agra factory during 1621 (Surat Consultation March 1, 1621). We learn that 'The whole of Hindustan (Agra-Biana region) produces scarcely 15,000 maunds (of indigo), of which Biana indigo forms only about third' (Agra to Surat, Nov. 12, 1633).

As the price was likely to fall at Agra, the Surat factors enquired from Ahmadabad (March 17, 1619) to whether it.

In 1620 the Surat factors, who expected (Feb. 18) to annually export 1000 or 1200 bales of indigo, found the Biana indigo to be

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28. Sarkar, Vanden Broecke in Moreland, *From Akbar to Aurangzeb*, 82n; 110, App. B; EF. 1618-21, 3, 41, 44, 49, 116, 158, 208, 255.; E. F. 1655-60, 103, T. Raychaudhuri, *Jan Company in Coromandel*.

29. Watt, CPI,

cheap(er) for its sort than Sarkhej'. In fact, notwithstanding its high price and the difficulties of transport over a long distance to Surat, the Biana indigo was much preferred to Sarkhej indigo. In 1624 the E. I. Company ordered that not more than ⅔rds of the indigo shipped should of the latter kind. Thomas Kerridge, abroad the *Jonas* at Swally, wrote to the Co. (Nov. 15, 1624): "The main leading of these ships will be Sarkhej indigo. Request the Company to reconsider their order that a third of all the indigo sent home should be that of Biana; the latter is a third dearer than the Sarkhej indigo, while the difference of price in England is small."

In 1629 (April) the Agra indigo was found to cost the E. I. Company 'three times as much as the Sarkhej'. So the Surat factors intended to start a fresh investment at Ahmadabad but awaited instructions from England.

The East India Co. reiterated the proportion of Biana and Sarkhej indigoes in their instruction to the President and Cauncil at Surat (March 9, 1630): "For indigo, both the Agra and Sarkhej sorts 'are but meane gheere.' That bought at Ajmer was so reasonable in price that further purchases should be considered...(P. 4). Would be glad to have 2000 barrels (of 280 lb.) of Srkhej indigo, and 1000 of the Agra Sort.

The Surat factors (at Swally Marine) wrote to the Co. (April 13, 1630): "The last fleet carried home a greater quantity of Agra indigo than had been sent for many years; this time they have not provided any, 'our ingagements at interest exceeding our hopes of supplies'.

The Biana indigo of 1633 proved to be very bad in England, though it had been procured at 'excessive prices.' The Dutch also had a similar experience as their Sarkhej indigo sold at 40 stivers the Biana only at 35. Hence the Company preferred Sarkhej to Biana indigo (1634). Commenting on this the Surat factors wrote: "Agra hath proved like that curst cowe...which hath given a good scoop of milck and kickt it down with her heel." (To Co. Dec. 29, 1634).

For a time the dissolution of the Agra factory was seriously considered but the idea was soon given up as the following will show.

"If Ahmadabad be thought fit to be resettled, in expectation of indigo or to accomplish any other investment, if Mr. Fremler were not here we know not who would be fitting to undertake it. As for Agra,

while the indigo is so dear bought and far fetched, especially when it is required in no greater proportion, we cannot conceive how it should support the expence of a chargeable foctory." (Surat to Co. Dec. 29, 1634) ...'The excessive charge and expence attending the goods provided in Agra, together with the inconvenient transport hither to be laden in season hath made us often times of opinion to dissolve that factory. Yea, itt hath almost as often been determined yet ever found (as now) new means obliging its continuance. You are requiring still one third of that indicoe in proportion of the other of Sirquez. We have againe resolved therefore its resettling by sending John Willough by and Crispin Blaghen thither to assist therein...".[1]

(9) Marketing and Procurement

(a) ***Marketing*** : The question of marketing followed the cultivation and manufacture of indigo. The flourishing cultivators would naturally sell their produce in the market to those who would give them the highest price. But all were not in that happy position. Many had received advances from experienced and 'substantial Hindu or Moslem' merchants some months before. Such debtor-cultivators were bound to sell to them and to none else. From his long experience in Agra Pelsaert tells us that the Hindu merchants could extract certain advantages from the peasants in buying, "through generous weighing to which they persuade (d) the peasants by wrangling and cajolery." This was because "in those days indigo was so plentiful that the peasants were sometimes confounded and the middlemen might have to hold over perhaps 100 bales for want of buyers." Since however the crop was washed away in 1621, the whole of the produce is marketed promptly, and then there is little or no surplus".[2]

(b) ***Procurement*** : Procurement was an important commercial question facing the prospective buyer. In the first place indigo could be procured directly from the producers in villages. Pelsaert advises purchase from the producing villages and their neighbourhood when the yield was plentiful (i.e., when the *jarhi* crop suffered no injury and the rains were timely for the *nauti*.) in which case "one or two experienced men should be sent in the end of August or beginning of

1. Terry, in ETI, Pelsaert, Ball EF. 1618-21, 85-6, 183-4, 235; 1624-29, XXXV, 38, 326; 1630-33, 325, 19, 20, 34; 1634-36, 65, 78-79,
2. Pelsaert, 16-17.

September" to Khanua or adjoining villages and to buy whatever is really good." The English factors at Agra also seemed to have followed the same procedure.[1]

In 1619 they purchased indigo in the *aldeas* (villages) at Rs. 24 and 25 a md. This in all probability, meant direct purchase from villagers.[2]

In the second place, indigo could be procured indirectly from merchants with or without the help of brokers in the organised market.[3] Pelsaert held that in case of an expected shortage of indigo crop, it was not advisable to purchase from villages but 'to remain quietly at Khanua and buy only from the merchants. He has mentioned two of the 'rich and substantial merchants' of Biana, viz., Mirza Sadiq and Ghazi Fazil "who sow most of the indigo and who in some seasons have sold to nobody but us (i.e., the Dutch). The price is settled at his house, usually a rupee per md. more than the rate at Ghanowa or in other villages, because the quality is superior, and when the price has been fixed, but not before, anyone can sell to anyone he chooses. This subservience, or respect, is shown to Mirza Sadiq, because he is the oldest (merchant) in Biyana".[4]

The foreign companies had necessarily to depend on brokers and agents in making purchases for their investments in indigo. In 1623, the English factor at Ahmadabad, John Leachland and Gurdas inquired secretly for Indigo and came to know of the availability of 3000 fardels at Ahmadabad and Cambay.[5] The broker was described as a 'subtle knave', who demanded Rs. 50 per fardel (of 4 mds. 7 seers) and also told them of the possibility of arrival of funds from varias to Ahmadabad.

Apart from the brokers, acting as middlemen or agents, there seemed to have been another class of persons, referred to as 'buyers' in factory correspondence who seemed to have been technical experts of indigo.

Both the Dutch and the English E. I. Co. had their own 'buyers' to make purchases on their behalf. The buyers were not always

1. Pelsaert, 16.
2. EF. 1618-21, 85-6.
3. Pelsaert, 16, 17, EF. 1624-29, 246.
4. EF. 1622-23, 328.
5. Pelsaert 17, EF. 1646-50, 77.

Indians. They had to be careful, test the purity of the indigo, and vouchsafe for it. Nevertheless, these precautions did not prove to be fool-proof. Some of the Agra indigo sent in 1644 was "so bad" that the Company returned a sample. The buyer (named Turner) having died, it was sent to Agra "for inquiry and as a warning to the present buyers, who have been earnestly cautioned to be careful in this respect." The Surat factors, however, pleaded that it was impossible for them to "see all that they buy, it being acquired in many several place, great distance."[1]

Advance of money was made to the villagers and merchants e. g., at Biana. But the most interesting case of advance seems to be that in Sind, as already noted earlier.

Purchase of indigo by the contending buyers followed close on heels the cutting of the crop. The time of cutting being August and September, the principal season for sale was October and November. But it would have been much more advantageous to the buyers to wait till 'the fine of December or January' so that the dye might be dry and merchandable'. However, owing to the competition of the merchants the English factors could not afford to wait till then, as delay would have exhausted the supply of good indigo ("if we should not buy with the first, it would be impossible to procure any good"). Hence the English factors had necessarily to make purchases early and they urged on the Company to send 'early advice of the Company's requirements. This early purchase was attended with one great disadvantage. At the time of purchase the indigo was 'green' i.e., fresh and not fully dried. But at the time of unloading in England after a long lapse of time, the indigo dried up and considerably declined in weight. Hence the Company used to send frequent complaints of 'the great want of weight' to the factors in India. But the latter had to assure the Company that this was but natural and it applied not only to indigo sent to England but also to Persia, Basra &c and the loss and disadvantage was felt not only by the English but also by merchants of other nationalities.

(c) ***Financing*** : Purchases of indigo could be made either in cash or barter :

(i) ***Cash*** : Sometimes cash was sent directly from England on ships or funds were obtained by exchange of rials into rupees.

1. Pelsaert 15-17; EF. 1646-50, 253-4.

In 1618 John Browne at Ahmadabad tried to procure a good quality of indigo before the ships' arrival. But the matter was delayed as he had to await a supply of money from the fleet. "The exchange of your ryalls into rupees is of some consequence, partly for the loss of time in attending for their delivery and return of money in Ahmadabad when our business lies in Serquess (Sarkhej), then the disadvantage in their sale ; whereof of either a word." (Ahmadabad to Co. Feb. 10, 1618)[1]

Funds were also provided for indigo investments by remittance of bills from the central factory as at Surat to subordinate factories like Agra or Ahmadabad (May 29, 1619).

In 1619 the Agra factors invested their entire cash in indigo. Bills of exchange were closed by the Surat factors "to be rescribed" at Ahmadabad and sent to the Agra factors.[2] As the Surat authorities required from Agra' a larger stock of indigo than usual', they enclosed (30 Sept. 1630) a bill of exchange for Rs. 25,000 drawn upon "Vimgee Kica (Bimgee Kuckaw, i. e., Bhimji Kaka) the Vakall, *Wakil* or agent, of the famous Indian merchant Prince Vergee Vora (Virji Vora) described as 'ancient acquaintance of the Company', who also gave them a letter of credit for Rs. 25,000 for further supply by Agra upon all occasions. Communicating their desire for purchasing 4000 or 5000 maunds, the Surat factors assured their colleagues at Agra of a regular supply of funds and of the quick dispatch of one or two factors for helping them[3]. The Surat authorities acting on the advice of Ahmadabad factors decided (Oct. 11, 1630) that they would restrict the purchase of Sarkhej indigo to 500 baskets at not more than 16 rupees a md. This would necessitate increasing the quantity of indigo to be procured at Agra, the funds for which could best be furnished through Ahmadabad by bills of exchange. So they requested Ahmadabad to immediately remit 20,000 rupees or 30,000 if possible to Agra and further supplies of 40,000 or 50,000 every twelve days.[4] The Surat factors wrote to Agra (Nov. 2, 1630). "Refer to their last letter concerning the provision of indigo. As regards funds, in addition to the 50,000 already forwarded, the factors at Ahmadabad

1. EF. 1618-21, 7-8.
2. EF. 1618-21, 100, 84.
3. EF. 1630-33, 56.
4. EF. 1630-33, 61.

have remitted them 20,000 rupees and the enclosed bills, payable by 'Bimgee Kuckaw' will provide 30,000 more. Further remittance will be made every eight or ten days until the full amount has been provided. Urge a speedy investment in order that the goods may be down here before the rains".[1]

Sometimes the cash remittances of the E. I. Company proved inadequate and they had to utilise the proceeds of some imported articles like quicksilver and broadcloth or they had to make recourse to borrowing. "The great quantities of quicksilver brought last year and this, not only on the Company's account but also by individuals, have cloyed all the markets, so that it is not, worth above 3 or 3½ mahmudis per seer. It is therefore, decided to send to Agra funds for indigo investment in that place, thus obviating the need of borrowing money at interest there. (Surat Consultations, Feb. 19, 1632).[2] In 1634, during the imperial monopoly in indigo, with the price of Biana indigo (Rs. 61 a md.), the Company's cash remittances proved inadequate to purchase 543 bales of indigo. They had to utilise the proceeds of other imported articles like quicksilver and broadcloth and to charge Rs. 33,000 upon Surat by two bills of exchange at a loss of 8⅝%.[3]

The absorption of the entire funds of the Company at Agra for joint Anglo-Dutch purchase of indigo compelled the Surat authorities (Feb 6, 1634) to stop the investment at Ahmadabad and other places in the absence of remittance.[4]

(ii) *Barter* : In 1618 the Agra factors sent 951 fardels of indigo to Surat after procuring them by "barter in cloth of which they had overstock".[5] In January, 1623, the Ahmadabad factors proposed to Surat that Dholka indigo might be purchased at bargain if the Governor could be persuaded to take coral in part payment[6]. In 1629 we read : "Of the lead, part was trucked at Ahmadabad for Sarkhej indigo at Rs. 54 and 55 per fardel of 4 mds. seven seers : the rest was taken by Virji Vora at 7 mahmudis per md. in exchange for pepper at 16

1. EF. 1630-33, 82.
2. EF. 1630-33, 206.
3. EF. 1634-36, 70.
4. EF. 1634-36, 11.
5. EF. 1618-21, 47.
6. EF. 1622-23, 187.

mahmudis per md. 'Hereof 1000 sowes or mds. 12000 will suffice this place yearly" (Surat to Co., April 27, 1629)[1].

9. Packing

The question of packing indigo assumed considerable importance as a principal article of export.

(i) The E. I. Company insisted on knowing the weight of each bale of indigo because the new indigo decreased much in weight. Agra and Ahmadabad factors were censured (1621) by the Company "for not sending home the particular weight of each bale of indigo." As a consequence the Company was assured that "care will be taken at Ahmadabad in packing and receiving indigo", and that twenty-eight fardels were sent home 'of a new packing' for trial. Details of this new mode are, however, not given. The Ahmadabad factors felt difficulties in packing the indigo and solicited instructions from Surat as to the mode of packing. They also found it difficult to comply with Company's directions to specify the exact weight of each bale (Oct. 1621).[2]

(ii) The E. I. Company gave strict instructions that no dirt or stones be packed. Thomas Kerridge (abroad the *Hart*) assured the Company (April 10, 1621) that "they would be careful to see that no dirt or sotes be packed in the fardels."

(iii) Care was also taken of the type of containers of indigo. (a) It was very natural for the Company to insist on strong baskets, because indigo was likely to be spoilt during transport either on land or on sea if it was not packed in strong baskets. We find in a letter Surat to the Company (Feb. 9 and 15, 1619) : 'The Ahmadabad factors will be instructed to send the indigo in strong baskets'.[3] (b) Indigo had to be embaled not only in strong baskets but also in square baskets, evidently for facilities of stowage on ships. Square baskets, were used by Sarkhej factors (Sept. 1621). Such instructions of the E. I. Co. must have been communicated by Surat to Ahmadabad but somewhat late, as we find the Ahmadabad factors writing to Surat (Nov. 13, 1621) : "They cannot now pack their round churls of indigo into square basket for want of time." It is interesting to read of smuggling

1. EF. 1624-29, 334.
2. EF. 1618-21, 301, 308, 314, 291.
3. EF. 1618-21, 51.

of pepper with indigo on the ships. The Surat factors informed the Company (Nov. 7, 1621) that they intended "to shoot the pepper in hould among the round churls of indigo, which for hast (i.e., haste) cannot be packed into square baskets". In 1623 the Swally Marine factors requested Surat to make an early supply of pepper 'to shute with the indigo'. Another difficulty was that the square baskets were not of uniform size. The Ahmadabad factors informed Surat (Oct. 6, 1621) "The square baskets are not made all of one bigness', and moreover, 'all indigo fills not alike; therefore they cannot without more time and help comply with the Company's directions. They would be glad to know the Surat factors' opinions in this matter.[1]

10. Factors influencing Price

(A) ***Rainfall*** : Indigo, being an agricultural crop, depended for production on rainfall and any factor affecting rainfall affected its price as well. Thus heavy rains raised the price of indigo in 1621. The Agra factors expressed their apprehension to the Surat authorities (Aug. 22, Sept. 8, 1621) that "indigo will be dear". The rainfall of 1621, being unusually heavy ('unaccustomed'), unprecedented during the last one hundred years, the major part of new indigo crop became drowned and damaged, though the old indigo became 'much improved'. Similarly the Ahmadabad factors informed Surat (Aug. 10, 1622) : "Have been endeavouring to procure the goods required : but on account of 'extreme rains' we cannot look upon nill (indigo)".[2]

On the other hand want of rains also caused the price to rise. The Surat factors wrote to the Co. (April 13, 1630) : "The want of rains these three passed years (1627-30) hath been also greater cause of its improving in price, half the quantity scarcely made of what' usually in former times. This year giveth hopes of a greater abundance ..." In 1648 indigo was reported to be 'both dear and poor' at Agra owing to scanty rain.[3]

(8) ***Famine*** : The famous Gujrat famine 1630-2 adversely affected the indigo manufacture and trade. As early as October, 1630 it was said to have caused 'a great scarcity of indigo'. We learn from a letter of Dec. 9, 1632 : "... The town itself and all the country

1. EF. 1618-21, 278, 330, 324, 291; 1622-23, 330.
2. EF. 1618-21, 260, 268; 1622-23, 123.
3. EF. 1630-33, 20; 1646-50, 276.

adjoining in a manner unpeopled. So that the times here are so miserable that never in the memory of man any the like famine and mortality happened. This that was in a manner the garden of the world is now turned into a wilderness, having few or no man left to manure their ground nor to labour in any profession : ... Ahmadabad, that yielded 3,000 bales indigo yearly or more, now hardly yields 300 ; yet a plentiful year for its growth, out few men living to gather it, but lies rotting on the ground."[1]

(C) *Quality* : The price of indigo, as of any other commodity, depended on quality. Thus Biana indigo, considered to be the best indigo, also commanded the highest price while Sarkhej indigo cost less. In 1625 the round indigo of Biana cost Rs. 28 to 32 a maund and the flat indigo of Sarkhej only about Rs. 12. So the Swally Marine factors 'thought it best' to buy the latter in preference to the former, because 'their respective values in England do not at all correspond'. In 1627 while Ahmadabad indigo (old and new) ranged from Rs. 12½ to 15½, the Biana indigo cost from Rs. 35/- to 36½ a md.

Again, new indigo cost more than the old. In 1627 the Surat factors purchased 580 square fardels, the old at Rs. 12½ to 13½ (per maund) and the new from 13½ to 15½,. They explained to the Company : 'the reason for the rise in price being that last years indigo is better made than any of late years has been'.[2]

(D) *Manner of Procurement* : Indigo purchased in the open market cost more than that for which money had been advanced to the cultivators before. In 1627, 386 bales of Biana indigo were provided at Rs. 35 to 36½ a md. "except a small parcel brought green in the villages 'by money advanced beforehand' costing only Rs. 24½.[3]

(E) *Season* : Purchases, if not made in right season, cost the buyer more. From a letter of Surat to the Company (Jan. 4, 1628) we learn that the English purchased 402 round churls at Rs. 51 the churl (of 4 mds.) and waited 'too long' in an endeavour 'to abate the price (as the Dutch were without money to purchase any) and were

1. EF. 1630-33, 59; 178.
2. EF. 1624-29, 63, 208.
3. EF. 1624-29, 208.

compelled to pay Re. 1 a md. more 'than they might have done before the rains'.[1]

(F) *Competition among buyers*: Trade competition naturally tended to raise the price. A very pointed reference to increased price due to Anglo-Dutch rivalry is found in a letter of Surat to the E.I. Co., Jan. 4, 1628: "They have done their best to bring down the price of Sarkhej indigo, but this will never be effected while both Dutch and English are competing for it"[2].

The price of Sarkhej indigo was expected to rise on the arrival of Dutch ships and so the English purchased more indigo at Rs. 10 the *man*[3].

In 1622 its price soared up on a 'rumour' i.e., report that the English at Ahmadabad (Aug. 10, 1622) intended to buy indigo costing three or four lakhs of rupees[4].

The Dutch were reported (by English factors at Agra) to have been buying indigo 'without fear or wit' at Rs. 35/- for old and Rs. 33 for new, which was considered by the latter to be "3 or 4 higher than necessary"[5].

The Agra factors bought more than 400 bales of round indigo but on account of the famine and keen competition among the buyers ('in regard of the often itterated drought and many greedy buyers') the price rose to Rs. 38 a md. and even at that rate not much was available in 1630. As they did not expect more than 500 or 600 fardels for export in 1631, they had to make a larger investment in Calicoes[6].

The activities of private traders, which increased the demand of indigo, also caused its price to rise. The unauthorised arrival of Richard Boothby, the English Chief of Baroda, at Ahmadabad and thence at Sarkhej raised the price of indigo "to the great hindrance of the Company's business", and his conduct was characterised as 'mutinous and contentious' by President Wylde (to Co. April 1, 1630).

1. *Ibid.*
2. *Ibid.*
3. EF. 1618-21, 324.
4. EF. 1622-23, 109.
5. EF. 1624-29, 189.
6. EF. 1630-33, 131.

When Signor Adam Verhoeve, the Dutch chief (at Ahmadabad) left Surat for Ahmadabad, the English President warned the local factor (Mountney) to watch whether the Dutch intended to buy indigo. Thinking Booth by to have been deputed by the English for investment in indigo, the Dutch purchased a large quantity of it. As a result the English also were forced to secure their needs at "the high prices then ruling."[1]

(G) *Transport* : After procurement and packing comes the question of transport of indigo. The cost of transport raised the price of indigo in the external market.

So far as the English E.I.Co. were concerned, the main problem was to send, besides other goods, the indigo procured inland to Surat for export. Goods were carried in cafilas or caravans, which were carefully guarded. The Ahmadabad-Surat Caravan with 450 bales of indigo was guarded by 55 peons. In 1632 Peter Mundy journeyed from Agra to Surat with a *cafila* (caravan) consisting of 258 camels and 109 carts with a convoy of 170 peons or soldiers, carrying 1493 fardels of indigo and 12 of saltpetre and other goods.[2]

Distance determined the cost of transport or carriage :—

(a) Burhanpur-Surat : about 1¾ Mahmudis the great maund, or nearby half a penny per lb.

(b) Agra-Surat : 3½ mahmudis per camel.

(c) Ahmadabad and Cambay-Surat : 1⅛ Mahmudis the small maund, besides 1½% custom on all goods 'there passed over the water'.[3]

Inland transport was sometimes affected by political conditions, e.g., rebellions, disturbances etc. A letter of Kerridge to the Company refers to' many petty rebellions in this country (10th April, 1621). The uncertainty of succession after Jahangir's death affected the course of trade. This is referred to in a letter from Agra to Surat (Dec. 31, 1627) : "Wrote last on November, 28. Nothing of importance has happened since "all merchandizing being at a stand (still), and who shall reign not yet known : the most likliest thought Choroom

1. EF. 1630-33, 13.
2. EF. 1622-23, 189; Mundy II. 225.
3. EF. 1618-21, 51.

(i.e., Khurram). Here are daily divers reports and rumours spread abroad from Lahore but nothing certain."[1]

Biana indigo amounting to 200 fardels and costing about Rs. 3 a md. lay 'in readiness' at Agra and could not be transported to Surat 'until the country is more settled.' (Jan., 1628)[2]

Inland insecurity sometimes affected the fate of the caravans carrying indigo. In 1618 the Agra-Surat cafila (caravan) coming under John Young was waylaid in the area between Hindowa (Hindia) and Naderbray, at a place 22 days' Journey from Surat, situated in the jagir of 'Shaw Narasans' Shah Nawaz Khan (Jahangiri), son of Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khanan. The crime was committed, as the English believed, by some of his servants, under the pretext of realising *rahdari* of customary charge for guarding the road; which was not paid when demanded, The English lost 4 or 5 attendants and 14 churls (63 mds.) of Biana indigo costing Rs. 2205 (at Rs. 35 a md.) or Rs. 4, 961.8 (at 2¼ M. a rupee). The Surat factors suspected the Baluchi guards thereof of having 'purloined some of the packages'. The Qazi (of Surat) was unwilling to listen to the evidence of the camelmen and refused to give them "certificates necessary to make a claim for restitution". They expected that the value would be restored by the lord of the place of occurrence if the jagirdar did not object. It seems, however, that there was opposition and no recovery could be made for the 14 chests of indigo by April, 1621. So they tried their best to get satisfaction and the Surat factors decided at a consultation to procure a royal *firman*.[3]

(H) ***Administrative Interference in Indigo Trade*** : Moreland pointed out that production and sale of indigo furnished opportunities for administrative exploitation. From English factory correspondence we learn that the Emperor and many high officials of the Mughal government, including Governor of a province and his diwan, sometimes engaged in their private trade in indigo. They made heavy or monopoly purchases and endeavoured to sell their own stocks to the English East India Company or sometimes to force it on them or interfered with the normal business activities in the market. Such practices affected the price.

1. EF. 1618-21, 250; 1624-29, 189.
2. EF. 1624-29, 208.
3. EF, 1618-21, pp. 59, 74, 81, 84, 102, 210, 250, 283, 308.

(i) *Governor of Ahmadabad*—In 1618 the Governor of Ahmadabad demanded a sum of one lakh of rupees before granting permission to start annual manufacture (according to a Dutch factor, quoted by Moreland).[1]

(ii) *Governor of Broach* : In September, 1621 the Broach facctors wanted instructions from Surat about Governor's indigo, because his *shiqdar* was pressing them for an answer.

They resisted the attempt to force the Governor's indigo upon them. They were told that it was from Sarkhej but the Ahmadabad factors held it to be from Jambusar which was not suitable for England (To Surat, Oct. 6, 1621).[2]

(iii) *Governor of Dholka* : The Governor of Dholka was engaged in indigo trade. The Ahmadabad factors, anxious for purchases, went there but could not meet him. His servants did not know if he had an idea of selling his indigo to the English. So they had to tap the open market.

When the English factors at Ahmadabad had weighted 600 mds. of Sarkhej indigo (1622), the Governor of Dholka came and tried to claim purveyance or prior right of selling his own goods before others. He persuaded 'Mohomett Tucke, the Princes Duan' i.e., Mahmud Taqi, the diwan of Ahmadabad i.e., of Prince Khurram, then Governor of Gujrat, to prohibit all the merchants of Sarkhej from carrying on any further sale or transport of even the sold quantities. ('boeth to sell other or to waye that which formerly they had sould'). His object was to compel the English to purchase his own indigo. This led the English to suspend their activities for five or six days. But the merchants of the place made a 'general complaint', whereupon the Governor withdrew his ban and granted free sale. So they expected to finish the embaling of 4000 mds. within about three weeks. Though the Governor of Dholka was very anxious that the English should buy his indigo the latter were unwilling to accept his terms, and as Surat did not desire an increased supply, the matter was not pursued. (Ahm. to Surat, Dec. 26, 1622). But he begged them to refer to Surat (Jan 22, 1623). The Ahmadabad factors recommended to Surat (Jan. 26, 1623) that the price of Dholka

1. Moreland, *From Akbar to Aurangzeb*.
2. EF. 1618-21, pp. 273, 278, 291, 300.

indigo was reasonable and it would be a good bargain if the Governor would take coral in part payment.[1]

(iv) *Prince Khurram, Governor of Gujrat* and

(v) *Mahmud Taqi, Diwan of Ahmadabad,* also carried on their own trade in indigo. At first it was learnt that the Diwan was anxious to sell his 1300 & 1400 churls of indigo on favourable terms. Subsequently the Ahmadabad factors reported to Surat (April 3, 1623) that "the indigo of Mahmud Taqi had been brought here and all dealers warned not to sell till its disposal, but that he had not spoken to them on the subject. They further enquired from Surat (April 5, 1623) the decision of the President and Council of Surat regarding the indigo of Mahmud Taqi, as it might possibly be seized for the 'king's use' and then it would take a long time before it became available for sale. But the Surat factors reminded (March 25, 1623) the Ahmadabad factors of "the Company's injunctions to buy the better quality only" but suggested that the best way would be to buy loose indigo at Sarkhej, but as the time was short, they should take what had already been fardeled. However, they advised the latter not to buy more than 1000 small churls and conclude an agreement, if possible, with Mahmud Taqi to pay him at Surat. The Ahmadabad factors received the instructions from Surat on April 7, 1623, and at once opened negotiations with Mahmud Taqi. He was willing to sell his own indigo (371 bales) and promised to do the same with the rest which belonged to the Prince 'when tymes are more quiett'; but he required payment at Ahmadabad and not in Surat. Considering the price charged by the Diwan (Rs. 40 per bale) to be "too dear" the Ahmadabad factors referred the matter to Surat for decision and asked for necessary remittances. Plenty of old indigo was available but the merchants were loath to sell "because of the prohibition." If they bought any from the latter they would endeavour to agree for payment at Surat, but at the prevailing rate of exchange (Rs. 41 for 100 mahmudis paid there). By April 17, 1623, the Ahmadabad factors purchased the entire stock of Mahmud Taqi's indigo at Rs. 36 per bale. But payment had to be held up pending the receipt of Rs. 15,000 from Surat. As Mahmud Taqi pressed for clearance the Ahmadabad factors feared that they might have to borrow it at interest, though only as a last resort.

1. EF. 1622-23, pp. 162, 172-3, 185, 187.

The payment was cleared by May 2, 1623, after the receipt of the bill for Rs. 4,200 from Surat ; for the balance due still one of the factors at Ahmadabad must remain as hostage pending a further remittance. But this partial payment was not followed by lifting of the embargo. The indigo merchants were still prohibited from dealing, and Md. Taqi would not permit the sale of any or dispose of the Prince's at present.[1]

(vi) *Saif Khan* : President Rastell made a bargain with Saif Khan for his indigo at Cambay (1623). It was settled that Leachland, an Ahmadabad factor, would go there to receive it. The Baroda factors, advised by Leachland, saw the Khan and adjusted the matter satisfactorily. Saif Khan pressed for payment.[2]

(vii) *Muqarrab Khan, Governor of Agra* ; Muqarrab Khan, Governor of Gujrat, was transferred first to Bihar and then to Agra. To satisfy the Emperor on his expected arrival there, the Governor wanted the English factors at Agra to supply 'toys and rarities'. After a great deal of effort the Agra factors procured goods worth Rs. 500. But he was never satisfied and imposed an embargo on the entire indigo by monopoly purchase, (embargues all the hearbe into his hands or under restraint). At the same time he declared that he would permit none except the English to purchase it at their prices only if they furnished him with "such things as were not presents". In other words if Muqarrab Khan was the sole or monopoly purchaser the English would be the sole buyer of indigo. The time for procurement and despatch of the ships was impending but he would not be induced to lift the embargo without the coveted articles. The indigo bargained by the English in November and December could not be purchased even at the approach of February. Meanwhile it was reported that the Governor granted "Asaf Khan's people to buy at ships and Surat and ovr bullion too in Ahmadabad, if I would have sold on desired conditions."[3]

(viii) *Emperor Shahjahan* : In 1632-33 Emperor Shahjahan established an imperial monopoly of indigo, which brought business to a standstill. Its working has been discussed by me separately.[4]

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1. EF. 1622-23, pp. 217, 218, 211-12, 219, 226, 230.
2. EF. 1622-23, pp. 333, 347.
3. EF. 1618-19, p. 9.
4. My article in *Quarterly Review of Historical Studies.*

(ix) : *Sind* : Cultivation of indigo suffered in Sind due to misgovernment and oppression. This has been explained earlier.[1]

I. Inland tolls and Customs

References to demand of inland tolls during internal transport and of customs at the time of export are very rare. But they must have a share in influencing the price.

There were certain factors which at first weighed with the English E. I. Co. in preferring Sarkhej indigo to Biana indigo, notwithstanding the undisputed better quality of the latter. The first was the prime cost of Biana indigo, about three times that of Sarkhej indigo. The second was the high cost of inland transport from Agra to Surat. The third was the price commanded in England. All these factors are clearly brought out in a letter of Surat to the Company (April 27, 1629).

"Of Biana indigo they have this year shipped 1,200 fardels which is a larger proportion than even was sent before. Its high price (Rs. 36 and 37 per md.) and the cost of transport make it very dear, quite treble the cost of Sarkhej indigo, which is now much better manufactured than formerly, and costs only Rs. 12 to 16 per md. Unless the yield in England is proportionate, they think it would be well to confine themselves to the Sarkhej variety, which can be more easily brought down to the ships."[2]

11. Trade Competition and Distribution

(1) *The Agencies* : During the period under review, indigo was highly prized and became an object of keen competition among merchants of different countries and nationalities. Among the Europeans, there were the English, the Dutch and the Portuguese.

Among the Asiatics, there were the Armenians, the 'Moor merchants',—the Persians and 'Moghuls',—and the (Hindu) Banians &c.

(A) The Europeans—(i) The English

The E. I. Company's demand of Indian indigo did not shoot up suddenly but it was a matter of gradual and slow development. 'Of exports, indigo which formed the chief lading of the *Hope* in 1615,

1. See ante. sec. 9.
2. EF. 16-24-29, 335.

maintained its importance throughout this period (1624-9) owing no doubt to great demand for in Europe for dyeing purposes' (Foster). In fact two opposite tendencies were discernible in contemporary English factory correspondence, the determining factors being the relative preference for cotton goods or indigo, the question of price and profit and the exigencies of the home market.

(a) On the one hand the English factors in India wanted to export indigo from India. Substantial amounts of indigo were despatched from Agra to Surat for export. The Surat factors also approved of such purchases and urged for more and expected (1620) to export 1000 or 1200 bales of indigo annually. Indigo figured prominently in the list of goods to be purchased at Agra and Ahmadabad (Surat Cons. March 1, 1621). In 1630 the total cost of 2000 fardels of Ahmadabad indigo and 500 fardels of Agra indigo was expected to come up to £25,000.[1]

(b) On the other hand, there was lessened demand for export of Indigo. The E. I. Company preferred cotton goods to indigo and accordingly instructed Surat to export less indigo. There are several references to this in English factory records:

(i) Agra noted (Dec. 1, 1618) the Company's decision 'to have less indicoes and more calicoes'.

(ii) Surat to Ahmadabad (Oct. 7, 1619): The Company's opinion regarding indigo and desire for increase of all linen commodities should be noted.

(iii) Surat to Masulipattam (Oct. 8, 1619): The Company wish for larger linen investments and less indigo.

(iv) Surat to Co. (Nov. 3 and 5, 1619), "Your earnestness for encreasse of linen comodities and disesteeme of indigo we also apprehend ..."

(v) Surat to Agra (Dec. 2, 1620): There will not be much need of factors at Agra, "for the Company have required but a small quantity of indigo, carpets and Samanas"[2]

In April, 1622, Robert Young at Agra considered that the factory might well be dissolved, for 'Agra yields nothing of itself, and

1. EF. 1624-29, XXXV; EF. 1618-21, pp. 183-4, 235; EF. 1630-33, 20.
2. EF. 1618-21, pp. 46, 126, 127, 137, 214.

indigo, the chief article of merchandise, is now too dear to give much profit".[1]

However, this pessimistic view did not seem to have carried much weight with Surat. It was decided (Surat Consultation, Sept. 24, 1625) to order Hopkinson to provide 1200 churls (bales) of indigo immediately and to send Rs. 8000 to Agra for purchase of Biana indigo. But as late as November, 1626 the Agra factors were found to have apparently neglected to carry out "the reiterated orders" for supply of indigo. In 1628 the prospect of indigo supply to England was reported by Surat to be slender, on account of high price of Ahmadabad indigo and risks of transport from Agra[2].

The prospects brightened up soon. President Wylde wrote to the E. I. Co. (April 13, 1630): "The last fleet carried home a greater quantity of Agra indigo than had been sent for many years. But the question of price seemed to have acted as a damper. We find Surat warning Ahmadabad : "Will insist no more on the provision of indigo unless it be had good and within the price mentioned" (Oct. 27, 1630), and again, "decline to sanction the purchase of indigo at its present price"[3].

The E. I. Company's "Commission enjoining a large investment this year in both sorts of indigo" could not be complied with by Surat in 1630 because of want of rains in Gujrat. So Surat ordered twenty to thirty thousand additional pieces of white calico, "as the scarcity of Sarkhej indigo necessitated a reduction under that head". Production fell by about 15-20 percent. As compared to the normal outturn of four or five thousand fardels, hardly two or three hundred were expected. In the consequential keen competition for this limited amount, the English were at a disadvantage, compared to other merchants. We read in a Surat letter (To Company, Dec. 31, 1630) : "And for that of the passed years growth the many buyers, as well Dutch as Persians, Armenians &c, having furnished themselves with the choicest ware at excessive high rates, there is left but a poor remains of refuse stuff behind, enough only for this country's service, and yet that not to be purchased under 18 rupees the maund; which therefore we determine not to meddle with, though at far less rates

1. EF. 1622-23, 75.
2. EF. 1624-29, pp. 94, 153, 214.
3. EF. 1630-33, pp. 19, 74, 96.

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in respect of its bad condition. In lieu of Sarkhej, they will send an increased quantity of Biana indigo"[1].

(ii) *The Dutch* were keen rivals of the English for provision of indigo for their respective investments, in Gujrat and Agra regions especially each trying to steal a march over the other. Standing orders were given by the respective Companies to their factors in India to have a 'good store' of indigo. We read in a letter of Swally Marine to the Company (Feb. 14, 1625): "However, in view of the Company's peremptory order, they would have bought a good store (as the Dutch have done), but their stock of money has been so much exhausted by the payment of their debts that they have judged it advisable to invest the small remainder in calicoes and other goods"[2].

In 1621 the Ahmadabad factors purchased more than 9000 mds. of indigo ordered as they were anxious 'to prevent the prevention of out Dutch friends' i.e., to forestall the Dutch[3].

It is interesting to read a letter from Ahmadabad to Surat (Dec. 20, 1621) as it throws light on Anglo-Dutch competition in Sarkhej: 'The Dutch with all their goods having quited Cambaya are come) again to Sarkhej, where they begin again to buy indigo new and old at about Rs. 9¼ or 9½ per md. Ninety maunds they bought after their arrival the next day and are now very busy in bespeaking square baskets after our fashion. They profess to have but 1000 rupees more to bestow, but they have so often failed of their promise as we dare give no credit to their words, and we are verily persuaded that though they buy not much now they intend a very speedy return hither again and if they have any means they are likely to sweep the market clear before them except this factory be supplied in tyme, whereof you may please seriously to consider.'[4]

In January, 1623, the Dutch were able to buy 500 churls and were there bargaining for 1000 more. However, they had to close their investments with 450 churls more.[5]

The English had no faith in the Dutch. A letter from Ahmadabad to Surat (Feb. 5, 1623) reads: 'If Malik Ambar's

1. EF. 1630-33, 124-5.
2. EF. 1624-29, 63.
3. EF. 1618-21, 329.
4. *Ibid*, 348.
5. EF. 1622-23, pp. 185, 187.

performance with you depend on the friendship and qaul of the Dutch, then may we think the finishing of that business is assuredly doubtful, for so far as we may collect by conference with them they have no resolution to be at peace with any, if violence and thieviag may produce them profit.' The Dutch indigo was stopped at the moment of departure because they had failed to pay ready money for it; but after much wrangling and on their giving better security, it was allowed to proceed with the English caravan.'[1]

In Gujrat the Dutch tried to procure indigo in different places. About December, 1623, they were at Nerriad (Nariad) and were endeavouring 'to engage house room in 'Durgesera'. This tended to raise the price. The English factors at Ahmadabad had to strike a bargain for 1600 fardels at Rs. 42¾ a fardel, this being the lowest price obtained. The Dutch failed to procure it even on Rs. 43½. They could do nothing except 'to hire our (English) houses at Sarkhej out of their hands at Rs. 8 a month. The English factors at Ahmadabad sarcastically noted that they left twenty fardels of bad indigo for the Dutch to purchase, and that 'the Dutch were likely to return as light as they came', for they had been several times to Sarkhej without getting any supply of indigo and were at a loss what to do (Dec. 1623), the shipping season being January. Two English merchants went to Cambay and the rest were engaged in hiring of houses and repairing the warehouses. Hutchinson at Ahmadabad informed Surat (Dec. 19, 1623) that they prevented the Dutch from getting the English house at Sarkhej and "would do their best to disappoint them in other matters."[2]

Notwithstanding this Anglo-Dutch rivalry we get some instances of Anglo-Dutch cooperation regarding indigo.

The Dutch and English factors at Ahmadabad "agreed to make no further investment in indigo without the joint approbation of both". The Dutch being desirous of buying some indigo it was agreed that 500 or 600 churls would be bought in common, and equally divided (Surat Consultation, Nov. 28, 1625)[3]

At the Sarkhej market (1630) heavy purchases of indigo were made by the 'Moore merchants' for Persia and the Banians for resale

1. *Ibid*, 190.
2. *Ibid*, 331-34, 346.
3. EF. 1624-29, 111.

to the English, the Dutch and the Portuguese. The English factors refrained from buying it for some time. But when there was 'a risk of their not getting any at all', they purchased 1000 fardels of 'the choice and principallest of the last years growth'. On getting scent of this the Dutch purchased more than 2000 fardels and even all available balance. So, when the English wanted to purchase 500 fardels, there was nothing left except '400 and odd fardels of coarse and base stuff of four years standing, which also the Portugals have since bought'. After this no indigo was left in Ahmadabad.[1]

After several years' drought, 1630 gave 'hopes of a greater abundance. Fearing that the Dutch would pounce on the crop, the English ordered 2000 fardels in Gujrat.

But during 1627-28 both the English and the Dutch were eager to purchase the entire stock of 250 fardels of old indigo then available at Agra but both were handicapped by want of funds, the owners demanding ready money. The Dutch had been ordered to buy 1000 fardels. Out of this they purchased 500 only and became heavily indebted. The Dutch were at an advantageous position compared with the English on account of earlier arrival of Dutch ships (with money). So the Agra factors begged from Surat (Jan 21, 1628) a 'speedy supply of money' to repay their debts and also to purchase indigo and other goods.[2]

It seems that the Surat factors had some complaints against the factors of Agra, viz., that they did not 'write quite as often as the Dutch', that they were less diligent than the Dutch 'in making advances for indigo and buying what was available'. The Agra factors stoutly denied these charges (March 2, 1628) and observed that 'the earlier arrival of the Dutch ships gave their factors the advantage, but still they paid dearly for what they procured'. The relations were as bitter that the Dutch were not on speaking terms with the English.

(iii) *The Portuguese*: The Portuguese trade in India had evidently declined in the seventeenth century even before the fall of Hughli (1632). Jourdain says in 1611: "Their lading which they carry from Cambaia is all sorts of fine cloth of cotton, much indigo (which is

1. EF. 1630-33, 20.

2. EF. 1624-29, 228.

brought from all places to be shipped there as is aforesaid), all kinds of drugs, which are bought in Cambay and many other places of India and sent hither against the time of the year. The country where the meaner sorte of indigo is made is near to Cambay etc."

They purchased some base indigo, four year old, what remained after the English and the Dutch had bought better stuff.[1]

(B) The Asiatic merchants :

Hence for all practical purposes the English and the Dutch were the principal European competitors for the Indian indigo. But far from monopolising the Indian market, they had to face keen competition from Asiatic merchants, both non-Indian and Indian. The activities of the non-Indian Asiatic merchants,—the Armenians, the Persians, or the Moghuls had, of course, a pronounced effect on the market, as rightly pointed out by Moreland. They not only purchased indigo for Asiatic consumption (e. g. Persia) but also carried it to Eastern Europe, exporting it from Agra via Basra. But Moreland has omitted to mention the part played by the Hindu merchants, the Banians of English factory records.

(iv) *The Armenians* : The Armenian traders were very actively engaged in the indigo trade and proved to be keen competitors of the Dutch and the English. This is clear from the report of Pelsaert and the Englieh factory correspondence. Palsaert writes : "From repeated personal experience there, my opinion is that it is more profitable for the Hon. Company that buyers should keep quiet, than that they should run about the country from one village to another. Goodness knows, the Armenians do quite enough of that, running and raçing about like hungry folk, whose greedy eyes show that they are dissatisfied with the meal provided, who take a taste of every dish (and) make the other guests hurry to secure their own portions, but directly they have tested each course, they are satisfied, and can hold as more. In the indigo market they have just like that, making as if they would buy up the whole stock, raising prices, losing a little themselves, and causing great injury to us and to other buyers who have to purchase large quantities."[2]

1. Jourdain I. 173; EF. 1630-33, 20.
2. Pelsaert, 16.

(v) *'Moore merchants* : The vital role of the Muslim merchants and the Hindu Banians in the indigo market has been forcefully described in contemporary English factory correspondence.

We learn from a letrer of Surat to the Company (Dec. 21 1628). "There is small likelihood of a fall in price, unless the Armenian and Moor merchants forbear their buying for Persia, &c. where it is in much request."

Similarly a Surat letter of April 13, 1630, tells us that any attempt to reduce the price of Sarkhej indigo was not likely to succeed "so long as the Moore merchants buy such large quantities for Persia as they have done of late years,..." Many merchants coming from Persia on board the English ships, being debarred from purchasing finer goods of the Deccan on account of the wars raging there (e.g., Shahjahan's Deccan wars), purchased 'the whole of last year's crop' (of Gujrat indigo). The price rose to Rs. 18 and 18½ a md. So great was the competition of these Persian merchants that the English factors had little hope of securing any large quantity of the new season's crop even, unless their influx could be checked. Hence the Surat factors suggested to their colleagues in Persia (Oct. 6, 1630) that they should have "some discreet preventions or restraint of passengers" on English ships returning from Persia that year. The general nature of trade was that the Persians and Armenians—transported cotton goods from India on English ships to Gumbroon. From there these were again dispersed and sold to second set of merchants in Ispahan, Basra, Bagdad. The latter transported them yet further for a third market at Constantinople and other places. The English factors at Surat suggested to the Company that at least a part, if not the whole of this 'great traffic (thus expensive by land) 'should profitably be diverted by sea (less chargeable conveyance) just as 'great quantities of indigo and calicoes' which used to be transported by the above Asiatic traders overland, had already been transported in the Company's ships to 'those foreign ports'. Thus the Surat factors proposed to eliminate Asiatic competition[1].

(vi) *Hindu merchants* : The Surat letter of April 13, 1630, already referred to, has equated the influence of the Hindu merchants with the Moore merchants in raising the price of indigo. But if the

1. EF. 1624-29, 307; EF. 1630-33, pp. 20, 59-60, 125.

latter exported it to Persia, the former used to 'engross' i.e., make large-scale purchases of indigo for reselling it at a profit to the merchants of the three European nations i.e. blackmarketeering : "Banians etc. engross it at first making to resell again unto us, the Dutch and Portugalls"[1].

(ii) Specialised demands

At first the different merchants seemed to have certain preferences of their own for the indigo grown in different parts of India. But this preference could not long be maintained. The first European buyers and exporters knew of Indian indigo by two names, Sarkhej (i.e, Gujrat and Ahmadabad indigo) and Lahori (i.e., Agra-Biana indigo, exported overland, the caravans being made up at Lahore, and hence called Lahori at Aleppo[2].

According to Pelsaert Biana indigo was closely bought up by the Dutch, the Armenians and the Moghuls who exported it to Ispahan and thence to Aleppo. But the Dutch bought Gujrat indigo also and further tried to tap other places like the Deccan (1645) and Chittogong (not successfully). The Asiatic merchants also purchased Gujrat indigo. He further says that the English were not good purchasers of the Biana indigo (i.e., in the 1620's),—due to bad luck, adversity, mismanagement and deterioration of the commercial position,—and that if they did, the price would rise. But this view of Pelsaert is not wholly true. References to purchases of Biana indigo by the English have been given by the early English travellers and also in the English factory records. Jambusar indigo was not considered suitable for England (Ahmadabad to Surat, Oct. 6, 1621)[3].

(iii) Countries where Indian indigo was exported.

(a) *Europe* : Indian indigo was carried to Europe by the English, the Dutch and the Portuguess. Moreland tells us that much of what was sent by the English to London was reexported to Europe, especially Eastern Europe. The Dutch carried it to Amsterdam and thence to Mediterranean regions. The Portuguese imported indigo to Lisbon, for use in West Mediterranean area but it was in-

1. EF. 1630-33, 20.
2. Moreland, *From Akbar to Aurangzeb*,
3. Foster, *Early Travels in India*, 93, 155, 191, 227.

ferior to Aleppo indigo which determined the price and quality in the London market.[1]

(b) : *Asia* :

(i) *To the Levant* : Indian indigo was carried to the Levant from Agra by overland route, and also from Gujrat both by sea and land. This came to complete in the Mediterranean markets with indigo carried from Surat, London and Amsterdam.[2]

(ii) *To Persia, Basra and the Red Sea* : Persia was a principal importer of indigo from India. It was carried there by Armenian and 'Moor' merchants (i.e., Moghuls or Persians), both by land and sea (on English and Dutch ships), and also by the English factors by sea. For the Agra indigo the overland route followed the usual Agra-Multan-Chotiali-Pishin-Kandahar-Herat-Meshhed route. For the sea-route the Armenian and Moghuls used the ships of the Dutch and the English to Combroon (Bandar Abbas). In 1628 not less than 1500 bales of Gujrat indigo were laden by them for Persia on these ships.

The English factors at 'Kuhestek' (Kuhistak, a small port on Persian coast, about 40 miles s.e. of Ormus) informed the Surat factors (Jan. 24, 1622) that though Biana indigo was "most in favour", and sold at 560-600 *shahis* the Sarkhej indigo also sold at 480 *shahis* the 'kella' *Kulah*, a man's load' of seven 'mauns shah'.

During the Gujrat famine of 1630-32, dearth of handicraftsmen affected the indigo trade. The factors in Persia were, therefore, requested by Surat to apply their utmost diligence in procuring (Persian) silk against 1633, as that and Agra indigo were "the only commodities available for relading one of the two ships (Surat to Persia. Jan. 23, 1632- Ef. 1630-33, 195).

All commodities suitable for Persia being dear it was decided by Surat (Dec. 6, 1632) to confine their purchases only to as much of indigo as could readily be procured at "easy rates". Ahmadabad was instructed to buy two or three hundred bales of indigo for Persia. In explaining matters to the Company Surat wrote (Jan. 4, 1633) : "The scarcity of Indian commodities prevents them from supplying Persia as they would, most of the coarse goods sent thither last year lie unsold. Intend, however, to furnish the factors with 200 bales

1. Moreland, *op. cit.*
2. Ibid, 98, 58.

of indigo some fine goods, to help away 280 cloths resent them. These cloths were consigned hither, but the Governor refused to buy them on account of their coarseness."

It appears that the internal conditions in Persia were not quite favourable for normal business transactions. We learn from a letter from Gombroon to Surat (March 15, 1633) : "That Surat has been unable to supply them with goods to the extent ordered by the Co. does not matter in the present state of the market, 'for tis a badd with us for selling as tis with you for buying'. For their indigo they are offered 75 'larrees' the Surat maund",[1]

(iii) *To Central Asia* : Finch says that Koil indigo was "spent in India or transported for Samarkand, Cascet (Kashgar) and those parts ; none passing into Christendom, except mixed with that of Biana".[2]

(iv) *To South East Asia* : A very interesting proposal to revive trade with Bantam was made in the letter of Surat to the Company (Dec. 21, 1628) : should the Company determine to revive the trade (with Bantam) it would be advisable, instead of sending rials thither direct, to forward them, in the first instance, to Surat, where they might be invested in goods that would produce 100 per cent profit or more at Bantam. A ship should also be dispeeded direct to Masulipattam (as is done by the Dutch) to purchase goods and then go on to Bantam ; 'for uppon theise two factories will and must your sotherne trade be grounded, if ever you mean to reap profit thereby'. Another convenience would be that letters could be sent overland from Masulipattam to Surat, giving early intelligence of the Company's plans. 'This the Dutch had this yere, and had prevented us of the Ahmadabad indigo, had we not gathered by circumstances from their own discourse of their intents ... We gave presents order to your servants in Ahmadabad to go through for the whole parcel of old indigo of the last year's growth, which we were ascertained to be extraordinary good and in opinion of some of our people and brokers is little, inferior to that made in Agra'.[3]

1. EF. 1624-29, 307; EF. 1622-23, 23; EF. 1630-33, 195, 248, 256, 287.
2. Foster, *Early Travels in India*, 179.
3. EF. 1624-29.

(C) *Africa* :

A very interesting reference to export of Indian indigo to Congo in Africa by merchants of Sind is found in English factory records—"The merchants of Tutta (i.e., Thattha in Sind) that constantly trade to Congo and Bussara (Basra) do (and that necessarily) provide themselves of indigo and sugar from Agra......" (Surat Consultations. Aug. 22, 1635)[1]

(iv) *Decline of Indigo trade*—About 1646-47 the demand for Indigo in Europe lessened and the price it commanded tended to fall in England, the rates being described as 'despicable'. This led the E.I. Company to reduce its demand and send instructions to India accordingly. So India's indigo trade also tended to decline. The primary cause of this was not reduction in European demand but the competition of the indigo of America and the West Indies and the manufacture of large quantities of indigo in the Barbados and other places. This proved to be cheaper, because it had double advantage of manufacture and distance. Hence large stocks remained unsold in England.[2]

It appears that this decline of indigo trade was not only due to competition of West Indian indigo but also to the heavy adulteration of the Indian indigo exported by the Company and the high prices of Indian indigo due to unfavourable seasons. These matters loom large in the factory correspondence of the period along with this subject of lessened demand, and it may be inferred that they also contributed to the decline at least for some time. President Breton informed the Adventurers in the Fourth Joint Stock. (Jan. 31, 1649) : "The high price of indigo has induced them to keep the supply low, both this year and last ; though that will probably prove an advantage, considering the despicable prices ruling in England. Trust that there will improve as they 'wholly depend upon the goodness of the commodity' and they are confident that the present consignment (as well as that sent in the *Eagle*) will merit the approbation of the Company.[3]

In January 1648 and 1649 Indian indigo was still in 'mean esteeme' and the rates were despicable at home. In compliance with

1. EF. 1634-36, 130.
2. EF. 1646-50, 76, 179, 258; Moreland, *op. cit.*
3. EF. 1646-50, 242.

the Company's wishes the provision had to be reduced accordingly; only 200 bales of Agra-Biana (Rs. 40 a md.), 200 bales of Ahamdabad and 50 bales of Sind indigo were shipped and this amount was the maximum target fixed for the future. For 1650 only 200 bales of Agra indigo were ordered. By 1650 the price of indigo fell further in England—"declined more than 1/3rd of its former price in England"; the price prevailing in the Agra-Biyana area in 1649 was Rs. 40-46 a md. even though the quality of indigo was poor; so though the Surat authorities procured 246 bales of Agra indigo they sent only 100 in the *Eagle* and 100 bales out of 200 bales af Ahmadabad. The Dutch consignments also grew smaller.[1]

There was similar decline in demand of Indian indigo in Persia, Basra and Mocha a few years before 1647. This naturally reduced supply to those parts and both the English and the Dutch came to be hard hit. Realising the prejudicial nature of their past competitive practices they 'contracted to buy together and share equally' in the Agra-Biana indigo. This Anglo-Dutch joint purchase caused a sharp fall in price. And hit the producers so hard that they discontinued manufacture ("which so improverished the proprietors that they were much disanimated in the making that specie"). This hit the Dutch so adversely that they gave up the agreement of joint purchase and begun separate purchases in 1645. This, in turn, had the effect of immediately raising the prices. In 1646-47, however, the English and the Dutch resumed the joint purchase system. But this time the price rose instead of falling. This was because the demand of indigo in Persia and Basra revived with the result that there was keen competition among buyers.[2]

To make up for the loss involved in the decline of indigo in which the Company had invested a lot, the Swally Marine factors suggested to the Co. (Jan. 3, 1648) an alternative, viz., trade in Persian silk.[3]

The demand for Indian indigo, however, revived in 1650. The Company informed the Surat President (13th February, 1650) that they had "disposed of all the indigo and would be glad to receive 400 bales of Lahore and 200 of Sarkhej" indigo. Supplies were, again, discouraged in 1651, and the quantity required was very small in 1660.[4]

109. EF. 1646-50, 181, 186, 189, 276.
110. EF. 1646-50, 76, 77.
111. EF. 1646-50, 179.
112. EF. 1646-50, 297-298.

GAUTAMĪPUTRA ŚĀTAKARṆI

BY

DR. SUDHAKAR CHATTOPADHYAYA

In studying the history of Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi's reign we are faced with two problems not yet solved satisfactorily :

(a) What was the cradle of Gautamīputra's power wherefrom he attacked the Kṣaharātas and restored the glory of the Śātavāhana dynasty ?

(b) What was the extent of his empire at its height ?

With the conquest of the Kṣaharātas by Gautamīputra we enter into a new chapter in the history of the Maharashtra country. His Nāsik inscription of the year 18 is issued from Vaijayantī = Banabāsī to his amātya Viṣṇupālita directing him that the land in the village of Apara-Khaḍiya which was till then (*ajakālakiyaṁ*) being enjoyed by Uṣavadāta, the son-in-law of Nahapāna, should now be bestowed over to the monks living in the Triraśmi hill.[1] A large number of Nahapāna's coins restruck by Gautamīputra as found in the Jogalthembi hoard prove conclusively that Gautamīputra completely uprooted Nahapāna's rule in the Maharashtra region. The hoard has supplied us with 13,250 coins, of which 9270 have been restruck by Gautamīputra. It has been urged by some scholars that the Śātavāhana king did not fight directly with Nahapāna, that Nahapāna was already dead and that Gautamīputra snatched away the Maharashtra region from some successor of the Scythian king. In support of this theory it has been asserted that in the Nāsik inscription referred to above there is no mention of Nahapāna but of his son-in-law Uṣavadāta. It should be noted, however, that in the Jogalthembi hoard there is not a single coin of any king other than Nahapāna. This proves that Nahapāna was directly conquered by the Śātavāhana monarch. As regards the evidence of the Nāsik record, we should note that it is not a document of war achievements. It throws light on Gautamīputra's achievements only indirectly. The field in question that was the

1. Sircar, *Select Ins*, pp. 191-2 ; *Ep. Ind.*, viii, p. 71, No. 4

object of gift had been under the ownership of Uṣavadāta and his name is therefore mentioned in the transfer deed.

In the Nāsik inscription of Gotamī Balasirī, which is 'a funeral ovation of a lamenting mother',[1] her son Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi is described as the king of Asika (Assikas in the valley of the Godāvarī), Asaka (Aṣmaka on the Godāvarī), Mulaka (the district round Paithan), Suraṭha (Kathiawad), Kukura (in western or central Madhya Pradesh possibly near the western Vindhyas), Aparānta (north Konkan), Anūpa (district round Māhiṣmatī, on the Narmadā), Vidarbha (Berar) and Ākarāvantī (e. f w. Malwa). All these formed the dominion of the Śakas-Kṣatrapas, and thus we may conclude that these were conquered by Gautamīputra after his victory over Nahapāna. Evidently, this achievement is again hinted at in 11. 5-6 of the record where Gautamīputra is described as the destroyer of the Śakas, Yavanas and the Pallavas and the uprooter of the dynasty of the Kṣaharātas. The description shows further that in the dominion of the Kṣaharātas, the Greeks and the Parthians had also settled down and they served in the Scythian army. Some of them may also have settled in the territory as traders, for, the Kṣaharāta kingdom played an important part in the Indo-Western trade of the age with Barygaza as the port par excellence, as shown by the account of the Periplus. The contamination with these foreigners surely disturbed the *varṇāśramadharma* and brought a disorder in the caste organisation. Gautamīputra championed the cause of Indian ideal and we are informed that he "stopped the contamination of the four *varṇas*." (1. 6)

So far we stand on somewhat surer ground. But then the epigraph furnishes us with description the exact significance of which has caused much speculation. Gautamīputra is described as the lord of the Vindhya, Ṛkṣavat, Pāriyātra (all denoting different portions of the present Vindhya range), Sahya (W. Ghats) Kṛṣṇagiri (Kanhagiri), Maca, *Siriṭana*, Malaya (southern portion of the W. Ghats), Mahendra (the E. Ghats specially between the Mahānadī and the Godāvarī), *Setagiri* and Cakora (S. portion of the E. Ghats). This account is on par with other description in 1. 3 that "his chargers drank the water of the three oceans."

1. Dubreuil, *AHD*, p. 39.

Two different interpretations have been put on the above account:

(a) A group of scholars holds that the above description is simply a conventional one. Gautamīputra's empire was not certaintly so extensive as the description indicates and his sway did not extend over the Andhradeśa where the earliest available Śātavāhana record belongs to the time of his son Pulumāyi.

(b) Dr. Rama Rao holds, on the other hand, that "the conventional way is to describe a *digvijayin* as *catus-samudrādhipati* and not as *tri-samudra-toya-pīta-vāhana*. The mention of three Samudras seems to have a purpose and a meaning... The Nāsik inscription shows beyond doubt that the entire Dakkan eastern as well as western, was under the rule of this monarch".[1]

In discussing the above theories, we should keep in mind the following facts:

(i) that the earliest Śātavāhana record available from the Andhradeśa belongs no doubt to the time of Pulumāyi, but he is nowhere described as a conqueror or as having extended the boundaries of his kingdom.

(ii) that if, on the other hand, we take the whole account in its literal sense, then we have to assume that Gautamīputra's lordship extended over the Cola and the Pāṇḍya countries, of which we have no evidence at all.

From the above discussions it appears that Gautamīputra's mother has stated in detail her son's victory over the Kṣaharātas and the countries that were snatched away by her son from the foreign intruders. She was naturally very proud of this fact while his sway over the Andhradeśa is vaguely alluded to in the so-called conventional descriptions e.g. *ti-samudra-toya-pīta-vāhana* etc. M. Rama Rao maintains that Gautamīputra's connection with the Andhra-deśa including the coastal region is proved by 'several coins of Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi... obtained from the coastal Andhra districts in association with the coins of his son, *Pulumāyi*, and other later *Śātavāhana* rulers. There are, in the Hyderabad Museum, hundreds of coins of this *Śātakarṇi*,

1. *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 1953, p. 37

obtained from the excavations at Kondapuram in association with the coins of *Pulumāyi* and others. Several hundreds of round and square copper coins of this king are included in the collection from Pedabankuru and the entire collection includes the coins of other later *Śātavāhana* rulers as well. These coins and the evidence of the Nāsik inscription, mentioned above, corroborate my view that *Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi's* dominions included both Telengana and coastal Andhradeśa".[1]

The mere find of a few coins from a particular place does not necessarily prove that their issue held sway over the region, for coins may be carried from one place to another, but in this particular instance when these discoveries are studied in the background of the epigraphic accounts, they certainly carry some meaning. The combined evidences prove that Gautamīputra's sway extended over the Andhradeśa including the coastal region. The conquest might have been achieved in the closing years of his reign, which accounts for the absence of any epigraph of his time hailing from the region.

On the basis of the above evidences we now proceed to deal with the problem with which we started :

(1) As Maharashtra and Andhradeśa had been conquered by Gautamīputra, the cradle of his power must have been outside these states. There is no evidence that Andhradeśa formed a part of the Śātavāhana empire before his time. Some scholars maintain that Hāla conquered the country ; but the evidence of *Līlāvatī*, on which the theory is based, is extremely doubtful.[2] M. Rama Rao's contention that Śātakarṇi I had under him the Andhradeśa is difficult to accept.[3] Nāsik inscription No. 4 speaks of the Vejayanta

1. M. Rama Rao, *Śātavāhana Coins in the Andhra Pradesh Govt. Museum*, 1961. pp. 25-6.
2. K. Gopalachari thinks that 'the substratum of history in all this legendary matter would seem to be certain military campaigns undertaken in Eastern Deccan, a part of which had probably already come under Śātavāhana sway; but some scholars doubt even this (*Comprehensive History* ed. K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, p. 306). Such legends can no better be utilised for writing a sober history than the *Mudrārākṣasa* for the reign of Candra Gupta Maurya. Some scholars even doubt the existence of Hāla as a Śātavahana monarch.
3. M. Rama Rao, *l.* *i.c.* pp, 23 ff ; cf. *JIH*, xli, p. 751.

army and hence Vaijayantī, the capital of the Kuntala country, must have been the base of his operations against the Kṣaharātas.[1]

(2) If thus Maharashtra, Andhra and Kuntala had been under him, we can at once take him as the lords of Mahendra, Sahya, Kaṇhagiri (Kanheri) and portions at least of Maca, *Siriṭana* and Malaya (southern portion of W. Ghats.) After his conquests of the Kṣaharāta dominion, naturally he could claim lordship over Vijha, Achhavata (Ṛkṣavat) and Pāricāta. It is difficult to determine the location of Setagiri and Cakora. K. Gopalachari maintains that 'the mention of Chakora and Mahendra proves the inclusion of Kaliṅga and Andhradeśa in Gotamīputra's empire.' There is, however, no evidence to prove the inclusion of Kaliṅga within the king's territory. Similarly, we cannot associate him with the extreme south, though it is not unlikely that he led some predatory raids there, which justifies his description as *ti-samuda-toya-pīta-vāhana.*

Thus though we may scent some amount of conventionalism in the inscription of Balasiri, the statements are more or less based on facts. We should see the epigraph in its proper perspective.

1. *Ep. Ind.*, viii, p. 71.
2. *Comprehensive History* ed. K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, p. 313.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON INDIAN SCULPTURE (STONE OR BRONZE) OF BUDDHIST DEITIES TRAMPLING ON HINDU DEITIES.

BY

DR. B. P. SINHA

It is universally recognised that by and large a spirit of mutual understanding and toleration among votaries of different sects prevailed in India throughout its long history, and examples of violent religious wars or feuds which disfigured the history of Europe and West Asia are extremely rare to be met with in Indian history. Different religious sects flourishing side by side in the same localities and in the same periods present the most persistent and pleasant phenomena to be appreciated by all. Buddhism and Jainism arose as challanges to Brahmanism, retained their individuality, and found many of their essential features absorbed in the great absorbent, Hinduism. Buddha was even taken to be an incarnation of Viṣṇu. At Khajuraho, Sanchi and Bhilsa, Ellora, Gaya, Rajagriha, Mathura, Nagarjunikonda and practically at all places of religious and archaeological importance we come across temples, stupas, and images of Buddhist, Jain or Brahmanical deities of all the three or of any two religions. Freedom of religious propaganda and proselytisation prevailed in the country without mutual violauce. And it may be said that Aśoka's prophetic and clarion call to the adherants of different sects, that to disparage other's, sects injures ones' own sect, and to honour others' sects, besides one's own promotes the casec cause of one's own sect, (R. E. XII) remained the basic policy of Indian kings and religious communities.

But this should not blind us to the fact that there was freedom of propaganda for every religion, and competition to gain adherents or to impress on the superiority of the respective sects over others went on unabated. This explains the missionary activities of the Buddhists or Brahmins in and outside the country. Fierce and keen philosophical contests to prove that superiority of one's own and to refute the tenets of others resulted in the production of highly learned logical and philosophical treatises belonging to the Hindus or Buddhists. This rivalry

was not confined between Hinduism and Buddhism. Various sub-sects of Hinduism such as Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, Śāktism etc. also endeavoured to show their respective superiority over the rest. The Purāṇas are full of such ideas and stories.. However, sculptural representations of such beliefs or myths exhibiting sectarian rivalry among Hindu sects are few and there are more numerous representations of associations of various deities together as principal or supporting casts. Such examples of syncreticism are not only confined to purely Hindu sculptures but there are Hindu deities and Buddhists represented together in some sculptures.[1]

In this perspective it is highly interesting to notice certain sculptures showing Buddhist deities trampling (or insulting) Brahmanical deities. Tantricism had profoundly influenced not only Buddhist philosophy and worship but had enormously increased the Buddhist pantheon and introduced numerous new features in Buddhist iconography such as addition of many heads and hands to the deities. However, the significance of the critical study of iconography does not lie only in increasing our knowledge about the distinguishing features of the deities of a particular sect but also in understanding the spirit of relationship between the different sects of the time. Unfortunately in spite of some literary references about Brahmanical images for worship earliest images so far found are Buddhist in nature. On the growth of the Bhakti Cult, images of Hindu deities followed in large numbers and varieties, and it was natural for Buddhist and Hindu iconography to influence one another. With the increase in the Mahayanist pantheon and its later development into Tantricism, we find numerous Buddhist deities taking over the form and attributes and often names of Hindu deities.[2] In such a background it becomes all the more significant to find such representation of Buddhist deities like those of Aparājitā trampling Gaṇeśa[3] and *Trailokyabhadra* has sometimes in one of his six hands (left) the severed head of Brahmā.

1. Image of Harihara...... ; Image of Buddha Viṣṇu and Sūrya ; and Śiva,– Development of Hindu Iconography, 2nd edn. Pl. XLVIII fig. I, p. 547 ; Manjusri in company of Gaṇapati and Vishṇu. Buddhist Iconography, p. 102; fig. 74.

2. Padmahāni Avalokitesvra like Viṣṇu, Vajrāṅga like Viṣṇu, Vajrānaṅga like Kāmadeva Siṁhanāda has features similar to Śiva.

3. Buddhist Iconography, Sd.-Edition Figs. 189-190.

Harihariharivāhana has as his vāhanas Siṁha, Garuḍa, and Viṣṇu.[1] No image of this god has so far been found in India. Sixteen-armed Hevajra has under his legs four Māras namely Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Maheśvara and Śakra.[2] Yamantaka is killer of Yama, the Hindu God.[3] His one form shows him riding a buffalo. Vighnāntaka is the Buddhist deity, the killer of *vighna*, (obstacle) who was Gaṇeśa to the Buddhist.[4] Vajrahuṅkāra tramples on Bhairava, a form of Śiva.[5] Vajravālānalārka tramples on Viṣṇu and his consort.[6] Only one Sādhana describes his form. Parṇaśabarī tramples upon Gaṇeśa,[7] Rati and Prīti. Kālacakra dances on the bodies of Anaṅga and Rudra,[8] but his images are rarely found in India. The goddess Ubhayavarāhānana, a form of Mārīcī with her three faces, of which two are like that of a sow, tramples under her feet the Hindu gods such as Hari, Hara and Hiraṇyagarbha (Brahmā) and others.[9] But no representation has been found in India. Five-faced and ten-armed Daśabhujaśila-Mārīcī riding a chariot drawn by seven pigs also tramples under her feet the Hindu Gods like Brahmā, Śiva, Viṣṇu and Indra.[10] Six-faced and twelve-handed Vajradhātvīśvarī-Mārīcī has in one of her hands the severed head of Brahmā,[11] while Vajravārāhī tramples on Bhairava and Kālarātri,[12] Prasannatārā according to its Dhyāna tramples with her left foot Indra, and with right foot Viṣṇu (Upendra) and presses Rudra and Brahmā between the two.[13] Vajrasarasvatī may have in one of her hands the Kapāla of Brahmā.[14] In the Dacca Sahitya Pariṣad image of Mahāpratisarā, Gaṇeśa appears below the lotus seat lying prostrate on the ground under the weight of the Buddhist deities.[15]

The aforesaid account is a fair sample of iconographic representations of the Buddhist deities insulting deities of Hindu Pantheon. It may be pointed out that though the Dhyānas in the Sādhanamālā imagine numerous such deities, actually many of these have not been so far discovered in the form of sculptures, and again many such as Hevajra have been only found in Tibet and China where traditions of religious toleration or co-existence of different sects were not so deep-rooted and well-marked. There are historical instances of religions

1. *Ibid*. p 136-137 2. *Ibid*, pp. 158-159. 3. *Ibid* p. 166. 4. *Ibid*, pp. 180-181 fig. 131. 5. *Ibid* p. 181-182. 6. *Ibid* p. 183. 7. *Ibid* p. 196-197, fig. 140 8. *Ibid*, pp. 186-187. 9. *Ibid*, p. 212 10. *Ibid*, p. 213 11. *Ibid*, p. 214. 12. *Ibid*, p. 318 13. *Ibid*, p. 249-50, fig. 192; 14. *Ibid*, p. 352 fig. 353 15. *Ibid*, p. 389.

persecutions by kings in Tibet. Then sculptures representing such deities like Hariharihariväharia have been found in Nepal only and that too, rarely. If we carefully look into the catalogues of the museums and other notices about such Buddhist sculptures found in India it will appear that by far the largest number of such images belong to Aparājitā, Trailokyavijaya-vighnāntaka, Parṇaśabarī, Vajrahuṅkāra, Mārīcī, Vajravārāhī. Sāmantabhadra with the severed head of Brahmā in one of his hands is not rare in India, though more popular in China.[1] Paraṇaśabarī is only represented in a Nepalese drawing.[2] Only a Nepalese drawing of Prasannatārā trampling Indra, Viṣṇu, Brahmā and Rudra has been noted.[3]

Thus it is clear that among the Hindu gods. Gaṇeśa, Śiva, Pārvatī or their forms, and Brahmā (his severed head) have been specially chosen to be objects of contempt and insult by the Buddhists as a whole in India. It is also obvious that these representations belong to the Tantric phase of Buddhism and such sculptures are to be dated not later than 10th century A. D. They are certainly post-Gupta in time. Another point to be noted is that most of these Buddhist sculptures so far found belongs to Eastern India, in Bihar and Bengal, where Vajrayāna Buddhism was most prevalent, and where Hindu Tantric cults (e. g., Śāktism) also were very popular.[4] (The find spots of the images of the Baroda Museum are not indicated in the Buddhist iconography).

The usual explanation of these Buddhist sculptures that had been offered is that "This is how the Buddhists attempted to exhibit the superiority of their gods to those of the Brahmanical faith."[5] At best it is only a partial explanation. It is true that in the Purāṇas

1. *Ibid*, p. 84 2. *Ibid*, p. 186, Fig. 182 3. *Ibid*, p. 250.
4. An Image of Aparājitā slapping Gaṇeśa is in the Patna Museum, and another in Indian Museum is also from Nalanda ; Parṇaśabarī's image trampling on prostrate Gaṇeśa in the Indian Museum belongs to Magadh. In the Patna Museum is a bronze sculpture from Nalanda depicting Vajrahuṅkāra trampling on Śiva's and Gaṇeśa ; there is another broken statue of Trailokyavijaya in Nalanda depicting the trampling of Śiva. A sculpture depicts ucchusmajambhala trampling Kubera. It is in Sarnath Museum but its whereabout is not indicated (Buddhist Icon. 2nd Edn. p. 267, fig. 130.) In the Dacca Museum that are images of Parṇaśabarī showing prostrate Gaṇeśa or Śiva (Iconography Buddhist and Brahmanical sculptures in the Dacca Museum)... and Pārvatī pp. 61.
5. Buddhist Iconography, 2nd Edn. p. 389.

there are numerous stories showing the respective superiority of the one deity over the other. In the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, Viṣṇu is shown superior to Śiva and the rest, and in the Liṅga there are several stories to prove the superiority of Śiva to Viṣṇu and others and latter's discomfiture at the hands of Śiva. There are some sculptural representations as well of such stories of ideas some of which will be considered later. It may be therefore said that if sectarian rivalry within the Hindu fold itself developed at least for some into mutual disparagement of other cult deities and which in some cases did not remain only confined to literary effusions but found visual expressions in sculptured icons, it was quite natural for the Buddhists to depict some Hindu deities in a dishonoured state. But it still remains to explain as to why are mostly Śiva or members of his family (Śiva, Gaurī, Gaṇeśa, Kālayātri, Bhairava) specially selected for such treatment and why are these sculptures mostly found in Bihar, Bengal and also in Nepal (which was very much influenced by Tantricism from Bihar and Bengal, and where Buddhists fled with their books and images as a result of decline of Buddhism in Bihar and Bengal and more as a result of Muslim invasions and conquest of Eastern India) ?

In this connection it has to be admitted that even in the earliest Buddhist Art Brahmanical deities like Brahmā and Indra (Śakra) were depicted as occupying subordinate positions to Buddha. In the birth scene of Buddha, Śakra and Brahmā are represented as paying homage to the birth of the Buddha. On Bodha-Gaya railing belonging to the Śuṅga period, Brahmā and Śakra are represented in subordinate positions. The Buddhist literature is full of such references and stories which show superiority of the Buddha to the Brahmanical deities. It may not be unreasonable to expect that later Brahmanical literature and also certain images, describing the humiliation or subordination of important cult-deities or respective gods or goddesses, the iṣṭadevatās of the cults represented by the Purāṇas and the images, were inspired by the Buddhist art and literature. While in one Śaiva image namely Ekapādamūrti, Śiva is the central figure having on either side Brahmā and Viṣṇu, in another Vaiṣṇava image we find Viṣṇu the central figure and Brahmā and Śiva are on either side. In the Purāṇas while there are stories describing Śiva as paying homage to Viṣṇu, there are also many stories depicting Viṣṇu as paying homage to Śiva. The latter as Kacchiyappeśvara is worshipped by Viṣṇu. Śiva's

image as Viṣṇvanugraham shows Śiva pleased with the devotion of Viṣṇu and offering him the cakra.[1] In a Varāha panel at Mahabalipuram, on the other hand, we find Brahmā and Śiva in añjali-pose (in a posture of offering service and devotion) to Viṣṇu as Varāha.[2] In another Mahabalipuram panel depicting Trivikrama form of Viṣṇu, we find Brahmā offering Pujā and Śiva represented in añjali-pose placed about the height of the navel of Viṣṇu in space.[3] Thus we find that "in some sculptured representations Brahmā would be shown as offering arghya at the uplifted toe of Viṣṇu's leg, with Śiva on the otherside in añjali pose".[4] However, these representations at worst prove the cult-rivalry, and suggest that in a bid to prove and demonstrate the superiority of one cult to the rest that were strong rivals, stories were invented and some of them were translated into stone or bronze images. But these representations at least were not crude nor inspired by fanaticism ; and also did not treat the Iṣṭadevas of cults other than one's own in contempt. Same may be said of the early Buddhist sculptures referred to above.

The explanation of such Buddhist icons which depict trampling of Hindu deities by Buddhist deities, has therefore to be sought elsewhere. The simple cult-rivalry could hardly naturally and normally degenerate into such crude and unseemly representations under discussion without some special reason or change in circumstances. Bearing in mind the find spots of such Buddhist icons and their probable date in post-Gupta period, the explanation that easily offers itself is that cult-rivalries, especially rivalry between the Buddhist Tantricism and the Hindu cults particularly Śaivism had become very keen and acute in this period and in East India. There is no doubt that in the Gupta period Brahmanism had an edge of advantage over Buddhism ; and though the Gupta emperors followed the policy of religious toleration and some of them even showed demonstrable favours to Buddhism, the latter was in a declining state, a fact noticed by Fahien and confirmed by Hiuen Tsiang. Among the Hindu cults Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism were most popular, closely followed by the Śakti-cult allied with Śiva.

1. Elements of Hindu Iconography, Vol. I, pp. 42-46
2. Ibid, p. 138.
3. Ibid, P. 166. 4. Srinivasan, T. N.—A hand-book of South Indian Images, P. 40. (34a) IHQ. VI pp. 45ft.

Ancient Bihar being the epicentre of political and religious activities naturally was one of the most important arenas where sectarian rivalry particularly between the Buddhist and the Śaivas became more and more sharpened. This part of the country was not only the birth-place of Buddhism but also was a stronghold of Buddhism for many centuries. Naturally therefore the Buddhists resented the onrush of aggressive Hinduism in their prized home and their consequent losing hold made them angry and hostile to Brahmanical cults. The Śaiva representing the spearhead of Brahmanical movement now boyant and confident, was equally bent upon vitally injuring Buddhists and their cult ; at least the Buddhists saw things in this light. It may be of some significance that Vainy-gupta Dvādaśāditya was devotee of Śiva. Mihirakula,[1] who was a convert to Buddhism had ordered a general persecution of Buddhism and it was this tall order which had enabled Narasiṁhagupta Bālāditya to lead a large-scale popular opposition to the Hūṇa invader in Magadha.[2] Śaśāṅka was a Śaiva, and he was responsible for many acts against Buddhists. He tried to uproot the Bo-tree at Gaya, threw into the Gaṅgā the stone with Buddha's foot print at Pāṭaliputra and he attempted to destroy Buddha's image at the Mahābodhi and place an image of Śiva in the temple east of the Bo-tree.[3] It is quite possible that political and personal reasons might have also weighed in launching the anti-Buddhist tirade by Mihirakula and Śaśāṅka,[4] but what is important to note is that to the Buddhists these acts appeared to be violent acts of Śaiva fanaticism and in the account of Hiuen Tsiang and in the later Buddhist literature like Mañju-Śrīmūlakalpa Śaśāṅka is painted in darkest colour. We are told by Tāranātha that the Nalanda monastery was burnt by the Brahmin sacrifices who threw the burning ashes of the sacrificial fire into the monastery. Dharmasiyāni who visited Magadha in 1234-36 A. D. says that the fleeing Buddhist monks from the Nalanda monastery took shelter in a *Chandi* temple, against Turk invaders. He also informs us that when Vajrāsana was threatened by Turks, the Buddhist monks had fled away after putting an image of Śiva in front of the Buddha's image to hide the latter. All these facts show the growing hostility between

1. Watters I P. 288.
2. Decline of the Kingdom of Magadha P. 105.
3. Watters, ft. P. 92, pp. 114-15. Records II pp. 121-22 ; Watters, II, P. 116.
4. Dk. M. pp. 260-261.

Buddhists and the Śaivas and also the growing popularity of the Śaiva cult. The spirt of frustration of the Buddhists might have further goaded them to attack Śaiva deities but in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa many hard things have been said against Buddha and the Buddhists.

In the Śiva Purāna there are worse effusions against Buddhists and it is advised that no righteous person should live in a kingdom inhabited by the Buddhists, Cārvākas, Jainas etc. Dr. Jaduvansi may be right in suggesting that the Śaivas took lead in aggressive religious activities against the unorthodox sects. (It is certainly significant to remember that Śaivism was a pre-Aryan cult which was later accepted in Brahmanism and as happens with all converts Śaivism became most virulent against the unorthodox cults. Even in the fold of Hinduism, Śaivism retained some of its rustic character and aggressive vigour of the old. The fanaticism of the Śaivas against rival cults belonging to the Hindu fold itself was expressed not only in their respective sectarian literature but also in their icons. We have referred to the fact that various rival Hindu cults in their respective sectarian literature eulogised not only their respective iṣṭadevas but also showed them superior to other cult-deities. Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism were the most dominant Hindu cults and we find their respective sectarian literatures proving the superiority of one set of deities to others. But we have seen above while the Vaiṣṇava icons were content with representing Śiva in subordinate role to the Viṣṇu, some of the Śaiva icons represent other deities in much worse situations. Śiva in the form of Śarabha is represented as a mythical lion destroying Narasiṁha, an incarnation of Viṣṇu. One representation from S. I. shows Śarabha standing on his two feet on the abdomen of the prostrate Narasiṁha in añjalipose.[1] While in the Liṅgodbhava Icon,......popular in S. I., Brahmā as the swan and Viṣṇu as Varāha fail to find the upper and the lower limit of the Liṅga of Śiva and ultimately Śiva appears.[2] In the Brahmaśiraśchedaka-mūrti Śiva is shown with the severed head of Brahmā stuck in the right palm of Śiva.[3] It is of some significance that by representing Śiva and members of his family in contemptuous and humiliated fashion, Buddhist accelerated the rivalry. The growing animosity between the Buddhists and the Brahmins in this part of the

1. JASB, L. XXI, Pt. 2, Pt. fig. 25, Pl. XIII, P. 85
2. A Hand book of South Indian Images, P. 71.
3. Ibid, P. 78

country was further sharpened by a keen and persistent intellectual rivalry and the highly philosophical treatises produced at Nalanda and Vikramasila were sought to be controverted by Hindu philosophical works produced in Mithila by scholars of Śaiva leanings. It is against this background that we may search for the explanation of the Buddhist icons under discussion.

It is true that Hinduism had already accepted Buddha as one of the incarnations of Viṣṇu, and in the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa directions are given for the fashioning of graceful images of the Buddha. But at the same time such Śaiva images depicting violent aggressive character of Śaiva icons against rival cults are mostly found in S. I. The explanation probably lies in the fact that very keen and acute rivalry between the worshippers of Viṣṇu and Śiva went on in South India since the 7th century A.D. contemporaneous with the rise of the Pallava power, and there are archaeological evidences to suggest that Vaiṣṇavite or Śaiva images or temples were damaged or modified or taken possession of by the votaries of either cult. The Śaivas appear to have gone as far as demonstrating publicly in some of their icon-types the gross humiliation of the rival cult-deities at the hands of Śiva.

It appears quite likely that some sections of the Buddhists who had reasons to be provoked by the growing state of Hinduism in this region and by the aggressive attitude of the adherents of Śiva took recourse to fashioning some Buddhist icons, which might have been imagined in the Buddhist Dhyānas, and which demonstrated Śiva or members of his family in prostrate or trampled position. It is also quite possible that the Buddhist saw in some of the Śaiva images or in literary references showing crude humiliation of other cult-deities, the models for exhibiting their wrath on some Hindu cults (probably many of the icons representing Śiva's triumph over Viṣṇu or Brahmā belong to a period earlier than the Buddhist icons under discussion). It is understandable that Buddhists who represented some of their deities (mentioned above) holding the severed head of Brahmā in one of their hands, were inspired by Brahmaśiraśchedakamūrti of Śiva, and the deity who was superior to Śiva could certainly in fitness of things held even Brahmā's head in one of the hands.

The aftermath of the discussion above appears to be that it was the growing hostility between the Buddhists and the Hindus, parti-

cularly the Śaivas in Eastern India, Bihar particularly, in early middle ages, which explains the prominence of those Buddhist icons. There is certainly some truth in the assertion that the Buddhists as a proof of their aversion to the followers of the Brahmanical faith made their gods trample upon Gaṇeśa.[1] However, we have not come across any similar representation of Buddhist deities in any Hindu icon, even of Śaiva character. Dr. B. Bhattacharya observes, "It is however a matter of satisfaction that the Hindus never disgraced any gods belonging to the alien faith in this manner". But it has to be pointed out again that there are Hindu icons belonging to one cult disgracing the gods of the other rival Hindu cults and in no less reprehensible manner than the Buddhist icons (some representations of Śiva have been referred to above). Then why was no Buddhist deity depicted in the like manner by Hindu or more particularly Śaiva iconographers ? An explanation may be that in South India when such Śaiva icons are generally met with there was no love lost between the Śaivas and the Vaiṣṇavas, and the former was the aggressive party. In Bihar during the period under review Buddhism was declining, and Brahmanical cult including Śaivism were coming to ascendancy. The Buddhists, or more properly some of them were in most aggrieved and frustrated moods and were swayed by emotional reaction resorted to such crude exhibitions of their embittered and frustrated feelings. The Brahmins had no reason to react in the similar way.

However, the aforesaid discussion should not carry us away with the impression that during this period Buddhists in general were following such aggressive crude and intolerant opposition to Brahmanical cults in general. On the contrary there are numerous bronze and stone sculptures found in Bihar which would show that a reconciliation between the Buddhist and the Brahmanical cults had proceeded very far. Images of Hindu deities, like those of Balarāma, Umā-Maheśvara Sarasvatī, Gaṅgā, Viṣṇu and the Sun etc. have been discovered from Nalanda and Kurkihara. We have already referred to the fact that Buddha was regarded as an incarnation of Viṣṇu and in some of the large images of Viṣṇu found in Bihar, there are representations of his various incarnations including that of in Buddha's from. The Buddhists adopted and modified many of the Hindu deities. Padma-

1. Buddhist Iconography, 2nd Edn. P. 389.

pāṇi Avalokitiśvara reminds us of Viṣṇu. Resembling Dikpālas we have Buddhist gods of Direction Gaṇapati etc. in the Buddhist pantheon as well. There are Dhyānas prescribed describing the forms of Agni, Vāyu, Brahmā, Indra, Viṣṇu, Chāmuṇḍā, Gaṇapati, Mahākāla etc. and of the Navagrahas. Many of the Bodhisattvas are fashioned after different forms of Śiva. There is a unique image already referred to above depictiong Hari-Hara, Sūrya and Buddha together. The image is in the Indian Museum, Calcutta[1] and most probably hails from this part of the country. From Eastern India are also discovered images of Śiva-lokeśvara and Sūrya-lokeśvara in the Ashutosh Museum, Calcutta, showing these association of Bodhisattva lokeśvara with the Hindu cult deities.[2]

Thus the irrefutable conclusion appears to be that notwithstanding the prevailing cult-rivalry there the movement of religious syncreticism and mutual animilation and toleration was also gaining strength. However, some sections of the Buddhists were embittered and aggressive enough to get such icons, as depicting of trampling of Hindu deities by Buddhist deities fashioned. But this was the sure index of Buddhism's inner strength and quality being dried up, and as we know Buddhism soon practically disappeared from the land of its birth leaving a trail of lessons behind for the posterity.

1. Development of Hindu Iconography, 2nd Edn., P. 547, Pl. XLVIII, fig. I.
2. Ibid, P. 547, Pl. XLVI, fig. 4. Image of Viṣṇu-Lokeśvara also found from different parts of E. I. Ibid, P. 554-55.

SĀTAVĀHANA POLITY

BY

R. S. SHARMA

The provenance of the Fourteen Rock Edicts and Minor Rock Edicts in Mysore and a fragment of the pillar inscription at Amarāvatī in Andhra clearly shows that the local princes were acquainted with the Aśokan system of government. Naturally some of its elements continued under the Sātavāhanas in the western Deccan. Like Aśoka the early Sātavāhana kings were called *rājā*. Although Gautamī Balaśrī, the mother of Gautamīputra Śātakarṇī, claims that her son and grandson were *maharajas*,[1] actually this title is adopted neither by Gautamīputra nor by Vāsiṣṭhīputra Puḷumāvi ; these rulers did not assume those grandiloquent titles which distinguish the names of Kuṣāṇa princes. Further, the Sātavāhana kings conveyed their orders to subordinate officers called *amātyas*,—and not *kumāra*, *ārya-putra*, or *mahāmātra* as in Aśoka's reign—in the same idiom and in the same language Prakrit as were prevalent under Aśoka.

The Sātavāhana kingdom was divided into *āhāras* (literally 'food') or districts, as we find in the Aśokan system. *Āhāras* are not named in Aśokan inscriptions, whose findspots would place them in Madhya Pradesh and eastern U. P. But the Sātavāhana inscriptions frequently mention Govardhana—*āhāra* and some others. This administrative unit continued in the Vākāṭaka kingdom, and obtained in Mahārāṣṭra and Gujarāt according to inscriptions of Gupta and post-Gupta times dated in the Kalacuri era.[2] A Sātavāhana epigraph of the first quarter of the third century A. D. suggests that the *āhāra* was identical with the *janapada*,[3] which is mentioned in both the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya and Aśokan inscriptions. But the similarity in nomenclature may not

1. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 86, l.10.

2. H.C. Raychaudhuri thinks that the *āhāra* tends to disappear after the Sātavāhana age (G. Yazdani, ed., *The Early History of the Deccan*, Pts. I-IV. OUP. 1960, p. 45), but this is not supported by inscriptions.

3. *janapade sātavāhanihāre*, *Sel. Inscrr.* II, no. 90, l. 2.

imply similar size because the Aśokan *janapada*, consisting of probably 3200 villages according to Kauṭilya,[1] was a far wider unit.

Mahāmātras, although rarely mentioned by Kauṭilya, formed under Aśoka a cadre of officers meant for multipurpose work. They also occur in Sātavāhana inscriptions, and in one case a *mahāmātra* seems to have been in charge of Buddhist monks,[2] thus roughly comparable to the *dhammamahāmātta* of Aśoka. But clearly this institution was not so widespread and important in the Sātavāhana kingdom. The Sātavāhana substitute for the Aśokan *mahāmātta* seems to have been the *amātya* or *amacca* to whom all royal orders regarding gifts of land or caves are communicated. *Amātyas* appear as advisers or ministers in the *Jātakas*, but the most detailed information about them is available in the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya, in which they constitute a class of officers from which all other functionaries are recruited. Oddly enough this very important class of officers is not mentioned in Aśokan inscriptions. They figure for the first time in Sātavāhana inscriptions, which show that the post of the *amātya* was not hereditary, as was the case in Gupta times. We know of at least three persons, Viṣṇupālita,[3] Śivadatta[4] and Śyāmaka,[5] who held this post within a period of 6 years at Govardhana in the reign of Gautamīputra Śātakarṇī. Again in A. D. 152 in the reign of Vāsiṣṭhīputra Puḷumāvi we hear of the *amātya* Śivaskandila working at the same place.[6] The names of these four officers working within a range of 28 years at the same place suggest that they did not even belong to one family. References to several other *amātyas* such as Parigupta probably under Gautamīputra Śātakarṇī[7], and Sateraka[8], Sarvākṣadalana and Viṣṇupāli under Vāsiṣṭhīputra Śātakarṇī[9], do not disclose any hereditary pattern. A few inscriptions speak of the

1. The *sthānīya* consisted of 800 villages (*AŚ*, II.2.1) and formed a part of the *janapada* (II. 2.3), which was divided into four units for revenue purposes (II. 2-34), and these may have been identical with *sthānīyas*.
2. Ibid., no. 75, ll. 1-2.
3. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 83, l.2.
4. Ibid., l.5.
5. Ibid., no. 84. l.1.
6. Ibid., no. 87, l. 2.
7. *Lüders List*, no. 1105.
8. Ibid., 994.
9. *Collected Works of R. G. Bhandarkar*, ii, 242.

rājāmātya, but the *kumārāmātya* of Gupta times does not appear as yet. By and large the *amātyas* formed a predominant element in the Sātavāhana polity, and they enjoyed the same position in it as the *mahāmātras* in Aśokan and the *kumārāmātyas* in Gupta polity. As regards their functions there is nothing to show that they acted as advisers or ministers ; at any rate they do not seem to have functioned as an organised body. On the other hand individually they did act in various capacities such as governors, treasurers and executors of land grants.

Several officers were connected with the writing of land charters. In one case the charter was drafted by an *amātya*, in another by a *pratīhāra* first mentioned under the Sātavāhanas, and in still another by a *mahāsenāpati*. All this indicates that this function was not specifically assigned to one officer, although in post-Gupta times it tended to be confined to the *sāndhivigrahika*. The Sātavāhanas also maintained keepers of land charters, known as *paṭṭikā-pālaka* (?)[1] and engravers who inscribed the charters, and agents who conveyed them to the beneficiaries. But none of such Aśokan officers as *rājukas*, *prādeśikas*, *prativedikas*, *puruṣas*, *yuktas*, etc, finds place in Sātavāhana inscriptions. If we go by this negative evidence the Sātavāhana state apparatus would appear to be rather simple.

Payment to Sātavāhana officers may have been made in cash—a practice recommended by the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya and supported by the long list of various figures of *kārṣāpaṇas* given in the Nanaghat Cave Inscription of Nāganikā[2] and elsewhere. Such figures show that the cash fees given on the occasion of various sacrifices amounted to 148,000 and odd *kārṣāpaṇas*.[3] Cash payment is strongly corroborated by the numerous coins of lead, potin, copper and silver found mainly in Mahārāṣṭra although not so uncommon in Andhra and parts of Madhya Pradesh. Hoards of the Roman gold coins found in the Sātavāhana territory may have been used for large scale transactions or as bullion, but the Sātavāhana coins were apparently put to use in day-to-day transactions, including payment to royal officials. All this however, does not preclude payment to officials in kind.

1. The reading given by Sircar in *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 87, 14 is *baṭika ... kehi*, which he sanskritises as *paṭṭikāpālakaiḥ*.
2. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 82.
3. G. Yazdani, ed., *The Early History of the Deccan*, Pts. I-VI, p. 134, fn. 2.

The fiscal system of the Sātavāhanas can be roughly known from revenue concessions in villages granted for religious purposes. Assessment was made in settled villages or cultivated land, whose mineral resources including salt belonged to the king. The state officials and police and soldiers could be billetted on the peasants either for their own maintenance or for the upkeep of the governmental machinery whose part they formed. The royal share of the produce is represented by such terms as *deya-meya*[1] and *bhoga*[2]. The king also received the *kārukāra*[3], which may mean taxes levied on artisans, and unless they worked for their chief (in this case Mahāraṭhī Vāsiṣṭhiputra Somadeva)[4] one day a month, as recommended by the Dharmaśāstras, they may have paid taxes in cash. Revenue seems to have been collected in both cash and kind. Actual finds of numerous coins of ordinary metal suggest that collection in cash was not slight. This is also supported by the use of the term *hairaṇyika*, keeper of gold, for treasurer.[5]

It is reasonable to look for the effects of the flourishing arts and crafts and increasing trade and commerce of the Deccan on the Sātavāhana political organisation. An inscription speaks of overseer under whose supervision the craftsmen constructed a cave[6]. This class of overseers includeds monks, elders, merchants, etc., and was known variously as *navakarmika* and *uparakṣita*.[7] But whether they had to do anything with the state is not clear. The machinery through which the Sātavāhana rulers dealt with the various groups and types of artisans and merchants (*negamas*), so often mentioned in inscriptions, is not indicated. To be sure, they were free to make and form their guilds, with which even royal benefactors deposited endowment money.

A perusal of gifts to Buddhist monks and institutions mentioned in *Lüders' List* leaves the impression that in Bharhut and Sanchi most gifts were made by artisans and a class of merchants called *gandhikas*, from which the title *gāndhī* is derived. But the Nasik and Junnar

1. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 85, l. 3.
2. Ibid., II, no. 86, l.11.
3. Ibid., no. 85, l. 3.
4. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 85, l. 3.
5. *Lüders List*, no. 996, 1038; The expression *Bhāṇḍākārikaya* occurs in no. 1141.
6. Ibid., 987.
7. Ibid.

cave inscriptions show that many individual gifts were made by merchants called *nekama* or *negama*, although *gandhikas*, *seṭhis* and *sathavahas* also figure as donors. If the merchants gave so liberally in the cause of religion the state would not permit them to be stingy in the cause of politics. Direct evidence on the royal income from artisans and merchants is little, but the use of the term *kāru-kāra* would suggest that even artisans living in villages had to pay taxes. Ferry dues, which were remitted in some cases by Uṣabhadāta[1], may have been mainly paid by merchants. Customs officers may have been appointed to look after custom-houses in various sea-ports of the Sātavāhana kingdom, but we have no means of finding out the real position.

Possibly the Sātavāhanas gave high government posts to merchants. The names of their *amātyas*, Śivagupta and Parigupta, would show them to be vaiśyas. Merchants seem to have been closely associated with the management of towns, whose number was evidently the largest in the Sātavāhana territory. Inscriptions mention Broach, Sopara, Kanheri, Kalyāṇa, Paithan, Tagara (Ter), Junnar, Karle, Govardhana, Nasik and Dhanakaṭa. Excavations reveal the existence of many other urban or semi-urban settlements. These are Maski, Brahmagiri, Chandravalli, Brahmapurī (Kolhapur), Jorwe, Kondapur, Bahal, Sangankullu, Amarāvatī, Nagarjunikonda, etc. We might include Arikamedu also. The Ariake Sadenon of Ptolemy, identifiable with the Sātavāhana kingdom, contained five ports and eighteen inland towns[2], and in all likelihood many of these are covered by those mentioned in inscriptions or unearthed by excavations. While disclosing their identity the merchants seem to be more particular about stating the names of their parents than those of their towns. Several *negamas* state that they hailed from Kalyāṇa[3]. we also hear of a *negama* from Sopara[4], a blacksmith from Kalyāṇa[5], and also of a carpenter from Dhenukākaṭaka[6]. Some people merely call themselves *nigamaputra*, inhabitant of town. These instances

1. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 59, l. 2.
2. *JAHRS*, xxii (1952-54), 69.
3. *Lüders' List*, nos, 1000-1, 1024, etc.
4. No. 995.
5. No. 1032.
6. No. 1092.

are not exhaustive, but they clearly indicate that artisans and merchants take pride in their cities and perhaps in their civic life to which they contributed their mite. 'Numerous examples of this type demonstrate that to the merchants town or territorial affiliations were of far more moment than tribal or family identities.

At least some of these towns were managed by the *nigamasabhā*, in which Uṣabhadāta proclaimed and got registered his deed of gift according to custom.[1] Sometimes the inhabitants of a town made donations as a corporate body, and there are several references to the gifts made by the town of Dhānyakaṭaka in Amarāvatī sculptures.[2] Members of the *nigamasabhā* were apparently merchants, although some *gahapatis* also served in this capacity.[3] The popular element in local administration has been underlined by several writers. What needs emphasis is that perhaps at no other time in ancient history do epigraphic records and excavations reveal so many towns in the Deccan, especially in Mahārāṣṭra, as in the first two centuries of the Christian era. Apparently merchants did not participate in civic life on such a scale in ancient India as they did in the Deccan during this period. With the evidence from the guilds of traders and artisans, commonly mentioned as *seni* or *śreṇi* and *nikāya* in inscriptions[4], the whole thing adds up to an unprecedented burgeoning of civic life under the Sātavāhana rule. In what relation did the guilds of traders and artisans stand to the *nigamasabhā* is unknown, and so is the nature of the relation between the guilds and the state. But evidently the guilds constituted an important source of economic stability to the king and may have helped him in the administration of towns. Curiously enough each merchant bodies are not heard of under the successors of the Sātavāhanas till the end of the sixth century A. D.

Another element that did not survive the end of the Sātavāhana rule for long is that of matrilineal inheritance, which can be inferred from metronymics and other similar traces. Gupta and post-Gupta kings are represented as devoted to the feet of father (*pitṛ-pādānudhyāta*)

1. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 58, l. 4.
2. C. Sivaramamurti, *Amarāvatī Sculptures in the Madras Government Museum* (*Bulletin of the Madras Government Museum*, N. S. General Section, IV, Madras, 1956), 275, 285.
3. V. S. Bakhle, "Sātavāhanas and the contemporary Kṣatrapas", *JBBRAS*, N. S., iv, 57 quoted in the *Early History of the Deccan*, pts. I-IV, p. 135.
4. *Lüders' List*, nos. 1137, 1180, 1133, 1165.

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but Gautamīputra Śātakarṇī is described as one who rendered uninterrupted service to his mother (*avipanamātu-susuka*).[1] It is significant that Gautamīputra Śātakarṇī, Vāsiṣṭhīputra Puḷumāvi,[2] Vāsiṣṭhīputra Śātakarṇī, Gautamīputra Śrī-Vijaya Śātakarṇī and Gautamīputra Śrī-Yajña Śātakarṇī do not mention their father's names, which is in sharp contrast to the Gupta practice in North India where princes make it a point to refer to their father and also describe with gusto their exploits, real or imaginary.

Since Simuka and Kṛṣṇa, the earliest Sātavāhana kings known from inscriptions, appear without metronymics, it has been thought that matriarchal practices appeared in the Sātavāhana dynasty later. But the stratigraphical position in which the coins of Vāsiṣṭhīputra Viḷivāyakura, Māḍharīputra Sivalakura and Gautamīputra Viḷivāyakura have been found at Brahmapurī in Kolhapur district in Mahārāṣṭra[3] leaves no doubt that the matriarchal practices prevailed in the Deccan even before the advent of the Sātavāhanas. This also abtained among the Mahāraṭhis, who were the contemporaries and vassals of the Sātavāhanas. Metronymics were common even among the ordinary folk, as would appear from the name of the household (*gṛhapati*) Kaunta (apparently son of Kuntī) Sāmba.[4] Matrilineal inheritance seems to be the likely explanation of the metronymics, and since in the dynastic rule the state was a larger version of the family the same system of inheritance prevailed there. The exact mode of succession in the Sātavāhana dynasty cannot be determined, but metronymics suggest that princes did not owe their throne to their father. Among the Nayar community property inherited by the daughter is managed by her brother and failing him by her son. Probably this analogy applies to the case of Gautamīputra Śātakarṇī, who evidently looked after the kingdom inherited by his mother. Occasionally the queen asserted her legal rights, as she did in the 24th year of her son's reign when she directly conveyed her orders to the governor of Govardhana regarding the grant of a field. Only the rightful occupant of the throne could function in

1. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 86, 1.4.
2. Vāsiṣṭhiputra Pulumāvi, however, donated a village 'out of love for his father'. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 86, 1.11.
3. P.L. Gupta, "Coins from Brahmapuri Excavations (1945-46)" *The Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute*, vol. 21, pp. 45-47.
4. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II. no. 90. 1.3.

this manner, for in Aśokan or in other Sātavāhana inscriptions orders were sent to the governors only by the king.

The long and impressive list of Vedic sacrifices performed by Nāganikā is an indication of the matriarchal influence over the Vedic and brahmanical patriarchal tradition which did not permit sacrifices to women. The argument that she did it in company with her royal consort[1] is based on a forced reading of the inscription. The exalted religious status, which involved huge gifts in villages, money and animals[2] and consequently an immense drain on royal treasury, undoubtedly reflects the high political position of the Queen Nāganikā, whose image seems to have been put up publicly. Although the two queens Nāganikā and Gautamī Balaśrī[3] give their antecedents in full, their land grants are not endorsed by the king. In these cases queens held villages not as maintenance grants, as under the Cāhamānas, but probably as portions of matrilineal inheritance.

The wives of the officials and vassals of the Sātavāhanas bore the administrative designations held by their husbands, which shows that they claimed similar prestige and influence; the titles *mahāsenāpatnī*[4] and *mahātalavārī*[5] bear witness to this. We have also the peculiar example of a woman doorkeeper who drafted a land charter.[6] All these facts are sufficient to demonstrate the important role of women in the Sātavāhana system of government.

Although mothers of kings are mentioned in Gupta records, except for Prabhāvatī, the daughter of Candra Gupta II who acted as regent in the Vākāṭaka kingdom, none played any noticeable part in administration. Obviously the Sātavāhana legacy did not make any serious impression on the Gupta or post-Gupta system of government, although women played an important part in administration in early mediaeval Orissā.

But several elements in the Sātavāhana polity proved to be durable. We may begin with the supernatural and super-

1. D. C. Sircar, *Sel. Inscrr.* (2nd edn), p. 97, fn. 1.
2. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 82.
3. Ibid., no. 86.
4. Ibid., no. 89, 1,2.
5. Ibid., no. 98, 1.9; it is an Ikṣvāku inscription of the second half of the third century A. D.
6. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 84, 1.6; based on the reading of D. C. Sircar and his fn. 1 on p. 201 in the second edn.

human attributes assigned to Gautamīputra Śātakarnī. He is compared in prowess and lustre to some legendary figures and supernatural forces such as Rāma, Keśava, Arjuna, Bhīma, Nābhāga, Nahuṣa, Janamejaya, Sagara, Yayāti, Ambarīṣa, Pavana, Garuḍa, Siddha, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Vidyādhara, Bhūta, Gandharva, Cāraṇa, Candra, Divākara and planets[1]. This analogy tends to bring out divine aspects of kingship, which come out prominently in the epigraphic descriptions of Gupta kings.

The Sātavāhana political functionaries provide one of the earliest instances of the use of the title *mahā* or great, which came to be widely associated with the designations of the Gupta princes and officials and feudatories. The Sātavāhana kings call themselves *rāja*, although the term *mahārāja* is mentioned in their inscriptions. There occur other designations such as *mahāsenāpati*, *mahārathī*, *mahābhoja*, *mahātalavāra*, etc., which are considered to be the epithets of the feudatories of the Sātavāhanas. Some feudatories such as the Mahārathīs not only bore metronymics like the Sātavāhanas but also enjoyed hereditary status[2], enabling them to issue coins[3] and grant villages in their own rights[4]. Some of these titles are found among the Ikṣvākus, Cuṭus, Viṣṇukuṇḍins, etc., and also among some branches of the Sātavāhanas, who were evidently the feudatories of the main branch. The use of the profix *mahā* introduces graded and unequal relationships and marks the beginning of the titles which became popular in feudal hierarchy in the early mediaeval period.

But the most important element which was adumberated later was the Sātavāhana system of rural administration in which people were committed to the care of police and soldiers or of religious beneficiaries. In the rural areas there is no indication of any popular element, as has been sometimes thought[5]. On the basis of Hāla's *Gāthā Sattasai* it has been suggested that the jurisdiction of the *grāmaṇī* extended to five or even ten villages[6]. But the mention of the term *rahaṭṭa-ghaḍiya* in Chapter V of that text would suggest that it

1. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 86, ll. 7-9.
2. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 85, ll. 2-3.
3. P. L. Gupta, *The Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute*, vol. 21, 42-45.
4. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 86, ll. 2-3.
5. G. Yazdani, ed., *Early History of the Deccan*, pts. I-IV, p. 135.
6. Ibid.

was compiled some time in the 9th century A.D. when the persian device of *araghaṭṭa* irrigation is mentioned in northern inscriptions. Although many villages are named in connection with the religious gifts of the Sātavāhanas, their headmen and elders do not come in for notice as they do in later charters. On the basis of an inscription of the first quarter of the third century A.D.[1] it has been suggested that the village was managed by the *gāmika* or *grāmika*, but the crucial seems to be *gumika*, the Prakrit form of *gaulmika*.[2] This befits the context in which the *gaulmika* Kumāradatta is represented as subordinate to the *mahāsenāpati* Skandanāga who held charge of Sātavāhaṇihāra. A century later a Pallava copper-plate charter from the same area includes the *gumika* or *gaulmika* in the list of royal officers to whom the grant is addressed[3]. The *gaulmika*[4] was head of a *gulma* consisting, according to the sources of the first four centuries of the Christian era, of 9 *pattis*, amounting to 9 chariots, 9 elephants, 27 horses and 45 foot in all.[5] Most probably chariots had gone out of use in war at this stage, but it is evident that the *gulma* was an army platoon. Manu states that the *gulma* should be stationed in the midst of two, three, five or a hundred villages[6]. These police-cum-military contingent obviously lived off the countryside, where they were the chief symbols of royal power. The earliest evidence for this development appears in Bellary district, south of the Krishna in Mysore, during the third century A. D. and may not be true of the earlier period and the Western Deccan, to which most of the early Sātavāhana inscriptions belong. Even in the second century A. D. the *mahāsenāpati* performed some civil functions such as drafting land charters,[7] but it is not known whether he held charge of large territorial units. Sukthankar suggests that these military officers were feudal lords of the lands, holding them as *jagirs*. This may or may not be true, but the practice of having military officers as governors is in sharp contrast with the administration of the Aśokan *janapada* which was placed under a high

1. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 90.
2. *EI*, XIV, 155, fn. 5.
3. Ibid., III, no. 65, 1.5.
4. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 90, 1. 3. D. C. Sircar reads *gamika*, but Sukthankar suggests *gumika-gulmika* (*EI*, XIV, 155, fn. 5). This is accepted by D. D. Kosambi, *An Introduction to the Study of Indian History* (Bombay, 1956) p. 276.
5. *Mbh.* I. 2.15-17 & *Amarakośa*. II. 8. 10-11 quoted in Kosambi, op. cit., 276.
6. VIII. 114.
7. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II. no. 87, 1.4.

civil functionary called *rājuka*. No doubt Aśoka was obsessed with the problem of maintaining peace among the frontier peoples, but he did not place them under military rule.

That coercive elements are prominent in the Sātavāhana rural administration can also be made out from the nature of concessions granted to religious beneficiaries. Gifts of both cultivated fields and villages are rendered free from molestation and entry of policemen and soldiers and also from the interference of royal officials. Since the charters give chief attention to these privileges and not to taxes from whose payment the beneficiary was exempted, they create the impression that royal police, soldiers, retainers and officials freely operated in the rural areas and formed an effective agency of exploitation. The practice was continued with vigour by the Vākāṭakas, who clearly enumerated the provisions that the villagers had to supply to various types of royal retainers, and became a general feature of early mediaeval polity in the countryside.

The military character of the Sātavāhana rule is also evident from their common use of such terms at *kaṭaka* and *skandhāvāra*. meaning military camps. It seems that every *āhāra* had its *kaṭaka*; the situation of Benakaṭaka in Govardhana[1]-āhāra is an example, although Dhenukākaṭaka or Dhānyakaṭaka may have held a similar position in another *āhāra*. The Sātavāhanas originated the practice of issuing land charters from victory camps, which became widespread in early mediaeval times.

Land grants formed a significant trait of the Sātavāhana rural administration. Inscriptions show that the Sātavāhanas started the practice of granting fiscal and administrative immunities to Brāhmaṇas and Buddhist monks. Perhaps the earliest epigraphic grant of land is found in the Nanaghat Cave Inscription of Nāganikā, who bestowed villages (*grāma*) on priests for officiating at Vedic sacrifices[2], but it does not speak of any concessions in this context. These appear first in grants made by Gautamīputra Śātakarṇī in the first quarter of the second century A.D. and include the surrender of royal rights to the procurement of salt from cultivated fields, which in actual practice may not have been found in every field. What is further important

1. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 83, l. 1.
2. *Sel. Inscrr.*, II, no. 82.

is that royal officials, –apparently policemen, retainers, and soldiers, –are asked not to interfere with the administration of the donated field or village, which is thus left completely in the hands of religious beneficiaries.

The Sātavāhana inscriptions of the second century A. D. speak of exemptions of all kinds granted to the beneficiaries by using the phrase *sarva-jāti-parihāra*.[1] *Parihāra* in the sense of royal charter is defined by Kauṭilya as an act of royal favour done to special castes towns, villages or countries.[2] In the sense of remission of taxes it is recommended to cultivators in new settlements,[3] and to sailors and merchants[4] in special cases; remission for five years is also prescribed for those who renovate irrigation works.[5] In the *Arthaśāstra* we hear of villages which enjoyed remissions[6] and also of royal favourites who lived on such remissions[7]. Kauṭilya's main objective in recommending *parihāra* is purely secular namely to eventually augment royal resources. But the Sātavāhana inscriptions speak only of *parihāras* granted for religious reasons, and specify only four or five[8] items from which immunity was granted. Eighteen items (*aṣṭādaśajāti-parihāras*) are mentioned separately in a fourth century A. D. Pallava inscription[9] which refers to their prevalence in the Sātavāhana *rāṣṭra*[10]; but we are not quite sure whether the peasants were subjected to all these impositions from the early third century A. D. when this area was occupied by the Sātavāhanas.

Nor was the transfer of fiscal and administrative rights made absolute and permanent. In one case a village granted to one set of Buddhist monks seems to have been taken away and granted to another set by Vāsiṣṭhīputra Puḷumāvi[11]. In another case Gautamīputra seems to have resumed the grant of a field from the monks on the ground that it was not being cultivated and the village was not being inhabited. Instead of this the monks were granted another piece of land on the boundary of the town.[12] In any case perpetual grants of land were not made in the Sātavāhana kingdom. Although we hear of the *akṣayanīvi*[13] tenure, yet at this stage it implied the inexhaustible character of the benefice and not its grant in perpetuity.

1. Ibid., no. 83, l.4.
2. *AS*, II, 10.
3. Ibid., II. 1.
4. Ibid., II. 16.
5. Ibid., III. 9.
6. Ibid., II. 35.
7. Ibid., II. 37.
8. Ibid.. 11. 3-4.
9. Ibid., III. no. 65, 11. 31-36.
10. Ibid., 1.27.
11. Ibid., II, no. 87, 11. 2-4.
12. Ibid., no. 84, 11. 3-5.
13. Ibid., no. 87, 1.2.

Evidently the Sātavāhanas supplemented the coercive method of maintaining their authority in the countryside by grants to monks and priests. The Buddhist monks, who seem to have been one of the earliest landed beneficiaries according to inscriptions, must have preached peace and rules of good conduct, lessening the occasions for defiance of the royal authority and social order. A similar service may have been rendered by the Brāhmaṇas, who would be interested in enforcing the rules of the varṇa system. In an inscription Gautamīputra Śātakarṇī is called the sole Brāhmaṇa and credited with the prevention of the fusion of four varṇas. The Sātavāhanas seem to have been improvised Brāhmaṇas, which accounts for their zealous support of the brāhmanical order. Perhaps all the four varṇas mentioned in the Sātavāhana inscriptions were not equally well established in their dominions, and in actual practice royal task may have been confined to the disciplining of the śūdras, although Gautamīputra claims to have disgraced the kṣatriya princes. The role which this king claims for himself is commended to the king by Kauṭilya. Later this claim is made in inscriptions by Gupta kings, Harṣavardhana and others. But royal responsibility for maintaining the existing social order and thus contributing to political stability was first stressed by the Sātavāhanas.

The picture of the Sātavāhana political organisation that emerges from this study is incomplete. We do not have any information about their judicial system, very little about their civil administration, and not enough about their fiscal and military system. Inscriptions of the second and third centuries show that their kingdom was divided into *āhāras* and *grāmas* in hierarchical order to which would correspond the official hierarchy of *amātya* or *mahāsenāpati*, and *gaulmika*. The two later officials as heads of territorial units appear in the third century A.D. in Bellary district. Hence it is difficult to visualise this neat territorial arrangement uniformly for the whole period and kingdom of the Sātavāhanas. Numerous epigraphic references suggest that the Sātavāhana polity was sustained by monks and merchants, but we cannot assess their exact contribution to administration. Probably the first preached peace in return for the rich grants they received, and the second provided the necessary resources for these and other expenses of the state.

Not the least striking feature of the Sātavāhana rule was its coercive, military character, which can be derived from the importance attached to freedom from visits of the police and soldiers to the countryside and from the names of such administrative functionaries as *mahāsenāpati* and *gaulmika*.

The Sātavāhana system of administration appears to be a significant link between the Mauryas and Guptas, and between the North and the South. The Sātavāhanas retained a few elements of the Aśokan administration, but they introduced several important ones which were continued by the Vākāṭakas and Guptas. The role played by women and merchants in their government did not last long, but the practice of placing rural districts under military rule and granting fiscal and administrative immunities spread both northward and southward. In this respect the Pallava system of administration was the southward extension of the Sātavāhana counterpart. It retained the *gulma* system of government as well as the practice of granting exemptions, which now covered a very wide range comprising eighteen *parihāras* in the fourth and as many as thirty-five in the sixth century.

CULTURE SEQUENCE IN HARIYANA

BY

ADRIS BANERJI

That there was a tract in mediaeval India called Hariyāṇā is not so well known to the demos. Still less is its extent and history. In a degree it corresponds with the ancient Kuru country, including the celebrated Kurukṣetra. The historians with their patronising advices in 'History' and 'Oriental' Conferences and Congresses, have considered it beneath their dignity, to define the geographical divisions of ancient and mediaeval India, except a few like Sir A. Cunningham, R. D. Banerji, Dr. H. C. Roychaudhury, P. C. Bagchi and B. C. Sen. The clarifications of dynastic synchronisms and cronology and controverting interpretations of lines of epigraphs, have proved so engrossing, that often they have forgotten to define the areas occupied by them, except in maps, where modern names have not been shown. Thus Chāhamāna chief Viśaladeva occupied Delhi, but what was the current name of the tract occupied has not been defined by any scholar except Dr. Dāśarathi Śarmā, notwithstanding the fact, that epigraphic and literary data existed. *The Imperial Gaseteer of India* (Provincial Series, Punjab. Vol I), edited by Sir John Thompson states that Hariyana : a tract of country in the Panjab, lying between 28°30′ N. and 75°45′ and 76°30′ E., is chiefly in the eastern half of Hissar district, but also comprises a part of Hissar district and the states of Jind and Patiala. It is in the shape of an irregular oval, with its long axis lying north west and south east." But late Sir John forgot to take into consideration the information supplied by two inscriptions found in the 19th century A. D. These are first : Sarvan inscription on stone of the reign of Sultan Muhammad ibn Tughluq, dated in V. S. 1384 (c. 1327-28 A. D.). Sarvan was a village, 5 miles to the south of the walled city of Delhi. It states, inter alia, that the city of Dhillika was situated in the country of Hariyāṇā, founded by the Tomaras, and then occupied by the Chāhamānas. The *melecoha* Sahābadīna (Sihab-ud-din) seized the city by force.[1] The next is the Palam (Baoli) inscription

1. *Epigraphia Indica*, vol. i, pp. 93 ff.

of the time of Ghyās--ud-din Balban, which clearly proves that the present Delhi district formed a part of Hariyāṇā.[1] Since from Delhi, one could not frog jump over Gurgaoṅ district to reach Patiala, Jind, Hissar and Rohtak districts, as well as portions of Karnal, we have to conclude that old Hariyāṇā stretched from the banks of the Yamunā to the foothills of Siwalik in Karnal. They occupied the lands of the ancient republican tribe of Yaudheyas, who, as late Jayacandra Vidyālaṅkāra has shown, were conquered by Nakula in his *uttarāpatha* campaign. Rohtak district was then known as *Rohitāśva-Bahudhānyaka.*[2] Coins and moulds of this tribe have been found at Khokra Kot within the municipal limits of the Rohtak city. It is therefore evident that there is some overlap in the geographical limits of the Panjab and Hariyāṇā. This need not be surprising since the modern state of Panjab, before the division, took its shape in British times after Mudki, Aliwal etc.

Geo-physically, Delhi district shares the features of the other north Indian plains and can be divided into *Khaḍar* (that is riparine) and *baṅgār* (that is dessicated area). The whole union-administered territory is dotted with extension of the Aravalli ranges, geologically known as 'Alwar outliers,'[3] mostly submerged under alluvium. Nowhere this phenomenon is so evident, than within the present Rāmakṛṣṇapuram colony, where I have seen trenches dug to a depth of 80 meters yielding no signs of previous occupations; but, here and there rocks protruding from the surface. In its neighbourhood (that is Delhi) it expands into a rocky tableland, about 3 miles in breadth running across the district. About ten miles from the old walled city, the range divided itself into branches, one of which re-entered Gurgaon district, by turning south-west, while the other continuing its northernly course has come to be known as the celebrated 'ridge' of Delhi, now completely lost in the jungle of ultra-modern subarban buildings. It was finally supposed to have terminated on the banks of the Yamunā. The next district Gurgaon, belongs to the Mewat area of Rajasthan. These Meos were originally Hindus, but were converted like the Kafirs of Afghanistan

1. *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, vol. xliii, pt. i., 1874, pp. 47-63.
2. *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, 1929, pp. 47-63; and *Bhāratīya Anuśīlana*, Section viii, pp. 3-9.
3. For clarification cf. D. N. Wadia—*Geology of India.*

during Turco-Afghan period by the sword and flames. The surface contours are various. First, rocky ranges of Alwar outliers, which enter the district from the south and runs northwards. The northern plains have been divided into two by the western range. Below the escarpment of the eastern range an alluvial portion extends upto the Yamunā. At the foot of the upland area a series of hollows existed, now being occupied by the land racketeers of Delhi to lay new colonies. Even now they are waterlogged during monsoon, but in bygone ages used to transform themselves into swamps. Rewari *tahsil* lying to the west of the western range is the second part, being a sandy plain dotted with isolated rocks. Torrents have cut deep beds. It was formerly inhabited by *Āhirs* before diluvian qualities of Panjabi and Jāt immigrants swept them away. It was they who are credited with having made Hariyāṇā green, notwithstanding dessication. The district of Rohtak (vulgo. from ancient Rohitāśva), with the fort built by Sher Shah and named after famous Rohtasgarh in Sahabad district of Bihar, is characterized by series of canals with belts of trees lines of sandhills, torrent beds, and depressions which are flooded during capricious monsoon and when the rivers are in spate. Lastly few rocky elevations glorified into hills. The surface rises gradually in terraces till it reaches the borders of Hissar. Beyond Jhajjar, the country becomes undulating, like rolling pasturelands. The district of Karnal has two natural divisions made by a low ridge. To the east of it lies the *Khaḍar* area, while to the west of it lies *baṅgār* area, an upland plain with 'Jumna canal'. They fill up the whole of the celebrated Panipat *tahsil* but in Karnal and Kaithal *tahsils* the land rises to a higher level, once an arid area now watered by the Sirsa canal. It is a part of Kurukṣetra. The famous 'Karnal Gap' to which our attention was first drawn by Sir H.J. Makinder, exists in this district 5, between north eastern extremity of the desert and foothills of the Siwaliks. "No river traverses this gateway, which is on the divide between the system of the Indus and the Ganges. Delhi stands on the west bank of the Jamuna at the northern extremity of the Aravallis, just where the invading forces from the north west came through to the navigable rivers." (Makinder).

Hariyāṇā has yet to yield from its bosom, the material remains of the Harappa empire. It has been found at several sites in the Punjab and in northern U.P., mostly in Meerut and Saharanpur dis-

tricts, that is in Madra and Pañcāla countries, but not in Hariyāṇā proper. But traces of their successors have been found at various places. The culture sequence in Hariyāṇā, in the present state of our knowledge is as follows :

I. No old stone age tools or neolithic artifacts have so far been found in Hariyāṇā, but an intensive explorations of the Karnal Gap and the Suraj Kund area might prove fruitful.

II. Painted Grey ware.

III. Northern Black Polished pottery.

IV. Śuṅga pottery and other antiquities.

V. Yaudheyas.

VI. Kuṣāṇa and later Kuṣāṇa pottery and coins.

VII. Pratihāra (three architraves found at Sultan Ghārī and now in National Museum).

IX, Plain red ware of mediaeval times (c. 800-1100 A. D.)

X. Muslim pottery both glazed and unglazed.

The *terminus a quo* of protohistory of Hariyāṇa is therefore P. G. Ware people and the sequence above given is based upon the excavations carried out at Purāṇā Quillā in the heart of New Delhi. It has also been found at Tilpat, a place 13 miles south of New Delhi, on the Delhi-Mathura Road. Either Āhmad Shāh Ābdāli or Nādir Shāh camped here. It has also been found at Amin, *tahsil* Thaneswar of Karnal district, Baghula, *tahsil* Palwal of Gurgaon district, Bahadurgarh in Rohtak district by O. F. Prufer ; Chhat in *tahsil* Rajpur, in Patiala district ; Dhankot in Gurgaon district ; Kurukṣetra in Karnal district ; Palwal the *tahsil* headquarters in Gurgaon district ; Panipat Pehowa (ancient Pṛthūdaka), Rājā Karana kā Quillā and Teora in Karnal district, Bhadasa, Malab and Gohana in Gurgaon district. Many of the sites mentioned here were not excavated but yielded P. G. ware from the surface, from the cleanings of the deep wells etc. At Kurukṣetra, from the ancient mounds lying near Thaneswar railway station, at Panipat, the Waterloo of India, on the north eastern side of the big mound where the Gandhi Memorial Library and the Power House have been erected, was noticed a fairly good vertical section, in which P. G. Ware was seen lying on the nathal soil, superimposed by NBP. Pehowa contained two mounds, completely overbuilt by patriotic immigrants. At this place, P.G. Ware

was recovered from thrown-out materials near the southern and south eastern periphery of the town. Low ground in front of Rājā Karana kā Quillā yielded P.G. sherds. Sherds from Teora were obtained by Sri B.K. Thapar. Bādli kī sarāi, supplied P.G. Ware to Sri R.C. Das[1].

Sequences yielded by the spade at Rupar, at Alamgirpur, Hastinapur and Purānā Quillā have definitely established that P. G. Ware people were succeeded by NBP. That is Mauryan age. It is a widely distributed pottery, symbolical of an integrated cultural milieu. Before we proceed to the next there is an important point to be emphasised. When we meet with P. G. ware, whether it be at Rupar, or in sites like Bhagwansar, Chak 11 or Chak 21 in Hanumangarh district, Purānā Quillā, or Hastinapur, they betray a considerable anterior development, and they were turned out by potters, who were not merely experts in their trade, but past masters in their art. In other words, we meet with the products of a mature phase and not beginnings.

The Northern Black polished pottery has been found at Purānā Quillā, where it was associated with Punch Marked coins, Cast coins, well-built brick buildings soakpits etc. At Khokra Kot, in Rohtak district, NBP was obtained by Hillary Waddington. At Panipat they were found in exposed sections above the P.G. Ware level. Sonepat in Rohtak district has also supplied N.B.P. At Tilpat NBP was found at a fairly high or level above P.G. Ware.

The *terminus ad quaem* of Pre-Muslim archaeology of Hariyāṇā was furnished by the excavations of the fortifications of Lāl Kot or Quillā Rāi Pithorā in 1957-58 and 1958-59[2]. Pottery found here was easily divisible into two ages, *significantly*, separated by a layer of ashes and rubble. The earlier pottery was a plain red ware, also found at Hastinapur V, and some of the types corresponded with those found in the latest level at Ahichhatrā, in Barelly district ascribed to c. 850-1100 A.D[3]. The second phase was marked by appearance of glazed ware used by Turco-Afghans and a grey ware with black wash. This latter pottery is found in many sites in Bihar[4].

1. *Cambridge History of India*, vol. i, p. 21.
2. *Ibid.*
3. For list of sites in which P.G. Ware has been found cf. B. B. Lal Report on Hastinapur Excavations, *Ancient India*, nos. 10-11, pp. 138-42 ; of present writer in *Man in India*, vol. 43, pp. 225 ff.
4. *Ancient India*, No. 1. K. C. Panigrahi & A. Ghosh—Pottery of Ahichhatrā.

WHAT A TRIBAL WOMAN CAN TEACH US

BY

P. C. ROY CHOWDHURY

The tribal women, just as their counter-parts in the non-tribal world, fix up more the values that bind the society and give us an index of the incidence of progress or otherwise of the society. It is a great mistake to think that the tribal women are more like a property to be bought and sold or mere tools for sex enjoyment or are beasts of labour. Such ideas are results of male egoism and immature study.

As a matter of fact, a tribal woman can teach us a lot. They occupy a position of prestige and status which is denied to the non-tribal women of many communities. A tribal woman will seldom submit to the arrangement of marriage where the bridegroom is a total stranger. Normally, the tribal pair had met and known each other well before they marry. The bride-price is paid not because the bride is bought as a chattel but as a personal homage to the girl. The payment of the bride-price indicates the assured position of the bride in the bridegroom's family.

The institution of marriage appears to be more rational and broad-based in the tribal society. The tribal boys and girls grow up in natural surroundings with very little of inhibition. The *Akharas* for dances and music bring them together and pre-marital sexual relationship within the non-prohibited group is not encouraged but not frowned upon as it is presumed this will lead to marital relationship. But within the prohibited group this will be a grave offence for which not only the pair but their parents will have to be severely punished. This shows that the moorings of their society are based on common-sense and reason with full advantage of the background. It is again a fact that there is hardly any post-marital delinquency in a tribal woman. If detected, it is more of an offence of the man to the society and the offending wife will not be deserted if the offending man pays a heavy punishment. This again shows a much more liberal and democratic idea in a tribal husband.

A tribal household runs very smoothly. The husband and the wife have separate zones, obligations and rights much more specified than probably what we find in the modern society. A tribal woman has her freedom and responsibilities after marriage in a much greater degree and can enforce them more easily and quickly than her sophisticated and educated sister.

There are certain pertinent features. In the tribal world there are hardly any unmarried adult women. Every girl finds a husband much more easily than her counter-part elsewhere. With the primitive technology and economy, running of tribal home is a wholetime occupation. A primitive woman is usually denied the various avocations open to an unmarried woman in a non-primitive society.

The tribal society has a much more liberal marriage institution and here again in full consonance with their background widow marriage, sororate, levirate and even condonation of untraditional unions through punishments and communal feasts keep their society in a very strong position and maintain their community feeling. It is only when they think that the society has been insulted and the *Bongas* or the spirits will be angry and there will be troubles that untraditional unions are punished by ostracism or ex-communication. A married woman is expected to keep the family, village and the higher deities pacified in every form, bring in additional income by collecting honey, grass, edible fruits, roots, tubers, *mahua*, fuel, bamboo-twigs and even trapping hare or other small animals. Women's contribution in the family is very substantial. It is the women who rear livestock and birds although the grazing may be done by the children. She also takes part in a number of agricutural operations not involving very heavy manual work. In our investigation on socio-economic surveys of some of the tribals in the Chotanagpur districts, the tribal women gave more coherent and thought-out answers than their husbands.

In a tribal family a large number of children gives a particular status to the mother who will be more honorifically addressed as the mother of so and so—usually the eldest child. Even regarding the childern there is a norm which keeps the temper of the family even. As soon as a son comes of age, he has little to do with the mother and comes completely under the father. But the daughter remains completely under the mother till she is married. Even the love-affairs of

an unmarried daughter will not perturb the father as it is the mother's jurisdiction and certainly not if the society does not feel shaken up by the unmarried daughter's pranks. Mother-fixation is seldom a feature in the tribal young man. Every one of the family has his or her zones and functions. A man has his agricultural or labour work, his social and community obligations, his *shikar*, his worship at the sacred groves and his propitiation of the spirit. He does not go out with his wife for these objectives just as the wife does not need the husband's presence for her part of the obligations in running the household or even going to the grain-gola to take loan of seeds. At the same time, it will not be correct to say that there is not much of companionship between the tribal husband and his wife. The conventional authority of the husband within the family is subject to the authority of the community and cannot override the wife's rights, civil and social and this sustains the incidence of companionship. Ties of kinship make the family relationship less intense and less acrimonious. The primitive child is brought up in very strong ties of kinship and a tribal boy or a girl when he or she grows up knows that he or she belongs to the wider family which is the society. This is so because as a child he has called and known quite a few as his father or mother or brother outside his own family. We suffer from a family exclusiveness—the family being "we" and the rest of society "they". But in the primitive societies each home spreads into another and the households intermingle in a communal life. There is not, therefore, the same emotional concentration on a very small circle of persons constituting our family. This idea has its advantages. When a parent dies, it is a disaster to us but it is not so in a primitive household as there is a bigger cushion of kinship that will absorb much of the shock.

The tribal women are still satisfied with their position, rights, obligations and restrictions. They do not consider themselves as dependent or under-privileged. They brew home beer for the men-folk as well as for themselves. They take a more vital part in the communal songs and dances. If leadership in instrumental music is the prerogative of a youngman, the leadership in song belongs to a woman. Unless one has seen how they enjoy themselves at the *Akharas* in the communal songs and dances, it is difficult to understand how much that plays in their life.

We could give some concrete illustrations by referring to the Santals. A Santal unmarried daughter has the duty to husk the rice, sweep the house and courtyard and smear them with cow-dung, bring drinking water, make plates and cups of *sal* leaves, cook and wash clothes. In agricultural operations she assists in uprooting and transplanting the seedlings of paddy and harvesting the crop. She brings firewood and grazes the cattle. In the evening she joins the village dance. The wages earned by her are the property of the head of the family but she has the absolute right to *irarpa* or a bundle of harvested crop, any present that her maternal uncle may give her out of affection and any gifts she receives as customary presents from her grandfather or elder sister's husband. If she is the elder sister and the younger sister is married, she must be given two rupees from the bridegroom's father. If this is not given to her, she can insist on being given *sindoor* also. If there is a partition in the family before the girl is married, she is given *dangua hisa* in the form of cattle. If her mother is dead and she has no brothers, she gets her father's moveable property on his death and retains it till her marriage. If she is a major, she can dispose it of. She has also her restrictions. She cannot ask for a partition if her brothers are separate, but normally a piece of land is kept in reserve for financing her marriage. Her right to maintenance continues if she is adult and she can claim it from her father, brother or father's agnates. She can even acquire land of her own out of the wages received in the form of *irarpa* and out of other customary presents. She has the absolute right to such land. The unmarried girl has rights over her own person. If any one violates her modesty, the culprit has to pay rupees five or some other sum decided as *lajao-maro* which remains as her absolute property.

The Santal girl on her marriage acquires a double status. She acquires the right of a wife while she retains the privileges of a daughter excepting that her right for maintenance lapses. During her life time a married daughter has full control of ownership over her all types of property whether moveable or immoveable. Regarding her private right to person, it changes with marriage and after marriage if anybody violates her person, it is the husband who has to move and be compensated. The marriage provides a girl with a new set of *bongas* as at the pre-marital stage she had her father's *bongas* as her own.

If a Santal desires a co-wife, he has to ask the approval of the first wife but her consent is not always decisive if the village elders decide otherwise. The first wife then is entitled to certain relief. The earlier custom was that the first wife awaited at the door of the house with a broom and burning firewood to compel the co-wife to purchase her entry by paying compensation known as *hirom baiha.* Usually a cow or five rupees are given. She can also claim *chadao-di* or divorce money. But if the first wife consents to live with her husband along with the co-wife, neither *hirom baiha* nor *chadao-di* will be paid.

Widow marriage is permissible. If a widow marries, she can take that property which she owns as a married daughter or acquired by herself. But a widow has no claim to her deceased husband's property if there are agnates and she can only keep the landed property of her husband with the consent of her agnates. If the widow does not re-marry, her right to maintenance will continue and if her husband's family neglects her, she can demand sufficient land for maintenance. If her husband was separate, the widow will remain under the control of her major sons. The land will be held jointly by all her sons subject to the obligation of maintaining their mother and unmarried sister. If they neglect her, she can demand sufficient land as *khorpos.* If her sons die unmarried, she inherits the property until her death or re-marriage.

When all the sons are minors, the widow acts like their father, usually supervises the cultivation, administers the moveables and runs the joint household. She must not, however, leave the village. If she does, her right lapses. The position, in fact, is that while her son is the father's ultimate heir, the widow is expected to take due care of the family moveables during the period of minority of the sons and if she begins to waste the property. the villagers can interfere and appoint a manager to administer the property of the minors.

If a widow marries or elopes, her rights to her deceased husband's property will lapse. If a widow is criminally assaulted by a Santal, and if the accused is fined by the villagers, out of the fine a share is given to the widow as *Lajao-maro.* But if she herself colludes, her husband's kinsmen can intervene and after her marriage, she must leave the house and property. After becoming a widow, her relation to her husband's

bongas is also affected. A widow is debarred from entering into the *bithar* or private shrine to offer worships to appease the family *bongas*.

A Santal girl has a number of methods through which she can be married. The most common form is where the marriage is negotiated and bride price is paid. Another form is that of *ghar jamai* where no bride price is paid. But the *ghar jamai* has to work as a servant in his wife's house for a previously stipulated period which may extend up to five years. Another common form is where a boy pounces on the girl and smears some red paint on the forehead of the girl with whom he is in love. Having done this, he runs away to avoid the thrashing that he may expect at the hands of the relations. This again is followed by a certain amount of show where the boy is spotted and given a beating and ultimately the *majhi* decides the case and the girl's father is paid some money. If the marriage forms are many, the divorce regulations are quite strict and a divorce is always to be compensated. The incidence of divorce is rather small.

All this will show that long before a Hindu woman had her rights secured by a Statutory law, the Santal women had many of them through customs and conventions. Their caste panchayat meets quickly and decisions are implemented with greater expediency and with almost an iron hand.

Lastly, the tribal woman is an example of living joy—she has a smile always—she enjoys life and that is a great lesson.

CYRUS THE GREAT AND THE INDUS VALLEY REGION

BY

BUDDHA PRAKASH

In his *Cyropaedia* (The Education of Cyrus), Xenophon (444 or 424 B.C.–357 B.C.) has written an interesting anecdote about the great Persian monarch Cyrus the Great (559-530 B.C.). When the great king had defeated the chaldaeans, he tried to bring about a *rapprochement* between them and their opponents, the Armenians and, for that purpose, invited their leaders to a dinner. While the party was in progress, one of the chaldaeans said that to all of them his overlordship was acceptable, but there were some of them, who lived by plundering, knew nothing of farming and might not relish his thraldom. He added that they were often in the service of the Indian king, who paid them well, for he was a very wealthy man. Then, he went on to remark that the chaldaeans made frequent trips to the Indian king in response to the visit of his embassy to Media. Cyrus became deeply interested in the Indian king and thought of borrowing money from him to meet the financial requirements of his forthcoming military programmes. With this end in view he sent an envoy to the Indian king and asked the kings of Armenia and Chaldaea to depute their men to escort him and introduce him to the Indian king. The message to be delivered by that envoy has been reported by Xenophon as follows :—

"King of India, Cyrus has sent me to you ; he says that he needs more funds, for he is expecting another army from his home in Persia. If, therefore, you will send him as much as you conveniently can, he says that, if God will give him good success, he will try to make you think that you were well-advised in doing him this favour"[1].

Regarding the outcome of the mission, Cyrus is said to have made the following observation :

"If we get anything from him (the Indian king), we shall have more abundant funds to use ; and, if we do not, we shall know that

1. Xenophon, Cyropaedia, III. 2. 29, English translation of Walter Miller Vol. I p. 265.

we owe him no thanks, but may, as far as he is concerned, settle everything with a view to our own interests"[1]

Scholars have seen in the description of the wealthy Indian king, to whom Cyrus sent his embassy, a reference to the Nanda Kings of Magadha, who were famous for their fabulous wealth.[2] But the Nandas, Mahāpadma and his sons, flourished about two hundred years after Cyrus. Besides this, they ruled over the region to the east of the river Beas with the territory to its west and north under powerful independent tribes and kings, mentioned by the grammarian Pāṇini and, a generation later, by the historians of Alexander's campaigns, so that no king of Persia could have any truck with them straightway. Hence there is no possibility of Cyrus having had anything to do with the Nandas of Magadha, unless we presume that Xenophon, who communicated the information about his embassy to the Indian king to us, is guilty of an anachronistic solecism, the burden of proving which lies on them who assert it. The common procedure of judging men and events is to produce evidence and marshal facts rather than to make guesses and hazard conjectures. In the present case, we have no facts to prove that Xenophon was jumbling up situations and personalities with no regard for chronological considerations. Hence it is not justifiable to presume that he was committing the mistake of synchronizing Cyrus the Great and the Nandas.

We know that in the sixth century B. C. the Indus Valley region was exceptionally rich. After its annexation to the Achaemenian empire by Darius I between 518 and 515 B. C. it contributed nearly one third of the total revenue to the imperial exchequer. According to the calculation of Herodotus, out of the total revenue of 14,560 silver talents, 4,680 talents came from the two satrapies of Gandarioi and Indoi, corresponding to taxation units no. 7 and 20 of his gazetteer,[3] into which he had divided the Indus Valley region, following his general policy of breaking up political concentrations by dividing the territories of erstwhile peoples and potentates into smaller administra-

1. Ibid, III, 2, 30; Vol. I p. 267.
2. H. C. Roychoudhury, *Political History of Ancient India* (6th ed) p. 230; *The Age of the Nandas and Mauryas*, p. 12; Etienne Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, p. 109.
3. G. Rawlinson, *History of Herodotus*, III. 89-97 edited by Manucl Kamroff p. 185.

tive and fiscal units. The ratio between the values of silver and gold being $13\frac{1}{3} : 1$, the Indian contribution in terms of gold comes to 360 talents,[1] which is equivalent to over a million pound sterling. This shows the enormous economic potential of the Indus valley region in the sixth century B. C. The wealthy Indian king, from whom Cyrus wanted to borrow money, may well have belonged to this region,

In the sixth century B. C. Gandhāra was making rapid progress as an imperial power in the North-West. Its king Pukkusāti had launched on an expansionist career. According to the Gandhāra Jātaka, Kāśmīra formed part of the Gāndhāra kingdom.[2] Strabo informs us that, in the territory between the Chenab and the Ravi, a tribe, called Gandaris, lived at the time of Alexander's invasion,[3] which shows that in some earlier period it must have been under the domination of Gandhāra. Hecataeus of Miletus (549-468 B. C.) writes that Kaspapyros or Kaśyapapura, which has been identified with ancient Multān by Foucher, was known as a city of Gandhāra.[4] Thus, it is clear that the kingdom of Gandhāra expanded eastward upto the Ravi and southward up to Multān and included Kāśmīra and almost the whole of the Indus Valley. Naturally, therefore, its ruler Pukkusāti desired to enter into diplomatic negotiations with King Bimbisāra of Magadha, to whom he sent an embassy[5] and made bold to declare war on King Pradyota of Avanti.[6] These plans and policies indicate the great power and prestige of Gandhāra under his rule.

Bimbisāra of Magadha and Pradyota of Avanti were the contemporaries of Buddha, a greater part of whose life was spent in the sixth century B. C. Hence their associate Pukkusāti of Gandhāra also flourished in that century. We know that between 518 and 515 B. C. Gandhāra had been annexed to the Achaemenian empire by Darius I.[7] Therefore, the period of Pukkusāti must be before the time of Darius.

1. Richard N. Frye, *The Heritage of Persia* p. 115.
2. *Jātaka*, ed. V. Fausböll No. 406.
3. J. W. Mc Crindle, *The Invasion of India by Alexander the Great*, pp. 111-12, 133.
4. A. Foucher, 'Ancient Multan', *A.C. Woolner Commemoration Volume* (1941).
5. *Papañcasūdanī*, II p. 982 ; T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India* p. 28 ; G. P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*, II p. 215.
6. Felix Lacote, *Essay on Guṇāḍhya* (English translation by Rev. A. M. Tabard) p. 176.
7. Buddha Prakash, *Political and Social Movements in Ancient Panjab*, p. 146.

In this way, he was the contemporary of Cyrus the Great. Considering the power, prestige and resources of Pukkusāti, it is plausible to hold that he represents the wealthy Indian king, to whom Cyrus sent an embassy for negotiating a financial deal, according to the account of Xenophon.

At the time of advancing against Croesus, the position of Darius was precarious. Croesus had crossed the Halys, the established boundary between Media and Lydia, to force Cyrus into battle before he could consolidate his power and menace the security of Lydia. As Stronach has shown, in the initial encounter between the two armies Cyrus may even have had the worse of matters.[1] This explains why he was in need of financial resources to meet the expenses of the campaign and sent the embassy to the Indian king to borrow money.

Pukkusāti was already in diplomatic contact with media and Chaldaea. As suggested above, he sent his envoys to those kingdoms and the Chaldaeans also reciprocated the gesture by despatching an embassy to him. Some Chaldaean people are also said to be in his employ as mercenaries. In this setting of diplomatic relationships between the Indian king and the Chaldaeans, Cyrus deemed it desirable to ask the Chaldaean and Armenian kings to send their escorts with his envoy. The response from the Indian king was favourable, for Xenophon writes that he sent an embassy to his court, obviously, in return for his, with the sum of money, which he had asked. The members of this embassy also served the Persian king in a delicate matter of espionage before the war against Croesus and the campaigns in Asia Minor.[2] Xenophon's narrative reads as follows :—

"At this juncture, representatives from the Indian king arrived with money ; they announced also that the Indian king sent him the following message : 'I desire to be your friend, and I am sending you the money, and if you need more, send for it. Moreover, my representatives have been instructed to do whatever you ask."

"Well then", said Cyrus, when he heard this, "I ask some of you to remain, where you have been assigned quarters, and keep guard of this money and live as best pleases you, while three of you will

1. David Stronach, 'Excavations at Pasargadae : First Preliminary Report,' *Iran*, Vol. I (1963) p. 28.
2. *Cyropaedia* VI. 2. 1-11, Vol. II ; pp. 149-155

please go to the enemy on pretence of having been sent by the king of India to make an alliance between them and him ; and when you have learned how things stand there, what they are doing and proposing to do, bring word of it as soon as possible to me and to your king. And, if you perform this service acceptably, I shall be even more grateful to you for that than I am for your bringing the money, with which you have come. And this is service, which you are eminently fitted to perform, for spies, disguised as slaves, can give information of nothing more in their reports than what every one knows, whereas men in your capacity often discover even what is being planned."

"The Indians were naturally pleased to hear this, and, when they had been entertained by Cyrus, they made ready and set out on the following day with the solemn promise that when they had learned as much as they could they would return from the enemy's side with all possible dispatch."

"The Indians, that Cyrus had sent as spies to the enemy's camp, returned with the report that Crœsus had been chosen field-marshal and commander-in-chief of all the enemy's hosts, that all the allied kings had decided to join him with their entire forces, to contribute vast sums of money, and to expend them in hiring what soldiers they could and in giving presents to those, whom they were under obligations to reward. They reported also that many Thracian swordsmen had already been hired and that Egyptians were under sail to join them, and they gave the number as one hundred and twenty thousand men, armed with shields, that came to their feet, with huge spears, such as they carry even to this day, and with sabres. Besides these, there was also the Cyprian army. The Cilicians were all present already, they said, as were also the contingents from both Phrygias, Lycaonia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, Arabia and Phoenicia; the Assyrians were there under the king of Babylon; the Ionians also and the Aeolians and almost all the Greek colonists in Asia had been compelled to join Croesus and Croesus had even sent to Lacedaemon to negotiate an alliance. This army, they said, was being mustered at the river Pactolus, but it was their intention to advance to Thymbrara, where even today is the rendezvous of

the king's barbarions from the interior. And a general call had been issued to bring provisions to market there."

This information, confirmed by other sources as well, led Cyrus to propose an immediate advance and take the enemy unawares. For this purpose, he also asked his army to give up the habit of drinking wine and accustom themselves to taking water and gave other necessary directions about the advance. As the narrative goes, he won the war and worsted the enemy.

Some scholars interpret the despatch of the embassy of the Indian king to Cyrus as a sign of submission and acknowledgement of his overlordship.[1] But the tone and temper of the message, that the envoy of Cyrus was to deliver to the Indian king, and the address, he gave to the Indian embassy, according to Xenophon, clearly show that the Persian king was dealing with him not as a subordinate but as a friendly neighbour. Likewise, his observation on the outcome of the mission of the embassy unmistakably indicates that he was not very sure of its success and did not consider the Indian king his subordinate. The narrative of Xenophon, cited above, leaves no room for doubt that the exchange of embassies and the borrowing and lending of money through them between Cyrus and the Indian king did not at all imply the relation of suzerainty and subordination between them.

After the conquest of Lydia and Asia Minor, for whose purpose, perhaps, he borrowed money from the Indian king, Cyrus turned his attention towards the East. He appointed Viśtāspa, son of Arśāma, the satrap of Hyrcania and Parthia and annexed Drangiana, Margiana and Bactriana to his empire one by one. Then he crossed the Oxus and encamped on the Jaxartes and set up fortifications to hold the turbulent nomads in check. The township of Kurkath in that region is a remnant of those military establishments. These movements, probably, made his Indian ally Pukkusāti apprehensive of his expansionist plans and led to a rupture between them. When Cyrus was busy in the West, settling the affairs of Babylonia and planning an invasion of Egypt, he received intelligence of disturbances on the eastern frontiers of his empire and, leaving the charge of the Egyptian expedition to his son Cambyses, himself marched towards the East. According to ancient writers, he thought of reducing the state of the

1. *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. I, p. 296.

Indus Valley, because the rebellious peoples sought succour from it. He seems to have divided his army into two parts, despatching one through Gedrosia and leading the other through the Paropamisdæ and Arachosia. The regiments, moving through Gedrosia, met with a crushing reverse, as we gather from the remark of Nearchus that the people of Gedrosia told Alexander that "Cyrus came to those parts with the purpose of invading India, but was prevented through losing the greater part of his army owing to the desolate and impracticable character of the route and escaped only with seven persons of his army."[1] However, the second wing of the army, commanded by Cyrus himself, was more successful. It stormed the city of Kāpiśī (Begram) at the confluence of the Panjashir and Ghorband rivers, as we learn from Pliny,[2] and overawed the Astakenoi (Aṣṭaka) and Assakenoi (Aśvakas) living in that region, to pay him tribute, as Arrian reports.[3] This success lies at the basis of the remark of Xenophon that Cyrus rulled over Bactria and India.[4] But the Indian monarch, undaunted by the initial success of Cyrus, made the strategic move of setting the Massagetae and the Derbikes against him and assisting them with his elephant corps. Cyrus had naturally to march against them, but in the heat of the encounter, when the fighting was in progress, a soldier of the Indian elephant corps inflicted a fatal blow on his thigh and put an end to his life, as Ctesias informs us.[5] Thus, the Indian campaign of Cyrus proved a vain march and did not achieve anything. Megasthenes rightly remarks that "although the Persians got mercenary troops from India, namely the Hydrakes, they did not make any expedition into that country, but merely approached it, when Cyrus was marching agains the Massagetae."[6] Like Megasthenes, Arrian observes that "although Cyrus marched against the Scythians and showed himself in other respects the most enterprising of Asiatic monarchs, he did not invade India."[7] Pukkusāti was successful in holding his own and quelling the menace of his powerful rival.

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1. Strabo's *Geography* (English translation by Hamilton and Falconer) XV. 1. 5.
2. Pliny *Natural History* VI. 23, 25.
3. J.W. Mc Crindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian*, p. 183.
4. Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, I. 1. 4, translated by Walter Miller, Vol. I p. 7.
5. Ctesias, *Persica* ed. Gilmore pp. 133-135.
6. J. W. McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian*. p. 110.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

The marches and wars of Cyrus in Gedrosia and Arachosia have left some lasting imprints on Indian legends, particularly those conserved in the *Mahābhārata*. The episode of the disaster of Cyrus and his escape with seven men only is reminiscent of the survival of seven persons in the Pāṇḍava camp after the nocturnal attack of Aśvatthāman following the holocaust of the great war of Kurukṣetra. Likewise, the death of Cyrus as a result of a smashing blow on the thigh is analogous to the end of the Kuru hero Duryodhana by the fracture of the thigh caused by the blow of the mace of Bhīma.[1] It is well-known that the *Mahābhārata* underwent its redactions at Takṣaśilā in Gandhāra, where Vaiśampāyana is said to have recited it to Janamejaya. Hence it is certain that the stories and episodes of this epic were widely prevalent in the North-West and it is possible that some of them received a colouring from the disaster of Cyrus in the north-western borders of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.

Indian traditions relate that when Pukkusāti was organising an expedition against King Pradyota of Avanti, the Pāṇḍavas launched an attack on his kingdom and prevented him from pursuing his campaign in the interior of India.[2] It is likely that this episode of the invasion of the Pāṇḍavas is based on the expedition of Cyrus. We have seen that several aspects of his campaign in Gedrosia and Arachosia were identified by ancient bards with some legends of the *Mahābhārata*. Among these people the Kauravas and the Pāṇḍavas were often confused and treated as descendants of the same ancestors. Hence it is no wonder that the followers of Cyrus were referred to as Pāṇḍavas in the tradition relating to Pukkusāti.

The aforesaid discussion has enabled us to throw some new light on the history of the Gandhāra under King Pukkusāti, who had increased his power and prestige so much as to develop diplomatic relations with the king of Magadha and Avanti in the East and of Iran and Chaldaea in the West on a footing of equality. It has also shown how the great King Cyrus first cultivated friendship with him and then broke away from him, when he tried to create difficulties for him, being apprehensive of his expansionist programmes.

1. H. C. Seth, "Cyrus the Great and the Mahābhārata War", *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress* (Hyderabad 1941) pp. 125-127.
2. Felix Lacote, *Essay on Guṇāḍhya* (English translation Rev. A. M. Tabard) p. 176.

EARLY BUDDHISM AND THE METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RESEARCH

By

DR VISHWANATH PRASAD VARMA

Early Buddhism has been discussed from various standpoints. It has been investigated as a system of ethical religion and salvationistic ethics. The significance of the Buddhist ethical imperative, comparable in some respects to the Kantian good will, has been emphasized as an antidote to the rampant contemporary disquiet, nihilism and despair. It is considered a system of soteriology by Max Weber and a scheme of Nirvanistic eschatology by Dahlmann. Some hold it to be a promulgator of the law of causation and thus a precursor of science. Spengler regarded Buddhism, Stoicism and Socialism as examples of intellectual movements during the era of civilization, coming at the end of 'late culture' and characteristic products of megalopolitanism and rationalism. He interprets Buddha as a nihilist and asserts that there is no ethic of will in Buddhism and Epicureanism. Toynbee in his *Civilization on Trial* states that according to Buddha, Stoicism, one school of Christianity and some forms of Platonism, the truth lies beyond history. Albert Schweitzer has drawn attention to the ethic of compassion in Buddhism. Northrop has pointed out the stark realism and positivism involved in the concept of *duḥkha* and has interpreted *nirvāṇa* along the lines of the notion of an undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.[1] Buddhism had also deep social repercussions and profound political consequences. Gautama Buddha did prescribe some social and political formulas relevant to the contemporary set up. For a comprehensive study of early Buddhism the social and political teachings of early Buddhism must be analysed.[2] This will also be a contribution to the history of social and political thought.

If a comprehensive history of social and political thought in the world is to be attempted then Indologists, Sinologists, Egyptologists, Babylonologists, Assyriologists and other specialists in the ancient

1. F. S. C, Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West*, p. 347.
2. Even if Gautama's primary interest was not in politics and although he did not formulate an explicit social philosophy, still in its institutional phases early Buddhism did inculcate social and political notions.

civilizations of Africa and Asia and Europe will have to specify the social and political speculations that were attempted in those countries. This will be a commendable enterprise not only from the historical standpoint but will also provide ideas and data which will be yard-sticks for comparing modern ideas and data with them.[1]

In the evolution of social and political categories we can distinguish three stages. The *first* is the stage of speculations, ideas and vague formulations. In this stage categories appear as unsystematized and have all the marks of a difficult birth. Sages, religious leaders, prophets, magicians, poets, political rulers take the initiative in the formulation of categories and ideas in this stage. In India the Vedas may be said to belong to this stage. The *second* stage is that of social and political thought. In this stage philosophers, idealists and thinkers, either singly or as the spokesmen of a generation, take the initiative in the formulation of utopias, systems and codes. The Upaniṣads, the Tripiṭakes, the Smṛtis and the writings of Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja, Vijñābhikṣu Kauṭilya, Kāmandaka, Śukra may be said to belong to this stage. In the west Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hegel, Comte, Marx, Spencer, Green may be said to belong to this stage. With reference to creations of these writers and system builders we use the terms *philosophy*, *thought*, and *theory* almost interchangeably although there may be and are some differences even among these terms. But for the purpose of broad typologization they may be used synonymously. The *third* stage is that of scientifically oriented social and political theories which use not only the methods of observation and classification as the old philosophers also did but are more concerned with the technics of correlation and inductive behavioral research. This stage is marked by the decline of norm-setting and prescription of ideals as prognosis. It is more fascinated by data-collection and analysis and claims to be objective and at least to a considerable extent 'value-free'.

Generally, the writers on the history of social and political thought in the West would relegate the social and political ideas and speculations of early Buddhism to the first stage—the stage of utterance of *obiter dicta*. If they were a little more comprehensive in their orientation and less prejudiced then they would concede that early Buddhism is also a system of social thought or social

1. The UNESCO should undertake this project.

philosophy. It is the contention of the present paper that early Buddhism is of interest not only as a bundle of disjointed social categories and speculations and is not only, at least partly, also a system of socal and political thought, but it is also possible to apply to it the technics of modern social and political research. It will certainly be unfounded to call the early teachers and writers on Buddhism as sociologists and political scientists. But it is possible to apply the methods of sociology of knowledge and sociology of religion to the study of Buddhism. Furthermore, a student of political science who has studied the modern behavioral theories of political power and leadership can also apply the modern concepts in the study of power relations in the Buddhist Saṁgha. He can study the technics used by Gautama Buddha for the maintenance of his leadership. He can study the situational data provided by the then society and polity and find out to what extent were they congruous with the emergence of authoritarian or democratic types of personality. He can also study the technics, if any, provided by Gautama to fight tyranny and for the furtherance of solidarity. In this short paper I could not undertake this kind of empirical study, nor did I intend to do it. My only purpose is to make a case for the study of aspects of early Buddhism by students and teachers of sociology and political science. Due to their ignorance of Indian history and philosophy as well as of the comprehensive development in the social sciences in the West, Indian teachers and students of political science are reluctant to study Buddhism. They will say that it is a subject outside the domain of political science. It is the contention of this paper that with the maturation of Indian independence, we should evolve our own political science and sociology and that in this connection the contributions of early Buddhism should not be lost sight of.

According to Albion Small the beginnings of modern sociology are to be traced not to Comte and Spencer alone but to the "drive towards objectivity" in German historical research. He tried to trace the beginnings of sociology in the "drive toward objectivity" in German historiology about 1800 A. D. We can examine it the quest for objectivity was present in the system of ideas of the early civilizations.

It cannot be denied that the researches of indologists have brought to light the elements of positivistic, objective, inductive and empirical thought and methodology in the Hindu and Buddhist philo-

sophies.[1] Hence it can be stated that the methodological foundations of empirical social enquiry were present in ancient India. It should not, however, be imagined that the sophisticated clarifications of the experimentally-oriented scientific method and mathematical logic can be traced in ancient India. But it must be stated that the methodological foundations of ancient India and Buddhist speculations were at least similar to those of the Greeks.

Max Weber holds that the period since the sixteenth century in Western Europe are eras of 'disenchantment'. The magical and enveloping theological creeds of the Middle Ages with the dominance of Christian *Weltansohauung* were now ending due to the rise of Renaissance humanism and secularistic science. This 'disenchantment' provided the mental framework necessary for the emergence of social and political thought which was oriented more to the problems of worldly organization and social control than to speculation regarding an ideal rebublic or the best form of policy. We can examine if in the Indian context there ever appeared eras of disenchantment necessary for the growth of intensive social and political thought.

It can be stated that in Indian history there have been ages and epochs which bear some resemblance to the European period of disenchantment. The period from the middle of the seventh to the beginning of the fourth century B. C. can be considered such an age. I do not want to imply that the intellectual achievements[2] of this period of 'somewhat of disenchantment' are com-

1. Brajendra Nath Seal, *The pasitive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*; B. K. Sarkar, *Positive Background of Hindu Sociology*, 2 vols. (Allahabad, Panini Office); S. C. Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic*; V. P. Varma, *Studies in Hindu Political Thought and its Metaphysical Foundations*; Satya Prakash's book on Indian Science.

2. B. K. Sarkar, *Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus*, Leipzig, 1922, p. 150 says: "In an inventory of India's contributions to the spirit of inquiry and the progress of mankind, the epoch of republics (c 600 B. C. – A. C. 350) interspread no doubt with monarchies, must be recognised as responsible for the anatomy, therapeutics and medicine of Charaka's academy, the linguistics and methodology of Paṇini and his scholars, the metallurgy and alchemy that found patron-saints in Patañjali and Nāgārjuna the philosophical speculations of the atomists, monists, sensationalists, and sceptics, the schools of political science that came to be finally absorbed in the systems of Kauṭilya and Śukra, the legal and sociological theories associated in the long run with the *nom-de-plumes* of Manu and Yājñavalkya, the elaboration of the Jātaka folklore and of the Rāmāyaṇa

parable in substantial value to the European achievements in science and sociology following in the wake of the period of sixteenth century disenchantment to which Max Weber has referred. My aim is only to point out that mental phenomena resembling disenchantment are characteristics of the evolution of all great cultures and civilizations. Eras of scepticism, intellectualism, mental and emotional frustration and questioning and repudiation of theological systems can be found in the cultural history of all peoples.[1] They are not the specific and monopolistic characteristics of Western culture alone although it is absolutely correct to maintain that the sustained emphasis on disenchantment may be peculiar to the West. In the modern era of world understanding which necessitates the appreciation of the cumulative achievements of mankind in the development of thought, it is necessary to give up the kind of ethnocentricism which characterizes most of the writers of the history of social and political thought in Europe and America. Dunning, Sabine and MacIlwain are absolutely innocent of any information regarding Asian contributions to political thought. Lichtenberger makes no mention of Asian contributions to social thought.[2] Although I differ from the main propositions and conclusions of *The Decline of the West*, I would appreciate Spengler's methodological approach: He says:

> "The most appropriate designation for this current West-European scheme of history, in which the great cultures are made to follow orbits around us as the presumed centre of all world happenings, is the *Ptolemaic system* of history. The system that is put forward in this work in place of it I regard as the *Copernican discovery* in the historical sphere, in that it admits no sort of privilaged position to the classical or the Western culture as against the cultures of India, Babylon, China, Egypt, the Arabs, Mexico—separate worlds of dynamic being which in point

and Mahābhārata epics, dramaturgy and the fine arts of the Bharata and Vātsyāyana cycles, the mystical militarism and the *niṣkāma karma* or "categorical imperative" of the Gītā, and last but not least the *sarva-sattva-maitrī* (humanitarianism and universal brotherhood) of Śākya, the preacher of *appamāda* (strenuousness) and apostle of *viriya* (energism)."

1. E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, pp. 298ff, refers to the growth of "searching scepticism" in India, Greece and Palestine (*Ecclesiastes*) in the 5th century B. C.
2. The chapters on Asian social thought in Becker and Barnes, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* 3rd ed. are absolutely inadequate but they do indicate a new trend.

of mass count for just as much in the general picture of history as the classical, while frequently surpassing it in point of spiritual greatness and soaring power."[1]

I definitely feel that such a Copernican revolution must be attempted in the history of the social sciences. The contributions of the ancient and medieval civilizations which were outside the context of the Western sector should be studied by students and teachers of the social sciences. P. A. Sorokin in his famous text-book *Contemporary Sociological Theories* has, on occasions, referred to the insights into social problems of the ancient thinkers of China and India. He says:

> "...in my opinion, the formal school is very old. Its founders were neither Tonnies, nor Simmel, as Dr. Vierkandt claims; nor Kant, Hegel, Herbart, Perguson, Fichte, L. Von Stein, Gneist, Jelleinek, nor Spencer, as G. Richard indicates more rightly. Its founders were all lawgivers who formulated the first rules of social relations, and especially all juriconsults and theorizers of Law. Beginning at least with Confucius and the Roman juriconsult, who so brilliantly formulated the principal forms of social relations, and ending with the theorizers of law, all have been formal sociologists."[2]

I do not agree with the views of Sorokin on this particular point but I have cited these lines to indicate that the Copernican revolution in the history of the social sciences is essential and this requires a comprehensive frame of reference wherein Simmuel has to be studied along with Confucius and Comte along with Gandhi. If the concept of natural law has to be studied then not only the contributions of Cicero, Thomas Aquinas and Grotius but also those of Lao-Tse, Buddha[3] and Patañjali should be taken into consideration. Hitherto historians of social and philosophical thought in the West have not only been ignorant of the Eastern contributions but have shown almost a contemptuous indifference towards them. It is for new research scholars to dispel this vast mist of ignorance, indifference and prejudice and discuss the contributions of early Buddhism to the concepts of

1. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (Alfred A. Knopf), Vol. I, p. 18.
2. P. A. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, (New York Harper & Co., 1928), pp. 497-98.
3. Gautama Buddha was opposed to dogmatic superstitions and denied supernatural intervention in the operation of the law of causation. He accepted the uniformity of natural phenomena and hence denied the role of chance.

individualism, liberty, internationalism etc. Certainly this comparative study has to be done not at the emotional but at the scientific level. The ancient literature of India is too vast and the dimensions of its social and political contributions have to be specifically spelled out.

Several sociologists have adopted a broad framework for the science of sociology. Small's earlier contention was that sociology is the philosophical synthesis and organization of the results of the specialized social sciences. This view of Small resembles the view of Giddings. According to the latter a sociological type of approach to the study of social phenomena was "predicted" if not created by Auguste Comte. Giddings holds that sociology is the elemental and basic social science, studying society in its broadest and most fundamental aspects. Small's views, however, later underwent a transformation and in the article on the "Future of Sociology" he said :

> "In proportion as sociology becomes responsibly objective it will leave behind its early ambition for a hegemony over social sciences, and it will realize its destiny of functioning within a federation of scientific activities, With widening and clarifying of social consciousness, it must become progressively evident that a single technique, no matter how penetrating, can at most lay bare only certain constituent aspects of the total social process".[1]

Znaniecki considers "activities-intentionally-affecting-others" as the central or exclusive object of sociology. Prof. L. T. Hobhouse holds that even after social psychology, cultural geography, history and the special social sciences have developed there would be need for sociology as a discipline of interpretative correlation—to bring facts into perspective even though it may not discover any facts. Prof. Hayes also has a broad general conception of sociology although in 1902 he defined sociology as "study of a particular type of causation, the causal relations between the activities of associates". He thinks that Comte and Spencer were not wholly wrong in their comprehensive conception of sociology as a philosophy of superorganic or social life.

I favour a broad comprehensive standpoint for social science. I do not think that sociology as a specialized discipline of social organization and social disorganization can rest content only with the study of family, criminology, human ecology and demography. The

1. Quoted in Harry Earnes (ed), *An Introduction to the History of Sociology.* University of Chicago Press, 1948 p. 779.

attempt to confine sociology to a study of "institutions" some recent social theorists proposes would result in the ignoring of vital infra-institutional and even supra-institutional dynamics of human behaviour. Buddhist psychology as formulated in the Tripiṭaka and by Vasuvandhu and others is full of references to subliminal, mystical, introspective and supra-intellectual layers of consciousness. Early Buddhism, in analysing the psychic structure (*skandhacatuṣṭya*) refers to four categories—feeling (*vedanā*), ideation (*saṁjñā*), will or volitional cognition (*saṁskāra*) and sensation or 'consciousness' (*vijñāna*). These also have to be studied. I agree with Sorokin when he says: "Sociology has been, is, and either will be a science of the general characteristics of all classes of social phenomena with the relationships and correlations between them; or there will be no sociology"[1].

If a broad approach is favored towards the subject-matter of social sciences then it becomes relevant to analyze early Buddhist literature from this standpoint. Thus it becomes essential to find out the Buddhist views on society, community, primary groups, factors for social solidarity, causes of social disorganization, role of amity (*maitti*) as a social bond, social change, leadership etc[2].

When I conceive of sociology as the broad science treating of all the multifarious forms of social relationships, I do also emphasize a quantitative, empirical, and inductive research methodology. But I distrust any mere Humean scepticism towards the acceptance of the role of rationalism in sociology. Inductive researches are highly necessary for the formation of large empirical and historical generalisations. But in spite of the attacks on the rational (metaphysical) method of philosophy by Russell, Wittgenetein and Carnap, I still think that mathematical rationalism cannot be avoided either by sociology or by philosophy of the Hindus and of Kant, still are note-

1. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, p. 761.
2. A comprehensive study of the Buddhist social and political teachings may expose the hollowness of such extreme statements: "Buddhism not being concerned with man and his welfare, was equally disinterested in man and his interests. Hence *jurisprudence, politics and economics were not within the purview of Buddhistic ethics*. Its indifference to the caste system, which is iniquity personified, can thus be understood. Buddha was indifferent to the *status quo*. He did not condemn the burdensome and demoralizing domestic rituals, although they were meaningless to him". (Melamed, *Spinoza and Buddha*, p. 272. Our Italics).

worthy. Inductive and historical empiricism can procure data but the transformation of the empirical generalisations into the conceptualised framework of a theoretical system requires the employment of rational techniques. Once 'theories' have been formulated we may begin to deduce therefrom further implications through the help of the Platonic geometrical-mathematical method or the logical-analytical method of the Hindu philosophers. Against the scientific empiricists, Max Planck tried to argue that science cannot proceed further unless the statistical laws are transformed into causal laws and the formulation of the causal hypothesis is necessarily based on a rational insight. Because I accept a combination of rational-mathematical and historical-empirical methods both in the social sciences and philosophy, hence I strongly advocate that the speculations, generalizations and theorisations of the early and medieval social thinkers and philosophers cannot be dismissed on the ground they do not furnish huge statistical tables.

Besides analyzing the explicit teachings of Gautama Buddha and his disciples with regard to political and social questions, it is possible to obtain numerous insights which have a socio-political relevance if the methods evolved by the school of sociology of religion are accepted. One may disagree with Marx regarding his statement that religion is the "reflex" of the sociol relations but it cannot be doubted that it is essential to be aware of the situational factors amidst the context of which religious propositions have their emergence and their norms get institutionalized. The study of the interrelations of the situational data and the intellectual and moral responses to them does provide notions which are extremely significant for the political and social scientist. Max Weber tried to study the sociology of religion and in the three volumes of his "*Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie*" he tried an analysis of this type.[1] His broad attempt was to judge the general character of the social structure as being "favourable" or otherwise to the development of the characteristic institutional patterns. I have attempted in some of my papers to demonstrate the interrelations between the contemporary social and economic and political situations and the dominant trends of Buddhist moral teachings.[2] Troeltsch

1. The second volume deals with Hinduism and Buddhism.
2. V. P. Varma, "The Sociology of Early Buddhist Ethics" Buddha Jayanti Volume of the *Journal of Bihar Research Society*, 1956 : "The Origins and Sociology of Buddhist Pessimism", *J. B. R. S.*, vol. XLIV, June 1958 ; "The Origins and Sociology of the Early Buddhist Philosophy of Moral Determinism" *Philosophy : East & West* (University of Hawai, April 1963).

attempts the task "of solving the problem of how far the origin, growth and modifications of Christianity as well as the arrest of that growth in modern times were sociologically determined." He wanted to make a comprehensive analysis of the social structure wherein particular religious systems arise. My contention is that now is the time not to rest content with merely an intuitive supra-cognitional prophetic attitude to religion but to take up a scientific attitude. If Buddhism and Hinduism are analyzed from the standpoint of sociology of religion then this will be a contribution not only to the history of social and political philosophy but also to the scientific study of the soical sciences. If only the social and political teachings of Buddhism are described in a historical fashion then that study pertains to the history of social and political ideas. But if the task of correlation between the environmental data and the emergence of theoretical propositions is attempted then this method has a scientific appearance.

A systematic approach to the study of social and political problems postulates the formulation of the distinction between the observer and the observed. Furthermore the conception of man as an actor and participant in the multiple network of significant activity-patterns is essential. To anyone who has been a student of metaphysics it is clear that the central point at dispte between realism and idealism is this relationship of the percipient and the object. We find this problem dealt with in Bnddhism, Berkeley and Einstein. A student of sociology who has never been a student of metaphysics can not appreciate the implications of this distinction and its significance for the study of the science of sociology. In early Buddhism we can find that the question of epistemology and ontology have been discussed at an advanced level. These discussions provide the theoretical background for social and political insights also. In a traditionalist custom-bound conservative society it is essential to challenge first the metaphysical and religious norms before any attack can be made on customs, conventions and *mores*. This is imperative because social and political practices are rooted in and enveloped by religious ideas and practices. Absolutism tends to support the concept of a motionless being. Since the highest reality is motionless, by analogy, it may be argued that social and political tronsformations are illusory. The ascendant classes may use absolutism as a philosophical cloak to hide the process of social and political exploitation. The Upaniṣads and Parmenides

and Plato inculcated sometimes pantheism and sometimes absolutism. This philosophy may sometimes be a method for resisting social and political change. By and large, Indian philosophical absolutism has been hostile to social and political changes. On occasions it may make concessions to ideas which some modern exponents of Brahmanism may exalt into a theory of resistance on behalf of popular rights. The Upaniṣadic idealism supports a philosophy of *status quo* in society. But early Buddhism by its resistance to pantheism and idealism sponsored a point of view which might have supported a dialectical transformation. I do not maintain that early Buddhism was an explicit movement for Kshatriya ascendancy in opposition to the Brahmanical ecclesiasticism.[1] But it is also a historical fact that in the tide of Buddhist advance the people of the lower classes also got opportunities to share in religious movements. The case of Upali, the barber, is a classic example. Individuals and groups tend towards the acceptance of ideas which, at least indirectly, support their interests. I do not uphold the thesis of dialectical materialism which pleads for the view that ideas are the superstructure raised on the basis of the relations of production. Nor do I hold it possible to maintain that all types of acceptance is determined by interest. Ideas, specially in abstract realms of the natural sciences and in logic, are capable of receiving acceptance on their inherent theoretical standing. But conclusions of the historical and social sciences, in the process of their acceptance either by individual research workers or by groups,can be said to bear the impact of one's interests. For example, regardless of the soundness of the historical data and evidence, we find that British imperialist historians tend to regard the Indian movement of 1857 as a local Sepoy Mutiny. But younger Indian intellectuals are on the lookout of evidence to substantiate its character as an independence movement. Thus it is possible to argue that towards the teachings of Buddhism the people of those groups must have tended to flock who felt that in some way or the other they were deprived. It will be unrealistic to negative the role of consciously felt deprivations in the accep-

1. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, seems correct in his view that the relation of Buddhism to Brahmanism is not comparable to that of Lutheranism to Papacy. There was at that time no Brahmanical organised Church, nor did Brahmanism enforce its commands through the instrumentality of the state. The presence of several religious sects in eastern India makes it possible to argue that Gautama did not find himself in the presence of a Brahmanical hierarchy embracing the whole popular life.

tance of ideologies. The complicated ritualism as propounded in the *Brāhmaṇas* like the *Aitareya* and the *Śatapatha* as well as the metaphysical absolutism taught in the Upaniṣads were congruous with the interests of the intellectual elite. The latter could alone participate in them. The protest of Gautama Buddha against Vedic revelation, Brahmanical liturgy and the Upaniṣadic absolutism and his enunciation of simple moral truths meant for the extinction of sufferings of the multitude was bound to evok sentiments of acceptance in the non-privileged sections.[1] If the statements in the Tripiṭakas are to be accepted as authentic propositions regarding Gautama Buddha's theories then it is undoubted that he was hostile to the claims of the Brahmins. He wanted to ridicule the claim of descent from the mouth of Brahmā. But it will also be an unfounded generalisation to maintain that Gautama Buddha was the declared spokesman of the interests of the Kshatriyas. Only this much can be legitimately argued that from his teachings the underprivilaged sections among the Kshatriyas, the Vaisyas and the Sudras got relief.[2] Thus

1. According to Herman Oldenberg, *Buddha*, pp. 250ff, it will be an error to consider Gautama Buddha as a declared and conscious champion of the spiritual rights of the poor and the humble. Gautama did not aim at a war against the privileged. Oldenberg would view it as historically untrue to conceive of "Buddha as the victorious champion of the lower classes against the haughty aristocracy of birth and brain". But even Oldenberg cannot deny that the Buddhist confraternity or Saṁgha was patterned on the principles of equity and justice and that admission to the band of Brahmanas was far more open and liberal in contrast with the closed group of the Brahmins. Oldenberg, however, seems correct in his statement that he is not aware of the admissions of *chandāl* and pariahs in the Saṁgha. Oldenberg tries to minimize the social significance of the ascendency of Upali in the Saṁgha by saying that he (Upali) was a barber of the Sakyas and hence was a courtier and friend of the Sakyas. Ed. Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, vol. I, p. 372 states that Buddhism did not seek to overthrow caste but treated it as an external and indifferent distinction. It dealt with it in the same way in which St. Paul deals with slavery (1 *Corinthians*, vii, 21).
2. Buddha did condemn some of the Brahmanical practices of the day, for example, astrology. Even his indirect opposition to Brahmanical sacerdotalism was calculated to undermine the status of the Brahmins. The opposition to Brahmanism meant that people of the lower strata would be freed from the economic exactions of the Brahmins in terms of *dakshinā* etc. But, of course, Gautama did not contemplate an open revolt against the state and society for the emancipation of the slaves. He missed the chance of becoming an Abraham Lincoln, twenty-five hundred years ago.

it is possible to utitize the insights gained from the discipline of sociology of knowledge to enquire into the social impact of philosophical teachings.[1]

I think that sociology in its methodological aspects has to lean heavily on science and philosophy. Sociologists are busy these days with the problem of social causation but if they do not know the metaphysical problems associated with causation they cannot go deep into their investigations. A sociologist or political scientist who dabbles with positivism and does not know the phenomenalist physics of Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt etc. is not well-equipped. Causation for a comprehensive knowledge has to be studied with reference to the works of Buddhist and Nyāya philosophers of India, Aristotle, Hume and Russell as well as the conclusions of statistics and science. Viewed in this light, if the problem of social and political causation has to be analyzed, then the contributions of Buddhist philosophers also have to be studied.[2] A social and political philosopher in India cannot afford to be ignorant of the Buddhist philosophy. Similarly if the social and political philosopher want to investigate the problem of social and political freedom he cannot be blind to the ethical dimensions of the case. If this task has to be approached, then some probe into the Buddhist researches regarding determinism and the autonomy of the will have also to be carried on.

MacIver[3] and Hertzler[4] (especially the former) think that there may be social speculation in the ancient (thus including the Buddhist) classics but there is not anything of "sociology" in them. I do hold that the amount of scientific detachment from all theological orientation

1. Cf. Hegel: "Only in the presence of a given forms of religion can a given forms of state structure exist, only in the presence of a given state structure can a given philosophy and a given art exist." (Quoted in *Text-Book of Marxist Philosophy*).
2. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, (Leningrad, 1927), p. 14, in commenting on the concept of *karman* in the *Abhidharmakośa*, II, states that it (*Karman*) is the driving force of nature, which, may correspond with the notion of Evolution of *Elan Vital*. But there does not seem to be present any old textual authority for this "scientific" interpretation. If the Hinayana metaphysics is interpreted as teaching radical pluralistic momentariness, then it will be absolutely incongruous to reconcile it with the concept of an immanental continuous Energy.
3. R. M. MacIver, "Sociology", *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. XIV.
4. Joyce O. Hertzler, *The Social Thought of the Ancient Civilizations* (New York, 1936).

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which is necessary for the development of sociology and a scientifically -oriented empirical theory of political science was not present in Early Buddhist India (6th to 4th cent. B. C.) but I do maintain that Buddhist philosophy makes certain vital contributions which could be or can be utilized for the development of a science of sociology and politics. I will summarize them :—

(I) Against the Upaniṣadic metaphysical conception of immobile reality, Buddhism formulated the conception of a dynamic reality.[1] Ceaseless becoming is what is real. Illusion or false knowledge is responsible for the view that an entity is perdurable. Buddha, thus, was, in some sense the precursor of Heraclitus, Marx, Engels, and Bergson. A philosophy of historical and cultural change can be constructed only on such a view of mutation and transformation on the constitutent of reality.

(II) Against the Vedic theological cosmology,[2] Buddhism as for example in the *Agganna sutta* of the *Digha Nikaya* tried to construct a naturalistic scheme of the origin of the universe. In some Buddhist passages we find a remote and indirect forestalling of the Kantian nebular hypothesis. It was unfortunate that this quasi-scientific insight of Buddha was lost sight of by later Hindu philosophers who once again tried to substantiate a completely theistic view of the universe.

(III) Against any theological metaphysical or intuitive basis of ethics, Buddha tried to forestall[3] Herder, Auguste Comte, Ludwig Feuerbach and the humanists by his view of a non-transcendental religion unconcerned with theology. In his philanthropic concern for human welfare and the extinction of misery without any reference to an extra-cosmic Godhead, he was setting up the theoretical pattern of a somewhat egalitarian society and polity.

(IV) I concur with Small and Ward in their view that sociology is also a science of social betterment. In his *Between Eras : From Capitalism to Democracy* Small advocated the substitution of service for

1. Against the dominance of absolutism in the Upaniṣads which made their writers sometimes unmindful of ethics, Buddhism and Jainism have been considered "ethico-pluralistic" reactions.
2. E. Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, vol. I, pp. 361ff, holds that Buddhism is primarily a protest against superstitious polytheism with the social dis-organization which accompanied it.

profit as the dominant motive of economic relationships. At one place he condemns the German Professors for their support of the first World War. The social telesis of Lester Ward deals with the conscious improvement of society. In his *Psychic Factors of Civilization* Ward deals with the prerequisites for the concretisation of collective telesis through governmental agencies. Hence insofar as Buddhism, in its ethics, emphasises norms for real collective advance towards the achievement of individual and social peace and resolution of political tensions it has to be studied by students of sociology also and not left as being only the battleground of ethicists quarreling over the problems of pain and moral evil.

(V) Moreover, even for a sociological study of the present day Indian social and political movements which are inspired by the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, it is necessary to study Buddhist ethics[1] which was the most determined attempt to inculcate the concept of a moral natural law governing the world upon the minds of the Indian population.

(VI) There is an attempt in modern sociology to understand the structure and dynamics of human action in terms of interests, sub-conscious layers of the psychic structure, feelings etc, In this connection, I think, the study of the Buddhist view of "Dependent Emergence" (*Pratītyasamutpāda*) would provide a related field.[2] The significance of the "*Upādāna*" doing action with desire or egoistic motivation has to be grasped. *Bhava* (previous existence), *jāti* (birth) and *jarāmaraṇa* (old age and death) depend sequentially on it. It, thus, stresses the role of psychic structuralization as an antecedent to the actual occurrence of concrete action. It emphasizes that motivation has to be taken account of. It may even be partly compared with Ratzenhofer—Small formula of "interests."

It is clear that the application of the modern methodological approaches to the study of early Buddhism reveals important insights. It indicates the ways in which the students of political science and

1. Vishwanath Prasad Varma, *The Political Philosophy of M. Gandhi and Sarvodaya* (Agra, 1965), 2nd ed., pp. 83-84.
2. The doctrine of *svabhāvavāda* inculcates the production of effects out of the immanent teleology of the causes. But while accepting the universal effectiveness of the law of causation, *pratītyasamutpāda* accepts the dependence upon certain conditions as necessary for the effect to happen.

sociology can study early Buddhism and make contributions to their own disciplines. Some of these standpoints can be thus summarized :

(1) A contribution to the "sociology of Buddhist religion" can be attempted and this would be in line with the sociological attempts of Max Weber and Troeltsch with regard to Christianity.[1]

(2) Such a study will be a contribution to "sociology of knowledge" insofar as it tries to trace the genesis of some of the concepts of Buddhist ethics and psychology in the contemporary economic and political conditions.[2] So far Buddhist scholars have attempted only a historical genesis of its philosophy.

(3) The Buddhist emphasis on moral actionism can be the necessary background for the concretisation of the aspirations behind the United Nations. It is very true that Buddhism cannot provide the detailed solution of social and political problems at institutional levels. No recipie can be obtained from it for the resolution of day-to-day affairs of a complicated world. But the immense value of Buddhism lies in stressing the moral background of political, economic and social problems. Its plea for the elevation of moral personality can alone be the solid citadel on which political, economic and social peace can be built. Thus alone can stability be obtained in the structure of civilization. The moral and psychological aspects of even

1. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Nirvana*, pp. 11-12, has discussed the Buddhist cosmography according to the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasuvandhu. The inhabitants of the *caturdhyānaloka* do not need clothes because they are born with a light ethereal covering that lasts all their very long life through. They do not want any residential constructions because *karman* provides to the newly born, houses. The phenomenon of sex is spiritualized, so to say and the new born baby is apparitional (*aupapādika*) and does not come out of the matrix of a female. No coercive governmental mechanism is needed because in the absence of gross passions there are no crimes. The feeling of hatred in absolutely non-operative. In commenting upon these details Stcherbatsky opines that this scheme is constructed with the notion that physical labor is the curse of humanity. Hence a state of existence is imagined where food, clothes and dwelling-houses do not present any problem. Dharma is the sole incentive to action. Among the inhabitants, however, there is not absolute equality. Sometimes a *pṛthagjana* can appear among them.

2. Some correlation has been attempted between the feudal social structure of Egypt and its feudal conception of the hierarchy of gods. Similarly it is said that the Temple organisation in Babylon was paralleled by the similar organisation of the state.

such concrete events as the proletarian and peasant revolts in Asia and Russia or the national upsurge in Africa cannot be lost sight of. The Buddhist scriptures, and specially the *Dhammapadá* and the *Sutta Nipata* preach in moving terms the concepts of charity, humility, love for the human kind and exalted philanthropy. Their stress on the neutralization of the ego can alone be the background for the solution of the detailed social, economic and political problems. According to Buddhist teachings individual betterment is the means of and basis for socio-political advance. If early Buddhism is interpreted in this way then its outlook has resemblance to the philosophy of the UNESCO which holds that war begins in the minds of men and hence necessarily preaches the primacy of culture and education for the remaking of human personality. Early Buddhism would also advocate that good men are social assets. Mere hedonistic utilitarianism which is the generally prevalent psychological view of most of modern Professors of sociology and political science in the West and of the quantitative statisticians has to be supplemented with the moral insights of Buddhist philosophers. It will be a contribution to political science and sociology as applied disciplines if the Buddhist technics for the elimination of conflict and the enforcement of social solidarity and cooperative mutualism are found out and investigated.[1] After their theoretical meaning and implications have been spelled out, it will be possible to implement them in action.

(4) By its treatment of metaphysics and sociology together, this type of intellectual enterprise is a warning to the narrow academic dogmatists who care only for specialized researches. These are most welcome but an integration of the propositions formulated by the specialized sciences has also to be attempted if man is to be viewed as as an integrated being and society an integrated unit. To understand the theories of climatic, racial or physical determinism it is essential for the student of the social sciences also to know the metaphysical meaning and implications of determinism. Similar is the case for causality. Social causation demands knowledge also of the philosophies of causation.

(5) It is correct that the application of the modern technics would clarify the nature of early Buddhism as social philosophy but

1. Monier-Williams, *Buddhism*, pp. 51-52, says that the preaching of the doctrine of universal brotherhood open to all constituted the corner-stone of his popularity.

it is to be notéd that social sciences have to borrow the "rational" method of social and political philosophy. Moreover, sociology would lose much of its historical vitality if it traced its origin only with Comte or Sponcer of the Scottish moralists. The ancient Hindu, Buddhist and Western philosophies—both metaphysical and social—can make substantial contributions in the shape of their insights. Hence it will not be worthwhile to neglect the theories and propositions of the social and political philosophers of the world on the ground that they do not follow the value-free methods and technics of the modern behavioural sciences.

Thus the relevance of the study of early Buddhism for the student of the social sciences is evident. Such a study will be a contribution to the history of social thought. If a comprehensive conception of the science of sociology is upheld, then such a study may also be conceived as pertaining to the domain of sociology. At least, so much may be conceded by all that this study will be a contribution to the history of sociclogical theory. Even the most sophisticated advocates of a "pure" objective science of sociology will grant that early Buddhism will provide a fertile field for the application of the methods and technics of sociology of knowledge. The student of political science may undertake a study of the power structure and leadership in the Buddhist Saṁgha. He may try to differentiate between the approaches to political power of Gautama Buddha, Machiavelli and Hobbes. A comparative study of the Buddhist and Marxian dialectic may also be undertaken.

SOME INTERESTING SCULPTURES FROM TRIPURĪ

By

Prof. K. D. Bajpai

Tripurī (modern Tewar), near Jabalpur town in Madhya-Pradesh, was situated quite close to the right bank of the river Narmadā. It was the capital of the Kalachuris, one of the chief ruling dynasties of northern India in the early Medieval period. During the Kalachuri rule the architectural and sculptural art at Tripurī flourished in manifold aspects. A number of temples dedicated to god Śiva were constructed here and in the adjoining region. The remains of these in the form of various types of architectural pieces and statues bear eloquent testimony to the artistic achievements of the Kalachuri kings during the period between the 10th and 12th centuries A. D.

These remains can be seen scattered in and around the modern village of Tewar. Reference may be made to a three-headed image of Śiva (height 5′—3″) made of buff sand-stone having a long *Jaṭājūṭa* on the head. Figures representing Umā-Maheśvara are also numerous. Some well-preserved statues of Gaṇeśa, usually in the dance pose, are worth mention. Other statues represent Kārtikeya, Viṣṇu (along with his *avatāras*) and several other gods and goddesses. On some panels ascetics and their disciples are seen in various moods. On a big slab an ascetic is seen preaching to several ladies, who are seen listening to him attentively with folded hands. The predominance given to these ascetics testifies to the growing influence of the Kaulas and Kāpālikas during this period.

Stone figures representing purely secular scenes are also numerous at Tripurī. Mention may be made of several figures of couples in various amorous postures and of the Surasundarīs exhibiting their physical charm. There is a unique panel showing a scene from the *Gāthāsaptaśatī* of the well known Sanskrit poet Govardhana. The particular verse on which the scene is based is also written on the slab. Sculptures depicting other scenes from the daily life of the people have also been found at Tripurī.

During a recent exploration conducted by me at Tripurī a

number of interesting stone sculptures were noticed. These are described below :

1. *Inscribed Stele* (Fig. 1) :—This well-preserved stele is divided into a number of panels. In the central panel is the figure of a four-headed goddess *nāgī* seated in *padmāsana.* She holds stalked lotuses in her upper two hands. The lower right hand is in *abhya-mudrā,* while the left lower holds a pitcher. The other two panels in the stele show multi-handed goddesses holding various objects. At the two corners are depicted male gods, one on each side. The panels are divided by ornamental pillars with *kīrtimukhas* above. On the pedestal, below an ornamental creeper, is incised an inscription in the early Nāgarī characters of 11th century A. D. The inscription reads as follows :

Śrī Vīranandi ācāryeṇa pratimeyaṁ karāpitā

(i. e., this image was caused to be made by Ācārya Srī Vīranandi)

The Śaiva Ācāryas are known to have played a significant role in the propagation of their cults in various parts of the country, particularly in the early medieval period. Ācārya Vīranandi was one of them.

2. *Umā-Maheśvara with gaṇas* (Fig. 2) :—

This richly embellished sculpture shows Śiva and Pārvatī seated on Nandī. The deities are facing each-other, the lord having placed his right hand fingers on the *cibuka* of his consort to raise up her head. Both of them wear elaborate ornaments and hold various *āyudhas.* A number of *gaṇa* figures are shown by the right side of Śiva and below the pedestal. These *gaṇas* are playing on various musical instruments and several of them are shown in dance poses.

3. *Dancing Gaṇeśa* (Fig. 3) :—This figure of multi-handed Gaṇeśa, wearing ornaments quite tastefully, is carved in a dance pose. His trunk (partly damaged), the slightly turned heavy belly and the two feet, supporting the entire weight of the body are remarkably shown.

4. *Surasundarī* (Fig. 4) :—In a rectangular panel of a decorated architectural piece is depicted the figure of a *Surasundarī* (divine damsel). She is wearing diaphanous dress and stands in the *tribhaṅga* pose. Her right hand, which was raised up, is broken. The left hand is placed on her right breast. She stands in front of a tree, the leaves of which on the sides of the lady's face fill up the background.




Plate I. Inscribed state from Tripuri depicting a Nāgī and other deities.




Plate II. Sculpture depicting Umā-Maheśvara with the *gaṇas*.




Plate III. Dancing Gaṇeśa from Tripuri.




Plate IV. Surasundarī from Tripuri.






Plate V. Lady removing a thorn from her foot (from Tripuri).



Plate VI. Damsel denuding herself (from Tripuri).



5. *Lady removing a thorn* (Fig. 5) :—This intricately-posed figure of a lady is shown in profile with remarkable bends of the body. She is engaged in taking out a thorn from her raised foot.

6. *Damsel denuding herself* (Fig. 6) :—The upper bare part of the female figure is embellished with various ornaments, such as a circular crown on the head, heavy ear-lobes, torque and necklaces (*stanahāra*). Her coiffure is very elaborate. She holds a part of the garment in the right hand and with the left she is denuding her lower body.

All these stone sculptures from Tripurī are assignable to 11th-12th centuries A. D. They give a clear indication not only of the plastic patterns of the period but also of the socio-religious trends and the artistic tastes of the contemporary people.

LAW AND JUSTICE IN KĀMANDAKĪYA NĪTISĀRA

By

Dr R. K. Dikshit

Unlike Kauṭilya, Kāmandaka does not throw much light on the important subject of law and justice. His observations are confined to punishment *daṇḍa* alone or rather only to the theory of punishment, for he does not mention the punishments for different kinds of offences.

The political philosophers of ancient India use the term *daṇḍa* to denote the punitive powers of the king. He was the preserver of *dharma*[1] (law), and for the proper administration of justice, he was vested with the right of punishment.[2] Manu, states that the Creator created the king for the protection of the people, and for his sake He created the *daṇḍa*.[3] Kāmandaka, writing in the same vein, identifies the king and the *daṇḍa*, when he asserts that '*daṇḍa*, which literally means punishment, figuratively signifies the king himself'.[4]

Our author further observes that it was the fear of king's punishment that restrained the wicked, kept the people to the eternal path of rectitude, and obliged them to attend their prescribed duties.[5] In the absence of punishment, the world would be afflicted with *mātsyanyāya*.[6] This assumption has naturally prompted our political philosophers to eulogise *daṇḍa*.[7] However, they do not fail to emphasise that if wielded improperly it would lead to disaffection and destruction of the king himself.[8] It must be wielded justly and impartially.[9]

Kāmandaka is an ardent advocate of *ahiṁsā* for all sentient beings,[10] but he permits the king to inflict punishment on those who

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1. Cf. *N. S.*, VI. 6. '*dharmasaṁrakṣaṇaparo*'.
2. *Ibid*, I. 1 (*daṇḍadhāro-mahīpatiḥ*) ; II. 41, 44.
3. *M. S.* VII. 3, 14.
4. *N. S.*, II. 15—दमो दण्ड इति प्रोक्तस्तात्स्थ्याद् दण्डो महीपतिः ।
5. *Ibid*, II. 41-43. Cf. *M. S.*, VII. 15, 20-24.
6. *N. S.*, II. 40—दण्डाभावे परिध्वंसी मात्स्यो न्यायः प्रवर्तते ।
7. Cf. *M. S.*, VII. 18, 25 ; *V. S.* III. 95; *N. Bh.*, XII. 15. Kāmandaka devotes one full section (*Daṇḍamāhātmya-prakaraṇa*) in Book II to the topic.
8. Cf. *M. S.*, VII. 127 ; *Y. S.*, I. 357 ; *N. S.*, II. 39.
9. *N. S.*, II. 36-38 ; XV. 13.
10. *Ibid*. XIV. 51.

deserve it.[1] In justification of that apparent contradiction, he ordains that 'a monarch can inflict torture for the purpose of justice just as sages can immolate animals for the purpose of *dharma*. Kings are not tainted with sin when they put impious and sinful wretches to death in the interest of justice'.[2] The ethics of this principle, enunciated by Kāmandaka, is unimpeachable.

However, he insists that the punishment should not be arbitrary. It should be just and balanced, impartial and equitable. The *daṇḍa* should be wielded neither too sternly nor too mildly. By inflicting excessively severe punishment, a ruler agitates the people while, on the other hand, by awarding extremely light punishment he becomes an object of ridicule.[3] The same principle is again affirmed when we are told that the punishment meted out proportionately to the offence and in accordance with the law (*yathāvidhi*) increases the *trivarga* of the king, while disproportionately inflicted, it excites anger even amongst those who have retired to the forest'.[4] Consequently, Kāmandaka insists that the punishment should be equitable, and advises the king to be absolutely impartial in the administration of justice, meting out punishments as impartially as Daṇḍī himself.[5] Another wholesome provision is that punishment should be awarded only after a fair trial[6]; it should not be arbitrary. His dictum is that the 'punishment which excites the people is contrary to *dharma* and leads to the destruction of the king himself. Punishment countenanced by the society and the *śāstras* alone should be inflicted'.[7] Kāmandaka very rightly observes that 'that is justice the administration of which is approved by the venerable geople well-versed in the scriptures, and that is injustice the execution of which is denounced by them'.[8]

In order to help the king in the proper administration of justice, our author prescribed that he should be well-versed in the scriptures and familiar with the popular customs, i.e., both the scriptural and customary law[9]. He should also be proficient in the science of punishment and political science,[10] able to distinguish between *naya*

1. *Ibid*, VI. 6, 8, 13, etc. It was his duty to punish the law-breakers, XIV. 47, 53.
2. *Ibid*, VI. 5.
3. *Ibid*, VI. 15; II. 37; XV. 14.
4. *Ibid*, II. 38. Also, *Ib.*, XV. 14-15.
Kāmandaka regards *daṇḍa-pāruṣya* as a *Vyasana* of the king, *Ib.*, XIV. 61.
5. *Ibid*, VI. 15; II. 36, III. 1.
6. Cf. *Ibid*, III. 8.
7. *Ibid*, II. 39.
8. *Ibid*, VI. 7.
9. *Ibid*, VI. 1.
10. *Ibid*, IV. 14; XVIII. 51.

and *apanaya*, and between *dharma* and *adharma*[1]. A *nyāyapravṛtta* king secures *trivarga* both for himself and his people.[2] He also protects himself by the proper administration of justice.

Kāmandaka recognises three kinds of punishment, viz., *vadha* (execution), *arthaharaṇa* (monetary punishment) and *parikleśa* (corporal punishment).[3] *Vadha-daṇḍa*, again, was either *prakāśa* (open) or *aprakāśa* or *upāṁśu* (secret)[4]. *Prakāśa-daṇḍa* should be meted out to the enemies of the king and to such persons as had incurred popular disapprobation, while *aprakāśa-daṇḍa* should be inflicted on the royal favourites (*nṛipa-vallabhāḥ*) and on those whose execution was likely to cause popular resentment.[5] Secret murder should be brought about by poison, magical rites and use of weapons.[6] Another method was to impute criminality to such persons and then punish them according to Law. Kāmandaka gives a naive example of such underhand measures. The king invites the culpable person to meet him in secret. The latter is followed by other individuals (instigated and got together by the royal agents) carrying secret weapons. When checked by the royal guards, they come out with the confession that they had been employed by the 'offender' to kill the king. The latter is thereupon put to trial and punished.[7]

However, Kāmandaka is not very much in favour of capital punishment, and ordains that except for high treason it should not be awarded even for serious offences : nor should it be inflicted upon the Brāhmaṇas and virtuous persons even of *antyaja* class.[8] He recommends *upekṣā* as an alternative to secret punishment—'those against whom secret punishment is recommended may be also done away with *upekṣā*, which, too, should not be outwardly manifest'[9]. Among other kinds of punishment, the *Nītisāra* contains only a figurative reference to imprisonment (*bandhanāgāra*)[10].

1. *Ibid*, I. 38 ; VI. 8.
2. *Ibid*, I. 15.
3. *Ibid*, XVIII. 9.
4. *Ibid*, XVIII. 10 ; VI. 10.
5. *Ibid*, XVIII. 10-11.
6. *Ibid*, XVIII. 12.
7. *Ibid*, VI. 10-13.
8. *Ibid*, XV. 17 ; XVIII. 13.
9. *Ibid*, XVIII. 14.
10. *Ibid*, XVII. 22.

SOME NEW LIGHT ON THE ROUTE OF MAHMŪD GHAZNAVĪ'S RAID ON SOMANĀTHA: MULTĀN TO SOMANĀTHA AND SOMANĀTHA TO MULTĀN

By

Dasharatha Sharma

Almost every writer who has written on Mahmūd of Ghaznī has something to say about his expedition to Somanātha. But the details of the route followed either way, from Multān to Somanātha and from Somanātha to Multān, are far from clear. The *Zain-ul-Akhbār* merely speaks of his having reached Somanātha by a way "very perilous, dangerous and full of hardships". The *Tārīkh-ul-Kāmil* states that he reached there by way of Anhilwārā. With the help of *Tārīkh-i-Alfī* we can add the detail that he passed through Jaisalmer. And this information can now be supplemented with the help of an ode by Farrukhī, a court-poet of Mahmūd, according to which Mahmūd went to Somanātha by way of Ludravā, Chikūdar, Mundher and Dewalwārā.[1] About the return journey we are told in the *Zain-ul-Akhbār* that Mahmūd marched direct by way of Mansūrā (in Sindh), the reason for this being that Param Deo, the king of the Hindus, was "in the way." The version of the *Tārīkh-ul-Kāmil* is slightly different. According to it, Mahmūd proceeded to Kandhāt, where Bhīm, the king of Anhilwārā had taken refuge. Fording the creek at ebb time, he managed to reach the fort and turn out the enemy from there. From Kandhat he went to Mansūrā.

We put in this paper some additional facts from two Jaina sources, one of them contemporary, *viz.*, the *Satya-purīya-Mahāvīra-utsāha* of Dhanapāla, a court-poet of Bhoja Paramāra, and the other, the *Vividha-tīrtha-kalpa* of Jinaprabha Sūri, a Jaina saint-scholar highly respected and honoured by Muhammad bin Tughlaq. These combined with the information gleaned already from Muslim sources would give us a much clearer picture of the expedition than the one we have at present.

According to the *Satyapurīya-Māhāvīra-Utsāha*, Mahmūd looted Śrīmāla-deśa (the territory of Srīmāla or Bhīnmāl) and after sacking Anhilwārā, Chaḍḍāvalī, Soraṭh and Dilwārā destroyed Someśvara, the

1. Nazim, *Life and Times of Sultān Mahmūd of Ghaznān* pp. 215 ff.

giver of pleasure to the hearts of people. But he could not destroy the idol of Mahāvīra of Satyapura, "for can even a large number of stars dim the light of the Sun or snakes swallow Garuḍa ?" The ropes, we are told, broke as elephants tried to pull down the idol. Elephants and horses fell. The blows aimed at the body of Mahāvīra struck the strikers themselves and though they left marks on the idol they could not break it.[1] The *Vividha-tīrtha-kalpa* gives practically the same story. According to it, when the "lord of Gajjaṇā (Ghaznā)" reached Satyapura (modern Sanchor in Rājasthān) on his way back after plundering Gurjara (Gujarāt), in v. 1081 (1024-25 A. D.), he saw the lovely temple of Jina and tried to demolish the idol installed there. But neither elephants nor bullocks succeeded in pulling off the brass idol of Mahāvīra.[2]

Let us now attempt a synthesis of the details. It appears from the Ode of Farrukhī and the *Tārikh-i-Alfi* that Mahmūd marching southwards reached Ludravā (then probably the capital of the Bhāṭīs) and captured it in spite of the brave resistance put up by its Rajput defenders. Ludrawā, as pointed out by Dr. Nazim, is present Lodravā which lies ten miles to the north of Jaisalmer and must have been a big town at one time. Moving to the south-east from there, probably with a view to avoiding the driest parts of the Thār Desert and the Rann of Cutch, and going perhaps along the river Lūnī and its tributaries, Mahmūd reached some point near the present Mārwār Junction. A well-frequented route from here led the army to Chikūdar, which has been identified by Dr. Nazim with Chiklodar Mātā Hill, a physical feature about seventeen miles north of Pālanpur. But doubts may arise regarding the correct route on account of the admittedly corrupt nature of the text of Farrukhī's Ode, particularly in this portion. These, a historian would be happy to find, are now removed by Dhanapāla's statement that Mahmūd sacked Chaḍḍavalī i. e. Chandrāvatī, the capital of the Ābū Paramāras which lies on the Mārwār-Pālanpur route, barely four miles south of the present Ābū Road station.[3] The route here is flanked both on the right and the left by the verdent Aravalli hills and there is no lack of water. This,

1. For the text of the *Satyapurīya-Mahāvīra-Utsāha* see the *Jaina-sāhitya-saṁśodhaka*. III, Part 3.
2. Singhī-Jaina-Granthamālā edition, p. 29.
3. Actually what has been read as Chikūdara in the corrupt text of Farrukhī's Ode may itself be Chaḍḍaval, i. e., Chaḍḍavalī or Chandrāvatī.

one might remember, was also the route which Muhammad Ghorī tried to take when he led an expedition against Gujarāt in 1178 A.D.,[1] and the route which Qutb-ud-dīn actually took when, after defeating Dhārāvarṣa of Chandrāvatī and Jayatsiṁha of Nāḍol, he invaded Gujarāt and sacked Anhilwārā.[2]

Pālanpur to Anhilwārā was no long distance to traverse. The chief of this place, fled to some other fort and Mahmūd pushed on to Somanātha.[3] Mundher, which is the next town noted by Farrukhī, lies south of Pāṭan (old Aṇahillapaṭṭana or Anhilwārā). Dewalwārā or Delwārā is mentioned by Dhanapāla as well as Farrukhī as situated between Ūnā and the island of Diu, at a distance of about forty miles east of Somanātha.[4] But between Chaddāvalī or Chandrāvatī, which may be Farrukhī's Chikūdara for all one knows, and Deulavāḍā Dhanapāla puts Soraṭh, i. e., the Kāthiāwār coast adjoining the Gulf of Cambay. Dilwārā to Somanātha was two days' journey according to the *Tārikh-ul-Kāmil*[5]

After capturing Somanātha, Mahmūd marched towards Kandahāt, where the chief of Anhilwāra had shut himself up. The place is said to have been situated about forty *parsangs* from Somanātha between that place and the desert. When he reached in front of the place, he was told that there was a practicable ford "but if the wind blew a little, he might be submerged."[6] Mahmūd managed to cross over and capture the place which has been variously identified by scholars. Wolseley Haig identified it with Beyt Shankhodhar, an islet near the north-western corner of Saurāshṭra. Buhler identified the place with Kanthākoṭ in East Cutch. Hodivala took it to be Cambay. But in view of the fact that both according the *Zain-ul-Akhbār* and the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī* Mahmūd did not return by the way he came, as Param Deo blocked the way, it is probably best to agree with the scholars who put Kandhat on the north-western or northern side. This would mean that instead of returning by way of Devalwāḍā and the western coast of Saurāshṭra which would have brought him to a point facing Cambay, he moved on along the western coast

1. For details see our *Early Chauhān Dynasties*, pp. 138-9.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
3. *Tārikh ul-Kāmil* as quoted by H. C. Ray in *DHNI.*, II, p. 954.
4. The distance is as given by Dr. Nazim.
5. According to Ibn-ul Athīr.
6. *Kāmil-ut-Tawārikh, ED.* II, p. 249.

till he reached a place from where, at ebb tide, he could cross over to Cutch on horseback. Kanthākoṭ, which lies 16 miles north-east of Anjār in East Cutch, nicely suits such a location. Further we might remeber that it was a favourite place of refuge for the Chaulukya rulers whenever they were attacked by a very strong enemy. Both according to the *Pṛthvīrājavijaya* and Merutuṅga, Mūlarāja I took shelter in Kanthā-koṭṭa,[1] (of which Kandahat is an obviously the corrupt form in Persian script) when he was attacked by Vigraharāja II of Śākambharī. His great-grandson followed his example when attacked by Mahmūd nearly fifty years later.

Mahmūd wished to reach Sind. But led astray by guides he suffered much on the way and reached the mainland perhaps at a point not very far from Sānchor or Satyapura. We have already quoted the accounts from the *Satyapurīya-Mahāvīra-utsāha* and the *Vividha-tīrtha-kalpa* stating that he could not destroy the idol of Mahāvīra of Satyapura. Perhaps the army was too dispirited and too tired after its fatiguing march across the Rann to think of destroying each and every temple that lay on the way. It therefore dashed on towards the fresh waters of the Sūkrī and Lūṇī, looting the district of Bhīnmāl on the way. Then moving westwards, Mahmūd reached Mansūrā (43 miles N. E. of modern Haidarābād in Sind) which he captured from an apostate Muslim ruler.[2] From there he might have proceeded along the Indus and the Chenāb to Multān and then in due course reached Ghaznī taking Bhāṭiā or Bherā on the way.[3]

1. *PV*. *V*. 50-3 ; *PC*., pp. 15-16, Singhī-Jaina-Granthamālā edit-edition.
2. *Kāmil-ut-Tawārīkh*, ED., II, p. 249.
3. *Ibid*,

ROMAN TRADE IN INDIA

By

Dr Parmeswari Lal Gupta

Quite a large number of Roman coins—gold, silver and copper—are known on the India soil. They range in date from the early Christian era to the fifth century A. D. No systematic study of these coins has so far been made. On the basis of the casual references of the finds of the Roman coins, it is generally assumed by the scholars of Indian History that Rome had a large volume of trade with India unabated till about the fifth century A. D. But an analytic study of the finds of the coins does not support any such assumptions.

In the old records of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, we often get references of the finds of the Roman coins of various places in India ; but unfortunately they refer the finds of gold coins vaguely as "quanity amounting to five cooly-loads", of silver as "some thousands", "enough to fill five or six Madras measures", "a dozen quart measure". These statements do not find support from any of the finds of the later period. In the largest hoard, known during the past hundred years, these coins were not more that a few thousand. This shows that the old records are not only vague but are also full of exaggerations. As such they are of little use to us. But at the same time, it is also regretting that the records of the recent finds too, are by no means satisfactory. The records that are maintained by those museums, who deal with the treasure trove finds, and their published reports are often found incomplete. Most of them do not provide the history of the finds ; nor they do give the analysis of the contents and, their disposition. They feel content by saying that so many coins of such and such metal (some times even this is also not given) was found in such and such district. Rarely they mention the exact find place. Then the coins are disposed off in such a manner, without being properly studied and the results published, that it is never possible to know about them and their whereabouts. With such an incomplete data, and that too not available at one place, if the historians have arrived at some wrong conclusions, they are not much to be blamed.

Recently, while I had an occassion to examine a few hoards of the Roman coins found in the Andhra Pradesh, I made an attempt to

collect information, as much as possible, about the finds of these coins known so far and to bring them together. As the result of my efforts, I could lay hands on 61 finds. Many of these finds consist of only one coin and a number of the others lack necessary details. Yet whatever is available is enough to present a fairly good study of the subject and to arrive at a proper conclusion.

An analytic study of these finds reveal the most interesting facts as follows :

1. No find of pre-Augustus or Republican period is known in my list. Seven Republican coins, extremely worn, were found at Manikyala (Rawalpindi) along with the Kushana coins.[1] A few coins of that period were also found in the Eyyal hoard[2] along with the coins of Augustus to Trajan. These finds show that the Repulican coins came to India only in the Imperial period. They thus made it quite clear that India had no direct contact with Rome in the Republican period.

2. The Roman contacts with India began only in the time of Augustus (31 B. C.—14 A. D). Six finds of coins, exclusive of his period are in my list. Five of them[3] are the stray finds of one coin ; only the sixth one[4] contained 121 *denarii*. Since no coins of the later emperors were found with these coins, there can be no doubt that they had travelled to India in the time of Augustus. These finds are confined only to Coimbatore district, Madras town and Chitaldrug in Mysore.

3. The Roman contacts expended widely in the time of Tiberius (14-37 A. D.). This is borne out from five finds which contain

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1. *J. A. S. B.*, III (1834), pp. 558-59 ; 564-65 ; 635-37.
2. Gupta, P. L. *Early Coins from Kerala*, Trivandrum. Found in 1945, included 12 *aurii* and 71 *denarii* along with 34 silver punch-marked coins. Four of the *denarii* belonged to Republican period, four *denarii* of Octavian of the Trivumvirate period, 1 *denarii* of Octavian issued from Gaul as *impervtor perpotus* ; 36 *Denarii* of Augustus ; 8 au *aurii* and 6 *denarii* of Tibarius ; 1 *aureus* and 4 *denarii* of Claudius ; 2 *aurii* and 5 *denarii* of Nero and 1 āureus of Trajan.
3. (i) Coimbatore (1843-44). *N. C.*, I (1843-44), p. 162.
   (ii) Coimbatore, Chavadepalyam (1808). Along with some silver punch-marked coins in a *pandukuli* (tumulus).
   (iii) Coimbatore, Pennar (1888). *Mad. Jour. Lit. & Sc.* XIX (1888), p. 228.
   (iv) Madras, Mambalam (1930). *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.* 1930, p. 6.
   (v) Chitaldurg (Mysore), Chandravalli (1909). *Mysore Arch. Sur. Rep.* 1909, p. 30.
4. Coimbatore, Vellalur (1932). *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.* 1932, p. 8.

exclusively the coins of Tiberius[1] and from other five finds which have his coins along with the coins of his predecessor Augustus.[2] These finds were deposited in the times of Tiberius or a little later. They show that the Roman trade was flourishing not only in the Madras state but had extended to the entire peninsula from the west to the east and at least upto Karimnagar (Andhra Pradesh) in the north. Its impact had reached upto Ganjam in Orrisa,[3] if not the actual trade.

4. This expended trade continued flourishing in the reign of Claudius (41-51 A. D.) We have three finds, which had exclusively the coins from Augustus to Claudius[4] and show that they were deposited either in the time of Claudius or only a little later. But no coin after Tiberius are known north of Mysore.

5. The Roman trade continued still later in the time of Nero (54-68 A. D.). We have four finds where the contents end with Nero. Two of them begin with Augustus[5], one with Tiberius[6]; the contents of the remaining one[7] is not available to me, These finds were undoubtedly buried in the time of Nero or a little later and show that the

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1. (i) Coimbatore (1912). 2 *denarii*. *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.* 1912, p. 4.
   (ii) Chitaldurg, Chandravalli (1929) 2*denarii*. *Mysore Arch Sur. Rep.* 1929, p. 28.
   (iii) Krishna, Vidiyadurrapuram (Bezwada Tk. (1888). *A.S.I.* (*Sc. C.*) *A. R.*, 1888, pp. 2-4.
   (iv) Visakhapattam, Saligundam (Chicacole Tk.) 1899. *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.* 1899, p. 5.
   (v) Ganjam. (?), *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.* 1915.
2. (i) Coimbatore, Kuruvur, 1878. About 500 *denarii*. *Madras Christian College Magazine*, I, 1883, pp. 219-26.
   (ii) Coimbatore, Pennar, 1888. *Mad. Jour. Lit. Sc.* XIX, 1888, p. 228.
   (iii) Coimbatore, Kattanganni (Dharapuram Tk), 1913. 233 *denarii*. *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*, 1913, p. 4.
   (iv) Coimbatore, Polachi, 1800, *Mad. Jour. Lit. Sc.* XIII 1844, p. 214.
   (v) Karimnagar, Nasthulapur, 1952, *J. N. S. I.*, XIX, pp. 1-4.
   (vi) Visakhapattam, Salihundam (Chicacole Tk.), 1899, *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*. 1890, p. 5.
3. *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*, 1915.
4. (i) Coimbatore, Kuruvvr, 1806. *Mad. Jour. Lit. Sc.*, XIII, 1884, p. 214.
   (ii) Coimbatore, Vellalur, 1842, *Mad. Jour. Lit. Sc.*, 1884, pp. 212-14.
   (iii) Bangalore, Yashwantpur, 1891, *Mad. Mus, Cat.* No. 2, pp. 26-38.
5. (i) Coimbatore, Vellalur, 1891, *N. C.*, 1891, p. 199.
   (ii) Nalgonda, Akkenpalle, 1959. *A. S. Nizam's Dominion, A.* R., 1933, p. 7.
6. South Arcot, Tondamanatham (Cuddalore Tk.), 1918, *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*, 1918, p. 3.
7. Madura town, 1917, *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.* 1917, p. 4-5.

Roman trade had continued command over the southern peninsula till his time.

6. The tempo of the Roman trade lasted most likely only for about a three-quarter of a century. After Nero, we do not have many finds of the Roman coins. Only one find is known of the time of Vespesian[1] (69-79 A. D.), which contains the coins from Augustus to Vespesian and would have been buried only in the early part of the latter's reign as it contains only three coins belonging to him, while these of his predecessor Nero are no less than 156. So, this find does not take us much beyond Nero. But another find having the *auris* from Augustus to Nerva (96-98 A. D.)[2] leaves an indication that the Roman trade continued till the end of the first century A. D. This is further supported by another find, which includes an *aureus* of Trajan (98-117 A. D.).[3]

7. The finds of the Roman coins thus indicate that the Roman trade in the first century A. D. was carried out from the ports of Malabar like Toṇḍi and Muziris (Crangnore) on the western coast and from the ports of Coromandal like Korkai and Kaveripattanam on the eastern coast. And the entire peninusula was buzzing with the Roman traders.

8. At the same time, it is also noteworthy that most of the coin-finds of this period are centred around the region of Coimbatore; and thereby they indicate that the area around it had keen trade relations with Rome than any other part of the peninsula. Most likely this was to a great extent, due to the beryl mine at Padiyur in Dharampuram Taluka. Here is an extensive dyke of crystalline perphyritic granite in the gneiss rock. The dyke abounds with masses of quartzs with the large crystals of the same, as well as felsper, cleavelandite and garnets. The crystals of cleavelandite are remarkably fine and it often occurs in large masses, in the cavities of which the aquamarine (green beryl) is found in six-sided prism. Most of the finds of the Roman coins are within the radius of thirty miles from this mine. Pliny seems to refer to this very mine when he says that the best beryls were those that had the greenness of pure sea water and came from India.

1. Puddukotta, Katukkakkuricchi (alangudi Tk.), 1898. *N. C.*, XVIII (3rd Ser.). pp. 304-20.
2. Madura, Caliyamputtur, 1854. *Mad. Jour. Lit. Sc.*, XVII, 1856-57, p. 114.
3. Trichur, Eyyall, 1945, *Early Coins from Kerala*, Trivandrum 1265.

According to him they were most lustrous when polished haxagonally ; and they were in great demand at Rome.

9. Then surprisingly enough, not a single find of the Roman coins of the second century A. D. is known on the Malabar coast and in the central part of the peninsula. Only two small finds are known from the Coromandal side. One hailed from Tinnevelly[1] and consisted of 6 aurii ; there the latest coin belonged to Hadrian (117-118 A. D.). The other find came from Trichnapally and had a single coin of Marcus Aurelius (161-180 A. D.).[2] Against this no less than ten finds belonging to the second century A. D. are known from the eastern coastal region of Andhra-deśa,[3] and three finds from the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra.[4]

These finds indicate that the Roman trade activities in the second century A. D. had shifted from the lands of the Cholas to the lands of the Andhras. The Roman ships perhaps now ceased to visit the Malabar coast and their activities on the Coromondal coast slowed down. They were now coming to the ports of Śūrpāraka (Sopara) and Bhrigukachchha or Broach (Barygaza of the Romans) on the western side ; and on the eastern side they anchored on the coastal emporiums of the Andhradeśa further north of Coromandal.

The Roman relations with the Andhra region is well attested from the time of Tiberius (14-37 A. D.) from his coins.

1. Tinnevelly Karivalamvandanallur (Sankarankoli Tk.), 1933, *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.* 1933, p. 5.
2. Trichnapolly, Karur, 1809, *J. R. A. S.*, 1904, p. 617.
3. (i) Cuddapah, Athirala (Pullampet Tk.), 1888. *In. Ant.* II. 1878, pp. 141-42.
   (ii) Guntur, Mallayapalem, 1915. *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.* 1915, p. 4.
   (iii) Guntur, Ongle Tk. 1908, *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.* 1905, p. 5.
   (iv) Krishna, Nagarjunikonda, 1936-37, *A. S. I., A. R.*, 1936-37, p. 61.
   (v) Krishna, Nagarjunikonda, 1956-57, *Indian Archaeology*, 1956-57, p. 38.
   vi) Krishna, Vindukonda, 1889, *N. C.*, IX (3rd Ser.), 1889, pp. 325-328.
   (vii) Kurnool, Nandyal, 1933, *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.* 1935, p. 5.
   (viii) Nalgonda, Gootiparti (Suriapet Tk.), 1933, *A. S.* Nizam's Dominion, A. R., 1933, p. 7.
   (ix) Nalgonda, Yelleswarm, 1961-62, *A Monograph on Yelle swaram Excavations*, p. 13.
   (x) Nellore, 1787, *Asiatic Researches*, 1790, p. 332.
4. (i) East Khandesh, Waghoda (Raver Tk.) 1890, *J. B. B. R. S.*, XVIII, 1890-94, p. 38.
   (ii) Solapur, Dhardhul, 1840, *N. C.*, V (1st Ser), 1848, p. 202.
   (iii) Surat, Nagdhara (Jalalpur Tk.), 1890-94. *J. B. B. R. A. S.*, XVIII, 1890-4, pp. 30-38.

No less than four finds of his time from this region is on record.[1] Then we know of a hoard containing coins upto Nero (54-68 A. D.).[2] Again we have a find of *aureus* of Trajan (98-111 A. D.) from Cuddapah.[3] This shows a brief break of about 30 years. But it should not be taken as any indication of any interruption, political or otherwise, in the relations between the Roman traders and the traders of the Andhra-deśa.

Then we have at least two finds of the time of Hadrian,[4] Trajan's successor (111-138 A. D.). One included a coin of Nero and the other was the exclusive find of his own *aureus*.[5] Then we have five finds of the time of Antoninus Pius (158-161 A. D.)[6] Two of them had his own coins as the latest.[7] The other three had the latest coins of his wife Faustina.[8] Of these finds, the details of two hoards are not available. Among the remaining three, the earliest coins belonging to Augustus was found in one,[9] of Claudius in the other[10] and of Trajan in the third.[11] If the coins of these early rulers, known from these

1. (i) Karimnagar, Nasthullapur, 1952, *J. N. S. I.*, XIX, pp. 1-4.
 (ii) Krishna, Vidiyadurrapuram (Bezwada Tk.), 1888, *A. S. I.* (S. C.), A. R., 1888, pp. 2-4.
 (iii) Vishakhapattam, Kotpad (Jaypore Tk.), 1915, *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*, 1915, p. 5.
 (iv) Vishakhapatttam, Salihundam (Chicakole Tk.) 1899, *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*, 1899, p. 5.
2. Nalgonda, Akkenpalle, *A. S. Nizam's Dominion, A. R.*, 1933, p. 7.
3. Cuddapah, Athirala (Pullampet Tk.), 1838. *Mad. Jour. Lit. Sc.* 1844, pp. 214-15.
4. Guntur, Ongle Tk, 1908, *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*, 1905, p. 5.
5. Krishna, Nagajunikonda, *A. S. I.*, *A. R.*, 1936-37, p. 38.
6. (i) Guntur, Mallayapalem, 1915, *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*, 1915, pp. 4-5.
 (ii) Krishna, Nagarjunikonda, 1936-37, *Indian Archaeology*, 1956-57, p. 38.
 (iii) Kurnool, Nandyal, 1933, *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*, 1935, p. 5.
 (iv) Nalgonda, Gootiparti (Suriapet Tk.), 1933, *A. S. Nizam's Dominion, A. R.*, 1933, p. 7.
 (v) Nellor, 1787, *Asiatic Researches*, 1790, p. 332.
7. (i) Guntur, Mallayapalem. 1915. *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*, 1915. p. 5.
 (ii) Nalgonda, Gootiparti (Suriapet Tk.), 1933, *A. S. Nizam's Dominion A. R.*, 1933, p. 7.
8. (i) Krishna, Nanarjunikonda, 1956-57, *Indian Archaeology*, 1956-56, p. 61.
 (ii) Kurnool, Nandyal, 1933, *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*, 1935, p. 5.
 (iii) Nellor, 1787, *Asiatic Researches*, 1790, p. 332.
9. Kurnool, Nandyal, 1933. *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*, 1935, p. 5.
10. Nalgonda, Gootiparti. 1933, *A. S. Nizam's Dominion A. R.*, 1933, p. 7.
11. Nellor 1887. *Asiatic Researches*, 1790, p. 332.

hoards, had reached India in their own time or they had come later, is not possible to say; but it may be confidently said that in the time of Antoninus Pius, the Andhra country had brisk trade relations with Rome and its coins were flowing in large number.

10. If the Roman trade with Andhra continued with the same fervour in the subsequent period, is by no means certain. Till now, we have only two small finds of post-Antoninus period. One of them, is an *aureus* of Septimus Serverus found in the excavations at Yaleswaram;[1] and the other is a hoard of 15 *aurii* of Tiberius to Carcalla (211-212 A. D.).[2] Here we have a gap of at least thirty years between Antoninus Pius and Septimus Serverus. If it had any meaning in our context, we cannot say. A find of two *aurii* from Bilaspur district (Madhya Pradesh)[3] may be placed in this gap. It had the coins of Antoninus Pius and Commodus (180-192 A. D.). It is quite likely that these coins reached their destination, passing through the Andhra-deśa.

The trade relations with Rome, that originated in the first century A. D., seems to have ended by the first quarter of the third century A. D. We do not have any Roman coin after Carcalla (211-212 A. D.) any where in the eastern and the central region of the Andhra-deśa.

11. The three finds from the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra are very small in their contents and belong only to the later half of the second century A. D. One of them had 18 *aurii* belonging to Antoninus Pius (138-161 A. D.), Lucius Verus (161-169 A. D.). Commodus (180-192 A. D.), Septimus Severus (192–211 A. D.) and Geta (209-211 A. D.).[4] The other had an *aureus* of Lucius Verus (161-169 A. D.).[5] And the third had only an *aureus* of Septimus Severus (193-211 A.D.).[6] If these finds have any indications of trade relations of this region with Rome, they show that it was confined to a short period of about 50 years in the periods of Antoninus Pius (138-161 A. D.) and Septimus Severus (193-211 A. D.).

1. Nalagonda, Telleswaram, 1961-62, *A Monograph on Telleswaram* Excavations, p. 13.
2. Krishna, Vindukonda, 1889, *N. C.*, IX (3rd Ser), 1889, pp. 325-328.
3. Bilaspur Chakrabedha, 1942, *J. N. S. I.*, VII, p. 6.
4. Solapur, Dharaphul, 1840, *N. C.*, V (1st Ser.), 1843, p. 203.
5. Surat, Nagdhara (Jalalpur Tk.) 1890-94 ?, *J. B. B. R. A. S.*, XVIII (1890-94), pp. 30-38.
6. East Khandesh, Waghoda (Raver Tk.), 1890, *J. B. B. R. A. S.*, XVIII (1890-94) p. 38.

It appears that prior to this period, Roman traders were not coming to the ports of the north-western coast—Sopara and Bhroach (Barygaza). The Indian ships were going to Persian Gulf, the south coast of Arabia and the Red Sea ceast of Africa from these ports ; and there the Roman trades were having their requirements from the Indian mariners in exchange of the commodities required by the latter.

Elaborate documentation of the ports of Sopara and Bhroach (Barygaza) and their trade with the western world is found in the *Periplus*. If the author had the first hand information of these ports, then it could be only true of the period when this region was directly and closely in contact with some. In that case, its date will have to be reviewed. It could not be placed earlier than the third quarter of the second century A. D. and not later than the beginning of the third century A. D.[1]

The hoard of the Roman objects found along with a number of Satavahana things from Brahmapuri (Kolhapur),[2] the stone cameo of a patrician woman from Karvan[3] and the the handle of the Roman bronze jug and the fragments of amphora from Akota (near Baroda)[4] most likely belonged to this period.

12. India's land-route trade with Rome through Gandhāra is often suggested by our historians. But only a few things of Roman origin have so far been found in Gandhāra region and possibly nothing anywhere else in the Northern India. As far the coins are concerned, only a single coin of Tiberius from Taxila is on record.[5] A few Republican coins in extremely worn condition were found in Manikyala along with the Kushana coins[6]. They can only be placed in the Kushana period or a little later. Of the second century A. D., we have three finds of *aurii* and *denarii*; but they are vaguely reported.

1. Originally *Periplus* was placed in the time of Dominian (81-96 A. D.). But the current view had been to place it in 106 A. D. But recently Jacqualine Piranne has questioned this date. She places the work in 225-30 A. D. (*Journal Asiatique*, 1961, pp. 441-51). This view is unacceptable to D. W. MacDowell. He puts it in 120-130 A. D. (*N. C.*, 1964, p. 280).
2. *Lalit-Kala*, No. 7, pp. 56-62.
3. *M. S. University Journal*, 1954, pl. XXId.
4. *Baroda Museum Bulletin*, VII (1949-50), pl. XXIe.
5. Taxila, 1934. *A. S. I.*, *A. R.*, 1935, pp. 29-30.
6. Rawalpindi, Manikyala, 1834. *J. A. B. B.*, III, (1834), pp. 558-59.

One of them had the latest *aurii* of Hadrian (117-138 A. D.)[1]; the other contained the latest coin of Antoninus Pius (136-161 A. D.)[2] and the third refers to the latest coin without naming the emperor to the period 158-159 A. D.[3]

For this paucity of the Roman coins in this region, the Kushanas are blamed by some of our historians directly or indirectly. They say that the Kushanas melted the Roman coins for minting the coins of their own.[4] But these historians fail to realise that the Kushana coins are known only in two metals—gold and copper. They did not issue silver pieces. The few silver coins, that are attributed to them, may be counted only on tips; and even these few are not considered to be genuine by many numismatists. So, if the Kushanas had ever used the Roman coins for making their own, of which we are extremely doubtful, they would have spoiled only the gold *aurii* and would not have touched the silver *dinarii*. If not *aurii*, at least a few finds of *dinarii* should have come to light in course of the last hundred years of the Indian Archaeology, across this land route. But *aurii* and *dinarii* both are equally scarce on the Indian land-route to west. And for this paucity, Kushanas cannot be blamed.

The reason of the paucity of the Roman coins lies in all probablity in the fact there was little direct land-route trade inter-course between India and Rome. The few coins that we have, had perhaps come there through indirect channels. But if these coins really indicate any thing about the land-route Roman trade with Gandhara they mean this contact only towards the end of the first century A. D., which did not last beyond the mid of the second century A. D.

13. Now coming to mid-India, we have a few small finds of the coins of Carcalla (198-217 A. D.), Carinus (283-285 A. D.) and Diocletian (284-304 A. D.) from Mathura,[5] Allahabad[6] and Mirzapur[7] reported by Prinsep. The only major and the important find of our interest that we have in this region, is that of the clay sealings that were found in a large number at Rajghat on the outskirt of the city of

1. Hazara, Pakli, 1889, *J. A. S. B.*, I (1832), p. 476.
2. Jalalabad, Ahin Posh Stupa. 1879, *J. A. S. B.*, 1879, pp. 77-79.
3. Rawalpindi, Manikyala, 1886, *Pros. A. S. B.*, LIII, 1885, pp. 86-89.
4. Rapson, *Indian Coins.* 123.
5. *C. A. S. R.*, XIII (1874-76), p. 72.
6. *J. A. S. B.*, I, 1832, p. 476.
7. *Ibid*, pp. 392-408.

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Varanasi during an excavations in the late thirties[1]. They had the representations of classical themes consisting of Greek gods and goddesses and royal heads and busts in imitation of the Greek and Roman coins. They have the string-marks at their back, which obviously show that the seals were originally fastened with some kind of despatches that had reached Varanasi in or about the third century A. D. Unfortunately these sealings were never studied in detail and we have hardly any published material about them. So, it is difficult to arrive at any conclusions from these sealings; they might be an indication of the commercial and cultural intercourse between India and the western world. But the most intriguing is the fact as to how these coins and sealings reached the Gangetic plains, without leaving any traces of their route either by land or sea. However, the link with the western world and the Gangetic plain may be anticipated via Tamralipti, the ancient port of the east in the Bay of Bengal, which was well connected with the interior by the land route. And a support may be found in the hoard of the Roman *aurii* that was discovered long back in the district of Singhbhum.[2] But nothing is known of the hoard beyond the fact that Mrs. Hayes, the Deputy Commissioner's wife at Singhbhum had picked the choicest coins (choice as to the excellence of preservation) from this hoard for her bracelet and among them Cunningham had seen the coins of Gardian (238-244 A. D.) and Constantine (308-340 A. D.). But we have yet to know if the Roman ship were ever coming to the port of Tamralipti. It is not unlikely that the seals and coins might have come there through some secondary sources.

14. A few stray coins of Diocletian (284-304 A. D.),[3] Theodocius (379-395 A. D. if I; 480-450 A. D. if II)[4] and *Zone* (476-491 A. D.)[5] are known from the Coromandal coast and hoard of coins, with the latest coins of Constantine I (308-340 A. D.) from Vishakhapattam district.[6] Besides these few silver and gold coins of the fourth and fifth centuries A. D., quite a large number of Roman copper coins

1. *J. N. S. I.*, III, pp. 76-77.
2. *C. A. S. R.*, XIII (1874-76), p. 72.
3. Tanjore. 1937. *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*, 1937, p. 7.
4. Chingleput, Mahabalipuram. *J. A. S. B.*, I, 1832, p. 406; *A. S. I. (S. C.) A. R.* 1888, pp. 2-4.
5. Madura, Tirumangalam Tk., 1839. *Mad. Mus. Coin Cat.* No. 2, p. 9.
6. Vishakhapattam, Gumada (Jaypore Tk.) 1928, *Mad. Mus. An. Rep.*, 1928, p. 4.

are known from various places in South India. Among them Walter Elliot had identified the coins of Velantine (344-375 A. D.), Theodosius (379-395 or 408-450 A. D.), and Eudocia, the wife of Theodosius II (408-450 A. D.). Sewell had seen the coins of Honorius (395-423 A. D.) and Arcodius (395-408 A. D.) among these coins.

On the basis of the testimony of Elliot and Sewell and from the fact that Ataric demanded and obtained as part of ranson three thousand pounds of pepper for sparing Rome, the continuity of trade between India and Rome down to the fifth contury A, D. is suggested.[1] But in doing so, the fact is ignored that the find of the Roman gold and silver coins are sporadic and the copper coins are found invariably in association with the Arab and Chinese coins. We know from the Chinese annals about the brisk trade between China and Arabia, which was passing through India. The Arabs used to come to Indian ports and exchange their merchandise with those of China. These Roman coins would certainly have come with these Arab traders. It is difficult to postulate that the Roman traders were coming to India during this period on the basis of these coins.

With these analytic observations of the finds of the Roman coins, the following facts regarding the Indo-Roman trade relations emerge :

The direct Roman trade with India began in the early first century A. D. The Roman traders anchored their ships on the Malabar and Coromandal coasts. Within the first century A. D. the Roman trade activities had spread over the entire peninsula including Deccan, the kingdoms of the Cholas and the Andhras. But the activities were more prominent in the western part round about Coimbatore. Suddenly in the second century A. D., the entire Roman trade activities shifted to the north-eastern coast to the port of Kaveri pattan and the kingdom of the Andhra was the centre of their trade. The Indian ships that were going to the Persian Gulf, the south coast of Arabia and the Red Sea coast of Africa from the ports of Sopara and Barygaza ceased to visit the western ports ; instead Roman ships began to visit these ports. By the end of the first quater of the third century A. D. Roman trade was undertaken by the Arab sea-farers. They now began to come to Indian ports and India's trade contact with Rome ceased once for all. With the expansion of the Chinese trade the Chinese traders began to come to the eastern ports in the Bay of

1. *J. R. A. S.*, 1904, pp. 207ff.

Bengal in the fourth and fifth centuries ; and they met there the Arab traders who brought with them the Roman commodities and mutually exchanged their goods at the ports of Tamralipti and of the Coromandal coast.

It is extremely doubtful if there was any direct trade relation with Rome through the western land-route of Gandhāra. In all probability Roman traders did not come to the trade centres of Gandhara ; the Roman goods reached there through other trade sources.

THE SECOND PHASE OF THE HŪṆA INVASION OF INDIA

By

Dr. Upendra Thakur

The first phase of the Hūṇa invasion of India may be described as an episode in the history of the country without any far-reaching consequence. The Hūṇas came, they raided and they were thoroughly defeated and routed. Their withdrawal, though temporary, from the Indian scene marked the ultimate collapse of their first serious attempt to establish an empire in India. It, however, produced an indirect result. It accelerated the pace of the dismemberment of the Gupta empire by encouraging outbreak of rebellions in border provinces and fissiparous tendencies all around. In spite of all his efforts, Skandagupta could not save the westernmost part of his empire from future troubles. It is true, during his life-time he retained his hold over Saurāṣṭra, the Cambay coast and the adjoining portions of continental Gujarāt and Mālwā[1], but it is also equally true that though he had arranged efficiently for the defence of his territories through scrupulous selection of his Viceroys, Governors, and Commandants of the army as is clear from the Junagarh inscription, neither he nor his father before him had taken due care to guard the north-western gates of India. They were completely neglected by Kumāragupta I and the Chinese historians have also recorded the destruction of the cities of Bactria and Afghanistan by the foreign invaders, first the Kuṣāṇas and finally the Hūṇas. And, Skandagupta, too, cannot be said to have put an end to the further devastation of the country by the Hūṇas once and for all. He merely postponed that tragedy.[2] His successors, however, do not appear to have been so fortunate, for we have not a single inscription or a coin so far to show that those frontier territories formed parts of the Gupta empire after his death.

The withdrawal of the strong arm of Skandagupta from the political scene was the signal for the disintegration of this mighty monarchy. With the provinces in turmoil the foreign barbarians once again started pouring across the western gates of the empire and

1. *PHAI*, p. 489.
2. Dandekar, *A History of the Guptas*, p. 115.

a disunited people could not long resist the united forces of the foreign hordes led by a great general. Thus, with the passing away of Skandagupta in c. A. D. 467, the fissiparous forces were again unabashed and dash and grab followed on all sides. The empire declined, especially in the west, but did not wholly perish. The sudden stoppage in silver currency in western provinces after Skandagupta probably points to the termination of the Gupta authority in those regions, and the general debasement of gold currency suggests a time of troubles. Epigraphic and literary evidence unmistakably points to the continuance of the Gupta empire in parts of Central and Eastern India in the latter half of the fifth as well as the sixth and seventh centuries A. D. The Sāranāth inscriptions,[1] the Dāmodarpur plates[2] and the Eraṇ stone-pillar inscription[3] of Budhagupta prove that from A. D. 473 to 495 the Gupta empire extended from Bengal to Eastern Mālwā. Besides these, the Betul plates of Parivrājaka Mahārāja Saṁkṣobha (Gupta year 199 i. e., 518 A. D.) "during the enjoyment of the sovereignty of the Gupta king" speak of the Gupta sovereignty over Ḍabhālā (Ḍāhīala) including the Tripuri Viṣaya (Jubbalpur region).[4] The Khoh Copper-plate inscription of Saṁkṣobha (Gupta year 209 = A. D. 528)[5], the Eraṇ stone-pillar inscription of the time of Bhānugupta (Gupta year 191 = A. D. 510)[6] and other records[7] prove that the Gupta empire definitely included some of the Central districts even in A. D. 528. Thus a careful perusal of the epigraphic records of the successors of Skandagupta and those of the contemporary kings leaves little doubt that even in A. D. 600 (the time of Prabhākaravardhana) the sway of the Gupta dynasty extended, though loosely, from Mālwā to Brahmaputra.

But, all told, the fact remains that the vast Gupta empire had started shrinking fast in dimensions after the death of Skandagupta (467 A. D.) and while the power and prestige of the Guptas was on the wane, that of the new rising kingdoms was on the wax. The hereditary character of the officialdom, particularly in some of the outlying

1. Sircar, *Select Inscriptions*, Vol. I, pp. 323-24.
2. *Ibid*, pp. 324-26, 328-30.
3. *Ibid*, pp. 326-27.
4. *EI.* viii, pp. 284-87.
5. Sircar, *op. cit.* p. 374.
6. *Ibid*, p. 335.
7. *Ibid*, p. 370 ff.

provinces, let loose centrifugal forces which gathered momentum and strength as the Central authority weakened owing to the continuous onslaughts of the barbarian hordes. Skandagupta's successors Purugupta and Kumāragupta Kramāditya (Kumāragupta II) had short reigns (A. D. 467-477) and it appears from epigraphic and numismatic evidences that they succeeded in maintaining the integrity of their loosely-knit empire during their life-time, although Ujjain is said to have been exposed to the invasion of the Hūṇas and the envy of the refractory chieftains of the west[1].

Budhagupta, the son of Purugupta, was a vigorous ruler with a number of dated inscriptions and coins to his credit, which prove that he ruled for a long period, *i.e.*, about 20 years (A. D. 476-96), and held sway over most parts of the empire including Central India as well as Kāśī and North Bengal. His Eraṇ inscription (A.D. 484) is an important document, for it sets at rest all controversies regarding the so-called occupation of Central India by the Hūṇas after the death of Skandagupta, or even during his life-time as some scholars suggest. The inscription speaks of the installation of a *dhvajastambha* in honour of Viṣṇu (A. D. 484-485) by Mahārāja Mātṛviṣṇu, ruler of Eraṇ, and his brother Dhanyaviṣṇu, while the *Bhūpati* (king) Budhagupta was reigning, and Mahārāja Suraśmicandra was governing the land between the Kālindī (Yamunā) and the Narmadā.[2] This is further corroborated by numismatic evidence as the coins of this emperor dated A. D. 495-96 continue the Peacock-type of the Gupta silver coinage issued for circulation in the Central and Western territories of Mālwā and Gujarāt. In fact, all the political convulsions and upheavals took place only after the death of Budhagupta when the Hūṇas, already poised for action on the North-Western border, had really a smooth run in many parts of the empire.

Thus the period after A.D. 484 (*i.e.*, towards the close of the fifth century) marks a turning point in the history of the Guptas when, besides the local chieftains, their suzerainty was successfully challenged by the fierce Hūṇas who after having settled their accounts with the Sasanid monarchs after the death of Firuz (A. D. 484) made another terrible dash towards the unstable and restless

1. *ABORI*, 1946, p. 128; also cf. *Bhaviṣyottara Purāṇa*, (*JBORS*, xxx, i, 1-47); *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, ed. Jayaswal's *IHI*, p. 50.
2. Sircar, *op. cit.* pp. 326-27.

frontiers of the Gupta empire as it were with a vengeance. While the passing away of Skandagupta had seemingly removed all impediments to their steady advance, the death of Budhagupta finally removed the last obstacle in their naked aggressive designs. Taking advantage of the weakness of the Central authority, now utterly disorganised and dangerously exposed owing to the fissiparous tendencies among the warring ambitious provincial chiefs who had begun asserting their independence one after another, they swooped down upon the North-Western provinces of the empire and eventually made themselves masters of the Punjab (Sialkot region), Kashmir, part of Rājputana and Eastern Mālwā whose chiefs perferred security to resisting the new menace by humbly transferring their loyalty and allegiance to the new leader (the Hūṇa chief).

This was not at all surprising. For, in an explosive situation like this, the provincial chiefs who largely constituted a class of rank opportunists and traitors always loved to worship the rising sun rather than remain loyal to and stand by their old masters in their hour of crisis. Devoid of all sense of patriotism and national honour, these bands of self-seekers and fortune-makers wanted to exploit the situation to their best advantage by meekly submitting to the advancing Hūṇas whose leader, Toramāṇa, was quick to seize this opportunity by grabbing large portions of the sinking empire without much efforts on his part. Thus the death of Budhagupta marked the end of that semblance of unity in the major part of the empire that was seemingly preserved till his time, and the erstwhile beaten Hūṇas once again spread in devastating hordes over some of the fairest provinces of the country which had now neither a Candragupta nor a Skandagupta to force them to lick the dust of their own defeat and humiliation. What the Hūṇas under Hephthal II could not achieve in spite of their mighty arms, the Hūṇas under Toramāṇa achieved with the least efforts and succeeded in building a kingdom as far as Central India which they were now destined to rule for some time, and play significant role in the history of India, both politically and culturally.

Toramāṇa (c. 500-515 A.D..)

The leader of this second wave of the successful Hūṇa invasion of India was Toramāṇa, a general of remarkable personality whose political achievements in India were no less great than those of Alexander and Menander. Rather, he outshone them in many respects.

He was the first great foreign conqueror in India to build up a vast empire from Central Asia to Central India. A ruthless follower of blood and iron, a veritable incarnation of hell and a born fighter and destroyer, he swept away everything before him like a surging storm, and at last gave the Hūṇas a stable home since their rout from their original home in Mongolia. After Attila, he was the only general who organised the Hūṇas under his inspiring leadership, stirred them on to move ceaselessly in search of a new home and established an empire which lasted for about a hundred years. Indeed, the story of Toramāṇa is the story of a nation re-born which makes a fascinating study in the history of India and forms a popular theme with many of the great contemporary writers, and after.

Like most of the great generals of history, Toramāṇa also emerged from obscurity and had no claim to high ancestry or glorious past. Like a meteor he shot up into the sky, shone brilliantly for a while and soon consumed himself in the darkness of history. Through conflagration and death, battles and the terrors, the reck and the cries, across heaps of corpses, and to the accompaniment of the agonised curses of the innocent dying civilians and the exultant shout of plundering soldiers, rose Toramāṇa, a new star in the political firmament of India, whose only companion was his sword, whose only love was plunder and bloodshed. Starting as an ordinary soldier he soon caught the eyes of his Ephthalite master due to his dash and courage and was appointed the *tegin* or Viceroy of the newly acquired territories of Gāndhāra and Afghanistan or the north-western frontiers from where he directed his ferocious attacks against the mainland of India. Thus at first subordinate to the supreme Ephthalite ruler who still continued to reside in Bactria, this official so effected and extended his conquest in India as to become one of the greatest monarchs of the age and "by his glory completely overshadowed his nominal suzerain who remained the semi-barbarous ruler of Central Asia".[1]

But, unlike other great generals, his origin is shrouded in obscurity. We have no knowledge of his geneology, of his parents and of their position and status in the Hunnish hierarchy. Almost all the sources of our information are silent on this point; they simply refer to his name and achievements in brief and mysteriously pass over.

1. McGovern, *Early Empires of Central Asia*, p. 415; Chavannes, *Documents*, p. 225; J. Macquart, *Ērānšahr* (Berlin, 1901).

A veil of mystery surrounds his early career which has given rise to numerous speculations regarding his tribe and race. In all the ages, men of low beginnings rising ultimately to the highest stature through sheer perseverance and talents have been subject to such persistent inquiries; and Toramāṇa is no exception to this general rule. Some scholars have even questioned his Hunnish origin and have suggested that there was a revival of the Kuṣāṇa power in the later part of the fifth century A.D. under the leadership of Toramāṇa and Mihirakula. The two tribes being ethnically allied were later merged into one nation and came to be known as the Hūṇas when they appeared on the Indian scene in the beginning of the sixth century A.D. In other words, the question arises—Who was Toramāṇa : Was he a Kuṣāṇa or a Hūṇa ?

It is suggested that the possibility of his being a Kuṣāṇa chief cannot altogether be ruled out.[1] Jayaswal[2] and Fleet[3] also believe that Toramāṇa was a Kuṣāṇa. Sten Konow[4] thinks that Toramāṇa was probably a Hūṇa, and not a Kuṣāṇa. The annals of the three Chinese dynasties assert that the, Ye-tha or Ephthalites belonged to the race of the great Yueh-chi,[5] to which the ruling Kuṣāṇa tribe in India is said to have belonged. In other words, the Ephthalites or the white Hūṇa constituted a branch of the great Yueh-chi and both the Kuṣāṇas and the Hūṇas came from the same stock, and there was striking resemblance in manners and customs between them and the Turks. His name 'Toramāṇa', which is neither Sanskrit nor Prakrit, is probably of Turkish origin, where *toremān*, *tūramān* or *toremen* means "a rebel or insurgent."[6] The title *Jaūvla* accordingly should be connected with *jul*, meaning 'a falcon'. Alberuni mentions a Laga-Turman as the last king of the Thibetan (?) or Turk Shahi dynasty of Northern India among whom was Kanik (Kaniṣka ?)[7]. These considerations have prompted Bühler, and following him Keilhorn, to suggest that the *Toramāṇa* of the Kurā inscription[8] is possibly not identical with the

1. *VGA*, p. 182.
2. *JBORS*, xviii, p. 201 ff; xvi, pp. 287 ff.
3. *IA*, xv, p. 245.
4. *IHQ*, xii, p. 532.
5. M.A. Stein, *IA*., xxxiv, p. 84.
6. Bühler, *EI*, I, p. 239.
7. *Alberuni* (Tr. Sachau), ii, p. 13.
8. *EI*, i, pp. 238 ff.

Toramāṇa of the Eraṇ inscription nor with the *Toramāṇa* of Kashmir mentioned by Kalhaṇa or with the *Toramāṇa* of the coins found in different parts of the country. He was in all probability an independent king for, "the fact that this Toramāṇa bears the title or surname *shāha* or *shāhā* and receives the epithat *Jaūvla*, which may be a tribal name or *viruda*, is sufficient to prevent the identification with the other Toramāṇas who are not characterised in this manner."[1] We, however, fail to understand what prevented Bühler and Keilhorn from identifying the Tormāṇa of the Eraṇ inscription and the Toramāṇa of Kashmir who, they agree, flourished during the same period (5th Century A.D. onward). The history of India records the rise of only one Toramāṇa as a great conqueror and monarch, and, therefore, the question of the so-called other Toramāṇas does not arise at all in this context.

Smith,[2] Rājendralāl, Bhāu Dāji and others have, however, no doubt of the identity of this king with the Toramāṇa of the Eraṇ record while Cunningham[3] expresses doubts and regards the Toramāṇa coins which he ascribes to Kashmir, as the unauthorised issue of a pretender, but at the same time he also feels sceptical as to the existence of two contemporary Toramāṇas in Northern India during this period.

The two inscriptions of Mihirakula from Uruzgan (Central Afghanistan)[4] and the Kurā inscription of Toramāṇa from the Punjab[5] (Salt Range) bearing the sur-name *shāhi* or *shāha* and the epithet *Jaūvla* speak of the early occupation of these areas by the Hūṇas and their settlements in that region. These records were engraved by the royal order whereas the later inscriptions such as the Eraṇ stone inscription and the Gwalior stone inscription were inscribed by the Indian feudatories of Toramāṇa and Mihirakula respectively who refer to their overlord as *mahārājādhirāja*, without mentioning the tribal sur-name and the dynastic epithet, which seemed quite redundant in this context and was not always considered necessary. We have numerous instances of such deliberate omissions of royal prerogatives in the epigraphic records issued by feudatories in the name of their suzerains, as well as in the royal records. The inscriptional evidence is further supported by

1. *Ibid*, pp. 239 ff.
2. *JASB*, 1894, p. 186.
3. *Transactions*, p. 232, *Num-Chron*, 1894, pp. 276-78.
4. A. D. H. Bivar *JRAS*, 1954, p. 112 ff.
5. Stein, *IA* 1894, p. 83.

numismatic evidence as some of the coins of Toramāṇa and Mihirakula also do not bear the above titles. This does not, therefore, mean that the Toramāṇa of the royal records is distinct from the Toramāṇa of the unofficial records issued by his feudatories. The adoption of the title *shāhi* borne by Kaniṣka and his successors, by Toramāṇa and his successors may also be explained by the fact that the Hūṇa king wished to appear as the rightful successor of the Kuṣāṇa monarchs[1] whose territory he had conquered, and the so-called tribal *viruda Jaūvla* or *zabol* really stands for a section of the Hūṇas who on their way to India first settled in a land called Zabulistān to the south of the Hindukush (*i.e.*, modern Afghanistan) of whom Toramāṇa was a scion and later a *tegin* or *Viceroy*. The literal meaning of his name well reflects his activities as a Viceroy who later severed all his relations with the Ephthalite monarch living in Bactria, and founded an independent kingdom of his own in India. There is thus no cogent reason for assuming that Toramāṇa of the Kurā inscription is different from Toramāṇa of the Eraṇ inscription. They are really one and the same person.

The account of the Chinese traveller Sungyun who visited Gāndhāra in 520 A. D. also indirectly confirms the identity of the two. He says: "This is the country which the Ye-thas destroyed and afterwards set up a *tegin* (Viceroy) to be king over the country since which events two generations have passed." It was during this time that Mihirakula, the son and successor of Toramāṇa, was ruling (A. D. 520) and thus this Chinese account would point to a time when Toramāṇa had been living (*i.e.*, c. 498 A.D.). We have noted above that Toramāṇa started his career as a *tegin* under the supreme Ephthalite king in Bactria and later severed all his relations with him in c. 500-510 A. D. These scattered pieces of evidence, when knit together, make it absolutely clear that Toramāṇa of the Kurā record is identical with Toramāṇa, the father of Mihirakula.

"As there is no mention of the term *Hūṇa* either in the epigraphic records or on the coins of Toramāṇa and Mihirakula, scholars have raised doubts regarding the identification of Toramāṇa. The Eraṇ inscription of Dhanyaviṣṇu dated in the first year of Toramāṇa calls him *Mahārājādhirāja Śrī Toramāṇa*, while the Kurā inscription refers to him as *rājādhirāja Mahārāja Toramāṇa Shāhi Jaūvla*. The two

1. Sircar, *op. cit*, p. 398 fn. 4.

records, when read together, mark two distinct phases in his career. The latter unmistakably points to his status in the beginning as a feudatory chief when he was in possession of Afghanistan and Gāndhāra or the Punjab whereas the former establishes him as a full-fledged Indian monarch who had conquered Mālwā, Rājasthan, Kashmir and other territories besides his earlier acquisitions, and advanced as far as Kausāmbī, Kāśī and Magadha and played a dominant part in the politics of northern India by extending his sphere of influence in other parts as well.

Even the show of this so-called feudatory status was not real but pretentious. In fact, he was now an independent king having practically no relation with his erstwhile master residing in Bactria. But he seems to have continued his nominal allegiance to the Ephthalite ruler for some time in order to consolidate his position and territorial exploits in India. Supposing, however, that *Jaūvla* was his feudatory title which he continued to use, there is reason to believe that he no longer held a feudatory status. The continued use of feudatory titles like *Mahākṣatrapa* and *Senāpati* by the Śaka kings of Ujjain and Puṣyamitra Śuṅga even after latter's celebration of the Aśvamedha sacrifices, speaks of the conventional camouflaging tactics adopted by the rebel chiefs to dupe their masters as well as the subjects, even when they actually became independent.[1] But, unlike the above feudatory titles, *Jaūvla* does not in the least convey any such sense. Even if it be so, this is understandable only in the case of Toramāṇa, but there is no reason why Mihirakula should have continued this humiliating practice even when his nominal link with the Bactrian monarch was long snapped with the result that he was regarded as a great Indian monarch who had completely taken to Indian way of life. The inscriptions of Mihirakula found in Uruzgan also bear the titles *Saho sobol* or *Sāho Jabula* which, as Bivar suggests, was the official title of the dynasty.[2] The whole of the great mountainous district of the Upper Waters of the Helmand and Kandahar (*i.e.*, Arghandeb) rivers was known to the Arabs as Zābulistan, a term of vague application[3]. Hamdullah Mustaufi says: "Zabul is

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1. Sircar, *op. cit.* p. 398 fn. 4.
2. *JRAS*, 1954, pp. 115 ff.
3. Le Strange, *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, p. 349.

a province, both broad and long, which was of old a kingdom".[1] Firdausī makes repeated reference to Zābulistan, and since he wrote at Ghazni, close at hand, he must have been well aware of its location. He describes it as grouped with Kābulistan, Bust and Ghaznin under the charge of a *Marzban*.[2] Whatever the exact boundaries of these regions, there can be little doubt that Mihirakula's Uruzgan inscriptions lie at the heart of Zābulistan. In our opinion, therefore, *Jaūvla* or *Zabol* symbolises his new home in Zābulistan, and *Shāhi* the official title of the dynasty, and not his feudatory title.

Moreover, the use of the title *Jaūvla* in one record and its complete omission in the other is quite significant as it symbolises the two district phases in the life of the man who had started as a petty local chief of an independent principality and had eventually made himself master of a vast territory. Thus he was now not only a king of Zabol, but a prominent monarch of northern India in his own rights and as such no longer poses to appear as the rightful successor of the Kuṣāṇas. This attitude is also reflected in the different types of silver and copper coins issued by Toramāṇa and Mihirakula[3]. Some of these coins bear the titles *Shāhi* and *Jaūvla* but there are others which altogether omit them. We, therefore, submit that these titles have actually no relation to his feudatory status. On the other hand, they speak of the stock to which the Hūṇas belonged and of the original home where they first settled after their departure from Persia for India.

Whatever the Hūṇa records may have to say, the contemporary epigraphic records make it abundantly clear that Toramāṇa was a Hūṇa. The Mandsor stone inscription of Yaśodharman (c. 525-35 A.D.), the victor of Mihirakula, refers to the latter as *Hūṇādhipa*.[4] Moreover, the successors of Toramāṇa and Mihirakula are invariably mentioned as *Hūṇa* in the later epigraphic records such as the Udepur Praśasti of the kings of Mālwā[5], the copper-plate inscription of Vākpati Muñja from Gaonri (Ujjain)[6], the Nālanda plate of Dharmapal,[7] the

1. Tr. Le Strange, p. 144.
2. Valāsh (ed. Mohl), i. 27.
3. For their coinage see *JASB*, 1894, pp. 185 ff.
4. Sircar, *op. cit.* pp. 394-95.
5. *EI*, i, pp. 225, 228, 237.
6. *IA*, xxiii, pp. 108 ff.
7. *Ibid*, p. 291.

Unā grant of V. S. 956 of the Pratihāras, the Ajmer *Harikelanāṭaka* inscription of V. S. 1210 of the Cahamānas, the Atpur inscription of V. S. 1034 of Guhila Allaṭa, the Khairha inscription of V. S. 823 of Kalacurī Karṇa[1] and others. The *Harṣacarita*[2] of Bāṇa refers to the Hūṇas having been subdued and conquered by' Rājyavardhana in Uttarāpatha or the Punjab. All these evidences are sufficient to prove that Toramāṇa was a Hūṇa and was known as such to the Indian tradition for long. The recent discovery of his two seals in Kauśāmbī should finally set all the controversies at rest. These seals were discovered in the excavations of the monastery at Ghoṣitārāma—one counter-struck by letters *To Ra Mā Ṇa* and the other with the legend *Hūṇa-rāja* evidently referring to the same king.[3] The arrow-heads of type (K) provide another evidence of Hūṇa conquest of Kauśāmbī under king Toramāṇa, sometime between c. 510-515 A. D. Further, in the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* he is clearly addressed as *Hakārākhyo mahānṛpatiḥ* (or "H-initialled") and is described as coming from the west and as a great king of the Śūdra caste.[4] There is no doubt that the expression *hakārākhyaḥ* or "H-initialled" describing the Śūdra king stands for Toramāṇa, the Hūṇa.

There is yet another controversy regarding his identity. The Ephthalite coins record the name of a king, Rāmanila. His portrait is depicted on the coins facing left, not right, which speaks of his independent status. Ghirshman identifies this king with Toramāṇa but hardly advances any argument in favour of his contention.[5] It is also suggested that probably Rāmanila flourished earlier than Toramāṇa and founded the new kingdom of Zabulistān in c. 455-56 A. D. when the other Ephthalites were still fighting with the Sasanians and were gradually swarming on the north-western frontiers of India under the leadership of Hephthal II, and as such the family of Rāmanila may have been different from that of Toramāṇa.[6]

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1. Sircar, *op. cit.* p. 315 fn. 1.
2. p. 326: "Atha Kadācid rājā Rājyavardhanaṁ kavacaharaṁ Hūṇān hantuṁ ...Uttarāpathaṁ prāhiṇīt."
3. G. R. Sharma, *The Excavations at Kauśāmbī*, (1957-59), pp. 15-16.
4. p. 57; Jayaswal, *IHI*, p. 64.
5. *Les Chionites Hephthalites*, p. 35.
6. Buddhaprakash, *Kālidāsa aura Hūṇa* (Hindi), p. 66. Also cf. his paper, "Kalidāsa and the Hūṇas" in *JIH*, 1957.

In this connection we have to note that our only source of information is the meagre numismatic evidence which merely gives his name, and nothing more. Further, we have the account of Sung-yun which speaks of the kingdom of Gandhāra (evidently under the later Kuṣāṇas) as having been destroyed by the Ye-thas or the White Hūṇas and the setting up of Lae-lih as their king, about two generations ago.[1] These statements, coming from two independent sources, when pieced together, may tempt one to suggest that the Rāmanila of the coins is probably identical with the Lae-lih of Sung-Yun. But the difficulty is that the numismatic evidence makes it clear that Rāmanila held an independent status and could not have been subordinate to any one as otherwise he could not have issued coins in his own name. The Chinese source, however, definitely indicates that Toramāṇa was a *tegin* in the beginning, as such his father (if he is to be identified with Lae-lih) could not have been an independent king or chief. Lae-lih is not known to us from any other source except the account of Sung-Yun. We, therefore, suggest that Rāmanila was an independent local king of Gāndhāra prior to the coming of the Ephthalites who, having established their supremacy, later borrowed the technique of the coinage of the local rulers under Sasanian influence just as Toramāṇa and Mihirakula issued coins in their newly acquired Indian territories on the pattern of the Gupta coinage. On the strength of these evidences it may further be suggested that Lae-lih was a pretty chief or Governor appointed by the Ephthalite king of Bactria to rule over the area. That "he was father of Toramāṇa and led the Hūṇas into India and succeeded in occupying Mālwā in c. 500 A. D."[2] is all the more doubtful as in that case he ought to have been referred to in the inscription of Toramāṇa just as the latter is expressly mentioned in the epigraphic record of his son and successor, Mihirakula.[3] Had he enjoyed independent status there is no reason why we would not have come across either his coins or epigraphic records, though Cunningham suggests that "the Udayāditya coins may have been struck by Lah-lih, the father of Toramāṇa."[4] But this ascription is merely conjectural. For, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that he ever adopted the title of Udayāditya which is purely Indian and all available evidences

1. Beal, *Records*, i, Intro. p. xcix.
2. B. P. Sinha, *DKM.* p. 87.
3. cf. his Gwalior inscription (Sircar, *op. cit.*, pp. 400-402).
4. *Transactions*, p. 228; *Num. Chron.*, 1894, pp. 285 ff.

suggest that it was Toramāṇa who first of all assumed the Indian title of *mahārājādhirāja.* Cunningham's view may be accepted only when we assume that Lae-lih is identical with Toramāṇa himself. Marquart has also shown that the name *Lae-lih* given to this ruler in Beal's translation is purely apocryphal, based solely on a misinterpretation of the Chinese characters rendering the Turkish title *tegin*, 'prince'.[1] Thus in the absence of any positive historical data, it seems that Lae-lih was either an Ephthalite chief in this newly acquired area prior to the rise of Toramāṇa, or more probably, he was Toramāṇa himself as suggested by Marquart. Moreover, the conquest of Mālwā was affected by Toramāṇa in c. 500 A. D. as an independent ruler and Lae-lih as a predecessor of Toramāṇa can on no account be associated with this later phase of Ephthalite achievements. The suggestion of Manquart seems most convincing that the terms *Lae-lih* and *tegin* have been confused by the translators and these really stand for one person only. This identification almost clears the confusion and quite conforms to the facts of the contemporary history.

Wars and Conquests :

Toramāṇa is credited with having fought many battles and won victories first as a *tegin* and then as a monarch. He established a vast empire and greatly influenced the politics of northern India through his direct and active participation. He started as a soldier and died as a soldier spending his whole life in bloody warfare and exploits, and at last gave the Hūṇas a new home as well as a new stature. A great general and conqueror he was also a great organiser and administrator. But his cultural achievements are far greater than his political exploits as it was with him that the process of Indianisation of the Hūṇas began which completed with Mihirakula with the result that the Hūṇas were no longer considered as foreigners in India and were ultimately absorbed in Hindu society in early mediaeval period.

The conquests of Toramāṇa may be placed in two distinct phases: In the first, he consolidated his authority in Kabul, Gāndhāra and the north-western provinces as far as the Punjab and Kashmir[2] before 496 A. D. which is strongly supported by his Kurā inscription in the Salt Range, the *Harṣacarita*, the *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, the *Kuvalayamālā* of Udyo-

1. *Erānśahr*, pp. 211 ff.
2. Sircar, *op. cit.*, No. 35, pp. 326-27.

tana Sūri and the numerous silver and copper coins found in those regions. In the second, he advanced on the Gupta territory after the death of Budhagupta towards the end of the fifth century A. D. (*i.e.*, after 496 A. D.), wrested a good part of the western portion of the Gupta empire, established his authority in that area and built up a strong principality of the Hūṇas up to Mālwā. It was during this period of his stormy march that the great ancient republican tribes like the Yaudheyas, the Mālavas, the Madras and the Ārjuneyas inhabiting the Punjab and the adjoining tracts of Rajputana, so long spared and respected by the great Gupta monarchs, were now completely engulfed in the Hūṇa avalanche[1] and finally wiped off the map of India.

Dashing beyond, Toramāṇa took Magadha, Banaras and Kauśāmbī in the course of a lightening march causing terrible depradations. Thus within twelve years of their existence in India proper, the Hūṇas under Toramāṇa established their main centres of power at Pavvaiya on the Chenab, Sākala (modern Sialkot), Eraṇ (in Madhya Pradeśa), Mālwā (Central India), Magadha, Kāśī and Kauśāmbī. It was doubtless a wonderful feat for any conqueror to have accomplished within so a short period.

But here again we are confronted with another important problem: When did the Hūṇa conquest in the interior of India begin ? A critical perusal of the available sources bearing on the conquests of Toramāṇa would suggest that the Hūṇas or the Ephthalites entered India proper between c. 500 and 510 A. D., and a comparative study of the three inscriptions from Eraṇ—Eraṇ stone-pillar inscription of Budhagupta (A. D. 484), Eraṇ stone-pillar inscription of the time of Bhānugupta (A. D. 510) and Eraṇ stone-boar inscription of Toramāṇa (c. 500-510 A. D.)—difinitely points to the beginning of Toramāṇa's rule in 500 A. D. or immediately after it, though he may have succeeded to the leadership of the Hūṇas about A. D. 470 or perhaps even earlier as a *tegin* for he appears to have had a long reign-period. The Eraṇ inscription of Budhagupta of 484 A. D. says that the region lying between the Yamunā and Narmadā was governed by one Mahārāja Suraśmicandra while one Mātṛviṣṇu was the *viṣayapati* of the division of Airikiṇa or Eraṇ. The inscription of Bhānugupta (A. D. 510) from the same place informs us that he went there with the purpose of conquest and his general Goparāja fell in battle there and his wife committed

1. *VGA*. H, 35-36.

sati[1]. The inscription of Toramāṇa dated in the first year of his reign speaks of one Dhanyaviṣṇu, the brother of Mātṛviṣṇu, who had acknowledged the superemacy of the Ephthalite ruler[2]. These epigraphs show that the *Viṣaya* of Airikiṇa (Eraṇ) passed from the Guptas to the Ephthalites and Dhanyaviṣṇu transferred his loyalty to Toramāṇa who has been glorified as a great monarch (*mahārājādhirāja*) who "caused the mountains to tremble with the blows of his hard snout[3]." As we know, Budhagupta died after 496 A. D. during whose time Eraṇ was for all purposes an integral part of the Gupta empire. The tragedy overlook the empire only after his exit from the political scene which paved the way for the realisation of the long cherished dreams of Toramāṇa's conquest and aggrandisement. We do not know when Dhanyaviṣṇu came to succeed his brother, but there seems little doubt that the event has occurred sometime during Budhagupta's reign (after 484 A. D.). Following the examples of other ambitious local chiefs, Dhanyaviṣṇu also asserted his independence after Budhagupta but he was not destined to live long in peace. The long-poised armies of Toramāṇa rushed unchallenged and unobstructed and soon overran the whole tract including Eraṇ which lay on their advancing route. The episode must have taken place in c. 500-502 A. D., when Dhanyaviṣṇu, taking precision to be the better part of valour, submitted to the new lord instead of taking the risk of fighting the mighty foe and losing his newly-won independence—a fact which gets confirmation from Eraṇ inscription of Toramāṇa himself.

The Eraṇ inscription of Bhānugupta says that he fought against Toramāṇa after a decade of Budhagupta's reign, *i.e.*, in 510 A.D. along with the brave Goparāja who fell in the battle. The record is vague about the fight with the Hūṇas and the ultimate victory thereof. It does not even mention the enemy by name and is silent on the outcome of the battle itself. In other words, it simply refers to the battle, and nothing more.[4] It is presumed, and rightly so, that the enemy must have been the Hūṇas who had by this time established themselves as masters of those regions as the very tone of the record suggests. In fact, he does not seem to have advanced to check the thrust of the enemy. On the other hand, he made a bold attempt at routing the enemy from those conquered areas but failed in his

1. Sircar, *op. cit.* pp. 335-36, verses 3-4.
2. *Ibid*, No. 53, pp. 396-97.
3. *Ibid*, No. 55, verse 1.
4. *Ibid*, No. 38, verses 2-4.

mission. Had it been the other way about, the epigraph must have recorded this great victory over a great enemy in no uncertain terms. The lack of positive expression in the record leaves us in no doubt that the disintegration of the Empire had gone too far to be checked and the goddess of fortune had deserted the Guptas for good. In view of this, the suggestions that "the Epthalite conquest of Eraṇ and the interior of India began in c. 510 A. D.; and the inscription of that year shows that Bhānugupta came to check the inroad but failed" or their "occupation of India came to an end in 510 A. D. by the conquest of Bhānugupta"[1] seem quite erroneous, and the suggestion of Chavannes, on the authority of the Chinese sources, that "no part of India proper"[2] was included within the Epthalite empire as late as 500 A. D., though partly untenable, seems, however, nearer the truth.

While the Eraṇ inscription of Toramāṇa mentions his first regnal year, two of his British Museum silver coins (Fantail Peacock hemidrachm type) are dated in the year 52[3]. To this Hoey's coins add two more dates, 54 and 58.[4] The former suggests the beginning of his rule in India proper whereas the latter possibly marks the reckoning of some white Hūṇa era beginning in 448 A. D. or near about. A critical study of the two British museum coins and those of Hoey throws interesting light on this problem. The legend on the coin dated 58 is damaged and every letter of the king's name cannot be read with certainty. But there is no doubt that the name begins with ś and Smith asserts that the reading is *Śrī-Śarvva-Varma-devo jayati*......Śarvavarman was the son and successor of Īśānavarman Maukhari. But the era in which all these coins are dated is yet undetermined and problematical. Fleet takes 52 to be a regnal year and suggests that "reckoning back from 515 A. D., which is very closely the latest terminal date that can be applied, it follows that the commencement of his reign, at his own capital in the Punjab, is to be placed approximately in A. D. 460."[5]

This interpretation of Fleet is not at all satisfactory and is rendered absolutely impossible by the discovery of coins of other kings

1. S. Chattopadhyaya, *EHNI*, p. 193.
2. *Documents sur les Toukiue Occidentaux*, pp. 224-25.
3. *JASB*, 1894, pp. 194ff.
4. *Ibid*, p. 194.
5. *IA*, xviii (1889), p. 529.

dated evidently in the same era, and must for that, and for other good reasons, be rejected.[1] And, Cunningham's suggestion that the era used is Śaka, with hundreds omitted, is, for several reasons, equally untenable.[2] The best solution of this problem seems to be that the date is probably expressed in a special white Hūṇa era commencing from c. 448 A. D., though Cunningham takes it to be A. D. 456-57, "the only remarkable date in the history of the white Hūṇas" when "the final expulsion of the Sasanians from the countries to the north of the Oxus by Chu-Khan" was accomplished. If the year 52 be reckoned from this point, we get A. D. 508 or 509 for the establishment of Toramāṇa's rule in Mālwā.[3]

It is thus clear that the date on the coins of Toramāṇa is in a special white Hūṇa era, otherwise, unknown to us. M. Drouin dates this Hūṇa era from A. D. 448[4] which fixes with tolerable precision the limiting dates for Toramāṇa. The date, when moved back, gives A. D. 502 (in the case of year 54) and A. D. 500 (in the case of year 52) which very nearly coincide with his first regnal year in India proper, as used in his Eraṇ record. It may, therefore, be suggested that while the regnal year in his only epigraph found in the interior of India indicates the beginning of his reign in India proper, the date on his coins is to be reckoned in the Hūṇa era started earlier by his predecessors in Gāndhāra and Zābulistan. Later the practice of dating in the Hūṇa era was substituted in India by the use of regnal year as is evidenced by his own inscription as well as the Gwalior inscription of his son and successor, Mihirakula. Moreover, a close study of these different dates reveals that there was practically no difference in calculation whatever between the system of dating from the Hūṇa era and that of the regnal year. This further shows that while the Hūṇa era replaced the Śaka era in those regions, it was not at all popular with the people of his newly acquired kingdom in India, and he was probably obliged to adopt the age-old Indian system of dating in the regnal year, instead of imposing his own era. Or, it may be that with the conquest of new kingdom in India, he held no more

1. *JASB*, 1894, p. 194.
2. *Ibid*, p. 194.
3. Quoted, *Ibid*, p. 195. M. Drouin also dates the Hūṇa era from A. D. 448 (cf. his papers in *Journal Asiatique*, 1890 & 1893).
4. *Ibid*; *IA*, XLVI, p. 287.

any charm for an era which he used as a subordinate chief and parted with even that semblance. In view of this, the date of his Kurā inscription must be placed earlier, probably c. 497-98 A.D.; and, the period between 500-512 A. D. was the period of the consolidation of the power and prestige of the Hūṇas under Toramāṇa in the interior of India.

Of the conquests of Toramāṇa in India, that of Eraṇ was affected soon after the death of Budhagupta, which is clear from the study of the two inscriptions at Eraṇ along with the third inscription of Bhānugupta, noted above, in c. 500 A. D. and not in 510 A. D. The change of loyalty on the part of Dhanyaviṣṇu, soon after the death of his brother, further confirms this conclusion, as otherwise the episode would have found a definite mention in the Gupta records. Bhānugupta's struggle just preserves the memory of a struggle for supremacy between the Guptas and the Hūṇas for a territory which was lost to the Hūṇas much earlier than the actual occurrence of this episode which finally sealed the fate of the Guptas in that area for about a quarter of a century.[1]

The battle for the supremacy of Mālwā was a turning point in the history of the Hūṇas in India. For, it was on the battle-field of Eraṇ that the conquering Hūṇas clashed for the first time with the resisting forces of the erstwhile victor, the Guptas who were now fighting with their back to the wall. They had not yet forgotten their humiliating defeat at the hands of Skandagupta who had struck such a terror into their hearts that they dared not cross the frontiers of the Gupta territory for long. Even after the passing away of Skandagupta, the past military glory of the imperial forces served as a deterrent, with the result that the foreign forces shuddered at the very prospect of meeting them in an open armed encounter. But the death of Budhagupta had turned the scale and the subdued Hūṇas once again issued forth from their hide-outs to measure swords with the disintegrating imperial armies to settle their old accounts once for all, under the leadership of their brave general Toramāṇa. The mantle of Skandagupta's leadership had now fallen on the weak shoulder of Bhānugupta who was no match for the Hūṇa leader. The result was tragic. The weak Gupta resistance broke to pieces under the terrific

1. For other suggestions somewhat contradictory in nature see R.C. Majumdar, *VGA*, pp. 191-92.

pressure of the violent Hūṇas thoroughly exposing their weakness as a fighting nation. The man-eater had now tasted the human blood and it was now impossible to curb his lust for more blood. The Hūṇas now became all the more ferocious because they no longer entertained any illusions about the so-called invincibility of the imperial arms. The victory as such was fraught with dangerous consequences for the tottering empire as it was from this strategic base in Mālwā that Toramāṇa could confidently probe the defences of the Gupta empire towards Saurāṣṭra in the west and the Eastern provinces in the north-east. Thus the battle of Eraṇ sounded the death-knell of the Gupta empire and marked the beginnings of the great departure of the Guptas from the political scene. All that was good, all that progress which had been achieved since the establishment of the dynasty, all that gave life to the mechanism of the State, bade good-by to the land, and the great Guptas gradually disappeared from the country by the end of the sixth century A. D., unwept and unsung.

After the successful conclusion of the Eraṇ episode, the conquering Hūṇas under Toramāṇa ultimately burst out of Eastern Mālwā and swooped down upon the very heart of the Gupta empire. The Eastern countries were everrun and the city of the Gāndhāra was occupied. The *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* (8th century A. D.) gives a graphic account of this phase of Toramāṇa's conquest. It says that after Bhānugupta's defeat and discomfiture, Toramāṇa led the Hūṇas against Magadha and obliged Bālāditya Narasiṁhagupta, the reigning Gupta monarch, to retire to Bengal.[1] This work constitutes our only source of information which is neither corroborated nor supplemented by any literary or archaeological evidence. No inscriptions or coins of Toramāṇa or of his son Mihirakula have been discovered in this part of the country nor have we any relative evidence to rely upon. The *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*-story was told and re-told by scholars without any corroboration whatever. But in recent times two seals of Toramāṇa (bearing the legends *Toramāṇa* and *Hūṇarāja*) have been discovered by G. R. Sharma[2] during the Kauśāmbī excavations which certainly confirm the conquering march of Toramāṇa up to Kauśāmbī and fully support the story as narrated in this work. The discovery of certain deadly weapons in the shape of barbed arrow-heads further shows that

1. edited in K. P. Jayaswal's *IHI*, p. 57.
2. *The Excavations at Kauśāmbī*, pp. 15-16 ; *Indian Archaeology*, 1954-55, p. 18.

Toramāṇa waged numerous wars and sacked and burned several cities causing indiscriminate pillage and unprecedented devastations. Their distinctive nature, their close analogy with those from Taxila and sudden appearance at Kauśāmbī clearly indicate that they were introduced here by the invaders from the north-western regions.[1] From the excavations it is further clear that Kauśāmī could never fully recover from the terrible Hūṇa depredations.

From the narrative of the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* it seems that Toramāṇa, to begin with, marched upon Kauśāmbī and sacked the prosperous city, although his Kauśāmbī expedition does not find explicit mention in the Tāntric text. We are simply told that after "having safely entrenched his authority behind the legitimacy of Prakaṭāditya (at Pāṭaliputra) Toramāṇa returned westward to look after the affairs of the state. But as he cooled his heels at Kāśī, he fell ill unexpectedly and expired. In his last moment he summoned his son Mihirakula to his bedside and appointed him as his successor."[1] This shows that he advanced from west towards east, overran the territories on the way, attacked Pāṭaliputra conquered Kāśī, sacked Kauśāmbī and having achieved his mission turned again towards the west to stabilise the affairs of his conqured territories.

The sack of Kauśāmbī was preceded by his conquest of Kāśī and adjoining territories. It is true that we have no direct and positive evidence bearing on this phase of the struggle for power in north-eastern India, but the Tāntric work makes it clear that he overran Magadha which also finds a mention in Śyāmalika's *Pādatāḍikam*[3], a Sanskrit work composed during the Gupta period, which give some very interesting information regarding the activities of the Hūṇas in Pāṭaliputra and Ujjayinī. During this time Magadha was being ruled over by Narasiṁhagupta Bālāditya whose identity has been disputed by several scholars on the basis of Yuan Chwang's account which preserves a long story about Mihirakula, the son of Toramāṇa, who was later captured and imprisoned by one Bālāditya.[4]

Raychaudhuri suggests that the conqueror of Mihirakula was

1. G. R. Sharma, *op. cit.* pp. 15-16, 37, 46.
2. *IHI*, p. 51.
3. *Caturbhāṇī* (edited Moticandra and V. S. Agrawala), p. 15.
4. Beal, *Records*, i, pp. 167-69; Watters, i. pp. 288-89.

not the son of Purugupta but an altogether different individual.[1] Others suggest that this Bālāditya is to be identified with Bhānugupta who put up strong resistance against the forces of Toramāṇa.[2] Recently it has been suggested that this Bālāditya is to be identified with Narasiṁhagupta Bālāditya, the son of Purugupta, who seized the Gupta throne after a temporary eclipse, following his defeat by the Hūṇa conqueror. This Bālāditya is also credited with many seals and coins and, therefore, it is absurd to postulate the existence of another imperial Gupta ruler with the title 'Bālāditya'.[3] Other considerations apart, we feel that a close perusal of Yuan Chwang's account itself makes it absolutely clear that the same Bālāditya who was defeated by Toramāṇa, later on defeated and imprisoned his son and successor, Mihirakula. Yuan Chwang says that the Bālāditya-rāja "refused to pay tribute" to Mihirakula, whereupon the latter pounced upon him furiously but was defeated and imprisoned and was obliged to remark that "the subject and the master have changed places". This remark gives us a definite clue to the identification of this Bālāditya-rāja and leaves no doubt that the same person who was his vassal was now, by turn of events, his victor and master. Had it been some other Bālāditya, this remark would not have come from Mihirakula who was mortally distressed at his tragic discomfiture by one who was only the other day his subordinate and tributary. Moreover, in view of the great significance of this episode, we can not just postulate the existence of a 'Bālāditya' who finds no place in the imperial Gupta lineage, is almost an obscure figure and has no seals or epigraphs or coins to his credit. The identification with Bhānugupta is absurd, for we do not know what happened to him after his defeat in the battle of Eraṇ. Whatever the fact, he was certainly not holding the throne of Magadha during this period. The Bālāditya of Yuan Chwang was no other than Narasiṁhagupta Bālāditya who played both the vanquished and victor during this critical phase of struggle with Toramāṇa and Mihirakula, the father and the son.

Coming to the conquest of Magadha, we find that it was a comparatively easy affair and Toramāṇa had a smooth run. Narasiṁhagupta no doubt offered resistance but it was too feeble to arrest his

1. *PHAI*, p. 497 fn. 1-5.
2. Dandekar, *op.cit*, pp. 153-54; Budhaprakash, *ABORI*, 1945-46, pp. 134-36.
3. *DKM*. pp. 80-92 fn. 8.

onward march. He was defeated and forced to accept his vassalage. The episode took place only a few years after the conquest of Mālwā, probably in c. 511-12 A. D. Besides arms, Toramāṇa also seems to have resorted to the master-stroke of divide-and-rule policy. The internal dissensions in the royal family and rebellious tendencies of feudatories were naturally encouraged and exploited by him to facilitate his smooth run and consolidate his power and influence in this newly conquered territory. We have an interesting passage in the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* which says that one "Pakārādhya or Prakārākhya, who was of refractory nature and whose conduct was throughout rebellious, had been imprisoned by Goparāja (probably the generalissims of the empire who had fought against Toramāṇa and was subsequently killed in the battle), and for seventeen years he continuously languished behind prison-bars. Now in the hurly-burly of the Hūṇa invasion he was somehow released at Bhagavatapura and incognito of a trader, he entered Tīrtha with a merchant in the dead of night. As the next day dawned, he was apprehended and Toramāṇa, with perspicacity, returned him to Nandapura (Pāṭaliputra) and enthroned him as king of Magadha and Kāśī."[1]

The full name of the Gupta prince 'Pra' of the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, described as son of Bhakārākhya (probably to be identified with Narasiṁhagupta), has been rightly restored by Jayaswal as Prakaṭāditya[2] who, when a boy, was imprisoned by king Gupta, possibly with the connivance of Narasiṁhagupta himself or his chief queen Sumitrādevī. We have also an inscription of Prakaṭāditya known as the Sāranātha inscription, which throws some light on his lineage. He is said to have belonged to a family in which *nṛpati* (king) Bālāditya was born and Prakaṭāditya himself was son of another Bālāditya by his wife Dhavalā. Thus it may be suggested that Prakaṭāditya (which seems to be an *āditya* title assumed by him as in the case of other Gupta rulers, (*e.g.*, Kramāditya, Vikramāditya, Mahendrāditya, Prakāśāditya, Bālāditya etc.) was another son of Narasiṁhagupta Bālāditya by his queen Dhavalā and was reduced to hard straits because of the intrigues of the chief queen who wanted to secure the interests of her own son for succession to the Gupta throne. Although it is impossible to be positive about one or the other possibilities in the

1. *IHI*, p. 51.
2. *CII*, iii, No. 79, p. 284.

present state of our knowledge, yet there is no doubt that Toramāṇa had a strong hand in encouraging the different scions of the imperial family to embark on a career of adventure and carve out independent principalities.

It was in pursuance of this policy that Toramāṇa encouraged Vainyagupta against Narasiṁhagupta to become the ruler of the eastern provinces[1] of the Gupta empire (Gauḍa) and further installed Prakaṭāditya as king of Magadha at Kāśī while encouraging Kṛṣṇagupta or his successor to gain some influence in Magadha proper, probably to offset the rebellious activities of Narasiṁhagupta who, in spite of his defeat, had not yet reconciled and continued his hostility towards his conqueror. Toramāṇa was too quick to grasp the deteriorating situation which, if allowed to develop further, would have dangerously affected his authority and prestige in Magadha. He was, therefore, determined to wreck vengeance on his Magadhan vassal by completely shattering his power and status and compelling him to go into wilderness. As a result of this new move on his part, Narasiṁhagupta had to flee from Magadha and live in exile for some years, till the death of Toramāṇa.

The distribution of political patronage by Toramāṇa unmistakably points to his great influence in practically the whole of north-eastern India whose kings now sought his help and patronage to stabilise their status in their newly acquired principalities. The discomfiture of the Gupta monarch had tremendously augmented his authority and made him the real arbiter of the destinies of many a king in this part of the country. It was probably a part of this diplomacy that he accepted Harivarman or Harigupta, a scion of the Gupta dynasty turned a Jain monk, as his preceptor in order to win over the sympathy of the followers of this sect in Magadha as we learn from the *Kuvalayamālā* of Udyotana Sūri (A.D. 777-78). He showed toleration towards other religious sects obviously for political expediency and increased his influence and popularity with the general mass who accepted him as their master and benefactor and turned away from their erstwhile masters whose mutual feuds and bickerings had shaken their confidence and produced demoralising effect throughout the empire.

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1. The Sāranātha inscription informs us that besides Magadha, Kāśī and Madhyadeśa were also under him and he was crowned at Kāśī.

The above survey shows that Toramāṇa was a great conqueror, greater than many of his predecessors in many respects. He had conquered practically the whole of northern India and a good portion of eastern India and made it possible for the Hūṇas to dominate the political scene for about a quarter of a century. His invasion and subsequent conquest of Magadha was an event of profound importance for the whole of northern India which changed the course of contemporary history and let loose the forces of disintegration, dealing a fatal blow to the prestige of the Gupta empire by directly as well as indirectly encouraging centrifugal tendencies all around to assert themselves with success. Even the Maitrakas of Valabhī after Droṇa Siṁha, who had been loyal to the Gupta rulers all through these years of stress and strain, assumed more high-sounding titles like *Mahāsāmanta*, *Mahāpratihāra*, *Mahādaṇḍa-nāyaka* and *Mahākartṛkṛtika* suggesting definite improvement in their status and the further loosening of the tie with the imperial dynasty.[1]

But unfortunately for the Hūṇas, Toramāṇa could not survive long after his victorious march to Gauḍa and Magadha. He died immediately after this event. From the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* we learn that the powerful Śūdra king, Toramāṇa, after the installation of Prakaṭāditya in Kāśī, fell ill suddenly, summoned his son, Graha (Mihirakula) to his bedside and crowned him as his successor[2] and expired in c. 513-14 A. D.

A great conqueror, Toramāṇa was undisputedly a very wise ruler and shrewd statesman who had revived the lost fortunes of the Hūṇas, built up a vast empire from Central Asia to Pāṭaliputra through his prowess, foresight, coolmindedness, diplomacy and conciliatory attitude. He made no change in the existing administrative pattern and disturbed none unnecessarily. He enticed officers like Dhanyaviṣṇu and left intact not only the old system of provincial administration but also the ancient official families and feudal hierarchy. This foresight on his part naturally facilitated his smooth run in his newly conquered territories without causing bitterness among the ruling familites of the day. His conquest of a considerable portion of northern India within such a short time was rather phenomenal, having few parallels in history. It was a wonderful feat which even Aśoka

1. *JBBRAS* (NS.), i, p. 16; *IHQ*., iv, p. 462.
2. *IHI*, pp. 64-65.

and Samudragupta would have just envied. He remained tolerant in religious and administrative affairs and stabilised his administration, issued coins and accelerated the pace of the disintegration of the Gupta empire. All that was now left of the empire was a carcass which was soon devoured by political vultures who are always on the look-out for such opportunities. Toramāṇa retired but the glory of the Guptas never returned, and the following century saw their final exit from the stage of history. The political unity of the country was shattered beyond repair and from 550 A.D. onward Indian history loses a common string of national and common life. True, the Hūṇas also quit the political scene by this time, but the old life was never to return.

POLITY OF THE ANDHAKA-VṚṢṆI SAṄGHA

BY

DR B. P. MAZUMDAR

The *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas* refer to the exodus of the Yādavas from Mathurā and the establishment of a capital at Kuśasthalī or Dvārakā by Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa. The *Bhāgavata* I. XI. 11 states that just as Bhogavatī is protected by Nāgas, so also Dvārakā was being protected by Madhus, Daśārhas, Kukuras, Andhakas and Vṛṣṇis who were equal to Kṛṣṇa in prowess. Though the different branches of the Yādavas knew of the monarchical form of constitution, yet at Dvārakā they chose to be ruled by more than one 'king'. Pāṇini cites the instance of not one but many *Rājanyas* amongst the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇis.[1] Kauṭilya also informs us that the Vṛṣṇis, who had a *saṁgha* form of government, were destroyed by the curse of Dvaipāyana.[2] The *Mahābhārata* preserves an 'old history' of the conversation between Vāsudeva and Nārada told by Bhīṣma. Nārada describes the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇi state as a *saṁgha* and Keśava-Vāsudeva as the *saṁgha-mukhya*.[3] The Jaina work *Antagadadasāo* also calls Kṛṣṇa as President of Dvārāvatī.[4] The rule of two Andhaka kings, Assaka and Aḷaka or Mūḷaka, has been referred to in a Buddhist text.[5]

There are certain similarities between the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇi *saṁgha* and other well-known republican States in northern India. Like the Licchhavis, the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇis had two kinds of citizens, one being called the consecrated *Rājanyas*. The Buddhist texts do not give the same number of Licchhavi *Rājans* of Vaiśāli. Whereas the preambles to the *Cullakāliṅga* and the *Ekapaṇṇa Jātakas* mention of 7707 *rājans* of Vaiśāli, the *Mahāvastu* speaks of as many as twice 84,000 *rājans*.[6]

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1. *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, VI. 2. 34. राजन्यबहुवचनद्वन्द्वेऽन्धकवृष्णिषु.
2. *Arthaśāstra*, I. 6 (Eng. trans. by Shamasastry, ed. 1960, p. 11).
3. *Mbh.* XII. 82.25 (ed. B.O.R.I.) भेदाद्विनाशः संघानां संघमुख्योऽसि केशव । यथा त्वां प्राप्य नोत्सीदेदयं संघस्तथा कुरु ॥
4. *Antagadadasāo*, ed. P. L. Vaidya, p. 4.
5. *Suttanipāta Comm.* (P. T. S.) II, p. 581.
6. Fausboll: *Jātaka*, Vol. III, p. 1 (*Chullakāliṅga Jāt.*), Vol. I. p. 504 (*Ekapaṇṇa Jāt.*) and *Mahāvastu*, Vol. I. p. 271.

We may or may not agree with the number of *rājans* of the Licchhavis. But there is no doubt that there was multiple number of kings in Vaiśāli. A passage in the preamble to the *Bhaddasāla Jātaka* refers to the consecration of the *kulas* of the *gaṇa rājans* of Vaiśāli in a sacred tank.[1] The Andhaka-Vṛṣṇis had similar consecrated chiefs and their sons, who were distinct from ordinary citizens. Explaining the *sūtra* of Pāṇini *rājanyabahuvacanadvandve* the *Kāśikā* tells us that though the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇis were Kṣatriyas, yet the appellation of *rājanya* was applied only to those Kṣatriyas who were specially consecrated.[2] The *Kāśikā* categorically states that though Dvaipya and Haimāyana were tribes inhabiting the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇi State, yet their members were not called *rājanyas*.[3]

The testimony of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and *Kāśikā* can be corroborated by the *Mahābhārata*. Kṛṣṇa himself tells us that in his clan Kṛtavarmā, Anādhṛṣṭi, Samīka, Samitiñjaya, Kahva, Śaṅku and Kuntī were *Mahārathas*.[4] Besides them, the Vṛṣṇi princes like Sāmba, (Pradyumna) the son of Rukmiṇī,[5] Yuyudhāna and Sātyaki attended the *Rājasūya sabhā* of the Pāṇḍavas along with other famous warriors like Akrūra, Kṛtavarmā etc.[6]

Though the clans of Vṛṣṇis were ruled by oligarchical 'kings', yet their State was not a *rājaśabdopajīvin*-republic. At least twice in the *Sabhā-parvan* the Vṛṣṇis has been described as valiant and vigorous warriors. The god-looking Vṛṣṇis have been mentioned as indomitable warriors.[7] The elderly Vṛṣṇis like Cārudeṣṇa and his brother

1. Fausboll: Jātaka, Vol. IV. p. 148 (*Vesālīnagare gaṇarājakulānaṁ abhiṣekamaṅgalapokkharaṇīm*).
2. *Kāśikāvivaraṇa-pañjikā*, Vol. II. p. 343 (ed. V.R.S. by Srish C. Chakravarti) अन्धकवृष्णिष्वित्येतावतैव क्षत्रियग्रहणे सिद्धे यद्राजन्यग्रहणं क्रियते तस्यैतत् प्रयोजनम्:- विशिष्टा येऽभिषिक्तवंश्यास्तेषां ग्रहणं यथा स्यादित्येवमर्थम् ।
3. Ibid. p. 343. द्वैप्यहैमायना इत्ययुक्तं प्रत्युदाहरणम् ।
4. Mbh. II. 13.57-58.
5. According to the *Viṣṇu P.* Bk. V. ch. XXXII Sāmba was born of Jāmbavatī and acc. to chs. XXVI, XXVII and XXXII Rukmiṇī's son was Pradyumna. Cf. also *HV. Viṣṇu-parvan*, 103.5, 9 : *Bhāgavata*, X. 61. 9, 11.
6. *Mbh.* II. 4.29 तत्रैव शिक्षिता राजन्कुमारा वृष्णिनन्दनाः ।
रौक्मिणेयश्च साम्बश्च युयुधानश्च सात्यकिः ॥
7. *Mbh.* II. 4.26—वृष्णीनां चैव दुर्धर्षाः कुमारा देवरूपिणः ।
आहुको विपृथुश्चैव गदः सारण एव च ॥

Cakradeva, Sātyaki, Kṛṣṇa, Pradyumna, Sāmba were *rathins* and Kṛtavarmā, Anādhṛṣṭi, Samīka, Samitiñjaya, Kahva, Śaṅku and Nirdānta were *mahārathas.*[1] Further, Kṛṣṇa himself tells us that at Kuśasthalī lived 18,000 warrior Kṣatriyas and they were *Vrātas.*[2] *Vrātena jīvati* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* V. 2. 21 has been interpreted in the *Kāśikā* and the *Mahābhāṣya.* According to the *Kāśikā* the *Vrātas* belonged to many races or communities and did not follow any specified profession.[3] Patañjali not only holds the same opinion on the *Vrātas* as the *Kāśikā* but also further states that they lived by *utsedha* or loot and plunder.[4] The *Lāṭyāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra* equates the words *Vrātīna* and *Vrātya.*[5] A commentary on the *Lāṭyāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra* 8.6.7. explains *āsedha* as terrorise (लोकं श्रासेधन्तः त्रासयन्तः प्रशयन्तः). Though the Andhakas and Vṛṣṇis have been branded as *Vrātyas* in the *Droṇa-parvan*[6] by Bhūriśravas, no where in the

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1. *Ibid.* II. 13. 56-58.
2. Ibid II. 13. 54-55—अष्टादशावरैर्नद्धं क्षत्रियैर्युद्धदुर्मदैः ।। 54 c

    अष्टादश सहस्राणि व्रातानां सन्ति नः कुले ।

    आहुकस्य शतं पुत्रा एकैकस्त्रिशतावरः ।। 55.

    The Bengali version of *Mbh.* as preserved in the Dacca University Library, Santiniketan Visvabharati Library and Devanagari versions have the word भ्रातृणां for व्रातानां. The southern recension as preserved in Melkote, Kadathur and Tanjore libraries has भ्रातरः (vide p. 78 f. n. 55 in the Critical edition of the *Sabhā-parvan*, edited by F. Edgerton (B.O.R.I.).
3. *Op. cit.* Vol. II, p. 64 on *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, V. 2.21 as नानाजातीया इति । अनेकजातीयाः । अनियतवृत्तयः इति । अनियतक्रियाः तेषां कर्म व्रातमिति ।
4. *Mahābhāṣya* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, V. 2.21.
5. *Lāṭyāyana-Śr-Sūtra*, VIII. 5.1.
6. *Mbh.* VII. 118.15 (B. O. R. I, Poona ed.)--

    व्रात्याः संश्लिष्टकर्माणः प्रकृत्यैव विगर्हिताः ।

    वृष्ण्यन्धकाः कथं पार्थ प्रमाणं भवता कृताः ।।

    In the fn. of p. 659, the editor Dr. S. K. De notes that the Lahore D. A. V. College Libr. Ms. has the word व्रात्यः संस्कारहीनः स्यात्. The Calicut, Malabar and Poonulli Ms. have the words द्वेषाः क्षत्रियगर्हिताः for विगर्हिताः. According to the *Bhāgavata* Śiśupāla accused Kṛṣṇa in the Rājasūya Sabhā of the Pāṇḍavas thus: "How his *Kula*, which was cursed by Yayāti, disassociated by pious men and engaged in constant but useless drinking, worthy of receiving obeisance? They leaving the Brahmarṣi-deśa and taking refuge in fortress surrounded by seas and bereft of the ब्रह्मतेजः was ruling over subjects like robbers" (Bhāg. X. 74. 36-37).

Mahābhārata we have reference to the unsocial and violent nature of the Vṛṣṇis and Yādavas. So when the Vṛṣṇis have been described *Vrātas* by Kṛṣṇa and branded as *Vrātyas* in the *Droṇa-parvan*, we may presume that they were warlike people. It is interesting to note here also that Kṛṣṇa testifies to the martial qualities not only of men but also those of women of the Vṛṣṇi clan at Dvārakā.[1]

Dr Jayaswal observed that the Vṛṣṇi-Andhaka league "had a joint federal constitution, where executive power was vested in two *rājanyas*... At one time he (Akrūra) was one of the two presidents of the Federal Council."[2] It may be noted here that Akrūra is never styled as a king at least in the *Bhāgavata*. In the *Bhāgavata* he is simply styled as a Yādava (e.g. X. 48. 29, X. 49. 30). A study of the *Purāṇas* and *Mahābhārata* does not the prove the existence of a system of dual executive. Bhīṣma informed Śiśupāla that the reasons for paying obeisance to Kṛṣṇa by the Pāṇḍavas at the *Rājasūya* ceremony were that Kṛṣṇa was not only a *Ṛtvik*, *guru* and *snātaka* but also a *nṛpati* or King.[3] The *Bhāgavata* also informs us that Kṛṣṇa was worshipped as a 'King' by the people of Dvārakā. Elsewhere we have references to more than one 'king' at Dvārakā. The *Bhāgavata* states that Kṛṣṇa narrated the whole incident regarding recovery of Syamantaka Jewel and handed over the Jewel to Satrājit in the presence of Kings in the Sabhā[4]. Chapter 82 of the *Rājadharma* (B.O.R.I. ed.) section of the *Mahābhārata* also refers to more than one 'king' in the Vṛṣṇi State. Verse 5 relates that Kṛṣṇa told Nārada that the former had given half of his executive powers to his relatives.[5] Referring to this verse Dr Jayaswal held that there were two executives in the Vṛṣṇi republic.[6] Here there is no reference to the scheme of division of power among two relatives. He also overlooked the information given in verse 17 of the above-mentioned chapter of

1. *Ibid.* II. 13. 51. स्त्रियोऽपि यस्यां युध्येयुः किं पुनर्वृष्णिपुंगवाः ।
तस्यां वयममित्रघ्न निवसामोऽकुतोभयाः ॥
cf. *HV. Viṣṇuparvan*, 98.29 A.
2. *Hindu Polity* (ed. 1955, 3rd ed.), p. 36.
3. *Mbh.* II. 35. 21. ऋत्विग्गुरुर्विवाह्यश्च स्नातको नृपतिः प्रियः ।
सर्वमेतद्धृषीकेशे तस्मादभ्यर्चितोऽच्युतः ॥
4. X. 56. 38.
5. *Mbh.* XII. 82. 5.
6. *Hindu Polity*, p. 36.

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the *Rājadharma-parvan*. Nārada tells Kṛṣṇa that the latter had given the kingdom to two persons, Babhrū, and Ugrasena.[1] It may be mentioned here incidentally that Jayaswal committed the mistake in accepting Pratap Chandra Roy's translation of the *Mahābhārata* and thereby treating Babhrū Ugrasena as one person.

Our problem of finding the number of the highest executive becomes all the more difficult due to the conflicting evidences in the *Mahābhārata*. While chapter 82 the *Rājadharma* section mentions at least three 'kings', Kṛṣṇa, Babhrū and Ugrasena, the first chapter of the *Muṣala-parvan* gives us the impression that during the last days of Kṛṣṇa, Ugrasena was alone the King of the Vṛṣṇis and Yādavas of Dvārakā. According to the *Bhāgavata* (XI. 1. 19 :

तच्चोपनीय सदसि परिम्लानमुखश्रियः ।
राज्ञ आवेदयाञ्चक्रुः सर्वयादवसन्निधौ ॥)

the boys of Piṇḍāraka placed the club before all the Yādavas assembled in the legislature along with the 'King'. In the *Muṣāla-parvan*, it was Ugrasena who asked the subordinate executive officials to grind the iron club to dust and throw off the particles of dust into the sea and proclaimed that nobody could prepare liquor in the State. The installation of Ugrasena as 'King' is also mentioned in the *Harivaṁśa*, *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* and the *Bhāgavata*.[2] As Ugrasena promulgated the orders after consultations with Kṛṣṇa, Baladeva, Āhuka Babhrū, it is very likely that Ugrasena was acting as President at the time of the *Muṣala* incident. So it is not possible for us to agree with either Jayaswal or Altekar and Kane[3] who believe that the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇi republic was presided over by Kṛṣṇa alone.

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1. *Mbh.* XII. 82. 17. बभ्रूग्रसेनयो राज्यं नाप्तुं शक्यं कथंचन ।
ज्ञातिभेदभयात्कृष्ण त्वया चापि विशेषतः ॥

2. *HV. Viṣṇu-parvan*, 57. 70 ; 99. 14 ; *Bhāgavata*, XI. 1. 21 ; *Viṣṇu P.* (ed. Wilson, Punthi Pustak), pp. 446, 476 ; *Brahmavaivarta P.* (Vangavasi ed), pp. 760, 764, 765. *Visnu P.* BK. V. Ch. XXI (Wilson, Punthi Pustak p. 446) says that after the enthronement of Ugrasena on the throne of Karuṣa, Kṛṣṇa asked Vāyu : "Go Vāyu to Indra and and desire him to lay aside his pomp, and resign to Ugrasena his splendid hall Sudharman : tell him that Kṛṣṇa commands him to send the royal hall, the unrivalled gem of princely courts, for the assemblage of the race of Yadu."

3. Altekar : *State and Government in Anc. India* (3rd ed., 1958), p. 127 and Kane ; *Hist. of Dharmasastra*, Vol. III. p. 88.

Though the composition and powers of the head of the executive are doubtful, yet we are certain that there was no multiplicity of prime minister, *purohita* and Commander-in-Chief. Uddhava has been described in the *Bhāgavata* as Prime Minister.[1] According to the *Harivaṁśa*, King Ugrasena was assisted by Kāśya (=Sāndīpani) as the *Purohita*, Anādhṛṣṭi as Commander-in-Chief and Vikadru as Minister.[2] Of course, it should not be forgotten that there are references to other ministers. According to the *Bhāgavata* X. 69. 27 Nārada found Kṛṣṇa consulting with ministers like Uddhava (मन्त्रयन्तं च कस्मिश्चिन्मन्त्रिभिश्चोद्धवादिभिः). The *Mahābhārata* tells us that when Kṛṣṇa came from Dvārkā to attend the *Rājasūya* ceremony of the Pāṇḍavas, the former appointed his father Vasudeva as the *Balādhipa* or Comander-in-Chief of the army of the Vṛṣṇis[3].

The Andhaka-Vṛṣṇis had a central assembly known as the Sudharmā.[4] We do not know of the number and qualification of

1. *Bhāgavata*, X. 46. 1.
2. *HV. Viṣṇu-parvan*, 58. 80.
3. *Mbh.* II. 30. 12.

प्राकारः सर्ववृष्णीनामापत्स्वभयदोऽरिहा ।
बलाधिकारे निक्षिप्य संहृत्यानकदुन्दुभिम् ॥

4. *Mbh.* I. 212. 10 ; II. 3. 24 ; *HV. Viṣṇu-parvan*, 58. 71-77 ; *Viṣṇu P.* V. 21 (ed. Punthi Pustak, p. 446).
In the *Bhāgavata*, Yudhiṣṭhira, asking about the welfare of Kṛṣṇa from Arjuna, said "Is the भक्तवत्सल गोविन्द surrounded by his सुहृद् (relatives or friends) staying at the Sudharmā in pleasure ? (भगवानपि गोविन्दो ब्रह्मण्यो भक्तवत्सलः । कच्चित्पुरे सुधर्मायां सुखमास्ते सुहृद्वृतः । (*Bhag.* I. 14. 38)
That Sudharmā was a Sabhā, is testified to by the *Bhāgavata* where we read that the Yādavas protected by the arms of Mādhava moved about freely in the Sudharmā, which was forcibly brought and was as good for use of gods :—

यद्बाहुदण्डाभ्युदयानुजीविनो
यदुप्रवीरा ह्यकुतोभया मुहुः ।
अधिक्रमन्त्यङ्घ्रिभिराहृतां बलात्
सभां सुधर्मां सुरसत्तमोचिताम् ॥ *Bhāg.* I. 14. 38.

Further the assembly did not only serve as a legislature but also gave certain powers to the members. The *Bhāgavata* says that those who enter in that assembly forget the six necessities, namely, *Śoka, moha, jarā, mṛtyu, kṣudhā, pipāsā*, i.e., sorrow, attachment, old age, death, hunger and thirst of human beings:—सुधर्माख्यां सभां सर्वैर्वृष्णिभिः परिवारितः ।
प्राविशद् यन्निविष्टानां न सन्त्यङ्ग षडूर्मयः ॥ *Bhag.* x.70.17.

Mbh. II. 3. 34—न दाशार्ही सुधर्मा वा ब्रह्मणो वापि तादृशी ।

members of the Vṛṣṇi *Saṁgha*. It is difficult for us to agree with the views of Dr V. S. Agrawala about the composition of the Vṛṣṇi assembly. Interpreting Patañjali's commentary on Pāṇini (Aṣṭādhyāyī, v. l. 58) and the references to Samuddavijaya in the *Antagadadasāo*, Dr Agrawal surmises that the assemblies of the Vṛṣṇis and the Daśārhas consisted respectively of 5 and 10 members[1]. In no age has a general assembly consisted of such an exceedingly small number of members. If we interpret the information given by Patañjali and the author of the *Antagadadasāo* after Altekar, that Sumudravijaya was assisted by ten principal Daśārhas and Baladeva by four deputies[2], it is difficult for us to take Baladeva as head of a republican *saṁgha*. No where in the epics and *Purāṇas* Baladeva is described as a King or President of any Branch of the Yādavas. It seems likely that each of the branches of the Yādavas, like the Vṛṣṇis, Andhakas, Kukuras, Daśārhas, used to send 5 or 10 representatives to the Sudharmā assembly. Of course it should be noted that neither the *Mahābhāṣya* or Patañjali nor the *Antagadadasāo* helps us in determining the exact number of members of the Vṛṣṇi assembly and executives of the different branches of the Yādavas.

All important affairs of the State were discussed in this assembly. The *Mahābhārata*, *Harivaṁśa*, *Viṣṇu*, *Vāyu* and *Bhāgavata Purāṇas* relate that all the disputes relating to the Syamantaka Jewel were sought to be settled in that assembly and thus convinced other members of the assembly that he had not surreptitiously taken possession of it.[3] Both the *Harivaṁśa* and *Vāyu Purāṇa* narrate that Kṛṣṇa thought it wiser to enquire of Akrūra of the possession of the Jewel in the assembly than settle the affair with him in private.[4] The consequences of the abduction of Subhadrā by Arjuna also indicate the importance of the Sudharmā.[5] The Vṛṣṇi soldiers narrated the abduction of Subhadrā

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1. V. S. Agrawala : *Pāṇinikālīn Bhāratavarṣa* (1st. ed.) p. 447.
2. Altekar : *op. cit.* p, 132.
3. *HV Harivaṁśa-parvan*, 38. 42-44 ; *Viṣṇu* P. IV. 13 (ed. Punthi Pustak p. 340 ff). *Bhāgavata*, X. 56. 38 States सत्राजितं समाहूय सभायां राजसंनिधौ । प्राप्ति चाख्याय भगवान् मणिं तस्मै न्यवेदयेत् ॥
4. *HV. Harivaṁśa-parvan*, 39. 30 ff., *Vāyu*, 96. 85 ; *Bhāgavata*, X. 57 1-42. Though *Bhāg.* does not mention the venue of the surrender of the Jewel by Akrūra, the *HV.* and *Vāyu* clearly state the Sabha "सभामध्यगतं प्राह तमक्रूरं जनार्दनः". *HV. Harivaṁśa-parvan*, 39. 35).
5. Mbh. I. 212. 10 ff.

and prowess of Arjuna to the *Sabhāpāla* or President of the Sudharmā. The Sabhāpāla thereupon began to beat the golden war-drum. On hearing the sound of the drum the Vṛṣṇis, Bhojas and Andhakas became angry, left their meals and soon arrived at the assembly and took their seats. The Sabhāpāla narrated the whole incident. The Yādavas became too much agitated, left their respective seats and and commanded the charioteers to prepare for war against Arjuna. Baladeva then asked the fellow-members of the assembly not to take any decisive step till they were acquainted with the views of Vāsudeva. The members listened to the suggestion of Baladeva and took their seats again. Baladeva pleaded for the killing of Arjuna. Andhakas loudly acclaimed the opinion of Baladeva. But the sober arguments of Kṛṣṇa calmed down the anger of the Yādavas. Peace was soon established between the Yādavas and Arjuna. It appears therefore that the President or 'kings' used to decide all important affairs in the assembly. Important leaders of the different branches of the Yādava clan were its members. But we are absolutely ignorant of the authority of the assembly. At our present state of knowledge we are not aware of the extent of power of the assembly over the exceutive. There is also no indication of the election of executives in the legislature which seems to have a single chamber. Probably wars could be declared and peace concluded with the consent of the assembly. The *Bhāgavata* relates that the messenger of Pauṇḍraka Vāsudeva arrived at the assembly of Dvārakā and demanded the alternative of submission of Vāsudeva (Kṛṣṇa) or war.*

The Vṛṣṇi *saṁgha* of Dvārakā did not exist for a long time. Its weaknesses were due to its nature and constitution. The different branches of the Sātvata-Yādavas constituting the *saṁgha*, did never merge their identity. No doubt at times of severe crises they united. When Arjuna abducted Subhadrā, with the exception of Vāsudeva, all the leaders of the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇi *saṁgha* were determined to fight with Arjuna. Again none opposed the war against Pauṇḍraka Vāsudeva.[1] But the stroug individualistic tendencies of the septs are noticeable on

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* दूतस्तु द्वारकामेत्य सभायामास्थितं प्रभुम् । कृष्णं कमलपत्राक्षं राजसंदेशमब्रवीत् ॥
Bhāgavata, X. 66. 4.

1. Acc. to *HV. Bhaviṣya-parvan*, Chs. 93-101 and *Padma P.* Pauṇḍraka Vāsudeva invaded Dvārakā, but *Viṣṇu P.*, V. 34 (ed. Wilson, p. 470) states that Vasudeva went to the city of Pauṇḍraka Vāsudeva and after slaying Pauṇḍraka Vāsudeva returned to Dvārakā.

other occasions. All of them did not join the side of the Pāṇḍavas in the Bhārata War. While the Vṛṣṇi chiefs like Kṛṣṇa, Yuyudhāna, Satyaki and Chekitāna joined the side of the Pāṇḍavas, Kṛtavarmā, a Bhoja Chief, along with the Andhakas and Kukuras, went over to the camp of the Kauravas.[1] The enmity between Kṛtavarmā and Sātyaki did not cease even after the Bhārata War. In the *Muṣala-parvan* we find that it was Sātyaki, a Vṛṣṇi, who picked up a quarrel with Kṛitavarmā, a Bhoja, at Prabhāsa. The quarrel ended in a deadly struggle which caused the death not only of Kṛtavarmā, Sātyaki and Pradyumna, but also of other Vṛṣṇis, Andhakas, Bhojas and Kukuras.

The influence of these branches of the Yādavas is noticeable in the alignment of so-called parties in the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇi *saṁgha*. The existence of parties in that *saṁgha* can be proved by the mention of words like *vargya*, *gṛhya* and *pakṣya* by Pāṇini and his commentators. Jayaswal gave two different meanings for *varga*.[2]. Once he tells us in *Hindu Polity* that each *rājyanya* was followed by a *Varga* or party. Elsewhere in the same book he writes: "*Varga* means an assembly or quorum". The first interpretation seems to be correct, because both Pāṇini and the *Kāśikā* mention of *Vāsudeva-vargyaḥ*.[3] Kātyāyana also in his *Vārttika* alludes to the *vargyas* of Akrūra and Vāsudeva.[4]

Dr Jayaswal presumed that there were only two parties in the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇi *saṁgha*. The reference to Āhuka and Akrūra in chapter 82 of the *Rājadharma* section of the *Mahābhārata* made Jayaswal believe that there were only two parties[5] and two Presidents in that republic. But such assumptions are not warranted by facts. On the one hand, the above-mentioned chapter of the *Rājadharma* does not state that the followings of Akrūra and Āhuka were the only two parties in the *saṅgha*. Rather, verses 9-12 tell us that as Akrūra and

1. *JRAS.* 1908, pp. 311-13, 329.
2. *Hindu Polity*, pp. 36, 242.
3. On *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, VI. 2. 131.
4. *Ibid.* IV. 2. 104. Comments of Patañjali on Pāṇini 4.2.104—
अक्रूरवर्ग्यः अक्रूरवर्गीणः । छस्य स एव । वासुदेववर्गादुभयं प्राप्नोति । वासुदेववर्ग्यः वासुदेववर्गीणः ॥ (ed. F. Kielhorn).
5. *Hindu Polity*, p. 355. "There were two political parties in the joint *saṅgha* or Federal Parliament, each of which tried to gain the upper hand in political matters." In p. 36 he observed "Probably it is to a constitution like that of the Andhaka-Vṛishṇis that the Jaina Sūtra (*Ācārāṅga-sūtra*, II. 3. 10; विरुद्धराज्य) refers to the rule of opposing parties."

Āhuka caused misery to both of their followers and their opponents, Kṛṣṇa-Vāsudeva decided not to side with or wish victory to either of them. Here is an allusion to two parties of Āhuka and Akrūra indeed. But it is not at all obvious that these were the only two parties in the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇi *saṁgha*. Leaving aside the negative evidence of these verses, the grammatical literature acquaints us with multiple parties. We have already seen that Pāṇini and Kātyāyana refers to the *vargyas* of Vāsudeva and Akrūra. The *Kāśikā* refers not only to Vāsudeva-gṛhya but also to groups of the following of *rājanyas* like Śini-Vāsudeva and Śvāphalka-Caitraka.[1] It may further be mentioned here that even the Andhakas and Vṛṣṇis did not follow one leader only. It we rely on so late a work as the *Kāśikā*, both Śvāphalka and Ugrasena were Andhakas and yet they had separate followings.[2] Even Kṛṣṇa and Balarama differed on many occasions, as for example, the Syamantaka Jewel incident, fight between Jarāsandha and Bhīma.

The Vṛṣṇi *saṁgha* suffered not only due to multiple parties but also due to a tradition current among the Sātvata-Bhojas. We remember an ancient curse given by Yadu to his third son Druhyu: "with all your family you will get the designation of Bhoja—and there will not be a *Rājā* amongst you."[3] The children and

1. The *Kāśikā* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, III. 1. 119 (V.R.S. ed. Vol. I. p. 575) and VI.2.34 (V.R.S. ed. Vol. II, p. 343).
2. On *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, VI. 1. 114—

अन्धकाणोऽन्धकाश: श्वाफल्क: । ण्यस्थ स एव । उग्रसेनो नामान्धक: ।

3. *Mbh*. I. 84. Cf. the address of Kṛṣṇa to Ugrasena, after the latter's (Ugrasena's) enthronement Mathurā by the former (Kṛṣṇa): "Sovereign lord, command boldly what else is to be done. The course of Yayāti has pronounced our race unworthy of dominion; but with me, for your servent, you may issue your order to the gods." ((*Viṣṇu P.*, BK. V. Ch. XXI, ed. Punthi Pustak by Wilson, p. 446).

In *HV*. *Viṣṇu-parvan*, 32. 51-53 we find the same words as in *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*. In *HV*. Kṛṣṇa told Ugrasena that

भवान् राजास्तु मन्ये मे यदूनामग्रणी प्रभु: ।
विजयायाभिषिच्यस्व स्वराज्ये नृपसत्तम ॥
यदि ते मत्प्रियं कार्यं यदि वा नास्ति ते व्यथा ।
मया निसृष्टं राज्यं स्वं चिराय प्रतिगृह्यताम् ॥

Vangavasi ed. p. 136.

In the *Bhāgavata* also when Ugrasena was enthroned after the death of Kaṁsa by Kṛṣṇa, Kṛṣṇa said "Oh! Mahārāja! We are your subjects. Command us. Yayāti gave a curse that Yadus would not sit on the throne of a *nṛpa*. When I, your servant is near you, what to speak of kings, even gods will bow down and show you respect (X. 45. 12B-14).

descendants of Druhyu were Bhojas, Andhakas, Vṛṣṇis etc.[1] Probably the wordings of this curse were invented to justify the non-existence of a single king amongst the Yādavas. The monarchical form of government, which dwindled into tyranny during the reign of Kaṁsa, was an abnormal event. So the Yādava leaders were pleased at the action of Kṛṣṇa, when the latter killed Kaṁsa. Further the republican tradition of the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇis did not end with the life of Kṛṣṇa. Coins of the first and second century B. C. testify to the existence of a Vṛṣṇi republic in Hoshiarpur district of the Punjab.[2]

Chapter 81 of the *Rājadharma* section clearly indicates the miserable position of Kṛṣṇa as a *saṁgha-mukhya*. Kṛṣṇa told Nārada that he was really a slave to his relatives who spoke bitterly against him and had no following of his own.[3] Nārada frankly pointed out to Kṛṣṇa that Akrūra, the Bhoja, withdrew his support from Kṛṣṇa because Akrūra was either envious of the bravery of Kṛṣṇa or the former expected monetary inducement from others.[4] Kṛṣṇa could not probably subvert the constitution and dispense with the powerful factions. So he had to make compromises with warring factions. In view of the irrevocable constitution, Nārada advised Kṛṣṇa to adopt a policy which would keep the latter in power. He asked Vāsudeva not only to be mild and tolerant but also entertain (the leaders) constantly according to his capacity. Further he said : "of relatives who are anxious to speak words which are bitter and light, you should not really mind and you should by your reply appease their mind, sentiments and tongue."[5] Mildness, toleration and appeasement can seldom transform a warring and weak republic into a strong, centralised and vigorous state.

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1. A. I. H. T., pp. 102 fn. Also cf. *dakṣiṇasyāṁ diśi ye ke ca Satvatāṁ rājāno Bhaujyāyaiva te'bhiṣicyante Bhojyetyenān abhiṣiktān ācakṣata* in *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, VIII. 14.
2. Cunningham : *Coins of Anc. India*, p. 69; Allan : *British Museum Cat. of the Coins of Anc. India*, pp. cxxii-cxxiii; Chattopadhyaya, S. : *Early Hist. of North India*, pp. 41, 43-44.
3. *Mbh.* XII. 81.
4. *Mbh*, XII 81. 14-15.

   सेयमाभ्यन्तरा तुभ्यमापत्कृच्छ्रा स्वकर्मजा ।
   अक्रूरभोजप्रभवाः सर्वे ह्येते तदन्वयाः ॥
   अर्थहेतोर्हि कामाद्वा द्वारा बीभत्सयापि वा ।
   आत्मना प्राप्तमैश्वर्यमन्यत्र प्रतिपादितम् ॥

5. *Ibid.* verse 22.

   ज्ञातीनां वक्तुकामानां कटूनि च लघूनि च ।
   गिरा त्वं हृदयं वाचं शमयस्व मनांसि च ॥

SLAVES AND SERFS IN MEDIAEVAL CAMBODIA (CIRCA 400—1300 A. D.)

By

RADHAKRISHNA CHOUDHARY.

In my Paper on "*Some aspects of Feudalism in Cambodia*" (Submitted to the Twenty-sixth Congress of the International Congress of Orientalists, held at Delhi, in Jaunary 1964, and published subsequently in the *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, Volume XLVII: Rahul Sāṅkṛtyāyana Volume), I have traced the development of Feudalism in Cambodia and have also discussed in brief the position of the slaves and serfs in the society. Some Soviet and Czech scholars have also turned their attention to this aspect of the Cambodian history and Mr. L. Sedov of the Institute of the Peoples of Asia, U. S. S. R., Moscow, has recently published two important Papers dealing with the socio-economic history of Cambodia in the Angor period.

Feudalism was a form of socio-economic system throughout the world at a given period of social development in history. The nature of feudalism differed from country to country and from continent to continent. In Europe, the Industrial Revolution destroyed the last vestige of feudalism, but in Asia the system continues in different forms even today. In Asia too, the nature of Feudalism differs from country to country. So far as Cambodia is concerned, we have at our disposal a vast mass of Sanskrit and Khmer Inscriptions. In my aforesaid study, I had confined myself mostly to the Sanskrit texts and here also I have depended mainly on the same though corroborative Khmer texts (in translation) have also been consulted. Religion played a great part in the daily life of the Cambodian people in the middle ages and the grants, more or less, deal usually with the religious aspect of the question. It is through the study of these grants that we get a glimpse of the social and economic life of the people during our period of review.

In Cambodia we come across different types of land tenure. The question of the actual ownership of land is not yet very clear. The question of ownership needs a separate treatise for better treatment.

Both the kings and their favourites issued grants and some of the important officials owed their position to the grace or kindness (*prasāda*) of the rulers. The creation of powerful intermediaries in land, the mode of production, and the system of production and distribution are points to be reckoned with in Cambodia. In a number of Sanskrit and Khmer inscriptions, we have got the actual details about all these things. The slaves and serfs formed an important part of the feudal economy of Cambodia. They seem to have participated in production without any equivalent or appreciative remuneration and a huge surplus was created in the temple or in other properties. The mode of production was, no doubt, primitive but the surplus, thus created, paved the way for a few rich people to grow from more to more. It is they who controlled the economic life-line of the country. The high artistic constructions, though rare specimens of art in history, bespeak the use of forced labour. A critical estimate of the exploitation of the surplus labour, though yet a desideratum, is not within the scope of this paper.

Though the Cambodians were not so much scrupulous with regard to purity, the duties of the four *varṇas*, which often changed with the econnmic status of man, were observed. The caste system, though apparently in vogue, underwent change in this region. There was an Officer known as the Chief of the Castes who had to look to the maintenance of the *varṇa* Law. The Brāhmaṇas were divided into two broad classes—worshippers of Śiva or Buddha. The first again was subdivided into five groups originating mainly from the marriage with lower castes. The Brāhmaṇas sometimes did the same type of work as assigned to the slaves (*RCM*-No. 155). The Kṣatriya were also divided into five classes. The Śūdras are not despised as impure or untouchable. Men of all castes took to agriculture. In Bali, the higher castes enjoyed the same privileges in the law court as their counterpart in India.

Slaves formed a distinct class in the society. Slavery as an institution arose out of the following circumstances :—

(i) By birth or born of slaves (*Gṛhaja*)
(ii) Non-payment of debt or fine (*Daṇḍadāsa*)
(iii) Imprisonment in war (*Dhvajahṛta*)
(iv) Poverty (*Daridradāsa*)
(v) Willingly accepting the status of a slave (*Bhaktadāsa*)

The Civil law of Java throws light on the conditions of the slaves and women. The Javanese Civil law permitted a husband to sell his wife. A slave may change his master by purchase, sale, gift or inheritance. Slaves were regarded as the absolute property of their masters and a master was entitled to the property and issue of slaves. A slave could be given as a pledge. The aristocracy in Cambodia included kings, nobles and official individuals enjoying all privileges, while the lower orders including the peasants were subjected to inhuman exploitation. The insatiable demands for forced labour and military service on the part of the ruler left the country in a state of impoverishment. The porters, the slaves, the *bhṛtyas*, garland-makers, water-carriers, and workers of almost all description constituted the gang of galley slaves. The artistic creation of Jayavarman VII bears testimony to the painful existence of the 'have-nots.' Feudal levies and obligations were not unknown. There were officers in charge of Corvee and slaves. As a result of the nefarious activities of the Chams (Champa), there was influx of slaves among them. Regular slave trade was carried on by the Cham merchants and the slaves formed a prominent element of the population in addition to the aristocracy and commonalty.

We frequently come across with the details of the slaves and serfs in the Kambuja inscriptions as they were also donated to the donees like other articles of gifts. It is thus evident that they were treated as chattels and helots and had practically no social standing. In most cases we have the details of slaves, servants, serfs, female slaves, their children etc., and their transfer from one master to another. In the feudal economy of Cambodia, this appears to have been a regular feature and these unfortunate persons were employed in all sorts of productive and unproductive humiliating jobs. In the absence of any escape from this drudgery, they had to compromise with the situation though instances of revolts are not few and far between. Whether the state was the vast labour employing machinery or not is difficult to ascertain but this much is certain that there was no security for the lower orders against the frequent oppression of their masters who, for all practical purposes, controlled the economic life. There was a regular sale and purchase of slaves in Cambodia.

The earliest Khmer inscription (609-611) records the dedication

of slaves to the temple of Gambhīreśvara.[1] Another Khmer inscription gives us an example of two princes and a personage in their service who has received from them the same marks of honour.[2] It is interesting to note that very often minor officials also make grants and in one case we find a chief holding the authority of a troop of thousand inhabitants. Slaves were also dedicated to the *Bodhisattvas*.[3] Whenever there was any new assignment, serfs were also donated.[4] The famous Paṇḍita, Śivakaivalya, is believed to have founded a *Śivaliṅga* and assigned it to some serfs. By their conduct and loyalty, the servants sometimes won the appreciation and reward of their masters. In one of the Khmer inscriptions we come across a servant named Nāsā who inspired confidence by his good conduct and another servant named Nādha who became the chief of the army.[5] Parallel examples of this type may be given from histories of other countries. Chivalry and loyalty paid due dividends in feudal society and Cambodia was no exception to this rule. Nādha received high-sounding titles like *Nṛpendravaya* and *Pṛthvīnarendra*. Those who assisted the king were amply rewarded by the grant of land and other allied privileges. Slaves formed an important part of the royal or feudal donations both secular and ritualistic. At times a servant was charged by the king to build a rock and other edifices.[6] The inscription of *Prasat Karvan* (921) speaks of a prince named Mahīdharavarman as offering serfs from Bhīmapura. He was a partisan of Jayavarman IV. A confidant is said to have celebrated the foundation by paying homage to the king.[7] Saṅgrāma was rewarded for his prodigies of valour in combat during the time of Jayavarman V.

The inscription of Jayavarman V brings to light various aspects of the question of feudalism and some of them have been discussed by Mr. L. A. Sedov. The donation of land needed scrutiny at several hands. Donations of ornaments were also known. Jayavarman V also created various new castes[8]. A bilingual inscription records

1. Inscriptions of *KK Yom* (609) and *Angor Borei* (611).
2. *Ponhear Hor Inscription.*
3. Cf; *Inscription of Vat Prasat.*
4. *Inscription of Sdok Ka Thom.*
5. *Inscription of Preah Vihar* (1).
6. Briggs-*Ancient Khmer Empire*-p. 126.
7. *Ibid*-131.
8. *Stele Inscription of Kompong-Thom* (dated 974).

the donation of slaves[1]. Another Khmer inscription of 974 speaks of the donation of land and slaves and fixes the redevances of the land[2]. The reign of Jayavīravarman forms a landmark in the history of Cambodian feudalism as most of the inscriptions of his reign relate to the transfer or confirmation of the titles of land. It appears that the germs of feudalism were fully entrenched in the life of the Cambodian people. One Sahadeva, the guardian of the sacred property, was holding the hereditary right over a portion of land. His maternal grandfather was a military general and the title to the land in question was acquired by his maternal great grandfather and it had remained in the family ever since. Various fraudulent attempts were made to sieze the land but both Jayavarman V and Jayavīravarman intervened and the title was confirmed in favour of Sahadeva as is evident from a stele inscription of *Tūol-Prasat* (1003). From a study of this document it appears that it was the king who confirmed the grant finally in favour of Sahadeva and various officials appear to have participated in the presentation of the request. In one case we see that the chief officials of the assembly are called upon to pass on the transfer of land (*BE*-37 :—379-413). The stele inscription of *Prasat Trapang Run* (*II*) describes in details the procedure for the transfer of a piece of land. There were hereditary functionaries and hierarchical officials who continued to work even when there were political convulsions at the top. The sacerdotal class went hand in gloves with the royalty. An undated stele inscription of *Tūol Ta Pao* relates the history of a family of dignitaries in the services of kings since Jayavarman II. The king seems to have enjoyed the holy royalty.

Even the Khmer inscriptions on the pillar of Gopura of the royal palace contain an oath of fidelity. The text leads us to infer that it was a sort of commendation to the reigning monarch. *Tamvrao* (Lictors *i.e.*, officials bearing axe and rod) of all categories swear grateful devotion to Sūryavarmadeva in the presence of the sacred fire, the holy jewel, the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *ācāryas* and promise not to revere another king. They further pledge (i) to fight and risk life (if there is war) and (ii) devotion to king up to death. In return the king was to look to the maintenance and sustenance of their families. Sūryavarman I

1. *Briggs-142.*
2. *Inscription on the brick temple of Prasat Neak Buos* of 974.

seems to have stabilised his power. A Khmer stele inscription at *Phnom Chisor* tells us of the founding of a monastery in 1015 where gifts of slaves and revenue are also mentioned. The transfer of land and revenue is further confirmed by another inscription of the same king (1019). The land granted by Sūryavarman to the family of Jayendra Paṇḍita was confirmed by Udayādityavarman II. Four hundred male and female slaves were also donated. When the foundation was completed, the king was informed and requested to see that the establishment and slaves be constituted as gracious liberality in favour of *Śivaliṅga* Bhadraniketana and the request was complied with (*Sdok Kak Thom*-1052).

Revolts in the feudal set up were not unknown. A favourite General, named Kamvau, revolted against Udayādityavarman II and Barth attributes it to the religious reaction. Kamvau ultimately fell at the hands of Saṅgrāma. While Saṅgrāma was busy with Kamvau, another rebel, Slvat, also revolted. Both these rebels were subdued by Saṅgrāma who offered the captives and the spoils to the king. Udayādityavarmana II was moved at the loyalty and fidelity of Saṅgrāma and the king said—"All these things which you have conquered, deign to keep them : while they are my treasures, they are certainly yours. What makes me forever happy are the striking proofs of your fidelity and not such riches". Saṅgrāma prevailed upon the king to accept these spoils as a gift to the golden image of *Devarāja* under the vocable of Udayāditeśvara. The feudal lords in a number of cases took advantage of the weakness of the central authority. A son of a vassal king, Jayavarman, is said to have taken advantage of the weakness of Harṣavarman III (1080).

A bilingual stele Khmer inscription at *Phnom Chisor* (1116) commemorates a gift of land, slaves and property to the god of the temple of Sūryaparvata. A Khmer pillar inscription of *Vat Phu* (1136) records a donation to the god of Liṅgapur by a man and his son of the country of Bhadreśvarapada, and of the corporation of the workers of the *viṣaya* of Śreṣṭhapur[1]. The Angor Vat sculptures also represent feudal elements and if Bosch is to be relied upon, the central tower contained the statute-portrait of the king and nineteen seigneurs. It was under Jayavarman VII that Khmer empire reached

1. *BE-II (3)-241-45-Vat Phu.*

its zenith and half of the great monuments are credited to him. According to Coedes, his religious zeal surpassed the bounds of all reason and his vanity amounted to megalomania. He impoverished and embittered the people with his tithes and forced labour in building useless monuments to satisfy his personal ambition and that of the fudal seigneurs as is evident from the towers and pavillions of the Angor sculptures. These were meant to celebrate their memory. He attempted to grind the people into lowest servility to build up monuments for his relatives and friends. The Angor monument was begun by Sūryavarman II and we learn from the inscription of *Preah Vihar* (IV) that in 1119 he gave orders to raise the "corveable workmen of the second, third and probably of the fourth categories". (cf-Briggs-196). The Angor monuments were built by forced labour, and the vast mass of slave-labour. The TAI states supplied a large part of the slave labour. They contributed a lot towards the prosperity of Angor whose rulers satisfied their vanity at the cost of peoples' happiness and pleasure. Here in these admirably excellent structures are depicted the daily life and manners of the people of Cambodia. There are depicted the warriors with their raised spears, superb gang of galley slaves, the porters carrying load, horses and elephants and many other aspects of daily life. As a result of the waning influence of theology and the loss of revenue, the popularity of the upper strata diminished. Even after the decline of the classical Khmer Civilisation (13th century A.D.), villages and slaves continued to be assigned. With the disappearance of the upper strata of the population and the removal of capital from Angor, the structures were soon abandoned. Louis Finot has attributed the fall of the Khmer civilisation to the following reasons :—"The suddenness of this catastrophe, at first surprising, is explained by the heterogenous composition of the Cambodian state.........nothing proves that the people reacted strongly against the aggression; perhaps even they saluted it as a deliverance. ......the conquerors offered to the conquered.........economic religion, whose ministers, devoted to poverty, contended themselves with a thatch of straw and a handful of rice"[1]. This clearly explains that the highhandedness of the ruling class was responsible for the decline of the Khmer Civilisation at a given period when the productive forces were disturbed on account of the lack of peoples' cooperation.

1. *Ibid*-VIII. 221-233.

In the middle ages all the Cambodian peasantry was in the service of gods and the slaves and villages were granted to the monuments for maintenance. The poor people had lost all genuine interest in the State and the result was disastrous for the country as a whole. The peasantry had so long laboured for the wellbeing of the upper strata without any considerable return. Hinduism was the cult of the upper classes while the people in general were attached to their animistic cults. At times Manu's law was considerably modified by Buddhism to assuage peoples' feeling. Religion in Cambodia was one of the main medium of economic and political exploitation.

The *Cham inscriptions* show that the Burmese as well as Tai slaves were granted to Cham temples. Chou-Ta-Kuan[1] mentions slaves and concubines. He further states that the official rank determined the kind of dwelling. Slaves were purchased for being employed as domestic servants and well-to-do persons had more than hundred slaves. Kuan says—" Only the very poor have none at all... They call their master and mistress, father and mother...If a female slave has a child by unknown person, the master does not trouble about the father but treats the child as a slave. If a slave tries to escape and is retaken, he is marked in blue on the face...the savages coming from the mountains are sold as slaves in the market." He refers to the sale of women and also to the ninety vassal governments. According this Chinese authority, all the people were obliged to fight.

The whole range of Sanskrit inscriptions is replete with the account of the dedication of slaves and serfs in Cambodia. Their specific duties are not invariably mentioned.[2] The Sanskrit portion of the inscription of Īśānavarman records the gifts of slaves and land by an ascetic Īśānadatta to the *Bhagavat*. Names of eleven male and twenty female servants are preserved in the Khmer portion.[3] An official named Śucidatta also donated three slaves.[4] A lady devotee gave twenty servants.[5] In one case the *Bhikṣus* are seen donating slave to their grand nephew by the order of the king. What is important here is not the donation of slaves but the principle involved.

1. *Ibid*-II. 123.27 (Pelliots' translation).
2. *ISC.* 47 ; Aymonier. I. 167ff.
3. *RCM.* 124.
4. *BEFEO*-XXXVI. 5 ; Aymonier-I. 139.
5. *RCM*-27-28 ; 50 ; 52 ; 54 ; 56 ; 57 ; 78 ; 189 ; 221 ; 222 ; 223 ; 285 ; 309 ; 311 ; 343 etc.

That is that the king had absolute right over the slaves and any donation of slaves would be considered valid only after its approval by the king.[1] A servant of king Jayavarman I (Śaka-595), by the favour of his master (Svasvāminaḥ Prasādāt), became the President of the royal assembly and was honoured with everything including slaves. What a feudal dignitary was equal to in Cambodia ! "Dust of the feet" was a title usually applied to a dignitary.[3] The *Louvek Pillar Inscription* (7th. century A. D.) records a royal order to bring four hundred slaves out of which 212 are named. These included five dancers and five musicians. The slave was described as *Vrau*, the name of an aboriginal people of Cambodia. The slaves be usually mentioned along with oxen, buffaloes, rice fields, kitchen gardens. Utensils and slaves are treated as property (*IC*-II. 115 ; 121 ; 135 ; 196). An inscription of Jayavarman IV (in Khmer) refers to donations to "*Kamratenāñ Jagat ta rājya*" (or divinity) by two dignitaries.[4] It included male and female slaves. Another Khmer inscription records an order by Jayavarman IV to a dignitary.[5] Another record (in Khmer) refers to the division of the products of lands among the different chiefs of slaves.[6] An inscription of Harṣavarman (Saka-844) records his order addressed to a dignitary relating to the delivery of goods, slaves etc. A Khmer inscription of Rājendravarman (Śaka-866) records that an humble petition was presented to him by some *Brāhmaṇas* recalling that the pious foundations included among other things slaves, cows, buffaloes etc. A royal order was issued asking the Ministers to maintain the integrity of religious property and forbidding their sale or alienation by judicial decree. In one of the inscriptions, the royal donation was made out of the confiscated property.[8]

We have an interesting record (in Khmer) of the tenth-eleventh century A. D. (*IC*-III. 72). It records an order (*ālakṣaṇa*) in respect of a slave named Śrī (SI) Varuṇa, who with his mother and other relations, was born in the domain of Rajguha. This slave fled but

1. *Ibid*-36 ; *BEFEO*-XXIV. 353.
2. *Ibid* 443.44 ; *IC*. 12.
3. Aymonier-II. 444.
4. *RCM*. 165 ; 175 ; *IC*. 28.
5. *Ibid*. 166 ; *BEFEO*-XXXIII. 16 ; Aymonier-I. 293.
6. *Ibid*-167 ; *BEFEO*-XXXIII. 17.
7. *Ibid*-178-79.
8. *Ibid*. 268 ; Aymonier-I. 384.

was arrested and the officials cut off his nose and ears. It was stated in the royal order that the slave Si Varuṇa and his mother and other relations were to be treated as exclusive property of the Rajaguha so that there may be no fraud in the endowments made by the king Rājendravarman. Another record gives a similar royal order asking to present in person the slaves (who are named) given by the king to sanctuary so that there might be no fraud. All deals were confirmed by the royal order and the judgements, given by the rulers, were preserved.[1] All grants were confirmed by royal acts. *The Kok Roseo Inscription* of Jayavarman V[2] throws light on the following points :—

(i) the families which gave their daughters to those holding the supreme power ;

(ii) the devoted and the faithful servant called *Sajjaka* (Sañjaka) who guarded the person of the king in the battle ; Sañjaka means a chief bound by a special oath to defend the person of a king or the prince. When the Sañjaka was killed, the king showed appreciation of his services in a befitting manner. Not only were the Sañjakas posthumously awarded but their slaves were also installed in the shrines ;

(iii) their oaths and inalienable property ;

(iv) the education of the sons of the families which suplied royal officials ;

(v) various grades and classes of royal officials.

Donation of land, serfs and slaves was a common feature of the Cambodian society. A Khmer inscription of the reign of Udayādityavarman relates to a royal Ordinance exempting the slaves of the temples of Chok Gargyar from the duty of the corvee so that they may exclusively serve gods. An inscription of the eleventh century A. D. (*IC*-III. 54) enumerates the slaves offered to the *Śivaliṅga* NarapatIndravarman. Slaves were donated along with their children and grandchildren. From the point of view of the study of feudalism, the *Sambour inscription* (Śaka-923) is very important[4]. Jayavarman IV had ordered the payment for the ransom of slaves and Dirgha Hor,

1. *Ibid*-169.
2. Aymonier-I. 420-423 ; *BEFEO*-XXVIII. 113.
3. *IC*-50 ; *RCM*. 308.
4. Aymonier-I. 307 ; *RCM*-309.

the guardian of the God at Śambhupur, had received the royal order for their maintenance. It appears that the royal order of maintenance, was given effect to only in 1001 A. D.[1].

The Prasat Kok Po Inscription (Śaka-926) gives some interesting details of the procedure of the sale of lands[2]. A Brāhmaṇa purchased land from two officials who sold land in order to acquire the precious objects for the royal service. The Brāhmaṇa then made a request on the subject of the proprietory right in the land. Notice was then issued to the Inspector of Qualities and Defects (*Guṇadoṣadarśī*) and to the assembly to summon the sellers. Full powers were given to Pṛthvīndra Paṇḍita who entrusted the execution of royal order to Inspector of wages, Chief Judicial officer, Superintendent of the Court of Justice, Inspector of the property of Gods, Inspector of the Bailiffs of the Third Class and ordered them to delimit the land and to call the nobles, the elders and dignitaries for assistance in fixing the boundaries and putting the land in possession of the Brāhmaṇas. After all the formalities were gone through, the royal order giving this land to the Brāhmaṇas was notified. Another Khmer document of the time of Jayavīravarman (Śaka-928) gives an account of the procedure for the transference of land by the royal order[3]. Kavīndra Paṇḍita, in charge of a religious establishment, asked for the gift of a piece of unclaimed land which he proposed to dedicate to god Nārāyaṇa and the donation was graciously made. The Sañjakas were present as witnesses when the king made this grant. Besides the Sañjakas the following officers are also mentioned :—

(a) Inspector of Qualities and Defects,

(b) Chief Ācārya, member of the Tribunal,

(c) Reciter of the *Dharmaśāstras*,

(d) Chief of the store house (First, Second and Third class) and

(e) Keeper of the Archives.

A royal official was asked by the king to transfer the land. He explained to Kabīndra Paṇḍitā the terms and conditions of the gift. The boundaries were fixed in the presence of the elders and notable persons who included (a) Chief of the ten villages (*Daśagrāma*),

1. *RCM*. 310 ff.
2. *BEFEO*-XXXVII. 896 ; *RCM*. 313.
3. *Ibid*. XXVIII. 58.

(b) *Pradhānu*, (c) two slaves named Nārāyaṇa and Hṛdayabindu and (d) the village elder. The land was given as a perpetual gift. Jayavarman VI commanded a number of high officials to keep watch on the proper upkeep on the monasteries and to see to the regular payment of the daily dues assigned to the officials of the temple. The Guardian slaves of the temple, numbering twenty-four, must obey the Chaplains of the first fortnight, the chiefs of the royal corvee, and the officers of the army charged with supervision of the foundation. These slaves belonged exclusively to the foundation established by Lakṣmīndravarman and were forbidden to work in corvee for other gods. Even the ascetics[1] purchased and donated slaves. Slaves continued to be donated till 1327 A. D.

The above details enable us to arrive at the conclusion that slavery was an important aspect of the socio-economic life of Cambodia. It appears that slaves participated in all types of productive measures. The fact that there was a chief of the slaves in the bureaucratic hierarchy is indicative of the importance of this institution. Similarly there was an officer in charge of the royal corvee. The system had its effect of the political history of the country as we have seen above that when it was invaded, the people welcomed the invaders. The reasons are not very far to seek. The social system based on the unscrupulous exploitation of the vast mass of population is bound to collapse. The slaves and serfs, though main props of the State, were subjected to worst form of exploitation and were equated with animals. They could be disposed of in accordance with the wishes of their masters and they had no say in the matter. In this respect they were no better than the Russian serfs in the pre-revolutionary Russia. They formed the lowest strata in the social set up. A critical study of the epigraphic records of Cambodia reveals to us that all types of feudal obligations, in one form or the other, were known and corvee was a regular feature. The king was at the top and the serfs at the bottom. The wars, won at the cost of these slaves and serfs, added luxury to the royal palace but nothing to them. There was no remedy against these atrocities except the revolts which occasionally took place. One such revolt is known as peasants' revolt. From the available records it appears that the slaves did not enjoy

1. *RCM*. 425 ff; Aymonier-II. 111; *BEFEO*-XXIX. 299.
2. *Ibid*. 351; *IC*. III. 137; Aymonier-I. 192.

any social status or standing. Self-sacrifice for the sake of the monarch was considered sacrosanct. The *Bantay-Chmar Inscription* gives a very interesting account of the heroic self sacrifice of the four soldiers of the Sañjaka class who were later deified (*RCM*-pp. 528-530). This deification was meant to inspire the slaves and other members of the lower orders to do their work in a spirit of dedication.

ABBREVIATIONS AND SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY :—

1. Aymonier-*Le Cambodge*-Three Volumes (Paris-1900-1903).
2. *BE-Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient* (Hanoi).
3. *BRC-Indian Influence in Cambodia* (By B. R. Chatterji).
4. Briggs-*The Ancient Khmer Empire* (L. P. Briggs).
5. S. Coedes- *Inscriptions du Cambodge*-Four Volumes (*IC*).
6. M. Barth and A. Bergaigne. *Inscriptions Sancrites du Cambodge* (*ISC*).
7. *RCM-Inscriptions of Kambuja* (By R. C. Majumdar).
8. Do-*Kambujadeśa*.
9. Do......*Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East* (Vol. I Champā ; Vol. II-*Suvarnadvipa*.
10. Maspero-*Khmer Empire*.
11. D. G. E. Hall-*A History of South East Asia*.
12. Swami Sadananda-*Hindu Colonies in Greater India*.
13. P. C. Bagchi- *Pre-Aryan and Pre-Dravidian in India*.
14. M. N. Ghosh-*A History of Cambodia*.
15. A. K. Coomaraswamy-*History of Indian and Indonesian Art*.
16. H. Parmantier-*L'Art Khmer*.
17. P. Pelliot-*Le Founan*.
18. B. C. Chabra-*Expansion of Indo-Aryan Culture during the Pallava rule*, published in the *JASB* of 1935.
19. N. G. Quaritch Wales-*The Making of Greater India*.
20. Reginald Le May-*The Culture of South-East Asia*.
21. R. K. Choudhary- *Some aspects of Feudalism in Cambodia* in the *JBRS* (Rahul volume).
22. JASB-Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.
23. Journal of the Burma Research Society.
24. JBRS-Journal of the Bihar Resoach Society.
25. IHQ-Indian Historical Quarterly.
26. JGIS-Journal of the Greater India Society.
27. Naodi Asia (and) I Africi (Moscow) for the articles of L. A. Sedov.

EARLY BRITISH RELIGIOUS POLICY IN INDIA

By

Dr S. B. Singh

In early years of British rule the Company adopted the policy of non-interference with India's social and religious practices. This can be ascribed to two factors. Firstly, some of the early British administrators in India like Warren Hastings, Thomas Munro, Elphinstone and others were influenced by the ideas of philosophical conservatism and wanted to preserve the traditions and laws of the country as far as possible. Secondly, it was considered expedient not to interfere with the social and religious practices of the country as far as practicable so that peace and order might not be disturbed. This was motivated by the desire to preserve the British empire in India. A President of the Board of Control rightly observed—"The paramount power which we now possess in India, undoubtedly demands from us additional caution upon this subject; it imposes upon us the necessity as well as strengthens our obligation to protect the natives in the free and undisturbed possession of their religious opinions; and to take care that they are neither harassed nor irritated by any premature or over-zealous attempts to convert them to Christianity."[1] The activities of the Christian missions were looked with misgivings. At first the Company restricted their entry into British territories in India and did not allow their own officials to be involved in the propagation of Christianity. Lord Wellesley could tolerate or encourage the labour of "prodent missionaries" wholly unconnected with the state. He made the following observation in the house of Lords: "He had thought it his duty to have the scriptures translated into the languages of the East, and to give the learned natives, employed in the translation, the advantages of access to the sacred fountains of divine truth; he thought that a Christian Governor could not have done less, and knew that a Christian Governor ought not to do more."[2] As a matter of fact the Company's Government in India did not like to be associated in any way with the activities of the

1. Calcutta Review, Vol. III, Jan.-June, 1845, p. 227.
2. Ibid, p. 244.

Christian missions and took measures to discourage their activities which were likely to offend the religious prejudices of the people. In 1807, a pamphlet printed in the Persian language at the missionary Press, Serampore, depicted the character of Prophet Muhammad in strong terms. The British Government in Bengal at once took note of it and asked the Danish Governor of Serampore to confiscate all copies of the pamphlet and to prohibit the printing or circulating of any works of similar character in future. An order was also issued prohibiting the missionaries from printing any books "directed to the object of converting the natives to Christianity." The circulation of the Bible in the Bengali language was permitted no doubt, but there was to be no comment on the religion of the country. Further, it was ordered that all works "intended for circulation within the British territories, should be submitted for the inspection of the officers of Government previously to their publication". As regards the public preaching of the gospel of salvation the Supreme Government in Bengal recorded the following resolution :—"That with this view we deemed it necessary to direct that the practice of public preaching at the house employed for that purpose by the missionaries in the town of Calcutta should be immediately discontinued ; and to prohibit the issue of any publications from the Press, superintended by the Society of missionaries, of a nature offensive to the religious prejudices of the natives, or directed to the object of converting them to Christianity".[1] The Governor of Serampore tried to intercede on behalf of the missionaries, but the Bengal Government was determined to curb their activities. Positive orders were given to the Superintendent of Police and the Magistrates for the town of Calcutta to adopt the necessary measures for giving full effect to the decision of the Supreme Government. Dr Claudius Buchanan submitted a Memorial to the Government against these arbitrary and anti-Christian proceedings. In the Memorial he observed—"It has been the usual conduct of Asiatic Governments to let Christianity be alone. In the annals of the British administration in India, there has been no instance of the suppression of a Christian Mission. Our empire here subsists by the discrepancy of religious opinion. It is good policy to strengthen the Christian religion, because it is as yet the weakest. It is certainly our duty not to oppose it, for if this counsel be of God, we can not resist it. And it would now be

1. Ibid, p. 249.

as easy to oppose the rushing of the Bore into the river Ganges, as to oppose the entrance of Christianity into the province of Bengal".[1]

Munro and Elphinstone as Governors of Madras and Bombay in the first quarter of the nineteenth century adopted cautious attitude towards the propagation of Christianity in India. Elphinstone was critical of the religion of the Hindus, but he did not approve of any interference with Indian religions. Munro did not allow the British officials to use their official position for spreading Christianity. As regards the policy of government he made it quite clear that it was not intended to employ Collectors and Magistrates as teachers of morality and religion.[2] According to him, the British officials in India were committed to a policy of previous Indian Governments. They had to facilitate religious ceremonies, sanction long-established religious practices, and administer religious foundations. Robert Dundas, son of Henry Dundas, insisted that the British Government in India had to maintain Hindu temples, collect pilgrim taxes, and even to appoint Hindu priests to manage these religious properties. The Company inherited these responsibilities from previous Indian Governments and must maintain them.[3] Thus, the Bengal Regulation XIX of 1810 was passed. It vested the general superintendence of all lands granted for the support of mosques, Hindu temples, colleges and for other pious and beneficial purposes in the Board of Revenue and Board of the Commissioners. A similar regulation was passed in the Madras Presidency in 1817. The Company's Government recognised Hindu and Muslim endowments and placed the superintendence of them in the hands of its officers. The Government began to collect pilgrim-tax at Gaya, Puri and Allahabad. At first the Company imposed a tax upon pilgrims at Gaya and made a large profit out of this source. In 1803, Orissa was occupied by British troops. Lord Wellesley instructed Col. Campbell "to employ every possible precaution to preserve the respect due to the pagoda (temple of Jagannath), and to the religious prejudices of the Brahmins and pilgrims; to afford the pilgrims the most ample protection and to treat them with every mark of consideration and kindness".[4] He further added—"...it will

1. Ibid, 252
2. Bearce, George. D.–British Attitudes towards India (1784-1858) p. 143.
3. Ibid, p. 61.
4. Calcutta Review, Jan.-June 1852, Vol. XVII, p. 122.

not be advisable, at present moment, to interrupt the system which prevails for the collection of the duties levied on pilgrims..."[1] The pilgrim-tax at Puri was at first established by the Mohammedan rulers of the country. The Mahrattas, who occupied Orissa in the middle of the eighteenth century, continued the same system and realised a great profit from this tax, varying from two to five lakhs of rupees a year. Lord Wellesley had no mind to interrupt the system. In a letter dated May 4,1804, he instructed :—"His excellency in council is satisfied that it will be, in every point of view, advisable to establish moderate rates of duty or collection on the pilgrims proceeding to perform their devotions at Jagannath".[2] Thus the British Government established pilgrim-tax at Puri. It gave to the company a profit of about £ 6000 a year from 1812 to 1828.[3] The Government had to make an annual donation to the temple of Jagannath. About the year 1810, the British Government began to levy a tax on pilgrims at Allahabad. The tax was one rupee for a man on foot; two rupees for pilgrim in a carriage, and twenty rupees for one with an elephant. Thus, the British Government collected pilgrim-tax and made donations to the temples.

There were other instances of British Government's connection with idolatry in India. At Hidjeli, near the mouth of the Ganges, the Company had a great depot for salt-manufacture. In order to insure the Company's trade in salt against loss, a Hindu priest offered worship to an image of Lakṣmī. Among the regular payments of the salt-agency were included monthly payments to a number of Brahmins, whose names were duly registered and whose duty was to offer worship to the Goddess Lakṣmī on behalf of the Company. The same custom prevailed at the opium agency in Bihar. When the first opium beats of each season were despatched to Calcutta, a special donation was made to Brahmins to secure their safe arrival. The British high officials, when arriving in the neighbourhood of celebrated shrines, visited them and offered presents. In 1839, Lord Auckland visited Brindaban and was said to have given Rs. 200 to one idol and Rs. 700 to others. This example was followed by other Governor Generals. It had been said in defence of such donations, that they

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, p. 126.

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were only a fee to the temple officers who conducted the British officials over the shrine. In 1841, the sum of money paid by the Company's government to institutions connected with the Hindu and Mohammedan religions amounted to £ 11,047. Of this, £ 10,321 were given in continuation of grants bestowed by former Governments.[1]

In the presidencies of Bombay and Madras the British Government followed the same policy. When Poona was occupied by the British troops, the city was filled with temples and the Brahmins were found in enjoyment of large income. The British Government promised not only protection to their rights and property, but also the continuance of their endowments and gifts. One special endowment called the *Dakṣiṇā* was bestowed by the Peshwas on learned Brahmins. The British Government continued this donation. The Government servants, civil and military, were instructed to attend the Hindu and Mohammedan festivals as a mark of respect towards them. Oaths were regularly administered in the name of Hindu Gods and on the Koran. Documents were consecrated by inscribing at their heads the names of Gaṇeśa and other deities, The Government showed itself to be the intimate friend of the native religions. Prayers for rain were ordered by the collectors to be presented at the various temples in season when drought and famine were feared. The authority of Government was used to force poor people for drawing the idol cars. In the district of Tanjore alone, there were no less than 400,000 people compelled every year to leave their homes and proceed often ten or twenty miles, without any provisions or remuneration for the purpose of dragging the idol cars.[2] The Government also undertook to manage the affairs of some of the temples. At first the landed endowments of temples were placed under the management of British collectors who paid into the pagoda funds the net proceeds of the estates. In many cases the Government resumed the estates altogether and paid annually to the pagodas a sum of ready money equal to their yearly value. In the thirty-eighth report of the Calcutta auxiliary Bible Society, 1851, the following observation was made ; "voluntarily, deliberately and knowingly the Government of Madras made itself trustee of the pagoda lands, for the perpetuation of that debasing idolatry, which the God of Heaven has determined to overthrow. In times of drought, the 'Collector' ordered the Brahmins

1. Ibid, p. 182.
2. Ibid, p. 141.

to pray to the Gods for rain, and paid money for their expenses. European officers joined in salutes to the idols. Some, of their own accord, would make their obeisance; and others would ride in front of the cars, shouting with the multitudes, "Hari Bol". Villagers were summoned to draw the cars by order of the Collector, and were whipped by the native officials, if they refused. The temples were kept in repair by the Government; and the illuminations at the festivals were paid for from the treasury".[1] Thus, the British Government had given a public sanction to the doctrines, ceremonies and practices of the religions of their empire in India.

The English East India company had a clause in its Charter forbidding the sending out to India of "missionaries and gentlemen". The Clapham Sect under the leadership of William Wilberforce began agitation in London for opening the doors of India for missionaries of all denominations. In 1793, William Wilberforce made an effort to insert a clause in the Company's Charter for getting "schoolmasters and missionaries" admitted to India. But his efforts proved fruitless at that time. Meanwhile he and his friends continued their agitation ceaselessly. Wilberforce was a ceaseless fighter for the cause of missionaries. At last his efforts were crowned with success in 1813. Christian missionaries poured in India in large numbers. The evangelicals joined hands with free traders. They were imbued with a civilising mission in India. Charles Grant, a Director of the E. I. Company, wrote in 1797: "In considering the affairs of the world as under the control of the supreme Disposer, and those distant territories ......providentially put into our hands......is it not necessary to conclude that they were given to us, not merely that we might draw an annual profit from them, but that we might diffuse among their inhabitants, long sunk in darkness, vice and misery, the light and benign influence of the truth, the blessings of well-regulated society?......In every progressive step of this work, we shall also serve the original design with which we visited India, that design still so important to this country, the extension of our commerce."[2] Mecaulay also voiced the same feelings when in 1833 he said: "To trade with civilised men is infinitely more profitable than to govern savages."[3] The missionaries

1. Calcutta Review, Vol. XVI, July-Dec. 1851, p. 174.
2. Edwardes Michael, Asia in the European Age (1498-1955), p. 109.
3. Ibid, p. 110.

took upon themselves the task of disseminating Christian knowledge and thus to bring social and religious regeneration in India. They particularly hated idolatry and condemned the Company's Government in India for giving protection to the idolatrous practices of the Indian people. Between 1813 and 1833 they brought this fact to the attention of the British public. The result of the agitation, both in India and England, was the transmission of the memorable Despatch of 1833, which is generally attributed to Lord Glenelg. In this Despatch, his Lordship discussed the question of the pilgrim-tax in all its bearings and referred briefly to other details of the connection of Government with idolatry. He stated, however, in emphatic terms, that the Company's Government in India must cease its connection wholly with idolatry. The Court's Despatch, dated the 20th Feb., 1833, contained the following instruction :

"All religious rites and offices, which are in this sense harmless, that they are not flagrantly opposed to rules of common humanity or decency, ought to be tolerated, however, false the creed by which they are sanctioned. But they could not be properly said to be tolerated if those who are engaged in them did not experience that degree of protection to which every citizen, not offending against the law, is entitled at the hands of his rulers. A religious festival, attended by immense crowd, cannot be said to be tolerated if the Government does not provide a police force sufficient to enforce order and to ensure the safety of individuals during the celebration. And on the other hand, the providing of such a police force is not an act of favour or friendship to the mode of worship, but one of simple justice to the worshippers. Beyond this civil protection, however, we do not see that the maxims of toleration enjoin us to proceed. It is not necessary that we should assist in the preparations for it, or that we should afford to it such systematic support as shall accredit it in the eyes of the people, and prevent it from expiring through the effect of neglect or accident".[1]

The above-mentioned Despatch of the Court of Directors outlined the policy which the Company's officials were to follow regarding the religious practices of the Indians. Firstly, the interference of British functionaries in the interior management of temples, in the customs, habits and religious proceedings of their priests, in the arrangement of

1. Misc. Revenue Department. No. 8 of 1833.

their ceremonies, rites and festivals was to cease. Secondly, the pilgrim-tax was to be abolished in the Company's dominion in India. Thirdly, the fines and offerings were no longer to be considered as sources of revenue by the British Government and these were no longer to be collected or received by the servants of the Company, Fourthly, in all matters relating to their worship, their religious practices, their ceremonial observances, the Indians were left entirely to themselves. Fifthly, in every case in which it would be found necessary to keep up a police force, specially with a view to the peace and security of the pilgrims or the worshippers. Such police force would be maintained and made available out of the general revenues of the country. Finally, the court of Directors made the following observation : "......So far from abandoning the principles of a just toleration, the British Government in resolved to apply them ever, and that this proceeding is, in truth, no more than a recurrence to that state of real neutrality from which we ought never to have departed".[1]

Despite this order, the Government of India did nothing for five years. No change was made in the system. The Christian missionaries of Bombay and Madras submitted Memorials and demanded the full execution of the Court's despatch of the 20th February, 1833. They started agitation in the press. Several pamphlets were published condemning the Company's policy towards the Indian religions. The missionaries wanted that the Government should not extend its patronage in any way to the religious ceremonies or practices of the Indians. As a matter of fact, they were anxious to extend their own activities for saving the souls of the Indians. They even wanted the support of the Government in their activities. But the Company's Government in India was more interested in the stability of the British empire than in the activites of the missionaries. The missionaries could get no undue favour from the Government. The Company was committed to the policy of neutrality. As regards the Court's despatch of the 29th Feb, 1833, the Governor-General was unwilling to implement it. The revenue officials of Madras, who reaped large profits from the temple management, wanted to see the question shelved. At last in Oct., 1837, the Court of Directors deprecated the disposition of the missionaries to force extreme measures on the Government and declared that time had not arrived

1. Ibid.

for any ostensible change in the old system.[1] A great hue and cry was made against this order of the Court of Directors. The evangelicals took up this matter and got hundreds of petitions sent to the British Parliament. The result was that on the 26th of July, 1838, Sir John C. Hobhouse, the President of the Board of Control, assured the members of the British House of Commons that he would direct such a Despatch to be sent to India, as would render it impossible for any functionary there to evade the severance of the Government's connection with idolatrous practices in India.[2] The missionaries succeeded in their efforts and the Court of Directors sent another Despatch which contained the following instruction : "We more particularly desire that the management of all temples and other places of religious resort together with the revenues derived therefrom be resigned into the hands of the natives ; and that the interference of the public authorities in the religious ceremonies of the people be regulated by the instructions conveyed in para 62 of our Despatch of Feb. 20, 1833".[3] As soon as this instruction reached India, Lord Auckland took steps to carry out this order of the Court, although he shared the Antipathy of the Utilitarians and Evangelicals towards Indian religions. As regards Indian religious institutions and practices, he said : "They are protected as you would protect a prostitute from robbery or a brothel from burglary".[4] First of all the pilgrim-tax was abolished. Secondly, the Governor-General in Council issued an order on the 10th August, 1840, that the administration of the affairs and funds of the native religious Institutions should be vested in individuals professing the faith to which the institutions belonged. Such individuals were to be responsible to the court of justice for any breach of the duties assumed by them, which could be made the ground of a civil action.[5] But the Madras Government took a different view. As regards the abandonment of the right of interference in the management of the land of the pagodas, the Governor of Madras recorded the following observation in a Minute dated 9th June, 1840 :—"This right could not be given up without injustice to the people and without the risk of great loss to the revenue of Government. It cannot be doubted that if the

1. Calcutta Review, Vol. XVII, Jan-June, 1852, p. 153
2. Ibid, p. 154.
3. Ibid.
4. Bearce George D :—British Attitudes towards India, p. 166.
5. Parliamentary papers, Vol. 17, 1841 (H. of C.)

right of summary interference was abandoned, the property of the pagodas would be speedily embezzled and alienated. The Government would be no loser by this, but the people would look upon such a state of things with deep dissatisfaction and would justly consider that they were denied that protection which Government is assuredly bound to afford. But it may be said that the temple and their property may be left to the protection of the local courts."[1] The Governor-General did not approve of this line of action and at once directed that 'the principle was definitely settled and the separation should not be partial and uncertain but final and complete'.[2]

The Government took steps to carry out tho instruction of the Court of Directors and by 1843, there were no longer any shrines left in the hands of Government officers. Henceforth, the revenue officers had nothing more to do with the repairs of temples, preparation of festivals and custody of offerings. All these duties were given over to the native committees or individuals. Temple-property was also given over to them for management. They also received the proceeds of the pagoda lands which the Government still retained under its management. Later on the pagoda lands were also transferred to them. In order to effect the complete separation of Government from idolatry in India, Bengal Regulation XIX of 1810 and Madras Regulation VII of 1817 were repealed. In a Despatch dated 31st March, 1841, the Court of Directors instructed that no troops or military bands of music be called out and no salutes fired in honour of the festivals. The Court further made the following observation: "We need scarcely impress upon the importance of your carrying these instructions into effect in such a manner as to assure the natives that our Government will never fail to protect them in the exercise of their privileges, and to manifest a liberal regard for their feelings."[3] Thus, the Evangelicals forced the Company to withdraw its patronage and support given to the Indian religion. But the Company was conscious of its responsibilities and wanted to adopt a policy of strict neutrality towards all religions in India. In 1845, the Court of Directors wrote to the Madras Government: "You are aware of our strong impression that it is the duty of Government, and not less of its officers, to stand aloof

1. Ibid.
2. Letter from Junior Secretary to Government of India to Chief Secretary to Govt. of Madras (Revenue Department), dated 10th August, 1840.
3. Letter from Court to G. G. C. (Revenue), 3rd March, 1841.

from all missionary labours either as promoting or as opposing them."[1] In 1848, the Directors again wrote to the Governor-General in Council: "Our object has been not only that the power and authority of Government should never be exerted nor manifested for the promotion of missionary objects, but that those officers by whom the Government is represented should practice a similar forbearance...........While we are unwilling to prohibit our servants from contributing their private funds towards the promotion of objects which they may feel to be connected with the interests of true religion, we would caution them against any manifestation of a disposition calculated to excite uneasiness and alarm among the people. We think also that missionary meetings ought never to be held in official buildings or to wear the appearance of having any official sanction."[2] Thus the servants of the Company were prohibited neither to participate in the religious festivals of the Indians nor to participate actively in meetings of the Christian missionaries.

Some of the temples continued to get grant from the Government in lieu of resumption of their lands. Christian missionaries took exception to it. In 1852, in a Memorial several missionaries observed...... "Your Lordship will now, by passing the draft Act of 1851, finally terminate the connection of Government with the temple of Jagannath and leave it to be sustained by its own votaries, till the time (which your memorialists pray may not be distant in India) when idols shall be banished from the earth, and the true Lord of the universe, whose right it is to reign, shall establish His peaceful kingdom throughout the world".[3] Missionaries continued to submit their representations to the Government of India for severing connection with non-Christian religions. In 1853, in a petition to the Governor-General in Council the members of the Orissa Baptist Mission stated: "Your petitioners are connected with a mission, which for thirty years, has with a fair measure of success, endeavoured to spread the light of Christian knowledge in this dark region, and during this period have been constrained to witness the obscene abominations, and wide spread desolating influence of this celebrated emporium of idolatry (Jagannath). They will not intrude upon the notice of your excellency the revolting

1. Minutes by Hon'ble F. Millet, dated 18th June, 1847.
2. Court to G.G.C. (Judicial letter) dated 19th Jan., 1848 (No. 2).
3. Parliamentary papers, Vol. 42 (H. of C), 1867-58.

details which have come under their observation, but they do consider themselves, in consequence of their position in this province, especially called upon to leave no means untried in order to effect a severance of the connection between Government and the idol of Jagannath.....".[1] In 1858, the Bombay missionary conference in a Memorial to Government also observed: "That there exists a connection between the Government of India on the one hand the Hindu, Mohammedan and other non-Christian religions on the other. That this connection is of the nature of patronage, sums of money being regularly paid from the Government treasury from sources under the control of Government for the support of Hindu temples."[2] In reply to this Memorial the Court of Directors in a letter dated 21st July, 1858 wrote to the Governor in Council at Bombay: "We have no hesitation in at once and the most decided terms, rejecting any such propositions as that made by memorialists for dispossessing the temples and other religious institutions of property belonging to them, in which property those institutions have right as valid as that of any individual in any of his possessions. Where money is paid from the Government treasury in lieu of lands resumed and managed by Government officers, arrangement should be made for the restoration of lands and discontinuance of payments, with a due regard, however, to all their integrity, to the established rights of property, the invasion of which on any grounds whatever, will receive no countenance from us."[3] Thus, in matters relating to their temples, their worship, their festivals, their religious practices, their ceremonial observances, Indians were left entirely to themselves. The Government stood neutral between Christians and non-Christians. The Christian missionaries extended their activities and emphasised more on dissemination of Christian knowledge than on formal conversion. They believed in the regenerative effects of western education and aimed at transformation of Indian society through it. Michael Edwardes rightly observed. "The social and political impact of Christianity, allied with the new technology, was to set Asia upon a new road, the end of which is not yet in sight."[4]

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. From Court of Directors to Governor in Council, Bombay (public), 21 July, 1858.
4. Edwardes Michael, Asia in the European Age, p. 108.

KAVĪNDRĀCĀRYA SARASVATĪ
A PROBLEM OF SCHOLARSHIP AND PERSONAL INTEGRITY

BY

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To the late lamented P. K. Gode goes the credit of rescuing from century-old oblivion, the shining name and personality of the ascetic-scholar, Kavīndrācārya Sarasvatī, of whom François Bernier had left us many reminiscences, but without mentioning his name.

In a number of articles, contributed to various journals and now also available in the volumes of his *Indian Literary History*[1], P.K. Gode conclusively established the fact that the ascetic-'Pendet' described by Bernier[2] was no other than the renowned scholar of Varanasi, the Sarva-vidyā-nidhāna Kavīndrācārya Sarasvatī. This conclusion was made possible due to the discovery of a large number of Mss, with the name of Kavīndrācārya written on each in token of ownership[3] as also by that of a Mss-catalogue, *Kavīndrācārya-pustaka-sūcī* since published.[4] Besides, certain works written by him or on him have also been discovered.[5]

Another, a Hindi version of *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, entitled *Jñāna-sāra* is not available although a Persian version based thereon was made by one Sita Ram Kayastha and was entitled *Rafiul-Khilaf*. This mss is available in the GN Jha Res. Inst., Allahabad. Among all these texts, the authorship of the *Jagad-vijaya-cchandas* is not authenticated, the mss having been worm-eaten precisely at the spot mentioning the author's name. Its editor, C. Kunhan Raja, however, gave plausible enough reasons for crediting the Kavīndrācārya with its authorship. To this work, P. K. Gode also had contributed a note, thus showing his implicit agreement with the editor's identification of the author.

1. Vol. I, Vol. II, 1954 ; Vol. III,
2. *Travels in the Moghal Empire*. Eng. Trans., London, pp. 264, 328, 341.
3. This page reads : *Śrī-sarva-vidyā-nidhāna-kavīndrācārya-sarasvatīnām.*
4. *Kavīndrācārya-sūcī-patram*, Baroda, 1921.
5. Of these the *Kavīndracandrodaya*, the *Kavīndrakalpalatā* and the *Jagad-vijaya-cchandas* have been published. The *Kavīndrakalpadruma* and the *Kavīndra-candrikā* are available in mss,

After a study of all these data, P. K. Gode had come to the conclusion that the ascetic-scholar mentioned by F. Bernier, whom he had come to know at Delhi and on whom he called again in Banaras, was no other than the Kavīndrācārya. In his honour scholars from all over the country had composed verses, celebrating his success in obtaining the abolition of the pilgrims' tax at Banaras and Allahabad. Moreover, a clear reference in a Persian source, brought to light by Dr Tarachand, mentioning Kavīndra, a Sanskrit scholar, by name also confirmed the view held by P. K. Gode. The latter brought it to the notice of the Sanskrit-knowing world by quoting large extracts from Dr Tarachand's article in his note to the *Jagad-vijaya-cchandas*, mentioned above. So far about identification.

From the facts thus gathered we learn that Kavīndrācārya had visited Shah Jahan at his court at Lahore and that his mastery of the *Dhrupad*-singing had pleased the Moghul emperor who had duly honoured the scholar-singer for his skill.

"Kavīndra Sannyāsī, who is a *darbari*, has a correct taste and complete mastery in Dhrupad music and Hindu literary composition. He came to the court of the Emperor.....and obtained permission for entry. His compositions were found pleasing by the Emperor ; he was exalted with the award of a horse, a robe of honour and two thousand roupies in cash. In esteem he was raised to the height of the sky".[1]

Presumably, he had a regular place at the Moghul court during Shah Jahan's days. He seems to have lost it when Aurangzeb became the Emperor. However, he spent quite some time in Delhi, in an effort to regain his pension. The only success he registered lay in his getting employment on the personal staff of Daneshmand Khan. These facts are recounted to us by Bernier.

> "When going down the river *Ganges*, I passed through Banras and called upon the chief of the *Pendets*, who resides in that celebrated seat of learning. He is a *Fakire* or *Devotee* so eminent for knowledge that Shah Jahan, partly for that consideration, and partly to gratify the *Rajas*, granted him a pension of two thousand *roupies*, which is about one thousand crowns. He is a stout, well-made

1. *Pādshāhnāmā* of Waris, quoted by P. K. Gode. K. R. Qanungo in his work, *Dara Shukoh*, Dacca, 1935, Vol. I. p. 202. writes that a pension of Rs. 1500/- was sanctioned for Kavīndrācārya along with similar pensions settled on other courtiers of Dara.

man, and his dress consists of a white silk-scarf, tied about the waist, and hanging half way down the leg, and of another tolerably large scarf of red silk, which he wears as a cloak on his shoulders. I had often seen him in this scanty dress at Delhi, in the assembly of *Omrahs* and before the *King* and met him in the streets either on foot or in a paleky".[1]

According to Bernier, therefore, the pension had been in recognition of his eminence in knowledge. On the face of it, this squares ill with Waris' account where Kavīndra is said to have obtained the pension in recognition of his eminence in vocal music. This disagreement, however, is not very important.

After the dethronement of Shah Jahan, this pension to Kavīndrācārya was stopped. "During one year he was in the constant habit of visiting my *Agah* (Daneshmand Khan who had Bernier as a member of his retinue), to whom he paid his court in the hope that he would exercise his influence to obtain the pension of which Aurang-Zebe, anxious to appear a true Musulman, deprived him, coming to the throne"[2]

His source of income at Delhi having been cut off, he might have experienced some financial difficulties and therefore sought employment in the personal household of Daneshmand Khan as a Hindu scholar. "My Agah, Daneshmand Khan, partly from my solicitation and partly to gratify his own curiosity, took into service one of the most celebrated *Pendets* in all Indies, who had belonged to the household of Dara"[3]

Bernier refers to his last meeting with the Kavīndrācārya as having taken place in Banaras, when he, in company with Tavernier, stayed there, en route to Bengal, on Dec. 11-12, 1665 : "When I visited him at Banaras, he was most kind and attentive, giving me a collation in the University library, to which he invited the six most learned *Pendets* in the town".[4]

His success, during Shah Jahan's region, in pleading for the abolition of the pilgrims' tax at Banaras and Allahabad, is not found in any chronicle of the times. Presumably, the Muslim chroniclers' fanatical orthodoxy made them omit its mention. But the book, *Kavīndra-candrodaya*[5] records a large number of tributes, mostly in

1. Bernier, op. cit., p. 341.
2. Bernier, ibid., p. 341.
3. Ibid., p. 323.
4. Ibid. p. 341-2.
5. Ed. by Haradatta and Patkar, Poona, 1939.

Sanskrit verse, paid to the great ascetic, by the Pandits of the entire land, in celebration precisely of this event. It is said that the Kavīndrācārya had travelled all the way from Banaras to Agra and had, in Dara's presence, pleaded his cause so well that both Shah Jahan and Dara Shukoh had been moved and that orders were issued there and then abolishing the unwelcome tax. The tributes recorded herein had flowed in as a consequence. The *Kavīndra-candrikā* records similar tributes in Hindi.

Probably the contact between Dara Shukoh and the Kavīndrācārya started at about this date. Mutual like seems to have been easily established and in his search for the right *guru*, Dara found the right person, offerring him full reverence as such. If *Nṛsiṁhāśrama* is the "fourth-stage name of our scholar, then Dara Shukoh had regarded him as the ādi-Śaṁkarācārya, for he sends his Obeisances preceded by the recitation of the *mantra, Om Namo Nārāyaṇāya*, to Srī Nṛsiṁhāśrama, the like of Śaṁkarācārya".[1]

In his search for 'basic truths' common to both Hinduism and Islam, Dara Shukoh enjoyed the support of Kavīndrācārya, who had prepared a *bhāṣā* version of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*. This must have been helpful to Dara Shukoh, in preparing his work, *Majma-ul-Bahrin*,[2] also available in Sanskrit as *Samudra-saṅgama*. The help for preparing this Sanskrit version could not have excluded that rendered by Kavīndrācārya.[3]

In the preparation of the Persian translation of the Upaniṣads, Dara Shukoh acknowledges the help received from a number of leading Pandits and Sannyasins: "When Banaras was under his jurisdiction, he assembled together the leading Pandits and Sannyasins and with their help undertook their translation, which was completed in six months, on Monday, 28 June, 1657, at his palace, *Manzil-e-Nigambodh*, Delhi.[4] As the year 1657 is two years after that of the composition

1. Quoted in *Kavīndrācārya-sūcī-patram*, op. cit., p. 2.; also *Adyar Lib. Bull.*, 1940, 43 for the full Sanskrit text of the letter.
2. Ed. by M. Haq, Calcutta, 1929.
3. My esteemed colleague, Dr Abidi informs me that according to a number of scholars Dara Shukoh first wrote the work in Sanskrit and then got it ready into Persian. His knowledge of Sanskrit revealed in the letter quoted above, does not render it, *prima facie*, improbable.
4. Dr Tarachand in his Introduction to *Sirr-i-Akbar* or *Sirr-ul-Asrar* by Dara Shukoh, ed. by Dr Tarachand and Reza Jalali Naini, Teheran, 1957, p. 48.

of the *Samudra-saṅgama* or *Majma-ul-Bahrin*, composed in A. D. 1655, obviously his apprenticeship with the Kavīndrācārya lasted a number of years. The *Samudra-saṅgama* deals with "problems of cosmogony, metaphysics, ethics and eschatology" and indicates the "similarities between the Hindu and Islamic systems"[1] which would only confirm the long duration of the apprenticeship.[2]

The mastery shown by him in grappling the issue of great importance in the *Samudra-saṅgama* shows clearly that he must have studied the Upaniṣads etc. in a fairly intensive manner, along with major Sufi works. In the very beginning, Dara writes that the book is based on his own experience and that he has undertaken the job out of compassion towards his family. He does not avow it as his aim to enlighten the ignorant or the adherents of various sects. He is very sure of the intrinsic worth of his labour, for at the end he writes: "Having churned the ocean of the Vedas, has been brought out such a jewel of knowledge, the like whereof was not obtained even among the fourteen jewels brought out by the gods and the demons from the churning of the ocean. The strength to complete the *Samudra-saṅgama* was obtained due to the devotion and prayers to God".[3]

A contemporary historian spells the purpose of this fateful job as follows: "He considered it his duty that in opposition to the behaviour of the ignorant bigots who were ever ready to condemn, punish and destroy the pious believers of other religions and advocates of divine unity, he should proclaim that the ancient people of India recognised the Oneness of God, both in their outward action and in their inner thinking, and that their sacred scriptures contained the purest doctrine of unity (Tarachand, ibid, p. 47)". (In parenthesis we may add that while seeking this synthesis, he had not renounced his faith in Islam.) He declares in the same work that "Our divine book, the *Koran*, is called the Veda among the *Siddhas*."[4]

This being the intimacy between the prince and the Pandit,

1. Dr Tarachand, ibid.
2. Dr Tarachand has also kindly informed me that he had read a statement of Dara Shukoh regarding his indebtedness about this work to the Kavīndrācārya, but unfortunately he could not recall the exact reference.
3. Quoted by Gode, *Studies in Ind. Lit. Hist.*, Vol. II, p. 436.
4. Ibid., p. 445.

there is nothing surprising in the latter composing *Dhrupads* in honour of both Shah Jahan and Dara Shukoh, found in his *Kavīndra-kalpalatā*.

Here we may, however, revert to the problem of the authorship of the *Jagad-vijaya-cchandas*. In the light of what has been said above and keeping specially in view the consummate skill of the Kavīndrācārya in classical vocal music (*Dhrupad*-singing) plausibility is lent to the view of C. Kunhan Raja that this work was a creation of the Kavīndrācārya. The learned editor had, in our view, rightly stressed the fact that the title, *Jagad-vijaya* is direct translation of *Jahangir* and that it has no independent existence in Sanskrit literature, especially as a name of Śiva, to whom the composition is directly addressed both in the long and in the short versions. These considerations had led the late scholar to ascribe the authorship to the scholar from Banaras.[1] Incidentally we may mention that Vallatolla was so enraptured by the poetry and music of the work that he wrote a beautiful Sanskrit preface to the work, where we read: "*yeṣām iṣṭadevatā-stuti-vikasitād vadanāravindād nirgalito makaranda idaṁ Jagad-vijaya-cchandas te...Kavīndrācāryā vaiduṣye kavitve ca asādhāraṇaṁ sthānam adhyatiṣṭhan, ityayamartho'nayaiva gītyā suspaṣṭam gīyate.*" (*Jagad-vijaya-cchandas*, Preface by Vallatolla, op. cit.).

Summing up the facts so far discussed, we find that the Kavīndrācārya was an ascetic settled at Banaras, that in addition to being extremely learned in the *śāstras*, he was a singer of great renown and that he had been received at the Moghul Court in Shah Jahan's time and suitably honoured for his attainments. We also learn that he successfully pleaded for the abolition of the pilgrims' tax, both at Banaras and Allahabad and that he was held in great esteem and reverence by Dara Shukoh. In addition to the pension from the Moghul Court, he must have been in receipt of certain sums from Raja Jai Singh whose two sons were being educated at Banaras under his direct supervision. Blessed with both scholarship and affluence, it was but natural that the Kavīndrācārya enjoyed great renown and prestige at Banaras and was deemed the chief of all scholars in that city of learning where he owned, besides, a fairly large collection of

1. We would like to draw the attention of the scholars to the words *pramudita-dīna* and *pracalita-cīna* in the short recension. We feel that here *dīna* also suggests the common Urdu connotation of the religion of Islam and *cīna* that of our neighbouring country.

books. Bernier refers to his meeting the *Pendet* in the "University Library" which must have been his personal collection.[1]

All honour, therefore, was due to the great personage who combined in himself the learning of the *śāstras* as also great skill as a singer of the *Dhrupads*. His service in getting the pilgrims' tax abolished was celebrated by the Hindus all over the country. His help and encouragement to Dara Shukoh in attempting a synthesis between two antagonistic religions would have proved historic, but for the tragic end of that prince.

The books—*Majma-ul-Bahrin* with its Sanskrit version, *Samudrasaṅgama*, the Persian translation of the *Upaniṣads* (supra) as also that of the *Bhagavadgītā*[2]—are a testimony of that experiment.[3]

In this context his praise of *Jahangir*, in the guise of that of Śiva or his composing eulogies in honour of Shah Jahan and Dara Shukoh, in the form of *Dhrupads*, can be easily justified as correct.

There is, however, one point requiring further elucidation because it squares ill with the character expected of a scholar-sannyāsin. Refer again to Bernier : "During one year he was in the constant habit of visiting my *Agah*, to whom he paid his court in the hope that he would exercise his influence to obtain the pension of which

1. We read in Tavernier, "Adjoining this great pagoda, on the side which faces the setting sun at mid-summer, there is a house which serves as a college, which the Raja Jai Singh, the most powerful of the idolatrous princes of the Great Moghul, has founded for the education of the youth of good families. I saw the children of the Prince, who were being educated there by several Brahmins..." *Travels in India*, London, 1925, Vol. 2, pp. 182-3. Bernier had accompanied Tavernier on this visit to Banaras, which took place on Dec. 11-13, 1665 A. D. We have Bernier's testimony, op. cit., p. 341, regarding the Kavīndrācārya being the chief Pandit in this establishment which he calls the University.

2. "He translated (with the help of the Pandits) the *Bhagavadgītā* under the misleading title of "Battle between Arjuna and Duryodhana, divided into eighteen chaptres", K. R. Qanungo, *Dara Shukoh*, op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 138-9.

3. Looking over the past four centuries, we find that a couple of centuries later, another mind was to undertake the same venture and register some success in achieving a synthesis between the philosophic views of these two religions. His sources of inspiration were the same. But a new fact in his thinking had been the success of the Europeans in dominating Asia. We are refering to Ram Mohan Roy who was a scholar of repute both in Sanskrit and Persian and who had drunk deep both in the *Upaniṣads* and the works of Sufi authors.

Aurang-Zebe, anxious to appear a true *Musulman*, deprived him, on coming to the throne".[1] So, the most learned and the most respected pandits of Banaras of his time felt no qualms of conscience in resorting to the door-steps of a man who had dethroned his own father and murdered his brothers. Forgetting all the honours he had received from Shah Jahan as also the inhuman barbarous treatment meted out to Dara Shukoh by Aurang-Zebe, the Kavīndrācārya thought it perfectly normal to resort to Delhi once again and plead his case for as long as one year, for having his pension restored. All that he could obtain during this time was employment in the retinue of Daneshmand Khan a patron of letters. This can be explained as the scholar might have fallen short of funds during his Delhi-stay and his patron had dishonoured himself during the war of succession leading to Dara Sukoh's murder and Aurangzeb's accession to the throne. Besides, Daneshmand Khan had a genuine interest in matters academic and spent a great deal of his leisure in scholarly discussion.[2]

But when we find the scholar having recourse to the usual type of flattery and practising it day in and day out, we find it difficult to justify the same. The language of flattery, used by this scholar, is mentioned *en passant* by Bernier when he writes about the general air of flattery pervading the entire Indian society: "A *Brahmin Pendet* or *Gentile* doctor whom I introduced into my Agah's service, would fain pronounce this panegyric; and after comparing him (Daneshmand Khan) to the greatest conquerors the world has ever known, and making for the purpose of flattery a hundred nauseous and impertinent observations, he concluded his harangue in these words uttered with all seriousness:

> "When my Lord, you place your foot in the stirrup, marching at the head of your cavalry, the earth trembles under your footsteps; the eight elephants, on whose heads it is borne, finding it impossible to support the extraordinary pressure."[3]

Of course this was routine during those days. Bernier himself calls it "quite characteristic". It is equally unimportant that this

1. Op. cit, p. 341.
2. "When weary of explaining to my *Agah* the recent discoveries of *Harveus* and *Pecquet* in anatomy, and of discussing the philosophy of *Gassendi* and *Descartes*, which I translated to him in Persian (for this was my principal employment for five or six years)...", Bernier, op. cit., pp. 324-5.
3. Bernier, ibid., pp. 264-5.

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language of flattery came in handy to everybody: "The vice of flattery pervades all ranks. When a Moghul, for instance, has occasion for my service, he comes to tell me by way of preamble and as a matter of course that I am the *Aristotalis*, the *Bocrate* and the *Abuysina-Ulsaman*, the Aristotle, the Hippocrates and the Avicenna of the age..." (Bernier, ibid., p. 264). What retains us here is the fact that a person of the eminence of the Kavīndrācārya found it normal to indulge in all this, notwithstanding his having renounced the world and despite his relative affluence.

Such conduct assumes an all the more doubtful hue when we compare it with that of a foreigner, with no support in this land, namely Francois Bernier himself. In brief: Bernier was a Frenchman, came to India in search of adventure and knowledge. He had no relatives here and his only assets were an enquiring and alert mind and his skill as a physician. As regards his knowledge of medicine, it could not have been such as to outshine the medical expertise locally available, to which, besides, he himself pays homage.[1] He did not have much money either and was an employee of a courtier. Novertheless he was extremely zealous of his independence. We may cite as an illustration his attitude during the two visits he made to two shrines in Kashmir.

His patron, Daneshmand Khan, having been keen to convert him to Islam would express agreement with all his arguments, and show his scepticism vis-a-vis the tenets of Hinduism as believed in and practised during those days. This was why he sent him on a trip, probably to Mattan near Achabal. Here the water in a tank, sacred to the Hindus, was said to have a certain regularity peculiar to itself. When Bernier came back and put forward a logically correct and valid explanation for this peculiarity, his *Agah* was very happy and thought that half his job was complete.[2] Being a devout Muslim and keen to earn the merit of converting a "prize" infidel to Islam, he then sent him on another trip to Baramula where in a Muslim shrine a rock could be lifted only under certain specified conditions. The courage of Bernier did not fail him here either and although he ran the risk of death during his investigation of this

1. Bernier, ibid., p. 338.
2. Bernier, ibid., p. 410.

miracle, he found and put forward the logically correct explanation for this 'miracle' as well.[1]

Here is then a foreigner who stood up with courage for his convictions, in painful contrast with a person, born in the land, honoured and respected all over, without any material care, who resorted to the lowest type of flattery just to regain his pittance from the assassin of his pupil and the jailor of his patron.

In the light of the foregoing, the question so poignantly posed by Bernier, can partly be answered in terms of lack of integrity of the "elite" of those times. While describing the infamous last ride of Dara Shukoh through Delhi streets, Bernier observed that the common people wept and cried, as the Prince had been popular among them and "inveighed bitterly against the un-natural conduct of Aurang-Zebe".[2] The armed escort with Dara Shukoh was very small. Yet to Bernier's surprise, "Not a single movement was made, no one offered to draw his sword, with a view of delivering the beloved and compassionated Prince" (Ibid). In a set-up where even an ascetic without any conceivable cause for worry or anxiety, would be a turn-coat how could it have been otherwise ?

But it may be objected that we are judging the conduct of a long past age in terms of the present. Maybe the men of those days thought of it otherwise than we. Maybe they thought that collaboration with the ruler was unavoidable, no matter how alien be the conduct of the man in power. So far as Bernier is concerned, notwithstanding his disapproval of the air of flattery he does not take it as abnormal that the large majority of the "idolatrous" people find it normal to collaborate with the rulers. He does not notice any conflict of "ideology" between the rulers and the leaders of the large majority of the ruled. But then what about the latter themselves ? How did they view the problem ?

Did they approve of this collaboration and if so on what grounds? Luckily, a chance discussion in a Sanskrit text of A. D. 1650 does throw some light on the subject. It poses the problem of the leading sections of the Hindu society collaborating with the Muslim rulers, called *Turuṣkas*, the Turks, and justifies the same in terms of social expediency.

1. Bernier, ibid., p. 414.
2. Bernier, ibid., p. 98.

The work, *Viśva-guṇa-ādarśa-campū*[1] was written by Veṅkaṭādhvari and seeks to be, as its name implies, a mirror of all the virtues or of the virtues of all. It is composed in the literary genre, *campū*, which is a mixture of both prose and verse, one succeeding the other in a regular rhythm. The author has only two characters, two *gandharvas*, who depart on an aerial tour of the entire country, stopping in the air from time to time for a discussion of the merits and demerits of well-known holy places and major regions. Veṅkaṭādhvari hailed from the South and therefore a large number of places described are from that part of the country.

The work is remarkable in that its author displays an attitude of tolerance for all the sects and sections of the Hindus of those times. His device is simple. One of the two *gandharvas*, Kṛśānu, is made assume the role of the carping critic who goes on picking up holes in the beliefs and practices of the Hindus of each and every place and region. The author speaks through the second character, *Viśvāvasu*, who demurs and points out the redeeming features of each and every belief and practice, so attacked. This tolerance is all the more remarkable in that the author is speaking from the standpoint of a *smārta*. That the author was a man of some courage is also indicated by the fact that his scheme covers the gods as well.

In regard to our problem : On reaching Banaras, the holy of the holies for the Hindus, Kṛśānu protests at the praise showered on the town by his friend and accuses the Banaras Brahmins of not observing even the most elementary rules of purity. He castigates them, among other things, for eating "even when exposed to the sight of the lowly Muslims" and concludes that the place is no longer worthy of the reverence endowed on it by tradition.

In answer, Viśvāvasu, the other character, puts in a defence of the high-caste Hindus of Banaras, pleading 'extenuating circumstances'. Says he :

"Those who are Kāyasthas, those who are the sons of kings, experts in weaponry,
"They, by following, with effort, the dry Turk rulers,
"Are protecting the gods and Brahmins and are, therefore, worthy of tribute. Had they stayed indoors,

1. Banaras, 1963.

"The learned would have bid farewell to Brahmin-hood on earth."

(Verse 96).

The meaning is clear : But for the collaboration offered by those, well-versed in the art of administration and warfare, the rule of the hot-tempered Muslim rulers would have become still more severe and it would have resulted in the extinction of the Brahmins on this land. The author implies that although impermissible from the point of view of the *Śāstras*, this collaboration had the saving grace of softening the edge of Muslim rule. Moreover,

"With the earth invaded by the Yavanas, from the Kanyā-kumārī to the Himālaya,
"With all the kings vanquished and with *Nārāyaṇa* sound asleep,
"With the Kali Age flourishing in full force, the Vedic
"Way of life is being maintained by the select few".

(Verse 97).

When the two characters reach Mahārāṣṭra, this theme is taken up again and the defence offered is along similar lines :

"If by controlling the army or by administering the (different) areas,
"The Brahmins of Mahārāṣṭra, thereby, gaining the seats of authority,
"Were not to earn their living as gods on earth,
"Then this entire world, becoming surrounded by the Yavanas, would become Brahmin-less."

(Verse 141)[1]

The Hindu way of life was thus not tenable except with the toleration of new rulers. According to the author, the price for this toleration was the collaboration of upper-caste Hindu fighters and administrators with the 'Turk' rulers.

1. Veṅkaṭādhvari is, however, conscious of the armed opposition to Moghul rule in Maharashtra. When *Kṛśānu* criticises the pillage indulged in by armed Maratha Bands, the author justifies it by saying that their operations are like bitter pills essential for curing the body of a host of serious diseases and are undertaken to rid the country of the *Mlecchas* for the sake of gods and of gods on earth (Verses 141, 143 and 145).

In this context, one can understand why men like the Kavīndrācārya hastened to offer their humble cooperation even to rulers guilty of fratricide.

But even this, if accepted as correct, would not answer the question so poignantly posed by Bernier regarding the totally passive reaction of everybody during the infamous 'last ride' of Dara Shukoh through Delhi streets. Obviously, the comportment of men like the Kavīndrācārya had left the people in these areas leaderless.

HONEY INDUSTRY IN ANCIENT INDIA

BY

LALLANJI GOPAL

A study of *madhu* and allied Indo-European terms reveals that the Aryans knew honey and used it as the most essential constituent of an intoxicating drink. But as distinct terms for honey, wax and bee appear first in the European group of languages, it is likely that the Indo-Europeans received honey from some neighbouring people by way of trade.[1] In India the Aryans appear to have had a first hand knowledge of honey. In a passage of the *Ṛgveda*[2] the suggestive epithet *sāragha* (derived from the bee) applied to *madhu* makes it clear that *madhu* denoted honey. Another passage[3] refers to honey from the *āraṅgara* and the *sāragha* bees. In the *Ṛgveda*, *madhu* is often used as a general term for a sweet thing. But passages are not wanting where the translation of the word as 'honey' gives a happier sense.[4] In the later *Saṁhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas* there is no dearth of references to honey[5]. The name *madhu-kṛt* (honey-maker) used for a bee[6] implies a fair acquaintance with honey.

From very early times, honey has been an important part of food. Pāṇini mentions honey along with other articles of food[7] and derives the word *madhura*, applicable to all confectionaries, from *madhu* meaning 'honey'.[8] Early Pali works[9] also show honey to have been an important food. It was sometimes collected as a ball and then eaten[10].

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1. Schrader, *Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan Peoples*, p. 321.
2. VIII. 4. 8. See also *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, III. 11. 3. 13.
3. X. 106. 10.
4. *Ṛgveda*, IV. 45.4 ; VIII. 32.2 ; VIII. 24.20 See also *Vedische Mythologie*, I. 239 et seq. q. by A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index*, II, p. 123.
5. A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index*, II, p. 123 : *Atharvaveda*, VI. 69.2 ; XVIII. 4.22 ; *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā*, XIX. 91,95 ; XXXVIII, 6 ; *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, III. 4.3.14 ; XIV. 2.120.
6. *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, I. 5.6.5 ; IV. 2.9.6 ; *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*. III. 10.10.1 ; *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, I. 6.2.1-2 ; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, III. 1.2 ; VI. 9.1.
7. II. 4.14 ; cf. II. 2.31.
8. V. 2.107.
9. *Jātakas*, I. 157, 238, 334 ; III. 41 ; IV. 117, 379 ; V. 20, 384; *Mahāvagga*, IV. 17 ; *Dhammapada*, 69.
10. *Vinaya Piṭaka*, I. 4 ; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III. 237 ; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I. 114.

The *Milindapañho*[1] mentions it together with other dainties. In the *Mahābhārata*[2] it is mentioned as being used to sweeten the milk pudding. In later times as the use of molasses and sugar became common, honey was not frequently used for sweetening things. This may explain the absence of references in the *Purāṇas* to honey along with other sweetening things[3]. In the *Mahāvaṃsa*[4], *madhu-da* (one who gives honey) is the adjective used to express the liberality of Aśoka. Honey was prescribed for sacrifices[5] and sacraments such as *jātakarman*[6] and *śrāddha*[7]. Honey was considered sacred and a man finding it on his way was to go by its left side[8]. It was a luxurious article with stimulating effects. That is why a *brahmacārin* was ordained not to partake of honey[9]. The *Mahābhārata*[10] advises that honey should not be taken daily, probably for similar reasons. Women performing *vratas* also avoided honey[11]. It has also been included in a list of sacred and valuable articles that should not be refused if offered by any one of one's own accord[12]. The *Bṛhat-parāśara*[13] says that honey, even if kept in a *mleccha's* vessel, becomes pure the moment it is taken out of such a vessel. The *Smṛtis* mention honey as one of the exceptions to the general rule that a person should not eat everything in his plate but must leave some remnant of food[14]. Honey being a valuable article of food, was presented to guests. In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Vasiṣṭha and Bharadvāja respectively entertain Viśvāmitra and Bharata with honey[15]. *Madhuparka* made of honey and curd was

1. I, pp. 95, 249 f.
2. XII. 4.2.
3. Om Prakash, *Food and Drinks in Ancient India*, p. 216.
4. V. 60.
5. *Manu*, II. 107 ; *Yājñavalkya*, II. 41.
6. *Manu*, II. 29.
7. *Manu*, III. 226, 272 ff ; *Śāṅkhāyana*, XIV. 32 ; *Viṣṇu-dharmasūtra*, XXI. 10.
8. *Manu*, IV. 39.
9. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XI. 5.4.18 ; *Āpastamba-dharmasūtra*, I. 4.6 ; *Mānava-gṛhyasūtra*, I. 1.12 ; *Khadira-gṛhyasūtra*, II. 5. 11 ; *Manu*, II. 177.
10. *Jaiminīya-upaniṣad-brāhmaṇa*, I. 55.2.
11. *Anuśāsana*, 161.99.
12. *Vasiṣṭha-dharmasūtra*, XIV. 12 ; *Manu*, IV. 247.
13. VI (Jivananda Part II, p. 210).
14. *Pulastya* and *Vasiṣṭha* q. in *Smṛti-muktāphala*, *Āhnika* (ed. J. R. Gharpure), p. 431.
15. I. 53.2 ; II. 91.55.

a preparation especially used for the reception of an honoured guest[1]. Honey was in demand also as an ingredient for making liquors. According to the *Arthaśāstra*[2], one hundred *palas* of *kapittha*, five hundred *palas* of sugar and one *prastha* of honey form *āsava*. The *Viṣṇu-dharmasūtra*[3] mentions the intoxicating drink made from honey along with other nine drinks as prohibited for the Brāhmaṇas. Honey was an important article of medicine. Suśruta has many references to its medicinal use. Caraka[4] recommends it as particularly useful in the rainy season. An oft-quoted proverbial saying observes that a wicked man has poison in his heart, though there may be honey at the tip of his tongue[5]. Suśruta[6] and Caraka[7] mention honey-sugar or *madhu-śarkarā* referring probably to the small crystals which form a deposit at the bottom when fresh honey is kept for some days.

In ancient India for different varieties of honey there were distinct terms after the bees collecting them. Works on medicine notice in detail the colour and properties of these types. Caraka[8] mentions four varieties of honey: *mākṣika*, *bhrāmara*, *kṣaudra* and *pauttika*. Suśruta[9] elaborates the list to eight types which include, besides the four mentioned by Caraka, *chātra*, *ārghya*, *auddālaka* and *dāla*. The lexicon of Amarasiṁha[10], though naming only *kṣaudra* and *mākṣika*, adds that there are others as well[11]. The *Āvaśyaka-cūrṇi*[12] names three varieties of honey: *macchiya*, *kuttiya* and *bhrāmara*.

1. *Āśvalāyana-gṛhyasūtra*, I. 21.5; *Manu*, III. 119f; V. 41; VIII. 131; *Gautama-dharmasūtra*, V. 25-27; *Kumārasambhava*, VIII. 72.
2. II, 25.
3. XXII. 83-84.
4. *Sūtra*, 6, *Bhela*, p. 25.
5. *Madhu tiṣṭhati jihvāgre hṛdaye tu halāhalaṁ*. Cf. *Arthaśāstra*, II. 9, p. 70.
6. *Sūtra*, 45.166.
7. *Sūtra*, 27.238.
8. *Sūtra*, 27.239ff. Also *Aṣṭāṅga-saṅgraha*, VI 98.
9. *Sūtra*, 45.132 ff.
10. II. 9. 107.
11. *Arthaśāstra*, II. 15. 16—*Kṣaudraṁ mārdvīkaṁ ca madhu* is sometimes interpreted to refer to two types of honey, made by bees and the juice of grapes —Om Prakash, *Food and Drinks in Ancient India*, p. 91, f. n. 6; R.P. Kangle, *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, Part II, p. 141. But we think that *madhu* here has been used in the sense of the juice or nectar of flowers or any sweet intoxicating drink. The context will support the suggestion. In preceding passages the text enumerates articles belonging to *sneha*, *kṣāra* and *lavaṇa* categories. In the following lines also such categories are described. Hence in the present passage also a similar enumeration should be expected. The description of any one article (honey) would be ill suiting the context.
12. II, p. 319. See also *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, II. 1.4; *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, XIX. 70.

Of these *kṣaudra*, *bhrāmara* and *mākṣika* are better known types and find frequent reference in literature.

Bhrāmara is the honey collected by large black bees. Caraka[1] says that it is very heavy to digest. The honey derived from bees was the most widely used and probably the earliest known one.[2] In Sanskrit the words used for honey often refer to the bee. Of the many synonyms for the bee not a few refer to its collecting honey.[3] In early Pali literature the terms *madhu-kara*[4] and *madhu-vrata*[5] are used for a bee. The *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghoṣa[6] has an elaborate simile about the collection of honey by bees. Similar similes can be traced in the canonical literature as well.[7] A bee gathering juice from the flowers is a favourite theme with Sanskrit poets.[8] Works on polity draw upon the way the bees collect honey from flowers to bring home the advice that a king should tax his kingdom little by little without destroying the people.[9]

Mākṣika is another, by far the chief form of honey. It is the honey collected by honey-bees. Caraka[10] regards it to be the best kind of honey. The honey-bee is mentioned in the *Ṛgveda*.[11] The *Praśnopaniṣad*[12] correctly says that if the leader of the honey-bees flies, the rest follow it and if it settles down, others also settle there. The *Rāmāyaṇa*[13] also refers to the collection of honey by the honey-bees. The term *mākṣika* is noticed by Pāṇini.[14] In the *Bṛhat-saṃhitā*[15], *mākṣika* honey is referred to along with some other articles of trade. The *Mārkaṇḍeya-purāṇa*[16] also implies knowledge of *mākṣika madhu*.

1. *Sūtra*, 27.239.
2. The word *bhrāmara* is known to Pāṇini, IV. 3. 119.
3. *Amarakośa*, II. 5. 29.
4. *Jātaka*, IV. 265.
5. *Dāṭhavaṃsa*, III. 65.
6. I, p. 136.
7. *Dīghanikāya*, III. 21. 11 ; *Dhammapada*, V. 49.
8. *Sāhitya-darpaṇa*, p. 45 ; *Kumārasambhava*, III. 36.
9. *Mbh.* XII. 88. 4-7 ; *Manu*, VII. 129.
10. *Sūtra*, 27. 239.
11. I. 119. 9.
12. II. 4.
13. III. 53. 59.
14. IV. 3. 105.
15. XV. 9.
16. XLIX. 31.

Thus in ancient India it was not black bee alone which was known to collect honey. In literary references to collection of honey the word *madhu-kara* is used rather loosely both for the honey-bee and the black-bee.

A third important variety of honey was called *kṣaudra*. It owes its name to the small bee called *kṣudrā* that collects it. The importance of this honey can be realised from the fact that it is only this variety that has been mentioned in the *Arthaśāstra*.[1]

The *Ṛgveda*[2] mentions a honey called *sāragha*. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[3] shows that this variety was considered to be superior to others and was prescribed for sacrifices. *Saraghā* is explained by the *Amarakośa*[4] as meaning *madhu-makṣikā*. Thus the honey collected by *saraghā* would appear to have been the honey made by some species of honey-bees. If we are to rely on the testimony of Kālidāsa, who is known for using precise technical terms, *sāragha* and *kṣaudra* honey were identical. In the *Raghuvaṁśa*,[5] Kālidāsa describes a hive of *kṣaudra* to be covered up by the *saraghā* bees. It thus appears that *sāragha* or *kṣaudra* honey was collected by the same small species of honey bees.

Another variety of honey is called *pauttika* by Suśruta and Caraka.[6] It is the honey collected by *puttikā*, explained by the *Amarakośa*[7] as meaning *pataṅgikā* or small black-bees resembling ants.

The *chātra* honey has been mentioned only by Suśruta. It is difficult to identify it. The *Rāja-nighaṇṭu*[8] explains it as the honey from the umbrella-shaped hive (*chatrākāraṁ tu paṭalaṁ*) made by bees (*saraghāḥ*) of a yellowish colour (*pīta-piṅgalāḥ*). There are references to *piṅgala* flies in the Buddhist works[9]. It is not unlikely that *chātra* honey was so named because of the shape of the hive they made.

1. II. 15, p. 94. *Kṣaudra* honey is mentioned in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (IV. 3. 119), *Rāmāyaṇa* (II. 35. 15 ; II. 26. 13 ; III. 77. 3 ; V. 59. 20) and *Bṛhat-saṃhitā* (XLII. 60).
2. VIII. 4. 8.
3. III. 11. 3. 13.
4. II. 5. 26.
5. IV. 63.
6. It appears to have been known to Pāṇini, IV. 3. 117.
7. II. 5. 27.
8. q. by Bohtlingk and Roth, I, p. 1086.
9. *Jātaka*, III. 263 ; *Suttanipāta Commentary*, 33,

Suśruta mentions *ārghya* honey also. In this case again it is the *Rāja-nighaṇṭu*[1] which helps us in identifying it. The text explains it as the honey made by a yellow fly (*pītā makṣikā*) with a large belly (*dīrgha-tuṇḍā*) and resembling a bee (*ṣaṭpada-sannibhā*).

The seventh variety of honey mentioned by Suśruta is *auddālaka*. Vācaspati[2] knew this variety. He describes its medicinal properties and explains it as the honey collected from certain bees which live in the earth.

Dāla, the eighth variety of honey, is mentioned later on by Suśruta himself as *dalodbhavaṁ madhu*.[3] The *Śabdārtha-kalpataru*[4] refers to it as *dalaja*. The honey appears to have been produced from the petals, but of which flower is not known.

Literary references enable us to have some idea of honey industry. The behaviour and habits of bees were well known to people and were used as similes and illustrations.[5] The attachment of the bee for the flower is a romantic theme favourite with Sanskrit poets. The religious preacher used it as a parallel for his point of view.[6] It is also a convenient simile to illustrate the maxim in polity that the king should tax his subjects lightly without destroying them. The most vocal comparison is found in the *Visuddhimagga*[7] of Buddhaghoṣa. The early Tamil literature[8] also refers to blossoms which the honey-bee seeks for its nectared food. The *Praśnopaniṣad*[9] notices that the bees follow their leader to wherever it flies or settles. In a Tamil passage an anxious maid laments that her paramour has left her as the honey-bee leaves its hive.[10]

The bee-hive containing honey is also mentioned very often.[11] The *Harṣa-carita*[12] refers to the woods as raining bees wax from

1. q. by Bohtlingk and Roth, I, p. 691.
2. On Hemacandra, 1214.
3. I, p. 185.
4. q. by Bohtlingk and Roth, II, p. 599.
5. *Milindapañho*, II, p. 278.
6. *Dhammapada*, v. 49.
7. Vol. I. p. 136.
8. *Kurum* 2. q. in *Q.J.M.S.*, XXIII, p. 343.
9. II. 4.
10. *Kurum* 176 q. in *Q.J.M.S.*, XXIII, p. 349.
11. *Jātaka*, I. 262, *Dhammapada commentary*, I. 59 ; III. 323 ; *Mahāvaṃsa*, XXII. 42 ; XXXIV. 52 ; *Kuringi* 5 q. in *Q.J.M.S.*, XXII, p. 14.
12. p. 37.

the bee-hives which ooze out honey. The use of the expressive term *madhūcchiṣṭa*[1] for wax also implies a first hand knowledge of the collection of honey from bee-hives. Procuring honey from the bee-hive is also frequently referred to in literary works. It is used to illustrate how others enjoy the money a greedy miser hoards. The bees work hard to gather honey but the honey collectors snatch it away[2]. A verse in the *Jātakas*[3] says that a tree, howsoever worthless it may otherwise be, becomes the best tree for the gatherer of honey, if he knows that it has a bee-hive. In the *Dhammapada commentary*[4] the expression *alla-madhu* has been used for fresh honey. The collector of honey faced the stings of the bee. In the *Harṣa-carita*[5], Harṣa grieved by the death of his brother through the treachery of the king of Gauḍa, burst out that the fool, in greed for the taste of sweet savours, laid hands upon his brother's life as honey, but he did not see the coming onset of arrows (or bees in the case of honey). The *Mahābhārata*[6] says that even a stronger enemy can be killed by those who though weak are united in every respect, as the honey collector is repelled by the bees. From the very nature of the case the industry derived its sustenance from the forests, though some honey could be gathered from elsewhere as well. This explains Daśaratha's remarks that Rāma would drink honey in the forest and be happy.[7] The Vānaras are also described as having honey as their chief drink.[8] The sages, for the same reason, entertained their guests with honey easily procurable in the forest.[9] We have already seen that the *Harṣa-carita*[10] describes woods as full of bee-hives oozing honey.

The *Mahāvaṁsa*[11] has a short narrative about three brothers who were dealers in honey. One sold honey in his honey shop while

1. *Amarakośa*, II. 9. 107 ; *Kumārasambhava*, VII. 18 ; *Yājñavalkya*, III. 37 ; *Bṛhatsaṁhitā*, XVI. 24.
2. *Rāmāyaṇa*, III. 53. 59; *Pañcatantra*, II, p. 155 ; *Siṁhāsana-dvātriṁśat-puttalikā*, p. 54.
3. IV. 205.
4. II. 197.
5. p. 162.
6. Critical Edition, III. 34. 68.
7. *Rāmāyaṇa*, II. 33. 6.
8. *Ibid.*, I. 53. 20 ; II. 91. 55.
9. *Ibid.*, IV. 37. 7 ; II. 61. 14 f ; V. 62. 9 f ; IV. 33. 7.
10. p. 37.
11. V. 49 ff.

the other two collected honey. Thus we see that there were traders who dealt exclusively in honey. Generally the two jobs of a gatherer of honey and a dealer in honey were not combined. The collector of honey gathered honey from hives and sold it to a trader in the city.

The industry was not without its own importance in the economic life. The *Bṛhat-saṁhitā*[1] points out the astronomical injunctions which result in an increase in the output of honey and thus more profit for the dealer in honey.

The compilers of the *Smṛtis* do not look upon the trade in honey with much favour. A Brāhmaṇa was given the option to resort to the occupation of a trader in times of difficulties, but even then he was not allowed to deal in certain articles including honey.[2] The reason for this is not indicated in the *Smṛtis* but it may be surmised that the stigma was due to the fact that this occupation was resorted to mostly by low forest tribes. The feeling of contempt for professions involving violence (*hiṁsā*) grew with religious movements attaching premium to non-violent ways of life. The Jain literary work *Yaśas-tilaka-campū*[3] voices resentment against taking honey. Being pressed out of the young eggs in the womb of bees it resembles an embryo in its first stage.

1. XV. 9; XVI. 24; XLI. 5; XLII. 60.
2. *Gautama-dharmasūtra*, VII. 8-15; *Saṅkhalikhita* q. by Aparārka p. 1113.
3. p. 331.

PLEASURES AND PASTIMES IN INDIA IN THE ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CENTURIES A. D.

BY

OM PRAKASH

In this article an attempt is made to present a glimpse of the pleasures and pastimes in which the members of the royal families indulged in the eleventh and twelfth centuries A. D. The paper is based mainly on a study of two—books the *Mānasollāsa* of king Someśvara and the *Tilakamañjarī* of Dhanapāla.

The rulers of this period were great patrons of men of letters and appreciated good poetic compositions[1]. Hence one of the most common sources of pleasure was listening to good poetry. Sometimes the kings themselves recited poems composed by themselves.[2] In the opinion of Someśvara sound was not so important as meaning in poetry.[3] In such sittings which were generally held after lunch many poets, musicians and learned scholars participated.[4] Sometimes the discussions centred round some topics concerning religion, ethics, philosophy and logic.[5] At the end of such conferences kings rewarded poets and logicians by giving them large sums of money.

Another common source of amusement was that derived from listening to stories. This was generally indulged in after meals.[6] The stories were generally based on the Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahābhārata, the Purāṇa, and some famous Mahākāvyas, dramas and other works like the Bṛhat-kathā.[7] In such *goṣṭhīs* sometimes the kings and other courtiers derived pleasure by solving riddles, completing incomplete verses or answering questions of an intricate nature.[8] Literary compositions of all kinds were also discussed in such *goṣṭhīs*.

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1. Tilak 70.4 ; 109.10.
2. „ 18.13-14 ; 172.9.
3. Manas IV, 2.205.
4. Manas IV. 2.199-200.
5. „ IV. 2. 375-402, Tilak 104.11 ; 172.10, 260.14, 264-15, 372.18.
6. „ IV. 16. 1407. Tilak 10.17 ; 75.14 ; 107.21 ; 163.18 ; 172.10, 237.10 ; 322.9.
7. Manas IV. 16. 1411-13 ; Tilak 169.7 ; 331.11.
8. „ V. 11. 515-559. Tilak 108. 4-8 ; 394.15.

Members of royal families were keenly interested in vocal and instrumental music.[1] They organised music conferences in which besides singers and musicians, queens, princes and courtiers also participated. Seats were allotted to them according to their status. Of the artists the vocalists sat in front, good singers at their back, those who played on flutes on their sides, and then the lady singers and last of all the drummers[2]. It was believed that one who sang in praise of gods attained salvation, and one who sang in praise of a king became prosperous as the kings often handsomely rewarded musicians.[3] Ladies of royal families regarded cultivating skill in singing as a necessary accomplishment.

Instrumental music was classified under four catagories—(1) with the accompaniment of song and dance, (2) with dance alone, (3) with song alone and (4) without song and dance.[4] The most commonly used musical instruments were divided into four varieties: *todya* (stringed) such as vīṇā; *ānaddha* such as mṛdaṅga; *suṣira* such as a lute; and *ghana* such as jhallarī. Besides vīṇā, mṛdaṅga and jhallarī other common musical instruments were tūrya, kāhala, śaṁkha, muraja, paṭaha, paṇava and dundubhi[5]. Accomplished ladies acquired skill in playing on musical instruments like vīṇā[6].

Besides vocal and instrumental music, dancing also provided much amusement to the members of the royal families. It was regarded as a great art and accomplished ladies learnt it with great care. On most festive occasions such as the birth and marriage of a son, victory in war, or at the time of spring festival, dance performances were arranged by kings in the courtyard of a house, in a garden or on a grassy lawn and provided much amusement to the ladies of royal household.[7] Sometimes even kings participated in dancing[8]. In these performances courtezans sang and danced in the

1. „ IV. 16.4; tilak 10.16; 104.15; 163.14; 184.5; 186.4; 193.18; 263.14 302.5. 423.1-2.2 Kathākoṣa 57.13.
2. „ IV. 16. 91-93.
3. „ IV. 16. 566.
4. „ IV. 16. 568-69.
5. Manas IV. 16. 572-78; Tilak 17.7, 57. 12-13, 70.6, 76.8, 180.19; 183.6, 209.16, 236.22, 244.6, 263-17; 264.22; 360.16; 370.8; 372.17.
6. Tilak 391.3.
7. Manas IV. 16. 950-52, Tilak 18.16; 61.13; 75.11, 163.14; 263.17; 302.5, 323.15, 391-7.
8. Tilak 263.17, 323.15, 391.7.

courtyard of royal places.[1] Various postures of hands, thighs, hips, fingers and sitting were used in dancing to express different ideas[2]. The colour of the face indicated various sentiments. Red colour expressed *vīra, raudra, karuṇa* and *mada* sentiments; 'lustrous face was indicative of *śṛṅgāra, hāsya* and *adbhuta* sentiments; dark face expressed *bhayānaka* and *vībhatsa* sentiments. Dance performances varied according to the occasion and six kinds of dances—*nāṭya, lāsya, tāṇḍava, lāghava, viṣama* and *vikaṭa*—were in vogue[3].

Dramatic performances seem to have been a regular feature of the life of the royal people as every palace had a dramatic hall where plays were staged on all festive occasions and provided much amusement to the people[4]. Sometimes jesters painted their faces in various colours and provided much amusement to the ladies[5]. Sometimes people enjoyed shows in which artificial horses and elephants were shown displaying their wonderful feats[6].

Magicians amused the members of the royal household by their magical feats—making a man disappear, holding fire in one's hand, showing that hair do not catch fire, remaining inside water for a long time, walking on water, living without taking food for one month, covering a distance of fifty *yojanas* without getting tired and not being wounded even when attacked by sharp weapons.[7] Another magical feat consisted in so changing things that they looked like something else by preparing a tablet with some powered medicines, drawing the figure of a scorpion on his palm and applying a medicated oil to it. This process enabled the magician to change a myrobolan fruit to look like a betelnut; the leaf of a *Pilkhun* tree look like a betel leaf and grains of *mudga*, gram, *āḍhaki* and pea look like those of pepper, *āḍhaki*, pea, and māṣa respectively.[8] The magician's success in such shows might have been due to hypnotic powers.

Sometimes sportive feats of intoxicated elephants were arranged in an arena 600 feet in length and 360 feet in breadth.[9] Two raised

1. Manas. IV. 16. 1131-1400.
2. Manas IV 16. 1126-1130.
3. Manas IV. 16 959-960.
4. Tilak 10.12; 41.12, 57.17, 270.15, 292.11, 372.8; 399.10.
5. „ 18.9.
6. „ 323.14.
7. Manas IV 16. 1443-1488.
8. „ IV 16. 1443-1449.
9. Manas IV. 3.515.

platforms surrounded by ditches were constructed one in the centre of the arena and the other outside it[1]. Before the commencement of the show an announcement was made that pregnant women and children should not move out lest intoxicated elephants should cause injury to them[2]. On the previous day the elephants were given some medicines to increase their bellicosity[3]. With the same objective in view they were given no food or water on the day of the sports[4]. Oil was applied to their hips and loins and red lead to their fore-heads and trunks. A *tilaka* mark was placed on their forehead[5]. Fights between elephants were very popular. Sometimes culprits condemned to death offered themselves to run in front of the mad elephants. If they remained alive after the race they were granted pardon[6].

For horse race there was a square arena, each side of which was 400 feet[7]. Horses for the royal stables were imported from many countries including Kamboja and Afganistan[8]. In the Indian Polo best horsemen were arranged in two teams each consisting of eight members[9]. There were two goals, one on each side. The goal posts were 24 feet apart.[10] The ball was made of *Pāribhadra* wood.[11] This game was very popular with the Calukya kings. The king gave away rewards after the game was over.[12]

Duels between persons carrying similar weapons were generally fixed for Sunday afternoons.[13] The two competitors rode on buffaloes[14] and displayed their skill in an arena, 24 feet in diameter and 72 feet in circumference.[15] The competitor who killed his adversary was declared victorious and suitably rewarded by the king.[16]

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1. „ IV 3. 518-523.
2. „ IV 3. 527-529.
3. „ 3. 470.
4. „ IV 3.512,
5. „ IV 3.513.
6. „ 3. 572.
7. „ IV 4. 664.
8. IV 4. 669-672.
9. Manas IV 4. 798.
10. Manas IV 4. 802.
11. „ IV 4. 806.
12. „ IV 4. 825.
13. „ IV 5. 854-55
14. „ IV 5. 835.
15. „ IV 5. 843.
16. „ IV 5. 875-76.

Wrestling matches were also arranged by the kings. Of the two wrestlers one who felt less tired and made his opponent's back touch the ground was declared victorious and was rewarded with dress, ornaments, horses etc. by the king.[1]

Other royal amusements were seeing fights of cocks,[2] quails,[3] rams,[4] buffaloes[5] and pigeons.[6] For cock fights the best cocks were trained and the matches were held during the period, November to March every year.[7] Pigeons were let loose from a distance of about 240 miles to find their mates.[8] Two bitches were let loose to catch a hare and the one that caught it first was declared successful.[9] Hawks were trained to catch birds from great heights.[10] All these patimes provided amusement to the members of the royal family.

There were some indoor pastimes. One of these was playing with pet birds.[11] Another such pastime was painting pictures. Young men and women often painted pictures of persons whom they loved and painting was considered an essential part of the training of an accomplished girl.[12] It was usual for aristorats to have in their mansions a room covered with paintings. Such a room was called a *citra-śālā*.[13]

Gambling was a very popular indoor game in ancient India. It was specially indulged in on the fourteenth day of the dark fortnight of Āśvina and people continued to gamble for a week.[14] Gambling was generally with *cawries* but sometimes with pearls in case of members of royal families.[15] A wooden board, 20 *aṅgulas* broad and 48 *aṅgulas* in length, with 24 rectangles, each 9 *aṅgulas* in length and 4 *aṅgulas* in breadth, was used for playing the game.[16] However, all sensible people realized that

1. „ IV 6. 993.
2. „ IV 7. 997 f.
3. „ IV 8. 1170f.
4. „ IV 9. 1239f.
5. „ IV 10. 1260f.
6. „ IV 11. 1270f.
7. „ IV 7. 1095-1096.
8. „ IV 11. 1295.
9. „ IV 12. 1323.
10. Manas IV. 13. 1376.
11. Tilak. 17.8.
12. Tilak 18. 10-12; 168. 14; 170. 6; 296. 13; 322. 10. 363. 11; 391. 6; 394. 14.
13. Tilak 29. 4.
14. Manas V. 14. 713-716.
15. Tilak 370.3.
16. Manas V 13. 634-35. Tilak 18. 3; 370.3.

excessive indulgence in the game resulted in utter ruin of the gambler.[1] Another game played with *cawries*, generally with women late in the evening, was called *phañjikā*.[2] It was played on a square board, of which each side measured 18 *aṅgulas* and lines were drawn at a distance of three *aṅgulas* from each other.[3] Five *cawries* of the same colour and size were used for playing the game.[4] The defeated person was blind-folded and had to carry the winner on his back to a place decided upon earlier.[5]

Chess also seems to have been a very popular game among the rich people in India. In the game the chessmen were classified as horses, elephants, chariots and foot soldiers. Someśvara mentions three kinds of defeat in this game. Sometimes the members of royal families provided amusement to the spectators by cutting sugarcane, cocoanuts, oranges and cucumbers into two pieces with one stroke of a sword or a long knife.

Some love pastimes were also popular during this period. One such game was played in pitch darkness in an underground cellar.[6] Young men and young women entered the cellar and engaged themselves in such love pastimes as catching hold of a girl by the ear, catching hold of their hair or striking them in the head or at the back. Sometimes they drew them by their clothes.[7] The king also participated in this game.[8]

The king often went out early in the morning to the city under the excuse of seeing it but actually to find out the most beautiful courtezans in the capital.[9] When they heard that the king was passing through their street they came out of their residences without any artificial decoration and the king saw them in their natural beauty.[10] Messengers were then sent to the most beautiful courtezans to find out if they were eager to meet the king. Having been assured of it

1. Manas V. 13. 706-709.
2. Manas V 16. 826.
3. „ V 16. 826-27.
4. Manas V 16.835.
5. „ V 16.860.
6. „ V 17.877.
7. „ V 17.888.
8. „ V 17.894f.
9. „ V 20.1122-23.
10. Manas V 20.1139.

the king visited the pleasure garden (*vilāsa kānana*) where music and dance performances were arranged.[1] The king then proceeded to the apartments set apart for the courtezans.[2] The king offered gold ornaments and clothes to the go-between who arranged the meeting.[3] This was a part of the aristocratic life of the period.

In the Kathā-koṣa-prakaraṇa in the Ṣaṭ-sthānaka-prakaraṇa, Jineśvara Sūri explains how a Jain Śrāvaka should behave with a courtezan when visiting her.[4] This shows that the visit of a Jain Śrāvaka to a courtezan was not considered objectionable in the Hindu society of the eleventh century A. D.. On the other hand the prostitutes seem to have occupied an honourable position in society and participated in all festive gatherings.

Of the outdoor games the most important for the Kṣatriyas were the shows in which they could display their skill in the use of weapons, such as daggers, swords, bows and arrows, maces, wheels and lances.[5] Such competitions were often arranged in which the kings also participated. Sometimes the competitors were expected to pierce with an arrow a fish moving in a circle by looking at its reflection in the water.[6] The queens, princes, feudatories, experts in the use of these weapons, learned scholars, poets, singers, courtezans and bards all witnessed this display of the skill in the use of arms.[7] After the display queens showered parched rice, bards sang songs in praise of the king and the priests gave benedictions to the king.[8] To show due honour to the king all the feudalories and common people who assembled to witness the game bowed before him.[9]

Another outdoor sport which was very popular among the Kṣatriya rulers in ancient India was hunting. The pleasure hunt generally took place in a forest not very far from the capital.[10] These forests had all kinds of fruit trees and were free from fierce animals.[11]

1. „ V 20.1183-85.
2. „ V 20.1216.
3. „ V 20. 1310-1337 ; Tilak 70-13 & 18.
4. Introduction pp. 52-53.
5. Manas IV. 1.2.
6. Manas IV 1. 159.
7. „ IV 1 3-5.
8. „ IV 1. 94-95.
9. „ IV 1 96.
10. „ IV 15. 1444 ; Tilak 183.2.
11. „ IV 15. 33-36.

On the other hand they had an abundance of all kinds of deer, peacocks, cocks, quails, pegeons and other animals and birds. Thirty-one kinds of hunting are referred to by Someśvara,[1] but only twenty one are described. This included hunting forest-deer which were attracted by domesticated deer or were hunted by persons who concealed themselves behind trees. Sometimes deer were enticed to come to the areas where nets were spread and traps set. Sometimes the deer were attracted to come by producing a peculiar sound by mouth. Leapords were also killed by offering deer as baits.[2] Royal princes were generally very fond of hunting.[3]

Sometimes kings amused themselves by fishing. In angling they used many kinds of rods and strings.[4]

Enjoyment was derived also from drinking various kinds of intoxicating drinks prepared from molasses, rice paste, grapes and juices of cocoanut, jackfruit and mango[5] fruits. For such a party the members of the royal family went to a forest or the sandy bank of a river.[6] All kinds of vegetarian and non-vegetarian preparations were served in such parties.[7] Even women enjoyed drinking.[8] The members of the royal party sang, danced, laughed, wept and muttered indistinct words. Sometimes they rebuked each other; being intoxicated they slept on bare ground.[9] *Pānotsavas* seem to be a common feature among the aristocracy in the eleventh century.[10]

The members of the royal family, sometimes, amused themselves by arranging visits to a pleasure garden in the centre of which there was generally an artificial hill.[11] Such gardens had all kinds of fruit trees and flower plants. These trees bore flowers and fruits in all seasons.[12] There were generally a number of shady bowers, artificial ponds, lakes and rivers in which the members of the royal family

1. Manas IV 15. 1450.
2. Manas IV 15. 1719-1724.
3. Tilak 183. 2.
4. Manas IV. 14. 1381-1432.
5. „ V 10. 429-449.
6. „ V. 10. 427 Tilak 9. 3 : 41.4 ; 169.5 ; 211.21, 245.19 ; 324.21.
7. „ V. 10, 450-465.
8. „ V 10. 481; Tilak 18.9 ; 61.12.
9. „ V 10. 502-511.
10. Tilak 9, 3, 41.4. 169.5 ; 211.21, 245.19 ; 324.21.
11. Manas V. 1.3. ; Tilak 11.10 ; 17.19 ; 33.21 ; 35.6 ; 78.18, 180.2.
12. Manas V. 1. 4-99.

played games of all kinds.[1] Singing, dancing and laughing were a usual feature of such festive gatherings.[2] Ladies often plucked flowers and derived pleasure by arranging them in different forms.[3] Kings offered beautiful flowers to their sweet hearts as a token of their affection.[4] At the end, of the day before the festive gatherings came to an end, the king often gave rewards to all and returned to royal residence riding on an elephant.[5]

In the spring season when the cool and fragrant breeze of the south blew and the atmosphere was full of the pollen of flowers and one could hear the sweet song of *kokila* (cuckoo) in the forest, the kings often derived pleasure by arranging a visit to some forest nearby.[6] There some members of the royal family plucked flowers and fruits and played hide and seek[7]; some ladies enjoyed playing with a ball.[8] When the members of the royal party got tired they returned to the pleasure pond and after washing hands and feet took some fruit and cocoanut water.[9] The women made beautiful bunches of flowers and fanned the king with plantain leaves to make him comfortable.[10]

On the full-moon day in the spring season the members of the royal family derived pleasure from swinging in the open.[11] Each swing was prepared by placing four beams on two strong wooden pillars. These pillars were covered with beautiful pieces of cloth and figures of puppets were painted on them.[12] Sometimes the ropes for the swing were suspended from the branches of trees.[13] Spring season was the occasion for the celebration of Vasantotsava[14]. As the king entered the place, people sang and played on musical instruments. When the king and the queens enjoyed swinging, four women of the royal household

1. Manas V. 1. 100-104 ; Tilak 8. 23, 18012, 370. 14 & 17.
2. „ V. 1. 122-124.
3. Tilak 353. 9, 363. 13.
4. Manas V. 1. 124.
5. „ V. 1. 125.
6. „ V. 2. 128-129 ; Tilak 78, 18, 168. 20. 22.
7. „ V. 2. 153-157.
8. Tilak 365. 3.
9. Manas V. 2. 160.
10. Manas V. 2. 158.
11. „ V. 3. 168.
12. „ V. 3. 169. 170; Tilak 12. 13., 213. 16.
13. Tilak 353. 5.
14. Tilak 19. 9,

sang sweet songs.[1] Such an occasion provided much pleasure to the common people in the capital.

Festivities were also arranged on some other occasions such as the birth of a son. Some rites were performed on the sixth day after the birth of the prince, and the ceremony of naming the child took place on the tenth day.[2] Other occasions were such as the marriage of the royal prince or victory in a great battle.[3] Such festive gathering also took place on the thirteenth day of the bright fortnight in Chaitra in the afternoon after lunch when the king derived pleasure from sprinkling on other people.[4] In such gatherings courtezans and their paramours also sprinkled water on each other and fully enjoyed themselves.[5] The members of the royal family used jars of gold and syringes made of gold, silver and horns of an ox.[6] In this sport, besides the members of the royal family many feudatories, priests, ministers, poets, musicians, singers, dancers, courtezans and bards also participated.[7] At sunset the sport came to an end.[8]

In the summer season the members of the royal family enjoyed playing in water in a pleasure pond (*Krīḍā-dīrghikā*) or lake which was surrounded by walls on all sides.[9] Such a pleasure pond had fish of many kinds and pieces of camphor were thrown into it. Sometimes gold coins, rings and precious stones were also thrown into the pleasure pond. All the members of the royal party then tried to catch those pieces of camphor or to find gold coins etc. by diving into water.[10] When all other members of the party departed the queens entered the pond and the king played with them.[11] Sometimes the rich people enjoyed shower baths in special bath rooms (*dhārā-gṛha*) in the summer season.[12]

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1. Manas V. 3. 180-190.
2. Tilak 77. 1-16, 78. 1-6, 263. 1-22.
3. Manas V. 4. 195-96.
4. Tilak 107. 14; 107. 20, 108. 15-19.
5. Manas V 4. 203.
6. „ V 4. 217.
7. „ V 4. 197-211.
8. „ V 4. 231.
9. „ V 5. 234-240; Tilak 8. 23, 11. 23; 12. 11; 17. 17; 18. 18; 105. 20; 204. 1, 213. 16; 296. 20. Kathā-koṣa-prakaraṇa p. 57. 28.
10. „ V 5. 248-256.
11. „ V 5. 258-274.
12. Tilak 17. 21; 106. 2; 173. 11; 178. 17; 180. 14; 418. 8.

In the rainy season the kings enjoyed playing on grassy lawns outside the capital. For such a pastime special huts were erected in which tasty dishes and all kinds of wines were served.[1] Singers amused the party by singing sweet songs and the musicians by playing on musical instruments. Beautiful women amused the party by giving wonderful dance performances.[2] Such a festive gathering provided special pleasure to ladies of the royal household.[3] At the end of the picnic betel leaves were served and gold ornaments and clothes were given to all.[4]

In the Śarad season after the rains, a visit to the sandy bank of some river was arranged. Tents were pitched and bamboo huts were erected for such a gathering.[5] There the members of the royal party dug small wells and drank water from them.[6] Sometimes fights of cocks were arranged. At other times people ran after the cocks. Sometimes they sprinkled water on each other or indulged in such pastimes as pelting each other with sand balls.[7]

In the bright fortnight of Āśvina or Kārtika a great festival named Kaumudī-mahotsava was celebrated. The courtyard where the festive gathering was to take place was smeared with cow dung and strewn with flowers.[8] At night in the moonlight all people, high and low, assembled at the appointed place. Members of the royal family including queens, kings, friends and servants made groups of five, six or eight members each and two groups of persons of equal age and equal number played a game, resembling the modern *kabaḍḍī*, in which the players tried to touch the player of the other side trespassing into their area.[9] The playground was 100 yards square. In such sports the king acted as a judge.[10] Those who were defeated had to carry the winners on their backs.[11]

1. Manas V 6. 280-290.
2. „ V 6. 310-311.
3. „ V 6. 288.
4. „ V 6. 313.
5. „ V 7. 320-328.
6. „ V 7. 331-332.
7. „ V 7. 337-338.
8. „ V. 8. 352; Tilaka 115. 2; 271. 12, Kathā-koṣa-prakaraṇa Introduction p. 100.
9. Manas V 8. 359-366.
10. „ V 8. 363.
11. „ V 8. 374-75.

In the winter kings enjoyed picnicing in fields where corn crop made them look beautifully green.[1] In such a surrounding, in an area cleared by removing the corn plants, the king's party enjoyed such tasty dishes as rice with curds mixed with pepper, ginger and cardamom, preparations of wheat or rice such as *polikās*, *śaṣkulīs* and *apūpas*, sweet preparations like *laḍḍukas* and *khīra* and saline preparations of roots and fruits.[2] Sometimes the members of the royal party enjoyed eating green gram or cucumber fresh from the field.[3] Roasted gram with salt and sesame was eaten with great relish. In the end butter milk or sour preparations were served.[4]

The above survey of the pleasures and pastimes of the royal families in the eleventh and twelfth centuries makes it clear that they were varied in character. Inside the palace *goṣṭhīs* were a common feature in which literary compositions, poems and philosophical subjects were discussed; and singers, musicians and dancers were rewarded for their fine performances. In the capital such shows were arranged as displaying one's skill in the use of weapons, wrestling, fights of cocks, quails, rams, buffaloes and pigeons. Fights of elephants and horse races were very popular. Dramatic performances were also given. Of the indoor pastimes listening to stories, solving puzzles, completing incomplete verses, gambling, playing chess and painting, especially among women, were common. Outdoor pastimes varied according to seasons. For example, in the spring people went out into the forest and enjoyed swinging, in the summer they enjoyed playing in water, in the rainy season, they enjoyed themselves on a grassy lawn; in the Śarad on the sandy bank of a river, and in the winter in the fields.

1. Manas V 9. 385-391.
2. „ V 9. 395-401.
3. „ V 9. 403-404.
4. „ V 9. 411-418.

ANCIENT INDIAN CARTOGRAPHY

By

A. B. L. Awasthi

"There is no special word in Sanskrit for 'a map'. The word *naksha* (from Arabic *naqshah*) has been adopted in most modern Indian languages in this sense, although it also signifies 'a picture, a plan, a general description, an official report'. In Eastern India, the word *māna-citra* has been coined to indicate the English word 'map'. The absence of any special Sanskrit word raises the question whether map-drawing was at all known to the Indians of old.[1] Dr D. C. Sircar asserts that "there is, however, reason to believe that in ancient India a map or chart was regarded as a *citra* or *ālekhya*, i. e., 'a painting, a picture, a delineation'. It will be seen that the Sanskrit word *citra* and its synonyms have practically the same meaning as the word *naqshah*. That the maps were made in ancient India seems to be quite clear from the evidence of the New History of the Tang Dynasty,...............the said king of Kia-mu-lu (i. e., Kāmarūpa) presented to the Chinese emperor some curious articles including a map of the country..................prepared by the artists at king Bhāskaravarman's court".[2] Dr Sircar aptly points out to the Citra-vīthī comprising the pictorial account of the life of Rāma and his ancestors. Dr Sircar holds that "These paintings included some which are said to have depicted particular regions and may be regarded as a sort of maps".[3] These map-like printings in the eighth century A. D. justify the observations of Wilford who held that the Hindus have also maps of the world both according to the system of the Paurāṇics and of the astronomers ; the latter are very common".[4]

"A good deal of information on early Indian cartography under Hindu and Muslim inspiration is given by Francesco I. Pulle in his interesting work in Italian, entitled La Cartografoia Antica dell, India, Part I. In Section II of the work dealing with Indian sources, there are reproductions of three maps, drawn by ancient cartographers

1. Dr D. C. Sircar, Geography of Ancient & Medieval India, p. 246.
2. Ibid. p. 246.
3. Ibid. p. 247.
4. G. A. M. I. p. 247.

according the Purāṇic ideas of cosomography and geography. As is well known, the world was regarded as consisting of seven concentric islands, each one of them encircled by a sea. The island at the centre was called Jambūdvīpa, the southern division of which was called Bhārata Varsha...............".[1]

Purāṇic geography conceives of the earth as shaped like a lotus (*bhū-padma*),[2] the petals of which represent the different continents. As such the lotus-shaped earth (*pārthiva-padma*) was represented in pictorial form of a map. Kumārikā, who gave her name to the ninth dvīpa of the Bhārata-varṣa, as Kumārikā-khaṇḍa, is also stated to have herself painted the earth in the form of lotus (*chitravat likhitā pṛthivī*).[3] Thus Citra-Padma i. e., the earth painted like a lotus may be said to correspond to the modern word, map or *naqshah.*

The Purāṇas have preserved the relics of our hoary heritage of the past, when Hindus had made no less progress in the study of geography as a science. The Padma Purāṇa gives us an interesting account of an ancient map of Bhārata-varṣa incorporated in a book of paintings, which corresponds to an atlas of our modern times.

Once queen Hemāṅgī, wife of Vīravarman of Drāviḍ,[4] happened to visit the house of her friend named Kalā, daughter of a minister.[5] Hemāṅgī asked Kalā to show the former some curious thing she had in her house.[6] Kalā, too, placed before the queen, a golden chest containing a wonderful book therein and requested the latter to open the book and to see what wonderful objects are delineated in that book of painting.[7] The queen took out a book from the *svarṇa-mañjūṣā* opened by a maidservant. She, at first, observed the portrayal of the divine incarnations (of Viṣṇu) put together. Next, she saw the pictorial representation of Bhūgola (earth) having the extent of fifty crores of

1. Ibid. p. 248.
2. Skanda Purāṇa, S. V. Press Edn. VII. i. 11. 11.
3. Ibid. I. ii. 39. 178; But N. K. (Edn.) text refers to Padma-pṛthivī—N. K. Edn. Kumārikā-khaṇḍa XXX. 8
4. Padma P., VI. 216. 48-50.
5. Ibid., VI. 216.51.
6. Ibid., VI. 216. 52.
7. Ibid., VI. 217. 1-3 :

Ityuktā sā kalā rājañ-stayā nṛpati-bhāryayā
Svakośāt svarṇa-mañjūṣām ānāyya vidadhe pure.
Uvāca ca mahārājabhāryesyāṁ had adbhutaṁ,
Udghāṭya dṛśyatāṁ kiñcit kiṁ kimastyatra pustake,
rañsyate te mano nūnaṁ tatrastha-lekhyadarśane.

yojanas. She noticed there golden-land painted dark, Lokāloka-parvata, seven continents surrounded by seven seas as well as the rivers, mountains and territorial divisions related to seven dvīpas (continents). There observing in the earth's map the queen pointed out towards Bhārata-Khaṇḍa comprising rivers like the Yamunā and the Gaṅgā which attracted her attention.[1] The queen's glances were struck at the sacred site of Indraprastha placed on the bank of the Yamunā comprising the sacred spot of Prayāga, which brought to her mind the reminiscences of the past.[2]

Hemāṅgī, queen of Vīravarman, was a courtesan in her previous birth. She had attained the status of queen by her pious charities as well as by the purifying influence of the water of Prayāga.[3]

This interesting episode throws important light on the ancient tradition of painting in India. It is now a well-established fact that divine incarnations (avatāras) were also represented through pictorial divices. The fact to which the attention is focussed here is the representation of bhūgola, sapta-dvīpas along with their divisions surrounded by seven seas and lastly the presentation of Bhārata-khaṇḍa with its rivers and sacred spots like Prayāga placed near Indraprastha where most of the ancient tīrthas found their places along the banks of the Yamunā.[4] This account of the pictorial representation of the earth, its divisions viz., sapta-dvīpas along with Bhārata-khaṇḍa corroborates the importance of the Bhuvana-koṣa tradition found in the Purāṇas which cannot be stated to be imaginary.[5] The modern scholars and researchers take refuge in their ignorance and incapacity to identify Purāṇic Geography with the modern world. Such Purāṇic accounts show that the Hindus, too, in the past had their geographical maps like that of Ptolemy who is himself stated to

1. Padma P., VI. 216. 5-8 : *tatrāvalokayāmāsa sāvatārān samāsataḥ,*
pūrvaṁ tatas tu bhūgolaṁ pañcāśat-koṭi-yojanaṁ.
tatrāndhakārasaṁyuktā bhūmir dṛṣṭā ca kāñcanī,
etayor antare rājanllokālokāś ca parvataḥ.
sapta dvīpās tato dṛṣṭāḥ samudraiḥ saptabhir vṛtāḥ,
eteṣu nadyaḥ śailāś ca khaṇḍāni tu mahāmate.
etad Bhāratakhaṇḍaṁ sā paśyanti bhūpatipriyā,
Yamunā-jāhnavīmukhyāḥ saritaḥ samavaikṣata.
2. Ibid., VI. 217. 9-10.
3. Ibid., VI. 217. 11-44.
4. Padma P., VI. Chaps. 212-218.
5. S. D. Gyani, Agni-Purāṇa-A Study, p. 151.

have committed many errors in his maps. Mythological stories represent the relics of our ancient heritage. Geography was a popular branch of study based on the accounts of the travellers, tīrthikas, bhikṣus and vaṇijas who were not deterred by the physical barriers or other calamities of man and nature in their way to distant lands across the seas and mountains.

"The geography, indeed, an attractive branch of inquiry which has been popular in many quarters, has received a certain amount of attention. But the researches in this line have been made chiefly with the object of trying to identify places, countries, and tribes...But tribes die out and disappear; towns decay and are deserted; sea-side emporia sometimes shift; and in addition to the gradual transition from classical to vernacular forms, the names of cities are liable to change entirely in the course of time, even though the places themselves survive".[1] Still, despite discrepancies in our Purāṇic texts, ancient Indian Geography can be reconstructed with the critical and conscientious evaluation of the Purāṇic data. But that requires patience, perseverance and proficiency in the literature as well as archaeology like that of Sir Alexander Cunningham who observes that the "Indians, even at that early date in their history, had a very accurate knowledge of the form and extent of their native land.[2]

1. J. F. Fleet, The Indian Empire, Vol. II, p. 76.
2. Cunningham, The Ancient Geography of India (1963), p. 3.

NUMISMATIC GLEANINGS FROM SANSKRIT BUDDHIST LITERATURE

By

Dr A. Lal, *Lucknow University*

In the beginning of the civilization there was no coinage. People fulfilled their daily necessities through barter. Prince Siddhārtha going from home to homelessness exchanged his fine Kāśikā clothes with those of a monk.[1] Coinage was introduced to the civilization to meet the new demands of the Society as well as to remove the defects of the barter system.

We find references to barter system even when the coinage was current in the Society. The early Pāli literature refers to different varieties of coinage of which Kahāpaṇa (Kārṣāpaṇa) was the most popular. The Sanskrit Buddhist texts also mention the various types of ancient coins.

There are references to *Niṣka*[2], an ancient gold coin (Suvarṇa niṣka).[3] *Suvarṇa* the well known ancient gold coin was also popular (*suvarṇalakṣābhir vyavahṛtam*).[4] According to Pūraṇāvadāna of the Divyāvadāna the king of Supārā purchased the Sandal wood for one lac suvarṇas.[5] Suvarṇa coins were also used for necklaces.[6]

Dīnāra was another gold coin. The Divyāvadāna refers to a proclamation made by king Puṣyamitra (Śuṅga) that "one who gives me a head of a Buddhist monk will be rewarded with one hundred Dīnāra coins."[7] It shows that *Dīnāra* was prevalent even in the age of Puṣyamitra Śuṅga. The Avadāna-śataka[8] and the Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa[9], too, refer to Dīnāra coins.

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1. Lalita-vistara 168/9 (Ed. P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga).
2. Divyā. 304/16 ; Milinda. p. 348 (Hindi translation, Calcutta 1951).
3. Divyā. 49/1, 8, 16.
4. Ibid, 18/25.
5. Ibid, 19/12-21, 32 ; 20/6-7.
6. Avadāna-śataka 140/1 (Ed. P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga).
7. Divyā. 282/15-16 ; *Yo me śramaṇa-śiro dāsyati tasyāham dīnāra-śatam dāsyāmi.*
8. Avadāna. 206/25, 28 (Ed. P.L. Vaidya, Darbhanga).
9. Arya-mañjuśrīmūlakalpa, 3/672/2, 3 ; 3/678/14, 15 ; 3/685/5.

Anāthapiṇḍika gave five hundred *Purāṇa* coins (*pañca purāṇāni śatāni*)[1] to a Brāhmaṇa. He brought these coin in a *heta*[2] (perhaps cart). The Mahāvastu gives an account that a villager was asked to sell a bowl of curds for five hundred Purāṇas.[3] In an other context it again refers to Vīryavanta who had sold a trunk of sandal tree for one hundred Purāṇas.[4] Purāṇas were given to the teachers as their fees.[5] Megha, a young Brāhmaṇa, purchased five lotuses for five hundred Purāṇas.[6] Purāṇas as the ancient silver coins are too well known to ancient Indian Numismatics. The prevalence of Purāṇa coin has also been witnessed by the Mathura Stone Inscription of Huvishka.[7]

The Divyāvadāna also refers only to *Arkūṭa Māṣaka*[8] which was probably made of brass.

Kārṣāpaṇa is an other popular coin of ancient India. The Divyāvadāna refers to Kārṣāpaṇa[9] which was either a copper or a silver coin of a Karṣa. Generally Kārṣāpaṇas were used for giving to male and female servants and to purchase the domestic articles.[10] The Divyāvadāna states that an artisan was paid five hundred Kārṣāpaṇas for his two days' work.[11] The Avadāna-śataka refers to a man who was given four Kārṣāpaṇas for service on an ordinary shop but he was paid eight Kārṣāpaṇas for serving on a perfumer's shop. A man serving on a goldsmith's shop was paid sixteen Kārṣāpaṇas for the first day and thirty two for the second day.[12]

The price of a bullock was three thousand Kārṣāpaṇas ((*kārṣāpaṇa-traya-sahasram vṛṣa-mūlyam*).[13] The king of supārā was given ointment (*pralepa*) for one thousand Kārṣāpaṇas.[14] A sandal wood

1. Avadāna. 100/1, 4, 10, 18.
2. Ibid, 100/10, 12.
3. Mahāvastu, 2/275/18-19.
4. Ibid, 1/34.
5. Ibid, 1/232.
6. Ibid, 1/233.
7. Dr R. B. Pande, Hist. Lit. Ins. P. 70.
8. Divya. 18/28.
9. Ibid. 20/13, 26/14, 79/19-20. 80/8-9; Avadāna, 89/31, 100/14, Milinda, P. 357 (Hindi translation).
10. Divyā. 19/7-8.
11. Ibid, 188/25-30.
12. Avadāna. pp. 89-90.
13. Divyā. 85/30-31.
14. Ibid, 19/12.

(go-śīrṣa-candana) was to be sold for five hundred Kārṣāpaṇas.[1] The sandal wood, purchased for five hundred Kārṣāpaṇas, could easily be sold for one thousand in the form of powder.[2]

Kārṣāpaṇas were also used for the necklaces.[3] People kept these coins tied to the end of garment (*vastrānte badhvā*).[4]

Thus Sanskrit Buddhist literature throws important light on the ancient Indian currency. Varied metals—gold, copper and brass—were utilised for the manufacturing the different coins viz., Niṣka, Suvarṇa, Dīnāra, Purāṇa, Māṣaka, Kārṣāpaṇa and Kākaṇī.[5]

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1. Ibid, 19/1-2.
2. Ibid, 19/3.
3. Avadāna. 140/1.
4. Divyā. 18/28, 107/120.
5. Ibid, 253/22, 23.

THE CANDRAGUPTA-KUMĀRADEVĪ TYPE OF COINS

By

DR. M. S. PANDEY

The Candragupta-Kumāradevī type of coins is still a problem and requires further elucidation. There are two sharp divisions amongst the numismatists regarding the issue of this type of coins. Mr. Allan, first of all, came with the suggestion that the Candragupta-Kumāradevī type of coins was issued by Samudragupta to commemorate his parents. This view was ably controverted by Dr A. S. Altekar in the pages of the Numismatic Supplement.[1] The problem was again raised by Sri S. V. Sohini. He seems to believe "that Candragupta I did not issue this type; and that it was Samudragupta who was the founder of the Gupta numismatics."[2] Dr V. S. Pathak[3] agrees with Sri Sohini. He arrived at this conclusion because of the fact that Candragupta I did not issue any other type of coins. Dr V. S. Agrawal[4] held a different view. He seems to feel that Candragupta-Kumāradevī type of coins was issued by the Licchavīs, to commemorate the marriage of their princess Kumāradevī with Candragupta, during the reign of Samudragupta.

Scholars holding different views regarding the issuer of this type of coins agree in this respect at least that the coin was issued in the sacred memory of the marriage of Candragupta I with the Licchavī princess Kumāradevī. The figures on the obverse of coins leave no doubt about this fact. However Sri Sohini in a recent article[5] suggested that the obverse figure depicted a Raṇa-yātrā scene.

So far as issuer of the Candragupta-Kumāradevī type of coins is concerned, Dr Altekar is right in pointing out that it was Candragupta I who had issued those coins. The medallion coins which have come down to us definitely bear the name of the issuer. In this respect the medallion coins circulated by the Indo-Bactrian kings can be cited as the best example. I do not think if any indigenous king ever issued a medallion coins. So it is but natural to suppose that Indo-Bactrian

1. Num. Supple. 1937, pp 105-11.
2. J. N. S. I Vol XIX p. 151.
3. J. N. S. I. XIX p. 142.
4. J. N. S. I. XIX
5. Num. Chronicle of India Vol. V p. 71.

medallic coins might have been taken as a model for Candragupta-Kumāradevī type of coins. The legend 'लिच्छवयः' on the reverse of the coins led Dr Agrawal to suppose that the coins might have been issued by the Licchavīs. But there are many points which have not been taken into consideration by the author.

The legend 'लिच्छवयः' on the reverse of the coin is in plural and definitely stands for the whole tribe. It means that the Licchavī State was still a republican in the first quarter of fourth century A. D. We have also to consider why the marriage of Kumāradevī with Candragupta I was deemed so important that the Licchavis were obliged to celebrate it with issuing a commemorative type of coins. The Licchavis had apparently gained nothing by this nuptial alliance. Candragupta I was definitely not superior in caste to the Licchavis. The case seems to be rather reverse.[1] So far as the political gain is concerned it was Candragupta I who had achieved some success. Here we must consider in some detail what cannot be explained satisfactorily owing to the paucity of materials. The Allahabad Pillar Inscription of Samudragupta does not include the Licchavi State among the territories conquered by Samudragupta. It appears that it was already a part of his kingdom and so he had compelled Nepal to surrender. It is naturally inferred that Kumāradevī was the only heiress of the Licchavī State who brought it to her husband as dowry. Kumāradevī could be the inheritor of the State only in the case when the Licchavi State had ceased to be a republican. If Kumāradevī was a natural successor of the Licchavi State, as seems to be, we must think that Licchavī republic in course of time had changed its character and had become monarchical. As the later *yaudheya* coins show their leaders were assuming high-sounding titles like kings and might have been behaving like them. Similar might have been the case with the Licchavis also. The father of Kumāradevī might have assumed powers of a king and so his only daughter inheirted the Licchavi territory. However these are merely assumptions at present and we cannot say anything authentically unless more details are forthcoming.

The Candragupta-Kumāradevī type of coins seems to have been issued by Candragupta I himself on the occasion of his marriage with the Licchavī princess Kumāradevī. At the time of his marriage

1. J. B. R. S. Vol XLVI.

Chandragupta I was still an ordinary ruler in his Original territory which was in the region round about Ayodhyā or Saranath in modern Uttar Pradesh. As the Licchavis were ancient Kṣatriya tribe and held high position amongst the ruling dynasties, the Gupta kings who were much inferior to the Licchavis in caste and political position felt obliged to them for obtaining a daughter from their glorious tribe. The marriage of Candragupta I with Kumāradevī naturally enhanced the prestige of the Guptas in the eyes of the people and contemporary rulers. With a view to perpetuating the memory of this relationship Candragupta I caused the effigy of the Licchavī princess to be engraved on the obverse of his coins depicting the marriage scene. The legend 'लिच्छवय:' on the reverse of the coin was just to remind that the princess belonged to the proud Licchavī family.

Some scholars hold that the issuer of the Candragupta-Kumāradevī type of coin was not Candragupta but Samudragupta. It is also argued that we do not come across any other type of coins of Candragupta I. If these coins were issued by Samudragupta as suggested by Mr. Allan and Sri Sohini, one fails to understand the absence of the name of Samudragupta on these coins. If there is no name of Samudragupta on his Aśvamedha type of coins, it does not mean that his name should not occur even on his first issue. The style of the epithet of the Aśvamedha type of coin of Samudragupta is explicit enough to display that the issuer can be no other than the great Samudragupta. But there is no sign on the Candragupta-Kumāradevī type of coins which may give us any clue to know that Samudragupta had issued these medallic coins. In this connexion, we can say that at the time when Candragupta I had issued the medallic coins, he was not in a position to issue too many types of coins like his successors. After being the Mahārāja, he was so busy in consolidating his newly acquired territory that he had little time to think of issuing any other type of coins.

The object held in hand by the king on the obverse of the coins is also a matter of controversy. Dr Altekar thought that it was either a ring, *sindūra-dānī* or something else which the king was offering to his queen. In a recent article, Sri S. V. Sohini[1] suggests that the scene on the obverse depicts the king departing for an expedition and the object held in the hand is *tāmbūla* offered to him by the queen.

1. Num. Chronicle of India, Vol. V, p. 71.

As the *tāmbūla* is in the hand of the kings, it may be inferred that he is offering it to the queen standing beside him. According to tradition and courtesy, the queen should have offered *tāmbūla* to the king on the eve of his departure. Had it been so, the object should have been in the hands of the queen. But the queen does not hold any object. So it is a far-fetched proposition to imagine that the king is holding *tāmbūla* already offered to him by the queen. Hence we can say that the scene on the obverse of the coin is not a Raṇa-yātrā scene as suggested by Sri Sohini.

Dr V. S. Agrawal presumes that the coin was issued by the Licchavis whose name we find engraved on the reverse of the coins. Had Candragupta-Kumāradevī type of coins been issued by the Licchavis for circulation, it must have been found in large numbers in the region once occupied by them. Unfortunately no coin of this type has been discovered from anywhere in Bihar. We should also remember that the number of this type of coins is the least of all the Gupta coins.

Having considered all these points I feel that Candragupta-Kumāradevī type of coins was issued by Candragupta I while he was an ordinary king in his Original territory.

A RARE DANCING IMAGE OF BHAIRAVA

BY

BHAGWANT SAHAI

The Municipal Museum at Gaya is in possession of a very interesting and fine piece of Śaiva sculpture belonging to the Pāla period. Its exact find-spot is though unknown, it is reported to have hailed from some neighbouring region or locality. It does not sound unlikely; for Bodhgaya, hardly at a distance of seven miles from Gaya, is well-known to have functioned as an important centre of the sculptural art during the regime of the Pāla rulers. The sculpture is lying in the museum still unidentified and hence unlabelled. Carved out of dark chlorite in the form of a stela with its upper portion somewhat rounded, the sculpture[1] represents a ten-armed deity facing to front, standing, rather dancing lightly, on a full-blown lotus resting on the back of a human figure crouching below on the pedestal. By his uppermost right and left hands, the deity is holding up a long heavy whip-like object over his head. In his second right hand he holds a sword (*khaḍga*), in the third right hand a cup made of human skull, while in the fourth and the fifth right hands he grasps a trident just below its three prongs with a severed human head balanced over it and a battle-axe by its handle respectively. In the second left hand, he carries a *khaṭvāṅga* (of which the human head attached to its upper end is entirely smashed). In the third left hand, he holds a rosary, while he holds a shield and a kettle-drum in the fourth and the fifth left hands. The god has a hideous-looking face with parted lips and staring eyes rolling in the sockets. He has also a third eye over the forehead. His hair gathered over the head is arranged in a massive *jaṭā*. He puts on a *yajñopavīta* decorated with a snake near the chest and a garland of two bands showing human skulls interwoven into it at regular intervals. He also puts on a tiger-skin secured by a waist-band, through which his membrum virile standing quite erect

1. See the Plate. I am greatly indebted to the Secretary, Municipal Museum, Gaya, Sri Baldeva Prasad, who not only evinced keen interest in my study of the sculpture, but also permitted the sculpture to be taken out in the sun for the convenience of getting it photographed.

is visible. The head of a stout dog is carved in the lower left field of the stela just above one of the folded legs of the human figure crouching below. Two miniature figures, a male and a female, evidently of devotees, the former offering prayer and pouring down something into an earthen jar before him and the latter playing on a cymbal with enthusiasm, are shown seated above the crouching figure on the either side of the deity.


The trident and the kettle-drum, the two main attributes of Śiva, the third eye over the forehead, the matted locks and the erect membrum virile establish the deity represented by the sculpture beyond any doubt to be a Śaiva one, rather a form of Śiva himself. Various are, however, the texts which describe the figure of Bhairava, one of the terrific aspects of Śiva, having no connection whatsoever with any particular Paurāṇic story narrating his exploits. According to the *Viṣṇu-dharmottara*,[1] Bhairava should have a flabby belly, round yellow eyes, side tusks and wide nostrils. He should be wearing a garland of skulls and adorned with snake ornaments. He should be as dark as the rain cloud, with his garment resembling the colour of elephant's skin. He should be possessed of several arms, decorated with all sorts of weapons, and should be represented as frightening Pārvatī with a snake. Hemādri's description[2] of Bhairava is much similar to that of the *Viṣṇu-dharmottara* according to which as well he should possess a grim face with protruding teeth, a pot-belly, a garland of skulls and several hands. These texts, however, do not mention the exact number of arms Bhairava should have; but the *Rūpa-maṇḍana*[3] provides him as many as eight arms, holding *khaṭvāṅga*, *pāśa* (noose), *śūla* (trident), *ḍamaru* (kettle-drum), *kapāla* (skull-cup), and a snake in six of them, a piece of flesh in one of the remaining hands and the other hand held in the *abhaya-mudrā*. Tho work also provides the deity with a dog of the same colour as its master.[4]

It may, however, be noted that the god represented by the Gaya Museum piece has characteristics and attributes tallying much with

1. *Viṣṇu-dharmottara*, Bk. III, ch. 59 (cf. Rao, T. A. G. *Elements of Hindu Iconography*, vol. II, pt. ii, App. B, p. 92.
2. cf. Bhattacharya, B. C. *Indian Images*, vol. I, p.
3. cf. Rao, T. A. G. op. cit, p. 92.
4. Ibid, *Ātma-varṇa-samopeta-sārameya-samanvita* .

those embodied in the textual descriptions. Endowed with a hideous face with rolling eyes bulging out of the sockets, he has a large number of arms, in accordance with the iconographic prescriptions of the *Viṣṇu-dharmottara* and Hemādri, in which he carries not only weapons of destruction but also severed human head and skull-cup, all these undoubtedly adding greatly to the terrific nature of the god. The plurality of arms is an important feature of the Mahāyāna Buddhist and the Brahmaṇic sculptures of the mediaeval period. Most of the objects held in the hand of the god are those which are found enumerated in the *Rūpa-maṇḍana*. The snoke, *yajñopavīta* and the garland of skulls along with the tiger-skin used as garment by the god further heighten his ferocious form. All these features and attributes of the figure are enough to identify the deity as Bhairava, one of the terrific forms of Lord Śiva himself, sometimes also regarded as an emanation or attendant of Śiva. The identification of the figure with Bhairava is further substantiated by the presence of the vehicle of the god (i. e., the dog), the head of which only is found carved on the pedestal in the lower left field of the stela. The texts are, however, silent with regard to the human figure shown crouching below on the pedestal; but there are sculptures belonging to this period wherein Bhairava has been depicted as standing on a human body or on a human head.[1] The figure, however, cannot be taken to be that of Aghora, another terrific form of Śiva, although there is considerable similarity in the iconographic descriptions of both the deities. The *Prapañca-sāra-tantra*[2] states: "Aghora is like the black clouds. He is very terrible. He has an awful countenance and has three eyes. He holds by his hands—the axe, kettle-drum, sword, shield, bow, arrow, trident and skull. He wears red garments; his body is entwined with superb snakes. He devours adverse astrological periods and evil planets. He confers boon on his devotees. May he save you from evils!" But the identification of the figure with that of Aghora is ruled out; for in actual representations, Aghora has a bull (and not a dog) as his vehicle, which, in the Vikramapur image of the Dacca Museum,[3] is shown looking up at its master through the two legs of

1. cf. ASI-AR, 1930-34, pl. LXIII. 9; Barua, B. K. *A Cultural History of Assam*, fig. 40; Banerjea, J. N. *Development of Hindu Iconography*, pl. XXXV. 4.
2. *Prapañca-sāra-tantra*, 27.18 (A. Avalon's Edn. p. 191).
3. Bhattasali, N. K. *Iconography of Buddhist and Brahmanical Sculptures in the Dacca Museum*, pl. XLVII. a.



A rare dancing image of Bhairava.

the god. But the present sculpture from Gaya depicts the head of a dog which is definitely, rather exclusively represented as the vehicle of Bhairava not only in the *Rūpa-maṇḍana*, but also in the South Indian texts.[1]

The Gaya Museum sculpture, however, is not an ordinary representation of Bhairava. The piece is rather more individualised by the manner in which the god is depicted on a fully expanded lotus placed over the back of a crouching human figure. This point becomes quite clear from the manner in which his legs have been exhibited. Both the legs of the deity are distended sideways, with the right foot planted and the left one raised in such a way that only its toes touch the lotus. Such steppings of dances are found represented not only in the dancing images of Śiva, but also in the images of various other divinities.[2] It is, however, a fact that the dancing images of the gods, besides the movement of the legs, also reveal simultaneous movements of other limbs. Particularly the dancing aspect of the figures is emphasised by the movement of the hands, which is conspicuous by its absence in the present specimen. But it has already been suggested that the god is shown dancing very lightly in the Gaya Museum sculpture. It is not the cosmic dance of Śiva that the sculptor has aimed at in the representation of Bhairava. In this connection, there is, however, one point of great import which cannot be lost sight of. Like the dancing image of Śiva at the British Museum in London[3] showing the god holding up over the head a pair of cobras in order to balance the body during the dance, the present sculpture also shows heavy whip-like object passing over the head of the deity and held in the two uppermost raised hands, evidently with the same purpose. It is thus not a vigorous dance of Śiva, not his *tāṇḍava-nṛtta*, which has been given a visual form in the present piece, but it is the dance of a Yogin dancing lightly on the back of the Apasmāra-puruṣa with innate peace and deep clam reflected on the smiling face of Bhairava. The crouching figure below also shares in the deep repose of the god with a free and frank smile which lits up his face. If the present piece of

1. Batuka Bhairava is described '*śvānamārūḍhaḥ*' in the *Batuka Bhairava Kalpa* (cf. Rao, op cit, p. 93).
2. cf. Banerjea, J. N., op. cit, pls. XXXVI and XXXVII (for dancing images of Śiva) and Bhattasali, N. K. op cit, pl. LVI. a (for dancing image of Gaṇeśa).
3. Chanda, R.P. *Mediaeval Indian Sculptures in the British Museum*, pl. XXIII.

sculpture[1] is compared with the many-armed Bhairava in the Asutosh Museum, Calcutta,[2] of the late mediaeval period hailing from Bengal, the great ideological difference in representing the same theme by two different artists of Eastern India can readily be realised. The face of the dire god in the Asutosh Museum is badly damaged, but many weapons of destruction, as Banerjea[3] has aptly pointed out, held by some of his far-flung arms, the *śūla* in his front right hand piercing the breast of the supine figure on which he stands in the *ālīḍha* pose, the miniature figures of the two uncouth attendants, one a plump and pot-bellied male and the other a lean and emaciated female, in swiftly moving *atibhaṅga* pose on either side, the long garland of small skulls and bones etc. help to create an atmosphere of unmitigated terror.

Dancing images of Bhairava though not altogether unknown from northern part of the country,[4] yet are very rare, and the present piece from Gaya certainly adds one more number to the already existing small list of the images of dancing Bhairava.

The present piece of sculpture in the Gaya Municipal Museum representing dancing Bhairava is, thus, not the work of a novice but a subtle creation of a master artist of Magadha who rendered the dancing aspect of the god into a lithic translation very skilfully, subduing the extraneous expression of the dance forms and bringing out the superb peace on the divinely smiling face. This piece, on the basis of the material out of which it has been fashioned and on the basis of the style in which it has been executed, can safely be placed during the Pāla period in the 10th-11th cen. A. D.

1. See the plate.
2. Banerjea, op. cit, pl. XXXV. 4.
3. Ibid, p. 482.
4. cf. ASI-AR, 1930-34, p. 129, pl. LXIII. a (from Kamakhya hill, Assam). The figure is locally known as that of Bāla Bhairava.

INDIAN TRADERS IN RUSSIA IN THE XVIITH CENTURY

By

SURENDRA GOPAL

The seventeenth century saw an outburst of trading activities all over the world. Russia, geographically sandwiched between the East and the West, attracted merchants from both the places. Its political union had only recently been consummated and the potentialities of its markets were immense. It could also be the clearing house for goods from the East to the West and vice versa. This significant fact was not lost upon the Indian traders. From the second half of the seventeenth century they became active in this part of the world.

The Soviet Indologist Goldberg has suggested the following reason for the interest of Indian merchants in Russian market during the period under review. According to him the control of India's external sea trade in the XVIth century by the Portuguese and by the Dutch and the English in the XVIIth century compelled the Indian traders to concentrate on land-routes, which lay beyond the reach of Europeans, leading to Central Asia and Persia. These routes ultimately converged in Russia. Goldberg's hypothesis is that Indian trading activities in Russia were the result of the efflorescence of caravan trade from Multan and Lahore owing to the blockade of the Persian Gulf by the Portuguese in the XVIth century.[1] But a look at facts does not favour this theory.

In the XVIth century we do not have any record of intensive trading activities by Indians in Russia. To be exact, Indian traders in Russia became active only in the second half of the seventeenth century, although Russian sources note their presence in Astrakhan in 1615-16[2]. This cannot be squared with Goldberg's thesis.

The land route to Russia was too long and too dangerous and remunerative trade was possible only if valuable but light goods were carried. The first half of the XVIth century saw political instability in India and on its north-western frontiers, which certainly hampered

1. P. M. Kemp, Bharat-Rus, Delhi, 1958, p. 99.
2. Ibid., p. 71.

spirit of enterprise. Peace returned to Northern India after Akbar ascended the throne. In the XVIIth century the Mughals were intermittently at war with Persia and Central Asian chiefs. On one occasion land trade came to a complete halt due to Perso-Mughal feuds[1]. Thus Goldberg's explanation that increased land trade stimulated Indian merchant's interest in Russian market cannot be accepted. An alternative theory seems more plausible. The Indian trade with Russia began only after the sea route to Persian Gulf again became freely available to Indian merchants and from there the Indian merchants could go to the shores of Caspian either through Persia or through Iraq and then cross it to Russia.

The Portuguese monopoly in the Persian Gulf was destroyed by the combined might of the English and the Persian ruler, Shah Abbas in 1622[2]. The Indians do not seem to have taken immediate advantage for establishing trade with Russia probably because of unsettled internal condition of the Mughal Empire during this period and the great famine of Gujarat in 1630-33[3]. But as soon as normal conditions were restored in India, her merchants appeared in the Russian city of Kazan in 1638 along with Persian traders[4]. From now onwards there is a continuous history of Indian traders in Russia, although there are ups and downs. This also contradicts the suggestion of Mrs. Kemp Ashraf that Indians might have kept up trading connections with Russia from olden times to circumvent the Muslim domination of the Persian Gulf.[5] Besides, in the XVIIth century there were enough Indians in Persia who could take advantage of the Russian market[6]. Actually as our accounts show, practically all the Indian traders in Russia in the XVIIth century came from Persia and some of them had accepted Persian citizenship.

When the Indian merchants appeared, conditions were favourable for their welcome in Russia. The Russians were aware that the

1. Ed. Foster, The English Factories in India, 1622-23, Oxford, 1908, p. 180.
2. Ed. Foster, The English Factories in India, 1622-23, Oxford, 1908, p. XI.
3. Beni Prasad, History of Jahangir; The English Factories in India, 1630-33; Peter Mundy, The Travels of Peter Mundy in Europe and Asia, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1907.
4. Russko-Indiskiye Otnosheniya (henceforth, R-I. O.), Moscow, 1958, document no. 12.
5. Bharat-Rus, p. 101.
6. The number of Indians in Persia according to contemporary French, German and Russian sources, ranged between ten to twelve thousand. R-I. O., p. II.

West European nations were benefiting immensely by trading with India. They even brought Indian goods to sell in Russia. Thus in 1616 and 1619 an Englishman came to Russia and sold Indian goods to the local Government[1]. Till 1643 the Russian government got its requirement of Indian goods from Arkhangelskaya Trade Fair where these were sold by European merchants.[2] If direct contact could be established with the Indians, it would be advantageous to Russia. The Government could get its requirements at a cheaper cost and Russians might also acquire a new avenue of profit either by selling Indian goods to West European merchants who yearly flocked to Russia or by selling European goods to Indians.

So the Russian Government made a beginning in this direction in 1635 by asking its embassy in Persia to purchase Indian goods.[3] In 1638 two Indian merchants appeared in Kazan from Astrakhan on way to Moscow. They had accompanied a group of 35 Persian merchants. The Indians brought not only different varieties of Indian textiles both cotton and silk and incense but also Persian cotton and silk textiles as well as highly prized Persian silks, raw and manufactured.[4] The Russian Government decided to use Indian and other Eastern traders for promoting the export of Russian goods specially to Persia.[5] Thus the ground was ready for the expansion of trading activities by the Indians in Russia in the seventeenth century. In 1641 an Indian applied, along with Persian and Armenian merchants from Persian cities of Isfahan, Gilan and Shemakha, for permission to trade in Moscow.[6] The request was granted and the merchants were asked to occupy a portion in the market place. Thus regular trading by Indians in Moscow began.

In 1642 three Indians went to Moscow to sell 47 horses which they had purchased near Astrakhan from Kalmuks. They were accompanied by 23 Bukharan merchants who were taking 219 horses for sale to Moscow.[7] In 1645 and 1646, Indian merchants sold textiles

1. R-I.O., document nos., 2, 3.
2. Ibid., doc. nos., 4, 6, 7, 14, 20.
3. R.I.O., doc. no., 10.
4. Ibid., doc. nos. 12, 13.
5. Ibid., doc. no. 15.
6. Ibid., doc. no. 17.
7. Ibid., doc. no. 18.

and some prized traditional Persian goods like jackets from goat's skin and in return purchased costly Russian furs.[1]

A measure of Russian anxiety to establish direct trade with India is shown by Czar's efforts to send there an embassy in 1646 through Persia. The embassy could not reach India as the Persian Shah refused it transit through his territory.[2]

Meanwhile, the Indians were getting on well. The career of Sutur, an Indian metchant, reflects the condition of the Indian traders. Sutur came back from India in 1647 and 25 Indian merchants followed him with their goods.[3] Sutur claimed that he had spoken highly of the Russian Administration which provided all possible encouragement for the development of trade. Hence the Indians had arrived. If the Government treated them well, they could hope to profit by one lakh Roubles per year as Custom's dues from them.[4] The Czar was favourably impressed by him. Sutur was even advanced a credit of 4,000 Roubles.[5] He acted as the purchasing agent of the Czar in Persia.[6] The Government issued orders in 1647 for proper treatment of the Indians at Astrakhan. As a mark of Czar's concern for the sentiments of the Indians, the Russian interpreter against whom the Indians had lodged serious complaints was removed.[7] The good treatment evoked immediate response and soon about 50 more Indian traders arrived in Astrakhan[8]. Sutur had trading connections with many Persian cities like Kasbin, Isfahan , Tabriz etc.[9] In one of his journeys Sutur was jailed by Persian authorities in Tabriz for nine months and was released only at the intervention of Russian diplomatic mission.[10]

Sutur even traded in Urgench and Khiva in Central Asia,[11] Derbend and Sherevan in the Caucasus.[12] In one of the expeditions,

1. Ibid., doc. nos. 21, 22, 23.
2. Ibid., doc. nos. 24, 30.
3. Ibid., doc. no. 33.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., doc. no. 34.
6. Ibid., doc. no. 57.
7. Ibid., doc. no. 35.
8. Ibid., doc. no. 38.
9. Ibid., doc. no. 57.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., doc. no. 59.
12. Ibid., doc. nos. 36, 37.

he was accompanied by an Armenian, against whom he subsequently proceeded at the court of the Czar.[1] In Russia itself Sutur traded with many cities. Once he went to Yaroslavl with his goods instead of Moscow, in order to avoid competition of the Persians who had preceded him to Moscow.[2] He was detected here carrying unauthorised tobacco but was let off at the intervention of the Czar[3]. Thus Sutur was a big merchant and his activities embraced the Caspian coast of Persia and Russia, cities in Central Asia and the interior of Russia. Undoubtedly in the fifties of the seventeenth century, Sutur was the most prominent and the most powerful Indian merchant in Russia and he dealt with Indian, Russian, Persian, Armenian and merchants of various other nationalities.

While Sutur was importing Persian, Indian and other goods in Russia and exporting Russian articles, other Indians were engaged in trade on a more modest scale. In 1645 and 1651 some Indians went to Moscow to sell horses.[4] Similarly, Indian merchants, Leki and Solak Nath brought Gilan and Isfahan goods to Moscow for sale.[5]

The question here arises, whether the Indian merchants were organised into big companies as the European companies of the seventeenth century, or in groups or whether they carried their trade single-handed with the help of their relations, friends and servants. The answer seems to be that the trade was based on the enterprise of individuals. Sutur, the most powerful Indian merchant, was helped by his son-in-law.[6] Therefore, he was always anxious to seek protection in the name of the Russian government while trading beyond the boundaries of Russia. Moreover, these merchants did not seem to have maintained steady links with India. Although Sutur claimed to have gone to India once, yet because of geographical reasons the connection was always very fitful.[7] This is also indirectly supported

1. Ibid., doc. no. 58.
2. Ibid., doc. no. 44.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., doc. nos. 41, 56.
5. Ibid., doc. nos. 42, 43, 57.
6. Ibid., doc. no. 36.
7. Our documents refer to only one instance of Indian goods being brought directly from India to Russia. In the sixties of the seventeenth century some Armenians brought Indian goods to Russia from India. They had come via Persia and carried gifts for the Czar from the Armenian merchant community in India. The Czar allowed them to sell some of these goods which included herbs and medicines in Moscow. Apart from this, the documents do not speak of direct import of Indian goods in Russia during this period (R-I. O., doc. nos., 66, 68, 71, 73, 72).

by the fact that Indians brought to Russia mostly Persian goods and from Russia exported mainly to Persia. May be from Persia these goods sometime found way to India but most of the time the articles were destined for the realm of the Shah.

The growing prosperity of Eastern Traders began to cause concern among the Russian protagonists of the theory of Mercantilism. In 1665 the Czar issued an order forbidding all Eastern traders to engage in retail trading in Moscow.[1] In pursuance of this order Eastern merchants including Indians, who were rendered idle were sent out of Moscow to Astrakhan.[2] As a further measure, the foreigners were prohibited from taking out of the country any gold or silver. The Eastern traders were not to visit any other city in Russia, nor to sell any foreign goods in retail, nor they were to participate in any fair in the country.[3] This step was obviously meant to preserve country's reserves of bullion, which were then running out and which were supposed to represent country's wealth. This is also supported by the fact that an attempt was to be made send a diplomatic mission to India to procure as much silver as possible. To ensure better observance of the order, the Eastern traders in Moscow were asked to move to a new place.[4] But the order of 1665 does not seem to have been enforced strictly. We find in 1680 Indian marchants visiting Russian cities in the interior and also attending the Makarovskaya Fair near Novgorod with goods from Tabriz, Gilan, Kashan etc. Besides textiles, they traded in gold, silver and precious stones.[5]

1. R-I. O., doc. no. 75
2. *R.I. O.*, doc. no. 76
3. Ibid., doc. no. 82
4. Ibid., doc. no. 104. From now onwards the fortunes of Indian merchant community in Moscow were definitely on wane. Ocasionally they did continue to visit Moscow from Astrakhan (R-I. O., doc. no. 90). An accident in 1675 brought a change for the better for some time. It happened like this: An Indian merchant at Astrakhan was robbed of everything. He petitioned to the Czar for permission to proceed to Moscow to trade so that he could somewhat remake his fortunes. The Czar allowed him (R-I.O., doc. no. 139). Along with him some more Indians went to Moscow and soon they flourished. One of them soon fell out with his country-men and complained to the Czar that an Indian had brought contraband goods worth 6,000 Roubles without the knowledge of the Government and had not paid customs on it. (This complainant eventually embraced Christianity—R-I. O., doc. no. 142). The Indians were also accused of money-lending. Thus the tide was running against the Indian merchant community in Moscow.
5. R-I. O., doc. nos. 184, 185.

However, as a result of the order of 1665, the Indian merchants tended to congregate more and more in Astrakhan and intensify their export of Russian goods to Persia. Their favourite route seemed to lay through Derbend.[1] The goods exported by the Indians were mostly different varieties of costly furs, skins, feathers, copper-sulphate, textiles etc.[2]

In 1676 eleven Indian merchants sent sixteen parties of goods to Derbend. Ram Chand sent three parties. Some of the merchants employed local men to accompany their goods.[3] The varieties of articles meant for export had considerably increased. Apart from traditional Russian items, exports now consisted of ambar sent to them from Moscow by their country-men, teeth of fish, cloves, iron, needles, different types of mirrors, sugar and suitcases.[4] The remarkable thing here is the export of manufactured goods. These however, represented simply re-export of goods imported into Russia by West European merchants. Cloves might have come to Russia that way or they might have been received through Central Asia. We cannot, at the moment, say anything precisely.

The Indians were prospering. The next year they maintained the tempo of their export to Derbend and Persia. It appears that many Indians owned boats in which they transported their goods.[5]

Subsequently in their exports to Persia from Astrakhan, the Indians added some new items like paper, sandal wood, pillows filled with feathers, German locks, German copper tubes and butter.[6] Some of the merchants like Mal Chand sent goods to two places at the same time.[7]

1681 was possibly the most prosperous year for Indian merchants in Russia. This year twenty-two parties of goods were sent out to Persian cities by fourteen persons. Out of these, five persons sent eleven parties—a fact which reveals a tendency towards concentration of wealth in a few hands. Among these Indian merchants there were four who had accepted Persian citizenship.[8]

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1. Ibid., doc. nos. 96. 97.
2. Ibid., doc. nos. 97, 100, 101.
3. Ibid., doc. nos. 149, 150, 152, 153, 155.
4. Ibid., doc. no. 141 and pp. 258-68.
5. Ibid., doc. nos. 87, 177, 178.
6. Ibid., pp. 289-296.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., doc. nos. 204, 205, 206, 207.

* One merchant sent 80,000 needles in a single consignment.

Further proofs of Indian prosperity are also available. An Indian merchant pleaded with the Czar for permission to trade in Moscow on the ground that in one year the Indian traders had paid 18,000 Roubles as customs duties on goods imported by them.[1] For those times it was an impressive sum and Russian Indologists agree that Indian traders played an important role in economic life of Russia in the seventeenth century.[2]

The success of the Indian merchants excited jealousy of all. The Armenians who were leading competitors started complaining to the Czar against the Indians. They claimed that since they paid more taxes to the Exchequer, they were entitled to better facilities. They wanted the Indians to be removed from the market-place and their shops and store-houses allotted to them. Although they did not succeed in driving out the Indians, they did obtain shops and store-houses in their neighbourhood.[3]

The Russians were also raising their voice against the Indian traders. In 1684 a big group representing all sections, petitioned to the Czar against the Eastern traders and particularly against the Indian merchants being allowed to operate in Russian cities. The Indians were accused of indulging in malpractices, cheating the treasury of its dues by not declaring all their goods, charging high rates of interest, purchasing goods from West European merchants etc. All these, the petition claimed, had led to the economic ruin of the local population. They prayed that the law of 1665 should be henceforth strictly enforced. The Eastern traders including Indians should not be allowed to trade outside Astrakhan nor they should deal with foreigners or in imported stuffs.[4] The Indians on their part denied the allegations and argued that they contributed substantially to the State Exchequer and could not be said to have been working against the economic interest of the Russians. All this was in vain. In 1684, the Eastern traders excepting the Armenians were asked to settle down in Astrakhan.[5] The Government provided them with a new market-place.[6]

1. R.I. O., p. 316.
2. Ibid., p. 12.
3. Ibid., doc. nos. 146, 147, 148.
4. Ibid., doc. no. 225.
5. Ibid., doc. no. 226.
6. Ibid., doc. no. 249.

As a result of this order the Indians stopped trading in cities of Russia except Astrakhan. They however, continued to export to Derbend and other places in Persia[1]. But the export consisted of purely Russian goods and traditional items like skins, furs, textiles, paper, iron, copper, sugar, fur caps etc. A new item of export seems to be 'Russian pepper'. Probably the Russians purchased it from West European or Central Asian merchants and sold it to Indians who in their turn re-exported it to Persia.[2]

Consequent upon Indians and other Eastern traders (excepting the Armenians) ceasing to visit Russian towns, merchants of different Russian cities like Moscow, Chabokeary, Kazan, Yaroslavi came down to Astrakhan to get their requirements.[3] To enforce the restrictions on Indian traders and Eastern merchants, the Russian government in 1693 constructed a new market-place in Astrakhan where all of them were asked to live.

The Indian traders in Russia collaborated with merchants of other nationalities. Close links were forged with Persian merchants. Once a Persian sued an Indian for 5,000 Roubles and wanted his extradition to Persia in order to realise the money. A Persian merchant in 1676 successfully established his financial claim against an Indian merchant in Moscow and proved that he was actually a Persian citizen. The Indian merchant was ordered to be deported to Persia.[4] Similarly, sometimes Indian and Russian merchants undertook joint ventures.[5] In 1672 an Indian merchant succeeded in getting a decision in his favour for 300 Roubles against a Russian merchant.[7]

However, the policy of containing the Indians to one particular place ultimately affected their pattern of activities. So far the Indian merchants had exclusively concentrated on trade. We rarely hear of them as money-lenders and even in those cases, the possibility is that they were business credits or merely postponements of payment by the customer. That they were not money-lenders is surprising because in India in the second half of the XVIIth century owing to the control of external sea trade by the Europeans, the local merchant community

1. Ibid., pp. 339-341.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., doc. nos. 238, 239, 240, 241, 243, 244, 247, 248.
4. Ibid., doc. no. 186.
5. Ibid., doc. no. 106.
6. Ibid., doc. no. 183.

had been gradually transformed into money-lender class. In the next century, however, the Indian traders in Russia, in view of increasing restraints on their trading activities, diverted their energies to money-lending.

Thus in the second half of the seventeenth century the Indian merchants had been able to extend their activities to a new land, disproving the theory that the Indian mercantile class in the XVIIth century lacked enterprise and ability to penetrate fresh markets. This was a remarkable achievement; for the Indian traders were not backed by the might of any Empire. It was purely the result of individual enterprise and initiative. They began to decline when the Russian government, in the interest of local merchants, began imposing restrictions upon Eastern traders including Indians but excluding Armenians.

AN UNPUBLISHED SAPTA-MĀTṚKĀ RELIEF FROM RĀJASTHĀN, IN THE NATIONAL MUSEUM OF INDIA, NEW DELHI*

By

B. N. Sharma,

The Hindus have been worshippers of the Mother-Goddess from a very early period of their history. One of the early historical references to them is in the Gaṅgadhāra stone inscription of Viśvavarman of the Mālava, year 480, found in the former Jhālāwāḍa State of Rājasthān. It records the construction of a shrine in honour of the frightful Mothers as follows :

Mātṛ(tṛṛ)ṇāñ ca (pramu)-dita-ghanātyarthanihrādinīnām ||
tantrodbhūta-prabala-pavanaodvarttitāmbhonidhīnām ||
...... *gatam idaṁ*......*ḍākinī-saṁprakīrṇam* ||
.*veśmātyugraṁ nṛpati-sacivo'kārayat puṇya-hetoḥ* ||

(Also, for the sake of religious merit, the counsellor of the king caused to be built this very terrible abode......... (and) filled full of female ghouls, of the divine Mothers, who utter loud and tremendous shouts in joy, (and) who stir up the (very) ocean with mighty wind rising from the magic rites of their religion.[1]

Many stories of the origion of the *Sapta-Mātṛkās* have been given in the *Purāṇas*.[2] According to the *Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāṇa* ".........to destroy the gods' foes, and for the well-being of the lion-like immortals, there issued forth endowed with excessive vigour and strength the Energies (*Śaktayaḥ*) from the bodies of Brahmā, Śiva, Gūha, and Viṣṇu and of Indra also, and went in forms of those gods, and whatever his ornaments and vehicles, in that very apperance,[3] his Energy advanced to fight with the Asuras. In the front of a heavenly car drawn by the swans advanced Brahmā's Energy, bearing a rosary of seeds and

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* Microns over 'e' and 'o' have not been used.

1. J. F. Fleet, *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, III, 1963, p. 76.
2. For a detailed discussion of these stories see Rao, T. A. G., *Elements of Hindu Iconography*, Madras, 1914, I, ii, pp. 379-383.
3. Cf : *Mātṛgaṇaḥ karttavyaḥ svanāmadevānurūpakṛta-cihnaḥ*–in Varāhamihira's *Bṛhatsaṁhitā*, 57, 56.

an earthern water-pot ; she is called Brahmāṇī. Maheśvara's Energy, seated on a bull, grasping a fine trident, and wearing a girdle of large snakes, arrived adorned with a digit of moon. And Kumāra's Energy, Ambikā, with spear in hand and riding on a choice peacock, advanced in Guha's shape to attack the Daityas. Likewise, Viṣṇu's Energy, seated upon Garuḍa, advanced with conch, discus, club, bow and scymitar in hands. The Energy of Hari, who assumes the peerless form of a sacrificial boar, also advanced assuming a hog-like form............Likewise, Indra's Energy, with thunderbolt in hand, seated upon the Lord of Elephants and having a thousand eyes arrived. As is Śakra, such indeed was she. Then those Energies of the gods surrounded Śiva. He said to Caṇḍikā, 'Let the Asuras be slain forthwith through my good-will'. Thereupon, from the goddess's body there came forth Caṇḍikā's Energy, most terrific, exceedingly fierce, howling like a hundred jackals".[1]

The ancient religious texts differ on the number and names of the *Mātṛkās*. But they are generally regarded as seven though sculptures depicting eight or even more have also been noticed.[2] The usually accepted seven *Mātṛkās* are :

Brāhmī Māheśvarī caiva Kaumārī Vaiṣṇavī tathā |
Māhendrī caiva Vārāhī Cāmuṇḍā Sapta mātaraḥ ||

Another aspect of the Mother-goddess cult was the worship of the *devī* with a child placed either on the lap or made stand on the left side of the deity. At many places, Gaṇeśa and Vīrabhadra, the Guardian deities, have also been found, flanking them.[3] In some individual sculptures, carved lintels and door-jambs, the mounts of their counter-parts are also depicted.

Some of the early images of *Sapta-Mātṛkās* assignable to the Kuṣāṇa period, have been discovered from Mathurā.[4] Their repre-

1. *Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāṇa*, Tr. F. E. Pargiter, pp. 502-503, vv. 11-22.
2. The *Aṣṭa-Mātṛkās* are :
Brāhmī Māheśvarī caindrī Vārāhī Vaiṣṇavī tathā |
Kaumārī caiva Cāmuṇḍā Carciketyaṣṭa Mātaraḥ ||
The images of the *Aṣṭa-Mātṛkās* have been found at Maṇḍor, Kekind and also at other places in Rajasthān.
3. Such sculptures can be seen at Ellora, Belur, Khajurāho etc.
4. Agrawāl, V. S., *Catalogue of the Brāhmanical images in the Mathurā Art*, pp. 69-73 ; *Journal of the U.P. Historical Society*, Lucknow, XXII, pts. 1-2, pp. 160-164.

sentation in stone and terracotta belonging to the Gupta period[1], have been found at Sāmalājī (Gujarāt) and Ahicchatra (Uttar Pradesh) and are now preserved in Barodā Museum and the National Museum respectively. But their images became more common probably after the sixth century A. D. From the seventh century onwards[2], we start getting a good number of their images both as individual figures and also executed in panels.

Dr S. C. Ray has rightly pointed out that the *Sapta-Mātṛkās* were originally Śaivaite in origin, but afterwards became the actual cult emblems of the devout Śāktas[3]; by the eighth century A. D. their worship had also developed along with the worship of other deities of the Hindu pantheon. Somadeva mentions the *Mātṛ-Maṇḍala*[4], and states that their worship was done by certain fanatics who tore out their intestines to please these goddesses.

It appears from the references about their *Sādhanās* in the Buddhist literature, that the Buddhists of the Tāntric period had taken these *Sapta-Mātṛkās* into their fold. This fact is also supported by the finding of a composite image of these deities at the famous Buddhist site Nālandā, District Patna[5]. These *Sapta-Mātṛkās* are depicted by the Jains also on some images of their deities[6].

The worship of the *Sapta-Mātṛkās* was prevalent throughout Northern India. Beautifully carved images of these deities were discovered at Pandrethan[7]. Mr. M. S. Vats has described the images of Brahmāṇī, Indrāṇī, Cāmuṇḍā etc. along with a broken slab depicting only six *Mātṛkās*, found at Baijanāth, Uttar Pradesh.[8] A few sculptures recovered at different sites in Rājasthāna are preserved in the Ajmer Museum and other local museums of the State[9]. A beautiful image of the *Sapta-Mātṛkās* has also been noticed recently

1. According to Patil, D. R., their images belonging to the Gupta period have also been recovered at Udaigiri, near Bhilsa. See *Monuments of the Udaigiri Hill*, Gwalior, 1948, p. 26.
2. *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Cuttack, 1959, pp. 109-112. They are now in the Gwalior Museum.
3. *Early History and Culture of Kāshmīr*, Calcutta, 1957, p. 160.
4. *Yaśastilaka-Campū*, Book I.
5. *Sādhanamālā*, (G. O. S. XIi), ii, p. 40.
6. *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*, No. 66, pp. 114-5.
7. Banerjea, J. N., *Development of Hindu Iconography*, p. 563.
8. Kak, R. C., *Ancient Monuments of Kāshmīr*, Lond. 1933, p. 116.
9. *Proceeding of the Indian History Congress*, Nāgpur, 1950, p. 100.


on a Sun temple at Mewār in Rājasthān[1]. At Khajurāho, several panels depicting their representation can still be seen on the sanctum gates of various temples. Among these, the one which shows the standing seven Mother-goddesses flanked by Vīrabhadra and Gaṇeśa, is quite interesting[2]. Their worship was prevalent in Bihār and other parts of Eastern India during the rule of the Pāla dynasty[3]. There was a separate temple dedicated to the *Sapta-Mātṛkās* at Bhubaneswar in Orissā, which is now no more. But their depiction has been found on the Paraśurāmeśvara and the Kappālini temples of Bhubaneswar[4]. Their separate images have also been found at Jājpur, District Purī, and other places.

The present architectural lintel (L. 72cms x Ht. 27cms) from Rājasthān, now under discussion, belongs to the Pratihāra period of C. 9th century A. D. It shows the *Sapta-Mātṛkās* seated at ease in a row on separate cushioned seats. The upper part of the body of the *Mātṛkās* is nude excepting for the fact that they wear ear-rings[5], necklaces, armlets, bracelets etc. The lower part has fine diaphanous *sāri*. The chief interest of this sculpture lies, however, in its iconographic peculiarities. The absence of the vehicles and also the child in this relief may be noted with great interest. The other thing worth-noticing here is that it does not have the figures of Gaṇeśa and Vīrabhadra on their either side, nor it has the figure of dancing Śiva as is found in the sculptures discovered at Maṇḍor[6] and Ābānerī[7].

The seven *Mātṛkās* from the left are as follows: Brahmāṇī, Māheśvarī, Kaumārī, Vaiṣṇavī, Vārāhī, Indrāṇī and Cāmuṇḍā. A short description of each is given below :—

1. *BRAHMĀṆĪ*—According to the *Varāha-Purāṇa*[8], cited by T. A. G. Rao, the four-armed Brahmāṇī should be shown with two hands in *varada* (attitude of hand suggesting beckoning to confer a

1. Agrawāl, R.C., *Śodha-Patrikā* (Hindi-Quarterly), Udaipur, April, 1963, p. 13.
2. Agrawāl, U., *Life as Depicted in the Khajurāho Sculptures*, Delhi, 1964, p. 67, pl. 45.
3. *Bihār Through the Ages*, Patnā, p. 334.
4. *The Orissā Historical Journal*, Bhubaneswar, X, 1962, No. 4, p. 74.
5. Brahmāṇī and Vārāhī do not have ear-rings.
6. Agrawal, R. C., *Journal of the Bihār Research Society*, Patnā, XLIII, pt. I-II. pp. 111-114 and plate.
7. Agrawāl, R.C., *Lalit Kalā*, Lalita Kalā Academy of India, Nos. 1-2, p. 133.
8. Rao, *op. cit.*, p. 382.



Sapta-Mātṛkas relief from Rajasthan.
(By Courtesy of the Archealogical Survey of India)

boon) and *abhaya mudrās* (hand suggestive of protection[1]). The remaining two hands should carry the attributes of her male counterpart, Brahmā. The Śakti with her three visible faces holds a *sruvā* (sacrificial ladle) in her upper hand, a *pustaka* (manuscript) in the upper left. The lower right hand is in the *varada mudrā*, and the lower left holds a *kāmaṇḍalu* (water vessel). She wears a *karaṇḍa mukuṭa* (crown resembling a pile of pots).

2. *MĀHEŚVARĪ*—According to the *Varāha-Purāṇa*[2], Māheśvarī should hold a *triśūla* (trident) and *akṣamālā* (rosary) in her upper hands, and the lower hands be in *varada* and *abhaya* poses. In this relief, she is depicted as holding a trident and a cobra in the rear hands, while the front right hand is in *abhaya mudrā* and the corresponding left carries a water-vessel. She wears a *jaṭā-mukuṭa* (crown composed of locks of hair).

3. *KAUMĀRĪ*—According to the *Varāha-Purāṇa*[3], she should hold a *śakti* (spear) and *kukkuṭa* (bird) in her rear hands, and the lower hands should be in *abhaya* and *varada* poses. The deity carved in this panel has a spear and a sword in the upper hands. Her lower right hand is in the *abhaya* pose and the lower left is holding a water-vessel. She wears a conical head-dress and plaits of curly locks falling plume-like on each side.

4. *VAIṢṆAVĪ*—There is a slight difference in the weapons attributed to the *devī* in the *Devī-Purāṇa* and the *Varāha-Purāṇa*. The former mentions that she should carry the attributes of Viṣṇu, and hold a conch, club, disc and the lotus. But the latter describes that she may have conch and disc in her two hands, and her remaining hands be in the *abhaya* and *varada* poses.[4] The representation of the goddess executed here shows her hands clock-wise in the gift-bestowing attitude and holding club, disc and conch. Her bejewelled crown is partly damaged and the nose also slightly chipped off.

5. *VĀRĀHĪ*—According to the *Varāha-Purāṇa*[5], Vārāhī should hold a plough and a spear in her back hands, while her front hands be shown in the *varada* and the *abhaya* poses. But the figure of the goddess

1. See the *glossary* at the end of this paper.
2. Rao, *op. cit.*, p. 388.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 388.
4. Rao, *op. cit.*, p. 384.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 388.

carved in this panel is only two-armed. Her right hand is in the gift-bestowing attitude and the left holds a water-vessel. The head of the boar-faced *devī* is raised above (like most of the images of Varāha, the third incarnation of Viṣṇu, who is very often shown lifting *Pṛthvī* (the Earth-Goddess) whom He had rescued from the great deluge). Her hair is flowing at the back.

6. *INDRĀṆĪ*—According to the *Devī-Purāṇa*[1], Indrāṇī or Aindrī holds only a goad and a thunderbolt. The figure of Indrāṇī shown in this panel carries a goad and a double-pronged thunderbolt in her upper hands. Her lower right hand is in the gift-bestowing attitude and the lower left holds a water-vessel. She wears a crown on her head.

7. *CĀMUṆḌĀ*—According to the authorities[2], the four-armed Cāmuṇḍā should hold a *kapāla* (skull) and a *śūla* (trident) in her two hands, while the other two should be in *abhaya* and *varada* poses. As depicted here, the *kaṅkālī* (fleshless skeleton goddess) holds a trident in her rear right hand. The rear left arm which is now lost, probably held a *khaṭvāṅga* (staff crowned with a human-skull). The front right hand has a *kuṭhāra* (dagger) and the corresponding left a *kapāla* (skull-cup probably filled with a lump of flesh). She is looking at the bowl as if trying to lick the contents of it. Her bristled hair adorned with a human skull in front depicts a fierce and blood-thirsty expression. The emaciated representation of Cāmuṇḍā with staring eyes, bare canine teeth, ghasty smile, pendulous breasts and sunken belly, portrays in a remarkable manner the weird and the uncanny.

The nicely executed lintel with architectural decorations is flanked by a *makarā-mukha* (crocodile motif) on each side. The crowning *āmlakas* in the centre are likened to a lotus or a solar halo with rays signifying the way to Heaven.

The sculpture, though damaged at few places, is still a very good specimen of exquisite workmanship and can be regarded as one of the finest pieces belonging to the mediaeval Rājasthān.

1. *Ibid.*, p. 385.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 386.

GENERAL EDUCATION THROUGH MUSEUMS IN INDIA

By

P. D. Sud

Education had been the purpose of a museum since the times of Pythagoras and Plato. Emphasis shifted from the religious and ethical to the intellectual side for the first time in the Hellinistic 'Museum' of Alexandria in the 3rd century B. C.

Museum has importance due to basic things or 'real objects' upon which all our theories and ideas are founded. Books stacked in our libraries are the outcome of the studies based on these objects. These books, with time, may become superseded by others which incorporate new knowledge and new interpretations. On the other hand, the objects in the museums remain the same—the never-failing fountains of our understanding of the world. To these we may return again and again for review and reassurance. Our books become more historical records of outmoded ideas; but our museums contain eternal varieties things upon which new books will be based. Under the circumstances, does it not look improper to show negligence to museums and their vast treasures?

In India we have evidences of the existence of museums, picture galleries from the earliest time. A temple in a village was often a miniature museum of arts and crafts, and created in public a taste for music, dance, sculpture, painting etc. Also, Epics speak of Citraśālās and Viśvakarma (temples)-Mandirs which were centres of recreation as well as education and culture. In the Viṣṇu-dharmottara there are references of paintings being used for visual education of the people.

In the modern sense of the museum, we trace its genesis to the Asiatic Society of Bengal, founded in 1784 to study the classics, oriental manners, history or to illustrate and elucidate the pecularities of art, antiquity and nature in the East.

Finally, India had a start of its museum movement with the establishment of the Indian Museum in 1814. The contribution of the Asiatic Society and the Indian Museum is too well known to the scholars in the realms of arts, humanities and natural sciences. Now

there is necessity to bring such varied facts to the people and museum is an indisputed medium.

General education through museums was initiated in the 20th century only. The problem was viewed and discussed on international level, in the Booklyn Seminar on Museum Education in 1952, arranged by the ICOM (UNESCO). Since then followed seminars at Athens (1954), regional seminars of Greece, Riode Generio, Brazil, Tokyo, Maxico city, Los Logos Nigeria and finally India in 1966. One of the recommendations on all occasions was that there be co-ordination between educational system and the museums and that there be heightened development of adult education in the area. Professor D. P. Ghosh was first to emphasise this point in his presidential address to the West Bengal Museum Association in 1964.

In India, attempts to discuss the problem of general education through museums were made. Seminar discussions were arranged on the topic by West Bengal Museum Association (1964), Museum Association of India (1966) and ICOM Committee India (1966). However, two experiments in applying museum exhibition techniques in fundamental education under typical conditions in an underdeveloped area were no more than tentative beginning in the practical field, Yelwal village of Mysore (December 1953—May 1955).

Since then much has been said and written on the subject. A discussion on the role of museums in general education should not require a demonstration of its educative and cultural value. Rather it should concentrate on the various ways in which it contributes to the total educational mechanism, keeping in mind the Indian background. Present discussion is restricted to the ways and means to interpret our vast cultural heritage and natural resources through museums. They are free from traditional curriculum and examination, and thus have more access to human spontaneity—that spring of goodness, inventiveness and skill.

Main points deserving our consideration while planning programme for general education are :—

(a) Indian Background.

(1) Most of our communities are rural rather than urban. Hence more stress should be laid on this aspect. Majority of the visitors in our museums are illiterate villagers or laymen.

(2) Types of visitors, their educational, social, economic and religious background.

(3) Our limited means and their proper and rational utilisation to benefit maximum with minimum means. We had been arranging useful, attractive and educational exhibitions at Punjab University, Chandigarh, with limited financial means through the co-operative efforts of staff and students. It is assumed that with a clear thinking about the problem much can be achieved with limited resources. It was remarked in the Tokyo Regional Seminar of 1959: "The seemingly universal phenomenon that museum professionals often find it difficult, if not close to impossible, is to reconcile their expected devotion to the profession with the hard facts of economic necessity". In view of our experience it can be said that at least we can meet the essentials to reasonable extent.

(b) Responsibility of a democratic government to enlighten the masses to educate them to participate in the task of national reconstruction.

(c) To lay more emphasis on local problems. Survey conducted in Japan and such studies in other places reveal "Primarily that the general public is more interested in exhibitions or other events which are closely related to their life-experience as individuals." This was also our own experience with the exhibit, Chandigarh. 2,000 million years ago base on Palaeographic reconstruction was most popular in the exhibition at Chandigarh.

(d) Purpose should not be to help people appreciate or amuse as many of us intend; but to educate and enlighten to understand the problems of their immediate environment and vast cultural heritage to participate more effectively in the economic and social progress of their community.

Suggestions

Make museums more effective in the field of formal education of illiterates, laymen, children and students :

(1) Herbert Spencer wrote, "Not only are sciences involved with each other, but they are inextricably interwoven with the complex web of the arts and are only conventionally independent of it". We must act up to this point of view and as far as possible in all

museums suitable space must be allotted to implement the above statement visually. It must intend to show the relationship of man with nature and the expression of his essence through art and artefact. This will help understand the 'culture' in a better way and would be of utmost utility to visitors of all categories.

(2) While planning to open new museums, areas having no access to the museums or museum extension programmes must be given priority. Many areas in India have not experienced formal programmes for the adult public. This might have been justified in the past. But at present the very nature and purpose of the museum as an institution has drastically changed. This must be taken in hand.

(3) Rural museums with bias on general education may be set up. For the financial implications, museums must explore the ground of collaboration with the organisations like Community Development. This will provide an effective field for experimentation and resources to the museums in the field of general education. It will provide the base for general education to the Community Development and such other organisations.

(4) Temporary exhibitions and mobile units on topical themes must be popularised through museums. National Museum, regional museums, State museums and University museum are to attack the problem of illiteracy and ignorance. This is needed at this juncture of our history.

(5) Cheap and informative introductory literature may be gallery guides; colour leaflets with line sketch of the object and all elementry information may be produced wherever possible. This is being done very effectively by the Commonwealth Institute, London .and the University Museum of Colorodo. We do not find any such effort in India.

(6) More effective guide lecturer services be introduced in our museums. Till we have the working knowledge of one language, it may have some difficulties. But at the moment provision in English, Hindi or the regional language may be useful.

(7) Formal programmes like popular lecture series, film shows and establishment of Community Centres may be strengthened. No

doubt at present such programmes, presented by some of our large museums, have not the deserving response from the people. Reasons may be investigated and programmes be remodelled.

(8) Co-operation with ***press, radio*** and ***tourist agencies*** be established. We have lagged behind in this field. A recently published report by P. S. Rawson on "Museology in India" says, "In fact inquiries indicate that major Western tourist agencies do not include a single museum in India ... with the occasional exception of National Museum in their normal tour programmes". It adds, "Indian Museums are depressing places for tourist to visit". This deserves our consideration.

(9) Co-operation with ***schools, colleges*** and ***universities*** be established and they be invited to take active interest in the cause of general education through museums and advocate their establishment.

(10) Summer school for teachers' training as in Phillipines and Madras museums be arranged. Libral use of museums in teachers' training courses be made.

(11) Seminars and conferences be arranged on the problems related to our museums in the field of general education and free exchange of ideas amongst the men of the museum profession be encouraged through publications and correspondence. For this purpose study of Russian Rural Museums, American Adult Education Departments in Museums, and general education programmes conducted by the developing nations of South East Asia and Africa, like Japan, Arab states, Ceylon, Phillipines etc. may be undertaken.

These are some of the suggestions of utmost importance in designing or planning a general educational programme through the museums in India. There is not a single village museum on modern lines. An excellent programme of Vijñāna Mandira (Educational Museums) in the Community Development programme, launched by the C. S. I. R. in 1959 has failed due to lack of planning and proper execution of the project. If we review the situation of general education through museums in India we shall find that we are where we were. Recently I happened to undertake a study tour of museums in North India. It was noticed that the

visitors were mostly illiterates and laymen. They were passing through the halls, innocent of all motive of general education. During discussion and conversation with many of these visitors about their aim and purpose of visiting these museums, to my surprise none replied "*education*".

It is hoped public will not fail to respond to the new policy on the part of our museum service provided what is offered can be related to things they already understand, and skilled and authoritative interpretation is furnished.

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MERCHANTS AND ARTISANS IN MEDIEVAL NORTH INDIAN ECONOMY

(1206–1526)

By

A. RASHID

The merchants, the *sahus* (bankers) and the artisans were the props and promoters of the industrial and commercial economy of the towns. The contemporary literature refers to such a class of people.

The merchants were associated with all classes of people—kings and nobles, saints and common men. Money-lending was a profitable business. Barani[1] tells us that the Multani merchants and *sahus* of Delhi provided loans on interest to the extravagant and luxurious nobility of the time. As a result of their money-lending business they became rich. They used to get rewards and presents from the nobility. The creditors and money-lenders frequented the houses of the debtor nobles.[2] They also used to advance loans to foreigners who came to India in order to purchase articles of presents for the Sultan. Ibn Batuta[3] says that the merchants of Sind and Hind advanced a loan of thousand *dinars* to every newcomer intending to visit the Sultan. They provided him with all that he needed for the purpose of offering presents to the king and to facilitate the purchase of animals and goods for personal use. They even rendered monetary and personal services to persons. Their debt was paid with the gift that the Sultan gave them. Thus they made enormous profit.

The money-lenders sometimes even relieved the Sultan of his financial worry. Afif[4] informs us that when Sultan Firoz Shah reached Sarsuti, the bankers and grain merchants met and collectively gave to the Sultan a few lacs of *tankas* by way of obeisance. Though not given as loan, the Sultan treated it as such. The amount was to be returned after the Sultan had reached the capital city.

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1. Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi, p. 120; Vidyāpati tells us that the system of taking loan from *sahu* was prevalent in Mithila. Likhanāvali, Letter nos. 61,62,63.
2. Barani, p. 204.
3. Rehla (G.O.S.), p. 5.
4. Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi (Bib. Ind.), pp. 12-3.

There were also bankers at the capital city who used to purchase *itlaq* (payment vouchers) of the soldiers.[1] The bankers and money-changers sometimes proved dishonest in their dealings with depositors. We get reference to a dishonest money-changer. Yadgar[2] relates a story that once a soldier who had friendly relation with a money-changer deposited at his place a bag containing gold coins. The money-changer took out the gold coins and kept ordinary coins. The case was brought before Mian Bhowa who decided the case in favour of the money-changer. The soldier at last brought this to the notice of Sultan Sikander Lodi who convicted the money-changer.

It is difficult to indicate the rate of interest charged by money-lenders. But some of the stray statements of Amir Khusrau show 10 per cent per annum on big sums and about 20 per cent on small sums.[3]

The system of borrowing money and other articles prevailed. Ibn Batuta had borrowed money from a merchant who pressed for its return.[4] Non-payment of the debt occasioned hue and cry on the part of the creditor.[5] The borrower was to execute a document and the creditor was expected to keep the document.[6] Even the *sufi* saints and religious divines were at times compelled to accept things on loan from Hindu grocers. We learn that Shaikh Nizam-ud-din Auliya was once in debt for twenty *jeetals*. Since he could not pay even this amount at one time, payment by instalment was agreed upon by the party.[7] Some of the *sufi* saints discouraged borrowing.[8] But the needs of the wayfarers and travellers, indigent people and inmates of the hospices had to be attended to. The saintly personages had no fixed income and had to depend upon *nazoors* and *futuh* (presents and gifts). We are told that a certain Hindu grocer who ran his shop just in the vicinity of *Khanqah* of renowned *Firdausi* saint, Haz. Sharf-ud-udin Yahya Maneri of Bihar, used to supply grains on credit.

1. Ibid. pp. 296-97: see also Moreland : The Agrarian system of Muslim India, p. 56 fn.; Dr Quraishi : The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi, pp. 222-24.
2. Tarikh-i-Shahi (Bib. Ind.), p. 61.
3. Ijaz-Khusravi, i, p. 147; Matla-ul-anwar, p. 150; K. M. Ashraf : Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan, p. 109.
4. Rehla, p. 133.
5. Ibid, p. 134.
6. Ibid, p. 135.
7. Fawaid-ul-Fuwad, p. 140; Siyar-ul Auliya, pp. 350-1.
8. Siyar-ul-Auliya, p. 66.

He would not press for immediate payment. When the amount swelled to one thousand *tankas*, the entire loan was paid off from the income of *futuhat* (income received gratuitously)[1].

The Multanis had specialised in business. Barani[2] tells us that after the death of Sultan Alau'uddin the Multani merchants sold their articles at their own profitable rates. Alau'uddin fixed the prices of all things according to the principle of 'production-cost' (*nirk-h-i-bara-ward*). Under favourable circumstances the shop-keepers became prosperous. Barani[3] tells us that during the time of Firoz Shah the merchants became the rulers of the market. They bought as they liked and sold as they liked. As a result of this, the property of the shop-keepers, merchants and bankers reached lacs and crores.

We are also told of merchants, some dealing in horses, some in slaves and some in clothes.[4] Some articles like wheat, gram, sugar-candy were carried from Delhi to those places where these were not available.[5] The merchants went to far-off places and stayed for two or three years.[6] Amir Khurd tells us that *teel* was carried from Nagour to Multan, and cotton from Multan to Nagour.[7] Amir Khurd speaks of his uncle who was very fond of betel leafs. Once there was such a scarcity that the prices of it had risen to ten *tankas* per piece.[8] The fact that it was brought from elsewhere and not grown in Delhi or its neighbourhood is supported by a reference in *I'Jaz-i-Khusra vi* of a caravanian carrying betel leaves to Delhi, which was raided and plundered by highway men.[9] Amir Khusrau also refers to the tendency to evade payments of *Baz* (baj = tax).

The merchants also accompanied the royal army. Before they could accompany the army, they had to take permission of the chief of the town. In order to get their consent they made offer of presents[10].

The merchants had to pay a number of taxes like *mandi barg* (a tax on leaves), *gulfuroshi* (sale tax on flowers), *garibahr-i-tambol*

1. Ganj-i-la-Yakhfa, p. 101.
2. Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi, p. 385.
3. Ibid, p. 554.
4. Tabaqat-i-Nasiri, pp. 138, 159, 167-68 ; Barani, p. 311.
5. Barani, p. 569.
6. Afif, p. 181.
7. Siyar ul-Auliya, p. 158.
8. Ibid, p. 217.
9. Amir Khusrau, 11, pp. 249-50.
10. Afif, p. 290.

(sales tax on betel leaves), *chungi-gallah* (octroi on grain), *nigari* (a tax on indigo), *mahi faroshi* (sales tax on fish), *nadafi* (tax on cottonca carders), *sabungari* (a tax on soap making), *nakhud-i-biryan* (tax on perched gram).[1] There was *jasari*[2]. Sometimes the attitudes of the officials were not encouraging. Merchants brought grain, salt, sugar and other goods laden upon beasts of burden into the city. The men of the *diwani* seized those animals by force and sent them to old Delhi. The animals were engaged for carrying bricks from the old fallen forts. This would cause great inconvenience to the merchants and they stopped coming. The merchants had to pay the *dang*.[3] Ibn Batuta tells us that it was the custom at Multan that one-fourth of the commodities brought by the merchants was appropriated by the State and on every horse was levied a tax of seven *dinars*. Later on these taxes were remitted.[4] Yet in spite of all these obstacles and dangers, there was more active trades than the conditions of the country might lead us to expect. We hear of markets and business houses by Vidyāpati.[5] The merchants sold camphor, saffron, scents, black cotton, collyrium and clothes on good profit.[6]

There is an interesting reference in *Fawaid-ul-Fuwad* about the cloth merchant of Lahore and that of Gujarat and the higgling and and extortionate practices of the former and honest dealing of the latter. Some merchants of Lahore went to Gujarat along with their commodities. At that time Gujarat was under the Hindus. People came to purchase goods. They enquired about the price. The merchants of Lahore started demanding extortionate prices, almost double, but sold them at half prices. This surprised the Hindu merchants of Gujarat because they were not used to such higgling and haggling. They expressed surprise as to how Lahore in spite of dishonest dealings of its merchants was flourishing. When the merchants were on the way they heard about the destruction of the town by the Mongols.[7] The pious writer attributes the sack of Lahore

1. Fatuhat-i-Firoz Shahi (Elliot), 111, p. 377, S. H. Hodiwala: Studies in Indian Muslim History, pp. 340-44.
2. Afif, p. 375. It was levied from the butchers at the rate of 12 *jeetals* for every cow slaughtered.
3. Ibid, pp. 375-6.
4. Rehra, p. 12.
5. Kitilate, p. 13.
6. Ibid, p. 12.
7. Fawaid-ul-Fuwad, pp. 116-17.

to such nefarious practices of its inhabitants.[1] The demand of the Lahore merchants shows that the element of risk caused by the Mongol menace enabled them to get higher profits.

In the *Munis-ul-Qulub* we get an anecdote about a certain Muslim merchant who became bankrupt and whose strained circumstances compelled him to take 50 thousand *tankas* from a Hindu grocer by telling a lie and adducing a false witness. Being honest by nature, he was determined from the very begining to share the profits arising out from the investment of this money advanced by the grocer. In his heart he treated that transaction as a *mazarbat*—partnership of stock on the one hand and labour and management on the other. No interest was charged. Risk and profit were shared by the parties. The grocer had provided the money, treating it as a charitable gift from him. When the merchants came, after some time, to return the amount with profits, the grocer refused to take back what he had given in charity. But the Muslim merchant would not accept charity at his hands. The *qazi* to whom the case was referred appreciated their honesty and his suggestion for building a mosque out of the money was carried out.[2]

We have a reference to a class of merchants who purchased commodities in the market when the prices were low, and sold them when the prices were high. They belonged to the rich community. Sometimes by virtue of their wealth they extended their hands to high posts, and desired to become *amirs*.[3]

There were petty business men like *khabas* (baker), *halwai* (confectioner) and *qassab* (butcher). They used to satisfy the demands of the locality.

Trade practices demanded some regulations from the hand of our law-givers. During the time of Sultan Alau'uddin, we learn about the merchants on whom the Sultan imposed his economic regulations. In Firoz Shah's reign, business rules found their place in the legal compendium. Some extracts relating to *silim* (contract of sale, causing immediate payment of price and admitting delay in the delivery of the wares) and *ijasat* (first proposal of contract) are worth-quoting. Q. If a

1. Khair-ul-Majalis, p. 95.
2. Munis-ul-Qulub, pp. 311-14. The mosque built of marble stone is said to have been situated in Delhi.
3. Fatawa-i-Jahandari, (Kitab Mahal), p. 87.

certain Zaid negotiated to sell ten maunds of wheat for a *tanka* by way of contract but after some time revised his opinion, will it be proper? A. Yes. Q. If a bird-catcher undertook the delivery of 10 pattridges for a *tanka* on its being caught, will it be proper? A. No. Q. A certain lady spinner having spun 10 yards of thread gave it to a weaver who is a partner-hireling, to weave it and fixed 10 *jeetals* as the wages of the weaver. The weaver after finishing the garment spread it outside the *kargah* (manufactory) and himself slept inside the thatched house. As the workshop was not a secured place, Zainab, the lady spinner, did not give her consent to the spread of the garment. If the garment is stolen, is not the weaver a surety for the payment of its price? A. He is.[1] An interesting extract refers to the commission of the broker. If a broker had negotiated the sale of a commodity between two parties and the transaction later fell through without any fault on the part of the broker and after the terms of the deal had been agreed to, the broker was not bound to refund his commission; for it was to be considered his wages.".[2]

The industrial products of India at this period were valuable. We have got no evidence of large scale industry under private management. The industrial products were entirely in the hands of the artisans, presumably financed by merchants and middlemen. Amir Khusrau has mentioned *sargar* (goldsmith and jeweller) *ahangar* (blacksmith), *darzi* (tailor), *kafashdoz* (shoe-maker), *kulahdoz* (cap-maker), *mosa-doz* (maker of stockings), *kamangar* (bow-maker), *kusegar* (potter) and *rismantab* (corder).[3]

Amir Khusrau writes about two types of artisans, good and bad, expert and unskilled, and he gives a graphic description of the tailors, cap-makers, shoe-makers, weavers, blacksmiths, embroiders, bow-makers and arrow-makers. Despite exaggerations, imageries, similies and metaphors, a few relevant extracts from the book may be given here as they are not devoid of interest.[4] He tells us of a tailor who was so expert and skilful that with the help of his scissors he could split the hair into two and with the head of his needle he could stitch

1. Fatawa i-Firoz Shahi, ff. 246a-258b.
2. Vide K. M. Ashraf; Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan, pp. 10, 108.
3. Ijaz-i-Khusravi, iv, pp. 45-8.
4. Ibid. pp. 45-6.

two pieces of hair into one. An old tailor whose white beard flowed like the fringe of women's scraf, was such a skilful carver or engraver that if he was to repair a rent or split fissure in a garment, he could produce an embroidered quilt out of it. There was another who in addition to his wages for sewing took out such a portion of cloth whereby he could make one *isarband* (knee-pan) and *sangchee* (breast cover). It is necessary that his veins should be drawn out like the thread of embroidery. Speaking about the cap-makers he says that some of the caps were so light that they could be blown off by the fragrant breeze, and some were so heavy that they were thrown on the earth by the cap-weavers.[1] Some of the coblers made such soft and fine boots that the eyes staggered at their sight, and some boots were such as their soles made the feet swollen. Some shoe-makers made such nice and fine shoes that instead of wearing them on the feet they might be carried in the hand. The weavers were praised for the fine fabric they made out of the yarn spun by them.[2] Paying warm tribute to the excellence of Bengal muslin, he says that it was so light and fine that even after wrapping hundred yards round the head one could see the underneath hair.[3] Elsewhere speaking about the fine texture of Bengal muslin, he tells us that a piece of it could be folded inside one's nail.[4]

In the literature of the period, we get reference to rich costumes, apparently used by the reigning kings, princes and nobles : *diba-i-haft rang* (variegated brocades of seven colours), *lisat-i-samurradi* (emerald-coloured apparel), *jama-i-unnabi* (carnation-coloured garment), *jama-i-sanjab* (a fur dress), *libas-i-bahman* (an apparel of fine silk interwoven or painted with flowers), *qaba-i-fistuqi* (a close cloak of pistachio or sea-green colour). Barani mentions silken clothes named after the places of their origin such as *Delhi khass* and *Deogiri.*[5] Amir Khusrau refers to *katan-i-Bihari*, *jama-i-Deogiri*, *yakta-i-Awadh*, *rupak-i-Bihari*, *atlas* (satin) and *barharman* (multi-coloured woven silk).[6]

1. Ibid., p. 46.
2. Ibid.
3. Qiran-us-Sa'dain., pp. 32-3.
4. Ibid., pp. 100-1.
5. Tarikh-i-Firoz shahi, p. 311.
6. Ijaz-i-Khusravi, 1, p. 18, 11, pp. 38, 245 ; iv, pp. 85-6. See also the accounts of Mahuan JR. A. S., 1895, 531-2., and Barbosa, 11, 145 ; Journal of The Department of Letters, Calcutta University., 1929, pp. 224-31. Mr. Gupta gives us an account of the different varities of cotton and silken *dhotis* and *saries* manufactured in Bengal in the sixteen century.

Shihab-u'd-din, the author of the *Masalik-ul-Absar*, tells us that Sultan Mohammad Tughluq employed 500 manufacturers of golden tissue, who wove gold brocade.[1] We are told about the existence of an embroidery house of the Sultan in Delhi in which four thousand workers in silk prepared different kinds of embroidered royal robes and other clothes.[2]

The goldsmiths had good business and were always busy in designing new and beautiful patterns. The literary passage suggests that they knew their art well. Their manufacture were appreciated and bought. The author of the *Tarikh-i-Daudi* tells us about the high water mark of excellence in execution and design of the goldsmiths.[3]

Other members of the artisan community were the blacksmiths. They manufactured various implements. Amir Khusrau praising a certain blacksmith makes special mention of the fine flexible sword as thin as the leaf of the willow which trembled without any slap of the wind.[4] Speaking about the needle-worker he says that the needle-worker had taken so much pain in attaining such perfection in his profession that by his thorn-like iron-needles he made golden flowers blossom.[5] The bow-maker, named Sayeed, made such bows from the glue of fish that no body could purchase it except the Mercury of heaven. Then the bow that was made by a certain other bow-maker looked like the bow of Rustam, whose height reached the rain-laden clouds. The bow made by another bow-maker was such that no arrow could be swiftly discharged. Still another bow-maker made such an arrow that it could pierce ten layers of heart and distance of ten miles was reduced to one. There were others who prepared thin and delicate arrows.[6] Thus Amir Khusrau in his hyperbolic language has given us some idea about the types of artisans, good and bad.

That India had large number of skilled artisans who could compare favourably with similar people elsewhere is quite evident from a reference found in the *Malfuzat-i-Timuri*.[7] We can presume that these skilled artisans whose lives were spared, were taken by the conqueror

1. Elliot, 111, p. 578.
2. Otto Speies, p. 51.
3. Abdullah, f. 58b.
4. Ijaz-i-Khuravi, iv. pp. 45-48.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Tuzuk-i-Timuri (Bombay), p. 61.

to his own country in order to impart knowledge and skill to the people of Central Asia.

Amir Khusrau boastfully claimed that mansons and the stone-cutters of Delhi were superior to their fellow craftsmen of the whole of the Muslim world.[1] Babar observes that he employed 680 stone-cutters for the construction of his building at Agra and 1,491 for other places.[2]

References are also found to the manufacture of artificial plants, birds and flowers.[3] Amir Khusrau in a letter to his son makes mention of many professional artisans in addition to those mentioned above. But his observations on the dignity of labour and the lawful and unlawful professions of the different kind of artisans are well worth one's notice. He tells us that the professional artisans who earn their livelihood by lawful means made the golden flowers blossom with thorny tips of their needle. Some who dug out the stone brought gold and some provided themselves with lawful morsel through the use of pig's hair. In fact there was no trace of forbidden earning. Some while labouring at bricks and stones dropped shining pearls from the sweat of their foreheads. They got in return two *dirhams* for these pearls. Although in the eyes of the people that pearl had no value, yet on the day of resurrection it would be no less worth and value than the real pearl. The artisans who were contended with small wages were in true sense the friends of God.[4]

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1. Khazain-ul-Futuh, p. 13.
2. Babar Nama (Beveridge), 11, p. 520.
3. Afif, p. 361. see also Journal of The Department of Letters, Calcutta University, 1929, p. 240.
4. Ijaz-i-Khusravi, iv, pp- 172-73.

AHMAD SHAH ABDALI'S NINTH INVASION AND ITS REPERCUSSION ON EAST INDIA COMPANY

By

BIRENDRA VARMA

Some scholars believe that Ahmad Shah Abdali never again invaded India after 1767.[1] But the contemporary English records reveal that he led an expedition into the Punjab in 1769 as well. During 1768-69, there was a rumour throughout North India that Ahmad Shah Abdali would visit India again to chastise his enemies. It was conveyed to Verelst that Ahmad Shah Abdali had ordered his artillery to be sent in advance to Attock so that he could use it when he marched towards India during the ensuing cold season.[2] After freeing himself from the turbulent disposition of the chiefs of Badakshah[3], Abdali now intended to devote his attention towards settling his affairs in India. The Sikhs in the Punjab were also greatly alarmed and they engaged themselves in making preparations to repel the invader.[4] Abdali soon confered the provinces of Kashmir, Multan and Lahore on Salim Shah who was to administer them on his behalf.[5] He also asked Salim Shah to keep himself ready for the Indian expedition. He then sent an envoy to Ratan Singh, the successor of Jawahar Singh Jat. He demanded no less than sixty lakhs of rupees which was the balance of what Jawahar Singh Jat had agreed to pay to him as the price of revenging himself upon the Rajputs.[6] Probably, Shuja-ud-dowlah, the Nawab of Oudh, was also carrying on negotiations with the Afghan monarch.[7] These solicitations induced Ahmad Shah Abdali to undertake this expedition.

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1. Sarkar, J. N., Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, p. 496.
2. Select Committee Proceedings, 20 July 1798, pp. 465-66, News from Najib-ud-dowlah's camp.
3. Select Committee Proceedings, (India Office copy), 1768, Consultations No. I. pp. 680-81.
4. Select Committee Proceedings, 3 November 1768, p. 915, Letter of Cartier, Smith and Russell to Verelst, 24 October, 1768.
5. Ibid., 20 July 1768, pp. 465-66.
6. S. C. I. O., 21 March 1769, pp. 192-94. From Richard Smith to Verelst, 6 March 1769.
7. Select Committee Proceedings, 14 March 1769, p. 150, From Select Committee to Richard Smith, C-in-C.

The rumour of the invasion of Abdali did not excite the English Governor, Verelst who was confirmed in his belief that the Afghan monarch would not be able to cross the Punjab where the Sikhs were strongly entrenched. Still he alerted the English authorities to procure the authentic news of Abdali's approach towards India. Richard Smith, the commander-in-chief, communicated to Verelst that Ahmad Shah Abdali had arrived at Lahore.[1] He wrote, "I have no authentic advices of it. Yet the Wazir Shuja-ud-dowlah speaks of the Shah's coming to Delhi as a certainty". On 9 March 1769, Smith again transmitted the news that Abdali was encamping on the bank of the Chenab and his vanguard had reached Emanalad, twenty *kos* off from Lahore.[3] On 18 March 1769, it was reported that the Shah was "encamped at Cawdrabad which was on this side of the Jhelum".[4]

The intelligences transmitted to Verelst announced the approach of Ahmad Shah Abdali. But Verelst was himself not sure of the intentions of Abdali for he believed that he would not go beyond the Punjab. So he directed Smith to procure the earliest intelligence of the motives and designs of the Shah[5] so that the third brigade stationed at Allahabad might be withdrawn at the earliest opportune moment.[6] He also asked him to inform the Nawab Wazir that he should not be concerned over the approach of the Shah unless the safety of Oudh was in danger.[7] On 19 March 1769, Smith informed the Select Committee that "Abdali was on his way back towards Attock and the danger of any disturbance in the empire from that quarter was over in the ensuing season."[8] As visualised by Verelst, Ahmad Shah Abdali remained busy in the Punjab during the short period that he was in India. In fact he could not proceed byond Jhellum.[9] Dissensions among the followers of Abdali[10] and the mutiny in a section of

1. Ibid., 14 March 1769, p. 147, From Smith to Verelst, 25 Feb. 1769.
2. Ibid., 1 March 1769, p. 134 From Richard Smith to Select Committee, 17 Feb. 1769.
3. Ibid., 21 March 1769, p. 195.
4. S. C. I. O., 5 April 1769, Vol. 9, pp. 203-6.
5. Sel. Com. Procgs., 21 March 1769, p. 186, from Sel. Com. to Col. Smith, 21 March, 1769.
6. Ibid., p. 187.
7. Ibid., 14 March 1769, p. 151.
8. Ibid., 5 April 1769, p. 203, Advices from Allahabad, 18 March, 1769.
9. Calender of Persian Correspondence, Vol. II, No. 1499.
10. Sel. Com, Procgs., 21 April, 1769.

his army compelled the Shah to go back to his country.[1] The failure of this expedition is described in a letter of Raja Parsodh Ray to Verelst—"The news from these parts is that Shah Abdali had come as far as Jhellum, when owing to dissensions among his followers, he was compelled to return to his own country. On the way between Peshawar and Kabul a tumult arose in his army, his whole camp was plundered and many of his chiefs and soldiers were either killed or dispersed. The Shah and Shah Vali Khan, his Vazir, in a miserable plight took the road to Kandhar."[2]. Shuja-ud-dowlah also informed Verelst that "Shah Abdallah had made an inglorious retreat."[3] The prolonged fight with the Sikhs in the Punjab must have convinced Abdali of the futility of any further campaigning in India. The Sikhs proved to be an "insuperable obstacle to Abdallah".[4] The Select Committee accordingly expressed its pleasure on Shah's retreat towards his own dominions because it would "restore peace and tranquility throughout the empire and Shah Alam and Shuja-ud-dowlah would be delivered from their late apprehensions at his approach and it would also afford an excellent opportunity to them to recall the brigade from Allahabad".[5]

The English attitude towards Abdali had changed considerably due to the consciousness of the failure of Abdali's previous expeditions. But in the official correspondence of this period there was a "lurking suspicion of the motives of Shuja-ud-dowlah, the Nawab of Oudh". Thus in order to safeguard the frontier of Bengal from future incursions of Abdali and also to keep a watchful eye over the conduct and movements of the Nawab of Oudh, Verelst refused to carry out the directions of the Court of Directors who were not willing to allow him to keep English forces at Allahabad.[6] The Court of Directors wrote: "Our views and expectations are confirmed within the Karamnasa, we are impatient to hear our troops are recalled from Allahabad."[7] But Verelst believed that the third brigade stationed at Allahabad would

1. Verelst to Select Committee, 16 Dec. 1769.
2. Calender of Persian Correspondence, Vol. II, No. 1499.
3. Select Committee Proceedings, 19 May 1769 ; C. P. C., Vol. II, No. 1365.
4. Select Committee Proceedings, 15 December 1769, p. 631, From Verelst to Sel. Committee, 15 December, 1769.
5. S. C. I. O., 1769, p. 148.
6. Letters from the Court of Directors, 16 March, 1768.
7. Ibid.

"serve both as a check to the operations of Abdali as also a security to the territorial possession of Shah Alam and Shuja-ud-dowlah."[1] He wrote to the Court of Directors that "to conciliate the minds of His Majesty and the Vizier and to curb the ambitious project and hostile intentions of the latter, were the first motives for continuing the brigade at Allahabad after the receipt of your order—to enforce, if necessary, required the performance of the Vizier's late treaty with us, to be in readiness to support the Madras administration, if the security of our possessions on the coast of Caromandal, should require our making a diversion against Maratha power and to be a check on the ambitious project of Shah Abdallah should he have determined to attack the frontier of your allies".[2] Verelst also pointed out to the Directors that "policy requires we should hold ourselves in constant readiness to oppose every attempt to destroy that equality and balance of power among the princes of the empire in which consists our greatest security".[3]

The Chunar fort was also considered by Verelst to be of strategic importance for the security of English possessions against future "irruptions of Abdali". It commanded a central position and hence a strong English force was kept there in spite of the strong protests from the Wazir.[4] On the representations of the Wazir[5] Verelst wrote in a diplomatic language that the interests of both of them were identical and the stationing of small force in the fort under pressure of necessity should not count his displeasure and interrupt the goodwill subsisting between them.[6]

The last step of Verelst against "unforseen dangers and sudden irruptions of Ahmad Shah Abdali in future" was to increase the company's military establishment.[7] He requested the Directors to agree to sanction at least the strength proposed by Clive.[8] He also

1. Secret : Letters to the Court of Directors, 1764-70, S. No. 1, p. 145.
2. Ibid.
3. Secret : Letters to the Court, 10 April 1769 ; Verelst, H., A view of the rise, progress, and present state of the English government in Bengal including a reply to the misrepresentations of Mr. Bolts and other writers, p. 51.
4. C. P. C., Vol. II, No. 1524, From the Wazir to Verelst, 12 August 1769.
5. Ibid., Sel. Com. Procgs., 3 Aug. 1769, From Harper to Col. Smith, 10 July 1769.
6. C. P. C., Vol. II, No. 1534, From the Governor to the Wazir, 16 Aug. 1769.
7. Letters to the Court of Directors, 10 April 1769.
8. Ibid.

wanted to raise a substantial force of cavalry in view of the danger from Abdali and authorised recruitment of four additional regiments of cavalry. The Directors disapproved of Verelst's actions and expressed their strong displeasure at the increase of military expenditure. The invasions of Abdali alarmed the English who adopted various measures to protect their territories from the Afghan menace and ultimately the superior intelligence and shrewd diplomacy of the English triumphed in warding off the danger.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE UPANIṢADIC EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

By

Brajdeo Prasad Roy

The Upaniṣads deal with the spiritual and the metaphysical thoughts of our seers of the remote past, and show the path of salvation to the people. So it may appear futile to find out educational information from these philosophical Books. But as a matter of fact, any kind of literature is representative of its Age. It is just like a mirror in which we can see the vision of the respective Age as reflected in it, because consciously or unconsciously the writer draws something from the society. This is the case with the Upaniṣads also. We have abundance of material in these Books, which throws light on the contemporary educational system. But out of them we have to separate the historical ingredients from purely philosophical staff. A critical perusal of the Upaniṣads throws considerable light on different aspects of the then prevailing educational system such as the notions of knowledge, the educational institutions, the teachers and the students, the subjects of study, the duration of the period of the study, the methods of teaching, fees, examinations and so on. We shall discuss all these points.

Notions of Knowledge

Regarding the notions of Knowledge we get a lot of information. The ultimate aim of human life is the attainment of Libertion but this cannot be obtained unless knowledge is gained. In the Upaniṣads knowledge is known as Vidyā which means the vision of the thing worthy of being known. The notions of knowledge are well described in many of the Mantras of these Books. The sages put questions : What is the Vidyā ? What is its utility ? Who can obtain it ? What are the fruits of its attainment ? It was the general view of the people that Vidyā must be obtained as it is the light which shows the real path, passing through which one may reach the goal of one's life—never to return to suffer from the chains of birth and death. The attainment of Vidyā results in salvation,

One who does not cultivate it goes to hell and suffers. But the man who is a hypocrite is worse than the man who does not cultivate it.[1] We must attempt to obtain knowledge for our salvation. But hypocrisy must not be shown by us as it is a very dangerous thing in the path of our betterment. It was the firm view of the seers that Vidyā results in good and Avidyā in evil. These two have different results.[2] Here Vidyā stands for what is known as jñāna. The Gītā[3] also advances the same view that jñāna is of more importance. It consists of unattached mind everywhere, disappearance of the thirst for enjoyment, pure reason, sāttvika food, living in a sacred and lonely place, control of the senses, restraint of mind, control of speech, body and mind, eradication of passion, meditation, avoidance of egoism, violence, arrogance, lust, anger and greed, cheerfulness of mind and the eradication of desires. By the practice of all these things man gets knowledge which enables him to obtain Immortality. But the cultivation of Avidyā results in suffering in the present life. It is the main cause of the future birth and death which cause suffering.

Vidyā and Avidyā have been taken in the sense of knowledge and ignorance. But the former has been used to denote karman also. It has been said that both jñāna and karman must be cultivated and not one of them. The cultivation of karman enables man to cross death, and jñāna enables him to obtain immortality.[4] No one should discard his duty as a hindrance to the path of Salvation. The Gītā[5] also says that prohibited actions and actions prompted by desire should be given up; but renunciation of action prescribed by the Scripture is not proper. Its abandonment through ignorance has been styled as partaking of tamas. People do not understand the meaning of jñāna. They should attempt to get knowledge and should cultivate karman. One should perform one's duty prescribed by the Scriptures and along with it one should cultivate vairāgya-vṛtti, non-attachment. The human body has been created in order to realise the Self—one's own identification with all the Jīvas. If one is successful in this respect then it is a better for one. But if one fails then

1. Īśa. 9.
2. Ibid. 10.
3. Gītā. 18. 49-55.
4. Īśa. 11., Kena. 1. 4.
5. Gītā. 18. 4.

it is a great loss to oneself.[1] Immortality is obtained with the help of Vidyā. So it is our essential duty to obtain it. By obtaining it with proper means man eradicates his sins and obtains the best Heaven.[2] It was held that spiritual knowledge is the root of all knowledge[3]. Later on in the Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali[4] we see that samādhi-siddha can do any thing according to his will. He can understand all languages and become all-powerful.

In the Upaniṣads we have two types of Vidyā and both are to be cultivated by persons wishing realisation of the Self[5] The first is Aparā Vidyā in which four Vedas and six vedāṅgas[6] have been included. This Vidyā is known as the laukikī Vidyā also, as it is related to the life of the persons in the physical world and helps them in worldly enjoyments. The second type of Vidyā is known as Parā Vidyā—spiritual knowledge which helps persons in their attempt to realise Brahman.[7]

A person who is established in Avidyā but who regards himself as established in Vīdyā, suffers much again and again like a blindman guided by another blindman.[8] In this context Avidyā has been regarded as the fruitless performance of Yajña[9] which is like a broken boat unable to help persons in crossing the ocean of birth and death. The cultivators of Avidyā regard themselves successful. But really they do not know the real path of good. They come to this physical world again and again to suffer. Vidyā cannot be obtained by those who are engaged in worldly life and perform duties with desire for fruit.[10] Vidyā is obtainable only by those who discard worldly life and retire to the forest to dwell therein, are peaceful and wise, roam for alms, control the mind and the senses, have faith in the Supreme and have sāttvika-vṛttis.[11] Persons desirous of Vidyā

1. Kena. 2. 5.
2. Ibid., 4. 9.
3. Muṇḍaka. 1. 1. 1.
4. Patañjali Yogasūtra, Vibhūtipāda.
5. Muṇḍaka. 1. 1. 4.
6. Ibid., 1. 1. 5.
7. Ibid., 1. 1. 5.
8. Ibid., 1. 2. 8.
9. Ibid., 1. 2. 9.
10. Ibid., 1. 2. 11.
11. Ibid., 1. 2. 12., Ka ha. 1. 3. 14.

should perform penance and observe celibacy.[1] Tapas, dāna and karman are essentially to be followed by the seekers of knowledge.[2] The avirata, aśānta and the asamāhita cannot obtain it.[3] Vidyā is obtained with the help of intelligence and study by those who have keen and sharp insight.[4] One can then gain complete knowledge. The person who regards himself as the master of knowledge knows only a part of it.[5]

Educational Institutions

There were different types of educational institutions in the country contributing their share in the development and cultivation of knowledge. They were the Āśramas of the sages, the yajñabhūmis and the courts of the kings. The Upaniṣads reveal that only a few are interested in spiritual knowledge; but still fewer know it. The teachers of the spiritual knowledge are very rare and the man is very lucky[6] if he gets a teacher who has realised the Self. Spiritual knowledge is not easy to realise. So an experienced teacher was needed to guide the students. The teachers of the spiritual knowledge were not ordinary persons hankering after wordly enjoyments. In the ancient Indian educational system, Āśramas were of much importance. These were the houses of the teachers and the students went there to gain knowledge from them. People thought that spiritual knowledge is beyond the reach of logic[7] and no one can understand it without the help of an experienced teacher. The students went to the Āśramas of famous teachers. We notice six śrotriya Brāhmaniṣṭha Brāhmaṇas going to the Āśrama of the sage Pippalāda in order to get spiritual knowledge from him[8]. The sage Śaunaka was a Mahāśāla[9] Brāhmaṇa whose Āśrama was a famous centre of learning. Aṅgiras also was a famous teacher. Vāruṇī was another teacher very respected by the people as a great scholar.[10] It was the view of the people that only the wise can

1. Praśna. 1. 2.
2. Kena. 4. 8.
3. Kaṭha. 1. 2. 24.
4. Ibid., 1. 3. 12.
5. Kena. 2. 9.
6. Kaṭha. 1. 2. 7.
7. Ibid. 1. 2. 8.
8. Praśna. 1. 1.
9. Muṇḍaka. 1. 3.
10. Taittirīya. 3. 1.

impart spiritual knowledge. So the aspirants of knowledge should go to experienced teachers in order to get it from them.[1]

The institution of the Guru was essential. It was the notion of the people that only the Brahmaniṣṭha Guru can impart knowledge to his students.[2] The knowledge obtained from a Guru was regarded as more important than the knowledge obtained from the gods[3]. Mostly the Brāhmaṇas were the teachers. But in the field of philosophical knowledge, the Kṣatriyas dominated. There was no caste restriction. Even a Śūdra could be persuaded to impart knowledge to a Kṣatriya. The king Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa went to Raikkva, a Śūdra, in order to get spiritual knowledge from him and for this he promised to offer him one chariot, a garland of the precious jewels and the village in which he resided.[4] The Pañcāla king Jaivali Pravāhaṇa,[5] the Kekaya king Aśvapati[6], Janaka of Mithilā[7] and Ajātaśatru of Kāśī were prominent Kṣatriya philosopher kings imparting spiritual knowledge even to Brāhmaṇa philosophers of highest merit. Knowledge was regarded as a sacred thing and was obtainable from anyone irrespective of caste and creed.[8]

The teachers were known as the Ācaryas. They had to face difficulties due to bad students. So they performed sacrificial rites to invoke God's grace on them in order to make them honest, graspers of knowledge and controllers of the senses.[9] It was the duty of the Ācarya to perform the Yajñopavīta ceremony of the students who were very poor. The students used to go to the Āśramas of famous teachers. But we have evidences to show that some persons remained with their fathers who imparted education to them.[10] When students went to the Āśramas, teachers asked questions to them in order to get information about their personal details.[11]

1. Kaṭha. 1. 3. 4.
2. Muṇḍaka. 1. 2. 22.
3. Chāndogya. 1. 9. 1-3.
4. Ibid., 4. 2. 5.
5. Ibid., 5. 3. 6.
6. Ibid., 5. 11. 2-4
7. Bṛhadāraṇyaka. 2. 1. 1.
8. Taittirīya. 1. 3.
9. Ibid., 1. 4.
10. Ibid., Bhṛguvallī, 1. 4.
11. Chāndogya. 4. 4. 1-5.

The courts of the kings also were famous centres of learning. Kings patronised learned persons and examined the graduates just returned from the Aśramas after the completion of their education. The Pañcāla king Jaivali Pravāhaṇa had examined a student named Śvetaketu who had returned from the Āśrama after getting education.[1] Some kings were specialists in the fields of philosophy and even great sages went to them to get knowledge from them. Āruṇī, a famous Brāhmaṇa philosopher, had gone to Pravāhaṇa to get spiritual knowledge from him.[2] Again, we have references to show six mahāgṛhastha paramaśrotriya Brāhmaṇas going to the court of the king Aśvapati of the Kekaya country, for getting information regarding Brahman and the Soul[3]. They were Prācīnaśāla, Satyayajña, Indradyumna, Jana, and Buḍila. The Kāśirāja Ajātaśatru also was a great philosopher and so was Janaka the king of Mithilā.[4] The kings attracted scholars who visited their courts for exchange of views.[5]

Kings performed different types of sacrifice in order to please the gods for the welfare of their subjects and for the fulfilment of their personal desires. Learned Brāhmaṇas from distant places came to take part in the performance of the sacrifice, and on such occasion, kings held discussions on philosophical problems. Janaka, the king of Mithilā, held such discussion on the occasion of the performance of the Bahudakṣiṇa sacrifice by him. He wanted to find out the best philosopher. So he declared a reward of 1000 cows for the best Brahmavid Brāhmaṇa. This caused interesting and learned conference in which the prominent philosophers of the Age had assembled to take part in the discussion. Some of the names of those philosophers are preserved in the Upaniṣads. They are Yājñavalkya, Aśvala, Ārtabhāga, Lahyāyanī Bhūjyū, Cakrāyaṇa, Usasta, Kaloha, Gārgī, Āruṇī, Uddālaka, Śākalya and so on.[6] This is only an example. It was the practice to hold such discussion on the occasion of the performance of the sacrifice,

1. Ibid., 5. 3. 1-5.
2. Ibid., 5. 3. 6.
3. Ibid., 5. 11. 14.
4. Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 2. 1. 1.
5. Ibid., 4. 1. 1.
6. Ibid., 3. 1-9, Brāhmaṇas.

Thus problems were solved. Successful persons were rewarded with cows and gold.[1]

Students and Teachers

The Upaniṣads throw considerable light on matters relating to students and teachers. Students were known as the Antevāsins[2] because they had to go to distant places in order to get education from famous teachers. In ancient times our educational institutions were in the forests, far away from the disturbed life in the villages and the cities. Students had to go to the Āśramas of their teachers after the performance of the Yajñopavīta. They were known as the Brahmacārins because they had to observe celibacy and were the seekers of Brahman. The observance of celibacy was a condition to serve as a ground for spiritual knowledge. It was essential also for sound health and spiritual lustre. One of the principles of the ancient Indian education was that knowledge should be imparted only to deserving students. Much care was taken by the teachers while accepting students. Brahmacarya, tapas and dama were strictly to be followed by students. When the six śrotriya Brāhmaṇas went to Pippalāda to obtain spiritual knowledge from him, he advised them to reside in his Āśrama for one complete year, observing celibacy, performing penance and cultivating faith. After that, he accepted them as his pupils.[3] We have other references to show that more care was taken for the maintenance of the health of students. It has been said that the limbs of students should be strong, their voice should be very clear. Further, they had to apply their mind to the subjects of study.[4] For all these things, students prayed to the gods. According to the Upaniṣadic educational thinkers, tapas, karman and dama are the funnamentals of knowledge. So students had to perform penance for sound health and had to control the senses.[5]

The story of Naciketā[6] reveals that students should not fear difficult lessons. It was the notion of the people that knowledge is difficult to acquire even by the gods. So students keeping patience

1. Ibid., 3. 1. 2.
2. Taittirīya. 1-34.
3. Praśna. 1. 2.
4. Kaṭha, śāntipāṭha.
5. Kena. 4. 8.
6. Kaṭha. 1. 1. 20-22.

should peacefully attempt to understand lessons. They had to remember that the attainment of knowledge is of highest value and worldly things are of no use. So they should attempt only to gain knowledge.[1] Teachers liked those students who had the patience of the highest order. So the students tried to cultivate Satyadhṛti.[2] The mind is spiritualised not by logic but by association with the wise.[3] Only a wise student is fit to whom education should be imparted.[4] Some technical words throw light on interesting things. Teachers imparted knowledge to those students who came to them [उपसन्न] for that purpose, who had peaceful mind [प्रसन्नचित्त] and had controlled their senses [समन्वित].[5] Only active students [क्रियावन्त:] versed in the Vedic studies [श्रोत्रिया:] could obtain spiritual knowledge.[6] Medhā played an important role in the Vedic educational system because students had to depend on the power of memory in order to learn lessons. So they offered prayers to Indra for sweet voice and medhā.[7] Students were to be very honest, active and had to control their senses.[8]

References throw some light on the problem of the relation ship between teachers and students. It was regarded that the student's good relation with the teacher was the foundation stone of his success in life. Both were careful for the maintenance of cordial relations. The opening lines of the Kaṭhopaniṣad show that they prayed to the god for their protection together, nourishment together, gaining energy together and for the illumination of the subjects studied by them together. It was their ardent desire that there should never be enmity between the student on the one hand and the teacher on the other.[9]

Students went to the teachers with sacrificial wood in their hands [समित्पाणय:] as it was a symbol of the students' dedication and

1. Ibid., 1. 1. 27.
2. Ibid., 1. 2. 9.
3. Ibid., 1. 2. 9.
4. Ibid., 1. 2. 11.
5. Muṇḍaka. 1. 2. 13.
6. Ibid., 3. 2. 11.
7. Taittirīya. 1. 4.
8. Ibid., 11.
9. Kaṭha, Śāntipāṭha.

sense of service to the teachers.[1] The teachers at first acquainted themselves with the students.[2] There are references to show that teachers requested students desirous of higher studies to wait in the Āśrama in order to prepare themselves for one year.[3]

The students regarded the teacher as their father. The teacher was regarded as the real father as it was he who imparted knowledge to enable them to come out of the ignorance.[4] Students prayed to the gods for the well-being of the teacher.[5] Students and teacher are inseparable and are closely tied together. As in the conjugation there are pūrvarūpa and uttararūpa and both constitute a word, so the teacher is the pūrvarūpa and the students the uttararūpa and both are joined like the Saṁdhi. This conjugation results in Vidyā. The reason of this conjugation is pravacana[6] by the teacher. The Guru was regarded as an essential institution for acquiring spiritual knowledge. So it has been said that the students should go to the "गुरुं श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठम्"—the teacher[7] who has studied the Vedas and has realised Brahman. The teacher used to perform special sacrifices for the well-being of students[8]. He in return had to look after the domestic affairs of the teacher. We see Hārimata Drumata ordering Satyakāma Jābāla to graze his 400 cows, and the latter also did not return from the forest until the cows were multiplied into 1000.[9] Students lived on bhikṣā.[10] They did not pay monthly fees to the teacher, but offered dakṣiṇā on the occasion of the Convocation ceremony. It was the notion that the teacher must not accept any thing given by the students prior to the completion of their education.[11] Students regarded their teacher as the god.[12]

The Subjects of Study

In the Upaniṣads the main subject of study is spiritual know-

1. Praśna. 1. 1.
2. Chāndogya. 4. 4. 5.
3. Praśna. 1. 2.
4. Ibid., 6. 8.
5. Aitereya & Taittirīya. śāntipāṭha.
6. Taittirīya. 1. 3.
7. Muṇḍaka. 1. 2. 12.
8. Taittirīya. 1. 4.
9. Chāndogya. 4. 4. 5.
10. Ibid., 4. 3. 5.
11. Bṛhadāraṇyaka. 4. 1. 2.
12. Taittirīya. 1. 11.

ledge but other subjects also were studied by the students. By the word śikṣā, we mean education in general. But in the Upaniṣads it has been taken in the sense of the Science of pronunciation of the Vedic Mantras. In the Vedic system of education, more emphasis was laid upon the pronunciation of words because it was regarded that change of pronunciation changes the meaning of the word. Hence the results are disastrous. According to the Upaniṣads Śikṣā included six things:[1]

1-2. The varṇas and the svaras, from अ to ऌ. The students had to learn the correct pronunciation of the varṇas and svaras.

3-4. The mātrā and bala stand for the duration and the accent on the pronunciation of words respectively. More care was taken for the accent of the varṇas and the svaras. Mātrā and the bala had two classes—internal and external. The former again was divided into five sub-classes: spṛṣṭa, īṣatspṛṣṭa, vivṛta, īṣatvivṛita and saṁvṛta. The latter was divided into eleven sub-classes vivāra, saṁvāra, śvāśa, nāda, ghoṣa, aghoṣa, alpaprāṇa, mahāprāṇa, udātta, anudātta and svarita.

5. Sāman. It means the art of singing the Vedic Mantras in melodious tunes.

6. Santāna. It means conjugation. Words change their forms in connection with varṇas and svara and thus their meanings also are changed.

Besides Śikṣā there were large number of other subjects studied by the people and the Chāndogyopaniṣad[2] gives a list of those subjects: the four Vedas, Itihāsa, Purāṇa, Vyākaraṇa, Śrāddhakalpa, Gaṇita, Utpātajñāna, Nidhiśāstra, Tarkaśāstra, Nīti, Devavidyā, Brahma-vidyā, Bhūtavidyā, Śastravidyā, Nakṣatravidyā, Sarpavidyā, Devajanavidyā, Nirukta, Dhanurveda, Jyotiṣa, Saṁgīta and Śilpa. Furthermore, the Yajñaśāstra[3] also was a separate branch of learning and Āruṇī Uddālaka had gone to the Madra country in order to learn this Science from a teacher named

1. Ibid., I. 2
2. Chāndogya. 7. 1. 1-5.
3. North Western Punjab.

Patañcala.[1] Here we see that during the Upaniṣadic period different branches of learning were studied and there were religious, secular and professional subjects to be studied.

Method of Education

In the Upaniṣads there are references which throw light on the methods of study, and the system through which education was imparted to the students. The teachers explained[2] the subjects to the students so that they could understand them. The most popular method was in the form of question and answer. The students put questions to the teachers and the latter tried to answer. This system naturally helped the students develop their critical and logical faculties. The teachers did not dictate their lectures to the students. In ancient Greece also this system of imarting education was very popular and knowledge was cultivated through discussions. The teachers presented examples to the students in order to clarify the topics of study. The students had to listen to the teachers attentively (श्रुत्वा) and had to understand (सम्परिगृह्य) the lessons, had to think over the subject-matter of the study (प्रवृह्य), and after this knowledge was acquired [प्राप्य] by them.[3] Pravacana, medhā and bahuśravaṇa were of more importance in the Upaniṣadic scheme of education.[4] A man cannot gain Vidyā, who is not free from evil habits and manners, has no peace of mind and has not controlled his senses.[5] The students should have sharp intelligence[6] and concentrated mind in order to understand the subjects[7]. They should attempt to gain more and more knowledge and must not be satisfied with what has been gained. Even great sages went to more learned ones in order to gain advanced knowledge about the subjects of their study. Sukeśā, Satyākāma, Sauryāyaṇī, Aśvalāyana, Bhārgava, and Kabandhī went to Pippalāda with sacrificial wood in their hands for gaining more spiritual knowledge from him though they were great Brāhmaṇas who had studied the Vedas well, and had realised Brahman (ब्रह्मपराः श्रोत्रियाः). Yet they were

1. Bṛhadāraṇyaka. 4. 1. 2.
2. Īśa. 10. & 13., Kena. 1. 3.
3. Kaṭha. 1. 2. 13.
4. Ibid., 1. 2. 23.
5. Ibid., 1. 2. 24.
6. Ibid., 1. 3. 12.
7. Ibid., 2. 3. 9.

aspirants of higher spiritual knowledge (परमब्रह्म अन्वेषमाणाः[1]). Different branches of learning were cultivated and preserved by particular families. The father handed over his academic possession to his son. Thus the process continued and several branches of learning were preserved and well cultivated from generation to generation.[2] As for example, spiritual knowledge was imparted by Brahmā to his son Atharvan. The latter transmitted it to his own son Aṅgiras who in his turn imparted it to his son Satyavāha. This system was known as paramparākrama. Śvetaketu and Āruṇī Uddālaka got education from their respective fathers.[3]

Duration of Study

So far as the problem of the duration of the period of study is concerned we come to the conclusion that there was no fixed rule regarding this matter. It depended on the intelligence of the students. Yet they had to stay in the Āśrama for a considerable period of time. Even the learned ones had to stay in the Āśrama for one year for their preparation for higher and advanced studies in spiritual knowledge. Students usually stayed in the Āśrama for 12 years. After this period their Convocation[4] ceremony was performed. But delay also was made in case with certain students. We see Satyakāma Jābāla advising Upakośala to stay for a longer period even after the complition of his studies for 12 years. Students went to the Āśramas after their Yajñopavita. The age of this ceremony differed from varṇa to varṇa. But generally it was performed at the age of 12. Students retured from the Āśramas at the age of 25 to their houses to begin the gṛhastha stage of life. So it seems that students studied for 12 years.[5] But persons wishing to gain more knowledge devoted their whole life to advanced knowledge.

Teacher's livelihood

Now we shall discuss the means of support of the teachers. They recieved abundance of money from kings as dakṣiṇā on the occasions of the performance of sacrifices by them. Teachers followed a simple way of life. Hence they did not need more materials to maintain comfortable life. Education was not a commercial commodity to be exchanged for money. It was the principle of the

1. Praśna. 1. 1.
2. Muṇḍaka. 1. 1. 2.
3. Aitareya, Bhṛguvallī, 1. 6.
4. Chāndogya. 4. 10. 1-3
5. Ibid., 6. 1. 2.

Upaniṣadic educational system that the teacher must not accept any thing from the students prior to the completion of their studies.[1] On the occasion of their Samāvartana Saṁskāra, they offered dakṣiṇā to their respective teachers according to their economic conditions. Students who could not offer Dakṣiṇā served the Gurus in different capacities. But economic condition was never a hindrance to the education of poor students. Teachers did not realise monthly fees from students because they had not to care for the means of their livelihood. The State offered tax-free land to them; they got dakṣiṇā and the public also supported them.

Examination System

The present examination system was unknown to ancient India because the system of imparting education was practical. Students had to satisfy their teachers with practical progress and personal abilities. The Convocation ceremony offered the certificate of the completion of the students' education. But it was not enough. The king's court also was an examination hall. Learned persons would be present in the court. They examined the educational ability of the students. Śvetaketu, a new graduate, had gone to the Pañcāla Samiti where he was examined by the king Jābāli Pravāhaṇa. The king put five questions to Śvetaketu. But he could not answer a single question. He returned to his house with the remark of the king as to how a person can regard himself a learned man, who cannot answer even those questions.[2] The king's court was an academic institution which examined the merits and the abilities of the scholars. Real merits of the learned were examined in the courts of the king, where open discussions were held for the same purpose. The scholarship of the learned was recognised and they were rewarded by the State.

The aim of the ancient educational system was to mould the student's character in such a way that he could realise the four objectives of human life. Svādhyāya and pravacana were essential for the cultivation of knowledge. A study of the Convocation Address reveals that teachers gave more emphasis on the moral life of the students even during the periods of their other three Āśramas. They advised students to speak the truth, control the senses and mind, to perform Agnihotra, respect the elders, to act according to the rules of morality and to regulate the sexual life

1. Bṛhadāraṇyaka. 4. 1. 2.
2. Chāndogya. 5. 3. 1-5.

to produce progeny. The different Upaniṣadic educational thinkers have advanced different opinions regarding the comparative importance of the elements of morality. Satyavāha, the son of Rathītara, is of the opinion that truth is the best virtue to be followed. Taponitya, the son of Puruśiṣṭa, thinks that tapas is of more importance than truth. But Nāka, the son of Mudgala, thinks that the study of the Scriptures is the best virtue to be practised.[1]

The Convocation Address was a landmark in the history of the ancient Indian educational system because it sets higher ideals before the students to be followed. Truth is the most vital moral element in the life of man. So the Guru preached the students to follow it in letter and spirit. Besides this, they had to follow *dharma* because it sustains human existence. Knowledge is limitless and it should be the ideal of every person to gain more and more knowledge. So the teacher advised to students to continue their studies even after the completion of their educatfon in the Āśramas. The national tradition and the heritage are to be preserved. They require generations after generations. So the teacher advised the students to cause the births of future generations to carry on the national heritage. They had not to discard the duties to truth, to their studies, and to the gods and to the ancestors. Education had social significance also. So the students were advised to serve and respect the parents, the elders and the guests like gods. The society consists of many members and even the great commit blunders and the commoners follow them. So students were advised not to do anything wrong in their life and were requested not to follow the elders who committed wrongs and pursued immoral way of life. The students were advised to consult the elders in doubtful cases. In the opinion of the Upaniṣadic sages it is the rule, the teaching and the true purport of the Vedas. This was their command which the students should follow.[89]

All these things indicate that during the Upaniṣadic period higher ideals of education were set before the people. The notions of knowledge were praiseworthy. There existed good relationship between students and teachers. The scope of education was very wide and a large number of subjects were studied. The technique of teaching was practical. Fees were not realised from the students and the aim of education was refinement of the people.

1. Taittirīya. 1. 9.

UPANIṢADS AND VEDIC RITUALS

By

BASANT KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAYA

The religion and culture of India are based on the Vedas which, it has been said, were not composed by man but revealed by God and therefore infallible. Western scholars began to study the Vedas diligently in order to show that they are not hoary and that they do not contain any noble ideals. Not content with giving their own verdict that the Vedas were composed by ordinary men who wanted to enjoy the pleasures of life, they said that the Upaniṣads do not believe in the existence of Vedic gods and the efficacy of Vedic sacrifices. As I shall show subsequently, these statements are not correct. I shall first quote their opinions on this point. Max Muller writes, "In these Upaniṣads the whole ritual or sacrificial system of the Vedas is not only ignored but directly rejected as useless, nay, as mischievous. The ancient gods of the Vedas are no longer recognised."[1] Deussen writes, "The Ātman doctrine (i.e., the main doctrine of the Upaniṣads) is fundamentally opposed to the Vedic cult of the gods and the Brahmanical system of ritual"[2] Macdonnel writes, "Though the Upaniṣads generally form a part of the Brāhmaṇas they really represent a new religion which is in practical opposition to the ritual or practical side."[3] Dr Winternitz writes, "While the Brahmins were pursuing their barren sacrificial science, other circles were engaged upon those highest questions which were at last treated so admirably in the Upaniṣads. From these hermits, who were not originally connected with the priestly caste, proceeded the forest hermits and wandering ascetics."[4] Dr Robert Ernest Hume writes, "No longer is worship or sacrifice or good conduct the requisite of religion in this life or of salvation in the next. Knowledge secures the latter and disapproves the former. The whole religious doctrine of different gods and the necessity of sacrificing to the gods is seen to be a stupendous fraud by the man who has

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1. *Origin of Vedanta*, p. 16.
2. *Religion and Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 21.
3. *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 21.
4. *History of Indian Literature Vol. I.* p. 237.

acquired metaphysical knowledge of the monistic unity of the self and of the world in Brahman or Ātman."[1] Garbe writes, "The Brahmin priest is proficient only at excogitating sacrifice after sacrifice and hair-splitting definitions and explanations of senseless ritualistic hocus pocus. All at once lofty thought apprears on the scene. A passionate desire to solve the riddle of the universe and its relation to one's own self holds the mind captive." Hertel says, "The Kṣattriyas unable to believe in the Vedic gods substituted instead the idea of nature powers and propounded a philosophy which was essentially a monism, atheistic, non-materialistic and morally indifferent."

Because the Upaniṣads declare the existence of One God (Brahman), Western scholars have concluded that the "authors of the Upaniṣads" did not believe in the existence of minor gods. Because the Upaniṣads declare that the aim of life is the attainment of salvation through the knowledge of Brahman, Western scholars have concluded that the authors of the Upaniṣads did not believe in the efficacy of sacrifices in attaining heaven. But both these inferences are illogical. The ideas of One Supreme God and of many subordinate gods are not contradictory. From the statement that one can attain Brahman through knowledge, it does not follow that one cannot attain heaven by performing Vedic sacrifics.

I shall now quote passages from the Upaniṣads to show that the Upaniṣads believed in the existence of Vedic gods and the efficacy of Vedic sacrifices. In the Īśopaniṣad we find the dying soul praying to the fire god (Agni) to lead it by a pleasant path.[2] In the Kenopaniṣad we find that Brahman appeared before the gods in a fine form and the fire god could not burn a straw nor could the air god move it, because Brahman willed it otherwise. It has also been said that Indra, Vāyu and Agni surpassed the other gods because they first perceived Brahman in close proximity.[3] In the Kaṭhopaniṣad Naciketā first learns from Yama how to perform Vedic

1. *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, p. 58.

2. अग्ने नय सुपथा राये अस्मान् Iśa Upa. 78.

3. तस्माद्वा एते देवा अतितरामिव अन्यान् देवान्
यदग्निर्वायुरिन्द्रस्ते ह्येनन्नेदिष्ठं पस्पर्शुः Kena. Upa. 4.2.

sacrifices and then get his lessons in the knowledge of Brahman.[1] When Naciketā asks for Brahmajñāna, Yama says that the gods also wanted to know it[2]. The Praśnopaniṣad says that those who perform Vedic sacrifices, dig wells etc. go to the heaven which is in the moon.[3] The Muṇḍakopaniṣad begins by saying that of all the minor gods Brahmā first came into existence.[4] The distinction between Brahman and Brahmā must be borne in mind. Brahman is the Supreme god. He exists always. Brahmā disappears at the *pralaya* and is created by Brahman before the world is created.

There is a passage in the Muṇḍakopaniṣad which has been interpreted by Western scholars to mean that the Upaniṣads did not believe in the efficacy of Vedic sacrifices. The passage runs thus: "These Vedic sacrifices are like frail crafts. In these sacrifices rituals without knowledge are prescribed. Hence they are inferior. For their performance 18 persons are required (16 priests, the person who performs the sacrifice and his wife). Those ignorant persons who think that they (sacrifices) are the best things again become subject to old age and death."[5] It means that those who perform Vedic sacrifices cannot attain liberation but are born again. Hence they become subject to old age and death. Those who consider sacrifices as the best thing have been called ignorant because they do not know that the highest aim of life is to attain liberation and become free from the sufferings of old age and death. It does not say that by performing sacrifices one cannot go to heaven. In fact after two verses we get a verse that those who perform sacrifices go to heaven: "Those who consider sacrifices and digging tanks, wells etc. as the best things, and do not know anything better, are ignorant. They enjoy the fruits of the good acts in heaven and again enter this earth or some inferior place."[6] Hence it is quite wrong to say that verse

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1. स त्वमग्निं स्वर्ग्यमध्येषि मृत्यो
   प्रब्रूहि तं श्रद्दधानाय मह्यम् Katha Upa. 1.1.13.
2. देवैरत्रापि विचिकित्सितं किल Katha Upa. 2.1.9.
3. इष्टापूर्ते कृतमित्युपासते ते चान्द्रमसमेव लोकमभिजयन्ते Praśnopaniṣad 1.9.
4. ब्रह्मा देवानां प्रथमः सम्बभूव (Mu. Upa. 1.1.1)
5. प्लवा ह्येते अदृढा यज्ञरूपा: अष्टादशोक्तमवरं येषु कर्म ।
   एतच्छ्रेयो ये प्रवेदयन्ति मूढा जरामृत्युं ते पुनरेवापि यन्ति ॥ Mun. Upa. 1.2.7.
6. इष्टापूर्तं मन्यमानाः गरिष्ठं नान्यच्छ्रेयो वेदयन्ते प्रमूढाः ।
   नाकस्य पृष्ठे ते सुकृतेऽनुभूत्वा इमं लोकं हीनतरं वा विशन्ति ॥ Mun. Upa. 1.2.10.

1. 2. 7 of the Muṇḍakopaniṣad says that sacrifices are inefficacious. The Muṇḍakopaniṣad says that the minor gods were created out of the Supreme God (Brahman).[1] The Taittirīya-Upaniṣad enjoins that sacrifices should be performed: "Thou must not neglect to perform the rites for the gods and the ancestors."[2] The rites for the gods are sacrifices. The rites for the ancestors are *tarpaṇa*. The Chāndogya-Upaniṣad says that the path of religion can be divided into three parts. Sacrifices, study and gifts form the first part.[3] The Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad says "It is this Brahman whom the Brahmins desire to know by the study of the Vedas, performance of sacrifices, making gifts, performance of austerities, without any desire."[4] The intention of this passage is that these acts, the performance of which involves a course of self-discipline, will gradually remove desires and prejudices from the mind and render it pure and fit for the knowledge of Brahman. So long as there are desires and prejudices in the mind it is not possible to realize Brahman.

It will thus be seen that practically all the principal Upaniṣads affirm the existence of Vedic gods and declare the efficacy of Vedic sacrifices. Besides the passages quoted above, there are many other passages in these Upaniṣads which do so. In these circumstances it may reasonably be concluded, European writers have attributed to the sages of the Upaniṣads their own prejudices against Vedic gods and Vedic rituals.

As regards the statement of Dr Winternitz quoted above that the persons who discussed philosophical questions were different from the persons who performed Vedic sacrifices, it may be observed that we find in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad that when king Janaka was performing a sacrifice the persons who performed the sacrifices also discussed questions regarding the nature of Brahman and other philosophical questions.[5] Also in the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad[6] we find that

1. तस्माच्च देवा बहुधा सम्प्रसूताः Mun. Upa. 21.4
2. देवपितृकार्याभ्यां न प्रमदितव्यम् Tai. Upa. 1.11.2
3. त्रयो धर्मस्कन्धाः यज्ञोऽध्ययनं दानम् इति प्रथमः Cha. Upa. 2.23.1.
4. तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणाः विविदिषन्ति
   यज्ञेन दानेन तपसा अनाशकेन Br. Upa. 4.4.22.
5. 3rd chapter of *Bṛ. Upa.*
6. 1. 10 and 11.

when Usasti established his superiority in spiritual knowledge he was asked by the king to officiate as priest. The statement of Dr Winternitz is therefore incorrect.

There is no justification for the supposition that the authors of the Saṁhitā portions of the Vedas have mentioned the existence of minor gods because they could not conceive of One Omnipresent Omnipotent God. Such a Supreme God is mentioned in many places in the Saṁhitās. In the Ṛg-Veda Saṁhitā it has been stated that during *pralaya* the Supreme God alone existed, nothing else existed.[1] Again it has been said that the Supreme God who controlls the universe remains in the transcendental region.[2] The commands of the Supreme God are obeyed by the minor gods.[3] He is the Supreme God, over all the gods.[4] Whatever Existed, whatever will exist, all are parts of that Great Being.[5] He is our Creator, our Protector, our Lord.[6]

It cannot therefore be said that in the Saṁhitās mention has been made of minor gods, because the authors of the Saṁhitās could not conceive of One Supreme God. In fact both in the Saṁhitās and Upaniṣads there is mention of One Supreme God as well as many minor gods who were created by the Supreme God.

Western scholars who are unfamiliar with Vedic tradition might be pardoned for misunderstanding the Vedas. But it is a matter of great regret that many prominent modern scholars of India following no doubt the lead of Western scholars have made the same mistake in such a fundamental matter and have helped broadcast ideas greatly damaging to Indian culture.

Thus Prof. Hirianna of the Mysore University writes, "The Upaniṣads primarily represent a spirit different from and even hostile to ritual and embody a theory of the universe, quite different from the one that underlies the sacrificial teaching of the Brāhmaṇas."[7] I have

1. आनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकं तस्माद्धान्यन्न परः किंचनास RV. 10.129.2.
2. योऽस्याध्यक्षः परमे व्योमन् RV. 10.129.7.
3. उपासते प्राशिषं यस्य देवाः RV. 10.12.2.
4. यो देवेषु अधिदेव एक आसीत् RV. 10.121.8.
5. पुरुष एव इदं सर्वं यद् भूतं यच्च भव्यम् RV. 10.90.2.
6. यो नः पिता जनिता यो विधाता RV. 10.82.3.
7. *Outline of Indian Philosophy* p. 48.

already quoted many passages to show that the Upaniṣads enjoin the performance of ritual. I may here add another. The Īśa-Upaniṣad says,[1] "One should wish to live a hundred years continuing to perform rituals." Both Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja say that here *karmāṇi* refers to rituals prescribed in the Vedas.

Dr S. N. Das Gupta of the Calcutta University writes, "The Upaniṣads are an entirely diffirent type from the rest of the Vedic literature as indicating the path of knowledge as opposed to the path of work. The Upaniṣads do not require the performance of any action but only reveal the ultimate truth and reality".[2] I have quoted passages that the Upaniṣads do require the performance of Vedic acts. Performance of the acts prescribed in the Śāstras purifies the mind and renders it fit to realize knowledge of Brahman. Mere theoretical knowledge such as one man gets by reading or listening to the Upaniṣad is not enough for emancipation. Realization is necessary.[3]

Prof R. D. Ranade of the Allahabad University writes, "The spirit of the Upaniṣads is on the other hand, barring a few exceptions here and there, entirely antogonistic to the sacrifical doctrine of the Brāhmaṇas."[4] Apparently Prof. Ranade thinks that some portions of the Upaniṣads support the "Sacrificial doctrine of the Brāhmaṇas" while other portions are antagonistic. In other words, the Upaniṣads are self-contradictory. Our ancient *ācāryas* have all said that the Upaniṣads are infallible. Apparent discrepancies have all been reconciled in the Brahma-sūtras, on the point under consideration. There is not even any apparent discrepancy, as nowhere the Upaniṣads say that sacrifices are not efficacious in attaining heaven or that they should not be performed.

Dr S. Radhakrishnan writes, "Men sat down to doubt the gods whom they ignorantly worshipped, and reflected on the mysteries of life. From primitive polytheism to systematic philosophy it is a long long way".[5] If the Vedas are polytheistic because they mention many gods, the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā are also polytheistic because both of them mention many gods. If there is a supreme God controlling the minor gods the doctrine cannot be called polytheism.

1. कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेत् शतं समाः Iśa Upa. 2.
2. *History of Indian Philosophy* p. 28.
3. अनुभवपर्यन्तं ज्ञानम् *Brahmasūtra Śāṁkara bhāṣya* 1.1.1.
4. *Consructive Survey of Upanishadic philosophy* p. 6.
5. *Indian Philosophy* Vol. I pp. 72-72.

The Upaniṣads refer to the Saṁhitās with great respect and sometimes quote passages from the Saṁhitās in support of the statements made in the Upaniṣads introducing them by remarks such as "So it has been said in the Saṁhitās."[1]

Sri R. G. Bhāṇḍārkar in his "Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Other Minor Sects" traces the origin of the Upaniṣads, disbelief in Vedic ritual. It is stated in "The Vedic Age", published by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, that the spirit of the Upaniṣads is antiritualistic,[2] and that the Upaniṣads did not believe in the efficacy of Vedic sacrifices. "The History of Philosophy—Eastern and Western", sponsored by the government of India, says "the spirit of the Upaniṣads is opposed to ritual".[3]

I am glad to say that Dr Satkari Mukhopadhyaya considers that my views expressed above are correct. Among other scholars who agree to these views I may mention a few names :—

1. Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Gopinath Kaviraj M. A.
2. Dr Kalidas Bhattacharyya M. A., Ph. D., Vice-Chancellor, Visva-bharati.
3. Pt. Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Head of the Deptt. of Philosophy, Calcutta University.
4. Dr Narendranath Chaudhuri M. A., Ph. D., Head of the Deptt. of Sanskrit, Delhi University.
5. Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Yogendra Nath Tarka-Vedānta-tīrtha, D. Lit.
6. Dr Nalini Kanta Brahman, M.A., Ph.D., Calcutta University.
7. Dr Sitangshu Sekhar Bagchi, M.A., D.Lit., Mithila Research Institute and others.

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1. तद् एतदृचाऽभ्युक्तम् Pra. Upa. 1.7, Mu Up 3.2.10 or तदेषः श्लोकः Pra. Upa. 1.10, 4.10, 615.
2. Chap. XXIV.
3. Vol. I p. 57.

THE APRATIGHA-TYPE OF COIN

By

O. P. Jaiswal

In the galaxy of the Gupta Emperors, Kumāra Gupta I was the only king who issued extensive currency in the yellow metal. Among his coins the so-called Apratigha-type is the most problematic one, though many eminent scholars of Indology have tried their best to unravel the mystery surrounding the coin under review. In the present article I propose to put forward my views on this crucial problem connected with it.

The description of the coin sets down as follows :

On the obverse, the coin presents three figures. The central figure is of a male standing facing with folded hands on chest, wearing pleated *dhoti* with the end wrapped round in front hanging between the legs. The hair is tied in a knot on the top of the head. I am convinced, the central figure is certainly of Kumāra Gupta I, as its identity is clearly indicated by the legend, 'Kumāra Gupta' written vertically on either side of the central figure, but read horizontally from top to bottom. On the right side of the figure, 'Kumāra' and 'Gupta' are written on left from bottom to top. 'Ku' of Kumāra is crystal clear on coin No. 8[1]. Similarly 'Mā' is palpably distinct on no. 13. The upper slant over 'Mā' is not visible and 'Ra' which is on no. 12 is positively perceptible and the self-same phenonmenon occurs with respect to no. 6 and other coins. It provides the full name Kumāra Gupta. A female figure standing in the right faces the central figure. It is notable that she is slightly bent forward with her hair tied upon her head in a shape of protuberance, her right hand raised up and left hand resting on the waist. She is dressed in a costume that bears resemblance to a bodice and *sari*. A male occupies the left side of the central figure and stands face to face of him. He holds a shield in left hand and a Garuḍa in right.

Legend circular...प्रथम-कुल-रिपुर्हंस: (between 3 o'clock & 6 o'clock).

1. B.H. Pl. XXXI.

On reverse—There is dotted border, within which goddess Lakṣmī faces the front. She is seated on a full-blown double-petalled lotus and adorned by a nimbet. Her raised right hand holds a lotus with a long steen and her left hand rests on waist. Crescent is engraved above the legend and a symbol is on her left-side and the legend on her right.

This is the description of the obverse and reverse of the coin.

Now we propose to examine the legend on reverse.

The legend on reverse has raised a storm of controversy. Meticulous observation, however, will clinch the issue. First of all, we should observe the actual form of the first letter that appears on the coin. And the result of it may be set forth as follows :—

This letter in our opinion is no other than 'A' and bears close resemblance to that found on the inscriptions of Central India. And it is too obvious to mention that it passes under the name of Sanchi inscription of Candragupta II, year 93[1]. It reveals unmistakable influence of the Kṣatrapa characters which are evidently manifest on the silver coins of the period.[2]

There is little room for dispute over the second letter. It positively represents 'Pra'. It is worthy of remark that it coincides with the reading of Allan, Altekar and Sohani. The identity of the third letter has, however, formed a bone of contention. It is true that existence of 'Ta' is not liable to doubt. The controversy centres round the sign of 'a' and 'i' over 'Ta'. A group of Numismatists consider is 'Ta' and others 'Ti'. But minute observation brings to light that sign over 'Ta' is definately 'i' and it should be read as 'Ti'. It is medial 'i' not long 'ī', as long 'ī' is indicated by curved mark on the right and left. It is positively attested by the structure of the word 'sri'. But in the case in hand curve is engraved only from one side. So, it may be legitemately by deduced that the letter in question is 'Ti'.

The last letter has formed a bone of contention as the first one. A few scholars of Numismatics deciphered it in conformity with their own preconceptions. We are astonished to find how it is read 'Pa' and something else. A subtle analysis of the whole situation renders

1. Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum Vol. III. Pl. III-B, p. 30.
2. Dr Altekar, corpus. The Coinage of the Gupta Empire.

it apparent that it should be read 'Gha' and not anything else. The two halves of the letter under consideration are equal in size. It may be distinctly observed on coin no. 11[1]. The view of Mr. Sohani that the two visargas got rubbed due to heavy circulation is devoid of substance. The distinct existence of the other letters on the reverse does not testify to the validity of the contention. It remains inexplicable as to how the two visargas, after getting rubbed, can make too equal and proportionate halves which are the characteristic features of 'Gha'. Futhermore, the visarga that makes its existence felt after 'Gha' on coin no. 11[2] preserves its identity beyond the shadaw of doubt. So, the theory of their transformation into a new letter through the medium of rubbing cannot carry weight with it. It may prove advantageous in other situations but in the present context there is no sphere for its operation.

So, we venture to suggest that it should be read 'Apratigha'. We know the meaning of 'Apratigha'; it signifies 'invincible'. The meaning aptly corresponds to the motif of the obverse.

It is a historical fact that the last days of Kumāra Gupta I were not peaceful. He was confroted with two invasions which placed the very existence of the Gupta empire in jeopardy. The Bhitari pillar inscription of Skandagupta bears testimony to the fact that during the subsequent years of the reign of Kumāra Gupta, his empire became exposed to the incursions of the Puṣyamitras.[3] The Junagaḍha inscription is more remarkable as bearing out the authenticity of it. The Puṣyamitras who had great resources in man and money delivered a serious blow to the imperial throne. But the credit belongs to Skandagupta for defending the tottering empire. Even Skandagupta did not find any rest as he had to face the onslaught of the Hūṇas.[4] He

1. B. H. Pl. XXXI. 2. Ibid.

3. विचलित-कुललक्ष्मी-स्तम्भनायोद्यतेन
क्षितितल-शयनीये येन नीता त्रियामा ।
समुदित-बल-कोशान् पुष्यमित्रांश्च जित्वा
क्षितिप-चरण-पीठे स्थापितो वाम-पादः ॥"—भितरी का स्तम्भलेख ।

4. हूणैर्यस्य समागतस्य समरे दोर्भ्यां धरा कम्पिता ।—भितरी का स्तम्भलेख ।
रिपेवांत्या मूल भग्नदर्पा निर्वचना म्लेच्छ देशेषु ।
नरपति-भुजगानां मानदर्पोत्फणानाम्
प्रतिकृति-गरुडाज्ञां निर्विषीं चावकर्ता—जूनागढ़ का अभिलेख ।

stayed committed in the western part of his dominion to meet their massive onslaught.

These two invasions are historically attested facts. Both were successfully repulsed by Skandagupta. After routing the Puṣyamitras Skandagupta could not get time to return to the capital. And it was essential to convey the message of victory to the king. So, he despatched a military officer to communicate this momentous news.

The king was not in his court at the time of receiving the messenger. The absence of royal-robe and chief-queen can be clearly noticed in the body of the coin. On hearing the arrival of a messenger from the battle field his younger queen, i.e., the mother of Skandagupta, could not resist the temptation to hear the news.

In the coin under examination the military officer i.e., the messenger is seen as delivering the message of victory to the king. The king is standing before an ordinary military officer. That is why he prefers to maintain studied reservation in order to exhibit his royal dignity and listens to the messege with perfect equanimity by folding his hands upon his chest. The younger queen (i. e., the mother of Skandagupta) hearing about the victory of her court and son became overwhelmed with delight and as a result of it she greeted the king by uttering the epithet "invincible." He was invincible even in his last days as he was in his prime of youth. The representation of Garuḍa by a military officer is also significant. We know from the Purāṇas that Garuḍa is a symbol of fast movement and victory. Here it signifies the victory and invincibility of the king.

The form invincible or Apratigha is also associated with the reverse figure of seated Lakṣmī. The king is invincible; that is why Lakṣmī is steadily seated on lotus. No body can alter her position now.

Elaborate discussion

In my opinion the entire story runs thus:—

There was no political upheaval in the reign of Kumāra Gupta I. This is testified by his inscriptions, not less than thirteen. But the last days of his reign were not peaceful as the Puṣyamitras, and the Hūṇas assailed the might of the Imperial throne, attested by the Bhitari pillar Inscription.[1] As Kumāra Gupta I came to know of the

1. विचलित कुललक्ष्मी..................वामपादः
हूणैर्यस्य समागतस्य समरे दोर्म्यां धरा कम्पिता।—भितरी का स्तम्भलेख

disturbance in the western part of his empire due to the Puṣyamitras, he despatched his son Skandagupta to repulse their back. After defeating the Puṣyamitras Skandagupta stayed there to watch over the situation carefully. This was necessary, otherwise the Puṣyamitras might have enjoyed the fruit of carelessness and attacked over the territory again. Meanwhile it was essential to communicate the news of the victory to the capital. Even in these days this is the practice that the capital is kept informed of every development of the battle field. These days it is done through the most advanced scientific method i. e., wireless set. But in the days gone-by, when the scientific advancement was not so high, the work was done through the medium of military personnel as they were supposed to be the most faithful messengers.

On the obverse of the coin the same scene is depicted. The military personnel is delivering the message of the battle-field before the king and the queen.

A comparative study of the coin of king-and-queen-type and the Apratigha-type of Kumāra Gupta I shows that there is no similarity between the queen of the Apratigha-type and of other types. It reveals the fact that the queen of the Apratigha-type is not the same as represented on other types of the coins. It makes clear that on other types the chief queen is represented whereas on the Apratigha-type the younger queen i. e., the mother of Skandagupta has been represented. It was but natural as her son was far away from her in the battle-field, she was anxious to hear the news of her son. Out of anxiety she joined the king to hear the news. We know the softness and weakness of the mother's heart towards her child. Similarly that softness compelled Skandagupta's mother to join the king to hear the news of the battle-field. When she heard of the victory, she cried out of joy "invincible" or "Apratigha" to the king, which aptly coincides with the obverse representation.

That was not the end of the story there. Skandagupta had not even breathed peacefully when he felt another onslaught of the Hūṇas. Skandagupta was capable of repulsing them back. These two invasions must have taken enough time, at least five or six years, for Skandagupta to consolidate his position in the western part of the empire and to return to his capital. It has been said above that just after the victory over the Puṣyamitras, Skandagupta despatched a

military personnel with the news and after obtaining the news Kumāra Gupta I probably circulated Apratigha-type of coin, presenting before his subjects the actual scene of receiving the correct news of victory, where he was styled "Apratigha" or invincible. Side by side the representation of the younger queen was essential to make it clear to the subjects that valiant Skandagupta was her son who defeated the Puṣyamitras.

The coin was particularly issued for the western part of the empire where the battle was fought in order to convince the subjects that the real master was he, and not others. This is also attested by the letters inscribed in the legends, both on obverse and reverse of this type as they belong to the western style of the Gupta Brahmi script, which lends additional weight to the contention that this type was in circulation mainly in western districts of Kumāra Gupta's empire.[1]

This was done just like Candragupta II did with a view to assuring the people of his authority over the western part when he defeated the Kṣatrapas. Similarly Kumāra Gupta I issued this type of coin in the western part of his country to demonstrate that now no body could give a blow to his authority.

The entire story aptly corresponds with the obverse legend. The legend is read by me "*Pṛthaja-kula-ripur dṛptaḥ*" between three and six o'clock. Before three and six o'clock the legend is too blurred to read. Here read legend means "the dreadful enemy of the king". We know about the dreadful enemy. Who it was ? It was the Puṣyamitras whom Kumāra Gupta I was referring to in the legend on obverse.

After sometime it was essential to celebrate his memorable victory formally, according to the practices of ancient India. We know that in ancient India victory was usually celebrated by performing an Aśvamedha sacrifice as we see in the case of Samudragupta. Similarly for Kumāra Gupta I this victory was memorable as it was the first victory over the Puṣyamitras in his long peaceful reign. So to celebrate this victory, he performed an Aśvamedha sacrifice and issued the Aśvamedha-type of coin to commemorate it.

Thus it is my cogent belief that the Apratigha-type was issued in order to convince the subjects his sway over the territory where the

1. Sohani—Indian Numismatic Chronicle, pp. 100-101.

battle was fought. When the victory was celebrated formally, then subsequently the Aśvamedha-type was issued. This strengthens my opinion as it is attested by the legend on the coin where he mentions specifically that he had conquered his enemy (*devo jita-śatruḥ*). I think this enemy must have been the Puṣyamitras as we know no other enemy before him.

So, to round up the present discourse, it can be concluded that the Apratigha-type of coin was circulated to commemorate the occasion of victory of Kumāra Gupta I over the Puṣyamitras.

ON THE EDITING OF MANUSCRIPTS

BY

DR C. S. UPASAK

The correct manuscripts and the correct decipherment of the MSS are equally essential for editing a reliable text. When there are more MSS of one text, the editor may pick and choose. But it is not safe to rely on the rule of thumb. It is presumable that the reading which is found in the majority of MSS should be correct. But here also it is not the democratic principle of the majority over-ruling the minority. It is quite possible that the majority of MSS may have been copied from the same source and this takes away from its authoritativeness. I have not had the privilege of consulting a large number of MSS in editing a text. So my observations are tentative and subject to correction. But when one has to teach a book which has not been edited with much care, attention and judgement, one finds that the readings are not intelligible. This causes headache. It is quite probable that the editor had to dispose of his work within a stipulated period dictated by the authorities or the proprietor of the press. In this case there is every likelihood of the book to abound in errors and misprints. The risk becomes greater and greater in proportion to the diminishing number of MSS one has at one's disposal. Sometimes a single MS is available but the subject is too important to make it possible to postpone the publication. Unfortunately the materials in which the MSS are inscribed are perishable. In this case the editor rushes with an imperfect press copy. But now-a-days we have got many instruments for making exact photostat copies. A scrupulous scholar will rather take time to decipher the text. One ought to keep before himself the example of that great archaeologist, *clarum et venerabile nomen* James Prinsep to inspire patience. It is common knowledge how that savant wore himself out in deciphering the Aśokan Brāhmī script. The result has been a stupendous discovery of the past history of India.

The problem becomes really acute when there is a solitary manuscript and that again not a perfect one. How to do justice to this task ? Those who are interested in Buddhist studies and parti-

cularly the Sanskrit branch of it, have to confront this problem squarely. We must acknowledge our incalculable debt to the late Mahāpaṇḍit Rāhul Sāṅkṛtyāyan, who was an explorer, a scholar, a man of genius and a prolific writer rolled into one, who had, within the span of a limited life not exceeding the biblical age of three score and ten, to write more than three hundred books and that also on diverse subjects. His greatest service to the cause of Buddhist studies was his discovery of original Sanskrit texts in the Tibetan monasteries. The MSS could not be borrowed and he had to take photostat copies. It is due to him that we have got access to the original works of Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti. He was not a rich man and had to struggle with odds. He could not concentrate on the work of editing these texts with as much industry as the editors of the Bower's MSS. In judging the value of the *editio princepe* of Mahāpaṇḍit Rāhul Sāṅkṛtyāyan we must make due allowance for the extenuating circumstances. No body can or should seek to undermine the glory that belongs to him as the pioneer. It is far from my intention to pick holes in the singular contributions of this Indian savant who is no more among us. But the cause of scholarship is too imperious to allow any latitude to sentiments and even sacred sentiments at that. With my unbounded admiration and regard for the great savant, I am pointing out certain doubtful readings found in Karṇagomin's commentary on the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of Dharmakīrti. The tangle could have been in the majority of cases unravelled if the editor had the time and leisure to bestow his acute reflection upon it. He himself frankly observed that he left this task to painstaking scholars.

Let me cite a few cases :—On page *22*, line 13—
अयं बाह्यार्थः should be अयं वाक्यार्थः ; page 31, line 13—
परस्पराभिन्नानामभावे न भेदः should be परस्पराभिन्नानामभावेन भेदः ; page 32
line *21*—प्रत्यक्षाभावनिरास should be अत्यन्ताभावनिरासः; page 32,
line *22*—न स्वभावस्य should be नन्वभावस्य; page 33,
line 23—लिङ्गो न should be लिङ्गेन; page 39,
line 12-13—तदाऽभेदो पि should be तदाऽभावोऽपि, page 46,
line 8—नन्वनभिहितात् should be नत्वनुमितात् etc.

These samples have been selected at random in order to show the possibility of various sorts of mistakes which cannot be explained away as due to the printer's devil. The possible causes of mistake

are various. There may be a mistake in the decipherment on account of close similarity of letters. The scribes were as a rule professional men. They were neither equipped nor expected to understand the meaning. The scribes' errors are apt to be perpetuated by other copyists and in this way various mistakes have been made possible. The letters may have been blurred or smudged. Sometimes the editors may come across a strange technical term and make amendation. Sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi is a technical term of Buddhist philosophy. A scholar may feel tempted to correct it as *Sat-kārya-dṛṣṭi*.

To err is human. But that should not be the apology of an editor. The mistakes can be detected only if a person tries to understand the text. The text must yield a consistent meaning. If no meaning is made out, we should think that the reading is wrong. In order to obviate a natural misunderstanding, I feel called upon to make an unambiguous assertion that the amendations proposed are only tentative. They may serve as helpful clues to the right reading. Therefore all these amendations should be read with a question mark. Sometimes luck favours a scholar when he is puzzled by an unmeaning expression. If there be no technical question involved and the words are used in their usual meanings, there is scope for the exercise of intelligence. One fundamental point which I consider to be of vital importance is that the editor should not undertake a text which he does not understand. Simply because a man chances upon a MS that does not confer upon him a privilege. The editor must be a man of integrity and modesty. As is done in Europe, the editing work should be entrusted to an expert who has infinite patience. Unfortunately the press in our country is not as scrupulous as in Europe. And to add insult to the injury the publishers want to spend as much less as they can. Some old presses and publishers were noted for the neatness of the works published. But unfortunately the standard has fallen and this is perhaps due to competitors who have the advantage of rising above scruples. Here also Grasham's Law 'Bad money ousts good money from the market' is playing its pranks. Proof-reading is a serious and responsible undertaking, which ought not to be scamped for economic reasons. If we succeed in overcoming them, this may result in the improvement of the state of affairs ruling at present. The rot must be arrested. The Government cannot be

exempted from the responsibility as they are professing socialistic ideals and extending their control to every sphere of private enterprise.

The search for old MSS, which was spasmodically done in the past by the British Government should now be resumed with religious fervour. The greatness of India is still enshrined in the old culture and the MSS are the custodians of it. There should be training centres for teaching the technique. But much depends on scholarship and intellectual equipment. We must be scrupulously selective in entrusting the work to scholars who are competent to do the work. No extra-academical considerations should warp on our judgement. Politics has the tendency to be ubiquitous and this must be checked within its proper limits.

THE PĀLI AṬṬHAKATHĀS—AN ESTIMATE

By

DILIP KUMAR BANERJEE

In the entire range of the Pāli literature of the Post-canonical epoch, the aṭṭhakathās or the commentaries written on the original Tipiṭakas hold a unique place. Apart from their exegetical value, being interpretations of the Buddhavacana as recorded in the Tipiṭaka, they possess historical value which can hardly be over-estimated. The aṭṭhakathās, the majority and the most important of which have been written by the great scholiast Buddhaghosa, contain a vast amount of materials, from which a more or less connected account of India as known from the Tipiṭakas, can be constructed. The materials from which a historian would have to glean authentic facts and imformation, lie scattered over the entire range of the commentarial literature. In the commentaries we find a curious blending of facts and fictions, of myths and legends, of anecdotes and tales. Often there are repetitions and exaggerations. But if we patiently and labouriously "sift the husks", we may find invaluable "grains" of historical fact.

The Indologists had been rather sceptical about utilising the aṭṭhakathās as a source-book for the history of development of the Indian religious thought. But a careful and critical study of the entire aṭṭhakathās would amply reward the scholar.

In the present article it would be our endeavour to point out the importance of the Pāli commentarial literature as a whole.

We must, first of all, dilate briefly on the general nature and scope of the aṭṭhakathās.

The aṭṭhakathās, as has been stated before, are exegetical treatises or commentaries on the original Tipiṭakas. Their main object was to interpret correctly the words of the Master embodied in the Tipiṭakas. So the commentators while commenting on the original texts took meticulous care to explain difficult and abstruse words bearing on the Doctrine and discipline of Theravāda Buddhism. In course of their explanations and elucidations on difficult and knotty points of

the Doctrine, the commentators also gave "additional explanatory information wherever it was deemed necessary".[1] These information cover a wide range of topics and throw much light on the social and religious life of the period of the commentaries.

According to the Theravāda, Buddhist tradition was preserved in Ceylon. Thera Mahinda and his companion Bhikkhus carried with them the aṭṭhakathās along with the original Tipiṭakas to Ceylon after the Ist Buddhist Council held at Rājagṛha. The Ceylonese tradition affirms that Mahinda translated the Tipiṭakas and their commentaries from the original into Singhalese. These texts and commentaries being handed down to posterity through the medium of oral transmission, were redacted in the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇī and finally retranslated into Pāli by Buddhaghosa in the 5th century A. D..

Dr Winternitz does not countenance this view although he admits that "the exegetical and literary activity of the monks began in India immediately after the compilation of the texts, and, that Pāli, the language of the canon, was also used for the early commentaries."[2]

It is probable that the aṭṭhakathās were handed down orally like their Tipiṭaka originals. But whereas the latter were finally compiled and reduced to writing in the reign of king Vaṭṭagāmaṇī Abhaya, we have no sufficient historical evidence to conclude that the aṭṭhakathās, as we have them now, were also committed to writing during the same period.

Ācārya Buddhaghosa, the doyen of the Pāli commentators, went to Ceylon, after his conversion to the Buddhist faith, with the avowed intention of translating these very aṭṭhakathās from old Ceylonese into Pāli, the accepted literary medium of Theravāda Buddhism. Not only the extensive and exhaustive commentaries composed by Buddhaghosa, Buddhadatta and Dhammapāla, but also the Dīpavaṁsa, the historical chronicle of Ceylon, belonging to the Pre-Buddhaghosa epoch, as also the later but more authentic Mahāvaṁsa which was based on the same, are indebted for their subject matter and main trends to these old Ceylonese aṭṭhakathās. Unfortunately, none of the aforesaid Ceylonese commentaries is available now although

1. Dr E. W. Adikaram, Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon, p. 33.
2. Dr M. Winternitz. History of Indian literature, Vol. II p. 184.

according to Dr Geiger, these were available as late as the 12th century A. D.

Nevertheless these Singhalese aṭṭhakathās were faithfully handed down to posterity by the process of oral transmission, so that when Buddhaghosa reached Ceylon he found a well-preserved stock of the Singhalese commentaries faithfully embodying the Theravāda tradition.

Dr E. W. Adikarma who has made a special study of the Ceylonese aṭṭhakathās observes in his Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon,[1] "When Buddhaghosa came to Ceylon there were already in the island many collections of commentarial matter preserved mainly in the Sinhalese language. Some of these collections were in book form, others as scattered literature embodying the views of learned teachers of the past. Buddhaghosa and other commentators often refer to them quoting them as authorities.

Among the more important of these may be mentioned :—

1. Mahā-aṭṭhakathā or mūla-aṭṭhakathā.
2. Mahāpaccariya-aṭṭhakathā.
3. Kuruṇḍi-aṭṭhakathā.
4. Andhaka-aṭṭhakathā.
5. Saṁkhepa-aṭṭhakathā.
6. Vinaya-aṭṭhakathā.
7. Suttanta-aṭṭhakathā.
8. Āgama-aṭṭhakathā.
9. Dīgha-aṭṭhakathā.
10. Majjhima-aṭṭhakathā.
11. Saṁyutta-aṭṭhakathā.
12. Aṅguttara-aṭṭhakathā.
13. Abhidhamma-aṭṭhakathā.
14. Sīhala-aṭṭhakathā.
15. Aṭṭhakathā (in the singular number)
16. Aṭṭhakathā (in the plural number).
17. Aṭṭhakathācariya.
18. Ācariyā.
19. Ācariya-vāda.
20. Ācariya-mata.
21. Thera-sallāpa.

1. Ch. 2 p. 10.

22. Parasamuddavāsī Thera.
23. Vitaṇḍavādī.
24. Porāṇā.
25. Porāṇakatthera.
26. Porāṇācariyā.
27. Porāṇā-aṭṭhakathā.
28. Bhāṇaka.

Only a few of these were distinct works. Buddhaghosa in his Pāli commentaries has drawn chiefly on the following aṭṭhakathās :—

(1) Mahā-aṭṭhakathā (2) Mahāpaccariya-aṭṭhakathā (3) Kuruṇḍī-aṭṭhakathā (4) Andhaka-aṭṭhakathā (5) Saṁkhepa-aṭṭhakathā (6) āgama-aṭṭhakathā (9) ācariyānaṁ samāna-aṭṭhakathā. As we are informed by Buddhaghosa himself at the end of each of the four aṭṭhakathās on the four Nikāyas of the Suttapiṭaka i. e., on the Dīgha, Majjhima, Saṁyutta and Aṅguttara, "*Sā hi mahā-aṭṭhakathāya sāramādāya niṭṭhitā esā*". (I have completed these by taking the substance of the Mahā-aṭṭhakathās), we can with some amount of certainty deduce that the works Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī, Papañca-sūdanī, Sāraṭṭha-pakāsinī and Manoratha-pūraṇī (the aṭṭhakathās on the Dīgha, Majjhima, Saṁyutta and Aṅguttara-nikāyas, respectively) have for their substatum, the old Ceylonese commentaries. According to the Saddhamma-Saṅgaho the commentaries, Mahāpaccari and Kuruṇḍī were aṭṭhakathās respectively on the Abhidhamma and the Vinaya. In his commentary on the Vinayapiṭaka-samantapāsādika, Buddhaghosa has not referred to the Kuruṇḍi as the chief source of his own aṭṭhakathās. He has simply stated that these aṭṭhakathās viz., the Mahā-aṭṭhakathā, the Mahāpaccari and the Kuruṇḍī were only the ancient aṭṭhakathās written in the Sinhalese language. These three aṭṭhakathās, again, are referred to in the Gandhavaṁśa, where the Mahā-aṭṭhakathā has been given preference to the other two, the former being the composition of the Porāṇacariyas while the latter two were composed by the Gandhācariyas. It would be more proper to regard the ācariyānaṃ samāna-aṭṭhakathā mentioned by Buddhaghosa in his Introduction to the aṭṭhasālinī, as referring not to any single aṭṭhakathā in particular but rather denoting the common conclusion of several aṭṭhakathās.

Whatever the actual state of things might have been, the truth seems to lie in this, that these aṭṭhakathās were not the compositions

of any single author but they were rather the traditional writings of the Bhikkhus residing in the Mahāvihāra of Ceylon, and they were being handed down from generation to generation as the common property of the monks of the Mahāvihāra.

Buddhaghosa has made it clear everywhere in his writings that he wrote all his aṭṭhakathās and the Visuddhimagga according to the method of the Bhikkhus residing in the Mahāvihāra. He states in the Samanta-pāsādikā and the Aṭṭhasālinī :—

"*Mahāvihāravāsinaṁ dīpayanto vinicchayaṁ |*
aṭṭhaṁ pakāsayissāmi āgamaṭṭhakathāsu'pi ||"

Buddhaghosa, while acknowledging his indebtedness to the old Sinhalese aṭṭhakathās, has often quoted in his commentaries the opinions of the ancient Sthaviras (Porāṇaka-tthera) or Porāṇas. Who these Porāṇas were we cannot assert with positive certainty. They might have been the authors of the old Ceylonese commentaries which Budhaghosa laid under contribution in the composition of his Pāli commentaries. One of the most important peculiarities of these quotations from the Porāṇas is that they are nearly all in verse and many quotations in the aṭṭhakathās of Buddhaghosa are available in identical terms in the Mahāvaṁsa.

Dr Adikaram after discussing at some length the vexed problem of the identity of the Porāṇas, Porāṇācariyas and the Porāṇa-aṭṭhakathās admirably concludes[1], "The Porāṇas were undoubtedly revered teachers of old and they must have played an important part in the formation and stabilising of the Theravāda school. They had their origin in India as is evidenced by the verses attributed to the dhammasaṅgāhaka Theras in the Milindapañha and to which we have made reference earlier. Probably they were not known in India by the name Porāṇa. It may be that their views and interpretations of the Doctrine were incorporated in an old commentary, and that when other new commentaries such as the Mahā-aṭṭhakathā, Mahā-paccari an the Kuruṇḍi came to be written, this old commentary was called the Porāṇa-aṭṭhakathā and the teachers whose views were incorporated in it were termed the Porāṇas or the 'teachers of old.' It seems evident that for the materials of his Pali aṭṭhakathās Buddhaghosa was indebted to a large number of old commentaries written in the Sinhalese language and he drew freely on them.

1. Dr E. W. Adikaram, Early Histoty of Buddhism in Ceylon, p. 23.

The vastness of the commentarial literature that was available to Buddhaghosa was overwhelming. To an ordinary commentator and translator the task of arranging and classifying this vast material would have been a Herculean task. But Buddhaghosa was a genius and with uncanny intuition he ransacked the enormous literature open to him, and made his selection with rare acumen and skill. His works are not simply verbatim translations of the Sinhalese originals as they are traditionally supposed to be, but in some cases they are original works, though faithfully keeping in tune with the main trends of the original works on essential points.

For exegetical purposes he not only depended on the Sinhalese commentaries themselves but also pondered on and studied the original Buddhavacana as embodied in the Tipiṭaka, in order to drive his arguments home. His originality lies in this very fact and to this we can attribute his unique position in the history of Pāli Literature. It was only possible for unfathomable scholar like him to take as much help as he liked from such vast and valuable storehouse of information which the Tipiṭakas were.

The elucidating sermons of the Lord Buddha himself, the expositions of his chief disciples, the dialectic mothod of the Abhidhamma, specially of the Kathāvatthu were all open to Buddhaghosa. He utilized these materials to the fullest and inaugurated that vast aṭṭhakathā literature in Pāli, which judged from the viewpoint of vastness and profundity ranks as the greatest composition in the field of contemporary commentarial literature in India and elsewhere.

Dr G. P. Malalasekera aptly remarks "The task before Buddhaghosa was, therefore, by no means an easy one. The very copiousness of the material was an embarassment. When he set out from India to make his concise commentary, his idea was merely to study the Sinhalese aṭṭhakathās and translate them into Pāli. But now, faced often with conflicting views, contradictory assertions and sometimes incompatible doctrines, he had to expunge, abridge, enlarge and make a new commentary of his own. The author of so systematic and coherent a synopsis as the Visuddhimagga could not rest content with a mere translation ; for that no great ability was required, and certainly far less extraordinary talent than he possessed. He wished to collect and systematize the knowledge which the various works contained, to

garner the criticism of ancient scholarship for the use of future generations of scholars; and therefore he did not shrink from rewriting them so as to expand what he found into a fuller and richer form, embodying in the old material whatever he found elsewhere, to illuminate and elucidate the text of his comment". If we judge unbiassedly we shall find that there is nothing similar to the aṭṭhakathā literature of Pāli in the whole range of Indian literature. In Sanskrit philosophical literature, of course, we come across numerous Bhāṣyas and Ṭīkās, but these by their very nature cannot be compared in every respect to the Pāli Ṭīkās or aṭṭhakathās. The chief aim of the Bhāṣyas is to explain the meaning of the Sūtras, clearly and succinctly, in precise and terse terms, and in the fulfilment of this objective the Bhāṣyas often speak something of their own account. The majority of the Bhāṣyas of Sanskrit literature falls to this category.

A Bhāṣya has been defined as :—"*Sūtrārtho varṇyate yatra padaiḥ sūtrānusāribhiḥ | svapadāni ca varṇyante bhāṣyaṁ bhāṣyavido viduḥ*" || Those who are versed in the Bhāṣyas call that a Bhāṣya wherein the meaning of a condensed saying (sūtra) is stated in words that follow the text and where, moreover, the commentator's own words are given.

It must be stated at the outset that the Pāli aṭṭhakathās, unlike the Sanskit Bhāṣyas, have a peculiarity of their own and in this very peculiarity lies their uniqueness and importance. The Pāli aṭṭhakathākāra, while explaining the text of the Tipiṭaka states clearly the historical background of the same. While commenting on any particular sermon, the commentator states elaborately the occasion when it was preached, the person to whom it was delivered and the place where it was delivered. Along with it the commentator mentions, sometimes at great length, any kind of anecdote that may be known about a person or place mentioned in the sermon commented upon. The historical sense that the Pāli commentators show in their treatises is not to be met with elsewhere in cognate works of the same type. This peculiar characteristic of the aṭṭhakathās makes them so important to a historian.

We must now deal briefly with the life and career of the three principal aṭṭhakathākāras of Pāli Literature, viz., Buddhadutta, Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla.

The beginnings of the commentary literature in Pāli can be traced as far back as the 4th or 5th century A.D. Thus the majority of the principal aṭṭhakathās was committed to writing nearly a thousand years after the age of the Tipiṭaka. It is certain, of course, that due to this long lacunae of time, the authenticity of these Pāli aṭṭhakathās would not have been so strong had they not been based on the old Ceylonese aṭṭhakathās traditionally handed dawn. As these old Ceylonese aṭṭhakathās had faithfully presevèd the tradition of the mainland in matters of Theravāda doctrine and Discipline as embodied in the Tipiṭaka. Therefore though their compilation had taken place at a much later period, their authority regarding the age of India of the Tipiṭaka cannot be totally ignored.

During the 4th and 5th Centuries A. D., three great scholiasts appeared in the field of Pāli literature, who were more or less contemporaries. They were Buddhadatta, Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla.

Buddhadatta :—We know from the Buddhaghosuppatti (Life of Buddhaghosa), the Gandhavaṁsa as well as the Sāsanavaṁsa that Buddhadatta and Buddhaghosa were contemporaries. The Gandhavaṁsa "puts him next in order to Buddhaghosa".

According to the Buddhaghosuppatti, Ācariya Buddhadatta went to Ceylon to study the Buddha-vacana before Buddhaghosa went there. The boat in which Buddhadatta was returning to India met on the way the boat which was taking Buddhaghosa to Ceylon. After mutual introductions and greetings Buddhaghosa disclosed to Buddhadatta the purpose of his journey to Ceylon. i. e., to translate the Ceylonese commentaries in the Māgadhī idiom. Buddhadatta also on being interrogated as to his purpose of visiting Ceylon, replied that he too was actuated by the same motive that was bringing Buddhaghosa to Ceylon, but due to his old age he could not undertake the projected task. When the two Theras were thus engaged in conversation the two boats separated and went on their respective voyages. Two salient facts emerge from this legendary account of the meeting of the two veterans of Pāli commentarial literature. First, Buddhadatta went to Ceylon before Buddhaghosa and secondly, he was somewhat senior to Buddhaghosa in age, as in the conversation which was supposed to have taken place between the two, Buddhadatta addressed Buddhaghosa as "Avuso", a term used by the senior monks while addressing their juniors. Buddhadatta himself has referred to this

meeting and conversation with Buddhaghosa in his Vinayavinicchaya, a commentary on the Vinaya-piṭaka. It is evident from this account that Buddhadatta requested Buddhaghosa to send him the copies of his aṭṭhakathās when completed, so that he (Buddhadatta) may give them an abridged shape. In pursuance of this request Buddhaghosa sent his commentaries to him. Buddhadatta summarised his commentaries on the Abhidhammapiṭaka and the Vinayapiṭaka into two small compendiums entitled Abhidhammāvatāra and Vinaya-vinicchaya respectively.

Of course, the evidence of the Buddhaghosuppatti should be taken 'with a grain of salt'. Dr B. C. Law does not attach much value to the Buddhaghosuppatti. He says, "A critical examination of the Buddhaghosuppatti does not assist us much in elucidating the history of Buddhaghosa. The author had little authentic knowledge at his command. He only collected the legends which centred round the remarkable man by the time when his work was written. Those legends are mostly valueless from the historical point of view."[1]

Dr Malalasekera observes on this point, "Whatever we may think of this description of the meeting of the two teachers in mid-ocean, there is no reason to disbelieve the statement that a meeting did take place."[2]

It can be argued that Buddhadatta while returning from Ceylon did not hope to live long and therefore it might not have been possible for him to abridge the works of Buddhaghosa. But this difficulty can be obviated if we remember that Buddhadatta and Buddhaghosa were nearly equal in age and any way the account of the Vinaya-vinicchaya is more trustworthy than that of the Buddhaghosuppatti. Buddhadatta, a celebrity of the Mahāvihāra at Anurādhapura in Ceylon, was an inhabitant of the Kāveri region in the kingdom of the Colas. He was born in Uragapura (modern Uraiyur) and flourished during the reign of king Acyuta Vikkanta of the Kaḷamba or Kaḍamba dynasty. His works which were all written in the famous monastery erected by Kaṇhadāsa or Veṇhudāsa, evidently a new Vaiṣṇava

1. Buddhaghosa, Dr B. C. Law. Bombay Bran. of the Royal Asiatic Society, Monograph No. 1 p. 13.
2. Pali Lit. of Ceylon, Dr G. P. Malalasekera, p. 106.

reformer of the Deccan on the banks of the river Kāveri, comprise the following :—

(1) Uttara-vinicchaya (2) Vinaya-vinicchaya (3) Abhidhammāvatāra, (4) Rūpārūpa-vibhaṅga (4) Madhuratthavilāsinī—a commentary on the Buddhavaṁsa.

Buddhaghosa :—Now we come to Buddhaghosa the epoch-maker in Pāli literature. In the whole history of post-canonical Pali literature, the name of Buddhaghosa stands out pre-eminently as the greatest commentator and exegetist of his time. The labour that he has undertaken in expounding the doctrine of the Buddha far surpasses the efforts of any of her scholiast for the same cause. His contribution to Pāli literature from the point of view of quality and quantity is so vast that it is difficult to believe how a single man can perform such Herculean task within the limited span of a single life-time. Like other great Indian master minds Ācārya Buddhaghosa is rather silent about his personal life. Of course from his short proems and epilogues to his aṭṭhakathās we can know about his writings, their nature, purpose and methodology, but as to Buddhaghosa the man, we know next to nothing from his writings. The personal element in a treatise was not considered so much important by authors then as it is these days.

As Dr B. C. Law so aptly remarks[1], "This is precisely the fate which the great sons of India themselves sincerely desired. It is comforting to think that what they have omitted to give us is but the external details of their personal domestic life, and what they have left us is the spiritual legacy of their thought, the abiding record of their inner life and experience". A considerable number of legends have clustered round the figure of Buddhaghosa, as they are bound to do in the case of any celebrity whose career is shrouded a bit in obscurity. The chief sources that enlighten us about the life of Buddhaghosa are : (1) Mahāvaṁsa (2) Buddhaghosuppatti (3) Gandhavaṁsa (4) Sāsanavaṁsa (5) Saddhammasaṅgaho.

Of these the account of the Mahāvaṁsa seems to be the most authentic, as the rest are full of all sorts of extraordinary legends. Ācārya Buddhaghosa was born near the Bo-tree at Gaya in a Brahmin family. Early in his life he became well-versed in the traditional Vedic learning and became an exponent of the system of Patañjali.

1. Buddhaghosa—B. C. Law, Ch. 1.

He established himself in the character of a disputant in a certain Vihāra. There he once met a Buddhist, Thera Revata, who convinced him of the superiority of the Buddhist faith and converted him. Buddhaghosa, then composed an original work called Ñānodaya and wrote the chapter called aṭṭhasālinī on the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, the first book of the Abhidhammapiṭaka. Being inspired by his preceptor he went to Ceylon to study the original Ceylonese aṭṭhakathās and to translate them into Pāli.

He visited the island in the reign of king Mahānāma in the 500 A.D. There in the celebrated Mahāvihāra at Anurādhapura he listened to the aṭṭhakathā and the Theravāda Doctrine and became thoroughly acquainted with the true import of the Doctrine. He then asked permission from the Theras to translate the aṭṭhakathās into Pāli. In order to test his knowledge, it is said, the monks set to him two gāthās from Saṁyutta-nikāya and asked him to explain the same. While explaining the two gāthās he wrote the celebrated book the Visuddhimagga. The Theras being convinced of his exegetical ability and granted him the permission sought for, whereupon Buddhaghosa took up his residence in the secluded Ganthakāra-vihāra at Anurādhapura and translated, according to the grammatical rules of the Māgadhī, the entire Ceylonese aṭṭhakathās into Pāli. Thereafter the object of his mission being fulfilled he returned to India.

The Burmese sources would have us believe that after having completed his work in Ceylon Buddhaghosa went to Burma to propagate the Buddhist faith. The Burmese ascribe the new era in their religion to the time when Buddhaghosa visited their country from Ceylon. Among the works composed by him, the following; in addition to the three already mentioned, are counted.

(1) Samanta-pāsādikā — the commentary on the Vinaya-piṭaka.
(2) Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī — Commentary on the Dīgha-nikāya.
(3) Papañca-sūdanī — Commentary on the Majjhima-nikāya.
(4) Sārattha-pakāsanī — Commentary on the Saṁyutta-nikāya.
(5) Monoratha-pūraṇī — Commentary on the Aṅguttara-nikāya.
(6) Paramatthajjotikā — Commentary on the Khuddaka-pāṭha.
(7) Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā — Commentary on the Dhamma-pada.

(8) Sammoha-vinodinī — Commentary on the Vibhaṅga of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka.

(9) Kathā-vitaraṇī — Commentary on the Pātimokkha.

(10) Pañcappakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā — A commentary on the five Abhidhamma texts excepting the Dhammasaṅganī and the Vibhaṅga.

(11) Jātakaṭṭhavaṇṇanā.

The quality and bulk of the works produced in a single life time show that Buddhaghosa must have been toiling steadily and indefatigably.

A controversy has centred round the place of origin of Buddhaghosa. Prof. Dhammānanda Kosāmbī is of the opinion that Buddhaghosa did not belong to Northern India, as is asserted traditionally. The reason for this conclusion is that several natural phenomena and topographical details that he has recorded in his works do not fit in with the physiography of Northern India. On the basis of the internal evidence of the works of the commentator, Prof. Kosāmbī has expressed his doubts as to his place of origin being in Northern India. Buddhaghosa's knowledge of Sanskrit and his Brāhmanical lineage have also been challenged by Prof. Kosāmbī. In his commentaries Buddhaghosa has certainly committed errors in the interpretation of certain passages from the Puruṣa-sūkta and also interpreted one or two words in a different way. Prof. Kosāmbī has followed the Burmese tradition which is in favour of acknowledging Buddhaghosa as a Brahmin from South India. While introducing himself in the conclusion (Nigamana) of the Visuddhimagga Buddhaghosa says :—

"Buddhaghosa'ti garūhi gahita-nāmadheyyena therena |
Moraṇḍa-khetta-vattabbena kato visuddhi-maggo nāma ||

So the colophon of the text informs us that he was a native of Moraṇḍakheṭaka and that he lived at Mayurasuttapattana or Mayurarupa pattana for some time since he repaired to the far South at Kāñcīpura where at the request of thera Jotipāla he wrote the Manorathapūraṇī the commentary on the Aṅguttara-nikāya. The birth place of Buddhaghosa Moraṇḍakheṭaka has been sought to be identified with the modern Gunda-palli in the Guntur district in the Andhra region. The discovery of the ruins of several ancient Buddhist establishments

in this district has led some scholars to suggest that this place might have been the birth place of Buddhaghosa. But the internal evidence of all the available works of Buddhaghosa tends to show that though Buddhaghosa's field of activity might have been in the South, his place of birth was, in all probability, in the vicinity of Gayā, as is traditionally asserted. A careful study of his commentaries shows a thorough acquaintance with the topography and physical geography of the Magadha region, its historical places and sites, the manners and customs of its people.

Nobody but a resident could have given such a vivid and accurate description of the country as Buddhaghosa has done in the pages of his commentaries.

However in the absence of other corroborative evidence we should leave this question an open one.

Dhammapāla :—According to Sāsanavaṁsa, Dhammapāla was a native of Ceylon. He lived at Padara-tittha (Badaratittha) in the kingdom of the Damila (Drāviḍa) in the neighbourhood of Ceylon. To be more exact we should say that he belonged to the region of Kāñcīpura in the Cola country and he belonged to same school of Theravāda Buddhism which obtained in Ceylon. He was also a celebrity of the Mahāvihāra and followed the same traditional method of exposition in his commentaries. Traditionally he is said to have been the author of the commentaries on the eight books of the Khuddaka-Nikāya, viz., Thera-Therīgāthā, Udāna and Itivuttaka, Peta-vatthu, Vimāna-vatthu, Cariyā-piṭaka and Apadāna. Besides these, he wrote a commentary on the Nettippakaraṇa and a ṭīkā on the Visuddhimagga called Paramattha-mañjusā. Dhammapāla's works show the unmistakable influence of Buddhaghosa, for whom evidently he had great admiration.

This brief survey of the Pali commentaries and the sub-commentaries would, we believe, demonstrate the value and importance of the aṭṭhakathās for a correct understanding and apprasal of the Buddha-vacana as embodied in the Theravāda tradition.

The exegetical method started by the great commentator Buddhagosa, had been faithfully continued and developed in the most prominent Theravāda countries, Ceylon and Burma.

In the latter country the Burmese monks continued to write sub-commentaries on the original commentaries, in the form of Ṭikā, Anuṭika and so on.

So we have now a vast amount of commentarial literature at our disposal, a careful and critical study of which by modern scholars may throw welcome light on some obsure and controversial points of Theravāda Buddhism.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

BY

ANG RAJ CHAUDHARY

What is the relation of language to culture ? Are they independent of each other ? Can culture exist without language ? If not, how does language reflect culture ? What is the relation of literature to culture ? These are some of the questions which I shall try to examine in this paper.

The atomistic view of culture as a haphazard collection of traits has been abandoned. Kluckohn and Kelly define culture as 'a historically derived system of explicit and implicit designs for living which tends to be shared by all or specially designated members of a group'. Human beings learn organized sets of behaviour. Edward Sapir, the famous cultural anthropologist and linguist, is of the opinion that 'all cultural behaviour is patterned'. So is language. It is also patterned activity and it is shared by all members of a society. How do we acquire a language ? Not by learning discrete utterances. We learn the frame in which we fit all meaningful utterances. 'I sit on a bench' is a frame in which other utterances like 'I stand on a bench' or 'I sit on a chair' can be fitted.

The second point of resemblance is that languages are diverse ; so are cultures. Each society has its own language and its own culture. Besides, language and culture are cumulative. They are acquired through generations. If we see language and culture in the historical perspective, only then can we account for the changes that occur in them. Culture is subject to change ; so is language. Above all, language is a powerful instrument which enable men who are members of a society, to share in the experiences of others, past and present. It also enables men to make their experiences continuous. Culture develops because language makes it possible to preserve what has been acquired before.

It is, therefore, truly said that, of all aspects of culture, it is fair guess that language was the first to receive a highly developed form and that its essential perfection is a pre-requisite to the development of

culture as a whole.[1] Most aspects of culture are dependent on language. It functions with most cultural behaviour and therefore its vital role in the total network of cultural patterns of a society cannot be exaggerated. Sapir has noted that language 'does not as a matter of fact stand apart from or run parallel to direct experience but completely interpenetrates with it'.[2] A parallel remark to this effect is found in Bhartṛhari, the great Indian philosopher of grammar :

Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte
Anuviddham iva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena bhāsate.[3]

There are three primary levels of language—substance, form and context. Substance is phonic and graphic. Form which is the organisation of substance into meaningful events is of two kinds —grammar and lexis. It is at this level that we shall be primarly concerned with in order to explore in detail the relationship of language to culture. The grammar of a language consists of formal devices which show in a most economical way the frames in which all utterences can be fitted. Grammar, therefore, is a matter of the highest abstraction. Here operates the closed system. What is a closed system ? It is a system where there are a limited number of terms and if one is chosen others are excluded, because the terms are mutually exclusive. Besides, if one more term is introduced into the system a change in the meaning of all the terms is brought about. Native speakers of English may tend to think that the speakers of other languages must make the number distinction between one and many. But this is not true of all languages. There are three-number systems is in Sanskrit as against two is in English. The meaning of plural in Sanskrit is, therefore, different from the meaning of plural in English.

There are some languages which make four-number distinction—one, two, three and more than three. And others make no grammatical distinction as to number at all.[4] Most of us suffer from linguistic ethunocetricism and we would better jettison our prejudices.

1. E. Sapir, *Culture, Language and Personality*, p. 1.
2. Ibid.
3. Bhartṛhari—*Vākya-padīya* I. 124.
   There is no knowledge in the world which is not followed by words. All knowledge seems to be interpenetrated with words.
4. R. Lado, *Linguistics Across Cultures*, p. 65.

At lexis operate open sets. Here unlike in grammar, the choice is not from a limited number of terms but from an infinite number of terms. He sits on a........................ ; if we take this frame the gap can be filled with a number of items such as chair, table, bench, sette and so on. Each item will be equally suitable. But if we take the third person singular number as the subject of the sentence and if the event is to take place in the present tense there can be no other form of 'sit' than 'sits'. These illustrations, I hope, have made the distinction between grammar and lexis clear. Lexis is a matter of great delicacy.

Recent studies show a relationship between lexis (vocabulary) and the content of culture. It is true that the vocabulary of a people reflects their culture. What are their particular points of interests, how is their society organized, how far they are advanced technically—are all indicated by their vocabulary. A close study of the vocabulary of a people throws sufficient light on their culture. 'Vocabulary is a very sensitive index of the culture of a people and changes of the meaning, loss of old words, the creation and borrowing of new ones are all dependent upon the history of culture itself. Languages differ widely in the nature of their vocabularies. Distinctions which seem inevitable to us may be utterly ignored in languages which reflect an entirely different type of culture, while these in turn insist on distinctions which are all but unintelligible to us'.[1]

Sapir has been quoted above *in extenso,* for he shows the influence of culture on the change of meaning, on the creation and borrowing of new words as also on why they are necessitated. Language is to a great extent dependent upon culture. And one of the meanings of culture is the 'ways of a people' ?

Why do the Eskimos make very subtle distinctions among hundred kinds of snow and have as many names for them whereas for us it is only snow ? Why do the Arabs have several different names for the horses and camels ? The reason is obvious. Snow plays a very important role in the life of the Eskimos and so do horses and camels in the life of the Arabs. Peoples who like the Cheri Cahua Apachi live by hunting, are found to have detailed lists of animal names and they name the topographic features precisely and with care as the Eskimos name different kinds of snow. Harry

1. E. Sapir, *Culture, Language and Personality,* p. 36.

Hoijer gives other illustrations to prove this. He says 'the Australian aborigines who emphasisze kinship as a means of social control, have a large and complicated vocabulary of kin terms. Status systems, among such peoples as the Japanese and Koreans, are similarly reflected in Vocabulary and even in certain partially grammatical features of a language, such as the pronominal system'.[1] Such examples can be multiplied *ad infinitum* from different languages. But one more example and we shall have done with it. Scores of different kinds of rice are named by us whereas the people who don't grow rice, know all kinds of rice as rice.

It has been rightly said by Sapir that 'Language gives us a sort of stratified matrix to work in for the purpose of unravelling culture sequences'. He further says, 'Language like culture, is a composite of elements of very different age, some of its features reaching back into the mists of an impenetrable past, others being the product of a development of yesterday. If we now succeed in putting the changing face of culture into relation with the changing face of language, we shall have obtained a measure, vague or precise, according to specific circumstances of the relative ages of the culture elements'.[2] Language changes and so does culture but culture changes rather more rapidly than language. When two cultures come into contact (the contact may be hostile or friendly or may have been caused by trade purposes) a phenomenon, *inter alias*, known as 'borrowing' takes place. And naturally therefore an analysis of the provenance of the words of a language will index the direction of cultural influence. In the English vocabulary various layers can be recognized. There are a large number of Italian words (Piano, Soprano, Opera, Libretto, Tempo, Adagio etc.) connected with music in English, which show how the Italian music has exerted influence on the English culture.

The Normans left a deep impress on English language. Words relating to administration such as govern, reign, realm, sovereign etc. are French. The terms pertaining to the law (justice, just, judge, jury, court, suit, sue, plaintiff, plead, summon, cause, crime, guile, felony, traitor, damage, property etc.) are also of French origin. Sir Walter Scott has humorously said in Ivanhoe, that while the names of several animals in their life-time are English (ox, cow,

1. H. Hoijer, *Anthropology Today*, p. 557.
2. E. Sapir, *Selected Writings of E. Sapir*, p. 432.

calf, sheep, swine, boar) they appeared on the table with French names (beef, veal, mutton, pork, bacon, venison).[1] Other sources from which English has borrowed can be shown likewise.

It has been shown above how the vocabulary of a language is an index of the culture of the people who speak that language. Differences of vocabulary are not confined only to the names of cultural objects such as arrow, gunboat, boomrang, gun, tank, saber-jet, mig and sputnik. According to Sapir 'they apply just as well to the mental world. It would be difficult in some languages, for instance, to express the distinction which we feel between *to kill* and to *murder*, for the simple reason that the underlying legal philosophy which determines our use of these words does not seem natural to all societies'.[2] Moreover, why is it that a language abounds in euphemistic expressions and another abounds in taboos ? What is the *raison dêtre* of these features in a language ? The reason perhaps is this that there are different types of cultures which determine the use of the language.

Vocabulary, as has been shown amply clearly above, reflects culture. Now the most pertinent question is whether grammar also indexes culture as sensitively as vocabulary or lexis ? Is there any correspondence between the form of a language and the form of the culture of the people who speak it ? The question is not very easy to answer. There is no one to one correspondence between cultural type and linguistic structure. 'So far as can be seen, isolating or agglutinative or inflective types of speech are possible on any level of civilization. Nor does the presence or absence of grammatical gender, for example, seem to have any relevance for our undertanding of the social organization or religion or folklore of the associated peoples'.[3] If there were, how could one account for 'the rapidity with which culture diffuses in spite of profound linguistic differences between the borrowing and giving communities' ?

There may not be one to one correspondence between cultural type and linguistic structure. But grammar does reflect culture to a great extent. The native speakers of French make a distinction between 'tu' and 'Vous' where modern English has one form only namely 'you'. The native speakers of Hindi also make a distinction between

1. Otto Jesperson, *Growth and Structure of the English Language*, pp. 82-83.
2. E. Sapir, *Culture, Language and Personality*, p. 36.
3. *Ibid*. pp. 34-35.

Tuma and *Āpa*, reserving the latter to be used when they want to show respect. Grammar also enables us to express concepts of number, tense, mode and case relation. English language has three third person pronouns, according to the gender system. But this is not the case with Navaho. 'But Navaho', says Harry Hoijer, 'does divide third person pronouns into four categories :—(1) that employed of persons or beings psychologically closed to the speaker or of perferred interest; (2) that employed of persons or beings psychologically remote such as non-Navaho (when contrasted with Navaho) or relatives treated with formality (as opposed to those treated with familiarity); (3) the indefinite third person, and 'it' that refers only to an unspecified actor or goal and (4) the third person that has references to a place, condition or times'.[1]

Sanskrit language has three numbers as against two in English and two in Hindi. What is the logical basis of such distinctions? Do they reflect some cultural traits? These questions perhaps will never be answered fully and satisfactorily and if at all a lot of linguistic researches is done they can be answered but partially. They look deceptively simple and the fact of the matter is that they are very very complex and knotty.

There is a sense in which the deep relationship between language and culture becomes obvious. 'He talks Bengali like us'. The speaker here is obviously trying to identify the speaker with his community not only in the matter of language but also in the matter of culture. Language, therefore is a valuable and important guide to the scientific study of a culture.[2]

Language plays a decisive role as 'it powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and social processes'. That we see in a particular way is determined by the language we speak. The linguistic frameworks that have come down to us predispose us to think in terms of them. This, indeed, is a limitation. Linguistic frameworks thus impose limitation on our exploring the experiences freely. Sapir expresses it happily in these words :—'Language is at one and the same time helping and retarding us in our exploration of experience, and the details of these processes of help and hindrance are deposited in the subtler meanings of different cultures'.[3]

1. H. Hoijor, *Anthropology Today*, p. 559.
2. E. Sapir, *Culture, Language and Personality*, p. 70.
3. *Ibid.* p. 58.

It might as well be said that people speaking different languages live in different worlds of reality, because the languages they speak affect to a considerable degree their sensory perceptions and their habitual modes of thought. Sapir has suggested this thesis in many of his writings. Whorf and others have developed this in more detail. In the words of Sapir, 'Human beings do not live in the objective world alone nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached'.[1]

Language is not merely incidental but it is vital. To understand the complex meanings of a work of art, it is necessary to know the life-history of each word and its overtones in addition to its apparent significance that it has come to acquire through a long history. The speakers of a language live the words they use and they, in turn, gain in richness, complexity, colour and subtlety. Words mirror the whole life of a community and therefore the 'understanding of a simple poem, for instance, involves not merely an understanding of the single words in their average significance, but a full comprehension of the whole life of the community'[2]. For, are not our simple acts of perception at the mercy of the social patterns called words ? 'We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation.'[3]

A Bengali translator of Sri Aurobindo's 'Life Divine' has rendered 'human aspiration' as equivalent to '*Naciketāra abhīpsā*'. And this is indeed a happy translation, for what greater human aspiration he thinks can be than that desired by *Naciketā* ? For com-

1. E. Sapir, *Culture, Language and Personality*, p. 69.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

prehending the full import of '*Naciketāra Abhīpsā*' therefore a good background in Indian culture is a *sine qua non*. Here are a few more examples to show how language is vitally inter-related with culture :—

Bhagīratha prayatana, Draupadī kā cīra,
Rāmabāṇa, agni-parīkṣā Lakṣmaṇa-rekhā, Nala-Nīla kā patthara,
Yama-Viriñci-daśā, Bhīṣma-pratijñā, Mahābhārata-macāna,
Hukkā-pānī-banda, Janeu-kasam. Bharata-milāpa, Surasā kī tarah Munḥ Barhāna, Nārada honā.

Words and phrases are recipes. They contain cultural implications and overtones and have nuances and subtleties which are the life and soul of culture. It will be shown, later on, how language is a complex matter and how different aspects of culture such as religion, philosophy, socio-economic and political situations infuse life into it.

How do we view the world ? How many segments do we divide the colour spectrum into ? How do we treat time, space, substance, matter, religion and other concepts ? How do we determine terms connected with kinship ? These are some of the problems to which we should direct our attention.

Harry Hoijer says that 'among the Navaho, for example, we find colour terms corresponding roughly to our white, red and yellow, but none which are equivalent to our black, gray, brown, blue and green.' He says further that they have two terms for black, one to denote the blackness of darkness and the other to denote the blackness of coal. The native speakers of English recognise seven colours in the colour spectrum which is formed when a white light is passed through a prism. The seven colours are expressed as VIBGYOR. The rainbow (our Indra-dhanus) also has seven colours. The speakers of Hindi and English express the blackness of coal and the blackness of night in a different way. Both use binomial frames. *Rāta kī taraha kālī, koyale kī taraha kālā or rāta sī kālī and koyale sā kālā*—are the phrases we use. In English the binomial frames are as black as night, as black as coal, (cf. Jet-black and pitch-dark).

Of a few concepts, adverted to above, let us take time and see how its different treatments bear relation to different cultures. Whorf says about Hopi terms :—'There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity of the subjective duration-feeling. Nothing is

suggested about time except the perpetual getting later of it'.[1] Our conception of time is different. 'Summer', 'morning', 'sunset', 'night', 'day' are nouns, linguistically. In our conception of time it is divisible into 'a sequence of separable units'.[2] We use time as a mass also. The Hopi use phases of cycles which are linguistically distinct from nouns. They form separate class called 'temporals'. In her paper 'Linguistic Reflection of Wintu Thought', Lee says that the Wintu uses verb stems of two types. Verb stems of Type I are used to express particular experiences. They express particularizations in which the speaker's "consciousness, cognition, and sensation act as a limiting and formalizing element upon the formless reality." Verb stems of Type II express only the formless reality, given in the Wintu-conceived universe. A reality for the Wintu is unbounded. He individuates and particularizes and imposes transitory shapes. In different cultures reality is defined and analyzed in different ways. Can it be a final analysis ? Perhaps not. Here we may take a few concepts more. Philosophy, literally means love of knowledge and the Western thinkers right from Socrates have emphasised this meaning. But is our 'Darśana' equivalent to this ? Darśana means Sākṣātkāra i.e., to realize God. The meaning of religion is not the same as that of *dharma.*

Words also come to acquire different meanings through the ages. "Industry" says Raymond Williams, 'was a name for a particular human attribute, which could be paraphrased as skill, assiduity, perseverance, diligence. This use of industry, of course, survives. But, in the last decades of the eighteenth century, *industry* came also to mean something else. It became a collective word for our manufacturing and productive institutions, and for their general activities'.[3] Democracy, class, art and culture are other words which gained in different meanings, since the French revolution. Examples of how other concepts are treated in different cultures can be multiplied infinitely. *ad libitum.*

Whorf makes an investigation into the relation of language to culture. He sums up a portion of the whole investigation in two questions : '(1) Are our own concepts of time, space, and matter given

1. Quoted from The Relation of Language to Culture, from *Anthropology Today,* p. 563.
2. H. Hoijer, *Anthropology Today,* p. 563.
3. Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society 1780–1950,* p. 13.

in substantially the same form by experience to all men or are they in part conditioned by the structure of particular languages ? (2) Are there traceable affinities between (a) cultural and behavioural norms and (b) large-scale patterns ?'[1]

Does the type of linguistic structure unfailingly and inescapably reflect a particular type of culture ? Can we say, for instance, that the isolating type of language is connected with only one kind of culture and the inflectional type only with the other. Will it not be naive to correlate language and culture in this way ? Whorf accepts Sapir's remarks as true : 'All attempts to connect particular types of linguistic morphology with certain correlated stages of cultural development are vain...Both simple and complex types of language of an indefinite number of varieties may be found at any desired level of cultural advance'.[2]

Moreover, in one sense the relation of language to a particular type of culture is not intrinsic. Shall we be right to say that the United Kingdom and the United States have the same culture ? And yet they speak the same language. The speakers of the Athabaskan languages belong to four distinct culture areas.[3]

It is true however that a language as the medium of literature has a close connection with culture. Language is a system of communicating thought and ideas. And when thoughts and ideas of a people find expressions in their works of art, they become repositories of their culture. But this is a point which we shall take up later on.

There is another sense in which language and culture are interrelated : 'Language is the medium of literature as marble or bronze or clay are the materials of the sculptor'.[4] Every language has its distinctive peculiarities and has particular set of aesthetic factors—phonetic, rhythmic, symbolic and morphological. Every language therefore has got its peculiar innate formal limitations and possibilities. Literature reflects this : 'The literature fashioned out of the form and substance of a language has the colour and the texture of its matrix'.[5] A literary artist may not be conscious as to how he is helped and hinde-

1. Quoted from *Anthropology Today*, p. 562.
2. E. Sapir, *Language*, p. 234.
3. See Sapir, *Language*, p. 228.
4. E. Sapir, *Language*, p. 237.
5. Ibid., 237.

red by the matrix of a language which is his medium, but this becomes pretty obvious to him who wants to translate his work or works of art into another language.

Here, it will not be out of place to say a few words about 'style'. What is style ? Is it something which is imposed on the language from outside or is it the language itself ? Sapir says, 'The major characteristics of style, in so far as style is a technical matter of the building and placing of words, are given by the language itself, quite as inescapably indeed as the general acoustic effect of verse is given by the sounds and natural accents of the language'.[1] Can a truly great style seriously oppose itself to the basic form patterns of the language ? If it opposes, it does so at the cost of the vitality and vigour of language. Milton is full of artificialities. Latin inversions almost gave a death blow to the English language he wrote in. Keats tried to imitate Milton, but he failed. Every language has its own possibilities which make up for the limitations. 'Single Algoukin words are like tiny imagist poems' because the structure of that language makes it possible.

Tone languages like Chinese and Vietnamese make use of pitch in verse. English rhythm on the other hand depends mostly on the principle of contrasting stresses, some other languages on the principle of the number of syllables in a line.

The last question to be considered is what is the relation of literature to culture ? Knowing that language is the medium of literature, let us examine how language reflects culture.

But what is culture ? Edward Sapir says that this word seems to be used in three main senses. Ethnologists and culture historians use this word to indicate material or spritual inheritance of a people. Culture, thus, means 'a complex net work of traditionally conserved habits, usages and attitudes'. In the second sense culture means individual refinement. When we say that he is cultured what we refer to is his refinement, his good taste, his assimilated knowledge and experience and intellectual sophistication, preciousness of conduct and so on. The third use of the term is rather complex. It takes into account the spiritual possession of the group rather than of the individual and it also gleans of factors which are more valuable, more

1. E. Sapir, *language*, p. 242.

characteristic and more significant in a spiritual sense. This cultural conception 'aims to embrace in a single term those general attitudes, views of life, and specific manifestations of civilization that give a particular people its distinctive place in the world. Emphasis is put not so much on what is done and believed by a people as on how what is done and believed by a people functions in the whole life of that people, on what significance it has for them'[1]. Genuine culture in this sense is inherently harmonious, balanced, self-satisfactory. It means a certain poise. This sort of genuine culture can be found even at a lower stage of civilization. Higher civilization does not necessarily mean higher culture. Civilization is a quantitative concept as against culture which is a qualitative one. Civilization is sophistication. The more sophisticated a society is the more complex its civilization. But it does not necessarily mean that the people are more cultured.

And when does crisis in culture set in ? It sets in when the individual is regarded as a mere cog, 'as an entity whose sole *raison dêtre* lies in his subservience to a collective purpose that he is not conscious of or that has only a remote relevancy to his interests and strivings'.[2] Literature expresses culture and if the language is closely analysed, one can see through it the vibrations, emotional conflicts, subtle psychology and the spiritual efforts made by the member of a society in order to combat undesirable powers and influences. The inner balance, harmony and self-satisfaction of the members of a society are expressed in one kind of language whereas the discord, disharmony, dissatisfaction and discontentment are expressed in a different kind of language.

Besides, our attitude to time and animals and thanks-giving is evidenced by the language. 'Indian time' is one such expression. How animal is classified in two different cultures is also suggested by the linguistic differences. Rebert Lado says, 'A number of vocabulary items that are applicable both to animals and to humans in English have separate words for animals and for humans in Spanish. In English both animals and persons have *legs*. In Spanish animals have *patas* (animal legs) and humans have *piernas* (human legs). Similarly in English animals and humans have *backs* and *necks*, while in Spanish, animals have *lomo* and *pescueso* (animal back) and (animal neck) and

1. E. Sapir, *Culture, Language and Personality*, p. 83.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

humans have *espalda* and *cuello* (human back) and (human neck). Furthermore, in English both animals and humans *get nervous*, have *hospitals* and have *cemeteries*, named by means of various metaphors. In Spanish animals do not get nervous or have hospital or cemeteries'.[1] Bull-fighting, the bull-fighter, the bull, metador, picadors all point to a different kind of culture. Bull-fighting, therefore, is a great source for misunderstanding. Some Americans interpret bull-fighting as cruel.

Now a few words about thanks-giving and we shall have finished this discussion. When an English man says 'thank you' what he says is this that 'I think of you with gratitude'. A Japanese says 'Arigato' which literally means 'It is difficult for me to express gratitude sufficiently'. The Malayans say 'Trima Kasi' which means 'to give is to receive'. The Arabs believe that all good things come from Allah and so they don't thank human beings. They say 'Al hamdu-li-lah' (Praise be to God). The Russians, too, thank God (Spasibo-bog)[2]. Each of these phrases of greeting reflects a particular culture.

In fine, we can say that language and culture are related to a considerable extent and in some points the relation is deep and vital. But this is an area of study which has not yet been considerably explored. Only a lot of intensive research in this field can throw sufficient light to show their relationship.

1. Robert Lado, *Linguistics Across Culture*, p. 116.
2. See *Breaking the Language barrier* by Fred West.

GIRLS' BOARDING HOUSES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT IN ANCIENT INDIA

By

Sushil Malti Devi

Educationists today have been fully and rightly conscious of the decisive role that the living accommodations have to play in the spread of higher education, especially amongst the girls. A girl, unlike a boy, cannot be expected to move all alone in a big city and put up with the members of a stranger's family, sharing a room or two with them. She is handicapped in this respect for reasons more than one, and insecurity of life and honour may await her there in doing so. Besides, there are other benefits too accruing from hostel life, common to girls and boys both, the detailed enumeration of which need not be given here. The provision of accommodation to a number of students in a hostel would mean enabling the talents to gather at one place and thereby exchange their ideas and help each other in the acquisition of their knowledge, in the building up of their character and in the development of their personality. Of course, there are certain pitfalls as well to lure weak students to their ruination, but for this reason the bright side of the picture cannot be overlooked. Hence, in order to spread higher education amongst women, special arrangements for their lodging and boarding have a vital role to play.

There is no denying the fact that the standard of girls' education in ancient India for a sufficiently longer period was fairly high and extensive, both in nature and score. One may, therefore, naturally feel inquisitive if the educationists of the contemporary period realised the significance of the hostels, and, if so, did they take adequate measures for the construction and management of establishments of the like and for the safety of the life therein. Social customs, religious beliefs and secular needs all favoured high attainments in women in varieties of subjects and fields. In the *Ṛg-Veda*, it is advised that an unmarried young learned daughter ought to be given in marriage to a young learned groom, and a father should never think of giving in marriage a daughter of very young age.[1] A scholarly daughter was

1. *ṚV*, III, 5, 65. 16.

cherished as intensely as a learned son, obviously to enhance the family prestige and to attract a good son-in-law. A propitiatory rite was observed for the fulfilment of the object.[1] The *Yajur-Veda* expressly lays down that a young daughter should be married only after she completes the period of her studentship.[2] It may be observed that the word *Brahmacārin* denoted a student who, after his initiation, stayed with his teacher for his studies. That the girls also observed the period of studentship may indicate that they too went to reside with their preceptors. Moreover, the *upanayana* of the girls is also described.[3] Girls could obtain husbands of their choice by observing *Brahmacarya*.[4] A bride at the time of her marriage is wistfully desired to have eloquence enough to influence the members of Vidatha in her advanced age in favour of the interest of her father-in-law's family.[5] Gobhil states that the wife should be educated in order to be able to take part in sacrifices.[6] There were Brahmavādinīs whose thirst for knowledge could be quenched only by the realisation of the supreme being, and for that end they were even prepared to remain celibate for the whole life and reside in forest retreats.[7] Yāska, in his Nirukta, states that the teacher should not teach one who is not a regular student living with him (*na anupasannāya*).[8] Mādhavācārya states that the Brahmin boys are to be initiated at the age of eight years, and the observance of the same rite was also obligatory for the girls.[9]

It is thus evident that education was as much indispensable for the girls as it was for the boys, and the guardians were prepared to send them to a place where they could get opportunity and facility for higher studies. The question of suitable accommodation for the girls, therefore, must have posed a very significant problem, and consequently adequate measures may certainly have been taken to solve the difficulty.

Now, the best way to approach the query would be to study the Āśrama system of life in the country. The Āśramas had been great

1. *Bṛ. Up.* VI. 4. 17.
2. *YV.* VIII. 1.
3. *AV.* XI. 7-20.
4. Ibid., XI. 5. 18.
5. *ṚV.* X. 85. 27 ; *AV.* XIV. I. 20-21.
6. *Gṛ. Sūtra* I. 3.
7. i. e., reference to the Upaniṣadic women like Gārgī ; Jaimini in the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*, *Adhi.*, iii, chap. I.
8. *Nirukta*, ii. 3. 4.
9. *Nyāyamālāvistāra*, p. 385.

centres of learning and education, and students from far off places flocked therein to quench their thirst of knowledge. In an age when girls' education was so much favoured and educated girls were so much in demand, it is no wonder if the girl students have also been found studying in these Āśramas, some of whose hearths and homes would by no means have been very close or in the vicinity of their institutions enabling them to visit their places daily.

Indications are, however, not wanting, which clearly show that the girls not only attended courses of their studies, but also resided in these Āśramas where arrangements were made for their lodging and boarding. In the *Atharva-Veda*, when the Principal of an educational institution proceeds to admit a newly arrived student, among several injunctions, he points out to him that he should try to live in harmony with the ladies according to the wishes of the Warden (*gopa*)[1]. This injunction, while on the one hand proves that there existed the system of co-education, and that boys and girls resided together, on the other also indirectly suggests that co-existence sometime led to such acts of indiscipline which were not approved of by the Warden. The problem which confronted the Warden sometimes would have very naturally arisen out of the sex vices for which no other solution served the purpose excepting the marriage of the individuals involved, Such a presumption gains support again from a passage in the *Atharva-Veda* where marriage is seen taking place between a youth and a maid who were '*savāsin*' (i.e., between those who resided together), still having not left the Āśrama.[2] It is not very unlikely that some of the subsidiary varieties of sons like Kānīna, Sahoda, Apaviddha, etc. might have been due to such moral lapses on the part of their parents while living together in one and the same Āśrama. That such a presumption is not totally unfounded finds further support from the story of king Tṛṇavṛnda of Vaiśālī. The king had, according to the custom, founded an Āśrama in the valley of the Himalayas. A Pulastya Ṛṣi came to reside with him for higher studies. His studies were disturbed by the presence of the Brahmin and the Kṣatriya maidens of the Āśrama who remained ever engaged in singing and dancing. In order to get rid of them, he behaved in such a way that all the girls, save one named Ilavilā, the daughter of the king, stopped visiting him any more

1. *AV*. III. 8. 4.
2. Ibid., II. 29 and V. 6.

for fear of becoming *Kumārī* mothers. The Kauṣītakī Brāhmaṇa states that an Aryan lady, Pathyāsavatī, proceeds to the north for study, and to obtain the title of Vāk by her scholarship.[1] Evidently, arrangements were made for her stay in the North. During the Upaniṣadic and the early Sūtra periods, there was unprecedented increase in the number of the Brahmavādinī students. The pursuers of the knowledge were compulsorily required to remain unmarried and to retire to the forests. Apparently some arrangements were made for their lodgings. The Bālamanoramā quotes an interesting old verse to show that in early times women versed in the Vedic literature were called Brahmavādinīs and were admitted to the discipline of Brahmacarya. They tied round their waist girdle of the muñja-grass, wore black antelone-skin and chanted *Sāvitrī mantra*. These features of a Brahmavādinī student are described by the Smṛti writers of the subsequent age and the Epics (referred to in respective places). In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini, we find a term *Chātrīśālā*, occuring probably to denote girls' hostels.[2] The ladies, specialising in the works of Āpiśali and Kāśakṛtsna were called Āpiśalā and Kāsakṛtsnā.[3] The fact that so many girls were called after a particular branch of learning for studying under a single individual may lead to suppose that girls of the distant places, intending to learn the subject, must have been provided with accommodation during the period of their study. According to the *Mahābhāṣya* of Pātañjali again there used to be lady scholars specialising in particular branches of the Vedic literature and were called after that branch of knowledge. For example, ladies versed in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* were called Kaṭhī[4], and in the several *Ṛg-Vedic maṇḍalas* as Bahvṛkṣī[5], Sāktikī[6], etc. As the Vedic literature had become vast and extensive with several offshoots and branches, it had become practically impossible for an individual to learn them all by heart. Naturally specialisation for teaching purposes was also required. Hence, even if the family played the part of an educational institution and father that of the teacher, girls desirous of learning particular branch of the Vedic studies would have gone to

1. *Kauṣītakī Br.* VII. 6.
2. *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, VI. 2. 86.
3. Ibid., IV. 1. 14.
4. *Mahābhāṣya*, VI. 3. 35.
5. IV. 3. 63.
6. IV. 1. 13. 6.

reside with the members of other family renowned for that branch of knowledge. Vedic rites and sacrifices were quite common up to the 1st cen B. C., as is evidenced by the inscriptions. Vedas could be taught by the Brahmins alone and that too orally. The fact, therefore, presupposes the constant presence of the intent lady scholars at the house of their teacher. References to lady teachers called Upādhyāyī or Upādhyāyā are found in the Mahābhāṣya. The term *Upādhyāyā* evidently denoted those lady teachers in whose houses students from other places came to study.[1] An Ācāryā of the Lokāyata sect is also referred to.[2] Then there were Kumārī-śramaṇās, Kumārī-pravvajitā, Kumārī-tāpasīs etc. in the society.[3]

Most fascinating and encouraging evidences, however, hail from the Epics. The incidents narrated therein no doubt appear to have occured much before the actual composition of the works, but the fact cannot be overlooked that the composers describe it in the spirit of what they actually visualised and found. Before Sītā was married, a Samavṛttā Bhikṣuṇī, who visited the court of her father, told her mother that she (i. e., Sītā) would have to spend her future life in forest hermitages.[4] Dr S. C. Sircar considers Samavṛttā Bhikṣuṇī to be the corrupt form of Samāvṛttā Bhikṣuṇī or a lady student having returned home from school after completing her education.[5] He appears to have been correct in his assumptions that a Bhikṣuṇī need not necessarily stand for a Buddhist nun, rather for a Brahmacāriṇī whose duties were wide in the Āśrama, a semi-religious educational institution, inclusive of begging of alms, and that the poet could see in her similarity with the Buddhist nun (Bhikṣuṇī) and hence the name. According to the Gṛhya-sūtras, the Snātakas, after the Samāvartana ceremony, were required to visit the royal court or the learned assembly in order to prove their educational attainments.[6] The *Mahābhārata* refers to the gift of thirty *dāsīs* by king Veṇa to the Snātakas who visited his court.[7] Such might have been the occasion for her to visit the court of Janaka to impress upon him that she had

1. *Mahābhāṣya*, III. 3, 21. 1, p. 302.
2. VII. 3. 45 ; Va. 7. 8, p. 190 : '*Varṇika-bhāguri-lokāyatasya*—Vārttika.
3. II. 1. 70 ; *Kumārīśramaṇādibhiḥ*.
4. *Rāmāyaṇa*, II. 29. 18.
5. Sircar, S. C. *Educational Ideas and Institutions in Ancient India*, p. 62.
6. *Drahyana-gṛhya-sutra*, III. 126 ; Āp. Gr. Sutra, I. 11.5.
7. *Mbh.*

become a Snātakā. After the restoration, Sītā is stated to have expressed her desire to revisit the Āśramas where she went alone with Lakṣamaṇa, and spent a night at each of these Āśramas, which would indicate that ladies were living in those Āśramas; otherwise it would have been against her decorum to have stayed therein. When she was left near the Āśrama of Vālmīki, the Ṛṣi welcomed and received her kindly, and consoled her saying that she should not feel shy as *tāpasīs* (nuns and lady students) would ever cherish her as one amongst them, i. e., as another sister student, and she was assigned a seat in the female section of the Āśrama.[1] Ātreyī was a *tāpasī* living in the Āśrama of Vālmīki. She afterwards migrated to that of Agastya because of her inability to keep pace with the sons of Sītā in education.[2] Ātreyī's home might have been close to the Āśrama of Vālmīki; but it was certainly not to that of Agastya, as the talk between the Vanadevatā Vāsantī and Ātreyī would suggest. Vāsantī wonders why Ātreyī came so far away to learn in the Āśrama of Agastya when Vālmīki was already living very near her home.[3] This may show that though the girls generally attached themselves for education to the Āśramas lying in the vicinity of their homes, yet there were exceptions, and the number of such students who visited far off places, may not have been insignificant; and this could not have been the case unless they might have been assured of their safe lodging there. The life, as described in the other Āśramas, also indicates that there were girls who were regular boarders in the Āśramas. The descriptions given in the *Rāmāyaṇa* of the Saptajana Āśrama,[4] the Atri Āśrama,[5] the Āśramas established by king Kuśadhvaja of Mithilā,[6] the Mātaṅga Āśrama,[7] etc., fully tastify it. The girls were sent to these Āśramas from far off places. Rāvaṇa's mother Nikaṣā was sent by her father to reside in the Āśrama of Pulastya,[8] and Ahalyā, daughter of Vadhryaśva-Pāñcala, was sent to that of Śaradvant Gautama in Mithila.[9] These instances show that the girls were versed not only in

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1. *Rāmāyaṇa*, VII. 55.60.
2. *Uttara-rāmacarita*, Act II.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Rāmāyaṇa* IV. 13.
5. Ibid., II. 117.
6. Ibid., VII. 17ff.
7. Ibid., III. 73-74.
8. Ibid., VII, 9-10.
9. Ibid., I. 48 and 51 and VII. 30.

theology, but they stayed there for receiving training in Fine Arts as well.

The *Mahābhārata* also provides some instances. In the hermitage of the Kurukṣetra, there lived two noted women hermits (*tāpasīs*), a Brāhmaṇī and a Kṣatriyā. While the former became *tapaḥsiddhā* by observing Brahmacarya from her very youth, the latter, also a Brahmacāriṇī, attained spiritual pre-eminence.[1] The Kṣatriyā was a princess, daughter of king Śāṇḍilya. Janaka had a discourse on philosophical topics with Bhikṣuṇī Sulabhā.

Rules laid down in the Dharmaśāstras also establish the fact that the girls were sent to the hostels during the period of their education. According to Manu, marriage is *upanayana* for the girls, husband is the Ācārya, the house is Āśrama for her, and the household duties her duties of the Brahmacāriṇīs.[2] It may indicate that there was still the practice of sending the girls to the Āśramas for study, though the lawmakers were trying to make it unpopular. Hārīta speaks of two types of lady scholars, Brahmavādinīs and Sadyovadhus. The former were entitled to offer secrifices to the fire and chant *Sāvitrī mantra*, and they also underwent *upanayana* ceremony. The latter too underwent *upanayana* but just before their marriage.[3] Yama also speaks of the Brahmavādinī students living in the days of yore ; but, during his age the girls were to be taught by their relations only and not by others.[4] In a later age, Priyambadā and Anasūyā are stated to have come from other places to reside in the Āśrama of Kaṇva.[5] In the *Mālatī-mādhava*, nun Kāmandakī is stated to have resided with Bhūrivasu and Devarāta for receiving education, besides there being several others as well from different places residing together.[6] The Bhārhut sculptures depict scenes of hermitages. One of the scenes, according to Cunningham, evidently represents female students residing in the hermitage.[7] In the royal harems and in the family of the rich people, thousands of females proficient in different arts are described to have been employed. It is not exactly known how these female

1. *Mbh.* IX. 54.
2. Ibid.
3. *Manusmṛti*, 11, 66-67.
4. Altekar, A. S. *Education in Ancient India*, p. 207, fn 4.
5. *Mbh.* I, 91.
6. *Mālatīmā.*, Act I.
7. Mookerji, R. K. *Ancient Indian Education*, facing, p. 68.

employees were imparted training in different branches of fine arts; but on the basis of the drama like Kālidāsa's *Mālavikāgnimitra*, it does not seem unlikely that royal harems themselves made arrangements for the training of these female employees, and that the women lived in the harem during their period of education and training. Kauṭilya affirms by saying that the female slaves and dancers and the persons connected with the teaching of the art of dancing, music and other pursuits should be maintained by the State. In the *Mālavikāgnimitra* of Kālidāsa, princess Mālavikā, in the guise of a maid-servant, is said to have been sent by queen Dhāriṇī with a view to learning the art of acting from Gaṇadāsa. Emperor Ghiyasuddin Balaban is known to have appointed lady teachers for imparting education to the women in the royal harem.[1] Rich families employed private tutors for the education of their girls. Uttarā was given lesson in dancing by Bṛhannalā (Arjuna in disguise). In one of the Khajuraho sculptures, a girl is depicted as reading something before a teacher. Commoners also might have been sending girls there for training, perhaps just like apprentices employed on a small remuneration with an assurance to be absorbed as regular employees after the completion of their training.

As regards the number of the girls residing in the hostels, it is by no means an easy task to assess. A large percentage of the educated girls referred to in the early Vedic period and no less than twenty Ṛṣikās mentioned in the *Ṛg-Veda*, however, do not enable us to ascertain as to how many of them had been living in the boarding houses for their studies and how many of them received education in their own houses by their own family members. However, during the later Vedic period, when the Vedic literature had become vast and varied and specialization was felt essential for gaining proficiency, mystic knowledge of the Upaniṣads and oral method of teaching necessitated constant presence of the pupil near his or her preceptor. The Āśramas were like modern residential Universities which provided all kinds of education, theoretical and technical, and at the same time safe accommodation to the students. Hence, so long the Vedic education and other knowledges were imparted to the girls and so long they underwent *upanayana* and did not observe *purdah*, the Āśramas vibrated with the noises of the girl boarders. That may explain why a large number of instances of the girl boarders is found in the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

1. Law, p. 194.

Besides, begging was not always necessary for a Brahmacārin. Dharmaśāstras have prescribed option for a student to beg once a week if it was not possible for him or her to beg daily.[1] Rich students were even exempted from this obligation by paying fees in advance, in lieu of it.[2] Besides, students could beg from their preceptors or from their friends and relatives, if they so liked.[3] Some of the Smṛti texts permit a girl student to beg in her own house.[4] Moreover, from the earliest times, kings and rich persons donated land and money, slaves and servants to learned scholars, and thereby patronized learning. Janaka of the Upaniṣadic age is quite famous for his love for men of letters. Rāma and Sītā, while proceeding on exile, parted with their belongings in favour of Suyajña-Vāśiṣṭha and his wife.[5] Kauśalyā also lavished the teachers and students with benefactions and presents on suitable occasions.[6] Hence there was nothing to obstruct a woman from residing away from her house for study. And lady teachers (Ācaryā and Upādhyāyā) used to initiate and keep girl students in their houses. *Ācārya-kula-vāsin* may be applied to girl students as well living in the house of their Ācaryas.

It appears that arrangements for their lodgings were made according to the qualifications and attainments of the students. Senior students and scholars of advanced studies, who at the same time imparted education to the juniors, were given separate independent quarters or required to live in lodgings specially provided for them. Perhaps such residences were called *āvasathas*, because in the *Rāmāyaṇa* references to this type of buildings have been made always in connection with the senior students. The Pulastya teacher in theology had repaired to the Āśrama of king Tṛṇavṛnda for *prasaṅga* on Dharma, and for further study he is said to have taken an abode there (*vāsa*). The *āvasathas* are regarded by Dr S. C. Sircar as town-hostels meant for the residence of advanced scholars. Such *āvasathas* stood on the road-side near Ayodhyā where Bhikṣu Sarvārtha-siddha resided who was afterwards appointed to be the Principal (*kulapati*) of a school near Citrakūṭa by Rāma.[7] When Sītā was

1. *Gopatha Br.* i. 2. 1-8; *BDS.* I. 2. 52.
2. Jatanokas.
3. Gautama, ii. 32.
4. Hārita quoted in VMS, p. 402; S. C. S., p. 62; Yama.
5. *Rāmāyaṇa*, II, 32.
6. Ibid., II, 32.
7. Ibid., VII. 71.

abducted by Rāvaṇa and Rāma was searching for her in his Āśrama, he is described to have gone to the side of the *āvasathas* as well.[1] This may indicate that *āvasathas* were constructed not only on road-sides, but were also within the premises of an Āśrama; and as Sītā is supposed to be found in one of the *āvasathas* of Rāma's Āśrama, it is clear that these *āvasathas* were blocks of residences meant for advanced lady scholars living in the Āśramas and spending their time in study and in imparting education.

Allotment of seats to the students in the Āśramas appears to have been made also on the basis whether they were married or unmarried (i.e., on their being of celibate studentship or non-celibate studentship). Married students living with their husbands were evidently allowed to live in separate independent quarters allotted to them. Rāma and Sītā, during the period of their exile, lived together in the Āśramas which they happened to visit. Such places of abode have been mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa* as *parṇaśālās*[2]. The example of Rāma and Sītā may, however, not be taken as a fitting illustration to prove the assumption just referred to for it was something else that, compelled by the peculiar circumstances, they had to pass their days in the forest retreats and avail of the opportunities so afforded to them in learning various arts or accepting to be the teacher or Warden of such Āśramaic institutions.[3] But the numerous stories of love incidents taking place in the Āśramas, right from the Vedic period down to the Paurāṇic age, and their culmination in actual weddings with permission still to lead Āśramaic life, leave hardly any doubt that they were lodged in separate cottages in the Āśramas as married couples. Such married couples, engaged in teaching and advanced studies, lived in the Āśramas in the manner just described. Lopāmudrā lived with her husband, and assisted him in his teaching work. Atri lived with his wife Anasūyā. Maitreyī repaired to the forest to live with her husband Yājñavalkya with a view to learning Brahma-vidyā. The daughter of Tṛṇavṛnda lived with her husband and prosecuted her advanced studies in his

1. Ibid., III. 17.
2. Ibid., II. 116 ff, III. 13-30.
3. Rāma learnt some new method in the skill of the use of arrows from Agastya, and Sītā studied certain languages. Rāma became teacher in the Citrakūṭa Āśrama and in the Āśrama of Ṛṣi Atri, where he is called a Ṛṣi (*ārṣa-carita*). He was appointed Warden of the Pañcavaṭī Āśrama by Agastya.

company. The mothers of Dīrghātamas, Śuka and Aṣṭāvakra of the traditional literature all lived in the Āśramas in the company of their respective husbands for studying the Vedas. In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, when Vālmīki proceeded with Sītā towards in Women's section of lodging to instruct the inmates for making arrangements for her stay in the Āśrama, the wives of the Munis are said to have come out of their residences standing close to the establishment to greet him and expressed much delight to have seen the great seer after a long interval.[1] The teachers' residences and women's boarding houses were thus clustered together in one block close to each other, perhaps with a view to facilitating constant watch and direct supervision over the boarders. Senior lady students of high intellect and educational attainments also enjoyed the privilege of having free independent quarters. Sītā was provided with such facilities while she lived in the Āśrama of Vālmīki.[2]

In the context of the married couples residing together in the Āśramas, the story of Ṛṣyaśṛṅga and his wife Śāntā may be narrated. Ṛṣyaśṛṅga was the son of Ṛṣi Vibhāṇḍaka in whose Āśrama the admission of women students, married or unmarried, was strictly prohibited. Social customs of the day, however, disapproved of such restrictions, and consequently a severe drought and famine in the region was interpreted by the people as being the result of such a rigidity followed in the Āśrama of Vibhāṇḍaka. The king also believed in the popular superstition. In order to break the celibate atmosphere of the Āśrama, he played a trick. Ṛṣyaśṛṅga, the son of the Ṛṣi, also assisted him in this regard by marrying his daughter Śāntā secretly. However, when the matter leaked out and became known to the Ṛṣi, he barred the doors of his Āśrama for his son and his daughter-in-law. It was, however, after a great entreaty that the Ṛṣi assented for their admission into the Āśrama, but on the express condition that they will have to observe *dvaividhya-brahmacarya*.[3] The exact significance of the term *dvaividhya-brahmacarya* is, however, not understood. It is very likely that under this kind of *brahmacarya* the couple were required to live separately and observe celibacy; hence the term *dvaividhya*.

1. *Rāmāyaṇa*, VII. 78.
2. Ibid., VII. 55ff.
3. Ibid., I. 9. 5. 10 ff.

Unmarried students lived in twos or threes in the residences erected in the midst of the teachers' cottages. Allusion to such arrangements may be cited from the *Atharva-Veda* where a student (of course, a male student) speaks of his residence in the company of his teacher and his fellow residents (*saṁveśya*)[1]. Anasūyā, Priyaṁvadā and Śakuntalā lived together in the cottage of Ṛṣi Kaṇva.[2] There were two Brahmavādinī ladies, a Brāhmaṇī and a Kṣatriyā, who lived together in the hermitage of Kurukṣetra.[3] The Gurukula system of education itself is suggestive of the accommodation of students in the houses of their preceptors in numbers according to his or her means, just like the members of the family. Sometimes, the young girls, who were sent to the Āśramas for their studies, were entrusted to the direct care of the head of the institution. Ahalyā resided in the cottage of Gautama, and Nikaṣā in that of the Pulastya Ṛṣi. However, as in both these examples the residents became the wives of their preceptors, it seems that they were purposely sent to develop such relations; but lifelong Brahmacārins live Kaṇva and Vālmīki kept elderly matrons in their Āśramas to look after the young boarders. Sītā is said to have been looked after by such matrons during the period of her confinement, and similarly elderly Gautamī is seen keeping watch over the three girls living in the Āśrama of Kaṇva and nursing Śakuntalā in her supposed illness. However, coining of a term *Chātrīśālā* by Pāṇini may postulate that girl boarders sometimes lived in large numbers in one single establishment. The appointment of Svayaṁprabhā by Hemā as the Warden of her establishment perhaps suggests the presence of such big boarding houses during the *Rāmāyaṇa* age.[4]

The Kulapati was the *de jure* head of the residential establishments. His powers were immense. He bestowed sacrificial gifts upon the boarders,[5] made offerings to the fire,[6] granted admission to the

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1. *AV.* III. 8. 1.
2. *Mbh.* I. 70. 3–51 : Kālidāsa, *Abhijñāna-śākuntala.*
3. *Mbh.*
4. *Rām.* IV. 50-53.
5. *AV.* VI. 58. 1.
6. Rāma and his party were received by Bhāradvāja and Agastya in the sacrificial hall.

new students,[1] dictated the rules of diet and conduct,[2] appointed Wardens over the hostels[3], received important guests of the Āśrama[4], determind the type of accommodation to be provided for the guests[5], etc. No body could enter within the premises of the Āśrama without his permission, e. g., Bālin was prohibited from entering into the Mātaṅgāśrama.[6]

But the Kulapati had his own limitations. It was beyond one man's capacity to transact all the businesses concerning big institutions like the Aśramas smoothly and efficiently without the assistance of others. A perusal of the Vedic and the Epic passages reveals that a number of staff were engaged in carrying out the business of the establishments. These consisted of the Wardens, the teacher in charge of admission, the physician, the nurses and the elderly matrons, the engineers and the staff to fulfil manual labours.

Thus, the study of the *Atharva-Vedic* passage indicates[7] that it was not always necessary that the Kulpati should have himself granted admission to the new entrants; rather some teacher was entrusted with the task. The fact also gains support when one sees that a number of arts and technical subjects were taught in the Aśramas and that the boarders wanted to specialise in the one or the other. Hence, students desirous of specialising in a particular branch of knowledge, after getting the approval of the Kulpati, were entrusted to the care of the specialist of the branch, and they resided with him in his cottage. A student, intending to learn several subjects, had to undergo *upanayana* several times, and during each course of the subject, he (or she, as the case might have been) stayed in the house of the particular teacher under his direct supervision. So, the teacher of the subject granted formal admission to the student concerned, and for all practical purposes kept supervision over the group of the students learning and residing in his house. Thus each Gurukula in the Aśrama was a hostel, each teacher

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1. *AV*. III. 8. 4.; *Rām.*
2. *Rām.* III. 7-8. Rāma could not stay in the Āśrama of Sutīkṣṇa as only vegetarian residents were permitted; *Rām.* I. 10 ff, with 9-5.
3. *Rām.* III. 73-74 (Śabarī was in charge of the Mātaṅga-āśrama); Ibid., IV. 50-53 (Appointment of Svayaṁprabhā by Hemā); Ibid, III. 13-30 Rāma's appointment over the Pañcavaṭī Āśrama.
4. Bhāradvāja, Vālmiki, etc, receiving Rāma.
5. *Rām.* II. 119.
6. *Rām.* III- 69–75.
7. *AV*. III. 8. 4

a superintendent, and his wife the matron or in the absence of the wife, an elderly women discharging the function of the matron.

The appointment of Wardens (*gopa*) has already been referred to. Perhaps they were next to Kulpati in order of superiority and in respect of power. While the teacher-superintendent could be responsible for the boarders residing only in his or her establishment, the Warden appears to have been responsible for the entire residents (students) of the Āśrama. This may explain why a teacher is found advising a newly admitted boarder to live in harmony with the ladies of the hostel so that he may not incur the displeasure of the Warden (*gopa*).[1] Hence, the function of the Warden was something like that of a protector of the weak from the strong who could punish the wrong-doers as well. Śramaṇī Śabarī is also seen discharging the function of affording protection to the inmates in the Aśrama of Mātaṅga from the onslaughts of Bālin.[2] The example of the appointment of Svayaṁprabhā as Warden of the estaablishment of Hemā may indicate that big hostels were kept under the Warden. The Warden also appears to have been assigned the duty of planning and organising a division of the bigger Āśrama. Rāma was appointed as a Warden of the Pañcavaṭī Āśrama for its organisation by Agastya.[3]

The physicians and surgeons were also employed in the Aśramas who were evidently responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the general health of the boarders.[4] The Āśramas were generally situated in the forests and hilly tracts. Snake-bites, yellow disease, Yakṣmā, etc. were dangers common to the residents of the Āśramas. The *Atharva-Veda* alludes to such diseases.[5] Besides, the Ṛṣis were not ascetics and recluses. They were householders. Sītā alludes to the dissections being made of the women's womb by surgeons in order to take out the foetus.[6] Sītā herself gave birth to her children in the Āśrama of Vālmīki where she was taken care of and nursed by the wives of the Ṛṣis and elderly matrons of the Āśrama.[7] Elderly Gautamī lived with Śakuntalā, Priyaṁvadā, etc.

1. Ibid.
2. *Rām.* III. 73-74.
3. Ibid., III. 17-30.
4. *AV.* X. 4. 15.
5. *AV.* iii. 8 ; IV. 9 ; *Kauś.* 58. 8.
6. *Rām.* V. 28. 6.
7. Ibid., VII. 78.

Tvaṣṭṛs were the officials in charge of the construction of the buildings, who were prayed for making adequate provisions for spacious accommodations. There were also officers to finance the institution, and it appears from the passage that the strength of the boarders depended to a considerable extent upon the provisions supplied by such officials.[1] The fact that the students flocked in large numbers in those Āśramas where they were assured of lavish supplies of provisions gains support from the Sūtras of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as well.

Bigger and crowded establishments like those of Bhāradvāja and Vālmīki maintained a large number of slaves.[2] Besides, there were hostel properties in the form of furniture, utensils and other valuables which were taken out for use when an honoured guest came to stay, e. g., at the time of reception of Rāma and Bharata in the Āśrama of Bhāradvāja.

Royal and important personalities were received and entertained by the Kulapati. Rāma and his party were received by Bhāradvāja, Atri and Agastya in their respective Āśramas; so also Bharata was received by Bhāradvāja and Śatrughana by Vālmīki; but, in the absence of the Kulapati, the Wardens also entertained the guests, e. g., Śabarī entertained Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa; Svayaṁprabhā received Hanūmān. The reception hall usually used to be the sacrificial hall where the Kulapati and the residents of the entire establishment congregated to offer sacrifices to the fire. That the girl boarders participated in such offerings become evident from the statement of Hārīta that the Brahmavādinīs of yore used to offer sacrifices to the fire (*agnīndhana*).[3]

A few facts may be added here regarding the dress and daily duties of the girl boarders during the period of their Brahmacarya. According to the *Gobhila-gṛhyasūtra* the Purohita may bring the maiden decently clothed and wearing sacred thread to the altar and pronounce the *mantra*.[4] Hārīta as well alludes to two types of women in the days of yore, Brahmavādinī and Sadyovadhu. The former underwent initiation ceremony, offered *homa* to the fire and recited

1. *AV.* VI. 63. 3.
2. Ibid, III. 3. 4.
3. Quoted in V. M. S. p. 402, S. C. S. p. 62.
4. II. 1.19.

Sāvitrī mantra.[1] Yama also states practically the same thing.[2] In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Vedavatī,[3] Śramaṇī Śabarī[4] and Svayaṁprabhā[5] are described as being dressed in the skin of black antelope. (*cīra-kṛṣṇā-jināmbarā*) ; but, according to the *Gobhila-gṛhyasūtra*, referred to above, this condition does not seem to have applied to all. Begging was a part of the daily duties of the students living in the Gurukulas, irrespective of their having hailed from good families. This might have inconvenienced the girl boarders. However, the study of the Dharmasūtras enables us to form the idea that daily begging was not compulsory. Begging was prescribed with a view to making the students humble and obliging, and as such begging even once a week was considered enough.[6] Besides, the student could beg from the houses of the preceptors[7] or friends, or could not beg at all if rich students paid money in advance. Then, as Yama states, girls used to beg from their own houses (*svagṛhe*). This could be possible only when the houses of the students were situated in the vicinity of the Āśramas. A Brahmacārin was required to do all the domestic works and personal duties of his preceptor's house, e. g., cattle-rearing, farming, bringing fuel for *homa*, cooking, washing utensils, and doing sundry services which his teacher demanded of him.[8] Cooking, washing, etc. might have been done by the girl students as well in the houses of the family with whom they resided just like the *dhammante-vasikas*..

The above facts lead us to suppose that the methods applied in the control and management of the boarding houses of the age were to some extent akin to modern hostel management. The Kulapati, like the present-day Vice-Chancellor, was the symbolical head of the institutions. The Warden (*gopa*) was the link between the Kulapati and the establishment. The teacher-superintendent was in direct touch with the boarders; the matron was to look after the general need of the students regarding diet etc. ; the physician was responsible for the

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1. Quoted in V. M. S. p. 402 ; S. C. S. p. 62.
2. पुराकल्पे तु नारीणां मौंजी-बन्धनमिष्यते ।
   अध्यापनं च वेदानां सावित्री-वचनं तथा ॥
3. *Rām.* VII. 17.
4. Ibid., III. 73-74.
5. Ibid., IV, 50-53.
6. B. D. S. I. 2. 52.
7. *M. Gr. Sb.* 1. 1. 3.
8. *M. V.* I. 25. 2 ; *Gunaga Jātaka* No. 157 ; *Mbh.* V. 36. 52.

general health and the engineers provided accommodation for the students. In the Gurukula system of boarding houses, the teacher-superintendent, performing teaching work, of course, furnishes some different arrangement; but the functions of the Warden supervising bigger institutions where boarders studying a variety of subjects stayed, must have been similar to those of the hostel Warden or Superintendent of the girl hostels these days.

A few words regarding the causes that brought an end to such fine fabrics, may not be out of place here. There is no doubt that changes such as in social outlook were mainly responsible for their extinction; but these changes appear to have resulted from the incidents taking place in the Āśramas themselves. From the *Atharva-Veda* it is evident that illicit practices between the boys and the girls were too much common, not always ending in their actual marriages. From the term *Kumārīdākṣāḥ* of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, it appears that sometimes boarders did not stay in the hostel for the purpose of study, but only for the fulfilment of their physical lust.[1] The boarders of the Āśramas are said to have become *pramattāḥ* by drinking and becoming unruly in the presence of the dancing women in the Āśramas.[2] Such was also the case in the Mātaṅgāśrama and the Saptajanāśrama wherefrom no boarders wanted to return to the life of the householders. It is true that the Wardens tried to check such vices, but what could the Wardens do when the Ṛṣis themselves proved to be corrupt? Śabarī is supposed to have connubial relations with several of the Ṛṣis in the Mātaṅgāśrama.[3] It is no doubt true that the Government also tried to check such amorous practices in the Āśramas. But it was also true that the Government itself more often misused the power. Vālmīki had warned Rāma while staying in the Citrakūṭa Āśrama to leave the place as he had a young and beautiful wife and had provoked the wrath of the Rākṣasas.[4] Rāvaṇa violated the chastity of Vedavatī[5], while king Daṇḍa violated that of Arajā.[6] Ahalyā was deceived by Devarāja Indra[7], and Sītā was abducted by Rāvaṇa.[8] Naturally

1. cf. Agrawala, V. S. *India as Known to Paṇini*, p. 284.
2. *Rām.* II. 117.
3. Ibid., III. 69-75; IV. 10-11.
4. Ibid., IV. 13.
5. Ibid., III. 73-74.
6. Ibid., II. 116-117.
7. Ibid., VII. 17.
8. Ibid., VII. 76-82.

such state of affairs must have been resented by the public, and consequently they disliked sending their girls in the Āśramas, as it was not possible for them to raise strong voice or stand against the might of the Government. Besides, sometimes the teachers themselves might have been misusing their position. An echo of this may be found in the statement of the guardian of Ahalyā who gave her hand into that of Gautama because the latter, in course of twelve years of teaching, had proved to be of strong character.[1]

Extinction of such Āśramaic institutions which provided living accommodations to the girl students, however, had one adverse affect on the educational carrier of the womenfolk. They, consequently, led a very miserable life due to lack of their intellect and wisdom, which proved disastrous not for them only, but also for the whole nation.

1. Ibid., I. 48 ; VII. 30.
2. Ibid., VII. 30.

TECHNIQUE OF TERRACOTTA ART

By

Dr Sachidanand Sahay

Terracotta has been one of the most popular mediums of artistic expression from time immemorial. The art in the terracotta is the best exponent of aesthetic and material, religious and secular life. It also throws light on the forgotten spiritual concepts and conventions of the people who lived in the past. The popularity of this art is evidenced from the discovery of a large number of terracotta figurines. This indicates an industry to flourish in this country but unfortunately no such industry has so far been noticed. The articles were purely of local manufacture and were evidently made by artisans like potters. The potter artists did equal justice to realistic and idealistic subjects. It was true that they were preparing objects for the use of village cults; yet they were fully alive to the various activities going around them.[1] Since it represented the common man's art, it is found in almost each and every part of the country, belonging to different ages.

The terracotta art took its origin from clay, one of the cheapest and easily available materials, and as such, man from the very beginning of the civilization started making household utensils, toys and figurines of gods and goddesses from it. Though other materials like copper, iron, stone, etc., were also available, yet their unductile character demanded exceptional labour and patience on the part of the craftsmen and artists.[2] It was because of this quality that clay was preferred to other materials. Beginning from the Harappan down to the Pāla period, the terracotta art, therefore, is found spread as rich and significant brocade on the composite textile of India's artistic achievements. Of course, after the Pāla period, a dark period is noticed in this art. But in the 18th and 19th century, once more it appears to be establishing its popularity. Recent archaeological excavations at Buxar have, however, yielded some terracotta figurines which may be ascribed to the Muslim period. This may indicate that the art had been continuing in some form or other in almost all the ages, although it is different to become popular in some period and unpopular in the other. Even

1. Kala, S. C., *Terracotta Figurines from Kaushambi*, p. 5.
2. Ibid., p. 2.

these days, on the occasion of Durgā Pūjā, Dewāli and other popular festivals, numerous terracottta figurines of gods and godesses suiting the occasions are being prepared for different purposes. Some of them are made serve religious purposes, while others are prepared as play-things of the children. This art had thus been as popular in ancient days as it is in modern times, for no material affords so much scope as does the terracottas. Even for individual self-expression of the artists, it is the best and the cheapest medium. Besides, it satisfies the creative impulse of both the rich and the poor alike.[1] Because of these characteristics, a continuous stream of terracotta art fills the entire period of our cultural tradition.

Bihar is one of those Indian states which yielded various types of terracotta figurines, ranging from the pre-Mauryan down to the Pāla period. A detailed study of the different aspects of these terracottas and the problems connected with it is an urgent desideratum. Of the various problems, the technique of making terracotta objects is one about which very little has been said. An attempt has, therefore, been made here to discuss this problem which not only concerns how the terracotta figurines were made, but is also linked with the fixing of the date of the terracotta objects, as the technique of their preparation has undergone changes from time to time.

The technique of terracotta art followed a progressive course in different periods of Indian history.[2] It consisted of four stages: The first stage was collection of the raw material suitable for making terracotta objects; the second was the fashioning of the clay; the third included the process of firing and the last was the decoration either by modelling tool or by paint.

Terracotta was prepared from clay which is found in abundance in every nook and corner of the country. But its colour differed from region to region, and sometimes from place to place, as a result of which the colour of the terracotta also changed. As a case in point, the terracotta objects made up of red clay were naturally different from those prepared out of black clay. But the most interesting thing in the art of making terracotta was the frequent introduction of foreign substances like sand, small pebbles and mica into clay to avoid cracking, when fired.[3] The contraction was generally uniform in case

1. Saraswati, S. K., *A Survey of Indian Sculpture*, p. 76.
2. Kala, S. C., *Terracotta Figurines from Kausambi*, p. 3.
3. Higgins, R. A., *Catalogue of Terracottas in the British Museum*, p. 3.

of vases with the result that they were not damaged; but figurines unless they were virtually without modelling, became uneven and courted distortion and breakage. It was, therefore, necessary to add some foreign substances in order to hold up contraction. From the Kuṣāṇa period onwards, the material became coarser with a considerable admixture of chopped husk, mica and sand.[1] During the Pāla period and thereafter, some change is, however, noticed in the raw material, and it was the absence of the foreign substances in most of the cases.

The second stage consisted of the fashioning of the clay which may be done in various ways. This may be modelled by the hand, may be prepared by single or double mould or may be made by any of these methods in combination. Modelling by hand was the most primitive method. The pre-historic terracottas were made by this method, and as such they were always crudely and hastily made. The second method was the 'Snowman technique',[2] in which bit after bit was added to the original lump to mould the limbs and features—one dab stuck for the nose, others for the eyes, two rolls for the two arms, and so on and so forth. The proto-historic terracottas were generally made by this method. The third was the practice of casting in a single mould; and many such moulds were discovered in course of archaeological excavations conducted at different ancient sites of the country. They were all of fired clay, but their very scarcity suggests that other models were made in a more perishable material, such as unfired clay or wax. Of course, moulds could also be taken from the existing objects in other materials such as metal, stone and wood. To make a mould, wet clay was pressed over the model, layer by layer, until the required thickness was obtained, and left until it hardened slightly. It, however, could not be left for long, since it contracted on being dried. If only a frontal mould was required, this could be lifted as it was; but if both front and back of the model were being moulded then the enveloping clay was certainly required to be cut vertically and removed in two pieces. Thereafter, the mould was left for little drying and then touched up with a modelling tool.[3] The simplest type of moulded

1. *J. I. S. O. A.*, Vol. VII. P. 104, 1939.
2. E. Douglas Van Buren, *The Figurines of Babylonia and Assyria Research Vol. XVI*—Introduction. The same method may be applied to the Indian terracottas.
3. Higgins, R. A., *Cat. Of Terracottas in the British Museum* Vol. I., p. 4.

terracotta was made by pressing the clay into the mould until it was level with the edge, resulting into a solid piece with a moulded front and flat back. This method was used for the manufacture not only of self-contained pieces but also of human heads for attachment to hand-made bodies. A variation of this type of figure was achieved by building up the clay in the mould so that it overlapped the edges, thus producing a relief plaque instead of a free standing figure. The fourth method was to make two seperate moulds, one for the front and the other for the back and to fasten them together. The exact adjustment of the two moulds was achieved by means of incised guiding lines on the sides of the moulds which had to be brought into line with each other. This was very similar to the piece moulded, but the majority of the terra-cottas discovered so far are hollow. To mould a hollow terracotta only, a thin wall of clay was pressed into the mould of an even depth of about 25 mms.[1] Sometimes two moulds were used, one for the front and the other for the back. But more frequently only the front was moulded, the back bieng made from a strip of clay laid on to the back of the moulded front. Thereafter, the joint between the front and the back was strengthened by the application of a ribbon of clay inside as far as the fingers could be inserted. There were certain advantages in this technique e. g., saving in the clay and increased lightness. But at the same time there was a distinct disadvantage also viz., that the hollow figure bursted in the process of firing, if there were no means for expanding air to get out. It was, therefore, essential that a hole should be made in the back or underneath which may be closed by a strip of clay after firing. Generally the heads of the hollow figurines were solid because the neck being so thin would block the space of the air from the head if they were hollow. There was nothing new in this technique; rather it was elaboration of the third method. The fifth and the last method was to make free standing figures, modelled round a piece of stone or wood. These figures were left to be dried in the natural heat of the sun and finally some colour was applied over them. This technique is noticed in the last phase of the Pāla period and the most remarkable point is that it is still continuing in some form or other. The terracotta discovered from various ancient sites of India and particularly Bihar bear testimony to the use of all the above five techniques of fashioning the terracotta objects.

1. Ibid.

The third stage consisted of the firing, but so far very few kilns have been noticed. Probably the process of firing of the terracotta figurines was the same as that of the potteries. A kiln of potters generally contained two chambers, one for keeping the terracotta objects and the other for the fuel. The chamber was provided with three openings, one at the bottom for the fuel, one at the side to receive the terracotta objects and one at the top to let out the smoke. They were generally fired at a temperature of 750°c to 950°c[1]. But in case of terracotta figurines, a considerably lower temperature was required; otherwise the shape and colour of the objects may change.

There was another process of firing as well[2] in which the charcoal was kept glowing around an earthen vessel in which the clay objects to be burnt were surrounded and covered with husk. In this process, there was very little chance of the objects being damaged, and as such it was most suitable for the terracotta figurines. Moreover, the potter could easily control heat and save the objects from wear and tear.

From the study of the terracotta figurines, it appears that during the pre-historic and the proto-historic periods, the earlier process might have been followed. But from the Mauryan period onwards and specially from the Kuṣāṇa period the latter process appears to have been adopted. The above processes are being followed even to-day.

It will not be out of place to mention here that during the process of firing the colour of the terracotta objects changed because of the chemical composition of the clay. As a rule, if the air had free access during firing, iron contained in the clay got oxidised and this produced red colour; and if, however, combustion was imperfect, the terracotta was grey or black. But natural atmosphere turned some clay cream, yellow, ochre, brown or green. It, therefore, appears that change in colour was due to atmospheric reaction in the kiln. In order to intensify the colour of the terracotta, a slip of deeper colour was applied to the figure.[3] Almost all these shades are noticed in the numerous terracotta figurines discovered from various ancient sites of this country.

The fourth stage included the decoration of the terracotta objects, either by means of modelling tool or by paints. Nearly all

1. Ibid.
2. Gupta, P. L., *Catalogue of the Patna Museum*, p. 170.
3. Ibid., p. 170.

the terracotta figurines bear colour, which indicate that they were painted, but such was not the case with the archaic or earlier groups of terracottas. The purpose of applying colour to a terracotta object was probably not religious, but it served as a preservative and also rendered a softer and beautiful surface to the piece. As far as the earlier groups of terracotta figurines are concerned, most of them were not painted but the decoration noticed on some of them was probably done by modelling tool. However, the painting on the terracotta figurines is noticed right from the time of Harappa and Mohen-jo-daro down to the Pāla period, and most interesting is that it is still continuing in some form or other. According to Kramrisch[1], some of the terracottas from Pāṭaliputra have traces of polychrome colouring similar to the Mohen-jo-daro terracottas but they are not distinct. In the Mauryan and Śuṅga periods, generally the use of black and red colours was noticed, though it is not the fact that other colours were not applied. Further, during the Kuṣāṇa period a large number of the terracotta figurines were baked to various shades of ochre and red.[2] Moreover, Dr Kramrisch observed[3] a few traces of silver and gold on two terracottas from Kauśāmbi belonging to this period. The popularity of the light yellowish slip was, however, noticed in the Gupta period.[4] But during the Pāla period once more they were probably painted in various colours. Still red and black colours predominated. Thus painting was an important aspect of the terracotta figurines. These colours were applied by means of a brush or by dipping the entire piece in the pot containing the colour.

Thus Saraswati has aptly observed[5] that the evidence of the terracotta technique, lends clue to determining and establishing an approximate sequence of the terracotta objects.

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1. *J. I. S. O. A.*, Vol. VII, p. 4, 1939. Kramrisch observed some colouring on some of the terracottas from Pāṭaliputra very similar to the terracottas from Mohen-jo-daro bearing polychrome painting (*Further Excavation at Moh*, by Mackay). However, it is full of doubts.
2. Ibid.
3. Kala, S. C., *Terracotta Figurines from Kaushambi*, p. 4.
4. Ibid.
5. Saraswati, S. K., *A Survey of Indian Sculpture*, p. 98.

SYNCRETISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF INCARNATION

By

Dr. (Mrs.) Suvira Jaiswal

The Vaiṣṇava doctrine of incarnation seems to have evolved[1] with the identification of Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa, the hero-god of the Sāttvatas, with the great Brāhmaṇical deity Nārāyaṇa-Viṣṇu who was thus supposed to have 'descended' in human form for the purpose of destroying evil and protecting virtue. It seems to have been further influenced by the Buddhist and Jaina doctrines of the former Buddhas and Tīrthaṅkaras, which have chronological priority. But the identification of Vāsudeva with Nārāyaṇa may well have been the starting-point. Raychaudhuri makes a very plausible suggestion[2] that the Brāhmaṇas had identified the popular god Vāsudeva with Viṣṇu in the second century B. C. to combat Buddhism and the active propaganda of Aśoka. Perhaps the worship of the Varāha (Boar) and Narasiṁha (Man-Lion) which seem to have been independent cult-objects in the beginning, was also assimilated into Vaiṣṇavism for the same reason. The syncretistic Nārāyaṇīya section of the *Mahābhārata* contains a short list[3] of the chief incarnations of Viṣṇu enumerating only the Boar, the Man-Lion, the Dwarf and Kṛṣṇa who is mentioned simply as *mānuṣa*. This appears to represent the original nucleus and is also found in the *Āraṇyaka-parva*[4] and the *Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāṇa*[5] which clearly mentions Māthura, i. e., Kṛṣṇa of Mathurā, in place of *mānuṣa*. Later Vaiṣṇava works mention as many as twenty-four and twenty-nine main incarnations of Viṣṇu.[6] The process of synthesis, once evolved, became a very convenient tool in the hands of the Brāhmaṇas, and the doctrine made a very deep impression on the Indian mind. The best examples of this

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1. Jacobi, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, VII, p. 195.
2. H.C. Raychaudhuri, *Materials for the Study of the Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Sect*, IInd edition, p. 117.
3. *Mahābhārata*, critical edition, XII. 326. 72f.
4. Ibid., III. 100.9 enumerates Varāha, Narasiṁha and Vāmana; Kṛṣṇa incarnation could not be mentioned as the passage refers to a past event. A passage of the *Āraṇyaka-parva* found in the vulgate (III. 272. 51f), listing these four incarnations is not included in the critical edition.
5. *Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāṇa*, 53. 56.
6. *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*, I. 3f; *Sāttvata saṁhitā*, Chapter IX.

process are provided by the Rāma (son of Daśaratha) and Buddha *avatāras* of Viṣṇu, both of whom had a Buddhist past.

The earliest available version of the Rāma story is found in the *Daśaratha Jātaka*, which differs from the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki on some very important points. It speaks of Daśaratha as a king of Vārāṇasī and not Ayodhyā and mentions Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā as the children of the first wife of Daśaratha, and Bharata as their step-brother. Daśaratha sends away Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa into exile in the Himālayan region to protect them from the evil machinations of their stepmother; and Sītā insists on going with her brothers. The exile lasts only 12 years and not 14 years as in Vālmīki's account. When the period of exile is over, Rāma marries his sister Sītā and makes her his chief queen. There is no mention of the abduction of Sītā and the expedition against Laṅkā. The entire episode appears to have been invented or derived from some other source by the author of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, who added two years more to the period of exile and changed the locale of the exile from the Himavat to the Deccan. There is much force in Weber's suggestion[1] that since Vālmīki hailed from some place in the neighbourhood of Ayodhyā, he changed the birth place of Rāma from Vārāṇasī to Ayodhyā. This is proved by the *Uttara-Purāṇa* of Guṇabhadra who seems to have followed a very old Jaina version of the Rāma legends which agreed on some points with the *Daśaratha Jātaka*. But as Guṇabhadra is familiar with the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki he tried to reconcile the traditional Jaina account before him with the account of Vālmīki and informs that originally the capital of Daśaratha was Vārāṇasī; and later he migrated to Ayodhyā. However, the mention of Sītā as the sister of Rāma is found only in the *Daśāratha Jātaka*, the Japanese and Malaya *Rāmāyaṇas*, and the *Hikāyata Mahārāja Ravaṇa*. In our opinion, this is the most primitive feature of the Rāma legends available to us.

The *Daśaratha Jātaka* adds 'devī' to the name of Sītā. Although the term is often used as a simple honorofic or surname, perhaps in this context it is suggestive of her divine character. Sītā, literally the furrow, is an important agricultural goddess in the Gṛhya Sūtras and is invoked in the Halābhiyoga ceremony.[2] The *Harivaṁśa* speaks of her as the goddess of the farmers.[3] It seems that like the goddess

1. Weber, *Indian Antiquary*, 1872, pp. 123, 253.
2. Ramgopal, *India of Vedic Kalpa Sutras*, pp. 466-7.
3. *Harivaṁśa*, Poona edition, II. 3. 14.

Ekānaṁśā who was worshipped with her brothers Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa[1], goddess Sītā also was associated with two male gods who were initially regarded as her brothers. Later, one of these brothers became her husband, as is evidenced by the *Daśaratha Jātaka*. But the author of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, in conformity with the ethical notions of his time, could not think of Rāma being the husband and brother of Sītā at the same time; so he gave her a different parentage. However, there is no doubt that in casting Sītā in the Epic he had the agricultural divinity of the same name in mind; and he made her the daughter of the plough-bannered (Sīradhvaja) Janaka. Janaka found her in a furrow; hence she was called *ayonijā* (not born from the womb);[2] and she did not die but returned to the womb of the earth. Very probably the goddess Ekānaṁśā also had some connections with fertility. The *Harivaṁśa* shows her as being worshipped with unhusked rice, parched grain and flowers.[3] There is no doubt about her associate brother Balarāma being an agricultural divinity. If Weber's suggestion[4] is accepted, the character of Rāma Dāśarathi also is developed out of a guardian deity of agriculture, known by the same name. We may point out that although the *Mahābhārata* and the early Purāṇas do not refer to any marital connection between Ekānaṁśā and her brothers, she is sometimes identified with Subhadrā[5]; and in a passage of the *Skanda-Purāṇa* Subhadrā who is worshipped with Baladeva and Vāsudeva at Jagannātha Purī, is described both as the sister and wife of Vāsudeva embodying his energy.[6] The *Skanda-Purāṇa* may be a late work, but in this instance it seems to echo a very early tradition. We may note that in the opening verse of the *Svapnavāsavadattā* of Bhāsa, goddess Śrī is invoked along with Mādhava and Balarāma. Names may differ and myths may vary; but there is no doubt about the prevalence of the cult of a mother-goddess with two associate male gods; and the description of the great mother-goddess specifically as the sister of Mahendra and Viṣṇu in the *Harivaṁśa*[7] has the same adoration of a goddess and two gods in view.

1. *Bṛhat-saṁhitā*, 50. 37-9.
2. *Rāmāyaṇa* of Valmiki, published by the Gita Press, I. 66. 13-5; II. 118. 28f.
3. *Harivaṁśa*, Poona edition, II. 101. 19.
4. Weber, op. cit., p. 253.
5. Shyam Chand Mukharji, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, XXXV, 1959, p. 192.
6. *Skanda-Purāṇa*, Utkala-Khaṇḍa, XIX. 117 quoted by Parashurama Chaturvedi, *Vaiṣṇava-dharma*, pp. 123-4.
7. *Mahendra-viṣṇu-bhaginī*, *Harivaṁśa*, II. 120. 6.

Nevertheless, the cults of Ekānaṁśā and Sītā are not one and the same but parrallel developments in two different regions, springing from identical social contents. Ekānaṁśā is a goddess of the west;[1] but the worship of Sītā seems to have prevailed around Vārāṇasī and further east. Vālmīki utilised the popular legend of Sītā and Rāma to weave out his beautiful epic; and he paints them as an ideal couple. But the poet did not conceive of Rāma as an incarnation of Viṣṇu. All such passages, and the first and the seventh books of the *Rāmāyaṇa* which identify Rāma with Viṣṇu, are regarded as later additions.

However, the popularity and ethical nature of the Rāma legend made Rāma eminently suitable for the role of a Bodhisattva or of an incarnation of Viṣṇu; and for some time Rāma seems to have been claimed both by the Buddhists and the Vaiṣṇavas. The *Anāmaka Jātaka*, which was translated into Chinese in A. D. 251 and shows acquaintance with the *Rāmāyaṇa* story of the abduction of Sītā and the help received from the monkey-king, speaks of Rāma, the unnamed king, as a Bodhisattva. So does the *Daśaratha Kathānam*, which was translated into Chinese in A. D. 472; although it is in remarkable agreement with the *Rāmāyaṇa* and attributes to Rāma the valour and prowess of Nā-rā-yen (Skt. Nārāyaṇa).[2] Bulcke points out[3] that the *Daśaratha Kathānam* incidently refers to Kaniṣka; so the original Indian text could not have been written earlier than the second century A. D.; and the Buddhist works of a subsequent period do not mention Rāma. Apparently by the end of the second century A. D. Rāma's identity with Viṣṇu had gained wide prevalence; and hence the Buddhists ignored him. He appears as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in the first and the last books of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, which were written presumably in the second century A. D. In our opinion, there is nothing to show that Rāma Dāśarathi was adored as an incarnation of Viṣṇu several centuries before the birth of Christ;[4] but he was certainly worshipped as such in the Gupta period. An inscription of the fifth century A. D. refers to him as the lord of Rāmagiri (modern

1. *Lalitavistara*, edited by S. Lefmann, p. 390. It speaks of the goddess as Ekādaśā. For the identity of Ekādaśā and Ekānaṁśā see *Vāyu-Purāṇa*, Bibliotheca Indica edition, II. 34. 203-5; *Brahmāṇḍa-Purāṇa*, III. 71. 220f.
2. Raghuvira and Chikya Yomamoto, *The Ramayana in China*, p. 27.
3. C. S. J. Bulcke, *Rāma Kathā*, Hindi Pariṣad (University of Allahabad, 1950), p. 55f.
4. P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, II, ii, p. 724.

Rāmaṭek); and Kālidāsa associates him expressly with the Rāmagiri hills.[1] He regards all the four sons of Daśaratha as partial incarnations of Viṣṇu.[2] The *Bṛhat-saṁhitā* contains instructions for making an image of Rāma.[3]

The syncretistic character of the doctrine of incarnation is nowhere so well illustrated as in the case of the Buddha. With the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Buddha had become as much an object of worship and pious devotion as any other deity. Brāhmaṇical views had infiltrated Buddhism, and the Buddhists also respected the *varṇa* rules and the Brāhmaṇas, and made large donations to them. It is not without significance that most of the celebrated scholars of Mahāyāna Buddhism—Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu—were Brāhmaṇas by birth. The Buddhist records of the Gupta period often end with an imprecation charging one who might violate the rules of the gift, with the guilt of the slaughter of a Brāhmaṇa.[4] In the fifth century A. D. the Ānanda king Dāmodaravarman who was a worshipper of 'the truely and perfectly enlightened one' (*Samyak-sambuddha*), that is, of the Buddha, claimed[5] to have performed such Brāhmaṇical rites as Gosaharsa and Hiraṇyagarbha included by the Purāṇas in the sixteen so-called great gifts[6] and made liberal land-grants to the Brāhmaṇas. Thus there was no longer any difference in the social basis of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Vaiṣṇavism. The fame of *bhagavat* Nārāyaṇa was already well established on account of his antiquity and orthodox character; under the Gupta patronage his glory reached the apex. It was apparently during this period that the popular mind identified the Buddha, the saviour, with Nārāyaṇa. The identification of the Buddha with Nārāyaṇa was not the result of a clever machination on the part of the Brāhmaṇas to absorb Buddhism, but rather a movement rooted in those social conditions which had mitigated the difference between Brāhmaṇism and Buddhism, and developed Mahāyāna Buddhism. In the *Lalitavistara*, a Buddhist work in Purāṇic style and necessarily of a popular character, the Buddha is

1. *Meghadūta*, verse 12.
2. *Raghuvaṁśa*, X.
3. *Bṛhat-saṁhita*, 50. 30.
4. *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, III, No. 5, line 10.
5. *Epigraphia Indica*, XVII, No. 18.
6. Hultzsch, *Epigraphia Indica*, p. 328

repeatedly described as *nārāyaṇa-sthāmavān*,[1] having the strength of Nārāyaṇa, and often he is simply referred to as Nārāyaṇa[2] and Mahānārāyaṇa.[3] The epithet 'Mahāpuruṣa' is applied to the Buddha in the *Lalitavistara*,[4] and to Nārāyaṇa in the *Mahābhārata*.[5] Therefore, it will be wrong to hold that the identification of Vāsudeva with Nārāyaṇa has its parallel in the identification of the Buddha with the same deity. In fact, whereas the first was brought about through deliberate Brāhmaṇical efforts, the second was a spontaneous movement, the result of popular mythology; and it is quite incorrect to state,[6] as Raychaudhuri does, that the Buddhists "ignored the identification of their master" with Nārāyaṇa, for a repprochement was apparently initiated by popular Buddhism.

It appears that the identification of the Buddha was not favourably received at first by the Vaiṣṇava priestly class which attributed to the Buddha the legend of the celestial preceptor Bṛhaspati who misled the asuras by preaching wrong doctrines and brought about their destruction. Sometimes they also sought to wriggle out of this awkward situation which made the founder of a heretical sect an incarnation of their own god by giving him new parentage, and the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* states[7] that the Buddha incarnation of Nārāyaṇa was born in the Magadhadeśa as the son of Ajana.[8] Orthodox writers such as Kumārila did not recognise the Buddha incarnation of Nārāyaṇa,[9] and the *Vṛddha-hārīta-smṛti* expressly forbids the worship of the Buddha.[10] But in the incarnation list given in the *Sāttvata-saṁhitā*, which is repeated in the *Ahirbudhnya-saṁhitā*, the Buddha is mentioned as Śāntātmā, and in the *Bṛhat-saṁhitā* of Varāhamihira he is described as Śāntamanas.[11] The *Agni-Purāṇa* also speaks of the Buddha as Śāntātmā;

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1. *Lalitavistara* (text), chapter VII, pp. 109, 110; chapter XV, p. 234; chapter XX, p. 291.
2. Ibid., chapter XV, p. 202; chapter XXI, p. 211.
3. Ibid., chapter XV, p. 229.
4. Ibid., chapter XXII, p. 353; chapter XXVI, p. 426.
5. *Mahābhārata*, XII. 325. 4, No. 8.
6. Raychaudhuri, op. cit., p. 109.
7. *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*, I. 3. 24.
8. Cf. Dikshitar, *The Purāṇa Index*, I, Introduction, p. xvi-xvii.
9. P. V. Kane, op. cit., II, ii, p. 721.
10. Ibid., p. 720.
11. *Bṛhat-saṁhitā*, 58. 19.

and in the *Gīta-govinda* of Jayadeva Nārāyaṇa is said to have incarnated himself as the Buddha out of compassion for animals.[1]

Thus the process which started with the assimilation of the Vāsudeva cult into Vaiṣṇavism, soon took the worship of Rāma in its fold; and the climax was reached with the recognition of the Buddha as an incarnation of Viṣṇu.

1. *Agni-Purāṇa*, 49. 7.

PEACE THROUGH HINDUISM

By

NITYA NARAYAN BANERJEE.

In Search for Peace

All of us are after happiness and peace—individual, social, national as well as physical, mental and spiritual. All our efforts in life are to have peace and happiness. Some are successful and some are groping in the dark, but the search continues. All religions in the world are also anxious to show the path of peace to their followers.

The Hindu Dharma has prescribed certain codes of life so that its followers can find real peace. The term *Dharma* of the Hindus does not mean only some religious rites or rituals or way of worship, as is generally understood by its English counterpart *Religion*. Dharma denotes much more—complete code of conduct for every individual which sustains the society.

A Universal Code

The Hindus claim that their Dharma is universal, as the codes prescribed by it may be practised by every one of every *Religion*; hence Hinduism is also known as Sanātana Dharma, the eternal religion. Hinduism is not founded by any individual, as is the case with other religions of the world. The eternal truths, realised by highly spiritual persons, called Ṛṣis, and followed by the people of Hindusthan, are the foundation of Hinduism. To many, this may seem to be too tall a claim, because they argue that even the Hindus are divided into so many sects with varied rites and rituals and even the conceptions of God and creation amongst them differ. They further advise: "Unite the Hindus under a common religious code, then talk of universal faith". Unfortunately, many of the critics who criticise the Hindu Dharma do so with only superficial or partial knowledge of the subject.

Characteristics of Hinduism

It is characteristic of the Hindu Dharma alone to allow various ways of worship and concepts of the Creator or creation and not to lay down a fixed code or concept for all individuals of the

society, as is insisted upon by Islam or Christanity. To avoid a lengthy discourse, we shall confine the scope of our discussion to the basis viz. Śrīmad-bhagvat-gītā as it is the essence of various spiritual thoughts developed amongst the Hindus. This short treatise aims at co-ordinating various opinions and ways of spiritual thoughts accepted by all the Hindus. Hence, let us see how the Gīta has looked at the problem of peace, the goal of religion and the ways to achieve it.

Strangely enough the Gīta was spoken by Lord Kṛṣṇa not in a calm atmosphere, but on the field of battle to encourage his disciple Arjuna to fight and kill his enemies when Arjuna refused to fight them. They were his near and dear relations and friends who had refused to give the legal share of the kingdom to Arjuna and his brothers.

Without going into the spiritual aspects of this background, which gave scope for discussion with Arjuna as to what is Dharma and adharma i. e., the right and wrong, I shall try to place before the readers the fundamentals of the Hindu Dharma, as prescribed by the Gīta for adoption and practice by all who are in search of peace.

Individual Nature Differs

The Gītā states that, by nature, individuals are inclined to different kinds of worship and ways of life.[1] Generally, it has divided the entire human race into two groups—daiva and āsura i.e., Godly and devilish. Fearlessness, purity of heart, steadfastness in knowledge and yoga, charitable disposition, control of senses, sacrifices, reading of scriptures, austerity, righteousness, non-violence, absence of anger, renunciation, placidity of mind, compassion, absence of calumny, freedom from desire, gentleness, modesty, boldness, forgiveness, fortitude, purity, absence of hatred and pride are divine qualities.

The persons of āsuria or devilish nature know not what to do and what to refrain from. Purity, good conduct and truth are not found in them. They say: "The Universe is without truth and moral basis and creation is caused by mutual union and not by God". Filled with insatiable desire, hypocrisy, pride, lust and arrogance, they work with impure resolve and evil designs. They strive to hoard wealth for personal enjoyment, led by hope, wrath and lust.

1. Ch. III, Sl. 3; Ch. XVII, Sl. 7-13, 17-22; Ch. XVIII, Sl. 7-10, 19-39.

They feel: "I am rich, well-born. Who else is equal to me? I will sacrifice, I will give, I will rejoice". They are possessed by egoism, power, insolence, lust, haughtiness, self-conceit, atheism and are intoxicated with wealth and power. They die beset with immense care, for to them gratification of lust is the highest and only aim of life.[1]

Then each individual also observes austerities, makes charities, takes food and does things according to his natural disposition. He is influenced by the three Guṇas—sattva, rajas and tamas, i.e., by his inherent propensities acquired as the result of his past activities.[2] On this basis, the society was divided into four castes or classes according to guṇas and karman of individuals, i.e., according to their inherent inclination, character and ability.[3] Even amongst the devotees, there are various types: some expect results of their worship; and others worship without any expectation; some by nature choose the path of knowledge; some the path of action; and others that of devotion.[4]

Hence this oldest Dharma of the world has prescribed various ways of worship and conceptions of the soul or creation conceivable and adoptable by individuals according to their *svabhāva* or *svadharma* i.e., natural ability and inclination, as none in this universe can escape the influence of Prakṛti (Nature).[5]

Conception of the Soul and Life

Advaita-Vedānta, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, Śāktaism, Viṣṇuism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, etc. have put forward varied conceptions of the Supreme Soul and life in individuals. Some believe that there is only one Soul which has no origin or end i.e., eternal, immutuable, all-pervading. As one sun lights the whole universe, this one Soul reflects itself in everybody and matter.[6]

Hence, every soul is He and the entire creation is He.[7] Others believe that each soul is a particle of the great Soul, a spark of the

1. Ch. IX, Sl. 12-13; Ch. XVI, Sl. 1-18; Ch. XVII, Sl. 5-6.
2. Ch. XIV, Sl. 5-20; Ch. XVII, Sl. 2, 3; Ch. XVIII, Sl. 18-40.
3. Ch. IV, Sl. 13; Ch. XVIII, Sl. 41-44.
4. Ch. III, Sl. 3; Ch. IV, Sl. 12; Ch. XIII, Sl. 25.
5. Ch. III, Sl. 5, 33; Ch. XVIII, Sl. 40.
6. Ch. II, Sl. 17-25; Ch. XIII, Sl. 34.
7. Ch. IV, Sl. 6; Ch. VIII, Sl. 4, 9; Ch. IX, Sl 4-6, 16-19, 43-46; Ch. X, Sl. 3, 19-42; Ch. XI, Sl. 1-25, 32-37, 40-46; Ch. XIII, Sl. 13-18, 31-33; Ch. XV, Sl. 12, 19 etc.

endless and formless energy. The soul suffers or enjoys according to its own karman or actions of this life as well as the past life.[1] According to them, the soul leaves this mortal body, as we leave our worn out clothes and enters into new forms carrying with it the results of its past actions, as air carries the flavour of flowers[2] The cycle of birth and re-birth has been continuing from eternity and will do so till pralaya (Dissolution), when this manifestation of the Creator is withdrawn and reduced to the vast ocean of causal water. The souls continue to exist to be created again just as the big trees are born from tiny seeds.[3] The souls are brought to birth with new creation according to their karman or merits and demerits.[4] Others take God as some super-human being, having a form.[5] According to another school, all matter and life-force in every being are His Aparā and Parā Prakṛties (Nature) respectively and He is 'the source of the two Prakṛties.[6] The immutable Supreme Self is omnipresent like Ākāśa but is not confined or attached to this body or is tainted.[7] Others assert that Puruṣa and Prakṛti are eternal and that they are the causes of this manifestation.[8] Some believe that He is the creator of all matters and being which are created according to their respective Guṇas of past lives.[9] The cycle of birth and suffering can only be broken if one realises Bliss by freeing oneself from the influence of works good or bad.[10]

One can come out of the effects of the Guṇas only by non-attachment and surrender to the primeval Puruṣa from whom emanate eternal activities.[11] But He who is beyond imagination and expression is born on this earth again and again whenever His devotees and religion require protection.[12]

All Roads Lead to Him

The Lord assures : "Whoever worships Me in whichever ways or forms, he worships Me. Whatever prayers the devotees make,

1. Ch. XIV, Sl. 3-5; Ch. XV, Sl. 7, 8.
2. Ch. XV, Sl. 8, 9.
3. Ch. IX, Sl. 7-8.
4. Ch. VII, Sl. 27; Ch. VIII, Sl. 17, 18, 19.
5. Ch. VII, Sl. 24.
6. Ch. VII, Sl. 4, 5, 6.
7. Ch. XIII, Sl. 31-33.
8. Ch. XIII, Sl. 20-24.
9. Ch. XIV, Sl. 2-18.
10. Ch. VIII, Sl. 21; Ch. XI, Sl. 46, 50-51.
11. Ch. XV, Sl. 4.
12. Ch. IV, Sl. 6, 7.

I fulfil the same. My path men tread in all ways".[4] So the form of worship, the conception of the Almighty, relationship of the Creator and the created are not so important. Every one may conceive the Creator or follow such path of worship as is within one's capacity and suitable to one's inherent nature.[1] What is needed is śraddhā or sincere devotion.[2]

He can be Realised

The Lord emphatically assures us that He can be realised directly by us and not through any agency.[3] He assures that He shall be the Saviour, out of this mortal world, of those who worship Him, resigning all actions to Him, regarding Him as the Supreme Goal and fixing his mind on Him.[5] "Fix your mind on Me, be devoted to me, sacrifice to Me, worship me, I promise thou shall reach Me".[6] The essence of various philosophies of the Hindus is surrender or absolute love for Him. If I am a part of him, or He is the Lord and I am His devotee, or if the Nature be the cause of all creation, the fact remains that I, the encased soul, am not the master; and surrender to him, the Master, is the easiest way to peace and easiest method of worship. Arjuna asks the Lord: "what is the better way of worship between the two—in fixing one's mind to you as unmanifested Abstract i. e., through jñāna or through bhakti, devotion.[7] Lord Kṛṣṇa unequivocally answers: "The devotees who worship Me with fixed mind and who are pure (śraddhāvān) are best grounded in yoga.[8]

Three Main Ways

The Gītā prescribes three main ways of worship or yoga, i. e., means to achieve the spirit of surrender to realise God, the ways of union with Him. These are karman, jñāna, and bhakti. Each of the 18 chapters of the Gīta is termed as yoga i. e., way of union with Him. But these three are the main. The Gītā has analysed and listed

1. Ch. IV, Sl. 10, 11; Ch. VII, Sl. 20-23; Ch. IX, Sl. 14, 15, 23, 26; Ch. XIII, Sl. 25.
2. Ch. V, Sl. 4, 5; Ch. VI, Sl. 23, 25, 26; Ch. IX, Sl. 14-15.
3. Ch. IX, Sl. 23; Ch. XII, Sl. 20.
4. Ch. VI, Sl. 20-23; Ch. VIII, Sl. 14, 22; Ch. XIII, Sl. 14-18.
5. Ch. IX, Sl. 22, 34; Ch. XII, Sl. 7, 8.
6. Ch. XVIII, Sl. 65.
7. Ch. XII, Sl. 1, 5.
8. Ch. XII, Sl. 2, 6. 7, 8; Ch. XIV, Sl. 26.

different types of yajna, tapas, austerity, gifts and other ways of worship according to *svabhāva* or *prakṛti* of individuals.[1]

The Goal—Peace of Mind

But all these ways of karman, jñāna, or bhakti are to reach the same goal—a state of mind peaceful and unperturbed by the turmoils of this world, i.e., the state of sthita-prajña or *Guṇātīta*.[2] In several chapters, the Gītā emphasises that the aim of various ways of worship is the same and they lead ultimately to the same goal, control of the mind.[3] He whose mind is under his control, who has no desire, ego and attachment attains Bliss.[4] By controlling your senses, desires, anger and ego, you may have the feeling of oneness with the entire universe and this sense of oneness is the source of peace, nay, Bliss.[5] The Gītā has stressed renunciation; as only through renunciation and not through enjoyment, you can attain peace.[6] But it has also pointed out that complete renunciation is not possible for every one. Superficial or outward renunciation with the inner desire for enjoyment is worse than open enjoyment.[7] Hence the Gītā advises to work according to one's *svabhāva* and *svadharma* (inherent nature and ability) instead ot feigning renunciation.[8] But all actions must be without expectation of results.[9] This is karma-yoga, union with Him through His work. Śrī Kṛṣṇa further advises: "He who hates money is friendly and kind to all, who is free from egoism and sensual pleasures, is forbearing, ever content, steady in meditation, self-controlled and has firm conviction, with mind and intellect fixed on Me—who is thus devoted to Me—is dear to Me".[10]

Cause of Distractions

Answering the question put by Arjuna as to why the mind is distracted by sensual things, though one may not like it, the Lord says: "Desire and anger are the causes, which are never satisfied. Thinking

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1. Ch. IV, Sl. 25-30; Ch. XVII, Sl. 11-22; Ch. XVIII, Sl. 7-9.
2. Ch. II, Sl. 55-58, 66, 68, 71, 72; Ch. XIV, Sl. 22-25.
3. Ch. XII, Sl. 3-4; Ch. XIII, Sl. 25-26.
4. Ch. II, Sl. 64-66, 69-72
5. Ch. V, Sl. 19; Ch. VI, Sl. 29; Ch. XII, Sl. 13, 14.
6. Ch. XII, Sl. 12.
7. Ch. III, Sl. 5-6.
8. Ch. III, Sl. 8. 35.
9. Ch. II, Sl. 15; Ch. III, Sl. 9, 19; Ch. XVIII, Sl. 5.
10. Ch. XII, Sl. 13-14.

of objects creates attachment for them. From attachment springs desire and from desire anger grows. Delusion follows anger succeeded by loss of intellect, which results in loss of the power of discrimination and then destruction comes."[2] "They (desire and anger) obscure the wisdom of man. Sense-organs, mind and intellect are their abodes. Hence to destroy these two main enemies you must control your senses and mind."[3] Arjuna explains the difficulties in controlling the mind which, he says, is as difficult to control as the air. The Lord gives the clue. He says: "Yes, it is so. But the mind can be under your control by austerity and constant practice. By constant effort, mind can be controlled and only a controlled mind can be in union with Me."[4] But if you cannot fix your mind steadily on Me, then try and practise it. If you cannot practise it, then try such works as are for Me. Even by action done for Me, you shall attain perfection. If you are unable to do action only for Me, then do all works without expectation of results, i. e., being indifferent to the fruits".[5]

Yogas

Śrī Kṛṣṇa clearly says: "Between those, who worship Me in abstract form, as the seed or source of all creation and feel one with the universe, and those who worship Me with mind fixed on Me steadfast and with supreme regard (śraddhā), the latter are best grounded in yoga".[6]

"Better indeed is the path of knowledge than blind practice (abhyāsa); meditation with knowledge is still better, but renunciation of all expectations out of your work is superior to meditation because mental peace directly follows it."[7]

That Yogin is considered the best, whose senses are under his control, who engages himself in work without expectation of results.[8] Such state of mind, as is not disturbed or agitated by personal desire, anger, greed, ego or effects of any actions, is the aim of all yogas or ways of worship. To work with equanimity without expectation of desired results and to work skilfully and adeptly are yogas.[9]

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2. Ch. II, Sl. 62, 63; Ch. III, Sl. 34.
3. Ch. II, Sl. 60; Ch. III, Sl. 36-41.
4. Ch. VI, Sl. 23, 35, 36.
5. Ch. XXI, Sl. 9-12.
6. Ch. XII, Sl. 2-7.
7. Ch. XII, Sl, 12.
8. Ch. III, Sl. 7.
9. Ch. II, Sl. 48-53.

All these methods ultimately link our minds with God, i. e., we are in yoga ; we are on the way to Dharma.

Dharma

What is Dharma ? "Those who follow the immortal Dharma as described above with śraddhā (respect) and devotion regarding Me as the Supreme Goal, are exceedingly dear to Me.[1] The preceding ślokas mention the following qualities of a man, which are termed here as Dharma. Those devotees are dear to Me, who do not hate any creature, are friendly and kind to all, who are free from the feeling of "I and Mine", have placidity of mind in pain and pleasure, forbearance, contentment, steadiness in meditation, self-control, firm faith with mind and intellect fixed on Me.[2] "He who does not afflict others and cannot be agitated by others, who is free from joy, envy, fear, anxiety, dependence, who is pure, prompt, unconcerned, untroubled, and who renounces all undertakings, neither rejoices, nor hates nor grieves, nor desires, who does not lose equilibrium of mind in good and evil and is fully devoted, is dear to Me."[3] "He who treats equally a friend or a foe, accepts equally honour and dishonour, heat and cold, pleasure and pain, is free from attachment, to whom censure and praise are the same, who is silent, content with anything, who is homeless (not attached to domestic pleasures), of steadfast mind and full of devotion, is dear to Me.[4]"

Apart from these qualities which are termed as Dharma[5], the Gītā has termed karma-yoga and rāja-yoga (jñāna-yoga) as Dharma.[6] The Lord says : "I am the abode of Brāhman, of everlasting Dharma and of absolute Bliss"[7]. Hence according to Hindu religion, the qualities which lead man to peace or Bliss are Dharma. Certain rituals, rites or customs are not Dharma. The Smṛtis and Śāstras prescribe them only with a view to enabling one by their practice, to attain these qualities in life.

Concentration of Mind

To concentrate the mind, the Gītā further suggests : "In a congenial atmosphere sit with your body and head erect and fix up your mind

1. Ch. XII, Sl. 20.
2. Ch. XII, Sl. 13-14.
3. Ch. XII, Sl. 15, 16, 17.
4. Ch. XII, Sl. 18, 19.
5. Ch. XII, Sl. 20.
6. Ch. II, Sl. 40; Ch. IX, Sl. 2, 3.
7. Ch. XIV, Sl. 27.

on the centre of your eye-brows, control and regulate your breath occasionally holding it, with mind fixed on Me". "Spread a seat of grass (Kuśāsana), cover it with a deer-skin and place a piece of silk or wollen cloth over it. Sit on such a seat for meditation"[1]. A pure and controlled mind and body free from all sensuousness and passion, forsaking of egoism, power, pride, lust, wealth and property are the other conditions necessary for concentration and to achieve the tranquillity of mind.[2] "A man following austerity and having self-controlled and peaceful mind fixed on Me is sure to have perennial peace which culminates in Nirvāṇa"[3]. "An unsteady person can have no meditation or knowledge; so he cannot have peace and without peace there can be no happiness. The steadfastness can be acquired by complete control of the senses. A tranquil mind only can fix itself firmly.[7] The Gītā, however, has forbidden too much austerity regarding food, sleep etc. It advocates moderation in everything in life.[4]

Various types of physical and mental austerity developed amongst different sects of the Hindus at a later stage, were mainly aimed at controlling the mind and to free oneself from the influence of the senses. All kinds of spiritual efforts and methods of worship are meant to discover the Self. It is not to make the Self shine but to remove the screen of ignorance which prevents us from realisting the ever-luminous Self.

Mantra

The Gītā has suggested only one Mantra (prayer) for worship *Om Tat Sat*—which means: "Oh Lord, every thing Art Thou" or "Thou art the only Real" or "All my activities are for Thou".[5] The various Mantras of the Hindu sects are only complementary or supplementary to this central theme for the purpose of lucidly developing this idea for the common man. The Gītā has clearly forbidden to disturb the religious feeling or way of thinking of others, as every body has his individual trend of thoughts according to his inherent nature.[6]

1. Ch. VI, Sl. 24-28, 10-14.
2. Ch. VIII, Sl. 51-53.
3. Ch. V, Sl. 26; Ch. XVIII, Sl. 53.
4. Ch. II, Sl. 65-68.
5. Ch. VI, Sl. 16-18; Ch. XVII, Sl. 5-6.
6. Ch. XVII, Sl. 23-28.
7. Ch. III, Sl. 26, 29.

Karma-yoga

The Gītā has, indeed, advocated action instead of inaction in the name of renunciation[1] because by nature a man must act.[2] But what is action ? Any action cannot be good for us. Only virtuous works, works for the benefit of others, sacrifices which lead us to Him are karman.[3] "He is called the wise, who works without any desire for result and with knowledge of sacrifice"[4]. Desire, anger and greed are the gates of hell; so if any person works for good objects avoiding these three evils, he will reach the Supreme.[5] One should not relinquish, however, his natural duties, even though they are attended with evil, because all undertakings involve some evil. He who does the duty, ordained by his nature, incurs no evil. None should meddle in such duties or actions which are against one's nature.[6] From whom is the evolution of all beings, by whom all these are pervaded, worshipping Him with his own duty man attains perfection. The Gītā says that all activities, emanate from Him. Hence by performing well your natural activities without longing for the results you should serve Him and realise Him[7]. Work is worship, only you must work with the spirit of surrender to His will.[8] To work with equanimity of mind and to perform one's duty well are yogas i. e., means of union with Him, the source of Bliss. This attitude towards life will ultimately turn all action into inaction.[9]

He whose intellect is unattached, who has controlled his senses, whose desires are gone, attains by renunciation supreme perfection which lies in freedom from action. Real peace lies in this freedom from action, good or bad.[10] He attains peace, who has given up desires and feeling of I and mine.[11] "Occupy", the Lord assures the mankind, "mind with Me, be devoted to Me, sacrifice to Me, thou shalt reach

1. Ch. III, Sl. 8-9; Ch. V, Sl. 1-2.
2. Ch. III, Sl. 4-5; Ch. XVIII, Sl. 11.
3. Ch. IV, Sl. 18-23; Ch. VIII, Sl. 3.
4. Ch. IV, Sl. 19-23; Ch. III, Sl. 19; Ch. V, Sl. 7-13.
5. Ch. XVI, Sl. 21-22.
6. Ch. III, Sl. 35; Ch. XVIII, Sl. 47, 48, 59, 60.
7. Ch. XVIII, Sl. 45-49, 56-57.
8. Ch. II, Sl. 47-49.
9. Ch. II, Sl. 47-50, 51; Ch. III, Sl. 19-20; Ch. IV, Sl. 42.
10. Ch. IX, Sl. 27, 28.
11. Ch. II, Sl. 71.

Me, I promise unto thee, my dear. Take refuge in Me, giving up all hesitation".[1] A man, who has this true spirit of surrender, can never be cowardly, weak, mean or selfish—the qualities that destroy peace. Surrender unto Me all your action, food, offerings, *tapasyā* i. e., worship, do all your acts as an offering to me; I shall free you from the bondage of their effects, good or bad, and you shall come unto Me due to such yoga of renunciation.[2] The Lord further assures: "My devotee is never destroyed".[3] Peace and happiness emanate from Him, so be with Him, either through knowledge, devotion, meditation or action. "Even by discussions and prayers with mind fixed on Me, men can be happy".[4]

Sannyāsa

Sannyāsa or renunciation of the wordly pleasures is deemed by many to be the ultimate goal of spiritual life. The Sannyāsins command great respect from all sects of the Hindus, as well as members of other religious faiths, because of their renunciation of all pleasures of worldly life. Arjuna puts a straight question to Śrī Kṛṣṇa: "I like to know the theories of sannyāsa and tyāga (renunciation) severally. Tell me about them". The teacher explains: "Renunciation of worldly action is termed by the sages as Sannyāsa. Renunciation of all expectations or results of actions is tyāga according to the wise. Some say that all actions should be relinquinshed as an evil, while others say that yajña, gift, austerity and other forms of worship should not be relinquished. But know the final truth from Me. Yajña, gift and austerity purify intelligence. Hence they (day-to-day religious practices) should indeed be performed. But they should be done without any selfish motive or expectation or attachment. Renunciation of obligatory actions is not proper. One cannot entirely relinquish activities. But he who relinquishes fruit of action is called a tyāgin (relinquisher). He who acts with an eye to result, suffers under its influence even in the life after death but he who renounces result is free from such suffering.[5]

Bhakti-yoga

After discussing various ways and means to have this strength

1. Ch. XVIII, Sl. 65-66.
2. Ch. IX. Sl. 17-18; Ch. XII, Sl. 6; 8.
3. Ch. IX. Sl. 31.
4. Ch. X, Sl. 9.
5. Ch. XVIII, Sl. 1-12.

of mind to renounce, the Gītā finally concludes that we can have this attitude in life only through His grace, as He is guiding every movement and every action of our life, like a driver running his machine. His grace can be obtained only if we take refuge in Him in all respects with open heart. "By his grace thou shalt attain peace in this life and in next life in the eternal abode of peace". "Relinquishing all Dharmas take refuge in Me alone ; I will liberate thee from all sins ; grieve not".[1]

Social duties

The Gītā has prescribed certain social duties for every individual. It has described the cycle of mutual obligations not only for the members of the human society, but for the gods and animal world.[2]

According to the Gītā, gods are not the Supreme Soul, but are souls enjoying greater powers and happier positions in a separate world (the heaven) as a result of their good actions. But they shall have to return to this earth on expiry of the effects of their good acts.[3] Men perform yajñas which please the gods ; gods create clouds which give us rains. From rains, grains are grown and human as well as animal world live on them.[4] Hence the Gītā has forbidden us to cook food for ourselves but for the benefit of others. "He is like a thief, who cooks for himself only"[5] because he must share with others who have contributed to production and his prosperity.

The Gītā enjoins that wise men should have equal attitude towards everyone, high or low. "There should be no discrimination between a Brāhmaṇa and a Caṇḍāla, a cow or an elephant, as every thing is Brahman".[6] A benefactor never suffers.[7] He sees really, who sees the Lord existing equally in all beings and the Imperishable in all perishable things. He cannot injure others ; so he reaches the highest goal.[8]

Character is the foundation of peace

Men of character make happy societies which in turn compose prosperous nations. Character is not created by speeches or precepts but though practice. If each individual of our society makes honest

1. Ch. XVIII, Sl. 57-62 ; 65-66.
2. Ch. III, Sl. 9-11.
3. Ch. VII, Sl. 16 ; Ch. IX, Sl. 20-21.
4. Ch. III, Sl. 11-14 ; Ch. XVIII, Sl. 40.
5. Ch. III, Sl. 3-4.
6. Ch. V, Sl. 18.
7. Ch. VI, Sl. 40.
8. Ch. XIII, Sl. 27, 28.

attempt to be happy and peaceful through the teachings of the Gītā, only then a healthy and happy society will emerge. The main emphasis of the Sanātana Dharma or Hinduism is on character building.

Manu, the great law-giver of the Hindus and on whose Saṁhitā the structure of the Hindu society still rests, has mentioned the following ten virtues as Dharma: Contentment, compassion, detachment, not to steal other's property, cleanliness, control of senses, intellegence with patience, knowledge, truth and absence of anger.[1] There are similar definitions of Dharma in the Manu-Saṁhitā, the Mahābhārata, the Rāmāyaṇa, the Bhāgavata etc...."There are innumerable ways towards Dharma. If you adopt any one of them to proceed towards Dharma, the effort is never lost." "Pleasure is always succeeded by pain."..."Idleness is the cause of sorrow. Deftness causes pleasure."..."It is the duty of the intelligent to accept with equanimity of mind pain or pleasure, things pleasant or unpleasant."... To attain peace and pleasure in life, there is nothing like giving up of expectations[2]..."Never give up truth. Immortal peace rests on truth"......"There is no eye like learning, no worship (tapasyā) like truthfulness, no pain like attachment and no pleasure like detachment[3]... "Non-possession is the only safest way to have peace in this world."[4]... "He who can look at things equally, who is not interested in wealth, adheres to truth, adopts the attitude of detachment and gives up all desires for worldly activities, is recognised to be happy......The wise point out that the aforesaid five are the means to Mokṣa (perennial bliss).[5]

I have quoted some ślokas only, with a view to making it clear to my readers that Hindu religion does not mean certain rituals or social laws. A Hindu has to observe Dharma from his birth to death and daily from morning till he sleeps at night. Naturally social customs, duties and orders are considered to be part and parcel of his Dharma. Dharma is the life blood of a Hindu and his society and peace is the goal of Dharma. I have tried to place before the readers a glimpse of only one aspect of this vast science with a view to creating interest amongst them to search for themselves eternal wisdom. This brochure is by no means an attempt to exhaustively deal with the philosophy of the Gītā but an attempt to briefly highlight some of its aspects for those who are in search of peace.

1. Manu-Saṁhitā Ch. VI, Sl. 91.
2. The Mahābhārata, Śānti-parva, Ch. 174.
3. Ibid. Ch. 175. 4. Ibid. Ch. 176. 5. Ibid. Ch. 177.

BUDDHISM IN TIBET

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Among the Indian religions, Buddhism is the only religion which contributed most to the culture not only of India, but also of other foreign lands. King Aśoka's contribution in this regard is highly praiseworthy. He despatched missions to various places both within and abroad to propagate Buddhism. But we know nothing of his mission or any activities of other Indian monks for its propagation in Tibet before the 7th century A. D. Buddhism was unknown in Tibet till then. Towards the beginning of the 7th century A. D. it first received Buddism and 'through it some beginnings of civilization among its people'. Undoubtedly it received the greatest contribution in respect of religion, literature, art and the like from India.

It is generally believed that Buddhism entered Tibet during the reign of king Naradeva (Miḥi-lha) who ascended the throne at the age of thirteen only. But owing to his meritorious deeds he was later on better known as Sroṅ-btsan-sgam-po (lit. straightforward, strict, profound) in Tibet. He was the son of king Gnam-ri-sroṅ-btsan who was a war-like king and held supreme authority over Tibet. King Sroṅ-btsan-sgam-po imbibed the martial spirit of his father and took delight in bloody wars and campaigns and on his accession to the throne he increased his military powers in many ways and laid an expedition against Aṁśuvarman of Nepal in the south. Fearing defeat at his hand Aṁśuvarman thought it wise to establish a matrimonial alliance with Sroṅ-btsan-sgam-po. He offered his daughter in marriage to him. The king accepted gladly the princess as his queen. Some two years later king Sroṅ-btsan-sgam-po led a military campaign against Seṅ-ge-btsan-po (Tai-tsung), the powerful emperor of China in the north. He also evaded the war by giving his daughter in marriage to him. King Sroṅ-btsan-sgam-po had thus two queens. One was Ṭhi-btsun, the daughter of king Aṁśuvarman of Nepal, while other was Oṅ-co, the daughter of the emperor of China. Both of them were very pious. The princess of Nepal was a devout Buddhist. As a part of her

dowry she brought an image of Buddha Akṣobhya, which was enshrined in a great temple built by the king in Lhasa. It still exists there and is popularly called Jo-khaṅ, house of lords. The princess of China was also a worshipper of Buddha. She brought to Tibet fine images of Buddha Śākyamuni and Maitreya as also a few Buddhist texts. These images were also installed in a great temple built by the king in Lhasa. The temple still survives there and is the chief temple of Lhasa. The king was a man of culture. He was deeply interested in cultural development, social reforms and the like. By the persuasion of these two queens, the king was soon converted to the religion of Buddha. He felt the necessity of introducing Buddhism into his own country and thenceforth devoted his attention to its propagation in Tibet,

At the instance of his queens king Sroṅ-btsan-sgam-po sent many intelligent young men to India, Nepal and China for Buddhist works and teachers. Among the young men sent to India, Thon-mi-sambhoṭa[1], son of Anu, was very intelligent. He was highly noted for his aptitude and erudition. Along with a group of sixteen companions, he was sent to study in Āryadeśa (India) the Brahmanical and Buddhist works under Devavitsiṁha (Siṁhaghoṣa), Lipikāra (Lipidatta) and others. But due to extremely burning heat of the plains, all his companions died and Thon-mi-sambhoṭa only survived. He stayed in India for several years and studied the texts—both Buddhist and Brahmanical—extensively with them. There was no form of writing in Tibet then. Texts were memorized and transmitted orally. It was Thon-mi-sambhoṭa who introduced the Tibetan script consisting of thirty-four letters—thirty consonants and four vowels. This new script was modelled on the central Indian script of the 6th-7th centuries A. D. Thon-mi-sambhoṭa is said to have written about eight books on writing and a grammar in Tibetan. He also translated several Buddhist texts into Tibetan. Of them, Kāraṇḍavyūha and the Ratnameghasūtra deserve mention. He is thus regarded as the father of Tibetan literature. The king was very much pleased with him and appointed him his chief minister. He became his pupil and studied Buddhism with him. He further procured Buddhist texts from Nepal and got them translated into Tibetan.

1. Thon-mi is the name of a tribe in Tibet and Sambhoṭa means a good Bhoṭa i.e., Tibetan. The word, therefore, literary means a good Tibetan of the Thon-mi tribe of Tibet.

The translation work, thus started during Sroṅa-bran-po's reign, continued steadily for several hundred years till the close of the 17th century A. D., as a result of which a large number of works dealing with Buddhism and allied subjects were rendered into Tibetan. He established several Buddhist centres and temples in his dominion. The famous sandal wood image of Avalokiteśvara, the lord of mercy which is worshipped even today, was brought to Lhasa during his reign. He encouraged his subjects to adopt the new faith. Thus he gave strong religious impetus to the whole of Tibet and made Buddhism his state religion. He died after reign of about twenty years in 650 A. D. 'To the Tibetans he is not only the national hero but also the inspired founder of the nation, the giver of civilization and, above all, the living spiritual guide of Tibet'. His name is to this day a household word. He is indeed revered as an Incarnation of Chen-re-zi (Lord of mercy), the patron diety of Tibet. His two wives are also deified as incarnations of Tārā, Goddess of Mercy. After his death Buddhism could not make much headway against the existing Bon religion, the aboriginal pre-Buddhist religion of Tibet. Because of the strong opposition of the followers of Bon, Buddhism had to suffer a set-back. As is expected, we hear very little of Buddhism for a few decades.

After Sroṅ-btsan-sgam-po we hear of king Khri-gtsug-lde-btsan. It is said that in 705 A.D. the king built many monasteries and temples in his dominion and highly encouraged the translation of Sanskrit texts into Tibetan. He also invited the monks of Khotan to Tibet. In an edict (783 A. D.), still extant in Lhasa, is recorded the earnest zeal of the king for propagation of Buddhism in Tibet.

The next great king was Khri-sroṅ-lde-btsan (740-786 A.D.). He is regarded by the Tibetans as an incarnation of Mañjuśrī even today. He ascended the throne at the age of thirteen only. He became a staunch admirer of Buddhism and directed all his efforts to further the consolidation of Buddhism in Tibet. He sent an envoy to China in search of Buddhist texts and manuscripts. He also brought Śāntirakṣita, the famous Buddhist teacher, from India. He was a distinguished teacher of the Yogācāra school and was a Professor at the university of Nalanda. He was also the author of many philosophical and logical works. His Tattvasaṅgraha which criticizes the Buddhist and non-Buddhistic philosophical works, deserves mention. Most of his other works are preserved in Tibetan translations, Sanskrit originals

of which are lost. But unfortunately with the arrival of Śāntirakṣita in Tibet an epidemic broke out there. The adherents of Bon, the old religion of Tibet, with the active support of the king's uncle invited the people by alleging that this calamity was due to the wrath of gods for the introduction of this new form of religion as also for the presence of an alien teacher in Tibet. Undoubtedly this accusation caused serious set-back to the propagation of Buddhism. At the advice of the king, Śāntirakṣita had to flee to Nepal for the time being to evade indignation. But subsequently the king brought him back to Tibet. He then advised the king to invite the celebrated Buddhist teacher Padmasaṁbhava who was one of the distinguished teachers of the university of Nalanda, 'the Oxford of Buddhist India', and was deeply versed in the Tantricism of the Yogācāra school.

In 780 A.D. Padmasaṁbhava came to Tibet. He visited many parts of Tibet and expounded the fundamental teachings of Buddhism which received fresh impetus. With him started an era of great literary activity in Tibet. He organised the Saṁgha (Order of monks) and introduced some elements of Tantricism into the then existing religion. With him thus originated a new sect called Nyiṅ-ma-pa (lit. the old one) sect.[1] It contains 'the necromancy of the old Tibetan religion more fully than any of the reform sects'. It is also called the 'Red hat' sect from the colour of the hats worn by the Lamas (monks). Several sects and sub-sects came to be founded later on by the distinguished Buddhist teachers. Padmasaṁbhava advised the king to send a body of monks from Tibet to India to study the Buddhist texts in original. The king further built the Sam-ye monastery a few miles away from Lhasa on the model of the Odantapuri Mahāvihāra of Bengal at the instance of Śāntirakṣita who became the head of the monastery. It is the greatest monastery ever built in Tibet. It contains a number of fine shrines and has a good collection of Sanskrit and Tibetan books. Towards the close of the 8th century A.D. through his sincere efforts, Padmasaṁbhava procured a number of Buddhist texts from Kasmir. Many learned monks were appointed to render them into Tibetan. The Sam-ye monastery thus became a great centre of literary activities in Tibet. Both Śāntirakṣita and Padma-

1. It is to be noted that the Buddhism in Tibet called Lamaism after its Lamas (monks) in an admixture of some old Bon practices and elements of Tantricism.

saṁbhava collaborated with each other in expounding the teachings of Buddhism in Tibet. Many young men were also ordained by them.

King Ral-pa-can (1817-36 A. D.) was the third king of Tibet. He made strenuous efforts to establish firmly the religion of Buddha in Tibet. On his first accession to the throne he convened a meeting of the monks to advise him for further propagation of Buddhism in Tibet. As a result, many scholars on his invitation came to Tibet from India. They were entrusted with the work of translating the scriptures and the commentaries of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Vasubandhu and others. A considerable portion of the present canon was also translated into Tibetan then. It was during his reign that the history of Tibet came to be written for the first time.

Till the 9th century A.D. Buddhism, however, played a dominant part in the life of the Tibetans. But it became moribund subsequently for about a century because of the initiation of the policies highly prejudicial to Saddharma *i.e.*, Buddhism by the then kings. It passed through many vicissitudes. But the translation work started some several hundred years back was not discontinued. The progress of the work, of course, occasionally disrupted. But it could not deter the zeal of the scholars engaged in it. They, however, pursued the work with sincere devotion. In 1038 A.D. Atīśa (Dīpaṅkara-śrī-jñāna), the most distinguished Indian Buddhist teacher, came to Tibet when he was sixty years old. Many Tibetan scholars studied Buddhism with him. He devoted himself wholeheartedly to the preaching of Buddhism in Tibet. He also introduced a new calander in Tibet. The famous Sa-skya manastery was built during his time. It was Atīśa who enriched the Tibetan literature by rendering Sanskrit works into Tibetan. This period is called the golden age of Tibetan literature. Thus he instituted a new era in the Tibetan literature. He reformed the Saṁgha in Tibet. His mission to Tibet is notable in various respects. Thus Dīpaṅkara's influence on the thought and culture of Tibet can neither be gainsaid nor exaggerated. He is worshipped as a living spiritual guide even today in Tibet.

Bu-ston (1290—1364 A. D.), the eminent scholar and anthoritative historian of Tibet, arranged Tibetan translation into two great collections. The first comprising the utterances of Buddha is popularly known as the Kanjur, while the second composed of writings of distin-

guished teachers by way of explanation of the first is known as the Tanjur. The first thus contains the original works, while the second exegetical works as also works on medicine, astronomy, grammar and the like.

Apart from translated works, there are various other original works composed in Tibetan under the titles : Lo-rgyus (history), Gtam-rgyud (oral tradition), Chos-ḥbyuṅ (the origin of the dharma), Rtogsbrjod (heroic deeds), Rnam-thar (legendary accounts), Deb-ther (documents), Deb-ther-sṅon-pa (ancient records), Yig-gzhuṅ (chronicles) and others. These works deal mainly with sacred subjects which are apocryphal or authentic or quasi-authentic. The apocryphal texts, of course, occupy the major portion and are very popular in Tibet. All these indigenous works are written in elegent and accurate Tibetan language. Their literary style is also commendable.

Lastly, many monks and novices came to India from Tibet to study Buddhist texts with the distinguished teachers of the Nalanda and Vikramśilā universities, They worked hard under these teachers and acquired proficiency in Sanskrit literature too. On their return to Tibet, they devised a system of vocabulary for translating mechanically Sanskrit terms into Tibetan, and restored a number of Sanskrit works from their Tibetan translations. It has been in vague since then.

TEMPLES IN RANCHI DISTRICT*

BY

DR SURESH SINGH

Temples in Ranchi district, historically and architecturally, fall into two distinct categories: the 'Orissan' complex of temples in Pañcapargana and the predominantly 'Vaiṣṇava' group of temples elsewhere. Pañcapargana (the geographical region consisting of Buudu, Silli, Tamar, Barainda and Raheparganas) temples are supposed to be the oldest (pending the determination of the historicity of the temple ruins at Manjhgaon, Tanginath etc.) temples in the district. The region was a confluence of two major streams of culture: the so-called Hindu influence (both pre-Vaiṣṇava and Vaiṣṇava) from adjoining regions of Purulia and Saraikela and the tribal (predominantly Munda). The temples or their ruins are scattered over the banks of two rivers Kanchi and Karkari along which the Hindu influence penetrated into what was once an intact tribal region (*Jharkhand*). The *Śiva-stotra* mentions *Jharkhand* as one of the abodes of Śiva. In 1871 E. T. Dalton on his way from Bundu to Chokahatu came upon "very old-looking ruins of stone temples, eight in number, apparently dedicated to Śiva" on the right bank of Kanchi. He noticed "several *liṅgas* about as the only visible object of worship". The temples were mere "ruins, built of cut stone, square and put together without any cement or clamps"; "no one in the neighbourhood" had the "faintest notions by whom or at what period, these shrines were constructed". These shrines were probably those now standing at Buradih, Haradih, Bamla, Djuri, Palna, Pandadih. Remains of temples and images have also been found in adjoining parts of Singhbhum and the *tarai* of Tamar; there were also images other than those of Śiva. These temples could be ascribed to probably the Pāla period (11th-12th century); these were the focii of pre-Vaiṣṇava influence, of Śiva-Śakti-Sūrya cults in the region. These temples in the entire plains of Pañcapargana, present Purulia (Bengal) and adjoining parts of present Singhbhum have been influenced by the 'canons' of medieval Orissan architecture. The *rekhā*-temple at Telkupi and

* This script is based mostly on my field study in Pañcapargana from Aug: 1960 to Dec. 1962 when I was posted as Subdivisional Officer at Khunti.

the ruined brick temple at Borem in the adjoining Purulia district in Bengal, similar temples at Icha and Kara in Singhbhum are some specimens. Pañcapargana temples represent a continuation of Orissan architectural influence. Two almost intact temples still stand at Haradih and Diuri (both in Tamar). I quote from my diary :

"A couple of temples stand in their solitary grandeur at Haradih (though popularly called Burhadih Temple), flanked by the villages of Darubara (Tamar), Badla (Tamar) and Heth Burhadih (Bundu), on a mound over-looking Kanchi river. It is probably the only perfect specimen of *rekhā*-type of Orissan temple architecture surviving almost intact in the region. I am given to understand that there were once a very large number of Śiva phallic images in the sacred precincts till some years ago; now most of these have been removed by villagers from adjoining villages. Still ten of these remain. The main basalt image of *Mahāmāyā* (as popularly called) or mother Goddess about three cubit high, seated on the lion-seat, is attractive. The smaller image is that of *Mahiṣāsuramardinī* in the well-known posture of killing Mahiṣāsura in the form of a buffalow. On the other bank of the river are to be found remains of a similar temple which contains the main image of a Sun god, carrying two sun-flowers, who is embedded up to the upper leg, in a chariot to which seven horses are yoked. There is also an image of what is popularly known as *Caturbhujī*, the four-armed Mother Goddess.[1]

"The other temple stands at Diuri, about two miles from Tamar. It has three closed windows. It contains the image of the sixteen-armed Mother Goddess (*Solabhujī devī*, as she is popularly called) flanked by Śiva on the top, Sarasvatī and Lakṣmī, Kārtikeya and Gaṇeśa on the sides. Local tradition has it that Kālā Pāhār, the great iconoclast, sought to desecrate this temple and even damaged it ; some manage to identify bullet marks on the walls of the temple and attribute the broken limbs of the main deity to the vendalism of a British Officer who passed through that area during the Kol Insurrection.

"Ruins of a similar temple may be seen at Harin (Sonahatu) on river Kanchi. The temple which stood five feet high till 70 years ago

1. Also see D. R. Patil's *Antiquarian Remains in Bihar*, 1963, p. 160. In 1944, A. Ghosh, noticed on the site ruins of "not less than twenty" temples, "their bara plinths and fallen fragments of *amalkas* or pinnocles". He also observed "two basalt architectural fragments ; a doorgamute and a lintel with "*Gaja-Lakshmi*" and a residential brick structure."

was damaged by a *semal* tree which grew into its walls. A Śiva *liṅga* exists, worshipped by villagers from neighbouring villages. Ruins of similar temples exist at Bamladih (Sonahatu), Palna (Tamar) etc.; an image of *Padmapāṇi* has been found at Dimbujarda. Images of Sun god are also stored at Śiva maṇḍapa at Tamar. Bamani ruins, situated in the heart of the Sonepur Munda region, represent probably the farthest extent of this architectural influence; the remains of probably a Śaiva stone temple with "about a dozen, large grooved stone pedestals" have been kept arranged around the temple court yard" near a tank now silted up.[1] Such places as Etre and Hitutola, probable Śaiva sites, require further exploration. Manjhgaon in the Chainpur police-station is the most important site of a Śaiva temple in the western part of the district. Brick ruins of a temple, exquisitely carved stone pieces, Śiva liṅgas with unusually large iron trident (*triśūla*), a large number of images of such deities as Viṣṇu, Sūrya, *Mahiṣāsuramardinī*, Lakṣmi and Gaṇeśa have been found there."[2]

Who were the builders of these temples? Popular traditions attribute most of them in Pañcapargana to the Asuras, the indefatigable builders, who had the uncanny way of building such structures during night and leave the site posthaste and their work unfinished by cock-crow. From Harin temple which they left incomplete, they are said to have proceeded to Bamla. In fact, these temples in Pañcapargana were built by local chieftains (now forgotten) or by some affluent cultivators who arrived in the wake of the migration of peasant population from the south, carrying with them its religious and architectural traditions.

An interesting fact about the worship of the deity in the temple at Deuri is that it is conducted by the Munda *Pahan*, the traditional village sacrificer (Hinduised, no doubt) on all days except Tuesdays when a Brāhmaṇa from a neighbouring village performs the worship. The Pahan of Deuri (Padma Singh Munda) is in the immediate charge of the temple and accepts sacrifice of sheep, goats and buffaloes particularly on the Dusserah day when sacrifices are performed on a big scale. At Ḥarin also the Pahan in charge of the Śiva image accepts the sacrifice of animals from people. This shows that the

1. Also see D. R. Patil op. cit., p. 14.
2. Ibid., pp. 248-49.

Hinduisation of the Mundas in Tamar was not a one-sided traffic; the Pahans gained in these cases in respectability in the new society.

Next to these temples, clustering round the *Śiva-Śakti-Sūrya* cults, come the predominantly Vaiṣṇava group of (or Jagarnath cult) temples. There are a large number of them spread all over the district, both old and new. Shyam Charan temples in Tamar and Rādhā Rāṇī temple in Bundu are not very old specimens. But the Doisa-Chutia-Jagarnathpur complex of temples are easily the oldest and most respectable.

The impressive palace complex built at Nawrattan (1687-1711 A.D.) has its Mahādeva temple, rock-temple and the five abbeys, *Pañc maṭh* and picturesque *Dhobi maṭh*. The Jagarnath temple in it was built by Harinath, the *guru* of the Raja in 1683; the two inscriptions on the temple refer to 1739 S as the year of construction.[1] The small double-storeyed temple at Chutia with its arches and undrground stairs similar to "Memadpanthi temples in Berar" was built by one Hari Brahmacārin in 1685.[2] The suburbs of the temple have considerably changed and developed since its first photograph appeared in 1901 or 1911. The temple at Jagarnathpur six miles

1. सम्वत ग्रह गुण सिन्धु शशी, शुची तृतीया रवि साथ
जगन्नाथ कहं भूपति गुरू हरिनाथ

(Royal preceptor Harinath had Jagarnath temple established on Sunday, the third day of the moon-lit fortnight in 1739 S). Another inscription says:

अङ्काग्नि मुनि शुभ्रांशौ तृतीयायां शुचो सिते
असो कृष्णालय श्री रघुनाथ सद्गुरू

(The holy preceptor of Raja Raghunath founded this temple of Kṛṣṇa on the third day of the moon-lit fortnight in 1739).
The other inscription (no longer in position) says:—

मुनि रस सिन्धु शशी समजान कार्तिक शुक्ल रबिवार प्रमाण
श्री हरिनाथ देव भ्रातराज, गोकुलनाथ संग बिराज

(The temple was founded on Sunday, the third day of the moon-lit fortnight of Kartik in 1767 S by Harinath Deva along with his brother Gokulnath).

2. The inscription says:—

सम्बत करयुग सिन्धु शशी अक्षयतृतीया चन्द
ब्रह्मचारी हरिमठ कियो श्री रघुनाथ नरिन्द

(Brahmacāri Hari established the temple in the region of Raghunath on the third day of the moon-lit fort-night in 1742).

from Ranchi, surrounded by ramparts, situated on the rocky eminence, no longer "solitary", overlooks the bustling township and the growing industrial complex at Hatia. It was built by Thakur Aini Sahi in 1691 A. D. In two corners of the rampart are stored phallic image of Śiva, two broken feet, images of Gaṇeśa and Garuḍa. A fiight of stairs has been added very recently (22. 2. 1965). A big melā is held in the plains below the temple on the *Rathayātrā* day every year, which touches off similar *Rathayātrā melās*, on smaller scales, everywhere in the district.

The stone temple at Borea five miles from Ranchi, built (1665-82) by Lakṣmi Narain Tiwary, was dedicated to Lord Madan Mohan. The two inscriptions, probably the first in the local Hindi dialect, are eloquent of the story of its construction :—

1. "The illustrious Rama is true. In Samvat 1722 (A. D. 1965) Vaiśākha, tenth bright moon, and in the reign of the illustrious Raja Raghunath (of Chutia Nagar), the Lord's temple was begun by Laṣmīnarayaṇa".[1]
2. Salutation to the illustrious Madana Mohana, Auspicious[2]: In 1722, Samvat, (A. D. 1965) Vaiśākha, 10th bright moon, Monday, the foundation of the Shrine of Śrī Madana

1. Halder, Rakhal Das, Notes on Three Inscriptions on Stone found in Chuttia Nagpur, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. XI, 1871, pp. 108-110.
श्री राम राज्य।
सम्बत् सतरसह् वाइस ।
वैशाख सुदि दशमी रजनीश ।।
श्री रघुनाथ नरेशविराज ।
लक्ष्मीनारायण ईश्वर भाठसाज ।
2. Ibid. श्री मंदनमोहन (नमस्) ते
अस्ति श्री सम्बत् १७२२ समय वैशाख सुदी दशमी १० (सीमा) रके श्री श्री मदनमोहनेक सटदायादल आउ सम्बत् १७२५ समय सावन सुदी दशमी १० के दरयाजा श्रो कोटरी श्री छायदेयाली का दावा देल तैयार मेल सम्बत १७३९ के ताकरलशीत मेल रूपया हजार १४००१ चाद ईश्वर निमित्ते ये किछु लालग हय से सत्य हय लाकर हिन्दु भय मट दरयाज छारदेयाली सहापाय से गाइक्वकतपीयय ब्रह्मणमारते कहत्या गुरूमाले कहत्या ताक हय मुसलमान भय मठदरयाज छारदेयाली टाहा याय तो शुयर खायआखन मारलक जो पीरक थारा शुयर कहरा डारलक दौषतेहिमुसलमानक हय ते वारि. लक्ष्मी नारायण भगवत इ विनति लिखाय राखल हय कारीगर अनिरूद्धक विनिति सा हो ।

> Mohana was laid; and in Samvat 1725 (A. D. 1668) Śrāvaṇa, 10th bright moon, the foundation of the gateway, with the room and the enclosure, was laid; completed in 1739 (A. D. 1682), at a cost of Rs. 14,000 (a heavy amount, no doubt) for the purposes of the god. The amount is correct. Now if a Hindu desecrate the temple with its gateway and enclosure, he shall drink cow's blood, and shall be visited with the sin of murdering a Brahmaṇa and a spiritual guide. If a Musalman desecrate the temple, with its gateway and enclosure, he shall eat pork, and commit the sin of murdering his akhund (or preceptor) and of putting pork in a saint's dinner-plate. The devout Laṣmīnarayaṇa caused this humbler request to be written. The architect Anirudha says, the request proper.

Rakhal Das Haldar also mentions a stone inscription in Persian, not correctly cut and unintelligible, probably only a translation of Hindi inscription. Other temples are Hapamuni temple of Mahāmayā in Ghaghra and Vāsudev Rāi temple at Korambe.

How have the tribals reacted to these temples or architectural "wonders"? Obviously, these temples have not been mere Hindu islands in an aboriginal sea. Tribals' first reaction was one of wonder at their Doisa "glittering like gold", their Khakhra "bright as silver", at their "glimmering" Chutia and Jagarnathpur, as echoed in their folk songs. Then some of them also participated and still continue to participate in the festivities such as *Deṣai*, *Mahādev Munda Melās* and *Makar Saṅkrānti* celebrations at these temples. Later in the 19th century, in the wake of the revivalistic movement of the Sardars and the political and religious movements of Birsa, they claimed that these historical sites were their "ancestral sites". In 1881, a party of Sardars who called themselves "Children of Mael" set up a *Rāi* Doisa under one "John the Baptist." Birsa, on his release from Jail in November, 1897, drew up a programme for visits to these "ancestral sites" which became places of pilgrimage in the new religious system organised by him. It was declared that these temples were built by Mundas in their *Sat-yuga*, their Golden Age, for purposes of the worship of their God. But owing to certain difficulties, these could not be completed. Later these were forcibly occupied by aliens. Birsa sought to re-establish the racial links with them and recover the

"ancestral possessions" i. e., *Tulsi* leaves and record of rights (probably the inscription on the wall was mistaken for a record of right) from Chutia temple, the sandal paste from Jagarnathpur temple and sacred soil and water from Nawrattan. He along with his people, visited Chutia in January 1898, made a frantic search for "record of right" in course of which the images were cast down and even desecrated. He also visited Jagarnathpur temple which was said to have been polluted by the alien's practice of bullock sacrifice. Then he visited Nau Rattan. The Birsaites also composed prayers in honour of their Master's association with these places. Today, however, no Birsaites visit them.

A survey of these temples and proper editing of their inscriptions are long overdue. There are also a few images without any temple to house them. These could be as old as the Pañcapargana or Manjhgaon temple images. The old ruling family's diety, *Cintāmaṇi Devī* at Palkot, is supposed to be quite old and respectable. A small broken image of Śiva (?) was discovered at Bhagalpur jhuljhula in Karra police-station in September, 1962. The determination of the historicity and further investigation into the origin and impact on the tribal and non-tribal population of these temples will shed new light on the process of acculturation which started probably as early as the 11th or 12th century in the Pañcapargana region. While the impact of Vaiṣṇavism on the tribal living in the lower regions (*latar disum*) is rather well known, that of the earlier waves of *Śiva-Śakti-Sūrya* cults still remains to be studied.

FORCED LABOUR IN POST-MAURYA AND GUPTA TIMES

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The term *viṣṭi* (forced labour) occurs for the first time in the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya[1] who refers to it as one of the branches of *vārtā*. He lays down that Śūdra labourers (*karmakāras*) and artisans (kārus), and *dāsas* should do manual labour for the State instead of paying taxes. This labour was recruited by some supervisor (*viṣṭi-vandhaka*) and was paid. Although *viṣṭi* was a source of income to the State in the Mauryan period perhaps it was not imposed on the independent peasantry in the villages.

It seems that the practice continued in post-Maurya times, for Manu[2] ordains that Śūdras, craftsmen and artisans discharge their dues by work. He also states that they may be made to work one day each month for the king.[3] A passage of Viṣṇu[4] may be cited to the same effect. There is, however, nothing in the legal texts to indicate that like the earlier period, *viṣṭi* was paid for in post-Mauryan times. It is probable that forced labour was unpaid in the post-Maurya period, so that it was referred to as oppressive both in the contemporary epigraphic and literary records. The Junagadh inscription of Rudradāman[5] states that the Sudarśana lake was constructed with resources from the king's own treasury without burdening the people, among other taxes, with forced labour (*viṣṭi*). Similarly, in the *Mahāvaṁśa*,[6] which is assigned to about the fifth century A. D., a king is stated to have declined to make use of unpaid labour. In other words, *corvée* was considered to be a burden on the people even by the kings who were broad-minded and benevolent.

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1. *AS*, II. 4.
2. *Karmopakaraṇāḥ śūdrāḥ kāravaḥ śilpinas tathā*, Manu, x. 120. Kullūka in his commentary states emphatically that even in bad times taxes should not be imposed on the Śūdras.
3. *Manu*, VII. 138.
4. *Viṣṇu*, III. 32.
5. *EI*, VIII, no. 6, ll. 15-16.
6. *Mahāvaṁśa*, XXX.

As noted earlier, Manu and Viṣṇu lay down that Śūdras, craftsmen and artisans should discharge their dues by work, which implies their exemption from taxes. But in course of time the non-taxpaying artisans were made to pay taxes in addition to free labour which naturally bore heavily on the people. The tendency to realise taxes from artisans is already shown by Manu according to whom weavers should pay 11 *palas*, and in the case of failure of payment in time, 12 *palas*.[1] Moreover, the *Śānti-parva* lays down that artisans and traders should be taxed after taking into account the conditions and nature of their crafts. Assessment may be made on the basis of the number of commodities produced and taxes may be collected in kind.[2] That artisans were taxed in the Gupta period is borne out by the charter of Viṣṇusena, palaeographically assignable to the last decade of the sixth century A. D., which informs us that the *chimpakas*, *kolikas* and *padakāras*, who appear to have been followers of particular professions, possibly had to pay as tax half the money that would be the price of the things produced by them according to the rate prevalent in that area.[3] Besides, a number of Gupta land grants refer to the taxpaying *kuṭumbins* and *kārus* (artisans).[4] It is beyond doubt that the *kārus* were mostly Śūdras[5] who in earlier times seem to have been non-taxpayers. There is, however, nothing to show that the taxpaying artisans were exempted from the usual *corvée*. On the contrary, the above-mentioned epigraph states that smiths, chariot-makers (*rathakāras*), barbers (*nāpitas*) and potters (*kumbhakāras*) should be recruited for forced labour.[6] Thus the nature of impressed labour underwent considerable change in our period. First, whereas in the Mauryan period it was paid for, in post-Maurya and Gupta times it tended to become unpaid. Secondly, unlike the earlier period, it seems to have been realised in addition to regular taxes. Due to these factors, *viṣṭi* became highly oppressive in course of time.

The occasion for the demand of unpaid labour was perhaps not fixed. A usual pretext might have been that of engaging free labourers

1. Quoted from, *Vyākhyāsaṁgraha*, *steyaprakaraṇa*, pp. 1727-8 in *Dharmakośa*, I. pt. 3, p. 1927.
2. ŚP. 88. 11-12. Note on 12 in Cr. Ed., *Rājadharma*, pt. 2, Fas. 19, p. 668.
3. *EI*, XXX, no. 30, Law no. 72.
4. *CII*, III, no. 26, 1.6 ; no. 27, 1.16 ; 60, 1.13.
5. R. S. Sharma, *Śūdras in Ancient India*, p. 233.
6. *EI*, XXX, no. 30, Law no. 72.

on royal farms and State manufactories.[1] It is known from the *Artha-śāstra* that forced labour was employed in warfare where its functions are described as consisting in (a) cleansing the camp, the roads, the bridges, wells and landing stages, (b) carrying machines, weapons, armour, instruments and provisions, and the wounded soldiers from the battlefields.[2] If the practice continued in our period, it must have borne heavily on the people because wars became more frequent in post-Maurya and Gupta times. It can be inferred from a post-Maurya epigraph that *corvée* was demanded also for hydraulic constructions carried out by the State.[3] The *Mudrārākṣasa*[4] shows that forced labour was used also on such occasions as coronation. In any case there was perhaps no hard and fast rule as to when a king could exact forced labour and when he could not. This left scope for the abuse of the royal power.

The element of oppression may have been rendered stronger in the Gupta period when the king's right to demand impressed labour was transferred to the donees who were the recipients of land grants. The use of the expression *sotpadyamāna-viṣṭi* in many land grants means that the donee was entitled to the privilege of getting free labour as the occasion arose. The *Kāmasūtra*[5] of Vātsyāyana informs us that peasant women were compelled to perform unpaid work of various kinds, such as filling of grainaries of the village headman, taking things in and out of the house, cleaning the houses, working in the fields, purchasing of cotton, wood, flax hemp and thread, and the purchase, sale and exchange of various articles. This may not have been a direct source of income to the State, but may have been allowed to the village headman as a part of his remuneration. It seems that forced labour included all conceivable kinds of work, for which any special occasion was not needed. In short, the practice of demanding it tended to become oppressive in course of time so as to anticipate the medieval feudal tyranny.

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1. *AS*, II, 7.
2. *Ibid.*, X. 15.
3. *EI*, VIII, no. 6, ll. 15-16.
4. *Mudrārākṣasa*, Act. II, Scene 2.
5. *Kāmasūtra*, V. 5.5.

THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF CAṆḌEŚVARA—A MEDIEVAL INDIAN POLITICAL THINKER

By

K. S. Karmashil

In spite of the fact that the great treasures of Indian political thought are enshrined mostly in the Sanskrit literature of the Ancient and to some extent of the Middle ages, it can be argued with Prof. Maxey that "most of the information about Hindu political institutions and ideas have emanated from sources which could scarcely achieve a detached view of the political side of the Indian life and character."[1] Of late, corrective lenses are being applied inside and outside India by eminent commentators and emphasis is being laid on the correct side of the picture. Sri B. K. Sarkar[2] very long ago tried to shun erroneous impression created abroad about Hindu literature and draw the attention of the Westerners towards a number of outstanding treatises on politics and administration of the Indian thinkers who now adorn the early pages of the history of Indian political thought. The political ideas contained in these Sanskrit treatises, in reality, formed the basic concepts of State and government throughout the Ancient and the greater part of the Middle Ages.

India has rich, colourful and varied history of her own and so this country possessing experience of diverse processes for centuries has undoubtedly made great contribution to the history of political thought.

When Islam came to India during the Middle Ages, India witnessed great political changes. But in spite of the political changes at the apex, Hindu political institutions and ideas held their own. Dr U. N. Ghosal[3] has given a brilliant summary of the prevalent

1. Maxey, *Political Philosophies* (Revised Ed., The Macmillan Company, New York, 1948, pp. 21-25. See also Gettell, *History of Political Thought* (15th Ed.).
2. B. K. Sarkar, *Hindu Political Philosophy*—Political Science quarterly, Vol. XXXIII (1918), pp. 482–500, quoted in Maxey.
3. Dr U. N. Ghosal, *A History of Indian Political Ideas* (Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 521–525.

political ideas during the period of transition from the Ancient to the Medieval India, which extends roughly from the 9th to the 12th or 13th Century of the Christian era. Creation of the political and the social order by Divine or Semi-divine will, the development of the old Smṛti-theory of the law of the social order, of the Artha-śāstra-Smṛti theory of the sources of the State Law, mutual complementary theories of the authority and obligation of the temporal ruler, the old Smṛti theory of the coercive authority, a miscellany of ideas relating to the theories as well as the principles and policies of Government, discussion of the old problem of the relation of state-craft to morality and the old Smṛti theory of Brāhmanical immunities and privileges are the important features of this era.

At the end of the 12th century A. D. when the Gharid Turkish made the political conquest of India, the country was in a state of complete political disorder. Ideologically she was the home of a plural society. The basic pattern of country's rule on the lower political plane witnessed perhaps no revolutionary change. According to P. Hardy[1], "it can be argued convincingly that they (the Ghorids and their successors) only substituted one set of rulers for another without fundamentally changing traditional functions of government or the traditional relations of rulers and ruled—that in administration while introducing a new structure at the centre, Delhi, they were conservative at the periphery, in the village." Thus the coming of Islam did not materially effect any change in the political and administrative structures save the introduction into the heart of India a new and unassailable interpretation of the meaning and end of Muslim life. It is also noteworthy in this connection that the political and social character of the Muslim conquest was something different. Hence both the Turks and Mughals did not try to enforce revolutionary administrative changes. In fine, they changed the men at the top of the social pyramid without dislodging the pyramid itself. According to the same writer, "The Turks and the Mughals sought paramountcy rather than empire in India, suzerainty rather than Government, superintendence rather the control."[2] Thus the political picture of the country during the Muslim rule in India practically remained unchanged."

1. P. Hardy, *Islam in Medieval India*—Introduction to Part Four in the *Sources of Indian Tradition* Edited by Bary (2nd printing, Columbia University Press, New York), p. 369.

2. Op. cit. p. 382.

The Hindu Chiefs enjoyed local powers under Muslim suzerainty and Hindu clerks staffed all but the directing and executive posts in the administration."[1] In spite of the fact that military and political power was enjoyed by the Muslim rulers, certain basic conditions in the governance of the country were tacitly observed. It is true that Muslim political thought has also a distinct place of its own in this country, yet it cannot be denied that the Hindu political thought which formed the basic tenets of Government during the ancient ages in India, continued to exhibit its supreme dominance for a longer period even during the Medieval ages. Under the Muslim rulers the Hindu kings enjoyed the status of vassals and these vassals ran their administration on the political theories and practices enshrined in the literature of the ancient ages. From a closer scruitny of the polity existing in the Medieval period, it can be easily discerned that the political commentaries available during this period bore the impact of the great Indian political thinker, Kauṭilya and his Artha-śāstra. Rather we may say that the Medieval Hindu political thought was the continuation of the Ancient Hindu political thought.

It is the purpose of the present paper to discuss in this background the political ideas of Caṇḍeśvara, a political commentator, who flourished during the Medieval period of the Indian history of the Mithilā region of this great sub-continent. Caṇḍeśvara's *Rājanīti-ratnākara* is a remarkable work in Hindu politics in the Middle Ages. It was due to the great efforts of the celebrated scholar Dr K. P. Jayaswal that this great book on Hindu polity came to light.[2] Caṇḍeśvara was a great lawyer, who started his political and literary career under the last king of the Karṇāṭa dynasty. The last king of that dynasty which ruled over the kingdom of Mithilā founded by Nanyadeva was Hari Siṁha Deva who came to the throne about 1304 A.C. It was Ghiyasuddin Tughlak's time. Caṇḍeśvara belonged to a distinguished family of Mithilā, given to orthodox learning which wielded great influence and power. Caṇḍeśvara's father was Vīreśvara and his grandfather's name was Devāditya. From his uncle's side he is connected with the

1. Op. cit. p. 382.
2. R. R. (Rājanīti-ratnākara), Edited by Dr K. P. Jayaswal who wrote its Introduction and was published in the Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Patna, Dec. 1936, Vol. XXII Part IV.

great poet Vidyāpati of Mithilā. Both his father and grandfather held the post of Minister of Peace and War under the Kārṇāṭa rulers in Mithilā. Caṇḍeśvara too succeeded to this post, somewhat hereditary, in 1310. Caṇḍeśvara who has been described as a clever judge and a great minister, was known for his profound scholarship. Later on he united in himself the office of the Chief Justice, Pradvivaka, of Mithilā and the important charge of Peace and War. Caṇḍeśvara, as he himself admits, wrote this *Rājanīti-ratnākara* on the order of the King Bhaveśa (p. 1). This king was the first in the dynasty of Kāmeśvara. This new dynasty was set up by the Delhi Emperor after Hari Siṁha. It appears that Caṇḍeśvara who composed this R.R. during this regime was of 85 years of age and thus he evidently enjoyed a long life like his grandfather. But this work proves the fact that in spite of his old age, the author of R. R. could maintain much of mental vigour.

The book *Rājanīti-ratnākara* is a great landmark since it is one of the few compositions which held its sway over this period on the theory and practice of government of this country. It is also remarkable for its deep appreciation of the change of time. But this book in no sense can claim originality. Moreover, that age seems to be barren in the sense that a long gap is found as regards political speculation. In his Introduction to Caṇḍeśvara's R. R., Dr K. P. Jayaswal has very rightly stated: "His style is pointed and not pedantic; he does not ramble about like other digest writers and in his remarks both on law and Rājanīti he has his eye on the changing times. But it seems that much of his work is based on the labour of earlier authors whom he expressly designates in the beginning or the end of his work as his sources".[1] Caṇḍeśvara has drawn heavily on the following authorities: (I) Artha-pradīpa of Vyāsa[2]; (II) Arthaśāstra[3]; (III) Kātyāyana[4]; (IV) Kāmadaka[5]; (V) Vācaspatya[6]; (VI) Koṣa[7];

1. See R. R., p. 72
2. Dr Jayaswal, Int. to R. R., p. 21.
2a. Prof. R. K. Choudhary, *Mithila in the Age of Vidyāpati.*
3. Do p. 55.
4. Do pp. 16, 20, 21, 69, 71, 77.
5. Do pp. 33, 54.
6. Do p. 54.
7. Do p. 55 (amar).

(VII) Koṣa (Koṣakāra)[1]; (VIII) Kullūka Bhaṭṭa[2]; (IX) Gopāla[3]; (X) Guru[4]; (XI) Nārada[5]; (XII) Nāradīya[6]; (XIII) Nārada (Nīti)[7]; (XIV) Raṇita-Nārada[8]; (XV) Nīti[9]; (XVI) Nīti-Kalpataru[10]; (XVII) Padma[11]; (XVIII) Pallavakāra[12]; (XIX) Prāñcaḥ (Navyāḥ)[13]; (XX) Bārhaspatya[14]; (XXI) Bhāgavata[15]; (XXII) Manu[16]; (XXIII) Mahābhārata[17]; (XXIV) Bhaya-Maitra-Visatakṣa[18]-Manu-Bṛhaspati-Śukra[19]; (XXV) Mitākṣrā[20].

R. R. is a work of great importance for it marks a great departure from the old tradition. It does not form part of Dharma-nibandha-ratnākara or Dharma Digest. It was composed later on as a separate work dealing with politics. In this sense Caṇḍeśvara did not follow the precedents of his predecessors like Gopāla and Lakṣmīdhara Bhaṭṭa who composed their respective Rājanīti-kāmadhenu and Rājadharma section of Kalpataru along with their Digests. Caṇḍeśvara distinguished himself by other departures too which will be discussed later on. But this much is certain that Caṇḍeśvara by his R. R. introduces to us a new branch of literature and it is the oldest work of that branch yet published. Politics as a separate study can be traced back to 7th Cent. B. C. It was then called by two names, Artha-śāstra and Daṇḍanīti.

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1. Do pp. 71-75.
2. Do p. 2.
3. Do pp. 72, 75.
4. Do pp. 3, 33.
5. Do pp. 12, 13, 17, 20, 22, 23, 56, 62, 68, 71, 77.
6. Do p. 5.
7. Do p. 3.
8. Do p. 70.
9. Do pp. 28. 31, 32, 43, 76.
10. Do p. 8.
11. Do p. 70.
12. Do pp. 16, 32, 37, 47, 48, 63, 70, 73.
13. Do pp. 20, 56.
14. Do p. 70.
15. Do p. 70.
16. Do pp. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 19, 22, 24, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 71, 76.
17. Do pp. 3, 9, 11, 26 27, 28, 32, 34, 36.
18. Do p. 59.
19. Do pp. 63, 76.
20. K. P. Jayaswal, op. cit. pp. 27 and 28.

The former meant a science dealing with the means of acquiring and developing material gain i. e., territory with population and the latter the principle of Government. It appears from ancient works on polity that Political Science was a popular subject and had a succession of masters. Dr Jayaswal is rightly of the opinion that in the period of early Christian centuries down to the 5th or 6th Century some important books were composed, but after that there appears to be a cessation in the composition of the new books for about five centuries. He further goes to point out that "on the analogy of what happened in the literature of Hindu Law, to which Hindu politics is closely allied, this was probably a period of commentaries". According to him, "About the 11th cent. a new class of literature on Political Science came into existence viz. Digests of Hindu Politics mainly based, not on the former Artha-śāstras and Daṇḍa-nītis, but on Dharma Śāstras. The Digest writers preferred to follow the Dharma-śāstra principles of Politics, not the Artha-Śāstra of Uśanas, Bṛhaspati, Kauṭilya etc. They ignored also the old titles, Artha-Śāstra and Daṇḍa-nīti and adopted a new term Rāja-nīti or Royal principles (or Polity). The writers of this class of works were lawyers of the Dharma-Śāstra school and composers of Dharma law-digests. To this class belongs our R. R." It may also be mentioned here that Gopāla's Rājanīti-kāmadhenu was another work of this type. Lakṣmīdhara Bhaṭṭa's[1] Rājanīti-kalpataru was one of the earlier Digest of Hindu Politics. Successors of Caṇḍeśvara, the later Digest-makers Vācaspati, Mitra Miśra and Nīlakaṇṭha, pursued the same model. In fine, we may say that it was really the period of Digests and hence works claiming originality of the type of Artha-śāstra cannot be expected to have been composed.

Caṇḍeśvara was a Digest writer of no mean importance. His Dharma or Smṛti Digest called Ratnākara is divided into seven sections such as (a) Kṛtya-ratnākara; (b) Dāna-Ratnākara; (c) Vyavahāra-ratnākara; (d) Śuddhi-ratnākara; (e) Pūjā-ratnākara; (f) Vivāda-ratnākara; (g) Gṛhastha-ratnākara. His R. R. (Rājanīti-ratnākara) is a separate treatise dealing with Politics. Caṇḍeśvara's political ideas are mostly enshrined in his R. R. He has largely contributed in his own way to the development of political thought in Mithilā. Quoting different earlier authorities on the problems of

1. The Senior Foreign Minister under King Gobindacandra of Kāśī, the grandfather of Jayacandra. No complete copy of R. K. is available in India (Jayaswal, p. 28) quoted in R. R.

State and government he makes here and there comments which sometimes express the departures which he made from the old and traditional modes of thinking.

Caṇḍeśvara's R. R. had been divided into the following 16 chapters and each chapter deals with a particular problem of politics. The chapters are: (1) Kingship (pp. 2 to 9); (2) Minister (pp. 10 to 13); (3) Minister of Religion (pp. 14-15); (4) Lord Chief Justice (pp. 16-17); (5) Councillors (pp. 18-25); (6) Forts (pp. 24-26); (7) Discussion of Policy (pp. 27-30); (8) The Treasury (pp. 31-32); (9) The Army (pp. 33-38); (10) The Commander-in-Chief (pp. 39-41); (11) Ambassadors (pp. 42-54); (12) Administration (pp. 56-61); (13) Executive and Punishment (pp. 62-65); (14) Abdication and Appointment (pp. 66-69); (15) Appointment of a new king by the Minister of Religion and other Ministers (pp. 70-74) and (16) Coronation (pp. 75-77).

Caṇḍeśvara's main political ideas contained in R. R. can be discussed under the following heads: (A) The King; (B) The Ministers; (C) Councillors; (D) Village Administration; (E) Defence; (F) State deliberation over Policies and (G) Diplomacy.

The King: Caṇḍeśvara believed primarily in the divinity of the king. The king was an incarnation of God on earth. The importance of coronation and the role of the Minister of Religion in constitutional matters support this proposition. The coronation oath also signifies this fact. Since the country is considered to be God and it is hoped that the king, in protecting it, will take it as such. Caṇḍeśvara seems to have based his coronation oath on the lines of the Mahābhārata. He was of the view that a weak or an old king should abdicate and go in for an austere life full of penance and salvation. The king, according to him, must be able to protect his subjects. The individuality of the kingdom was given much importance by him. He went to the length of stating even that "leadership if divided would destroy the State". He was really a supporter of benevolent monarchy and as such he desired certain qualities in a king. Justice and honesty, love for his subjects and rendering protection to them during peace and war must be his primary qualities. Sound wisdom on critical occasions will save his kingdom. Efficiency and mastery over details will be his great virtue which will stand him in good stead. Caṇḍeśvara further enjoined that the king must be thoroughly conversant with administrative details and also have

the ability to tackle the emergent and urgent problems of the State tactfully. Caṇḍeśvara has compared his king with a Kalpavṛkṣa. He is of the opinion that king should be served because he is generally endowed with all qualities. But even if it were not the case, he tells us, the king should be served and obeyed. In fine, Caṇḍeśvara laid emphasis on the unflinching loyality to be shown to the king. Caṇḍeśvara has also prescribed certain minimum court etiquette and he is of the view that the court mob should be careful in watching the movements of the king and should not uttter unwanted things.

According to him Rāja-dharma enjoins upon him to become "protector and benefactor of his subjects". In this connection it would not be inappropriate to maintain here that Caṇḍeśvara had in mind three types of kings : (a) Emperor; (b) Karada and (c) A-karada. These three have different positions. The Emperor is one who receives taxes from the kings under his suzerainty. The second is one who pays taxes to the Emperor regularly; and the third is one who makes a gift to the Emperor of one's sweet will. King, Emperor (Cakravartin or World-ruler) and Mahārāja are the different names given to the rulers. Caṇḍeśvara again divides Mahārājas into two types : one who becomes free from the control of the Emperor by virtue of his own prowess; and the other is left to award punishment by his own will. The latter has similar right subject to Emperor's modification. Sa-kara kings (Karada) also are of two types: the one possesses the right to award punishment and the other enjoys no such right. The Emperor is above all these types.

Apart from what has been stated above Caṇḍeśvara mentions certain basic advices which a king should follow in his daily routine if he does not envisage his own destruction. The king, after finishing his daily rites, should go to his harem at noon and take his meals only when the food articles have been examined by his aids. The king is advised to be a Jitendriya. He should give up such things such as intoxicants, bad habits and anger as are likely to make him weak and docile. Only a considerate and well-advised king, devoid of bad habits, can divert his energy to the welfare of his people. A sinful king is never respected. A king should be like a stark (*bagula*) in accumulating wealth, like a lion in preserving strength, like a sheep in dealing efficiently with the enemy and like a *hara* in diplomacy.

1. R. R. pp. 46-47.

It is his duty to protect the kingdom. Any carelessness on his part spells disaster and the kingdom is lost. Caṇḍeśvara also prescribes abdication by the king in his old age and suggests peaceful transfer of power in accordance with the rule of primogeniture before a distinguished assemblage.

The Ministers : The king according to Caṇḍeśvara had a Council of Ministers with whose help and advice the administration was carried on. In the appointment of these ministers hereditary principles were followed. But though the intellectual qualities and political sagacity of these ministers who often came from the Brāhmanas, gave them a commanding position of influence, yet it can be said without any shadow of doubt that in the State supreme position was enjoyed by the king himself. These ministers were no doubt important and Caṇḍeśvara even mentions the different qulities that make a Minister and his functions. Mantrin or Mahā-mātyaka was an important official of State,[1] who enjoyed a status similar to that of the Prime Minister of the modern age. As regards his qualities, Caṇḍeśvara demands him to be righteous, wise, practical, and acquainted with the activities of the State. He suggests that only wise and experienced person, learned and adept in the art of politics[2], preferably from the royal or noble family, should be appointed to this important post. Such person must have also a perfect knowledge of sandhi, vigraha, yāna, āsana, dvaidha, and āśraya. The king should entrust to the P. M. all his responsibilities and should formulate policies in consultation with his P. M. in a similar way. The P. M. should identify himself with the king. Caṇḍeśvara further says that a Minister should be so much devoted to his work as he is to his own son,[3] for an irresponsible one destroys the administration. Only by remaining always happy and free from financial troubles a Minister can have free mind to deliberate upon big policies of the State and advise the king accordingly. Caṇḍeśvara recommends that experts in different branches should be appointed to respective posts. From these accounts it appears that the Ministers were like the feudal barons and enjoyed their position as such.

The Councillors : Apart from the Ministers, Caṇḍeśvara also mentions the place of Councillors in the administration of the kingdom.

1. R. R. pp. 10-13.
2. R. R. p. 11.
3. R. R. p. 30.

He has devoted a good deal of space in his R. R. in describing their qualification and manners. According to his conception, the State was regarded as an organism and the Councillors were the limbs of the body and functioned as such. Accordingly the king was the head, the mouth being the chief Executive, arms were taken as Sabhyas, hands as Dharma-śāstras, the two thighs were represented by Gaṇaka and Lekhaka. Similarly fire and water represented the two eyes and gold eternal internal eye. Sākṣin or witness also played an impotant part Only such persons should be appointed Councillors as are wise, honest, truthful, and learned, are men of integrity and character and are free from all bad qualities. Caṇḍeśvara has made here a significant departure. He says[1] that when some difficult problems arise and positive decisions are not arrived at, a kind should on such occasions, not only depend on these learned advisers but he should discuss the matter thread-bare in the Council and outside and then he should take decision. Righteousness and straightforwardess should be his virtues.[2] He should not try to become a sychophant, but he should rather state facts in the light of justice and fair play. Caṇḍeśvara even advises them not to support the unjust acts of the king. In a sense we can say that according to Caṇḍeśvara the powers and responsibilities of the Government were vested in the Council which acted under the supervision of the king.

Village Administration : Apart from the higher officials of the State mentioned in R. R., Caṇḍeśvara has devoted some attention to the village administration as well. This explains the stability and integrity of the village system. Caṇḍeśvara's reference to Grāmapati, Grāmādhipati, Viṁśa-triṁśa, Gramapati, Sahasra Grāmapati, and Rāṣṭrapati are significant points in this connection. It appears that the author did not try to evade the treatment of lower rungs of the administrative machinery.

Defence : Caṇḍeśvara examines also the problem of the defence of the kingdom. In this connection he enumerates the duties of the Commander-in-Chief or Senānī whose prime concern was the protection of the State. He should discuss the implements which should be used in a battle. Adumberating the method of protecting the kingdom, he mentions in this connection the importance of durga or Fort. He

1. R. R. p. 20.
2. R. R. p. 21.

suggests that a king should fortify his kingdom for safety. He[1] also advises that the koṣa or the Treasury should be located at a safer place within the fortification and the king's palace also should be within the fort. That would ensure greater safety for the person of the king. Caṇḍeśvara also, like others, classifies forts such as (i) Dhana-durga ; (ii) Mahī-durga ; (iii) Jala-durga ; (iv) Varkṣaya-durga ; (v) Nṛ-durga and (vi) Giri-durga.

State Deliberation over Policies : It has been earlier pointed out that Caṇḍeśvara while discussing the qualities of a king suggested the proper time and place when and where important decisions affecting the State should be taken. The suitable time according to him is either in the afternoon or in the midnight. On such occasions of decision taking, the mind of the king and his councillors should be free from all bad or ill feelings. Such policies should also be discussed with the Ministers and[2] and in no case they should be made public. He goes to the length of stating that a policy, without deliberation, is like burning fire.

Diplomacy : The important question[3] regarding the conduct of the affair of the State was the question of war and peace and in this connection his ideas on diplomacy deserve special scruitny. Caṇḍeśvara does not dismiss the prospects of the success of diplomacy in dealing with the State affair. He says that a king must know the strength of his enemy before he declared war on him. He further says that the enemy should be stopped at a point and his territory should be deprived of the daily necessaries of life. Not only that, his fort also should be destroyed and attempt should be made to apprehend the enemy during night. He also recommends that attempts should be made to procure the[4] secrets of the enemy by obviously espoinage activities and the enemy should be isolated by gaining more friends. If and when all such arrangements have been made, the king should then declare war. After victory the king has been advised by Caṇḍeśvara to offer prayer to gods and godesses and the righteous Brāhamaṇas. He also suggests remissions and release of prisoners as a mark of victory and advises the king to win over the Ministers of his

1. R. R., p. 24.
2. R. R., p. 27.
3. R. R., p. 28.
4. R. R., p. 56.

enemy. Caṇḍreśvara also recommends sandhi, virgaha, āsana, and dvaidhībhāva, and sañcaya to the king for the protection of his kingdom, by means of which he can bring his enemy under effective[1] control. Only if the enemy refuses to come to his terms that king should use war as a measure in the last resort. And in this effort of war and peace there comes the role of a diplomat. A real diplomat tries to increase the number of king's friends and decrease the number of his enemies. The king, if he is wise, deliberates and examines fully the pros and cons of all political matters and then he arrives at a conclusion. Any hasty step would be suicidal for him. Hence such wise kings are never defeated. Elaborating diplomatic tactics further, Caṇḍeśvara points out that if a king falls into the trap of an enemy, he should try to adopt the tactics of a hare and by hoodwinking his enemies, he should take shelter under a stronger monarch. Again he remarks that it is the duty of the king to root out the opponents of the State within his territory by all possible means as an agriculturist roots out grass from the field. Thus Caṇḍeśvara does not leave out the uses of diplomatic method in settling the inter-State relations.

From a discussion of these political ideas of Caṇḍeśvara, treasured in his R. R., it gives us the impression that this great scholar was profound in his knowledge of the theory and practice of the State and the Government.

It is true that in describing or discussing them he does not try to give the impression of an original thinker. But it is also true that he was a great political commentator of his time and his R. R. is a valuable contribution to the history of Medieval Indian political thought. It would be appropriate to quote the words of Dr K. P. Jayaswal who very correctly evaluated the importance of this work: "The Ratnākara is thus valuable on the history of political literature and deserves attention on that ground as well. Still more important are the norms which obtained at the close of the Hindu and the begining of the Mohammadan periods. Originality and force are on the decline; yet there is no lack of interest, and no total surrender of reason."[1]

1. R. R., p. 56.
1. Dr Jayaswal, Introduction to R. R., p. 29.

HINDU DEITIES IN THE JAINA PURĀṆAS

By

SHAKTIDHAR JHA

The Purāṇas of the Jainas constitute an important branch of their narrative literature. These works are very important and interesting from the standpoint of comparative mythologies of the Hindu and the Jaina traditions. For, in presenting the universal histories according to their traditions, the Jaina Ācāryas seem to have utilized the Hindu materials to the fullest extent. These materials are of varied nature, relating, for instance, to the institutions of classes and orders, aims of human life, purificatory rites and rituals[1] and various legends and episodes[2] of purely Brāhmaṇical origin. However, the present article will be restricted to the study of the Jainist representation of the deities along with their old and new functions, attributes and associations. The deities in question recur in these Purāṇas both in Brāhmaṇical forms and in changed appearances as well. In the changed forms they are represented here mainly as the *Śāsana-devatās* of various deified Jinas who are represented as being waited upon by the major gods and goddesses[3] of the cults, viz., Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva and Śakti. In these new forms these godheads have suffered diminution and deformity to a great extent. In their new assignments all the deities, adopted from Brāhmaṇism, have been relegated to a subordinate position before the Jinas who are considered as divinities *par excellence*. In some cases these godheads have undergone some modifications. But these modifications that have been done to accord them an air of new appearance, are insignificant inasmuch as the points of similarity are far more striking than the points of difference.

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1. *M.P.* (Mahāpurāṇa of Jinasena-Guṇabhadra) Chaps. 38, 39, 40.
2. Vide episode of Megharatha and the hawk, MP. 63. VV. 257-279; that of Vajrāyudha and the hawk, CMC (Caupanna-mahāpurisa-cariya), pp. 148-149, Gathās 2-10; cf. Epic episode of Śibi and the hawk; cf. Mahābhārata, Vana. chap. 197 (whole).
3. These goddesses, represented in Jainism as the wives of the male attending deities, are known to us from the Hindu sources as their consorts and innate personified powers. Vide. *Mārkaṇḍeya-purāṇa, Caṇḍī-Prakaraṇa* chap. 8. 13-21.

Indra

In the Jaina Purāṇas Indra[1] is represented very nearly as in the Hindu Epics and Purāṇas. In the Hindu tradition, he is acknowledged as the lord of all celestial beings other than *Trinity* (Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśa). So also in the Jaina faith he is recognised as the lord[2] of the entire host of recruited gods and goddesses other than the deified Jinas to whom every deity is made subordinate. He has appeared in these Purāṇas with all his Brāhmaṇical attributes, functions and associations as well as with most of the legends connected with him in the Hindu sources. He is represented here times without number as 'a thousand[3]-eyed god' (Sahasrākṣa) with thunder[4]-bolt as his favourite weapon. Airāvata or Airāvaṇa is his pet ride. In some passages he has been mentioned as the vanquisher of the Asuras[5]. References are also met with where Indra is described as the destroyer of the mountains[6] and punisher of Maināka[7], son of the personified Himālayas. His power of arms finds mention in these Purāṇas in a manner quite analogous to the Epican one[8]. Powerful kings and monarchs are compared to Indra with indomitable power[9]. A passing reference is made to the *Śakra-dhvaja*[10] and Indra-worship[11] about which several references are to be found in the Epics. In a number of passages he is mentioned as the pupil of Bṛhaspati, also

1. There are sixty-four Indras accordingto Jaina Mythology. Of them Saudharmendra is the real Indra introduced in Jainism with all his Hindu traits. See U.P. Shah : "Introduction of Śāsanadevatās In Jaina Worship" in "Proceedings and Transactions of the all India Oriental Conference", October 1959. Vol. II, Pt. I p. 152.
2. '*Sakke ya Surāhivaī*, CMC p. 35 (Caupanna-mahāpurisa-cariya of Śīlāṅka, edited by Pt. Amṛtlal Mohanlal Bhojak, Ahmedabad, 1961) ; TSPC. Vol. IV. p. 79.
3. Pauma-cariya of Vimala, 3.77 ; P.C. (Padma-carita of Raviṣeṇa) 2,13,3. 174 ; MP. 63. 448 ; C M C. p. 36, 283 ; TSPC (Triṣaṣṭi-śalākā-puruṣa-carita of Hemacandra, translated by M. Johns) Vol. III. p. 205.
4. VPC. 3. 127 ; PC. 3. 221, 243 ; MP. 47. 113 ; CMC. p. 201.
5. Pc. 2. 243 ; CMC. p. 293. 336 ; TSPC. Vol. IV, p. 88.
6. TSPC. Vol. III. p. 165.
7. *Kadhiṇakulisāhayā mahiharavva Hariṇā khayanīyā*, CMC 201.
8. TSPC. Vol. III. p. 245 ; PC. 2. 62.
9. TSPC. Vol. III p. 227 ; PC. 6. 181.
10. The expression '*Indra-tulya-parākrama*' is a common phrase for demonstrating heroism of various powerful persons.
11. TSPC Vol. III, p. 168.
12. *Indrāś cakruḥ prāvṛdanta Indrotsava iva prajāḥ*, TSPC. 4. 2. 110 b (Jaina Ātmānanda Sabhā Edition, Text).
13. TSPC Vol. IV. p. 79.

called Guru[1], the latter also being represented as his consellor and minister. Harmonious relation subsisting between kings and their ministers is often likened with that between Indra and Bṛhaspati,[2] who are frequently alluded to together.

In a passage Indra's illicit relation with Ahalyā[3], wife of Gautama, is mentioned. This reference is made to show the darker side of Vedic religion in which he is extolled and worshipped more pre-eminently than other gods. However, more often he is represented as faithful husband of *Śacī*,[4] and their ideal conjugal love has been displayed as standard of comparison[5] for all sincere marital love. As in the Brāhmaṇical tradition so also in these Purāṇas Indra is variously styled *Śatakratu*,[6] *Śatamakha* and *Śatādhvara*, all epithets or titles representing him as the performer of a hundred sacrifices. He is also called *Purandara*[7], viz., destroyer of cities. Thus a brief study of these Purāṇas reveals without doubt that almost all of his Hindu characteristics have been faithfully retained here. Nevertheless, one important variation from the Hindu tradition invests Jainist conception of his character with certain amount of originality. For, the Jaina representation of Indra records a substantial improvement in his conduct. These Purāṇas, unlike the Hindu Epics and Purāṇas, do not paint him as a libertine[8] and disturber of powerful penances of holy[9] sages. On the other hand, he is consistently treated here as great upholder of pious cause and helper of religious-minded people, especially, of the Tīrthaṅkaras whose service he considers his pious duty. And in this connection it must be borne in mind that Indra is represented in these Purāṇas, without exception, as the sole Superintendent of the rites and rituals to be performed on the cere-

1. MP. 43. 107.
2. TSPC., Vol. IV, p. 43.
3. Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 45.
4. MP., 63. 443.
5. *taya ca śakravat śacyām tayām prītir amānuṣī*, MP. 63. 42; *sai vva surāhivaī*, CMC., p. 34.
6. MP., Chap. 67.
7. CMC., p. 299.
8. See, for example, Mahābhārata, Anu. Parva, 41. 1-27. The epithet 'Sahasrākṣa' owes its origin to his licentious nature for which he was cursed with a thousand marks of female organ by Gautama whose wife he had seduced. However, these marks were later on changed in to eyes.
9. The Epics and later Brāhmaṇical Purā as are full of such myths and legends.

monial occasions of birth, enlightenment and emancipation of the Tīrthaṅkaras.

Brahmā

Brahmā has been adopted as an attending deity of the Jina Śītalanātha[1]. He has been described as four-faced, eight-handed and lotus-seated god. This representation is in perfect agreement with the Hindu conception of Brahmā as *catur-mukha*. But it is curious that Jaina pantheon describes him as a three-eyed[2] god. However, this feature, too, seems to have been suggested by the Hindu concept of Śaṅkara, representing him as three-eyed and five-headed divinity.[3] Thus, the peculiar characteristics of two important gods of Hindu pantheon have been hinged together to give the adopted god an air of novel appearance. Nevertheless, the points of similarity[4] that are more conspicuous than the elements of difference, highly speak of his Hindu affiliation.

In spite of the subordinate position to which he has been pushed as an attendant of the Jina, there is sufficient ground to believe that the Jaina mythologists could not keep themselves free from the all-pervading influence of Hindu conception of his creative powers.[5] For, quite contrary to their strong stricture on the Hindu theory of creation, as also against their own evolution theory of the world accepting it as being formed[6] of eternal atoms, the Jaina Purāṇa authors very often refer to Brahmā as the progenitor of the world[7]. Almost in all the Jaina Purāṇas he has been alluded to as the creator of all the animate[8] and inanimate world. In some passages he has been praised for his unique creative[9] power, while in others he has also been criticised for

1. Shashikant Jain, M. A., D.R. 'Yakṣas and Yakṣiṇīs', The Jaina Antiquary, Vol. XVIII. No. 11, December 1952, pp. 32-35.
2. Yakṣas and Yakṣiṇīs. p. 35.
3. V. S. Agrawala: Matsya Purāṇa–A Study pp. 51-52. These five faces are named (1) Īśāna (2) Tat-puruṣa, (3) Aghora or Agni, (4) Vāmadeva (5) and Sadyojāta.
4. Such as four faces, lotus-seat and the very name Brahmā.
5. Matsya Purāṇa (Ânandāśrama Edn., Poona) 4. 25-31 ; Also, Matsya-Purāṇa-A Study pp. 35-55.
6. Monier Williams : Indian Wisdom, pp. 130-131. See also MP. 4. 15-17.
7. MP. 43. 160 ; 51. 47-48 ; 63. 409.
8. MP. 31.25. 43.110 ; TSPC Vol. III. p. 163.
9. CMC. p. 138.

his unjudicious[1] performance. A lady of exquisite beauty is often said to be the masterpiece[2] of Brahmā, variously styled as Prajāpati[3], Vedhā,[4] Vidhātā,[5] Vidhi[6] and Sraṣṭā.[7] As a matter of fact, all things of consequence are spoken of as the result of Brahmā's consummate workmanship.[8] However, in one passage Brahmā is referred to as an old person with his mind stupefied by old[9] age. This representation of him as decrepit is also in keeping with the Hindu representation of Brahmā as Pitāmaha[10] (grand-father of all). In one passage he has been reproached for his lascivious[11] nature suggesting thereby his incestuous intercourse with his own daughter.

The Mahāpurāṇa of Jinasena-Guṇabhadra betrays, on various occasions, an overwhelming influence of the cult of Brahmā.[12] In several passages the Tīrthaṅkaras have been identified with him.[13] Almost all names and epithets expressive of his qualities, associations and functions[14] have been liberally appropriated to the Jinas who are called Parameṣṭhin, Pitāmaha, Paramapuruṣa, Paramātman, Caturāsya and Svayambhū.[15] Though these exclusive attributive designations of Brahmā have been appropriated to the Jinas with some interpretative justification[16] yet there can be no doubt about their being usurped to the latter under the influence of the cult of Brahmā,

1. MP. 54. 103, 110 ; TSPC (Text) 4. 7. 15.
2. MP. 54.42. See also CMC. p. 24.
3. MP. 54. 110 ; CMC. p. 161, 225.
4. MP. 54. 42, 103 ; TSPC (Text) 4. 7. 14.
5. CMC. p. 24.
6. Ibid. p. 138.
7. TSPC. (Text) 4. 7. 15.
8. CMC. p. 225.
9. TSPC. (Text) 4. 7. 14.
10. J. Dowson : Classical Dictionary pp. 59, 285.
11. MP. 39.129.
12. J. Dowson, Classical Dictionary, pp. 56-59 ; See also R. C. Hazra : Studies in the Upapurāṇas, p. 20.
13. MP. 39. 127-128.
14. Ibid., 24. 32-33.
15. Ibid., 24. 33-45.

and स्वयम्भुवे नमस्तुभ्यमुत्पाद्यात्मानमात्मनि ।
स्वात्मनैव तथोद्भूतवृत्तयेऽचिन्त्यवृत्तये ॥

—MP. 25.66.

16. MP. 39. 127.128.

Viṣṇu

Besides the main narrative of nine Vāsudevas[1], wherein is treated the life-history of various Jainised incarnations of god Viṣṇu almost in a stereotyped way, we meet with several passages which reflect his Epic and Hindu Purāṇic character. Notwithstanding the fact that the Jaina Ācāryas were constantly endeavouring for divesting[2] Viṣṇu of his pristine glory and divine character, the Purāṇas of the Jainas contain many direct and indirect references to his various divine manifestations[3] dealt with in detail in the Brāhmaṇical works. In several passages of the Purāṇic works of both the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras, Viṣṇu occurs along with his consort Lakṣmī with all their Brāhmaṇical designations. Almost all his popular Brāhmaṇical names and epithets[4] have been adopted here too as his names with little modification in their original meanings. He is often referred to as Ramāpati,[5] Upendra,[6] Madhumatha[7], Murāri[8] etc. and is frequently mentioned as the husband[9] of Lakṣmī who is also designated as Ramā, Padmā, Śrī, Kamalālayā and so on. Over and above that, his various incarnations dealt with in details in the Brāhmaṇical works have been mentioned with firm belief in them as of actual occurrences. The references to the Brāhmaṇical incarnations of god Viṣṇu are of great interest and significance. For, the very brief mentions of them as known facts of importance not only show their popularity among the Jaina laity, but also afford us sufficient ground to believe that even the savants of the faith were not free from their all-pervasive influence.

1. In all the Jaina Purāṇas dealing with the life-history of sixty-three or fifty-four great personages of the faith, they are said to have been born to release the world from the tyranny of the Prati-vāsudevas who are the Jaina counterpart of the Brāhmaṇical demons.
2. Viṣṇu as Vāsudevas occupies third rank among the Śalākā-puruṣas. And all the Vāsudevas are said to have gone to hell for their excessive indulgence in world and worldliness.
3. Such as Vāmana, Kṛṣṇa (in non-Jaina context) and Nṛ-simha.
4. These are: Acyuta, Akṣara, Viṣṇu, Hari, Asurāri Mādhava, Lakṣmībhartā etc., MP. 24. 24-25. All these names and epithets have been appropriated to the first Jina, Ṛṣabhadeva. Ibid., 24. 23-50.
5. TSPC. Vol. III, p. 245,
6. Mahāpurāṇu of Puṣpadanta (edited by Dr P. L. Vaidya LXXXVI. 1.23, 10.2.
7. Ibid., LXXXVIII. 1.12.
8. Mahāpurāṇu, LXXXVI. 6.13.
9. *Lacchie vva Mahumahassa*, GMC. p. 117.

The following are the incarnations mentioned in these Purāṇas in their Hindu forms :

(i) Nṛ-siṁha[1] (Man-lion). This incarnation has been alluded to twice in three passages of the Caupaṇṇa-mahāpurisa-cariya.[2] The first reference is made in connection with the description of a big forest which is compared with the disturbed capital city of Hiraṇyākṣa,[3] slain (by Nṛ-siṁha). Again in another passage the forest is likened with the body of the demon king, torn out by the lion with his nail.[4] In the same context Śīlāṅka gives illustration of the Nṛ-siṁha[5] incarnation in support of his view that an adept warrior does not depend on external weapons for his use. To him as to Nṛ-siṁha, says the writer, his arms are his veritable weapons. Now, all the passages put together unmistakably prove that in all cases Śīlāṅka's allusion is to the Nṛ-siṁha incarnation of god Viṣṇu, which he thinks too popular to require any detailed account.

Vāmana

Viṣṇu's incarnation as the dwarf to punish the deman Bali has also been alluded to in two passages of the CMC. In the first passage Bali is said to have been bound by Hari on account of the gift of land solicited[6] in a sacrifice. And in another passage Hari as Viṣṇukumāra is said to have taken three playful strides.[7] Though the reference is too brief to allow any detailed comparison with the Hindu account of this incarnation of god Viṣṇu, yet it contains sufficient material for our inference in favour of its being an allusion to the Vāmana incarnation of the said god according to the Hindu tradition.

This dwarf incarnation of god Viṣṇu recurs also in the TSPC[8] of Hemacandra in a slightly changed form and context. Viṣṇu-

1. According to Brāhmaṇical mythology this is the fourth incarnation of God Viṣṇu.
2. (a) विणिहय हिरण्णक्खस पुरिव्व मयाहिव समाकुला ।
   दाणवाहिव तणुव्व वियरिय हरिणहा । CMC. p. 111.
   (b) णियहत्थ च्चिय सुहडाणमायुहं णारसिंह दिट्ठंतो । Ibid. p. 167.
3. Foot note 2 a supra.
4. Ibid. 2 a supra.
5. Ibid. 2 b supra.
6. बद्धो तेणेव बली हरिणा जण्णम्मि पुहइदाणेणं । CMC. p. 41.
7. विण्हुकुमारो व्व कय तिवत्तीविलासपसरो CMC. p. 249.
8. TSPC. Vol. IV. pp. 90-92, 99-102, 115.

kumāra[1] is said to have taken recourse to three steps to punish Namuci,[2] a Brāhmaṇa minister of king Padma. The change seems to be deliberate and motivated by the anti-Brāhmaṇical feeling of the author.

In one passage of the CMC, Lord Kṛṣṇa's revelation of the whole universe in his person has been mentioned by way of simile.[3] This passage is full of significance, as quite contrary to the Jaina representation of Kṛṣṇa. It certainly shows Śīlāṅka's full belief in the Epic description of Kṛṣṇa's supreme divinity.

It is to be noted here that the Jainist adoption of all the deities shows two systems of representation: One system represents them in their Jainised forms while the other incorporates them with all their Brāhmaṇical traits. It is in their Jainised forms that they have been subjected to degradation in their character while in their original forms they have mostly been introduced with all their divine glory and supernatural exploits as described in the Hindu sources. Thus, god Viṣṇu, like other two members of the Hindu triad, recurs in these Purāṇas in both the forms noted above. In his Jainised appearance he is represented here as the nine Vāsudevas in general and as Kṛṣṇa, the last Vāsudeva, in particular. As Kṛṣṇa, he is introduced in these Purāṇas as the elder cousin of Tīrthaṅkara Neminātha, and is eventually promoted or demoted to the rank of a male attending deity of the latter. It is in this modified form that Viṣṇu has been made suffer considerable diminution in his supreme divinity, for this representation not only makes him inferior to the Jinas, but also attempts to portray him as mere mortal destined to sink down to damnation for his grievous attachment to world and worldliness. However, even in this later form his divinity could not be negatived. For, in spite of Jainist representation of Vāsudevas as mortals of decaying nature, Kṛṣṇa-Vāsudeva's elevation to the status of a Śāsana-devatā is sufficient proof of his otherwise recognised divinity.

1. Also styled *Trivikrama.*
2. According to the Hindu tradition, Namuci, a *daitya,* was slain by Indra. See J. Dowson : Classical Dictionary, p. 217.
3. णारायणमुत्तिव्व पयडिय विस्सरूवा । CMC. p. 111.

SALIENT FEATURE OF THE FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ANCIENT INDIA.

By

TARKESHWAR NATH SINHA

In ancient India, the local Government was mainly responsible for the moral and material welfare of the people. The Government had certain responsibilities towards the people and the functions of the different organs of administration were clearly marked and well-defined. The local laws had their own importance and the central authority generally did not intervene in local matters. The people invoked the aid of the central government only when the local government failed to discharge its duties.

The *Mahābhārata* and the *Artha-Śāstra* refer to the working of the local government. Kauṭilya's reference to the *Saṅghas* and the *Śreṇis* is a point in question. On account of their military organisation, the *Śreṇis* were of immense importance to the State and Kauṭilya refers to *Śreṇi* as a source of recruitment for the army. Equal importance is attached to these corporations by the *Mahābhārata*. We are yet to assess the nature and significance of these agencies. According to *Bṛhaspati*, one of the main objects of the village associations was to protect the villagers against a common danger.

It appears from the inscription and other sources that the local bodies developed some sort of self-government entrusted with the responsibility of watch-and-ward.

The local bodies had their own police and military force. They mainly looked after the local problems and divided themselves into a number of standing annual committees to administer the manifold interests of common life. The local assembly punished the seditious offenders against the village. In South India, the local assembly had immense power with regard to the acquisition and disposal of land for public purposes. On such occassions, the local authorities went round the plots, verified the boundaries and marked them. The local assembly prohibited the sale or gift of land to an outsider. In the Gupta and post-Gupta periods, the local authorities had assumed sufficient powers in Bengal in so far as the sale and purchase of land

were concerned. In south India, even the distribution of water was carefully controlled by the local authority. Among the various functions of the local assembly, irrigation and water supply were most important. Special taxes were levied to maintain public works of importance. The local assembly had to look to the maintenance of the pasture lands, roads etc. and also the rest houses meant for the travellers.

Such wide diffusion of power at the local level imlies the existence of a Secratariat which maintained all important records. Lands were granted to temples or to other religious endowments and records of such tax-free lands were maintained in a separate book. Important Officers like accountant and the arbitrator are mentioned in a number of inscriptions. Cases of embezzlement of Public fund are not unknown and such crimes were severely dealt with. Viṣṇu recommends the banishment of such persons while *Yājñavalkya* recommends the confiscation of their properties. The importance of the local assembly can be gleaned from the Nasik inscription where we find that the terms of gift are announced in the *Nigam Sabhā*.

The local bodies and assemblies checked the growth of royal absolutism. The local assembly collected and paid the royal revenue. When the local assembly failed to collect the dues, it had to apply to the king for permission to confiscate property. At times, the central Government also interfered with the working of the local government. It is believed that *Adhikārin* was the Minister-In-Charge of the local government Board. The *Adhikārin* used to serve king's decree on the local assembly. He was assisted by a host of officers and assistants. Genesally the royal order was accepted by the local authorities but we have also the instances of royal order being discussed in the local assembly. At times, even aggrieved party invoked royal interference. One of the South Indian inscriptions of about fourteenth Century A.D. records the case of a village assembly seeking royal protection against an intruder into the village. In one case, the assembly is fined by the king for not acting in proper manner as trustees of the temple. Instances of royal interference in the local administration are not few and far between. Nārada gives ground for such interference. The commentators on Nārada say that though the local bodies are self governing and are to be treated and maintained as such, they must know that there are certain limitations upon their

authority. These limitations were imposed by the morality and religion and these limitations must not be transgressed. It should be noted here that the king counted upon the co-operation of local bodies in doing away with treason and sedition.

Kauṭilya has worked out the delimitation of boundaries between the central and local authorities. The District was placed under a *Sthānika* and groups of five or ten villages were placed under a *Gopa.* He supervised the working of rural administrative machinery under the self-governing villages. The taxable capacity of each village was ascertained by the officers of central Government. The extent of central control was determined by the necessity not merely of securing revenue but also of maintaining a grip upon the sources of revenue. Disputes about the boundaries were to be settled by the village elders and the matters relating to temples, Brāhmaṇas, ascetics, women, minors, old and invalid persons were to be decided upon at the local level. Even the administration of justice was decentralised.

Kauṭilya advocated active co-operation in village life as village was the basis of higher political existence. *Grāmika* was the head of the village unit. He was vested with some Judicial authority. He could expel thieves, adulterers, criminals and other undesirable persons. He was assisted by a number of elected village officials. Village co-operation was inforced by law in the work of public utility and amusement, in the building of temples, public halls, the creation of dams etc. Each village formed a close corporation invested with large powers and responsibilities.

The towns were under the *Nāgarakas.* They maintained peace in city and kept watch over the whereabout and conduct of the newcomers. The urban administration was charged with the maintenance of census records, ensuring good sanitary condition and the protection of the people from the various calamities, natural and unnatural. One of the main functions of the municipal administration was to keep the drain and water ways in proper order and to safeguard the passage of the city. The Nāgarakas had a regular office with permanent employees. The towns were also the seats of the judicial tribunals. The city elders, like their village counterparts, had various powers. According to Meghasthenes, the municipal administration was highly organised and efficient. There were six committees consisting of 30 members who looked after the welfare of the towns' people.

DR. SATKARI MUKHERJI FELICITATION VOLUME

PART II

SOME PROBLEMS OF JAIN PHILOSOPHY

Dr B. C. Law

It is admitted that Jainism is a distinct form of religion with a philosophy of its own The philosophy of the Jains is deep and extensive. There are many problems connected with Jain philosophy, which should attract the attention of scholars interested in Jain philosophy. The Jaina *sūtras* should be carefully studied to make a through understanding of the difficult philosophical topics of the Jainas. By way of comparison and clear exposition of the difficult Jain philosophical problems, other systems of Indian religious and philosophical thought should also be discussed. The *Bhagavatī-sūtra* (or *Vyākapaṇṇatti*), for instance, presupposes the development of atomic theory (*paramāṇu-vāda*) in Indian philosophy. Each atom is the smallest unitary whole of matter (*pudgala*). Each of them is characterised by its internal cohesion (*sineha*). We cannot speak of a half atom (*arddha*) since an atom is an indivisible unit of matter.[1] With division, it ceases to be an atom. A molecule (*aṇu*) is a combination of atoms more than one. An aggregate (*skandha*) of matter results from an organic combination of five molecules. Disintegration of a corporeal aggregate results from the separation of molecules and atoms. We may pass through different degrees and forms of internal cohesion through the process of organic development or evolution. This difficult subject may be made sufficiently clear by means of comparison with that of other systems of Indian thought.

In the following pages I have dealt with three problems only of great importance. In my published article entitled "A Few Thoughts on Jainism"[2], I have discussed many other important topics of Jain doctrine and philosophy.

I. Morality

According to the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*[3], *cāritra* means the sphere of conduct and behaviour. It really means cessation from doing sinful or evil deeds. It consists of *ahiṁsā* or non-harming which is the first principle of higher life inculcated by Mahāvīra to his disciples and

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1. *paramāṇoḥ ardhikaraṇe paramāṇutvābhāvaprasaṅgāt.*
2. *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. II, No. 116, August 1961.
3. 1. 6. 14.

followers. Pārśva laid stress on this doctrine of non-harming. The harming of life is deprecated by the Jainas as a sinful deed which serves to generate delusion and great fear and brings about mental distress for fear of death. According to the *Paṇhāvāgaraṇāiṁ* harming life is an inequity of which the consequences are bitter. It is an outcome of unrestraint. Its visible effect was sought to be shown how even such brute creations as beasts, birds, fish etc. happily responded to the non-harming and compassionate attitude of men. Equanimity, recovery of equanimity after a downfall, pure and absolute non-injury, entire freedom from passion, and ideal and passionless state are the five kinds of conduct.[1] The three spheres of self came to be represented by these three terms : *jñāna* or sphere of knowledge and intuition, *darśana* or sphere of faith and devotion, and *cāritra* or the sphere of moral conduct and behaviour. Knowledge, faith and virtue are the three jewels or excellences of Jainism. Faith is the guiding factor which precedes all charitable, moral, religious and spiritual functions, the basic principle of all virtuous deeds sanctioned by religion.[2] Faith is perfected by practising charity, morality, patience, energy, cessation or tranquillisation and intellectual insight. By faith one crosses the stream by earnestness, one crosses the ocean, suffering is overcome by energy, and by wisdom one is purified.[3]

Knowledge, faith and virtue signify the comprehensiveness of Jainism as taught by Mahāvīra. Knowledge is characterised as right knowledge, faith as right faith,[4] and virtue as right conduct. These three constitute the path to *nirvāṇa* or liberation or perfect beatitude. Virtue consists in right conduct. There is no right conduct without right belief[5] and no right belief without the right perception of truth. The quintessence of right conduct is the purity of morals,[6] which can only be achieved by the restraint of body, speech and mind.[7] Virtue is that form of conduct which increases the self-realisation of man, helps him in the purification of the heart, and the attainment of liberation. It leads to perfection. It is of immense value in improving

1. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 1. 4. 10-13 ; Vide also *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* Law, *Jaina Canonical Sūtras*, Ch. XXV.
2. *Aṭṭhasālinī*, p. 120.
3. *Sutta-nipāta*, v. 184.
4. In Buddhism faith is reckoned as a great relative (*vissāsa paramājñāti*).
5. *Uttarādhyayana*, XXVIII, 28, 29.
6. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 1. 2. 27.
7. *Ibid.*, I, 1. 2. 27.

and disciplining the spirit. It elevates entire moral disposition. It clarifies our vision, refines our thought, and animates our will.[1]

The first step to virtue lies in the avoidance of sins. There are various ways of committing sins directly or indirectly by one's own activity, by commission, and by approval of the deed.[2] Not to kill anything, to live according to the rules of conduct, and without greed, to take care of the highest good, to control oneself always in walking, sitting and lying down, and also in the matter of food and drink, to get rid of pride, wrath, deceit and greed, to possess the *samitis*, to be protected by the five *samvaras* (restraints), and to reach perfection by remaining unfettered among the fettered (namely, householders)—these are in short the cardinal principles of *cāritra* as taught by Mahāvīra[3] who was all-knowing.[4] Right knowledge, faith and conduct are the three essential points in Jainism, which constitute the path leading to the destruction of action (*karman*) and to final deliverance (*mokṣa*).[5] Right belief, right knowledge, right conduct, and right austerities constitute *ārādhanās*. Right faith consists in an insight into the meaning of truths—a mental perception of the excellence of the system propounded. The Buddhist idea of right view conveys the sense of faith rather than that of any metaphysical view or theory.[6]

A wise man should abstain from all that is contrary to the rules of conduct.[7] Those who are virtuous have arrived at the right understanding of the passions and have well practised control. A monk who complies with the rules for hermits as regards postures, lying down, sitting and exertion, who is acquainted with the *samitis*[8] and *guptis*[9] should in teaching others explain every point of conduct.[10]

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1. Nahar & Ghosh, *An Epitome of Jainism*, p. 477.
2. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 2. 2.
3. *Ibid.*, I, 1. 4. 10-13.
4. *Ibid.*, I, 2. 2. 31.
5. *Ibid.*, I, 2. 1. 21, 22.
6. Cf. *Majjhima*, I, 285 ff.
7. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 9. 12.
8. *Ibid.*, I, 2. 2. 29.
9. The five *samitis* and three *guptis* constitute eight means of self-control. The *samitis* are the following : (1) going by paths trodden by men, beasts, carts etc. and looking carefully so as not to cause the destruction of living beings ; (2) using gentle, sweet and righteous speech ; (3) receiving and keeping things necessary for religion ; (4) performing the operation of nature in solitude. The three *guptis* are as follows : (1) preventing mind from sensual pleasures by engaging it in meditation etc. ; (2) preventing from uttering bad things by a vow of silence ; (3) keeping the body steady. We have similar ideas in Buddhism (*Digha*, II, 293 ; *Dhammapada*, V 375 ; *Aṅguttara*, IV, 106 ff. ; *Digha* III, 148). Even in Asoka's Rock Edict XII, we have *Vacīgati*. *Gutti* = Vedic *gupti*, guard, watchfulness etc.
10. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 14. 5.

One should abstain from killing beings, theft, falsehood, sensual pleasures and spirituous liquor. The pious obtains purity and the pure stand firmly in the law. Those who practise moral precepts regard pleasures as equal to diseases. There are four ways to meditate on purity of mind : love, love towards the suffering world, love towards the happy, and love towards the cruel person. Love is also extolled as pre-eminent in Buddhism.[1] Hatred ceases by love as we learn from the *Dhammapada*.[2]

The five rules of conduct or *cāritra* are specially binding on monks and nuns. They should also be observed by the laity. An ideal teacher possessed of 36 qualities observes them.[3] The first rule entails two things : the giving up of all evil conduct and the turning to good actions such as meditation. In order to carry out the rule perfectly both the laity and the monks should try to keep their minds in a state of equanimity and to look on all mankind with indifference. The duty of repentence is also binding on all, arresting the growth of *karman*. If a monk commits sin, he must confess to his own preceptor and do the penance inflicted. The third duty (*parihāraviśuddha-cāritra*) is variously interpreted by the different sects. The Sthānakavāsī and Śvetāmbara believe it to be carried out when nine monks, at the order of their superior, go out together to perform austerities or *tapas* for 18 months. The Digambaras regard the duty as performed simply by being careful not to injure any living being while moving about. The fourth rule emphasises the importance of being bound to the world as loosely as possible, and of casting out the last root of passion after the tumult caused by it has died away. By the time a man has reached the last stage of this upward road, he will have lost all attachment to the world and think only of his soul, so that he will automatically keep the last of the five rules of conduct.[4]

According to the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* the ten virtues are the following :—forgiveness (*uttama-kṣamā*), humility (*uttama-mārdava*), honesty (*uttama-ārjava*), contentment (*uttama-śauca*), truthfulness (*uttama-satya*), restraint (*uttama-saṁyama*), austerity (*uttama-tapas*) renunciation

1. *Itivuttaka*, 19 ff. ; Cf. *Aṅguttara*, IV, 151.
2. Cf. *Matthew*, V, 44 ; *Romans*, XIII, 8-10 ; *Mahābhārata*, Bhīṣmaparva, Ch. XXI, 10 ; *Śrīmad-Bhagavad-gītā*, XII, 13-14. For a very detailed treatment of Buddhist amity vide B. C. Law, *Indological Studies*, Pt. II, Chap. XII.
3. S. Stevenson, *Heart of Jainism*, p. 241.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 155 ff.

(*uttama-tyāga*) selflessness (*uttama-ākiñcanya*) and chaste life (*uttama-brahmacarya*). *Uttama-ārjava* (honesty) has been understood by some as that simplicity which is opposed to cunningness. As regards *uttama-śauca* it may be pointed out that there is manifold duty of purity and cleanliness binding on all monks, for an ascetic must keep himself free from all suspicion of dishonesty or thieving; he must also keep his body pure and his soul free from all dark thoughts.[1]

The four vows of Pārśva[2] were the following :—(1) abstinence from killing living beings.[3] According to the *Paṇhāvāgaraṇāiṁ* the first principle of non-harming is praised as the refuge, the destination, the basis and *nirvāṇa* to be worlds of gods, men and demons. It is another name for pity (*dayā*), forbearance, purity, goodness, welfare, protection, morality, self-control, self-guarding and the virtue which is the abode of the perfected ones (*siddha*). A Jain is careful in walking. He searches into his mind and speech. He eats and drinks after proper inspection. He is careful in laying down his utensils of begging.

(2) Avoidance of falsehood.[4] Lying is defined and characterised as telling an untruth which makes a person light and fickle, which is fearful and which causes enmity and brings ill-fame according to Jain *Paṇhāvagaraṇāiṁ*. A Jain speaks after deliberation. He comprehends and renounces anger, greed, fear and mirth. According to the *Paṇhāvāgaraṇāiṁ* the truthful speech (*sacca-vayanaṁ*) is the second door to self-restraint. It implies one's moral purity and uprightness and it is a virtue which inspires confidence. It requires a person to abstain from praising himself and condemning others.

(3) Avoidance of theft.[5] It is defined as an act of stealing, oppressing, bringing death and fear, an iniquity which is terrifying, a sinful deed, which is rooted in covetiousness and greed, according to the *Paṇhāvāgaraṇāiṁ*.[6] It implies an abstinence from taking what is not one's own. A Jain begs after deliberation for a limited space. He consumes his food and drink with the permission of his superiors. He who has taken possession of some space should always take posses-

1. S. Stevenson, *Heart of Jainism*, p. 154.
2. According to some these four vows are the same as the four restraints in Jainism (Cf. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, II, 7. 17).
3. Cf. Buddhist *Pāṇātipātāveramaṇī*.
4. Cf. Buddhist *musāvādāveramaṇī*.
5. Cf. Buddhist *Adinnādānāveramaṇī* (*adattādānaṁ*).
6. Law, *Some Jaina Canonical Sūtras*, XI.

sion of a limited part of it and for a fixed time.[1] He may beg for a limited ground for his co-religionists after deliberation.

(4) Freedom from possessions[2] (*apariggahattaṁ*). The non-hankering after worldly possessions may be internal and external. The external hankering is hindrance to religious practice and the internal hankering leads a person to the incorrectness of method, recklessness, thoughtlessness and moral contamination. This is the principle of non-attachment which is conducive to the practice of *samitis* and *guptis*. This stands on the very top of the path leading to deliverance and emancipation according to the *Paṇhāvāgaraṇāiṁ*.

If a person hears agreeable or disagreeable sounds[3], sees forms, smells[4] tastes things, and feels touches[5], he or she should not be attached to them. The vow of chastity was later added by Mahāvīra by dividing the vow of property into two parts—one relating to women and the other relating to material possessions. The nations and individuals who came under his influence were taught that chastity, sexual and moral, was virtue for them. Chastity is the root principle of the best of austerities, regulated life, knowledge, faith, conduct and perfect discipline. It implies moral rectitude which is cultivated as a path to deliverance. The Jain vow of chastity (*brahmacarya*) is deeper in meaning than the Buddhist principle of non-excess in sexual indulgence.

The *Paṇhāvāgaraṇāiṁ* explains the great moral vows of the Jains, which are nothing but precepts (*sīla*). The Jains laid greater emphasis on the abstinence from impious acts, while the Buddhists attached much importance to the positive aspect of virtues.[6]

By the four-fold self restraint (*cātu-yāma-saṁvara-saṁvuto*)[7] the Buddha meant the four moral precepts, each of which is viewed in its fourfold aspect. The four precepts and self-privation are recognised roads to the blissful state of the soul.[8] Upāli, a Jain householder, said that his Master had considered every act of killing a demerit,

1. Cf. *Aṅguttara*, I, 206. This is known in Theravāda Buddhism as *Niganṭhūpasatho*.
2. Cf. Buddhist *Jātarūparajatapaṭiggahaṇāveramaṇī*. Hankering after worldly possessions (*pariggaha*) is an impiety.
3. Cf. Buddhist *naccagītavāditavisūkadassanāveramaṇī*.
4. Cf. Buddhist *mālāgandhavilepanadhāraṇamaṇḍanavibhūsanaṭṭhānāveramaṇī*.
5. *Aṅguttara*, III, pp. 99-100.
6. Law, *Some Jaina Canonical Sūtras*, pp. 62-63.
7. *Dīgha*, III, 49; *Saṁyutta*, I, p. 66; *Indian Historical Quarterly*, II, p. 705.
8. *Majjhima*, II, pp. 35-36.

whether the act be intentional or not. The Buddha held the view that it was not possible to avoid killing, for even in moving about a man was bound to destroy many lives. This Buddhist view was not accepted by the Jains.[1]

According to the *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, without right faith there is no right knowledge, without right knowledge there is no virtuous conduct, without virtue there is no deliverance and without deliverance there is no perfection.[2]

By conduct one gets freedom from *karman* and by austerity one reaches purity.[3] By possession of moral conduct (*cāritra-sampannatā*), one obtains stability, perfection, enlightenment, deliverance, final beatitude and puts an end to all misery.[4]

In Jainism right conduct (*cāritra*) with right belief and right knowledge constitutes the path to liberation. Without right knowledge, right conduct is impossible. In right conduct there is the pursuer of conduct, conduct itself and the means of conducting. Right conduct is caused by right knowledge and implies both right knowledge and right belief. There is no right conduct without right belief and it must be cultivated for obtaining right faith. Righteousness and conduct originate together or righteousness precedes conduct.[5] The road as taught by the Jains consists of right knowledge, faith, conduct and austerities. There cannot be right faith unless there is a clear preperception of the moral, intellectual or spiritual situation which is to arise. Virtue consists in right conduct. There is no right belief

1. Law, *Historical Gleanings*, pp. 30-31.
2. *Uttarādhyayana*, XXVIII, 30:
   नादंसणिस्स नाणं नाणेण विणा न हुन्ति चरणगुणा ।
   अगुणिस्स नत्थि मोक्खो नत्थि अमोक्खस्स निव्वाणं ॥
3. *Ibid.*, XXVIII. 35.
   नाणेण जाणई भावे दंसणेण य सद्दहे ।
   चरित्तेण निगिण्हाइ तवेण परिसुज्झई ॥
4. *Ibid.*, XXIX, 61:—
   चरित्तसंपन्नयाए णं भन्ते जीवे किं जणयइ ॥ च० सेलेसीभावं जणयइ । सेलेसिं पडिवन्ने य अणगारे.चत्तारि केवलिकम्मंसे खवेइ । तओ पच्छा सिज्झइ बुज्झइ मुच्चइ सव्वदुक्खाणमन्तं करेइ ।
5. *Ibid.*, XXVIII, 28-29:
   परमत्थसंथवो वा सुदिट्ठपरमत्थसेवणं वा वि ।
   वावन्नकुदंसणवज्जणा य सम्मत्त सद्दहणा ॥
   नत्थिचरित्तं सम्मत्तविहूणं दंसणे उ भइयव्वं ।
   सम्मत्तचरित्ताइं जुगवं पुव्वं व सम्मत्तं ॥

without the right perception of truth.[1] It is the other aspect of *dukkhakārikā* or *tapas*. It is included in the doctrine of nine terms (*nava-tattva*). The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*[2] points out that the restraint as regards body, speech and mind can enable a person to achieve the purity of morals which is the essence of right conduct.

The category of *saṃvara*[3] comprehends the whole sphere of right conduct. It is an aspect of *tapas* or austerity. *Mohanīya* is twofold as referring to faith and conduct. The two kinds of *mohanīya* referring to conduct are: (1) what is experienced in the form of four cardinal passions, and (2) what is experienced in the form of feelings different from them.[4]

There is an important point of difference between the Jain and Buddhist ideas of precepts and vows. In the Jain presentation a greater emphasis is laid on the side of abstinence from impious acts, while in Buddhist presentation much emphasis is laid on the positive aspect of virtues. It is not enough that a person abstains from doing a wrong thing inasmuch as a progressive man is expected to cultivate and develop friendliness, truthfulness honest life etc. The difference is one of degree and not of kind.

II.—Action (Karman)

Karman is accepted as an article of faith in all the main systems of Indian philosophy and religion. The word *karman* is derived from the verb *kṛ* meaning 'to do'. In the Brahmanic thought the doctrine of action is combined with that of transmigration. According to the popular Hindu belief *karman* is nothing but an aggregate of man's actions in a former birth, which determines his unalterable future destiny. The Brahmanic doctrine of *karman* as found in the teachings of Yājñavalkya has been somewhat modified in Buddhism. Yājñavalkya and Ārtabhāga are of opinion that one becomes virtuous by virtuous action and vicious by vicious action.[5] Karman draws the soul back into a new corporeality. Karman

1. *Uttarādhyayana*, XXVIII, 28-29.
2. I. 1, 2, 27.
3. It is preventing by means af *samitis* and *guptis* the sins or influx of the *karman* upon the soul. It is the practice of self-restraint with regard to body, speech and mind.
4. *Uttarādhyayana*, XXXIII, 10.
5. *puṇyo vai puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati pāpaḥ pāpena*.

does not mean a deed or some invisible mystical force. It is a complexity of a very subtle matter which is supersensuous, and which pervades the whole world. The Jains believe it to be the result of actions arising out of four sources—(1) *karman* is attachment to worldly things, such as food, raiment, dwelling place, women etc.; (2) *karman* is produced by uniting one's body, mind, and speech to worldly things; (3) *karman* is engendered by giving reins to anger, pride, deceit or greed; and (4) false belief (*micchā-diṭṭhi*) is a fruitful source of *karman*. In Hinduism, we find that God awards the fruits of *karman*, whereas in Jainism, *karman* accumulates energy and automatically works itself out without any outside intervention. The Hindus think of *karman* as formless, while the Jains think of it as having form.

The Jains divide *karman* according to its nature, duration, essence and content. *Karman* is closely bound up with the soul. According to the Jains, there are eight kinds of *karman*. It is the deed of the soul. It is a material forming a subtle bond of extremely refined karmic matter which keeps the soul confined to its place of origin or the natural abode of full knowledge and everlasting peace. The first kind acts as an obstruction to right knowledge (*jñānāvaraṇīya-karman*). The second prevents us from beholding the true faith (*darśanāvaraṇīya-karman*). The third causes us to experience either the sweetness of happiness or the bitterness of misery (*vedanīya-karman*). The fourth leads to delusion (*mohanīya-karman*). It results from worldly attachments and indulgence of the passions. The fifth determines the length of time which a *jīva* must spend in the form with which its *karman* has endowed it (*āyuḥ-karman*). The sixth determines the name or individuality of the embodied soul (*nāma-karman*). There are many divisions of *nāma-karman*. The seventh is *gotra-karman*. It is the *gotra* or family name which determines a man's life, his occupation, the locality in which he may live, his marriage, his religious observances, and even his food. There are two main divisions of this *karman*. It decides whether a living being shall be born in a high-caste or low-caste family. The eighth and the last kind is the *antarāya-karman*, the *karman* which always stands as an obstacle e.g., *lābhāntarāya*, *bhogāntarāya*, *upabhogāntarāya* and *vīryāntarāya*.[1] It really prevents a person from entering the path leading to eternal bliss (*antarāya*).

1. *Uttarādhyayana*, XXXIII, 1-3.

The Jains hold that the soul, while on the first step (*mithyātva-guṇasthānaka*), is completely under the influence of *karman* and knows nothing of the truth. The soul, whirling round and round in the cycle of rebirth, loses some of its crudeness and attains the state which enables it to distinguish between what is false and what is true. A soul remains in an uncertain condition, one moment knowing the truth and the next doubting it. A man either through the influence of his past good deeds or by the teachings of his preceptor obtains true faith. He then realises the great importance of conduct, and can take the twelve vows. The Jains believe that as soon as a man reaches the stage of an *ayogikevalī-guṇasthānaka*, all his *karman* is purged away, and he proceeds at once to *mokṣa* as a liberated one.

Kriyā-vāda is nothing but *karma-vāda* or the doctrine of action.[1] Buddhism was also promulgated as a form of *kriyā-vāda* or *karma-vāda*. The Jaina *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*[2] speaks of various types of *kriyā-vāda* (doctrine of action) then current in India. According to Mahāvīra, *kriyā-vāda* of Jainism is distinguished from *a-kriyā-vāda* (doctrine of non-action), *ajñāna-vāda* (scepticism) and *vinaya-vāda* (formalism). To arrive at a correct interpretation of *kriyā-vāda* of Jainism, it is necessary not only to see how it has been distinguished from *a-kriyā-vāda*, *ajñāna-vāda* and *vinaya-vāda*, but also from other types of *kriyā-vāda*.

According to the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, the types of *a-kriyā-vāda* are as follows:

(1) On the dissolution of the five elements (i. e., earth, water, fire, air and space) living beings cease to exist. On the dissolution of the body, the individual ceases to be. Everybody has an individual soul. The soul exists as long as the body exists.

(2) When a man acts or causes another to act, it is not his soul (*ātman*) which acts or causes to act.[3]

(3) There are five elements, and the soul is a sixth substance. These six substances are imperishable.

(4) Pleasure, pain and final beatitude are not caused by the souls themselves, but the individual souls experience them.

1. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 12. 21.
2. Ed. P. L. Vaidya, Poona, 1928, I, 6. 27; I, 10. 17.
3. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 1, 1, 13; *Jaina Sūtras* (S. B. E.), II, 237 ff.

(5) The world has been created or is governed by the gods. It is produced from chaos.[1]

(6) The world is boundless and eternal.

All these views are reduced to four main types that correspond to those attributed in the *Pali Nikāyas* to four leading thinkers of the time, namely, atheism like that of Ajita, eternalism like that of Kātyāyana, absolutism like that of Kāśyapa, and fatalism like that of Gośāla. These may be described as follows :

(1) The *ātman* is a living individual, a biological entity. The self does not outlast the destruction of the body. With the body ends life. No soul exists apart from the body.

(2) The five substances, with the soul as the sixth, are not created directly or indirectly. They are without beginning and end. They are independent of a directing cause. They are eternal.

(3) From nothing comes nothing. All things have the *ātman*, self or ego for their cause and object. They are produced by the self ; they are manifested by the self ; they are intimately connected with the self ; and they are bound up in the self.

(4) One man admits action, and another man does not admit it. Both men are alike ; their case is the same, because they are actuated by the same force (i. e., by fate). It is their destiny that all beings come to have a body to undergo the vicissitudes of life and to experience pleasure and pain.

Each of these types stands as an example of *a-kriyā-vāda*, inasmuch as it fails to inspire moral and pious action, or to make an individual responsible for an action and its consequences.[2]

According to the *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, the inefficiency of knowledge is the real upshot of *ajñāna-vāda*. In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, the upholders of *ajñāna-vāda* are represented as those thinkers who, pretending to be clever, reason incoherently and do not get beyond the confusion of their ideas.[3] Inefficiency of knowledge is the real upshot of *ajñāna-vāda*.[4] *Vinaya-vāda* may be supposed to have been the same

1. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 1. 3. 5-8.
2. *Ibid.*, II, 1. 15-34.
3. *Ibid.*, I, 12. 2.
4. *Uttarādhyayana*, XVIII, 23.

doctrine which has been criticized as *sīlabbataparāmāsa*[1] in Buddhism. *Sīlabbataparāmāsa* is a view of those who hold that the purity of oneself may be reached through the observance of certain moral precepts or by means of keeping certain prescribed vows. The upholders of *vinaya-vāda* assert that the goal of religious life is realized by conformation to the rules of discipline.[2]

The types of *kriyā-vāda* that do not come up to the standard of Jainism are the following :

(1) The soul of a man who is holy will become free from bad *karman* on reaching beatitude, but in that state it will again become defiled through pleasant excitement or hatred.

(2) If a man, with the intention of killing a body, hurts a gourd, mistaking it for a baby, he will be guilty of murder.

According to Mahāvīra, the painful condition of the self is brought about by one's own action, and not by any other cause. Pleasure and pain are brought about by one's own action. Individually a man is born, individually he dies, individually he falls from the state of existence and individually he rises. This idea is similar to the Buddhist idea of rises and falls of beings as individuals according to their deeds. His passions, consciousness, intellect, perceptions and impressions belong to the individual exclusively. All living beings owe their present form of existence to their own *karman*. The sinners cannot annihilate works by new works, the pious annihilate their works by abstention from works.[3]

The Jaina doctrine of nine terms (*nava-tattva*) developed from the necessity for a systematic exposition of *kriyā-vāpa*. *Karman* consists of acts, intentional and unintentional, that produce effects on the nature of the soul. It must be admitted that the soul is susceptible to the influences of *karman*. The categories of merit and demerit comprehend all acts, good and bad, which keep the soul bound to the cycle of births and deaths. *Nirjarā*[4] consists in the wearing out of accumula-

1. Vide *Khuddakapāṭha*, p. 5 ; *Suttanipāta*, V, 231 ; *Vinaya*, I, 184 , *Majjhima*, I, p. 432 ; *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, p. 1005 ; *Aṅguttara*, III, 377 ; *Ibid.*, IV, 144 ff. ; *Mahāniddesa*, p. 98.
2. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 12. 4.
3. *Ibid.*, I, 12. 15.
4. *Uttarādhyayana*, XXVIII, 11 ; *Ibid.*, Lecture, II, 37 ; B. C. Law, *Mahāvīra : His Life and Teachings*, p. 92.

ted effects of *karman* on the soul by the practice of austerities and *mokṣa* which logically follows from *nirjarā* signifies final deliverance of the soul from the bondage of *karman*, the bondage of sin.

There are four kinds of destructive *karman* (*ghātiya-karman*) which retain the soul in mundane existence. They are as follows: (1) knowledge-obscuring *karman*; (2) faith-obscuring *karman*; (3) *karman* which obstructs the progress of the soul, and (4) *karman* which deludes the soul.[1]

In short, Mahāvīra's great message to mankind is that *karman* is everything; and on the destruction of *karman* future happiness depends. *Karman* is the deed of the soul. It is a material forming a subtle bond of extremely refined karmic matter which keeps the soul confined to its place of origin or the natural abode of full knowledge and everlasting peace. Jainism, as a practical religion, teaches us to purge ourselves of impurities arising from *karman*. Thus *karman* plays an important part in Jaina metaphysics.

III. The Soul

The soul is a unity. It is a single substance and is the substratum of all experience. The unifying principle of experience is the soul itself. The soul creates its own substratum which cannot exist apart from the soul. It is self-conscious.

It is interesting to record here the views of the ancient Indians regarding the soul. In the *Ṛgveda*[2] the soul of man, apparently unconscious, is invited to come back to him from the trees, herbs, the sky, the sun etc. It is described as being separable from his body and subject to suffering and enjoyment in another world according to his good or bad deeds. According to the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*[3] the soul does not die. A soul in the pre-Buddhistic Upaniṣads is supposed to exist inside each human body. In the living body in its ordinary state the soul dwells in a cavity in the heart.[4] The soul is like smoke, coloured wool, flash of lightning,[5] flame, white lotus etc. When it returns to the body, life and motion reappear. It escapes from the body at death and then continues to carry on an everlasting life of its own.[6] There are passages in the

1. *Ibid*., p. 104
2. X. 58.
3. VI. 11.
4. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV, 3. 7; V, 6; *Chāndogya*, VIII. 3.3; *Taittirīya*, I, 6. 1.
5. Cf. Avicenna's poem on the soul.
6. Cf. J. R. A. S., 1899.

Upaniṣads which suppose the soul to have existed before birth in some other body.[1] There is almost entire unanimity of opinion in the *Upaniṣads* that the soul will not obtain release from rebirth either by the performance of sacrifice in this birth or by the practice of penance.

According to the *Śrīmad-bhagavad-gītā* the soul is indestructible[2]. It is immeasurable[3]. It is unborn, eternal, permanent and old. If the body is lost, the soul is not lost[4]. The soul enters into a new body after leaving the old body[5]. It is all-pervading, firm, immovable and perpetual.[6] It is indescribable, unthinkable and unchangeable.[7]

As regards the exact nature of soul there are different views. The *Nyāya* calls it absolutely qualityless and characterless, indeterminate, unconscious entity. The *Sāṁkhya* describes it as being of the nature of pure consciousness. According to the *Vedānta* it is that fundamental point of unity implied in pure consciousness, pure bliss and pure being. The *Mīmāṁsā* has to accept the existence of soul. All of them agree that the soul is pure and unsullied in its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do not form a real part of it. When all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self is perfectly understood and other extraneous connections with it are absolutely dissociated, the highest good of life is attained.[8]

The Hindus believe in rebirth through the transmigration of soul from one body to another. The Upaniṣadic idea of transmigration of the soul has been illustrated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* by the simile of a grass-leech (*tṛṇa-jalaukā*) which passes from the end of one blade of grass to that of another. But this analogy has been found to be untenable by the *Bheda-saṁhitā*.

In early Buddhism the soul is feeling, happy, painful or neutral.[9] The soul after death is not subject to decay and is conscious. It has form, is formless, finite, infinite, both or neither. It has one mode of consciousness, various modes of consciousness, infinite consciousness.

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, III, 2.13; IV, 4. 6; Cf. *Aitareya-āraṇyaka*, II, 3. 2.
2. II, v. 19; Cf. II, vs. 17 and 30.
3. II, v. 18.
4. II, v. 20.
5. II, v. 22.
6. II, vs. 23-24.
7. II, v. 25.
8. Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 75.
9. *Digha*, II, 66 ff.

It is altogether happy, altogether miserable, is both or is neither.[1] The Buddha denies the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body or the reverse.[2] The soul and body are not the same. The soul is neither reborn nor dissolved like *nirvāṇa*. It is permanent, unchangeable and unaffected by sorrow. As pointed out in the *Milindapañha* there is no such thing as the soul.[3] Transmigration is defined in the following manner:[4] A being born here, dies here. Having died here he is reborn elsewhere. Having been born there, he dies there. Having died there he is reborn elsewhere. This is what is meant by transmigration. In early Buddhism there cannot be any such process as transmigration in the usual sense of the term. In Mahāyāna Buddhism the existence of the soul is denied. The non-Śautrāntika and the non-Vaibhāṣika schools of Buddhism of early times agreed with the Theravāda Buddhists in denying the existence of a permanent soul and a permanent external world. A soul is in reality a bundle of elements or forces (*saṁskāra-samūha*) and a stream of thought (*santāna*). It contains nothing permanent or substantial; it is *anātma* or soulless.[5] Buddhism does not see the necessity of accepting a permanent soul, because it believes that the *khandhas* or the constituent elements are always changing and that the mental state is also changing with them.[6] In fact the Buddha denies that there exists anything equivalent to that which in other systems is called the soul.

In Jainism everybody has an individual soul. These souls exist as long as the bodies exist but after death they are no more. There are no souls which are born again. Souls and substances do not undergo any change. They are liable to changes due to changes in circumstances. The plurality of souls is a point in Jain philosophy which is the same as in the Sāṁkhya system. Both the systems necessitate a careful consideration of the cosmical, biological, embryological, physical, mental and moral positions of the living individuals of the world as a whole. These constitute the scientific background of the two systems of thought. These also constitute the scientific

1. *Ibid.*, I, p. 31.
2. *Saṁyutta*, II, 75 ff.; III, 135.
3. *Milindapañha*, p. 55-57.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
5. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 8.
6. Yamakami Sogen, *Systems of Buddhistic Thought*, p. 133.

background of Vedānta and Buddhism. The Jain belief is a belief in the transmigration of the soul, a point in which it differs from the Buddhistic conception of rebirth without any transmigration of the soul from embodiment to embodiment. In Jain philosophy a cosmographical gradation of beings was followed more or less in agreement with those adopted in other systems. The soul in Jain philosophy as in most of the Indian systems is the factor which polarizes the field of matter and brings about the organic combination of the element of existence with consciousness as its fundamental attribute. The soul is imperishable and eternal by its very nature. It is one of the six substances. It is susceptible to the influences of *karman* which consists of acts that produce effects on the nature of the soul.

THE VIŚEṢA AND THE A-VIŚEṢA

DR S. BHATTACHARYA

The Problem

Like other systems of Indian Philosophy, the Sāṁkhya has introduced, in its prolonged career over one and a half millennia, a host of technical terms to give precision to its special ideas. Prakṛti, Prakṛti-vikṛti, Vikṛti, Bhūtādi, A-śakti, Tuṣṭi, Viśeṣa, A-viśeṣa are a few examples on this point. The present article is addressed to the examination of the last two terms, Viśeṣa and A-viśeṣa.

The special reason for this examination may be stated thus:

The Sāṁkhya-kārikā 38 *defines* the two terms as follows:—

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः, तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।
एते स्मृताः विशेषाः, शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥

The Tanmātras (five subtle elements) are said to be A-viśeṣas while the Bhūtas (five gross elements) emanating from the Tanmātras are known to be Viśeṣas. The Bhūtas are called Viśeṣas because they give rise to three types of experience (to three types of people): experience of happiness, experience of sorrow and experience of despair.

In Kārikā 39, the Sāṁkhya-kārikā *classifies* Viśeṣas in the following terms:

सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सह प्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।

Viśeṣas are threefold: (i) sūkṣma, the subtle (which the commentator Vācaspati equates with the subtle body), (ii) the gross body contributed by the parents and (iii) the Bhūtas, the five gross elements.

The Sāṁkhya-kārikā 40 *details* the subtle body referred to in Kārikā 39 as *mahadādi-sūkṣma-paryantam.* Vācaspati *elaborates*[1] this phrase to mean Mahat, Ahaṁkāra, the eleven organs (five sense organs, five action organs and the mind) and the five Tanmātras—eighteen categories in all.

The three Kārikās (38, 39, 40) referred to above, when read together, give rise to difficulties: If the term Viśeṣa is confined to the Bhūtas (the five gross elements) as stated by Kārikā 38, how in the very next

1. महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्—महदहङ्कारैकादशेन्द्रियपञ्चतन्मात्रपर्यन्तम् ।
—Vācaspati on the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* 40.

Kārikā (i.e., Kārikā 39) could the same term (Viśeṣa) go beyond the five gross elements to embrace the subtle and the gross bodies as well? Then, if the subtle body includes the Tanmātras (which are A-viśeṣas) as proposed in Kārikā 40, how could the subtle body be regarded as a kind of Viśeṣa as done in Kārikā 39? If in the light of Vācaspati[1] it be contended that in spite of the Tanmātras the subtle body may still be looked upon as a Viśeṣa inasmuch as the subtle body incorporates as many as eleven sense organs which (judged by the criterion of producing three types of experience) are Viśeṣas, then why should the subtle body be not called A-viśeṣa for the presence of the Tanmātras (which are A-viśeṣas) therein? Further, why should the gross body be taken as a Viṣeśa? True, that the gross body has emerged from the Bhūtas, the Viśeṣas. It is also conceded that the Sāṁkhya recognizes identity between the cause and the effect. But if on this ground the gross body acquires the designation of Viśeṣa, then why not the rest of elemental creation be likewise called Viśeṣa? Why should Kārikā 39 while classifying Viśeṣa remain silent over this issue?

An Approach to the Problem from Sāṁkhya Viewpoint

I

In face of vagaries over Viśeṣa and A-viśeṣa, it must be recognized that these two terms, among others, were a part of established tradition. The Mahābhārata,[2] for instance, mentions the Bhūtas by the term Viśeṣa:

अव्यक्तं बुद्ध्यहंकारो मनो बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि च ।
तन्मात्राणि विशेषाश्च तस्मै तत्त्वात्मने नमः ॥

The Viṣṇu-purāṇa[3], on the other hand, not only mentions the Tanmātras as A-viśeṣa but also justifies the nomenclature along the lines of the Sāṁkhya-kārikā:

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाणि अविशेषास्ततो हि ते ।
न शान्ता नापि घोराश्च न मूढाश्चाविशेषिणः ॥

1. सूक्ष्मं शरीरं शान्तघोरमूढैरिन्द्रियैरन्वितत्वाद्विशेषः ।
—Vācaspati on Kārikā 40.
2. The Mahābhārata 12. 46. 88, Haridasa Siddhantavagisa's edn.
3. Quoted by Vijñānabhikṣu under *Yoga-sūtra* 2. 19.

The traditional interpretation of the two terms Viśeṣa and A-viśeṣa may therefore be restated as follows :

Although the five subtle elements and the five gross elements are equally made of three guṇas in so far as both are offshoots of tripartite Prakṛti, out of which all creation gross as well as subtle has come into existence, yet the five gross elements differ from the subtle elements in one important respect. While the five subtle elements *do not*, the five gross elements *do* give rise, as already suggested above, to three types of experience to three types of ordinary persons. Ākāśa, for instance, is a pleasure for one who escapes congestion ; is painful in unkind weather ; is a sheer despair to a straggling soul. So with other elements.[1] Such varying experiences are brought about by the five gross elements in so far as the elements have differentiated themselves to make such experience possible. The five subtle elements are not so differentiated. To the extraordinary perception of the *Yogin* the three guṇas constituting the subtle elements might yield their individual mysteries of pleasure, pain and despair. But to the *ordinary* observer the five subtle elements are unresponsive. So, from the *ordinary* standpoint the threefold experience is limited to the gross elements which are differentiated. This is how Vācaspati would interpret[2] the distinction between Viśeṣa and A-viśeṣa, laid down in the Kārikā 38, in the light of *ordinary* experience.

Gauḍapāda[3] in his Bhāṣya on the Sāṁkhya-kārikā and Māṭhara[4] in the wake of Gauḍapāda at his Vṛtti on the same text have interpreted the textual passage on the distinction between Viśeṣa and A-viśeṣa in a different way. According to them, the Tanmātras are marked by the predominence of sattva with rajas and tamas reduced to their barest minimum. Thus the Tanmātras provide for unalloyed joy. Gods are associated with the Tanmātras and so with unalloyed

1. आकाशं कस्यचिदनवकाशादन्तर्गृहादेः निर्गतस्य सुखात्मकं शान्तं भवति ; तदेव शीतोष्ण-वातवर्षाभिभूतस्य दुःखात्मकं घोरं भवति; तदेव पन्थानं गच्छतो वनमार्गाद् भ्रष्टस्य दिङ्मोहान् मूढं भवति । एवं वायुतेजःप्रभृतिषु द्रष्टव्यम् ।
—Gauḍa-pāda on Kārikā 38.

2. तन्मात्राणि त्वस्मदादिभिः परस्परव्यावृत्तानि नाऽनुभूयन्ते इत्यविशेषा सूक्ष्मा इति चोच्यन्ते ।
– Vācaspati on Kārikā 38.

3. विशेषाः मानुषाणां विषयाः ।
—Gauḍa-pāda on Kārikā 38.

4. देवानां तन्मात्राणि सुखलक्षणा विषयाः, तत्रापि रजस्तमसी स्तः किन्तु तत्र सत्त्वमुत्कटत्वेन वर्तते तस्मादविशेषा इत्युच्यन्ते ।
—Māṭhara on Kārikā 38.

joy. While gods derive pleasure from the Tanmātras, ordinary men are subjected to three types of varying experience from the Bhūtas. The Tanmātras are called A-viśeṣas because they provide pleasurable experience for the gods, unadultered by sorrow and despair. The Bhūtas are Viśeṣas because the experience of ordinary men are polluted by sorrow and despair.

The above view of Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara that the gods are associated with the Tanmātras finds support from the Bhāṣya[1] of Vyāsa on the Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali. Vyāsa interprets the term "videha" occuring in the Sūtra I. 19 as "gods." Vacaspati justifies[2] this interpretation on the ground that gods are the individual souls that look upon the Tanmātras and the five gross elements as their own selves. If we adopt the above justification of Vācaspati, still the gods are superior to ordinary human beings in that while the ordinary human beings falsely think the gross body as their soul the gods do not suffer from such delusion. So the gods are 'videhas' because they are rid of misconception of the gross form as the soul.

But the view of Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara that the Tanmātras are characterized by the prominence of sattva is unwarranted. At the stage of Tanmātra creation, the category of Ahaṁkāra from which the Tanmātras emanate is said[3] to be marked by the dead weight of tamas so that the inert matter viz., Tanmātras (as distinguished from the organs which reveal or embrace objects) could be brought into existence. Such Tanmātras therefore inherit the prominence of tamas from Ahaṁkāra. How can they be conceived, as Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara do, to be giving rise to pleasure alone in exclusion of sorrow and despair ? If gods enjoy happiness such happiness may at best be construed as cessation of sorrow that attend the gross body.

The Yukti-dīpikā, the anonymous commentary on the Sāṁkhya-kārikā, unfolds[4] the concept of "tanmātra" in a way that throws new light on the designation of the Tanmātras as A-viśeṣas : Why is the Śabda-tanmātra so called ?—the Yuktidīpikā asks itself. It then proposes its own answer : The Śabda-tanmātra or the sound-potential is

1. विदेहानां देवानां—Vyāsa on Y. S. I. 19.
2. इन्द्रियेषु भूतेषु वा लीनाः ···षाट्कौषिकशरीररहिताः विदेहाः ।
—Vacaspati on the Bhāṣya on Y.S. I. 19.
3. भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसः ······ Karika 25.
4, तस्य तस्य गुणस्य सामान्यमेवात्र न विशेष इति तन्मात्रेस्वेतेऽविशेषाः ।
—Yukti-dīpikā on Kārikā 38,

so called because it is *just* sound without being differentiated into varying pitches viz., udātta, anudātta and svarita. Thus marked by the absence of differentiation (viśeṣa) it is called A-viśeṣa. It therefore follows that the five gross elements are Viśeṣás because they have such differentiations comprehensible by the common man.

It would appear from the discussions by different commentators of the Sāṁkhya-kārikā that they all agree that the Tanmātras are undifferentiated while the Bhūtas are differentiated and hence they have acquired the designations of A-viśeṣa and Viśeṣa respectively. Although in the light of Sāṁkhya evolution the cause being undifferentiated in comparison with its effect Ahaṁkāra may likewise be called A-viśeṣa and the Tanmātras Viśeṣa because Ahaṁkāra produces the Tanmātras, yet the two terms A-viśeṣa and Viśeṣa are confined by *convention* to the Tanmātras and the Bhūtas respectively. Such convention seems to have been suggested by the Sāṁkhya-kārikā 38 which specifically mentions the Tanmātras as A-viśeṣas and the Bhūtas as Viśeṣas. But why should the same Kārikā describe the Bhūtas as *śānta*, *ghora* and *mūḍha*, i.e., producing pleasure, sorrow and delusion ? Prima facie these characteristics are common to the three guṇas and therefore to all their evolutes from Mahat to the Bhūtas. Why should the Bhūtas alone be described like that ? Vācaspati's answer is given above : The guṇas are felt to be so by ordinary experience only when they manifest themselves as Bhūtas, the five gross elements. Viśeṣas therefore, according to Vācaspati, are those responsible for the experience of pleasure, sorrow or delusion by the common man. Judged by this criterion, the eleven organs also may be looked upon as Viśeṣas in so far as the sense organs are also responsible for the occurrence of the experience of pleasure, pain and despair. But would not this view militate against the position so far accepted that the term Viśeṣa should be confined, as seems to have been done by the Sāṁkhya-kārikā 38, to the Bhūtas only ?

Let us then conclude that (i) by *convention* the term Viśeṣa is confined to the Bhūtas, the five gross elements ; that (ii) they are so called because the three guṇas are so manifested in the shape of the five gross elements that even an *ordinary* person can grasp three types of experience from them ; and that (iii) the Tanmātras, the five subtle elements, do not represent such manifestation of the three guṇas as to

fall within the reach of man in the same way and therefore the five Tanmātras are called A-viśeṣas.

II

Recapitulation of the Kārikā 38 and the Kārikā 39 yields the following results: (1) the term A-viśeṣa refers to the Tanmātras, the five subtle elements; (2) the term Viśeṣa refers to the Bhūtas, the five gross elements; (3) the Viśeṣas are produced from the A-viśeṣas; and (4) the Viśeṣas are threefold (i) the subtle body, (ii) the gross body and (iii) the five gross elements.

The interrelation between the third and the fourth points drives us to the conclusion that the subtle body, a type of Viśeṣa, has to be taken to have been produced from the Tanmātras, the A-viśeṣas. But is not this position just the reverse of the accepted Sāṁkhya view that the Tanmātras have emerged from Ahaṁkāra, one of the constituents of the subtle body? Moreover, how can the Tanmātras, another constituent of the subtle body, produce themselves?

It is a pleasant surprise that Māṭhara[1] in his commentary on the Sāṁkhya-kārikā should have come upon the position that at the beginning of creation the subtle bodies of the three worlds were created by the Tanmātras. Śrīdhara[2] in his commentary on the Śrīmad-Bhāgavata offers further details on this issue: On the basis of the such Upaniṣads which state that the element of ether was the first to emerge from Brahman, then came the element of wind from the element of ether etc., it has to be conceded that the five elements were the first to emerge in the order of creation. From the five elements in their un-amalgamated stage (*a-pañcīkṛta*) came into existence the entire gamut of the subtle body starting from "Prāṇa". When on the other hand, the five elements were quintuplicated (*pañcīkṛta*), they gave rise to the cosmic mass (*brahmāṇḍa*).

Śrīdhara thus contemplates the Tanmātras in two different states—pure and mixed. In their pure state, the Tanmātras give rise

1. तत्र सूक्ष्मास्तावत् पञ्चतन्मात्रकाः; तैरेवादिसर्गे सूक्ष्मशरीराणि त्रयाणामपि लोकानां प्रारब्धानि— Māṭhara on Karikā 39. cf. Gauḍa-pāda, ibid.

2. तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूत इत्यादिश्रुतेरन्नमयं हि सौम्य मन इत्यादिश्रुतेश्च प्रथमं भूतानि जायन्ते, तेभ्यश्च अपञ्चीकृतेभ्यः प्राणादिक्रमेण समष्ट्यात्मकं लिङ्गशरीरम्, पञ्चीकृतेभ्यश्च ब्रह्माण्डमिति प्रक्रिया।

—Śrīdhara on the Śrīmad-Bhāgavata II. 24. 7.

to the subtle body while in their mixed state they are transformed into five gross elements to create the cosmic mass out of which the different worlds are born. Śrīdhara thus equates the Sāṁkhya Tanmātras with the quintuplicated five elements. In the light of the statement of the Upaniṣads, if one reserves the word "Bhūta" for the pure elements and the word "Tanmātra" for the mixed elements, then we have the Bhūtas and the Tanmātras, representing the pure and the impure elements. The Praśna-Upaniṣad[1] has recognized this position as can be evinced from its statement: The earth element and the earth-Tanmātra, water element and the water-Tanmātra etc. The Mahābhārata[2] also holds the same view when it counts the five elements under cause and the five Tanmātras under effect. To Nīlakaṇṭha[3], however, this early significance of the Bhūtas and the Tanmātras was lost. He therefore interprets the Mahābhārata passage in such a way as to fit in with the apparent position of the Sāṁkhya-kārikā.

One might therefore conclude that the pure Tanmātras brought about the subtle body while being mixed they were transformed into the five gross elements which eventually resolved into the physical worlds. This is how the subtle body may be regarded as a Viśeṣa to have emerged from A-viśeṣas, the (pure) Tanmātras. Although the Sāṁkhya system as represented in the Sāṁkhya-kārikā describes the creation of Mahat directly from Prakṛti, yet in the light of the above position one might opine that Prakṛti had directly produced the pure Tanmātras and they in their turn produced Mahat. Such suggestion is supported by the Yukti-dīpikā which records[4] a view of the emergence of a category called "A-nirdeśya" between Prakṛti and Mahat. One cannot miss the close affinity between the two terms "A-nirdeśya" and "A-viśeṣa". While the Sāṁkhya-kārikā remodelled the Sāṁkhya view so that this "Anirdeśya" was obliterated, this category could still be traced in the classification of Viśeṣa into three types including the subtle body. The position of pure Tanmātras as the source of the

1. पृथिवी च पृथिविमात्राश्च आपश्च अपोमात्राश्च—etc. P.U. 4. 8.
2. अष्टौ प्रकृतयः प्रोक्ताः ......
अव्यक्तं च महांश्चैव तथाहंकार एव च।
पृथिवी वायुराकाशमापो ज्योतिश्च पञ्चमम् ॥—M.B. 12.298. 10-11.
3. पृथिव्यादिपदैस्तन्मात्राण्युच्यन्ते प्रकृतिशब्दितत्वात्—Nīlakaṇṭha on M.B. 12. 298. 11.
4. केचिदाहुः—प्रधानादनिर्देश्यस्वरूपं तत्त्वान्तरमुत्पद्यते, ततो महान् इति।
—Yukti-dipikā p. 108, Calcutta Sanskrit Series XXIII.

subtle body leads us to far greater conclusion. It shows how the early Sāṁkhya could thus be legitimately regarded to have been based on the Upaniṣads. In fact, Bādarāyaṇa's attitude[1] towards the Sāṁkhya thought as the main opponent reflects the truth that he wanted to oust Sāṁkhya thought from the purview of the Upaniṣads so that Vedānta thought might be looked upon as the only interpretation of the Upaniṣads.

We have noted above that Śrīdhara has started the description of the subtle body with "Prāṇa". Indeed, Śrīdhara bases his view on the Śrīmad-bhāgavata which speaks[2] of the emergence of the great life from the element of ether. Such "Prāṇa", the starting point of the subtle body, may therefore be equated with the category of Mahat. As the evolutes of the great life (which is Mahat) Ahaṁkāra and Manas may similarly be called "Prāṇas". This is suggested by the Sāṁkhya-kārikā which considers[3] the five vital airs to be the characteristics of the internal organs consisting of Mahat, Ahaṁkāra and Manas. The eight "Prāṇas" viz., Mahat, Ahaṁkāra and Manas and the five vital airs constitute, according to the Yukti-dīpikā,[4] the subtle body. According to Māṭhara,[5] on the other hand, the subtle body is made of the three internal organs and the ten external organs—thirteen in all. The common feature of both Māṭhara and the Yukti-dīpikā is that they eliminate the five Tanmātras from the purview of the subtle body. Gauḍapāda[6] on the other hand conceives the subtle body to consist of three internal organs and the five Tanmātras only. The Sāṁkhya-kārikā, as understood by Vācaspati, forges[7] a compromise by including all the thirteen organs and the five subtle elements under the subtle body.

But should Māṭhara and the Yukti-dīpikā eliminate the five subtle elements from the constituents of the subtle body ? Probably,

1. Everywhere in the Brahma-sūtra the Sāṁkhya view first comes under fire.
2. अन्तःशरीर आकाशात् पुरुषस्य विचेष्टतः ।
ओजः सहो बलं जज्ञे ततः प्राणो महानसुः ॥ 2. 10. 15.
3. सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च । Kārikā 29.
4. महदादीत्यनेन प्राणाष्टकं परिगृह्णाति·····सूक्ष्माः = चेष्टाश्रितं प्राणाष्टकम् ।
—Yukti-dīpikā pp. 145, 148.
5. सूक्ष्मशरीरं त्रयोदशकरणाख्यम् ।—Māṭhara, Kārikā 41.
6. महदादि = बुद्धिरहंकारो मन इतिः पञ्चतन्मात्राणि = सूक्ष्माः ।
—Gauḍa-pāda on Kārikā 40
7. महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्—Kārikā 40.

to accommodate the Sāṁkhya-kārikā no. 41 which speaks of the subtle body (liṅga) to subsist in the A-viśeṣas which, as we have already noticed, are no other than the five Tanmātras. To provide for such relationship (*āśrayā'śrayi-bhāva*) between the subtle body the Tanmātras, the latter had to be taken out. But it is difficult to see how Gauḍapāda who takes the five subtle elements to constitute the subtle body would interpret this Kārikā. How can the same Tanmātras be the shelter of their own selves? Perhaps Gauḍapāda was aware of this inconsistency. That is why he reads[1] the Kārikā as "*vinā viśeṣaiḥ*" and interprets the Kārikā to mean that without the gross body (viśeṣa) the subtle body hangs in the air.[2]

Now why should the gross body be called Viśeṣa as the Sāṁkhya-kārikā has done? The gross body which has emerged from the five gross elements which themselves are Viśeṣas should not be counted under Viśeṣas. Otherwise, all creation that has come out of the five gross elements should have been likewise Viśeṣas. But they are not. It may be suggested in answer that the five gross elements out of which the gross body has come into existence are nothing but the five Tanmātras quintuplicated. So the gross body may be called Viśeṣa inasmuch as it emerges from the quintuplicated five Tanmātras which are A-viśeṣas. The products of A-viśeṣas are Viśeṣas. From this standpoint the gross body may be looked upon as Viśeṣa. It may be noticed here that the Bhāgavata has used[3] the term Viśeṣa for the cosmic mass (brahmāṇḍa), the sprout of gross creation, to emerge first from the five gross elements.

It has been stated above that the special feature of the Viśeṣa is that it conduces to the experience of pleasure, sorrow or despair. Gauḍapāda has described[4] how the three types of Viśeṣa viz., the subtle body, (i.e., the three internal organs and the five Tanmātras, according to him), the gross body (the contribution of the parents) and the five gross elements mutually cooperate to bring about that

1. विनाऽविशेषैः ··· अथ विशेष-भूतान्युच्यन्ते······Gauḍa-pāda on Kārikā 41.
2. वैशेषिणा शरीरेण विना क्व लिङ्गस्यानं चेति—Gauḍa-pāda on Kārikā 41.
3. एतदण्डं विशेषाख्यम्—B.P. 3. 26. 53.
4. मातापितृजा···सूक्ष्मशरीरस्योपचयं कुर्वन्ति···शिरःप्रभृतिषाट्कौषिकं रुधिरादि······ संभृतमाकाशोऽवकाशदानाद् वायुः वर्धनात् तेजः पाकात् आपः संग्रहात् पृथिवी धारणात् समस्तावयवोपेतं मातुरुदरात् बहिः—Gauḍa-pāda on Kārikā 39.

experience. The subtle body is strengthened by the gross form generated by the parents in the mother's womb. Finally comes the hour when that gross form emerges into the world from the womb. The five elements are then ready to receive the new-comer. The element of ether provides space for it; the element of air nourishes it; the element of fire looks after its digestive system; the element of water makes for its cohesion and the element of earth gives it a footing. In this congenial atmosphere, with a physical body fitted with internal and external organs, the new-comer is now ready to experience pleasure, pain or despair.

The Yukti-dīpikā conceives[1] the three types of Viśeṣa in a different way. As already stated, by the first type of Viśeṣa (viz., *sūkṣma*) it understands the subtle body constituted of eightfold life. By the term "*mātā-pitṛja*" it takes the *jarāyuja* and *aṇḍaja* whereas by the term "*prabhūta*" it takes *udbhijja* and *svedaja*. So the four types of physical form (*bhūta-sarga*) are brought into the world, charged with life, to experience pleasure, pain or despair. The Yukti-dīpikā does not speak of the external sense organs in this context, which also help in generating this experience. It may be presumed that the Yukti-dīpikā might have looked upon them, in the light of the earlier Upaniṣads like Chāndogya[2] and Bṛhadāraṇyaka[3], as "*prāṇa*" and so have included them under the subtle body. So, the gross body strengthened with life and the sense organs is now ready for worldly pleasure, pain or dispair.

It would appear that the truncated notion of the subtle body as proposed by Gauḍapāda, Māṭhara or the Yukti-dīpikā would militate against the express view of the Sāṁkhya-kārikā that the subtle body consists of the categories from Mahat to the five Tanmātras. Yet the statement of the Sāṁkhya-kārikā that the Viśeṣas (i. e., the Tanmātras) are the basis of the "*liṅga*" (i. e., rest of the subtle body) can still be maintained. Although Tanmātras are as much material as the organs both internal and external in that all of them have emerged from the primordial matter viz, Pradhāna or Prakṛti, yet the Tanmātras are the

1. सूक्ष्माः = चेष्टाश्रितं प्राणाष्टक···मातापितृजाः जरायुजा अण्डजाश्च···प्रभूताः = उद्भिज्जा स्वेदजाश्च । एतैस्त्रिभिः विशेषैः देव-मानवतैर्यग्योनिलक्षणः त्रिविधः भूतसर्गः आरभ्यते ।
—Yukti-dīpikā p. 143.

2. ते ह प्राणाः प्रजापतिं पितरमेत्योचुः—Ch. U. 5. I. 7.

3. ते ह इमे प्राणा अहंश्रेयसे विवदमानाः ब्रह्म जग्मुः—B.U. 6. I. 7.

physical foundation of the organs internal as well as external, all of which are psychical. If on the other hand we read Kārikā 41 as "*vinā viśeṣaiḥ*" the explanation becomes comparative simple. For then, we can interpret the Kārikā to mean that the gross body (*viśeṣa*) is the foundation of the subtle body which subsists in the gross body. So we can say with Gauḍapāda that Kārikā 41 may be read in both ways "*vinā'aviśeṣaiḥ*" and "*vinā viśeṣaiḥ*".

It would also appear that the term "*viśeṣa*" may be reserved for the five gross elements. Yet the subtle body as well as the gross body may come under the term by extension of its meaning. In other words, the term Viśeṣa primarily means the five gross elements. But it may secondarily mean the subtle body and the gross body as well. If the special characteristic of the five gross elements is to produce the knowledge of pleasure, pain or despair, then the subtle body as well as the gross body *do* possess this special characteristic. For the organs are the instruments for the realization of such experience in the physical form i. e., the gross body. Without the organs or the gross body such experience is not possible. Hence as the conditions of the worldly experience which goes under the name of '*bhoga*' both the subtle body as well the gross body may be designated as Viśeṣa like the five gross elements.

An Approach to the Problem from the Yoga Viewpoint

Patañjali has classified[1] the categories under four names—Viśeṣa, A-viśeṣa, Liṅga and A-liṅga. Vyāsa in his Yoga-bhāṣya[2] takes the term Viśeṣa to mean the sixteen categories—eleven organs and the five gross elements. This evidently shows that Patañjali equates Viśeṣa with Vikṛti of the Sāṁkya system. According to Vyāsa, again, A-viśeṣa means Ahaṁkāra and the five subtle elements (i. e., the five Tanmātras). By the term Liṅga, Vyāsa understands Mahat, Buddhi or Citta. Lastly, A-liṅga refers, according to him, to Pradhāna or Prakṛti.

It appears that Patañjali starts with the concept of Viśeṣa or Vikṛti. In so far as Ahaṁkāra and the five Tanmātras directly bring

1. विशेषाविशेषलिङ्गमात्रालिङ्गानि गुणपर्वाणि—Y. S. 2. 19.
2. भूतानि···तन्मात्राणां विशेषाः, तथा बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि कर्मेन्द्रियाणि···मनः अस्मितालक्षणस्य ···विशेषाः गुणानामेष षोडशको विशेषपरिणामः षडविशेषाः···शब्दादयः पञ्च अविशेषाः षष्ठश्च···अस्मितामात्रः ···लिङ्गमात्रम् महत्तत्त्वं···अलिङ्गं प्रधानम्—

Vyāsa on Y. S. 2. 19.

about the elēven organs and the five gross elements respectively therefore he restricts the term A-viśeṣa to Ahaṁkāra and the five Tanmātras, thus eliminating Mahat and Pradhāna from its purview. That Patañjali has started from Viśeṣa is suggested in the interpretation of the term A-viśeṣa by Vijñānabhikṣu. He takes[1] the term A-viśeṣa to mean "general" (sāmānya) as against Viśeṣa which means "particular". Vācaspati also defines[2] A-viśeṣa as the cause of the sixteen Vikṛtis (i. e., the eleven organs and the five gross elements). One might of course argue, on the basis of the relationship of cause and effect, that Mahat might be called both A-viśeṣa and Viśeṣa in relation to Ahaṁkāra and Pradhāna respectively. Mahat is admittedly the cause of Ahaṁkāra and the effect of Pradhāna. Yet as pointed out by the commentators[3] of the Yoga-bhāṣya, the two terms A-viśeṣa and Viśeṣa technically mean the six (i. e., Ahaṁkāra and the Tanmātras) and the sixteen (eleven organs and five gross elements) respectively. It may be pointed out here that the Yukti-dīpikā refers[4] to an ancient view under the name of Vindhyavāsa, which also considers Ahaṁkāra and the five Tanmātras as the six A-viśeṣas. This suggests that the term A-viśeṣa had acquired the technical connotation quite early and therefore should not be considered to have been the special privilege of the Yoga system. The term "liṅga" in the Sāṁkya-kārikā suggests that "liṅga" in the sense of Buddhi was prevalant also in Sāṁkhya thought. The term A-liṅga, however, does not seem to have been mentioned by the Sāṁkhya.

Vyāsa in his Bhāṣya conceives[6] Mahat as the first manifestation from the Unmanifest (i.e., A-vyakta or Prakṛti). But why should Mahat be called liṅga both by the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga? The commentary Bhāsvatī suggests[7] that Mahat is so called because it is

1. अविशेषत्वं च सामान्यत्वम्—Vijñānabhikṣu on Y. S. 2. 19.
2. विकारहेतुत्वं चाविशेषत्वम्—Vācaspati on Y.S. 2. 19.
3. तन्मात्रपञ्चकमस्मिता चेति षट् पदार्था अविशेषा इत्यस्मिन् शास्त्रे परिभाषिताः। तथा च ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि कर्मेन्द्रियाणि सङ्कल्पकं मनः पञ्चभूतानि चेति षोडश विशेषाः—Bhasvatī on Y.S. 2. 19.
4. अविशेष-शब्दः पङ्कजादिशब्दवत् योगरूढः षट्स्वेव—Vijñānabhikṣu on Y.S. 2. 19.
5. महतः षड् अविशेषा सृज्यन्ते पञ्चतन्मात्राण्यहंकारश्चेति विन्ध्यवासः—Yukti-dīpikā p. 108.
6. एते सत्ता-मात्रस्य आत्मन महतः षड् अविशेष-परिणामाः—Vyāsa on Y. S. 2. 19.
7. लिङ्गमात्रम्…पुंप्रधानयोर्ज्ञापकम्—Bhāsvatī on Y.S. 2.19.

the sign on the basis of which we can infer the soul as well as Prakṛti. Prakṛti incapable of doing this is therefore A-liṅga. Vijñānabhikṣu, on the other hand, opines[1] that Mahat is Liṅga because it is the original seed out of which the entire creation is manifested. As the precursor of this seed, Prakṛti is A-liṅga.

Conclusion

According to the Sāṁkhya, the term Viśeṣa refers to the five gross elements, and A-viśeṣa to the five subtle elements. The term Viśeṣa may be extended to cover the subtle and the gross bodies on the ground that both these bodies are as much necessary as the five gross elements in the realization of three distinct types of experience viz., pleasure, pain and despair. *According to the Yoga,* Viśeṣa means the eleven organs (viz., five sense organs, five action organs and the mind) and also five gross elements. A-viśeṣa consists of Ahaṁkāra and the five Tanmātras.

Thus Viśeṣa of the Yoga includes eleven organs besides the five gross elements, the Viśeṣas of the Sāṁkhya. The A-viśeṣa of the Yoga incorporates Ahaṁkāra besides five subtle elements, the A-viśeṣas of the Sāṁkhya. Viśeṣa of the Yoga and the Vikṛti of the Sāṁkhya refer to the same catagories. Ahaṁkāra and the five subtle elements are A-viśeṣas because they directly produce the eleven organs and the five gross elements respectively.

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1. जगदङ्कुरो महत्-तत्त्वम्...अखिलवस्तूनां व्यञ्जकम्—Vijñānabhikṣu on Y. S. 2. 19.

THE ADVAITA VIEW OF TIME

Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan

Advaita, with which the name of great Śaṅkara is associated, is not a system among systems of philosophy. It stands for the plenary experience, *pūrṇānubhava*, that does not involve the usual distinctions of experient, experiencing and experienced object. The plenary experience is the non-dual Self which is referred to in the Upaniṣads by such terms as *Brahman* and *Ātman*. The world of plurality of which we as empirical souls are a part is an appearance of the non-dual Self. The fact of this appearance is called *Māyā*, the principle of illusion which presents the Many in the place of the One, and introduces the distinctions of experients, experiencings and experienced objects into distinctionless experience.

Māyā is not real, as it gets sublated in pure experience, along with the world of plurality which is its product. Nor is it unreal because it makes the world-appearance possible. Hence, it is described as indeterminable, *anirvacanīya*, being neither real nor unreal. Time, according to this scheme, has meaning only in and for the world of plurality. It represents the relation between the *Self* and *Māyā*. In other words, time is the condition of the possibility of experiencing, and not of experience. Therefore, like *Māyā*, it is not real.

An analysis of the three states of experience—waking, dream and deep sleep—will render the meaning of time, according to Advaita, clear. Both waking and dream are forms of experiencing, and are governed by time. The difference between waking and dream is that while in the state of waking the empirical subjects experience an external world, in dream the experiencing is internal. The objects that constitute the external world are conditioned by both physical time and mental time. They are *dvaya-kālāḥ*, says Gauḍapāda, an illustrious predecessor of Śaṅkara; whereas the contents of dream are made possible by mental time; they are *citta-kālāḥ*. Thus there is this difference between the world of waking and the world of dream, that while the former is public, the latter is private. Since Advaita recognizes this difference, it should not be confused with subjective idealism. The non-dual Self is not a subject as against an object. It

is that which transcends this distinction. The states of waking and dream, however, agree in this that they are, both of them, phenomenal and are, therefore, subject to time.

The state of deep sleep by contrast is a timeless experience. Here, there is neither the external world of things nor the internal world of ideas. There is no experiencing; there is experience. Although when one wakes up from sleep, time reappears, in sleep itself there is no time. Where there is duality, there is time. Where there is time, there is misery. In sleep-experience, there is no duality, no time, no misery. That sleep-experience is of the nature of happiness is evidenced by the fact that the one who wakes up from sleep recalls and says "I slept happily." Can we, then, regard the sleep-experience itself as the transcendent pure experience? The answer is: no. In sleep, ignorance or *Māyā* persists. One who has woken up from sleep not only says "I slept happily" but also "I did not know anything." In the language of duality—which is temporal—we may say that in sleep there is temporary suspension of time.

The truly timeless experience is *turīya*, where even ignorance disappears. '*Turīya*' means the 'fourth', and is so named to distinguish it from the three empirical states. But, in truth, it is not 'fourth' in addition to the three. It is the non-dual experience that is the ground and goal of all relative experience. Deep sleep resembles *turīya*, since in both there is no perception of plurality. But they differ in that while in deep sleep there is no realisation of non-duality, in *turīya* there is. Explaining this difference, Gauḍapāda says that :

"The self of the sleep state knows neither itself nor another, neither truth nor untruth : *turīya* is all-seeing always." Interpreting the meaning of the expression *sarvadṛk sadā*, Śaṅkāra observes : "Since there is nothing other than *turīya*, it is eternally all, as well as the seer ; there is no ignorance in it. Indeed, when the ever-luminous sun shines, there can be neither darkness nor erroneous appearance."[1]

Turīya, thus, is pure experience where there is neither time nor *Māyā*. The true non-dual Self is eternal ; time is its moving image. The *Maitrāyaṇī-Upaniṣad* declares that

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1. नात्मानं न परं चैव न सत्यं नापि चानृतम् ।
प्राज्ञः किंचन संवेत्ति तुर्यं तत्सर्वदृक्सदा ॥
Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, 1. 12.

"There are two forms of *Brahman*: time and the timeless; that which is prior to the sun is the timeless, without parts; but that which begins with the sun is time which has parts.."[1]

Further on, the Upaniṣad quotes an ancient verse:[2]

'Tis Time that cooks created things,
All things, indeed, in the Great Soul (*Mahātman*).
In what, however, Time is cooked—
Who knows that, he the Veda knows'.

Time is said to cook because it makes everything mature and resolve in *Brahman*. But time itself is cooked ultimately and is resolved in *Brahman*. Time is not the true nature of the Ultimate Reality. Time is with parts whereas the timeless is without parts. *Brahman* is the timeless.

Reality, according to Advaita, is truly timeless—timeless not in the sense of endless duration, but in the sense of eternity and completeness, requiring neither a 'before' nor an 'after'. A well-known text of the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* defines *Brahman* as being, consciousness and infinitude.[3] The expression 'infinitude' here means 'timeless'. Śaṅkara explains, in his commentary on this text, *Brahman* as timeless in the sense that it is not conditioned by time, is the ground of time, and is unsurpassably subtle.

If time is not real, it may be asked, what is its use, what purpose does it serve? The answer of Advaita is that time is the gateway to Reality. The purpose of the notion of time is the same as what, according to Gauḍapāda, is the object of the teaching about creation. If we imagine time to be real and inquire into its nature, we shall never find a solution. The discussion of time is not an end in itself, but must lead us to the knowledge of the Real. To employ an apt imagery of the *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad*, while the different orders of creation serve as food for *Brahman*, time (here called 'Death') is the sauce (*upasecana*). Just

1. द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे कालश्चाकालश्च ; अथ यः प्रागादित्यात् सोऽकालोऽकलः ; अथ य आदित्याद्यः स कालः सकलः ।

Maitrāyaṇī Upa. 6. 15.

2. कालः पचति भूतानि सर्वाण्येव महात्मनि ।
यस्मिंस्तु पच्यते कालो यस्तं वेद स वेदवित् ॥

Ibid.

3. सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ।

Taittirīya Upa. 2. 1.

as a sauce makes consumption of food (even when it is insipid) possible, even so time serves as the channel for all the orders of creation to return to their source which is the eternal *Brahman*. But time is not left behind, for time too is consumed.

Time is useful in the sense that it is in time that we have to strive for and reach the timeless. All *sādhana* is in time. It takes time to gain the timeless. Apart from time being a general condition of spiritual progress and perfection, it can also be employed as an object of meditation. Meditation on time is recommended as a method for getting beyond time to the timeless reality. The *Maitrāyaṇī-Upaniṣad* mentions time as one of the principal forms of the supreme, immortal, unembodied *Brahman*.[1] It is as a form of *Brahman* that time is to be meditated on. The supreme *Brahman* is not in the sphere of what is seen, and is without shape. So, the mind cannot be dissolved in it directly. One of the indirect ways of mind-dissolution is the contemplation of time as the image of *Brahman*. Meditation implies imaginative substitution. It involves necessarily a make-believe. But it is useful in that it leads us through the image to the real. The image may be external or internal, gross or subtle. As one progresses in meditation, one makes the image more and more subtle. Of the most subtle images of *Brahman*, time is preeminent. The fruit of time-meditation is not to cling to time as if it were ultimately real, but to transcend it. As the Upaniṣad declares, "He who worships time as *Brahman*, from him time withdraws afar."[2]

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1. ब्रह्मणो वावैता अग्र्यास्तनवः परस्यामृतस्याशरीरस्य ।
Maitrāyaṇī Upa. 4. 6.

2. यः कालं ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत कालस्तस्मातिदूरमपसरति ।
Ibid., 6. 14.

JAINA LOGIC AND LOGICIANS.

Dr Nathmal Tatia

I. Jaina Logic

1. We have used the word 'logic' in a wider sense to include epistemology under it. Our treatment of the contents of Jaina logic will be based on Ācārya Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* which is a standard treatise on the subject, supplemented by other sources where necessary. The treatment will be prefaced by an account of logical elements in the Āgamas and exegetical literature on them.

2. The Jaina Āgamas contain a theory of knowledge, based on their doctrine of *karman*. Consciousness obscured by karmic particles finds expression in various forms of knowledge other than omniscience which however becomes manifest only when the *jñānā-varaṇīya-karman* is completely dissociated from the soul. Apart from omniscience, there are other four kinds of knowledge, viz. (1) *mati-jñāna*, that is, knowledge through the sense-organs and the mind; (2) *śruta-jñāna*, that is, knowledge acquired through study; (3) *avadhi-jñāna* which stands for direct intuition of objects having shape or configuration (*rūpin*), situated at great distances in space and time; and (4) *manaḥparyāya-jñāna* which directly intuits the objects thought of by the minds of others, Jinabhadra however holding the view that it intuits only the states of the mind-substance directly, and the external objects thought of are known by inference. These four forms of knowledge occur owing to the suspension-cum-dissociation of karmic veils—the first requiring additionally the help of the sense-organs and the mind; the second needing the help of verbal symbols representing the objects; and the last two being independent of such help. Together with (5) omniscience, the total number of all possible forms of knowledge comes to five. Of these five varieties, the last three are direct and the first two are indirect knowledge of the object. The criterion of direct knowledge is the absence of any intermediary between the soul and the object. The presence of such intermediary is the criterion of indirect knowledge. In *mati-jñāna*, the object is known through the sense-organs and the mind, and in *śruta-jñāna*, the object is known through verbal symbols. This explains their

indirect nature. In the other three forms of knowledge, neither the sense-organ, nor the mind, nor any verbal symbol is requisitioned, and so they are the varieties of direct knowledge, that is, knowledge that occurs owing to the partial or complete dissociation of karmic particles without the help of any other external instrument of knowledge, such as the sense-organ or the mind or the verbal symbol. The term *pratyakṣa* in the sense of direct knowledge is therefore applicable only to the last three forms of knowledge, the remaining two falling under the category of *parokṣa* in the sense of being indirect knowledge. But in ordinary usage, sensual or mental perception is called *pratyakṣa*, and so the Jaina logicians condescend to designate such knowledge as popular or empirical (*sāṁvyavahārika*) *pratyakṣa*. The *śruta-jñāna* however is *parokṣa* by all standards.

2 (a). Akṣapāda Gautama's classification of *pramāṇas* appears accepted in the Jaina Āgamas which mention *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *aupamya* and *āgama* as the four *pramāṇas* or *hetus*. A *pramāṇa*, in Jainism, is essentially a form of knowledge and not anything else such as sense-object contact (*sannikarṣa*) or the like, which are regarded as *pramāṇa* by the Naiyāyika. In the *Anuyogadvāra-sūtra*, *pratyakṣa* is divided as sensuous and non-sensuous (which includes *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya* and *kevala*); *anumāna* is divided as *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *dṛṣṭasādharmyavat*—each of the latter two having more than one sub-variety. The *aupamya* is divided as *sādharmyopanīta* and *vaidharmyopanīta*, each having a number of sub-varieties. The *āgama* is divided as *laukika* and *lokottara*. The question of integrating *anumāna* and *aupamya* with the original scheme of five forms of knowledge is solved by Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* by subsuming these and a number of other kinds of *pramāṇa* under *mati-jñāna*. Early Jaina thinkers do not appear seriously mindful of the logical issues discussed in the Brāhmaṇical and the Buddhist camps. It is only in the treatises of Siddhasena Divākara, Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka that the attempt at systematization of these issues is made and pursued. Until then the logical concepts were loosely adopted and enumerated to serve the needs of popular discussions. Ācārya Bhadrabāhu, in his *Daśavaikālika-niryukti*, has given the number of the members of an inferential process as five or ten, though admitting that the probans and example, or even example alone is competent enough to lead to the inference. In the

Sthānāṅga-sūtra, four varieties of *hetu* (probans) are enumerated, viz. positive probans proving positive probandum, positive probans proving negative probandum, negative probans proving positive probandum and negative probans proving negative probandum.

2(b). The science of debate also found due importance in Jainism. Three kinds of *kathā* (debate) were recognized—*artha-kathā*, *dharma-kathā* and *kāma-kathā*—of which the *dharma-kathā* was again divided into four varieties viz. *ākṣepaṇī*, *vikṣepaṇī*, *saṁvejanī* and *nirvedanī*. The *saṁvejanī* and *nirvedanī* were for inspiring fear (*saṁvega*) and detachment (*nirveda*) in the disciple. The *ākṣepaṇī* was for the enlightenment and elevation of the disciple by dispelling his doubts about the spiritual code. The *vikṣepaṇī* was in vogue between the teacher and the taught, as well as between two persons belonging to two rival camps, for achieving victory. Six ways of disputation (*vivāda*) are also found enumerated in the *Sthānāṅga-sūtra*. Ten blemishes of legitimate discourse (*vāda*) are also given there, viz. *tajjāta-doṣa*, *matibhaṅga-doṣa* etc. Six types of queries (*praśna*) are mentioned. The *hetus* are also classified as *yāpaka* (one that is used to delay the opponent), *sthāpaka* (one that is used to establish one's own position without loss of time), *vyaṁsaka* (one that is used in casuistry), and *lūsaka* (one that is used for exposing casuistry). Many varieties of example are noted, using the term 'example' to include detailed arguments and even stories in support of the conclusion.

3. A brief account of the main topics of Jaina logic as systematized by Jaina logicians is given below on the basis of Acārya Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā*.

3(a). A *pramāṇa* is defined as 'right definitive cognition of an object'.[1] A cognition necessarily cognizes itself while cognizing the object, but this self-cognition is not included in the definition, because it overlaps the cases of erroneous cognitions also. It is not necessary that the object of cognition should be an object unknown before. The Jaina philosopher believes in continuity-cum-change, and so even when a new mode is cognized, the object *quâ* substance which was cognized before together with its past mode is also cognized along with the new mode.

The determination of the validity of a *pramāṇa* is sometimes

1. सम्यगर्थनिर्णयः प्रमाणम् । *Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā* 1. 1. 2.

effected by the cognition itself (*svataḥ*), e. g. in the case of repeatedly occurring cognitions of daily life, and on other occasions by another (*parataḥ*) confirmatory cognition, or by cognition of its pragmatic consequence, or by cognition of another necessarily concomitant fact.[1] The validity of the confirmatory cognition is self-cognised and thus infinite regress is avoided.

3 (b). The object of *pramāṇa* is the real, which is of the nature of substance-cum-mode, the criterion of reality being causal efficiency.

3 (c). The resultant of *pramāṇa* is the illumination of the object.[2] But here a difficulty arises. Both the *pramāṇa* and its resultant, being cognitions, their differentiation as two separate acts will be impossible. But the Jaina philosopher asserts that cognition *quâ* the activity of the knowing subject is *pramāṇa*, while cognition *quâ* the activity directed towards the object is the resultant (*pramāṇa-phala*). There is no contradiction in the same cognition being self-regarding and object-regarding. In another view, the cessation of ignorance is regarded as the immediate resultant of *pramāṇa*. Again, when there is a causally connected series of cognitions regarding the same object, each succeeding cognition is the resultant of the preceding one. Another resultant of *pramāṇa* is the judgement of avoidance, or of acceptance, or of indifference.[3] The nature of the resultant is determined by the interest of the cognizer.

3 (d). The subject of cognition (*pramātā*) is the self which reveals itself as well as the object, and is liable to change of modes.

3 (e). The *pramāṇa* is of two kinds, viz. perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) and non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) cognition.

3 (e) (i). The perceptual cognition is defined as the cognition which is immediate-cum-lucid. Immediacy-cum-lucidity of a cognition means its independence of any other *pramāṇa* or the direct apprehension of the object as 'This'.

The perceptual cognition is twofold—(1) transcendent (*mukhya*) and (2) empirical (*sāṁvyavahārika*). Of these, the first has three subkinds. The highest kind stands for the full manifestation of the nature of the

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1. अर्थक्रियानिर्भासाद्वा नान्तरीयार्थदर्शनाद्वा··· Ibid., 1.1.8. (com).
2. फलमर्थ प्रकाशः । Ibid., 1.1.34.
3. हानोपादानोपेक्षाबुद्धयो वा प्रमाणस्य फलम् । Ibid., p. 31.

conscious principle on the complete dissociation of karmic veils that obstruct knowledge. The other two kinds of transcendent perceptual cognition are *avadhi* and *manaḥ-paryāya*, standing for clairvoyance and telepathy respectively, each varying in excellence according to the purity of the relevant karmic veils that cover the soul.

The empirical perceptual cognition occurs through the instrumentality of a sense (*indriya*) and the mind (*manas*) and is of the nature of *avagraha* (determinate perception), *īhā* (speculation), *avāya* (perceptual judgement) and *dhāraṇā* (retention).

There are five senses, viz. touch, taste, smell, sight and ear which respectively apprehend touch, taste, smell, colour (including shape) and sound. Each of the sense is twofold, viz. *dravyendriya* and *bhāvendriya*. The material particles arranged in definite shapes constitute the *dravyendriya* or the physical sense-organ such as the tactile or the gustatory or the olfactory or the ocular or the auditory organ. The *bhāvendriya* has two aspects. The *kṣayopaśama* of the *jñānāvaraṇīya* karmic particles constitutes the *labdhi*-aspect of the *bhāvendriya* whereas the soul's tendency towards apprehension of the object is the *upayoga*-aspect of the *bhāvendriya*. The mind is similarly twofold—(1) *dravya-manas* and (2) *bhāva-manas*, and is defined as an instrument which is capable of cognizing all kinds of objects[1], not being limited to the objects of individual senses.

As regards the nature of *avagraha*, it is defined as the cognition of the object, which closes up the rear of indeterminate perception on the sense-object contact. And the further enquiry of the object thus cognized is *īhā* (speculation). The next stage of perceptual cognition is perceptual judgement (*avāya*) which is the determination of the specific characteristic which was the object of *īhā*. Finally, retention (*dhāraṇā*) is effected, which is the condition of memory of the object in future.[2] Similar details are available in the course of sensuous cognition described in the Pāli Abhidhamma.

3 (e) (ii). Now we come to the non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) cognition which lacks in immediacy-cum-lucidity. It is of five kinds, viz. *smṛti* (memory), *pratyabhijñāna* (recognition), *ūha* (inductive reasoning), *anumāna* (inference) and *āgama* (verbal testimony).[3]

1. सर्वार्थग्रहणं मनः । Ibid., I.1.24.
2. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
3. स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानोहानुमानागमास्तद्विधयः ॥ Ibid., 1. 2. 2.

3 (e) (ii). 1. Memory is a cognition which is conditioned owing to the rousing of past impressions and refers to its object by the pronoun 'that'.[1] It is expressed in judgements like 'that jar', 'that ear-ring' and so on.

3 (e) (ii). 2. Recognition is the synthetic judgement born of perceptual cognition and memory, as expressed in the following propositions: (1) 'This jar is necessarily that jar' (seen in the past)—a judgement of identity; (2) 'the gavaya is like (*sadṛśa*) the cow'—a judgement of similarity; (3) 'the buffalo is unlike the cow'—a judgement of dissimilarity; (4) 'this is less than, greater than, farther than, nearer than that, etc.'—judgements of difference.[2]

3 (e) (ii). 3. Inductive reasoning (*ūha*) is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation and non-observation. The universal concomitance cannot be known by perception, because perception is limited to the present. Nor can it be ascertained by inference, because inference itself is based on universal concomitance. The Jaina logicians therefore postulate this *ūha* (also called *tarka*) for the knowledge of universal concomitance. Universal concomitance is defined as necessary occurrence of ihe determinant concomitant (*vyāpaka*) on the occurrence of the determinate concomitant (*vyāpya*), or the existence of the determinate concomitant only where there occurs the determinant concomitant.[3]

3 (e) (ii). 4. The next category of non-perceptual cognition is inference (*anumāna*). Inference is defined as the knowledge of the probandum (major term) on the strength of the probans (middle term).[4] It is of two types—subjective (*svārtha*) and syllogistic (*parārtha*). The former is resorted to for the removal of one's own ignorance, while the latter is requisitioned for dispelling the ignorance of others.[5]

The *svārthānumāna* is defined as the knowledge of the probandum from the probans which has the single characteristic of standing in relation of *avinābhāva* (necessary concomitance) with the probandum,

1. वासनोद्बोधहेतुका तदित्याकारा स्मृतिः। Ibid., 1 2. 3.
2. दर्शनस्मरणसम्भवं तदेवेदं तत्सदृशं तद्विलक्षणं तत्प्रतियोगीत्यादिसङ्कलनं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्। Ibid., 1. 2. 4.
3. व्याप्तिर्व्यापकस्य व्याप्ये सति भाव एव व्याप्यस्य वा तत्रैव भावः। Ibid., 1. 2.4.
4. साधनात्साध्यविज्ञानम् अनुमानम्। Ibid., 1.2. 7.
5. Ibid., 1. 2. 8.

ascertained by one's self.[1] '*Avinābhāva* with the probandum'—means 'non-occurrence of the probans in the absence of the probandum'.

For proving the *avinābhāva* with the probandum, the Buddhist logicians laid down the following three characteristics (*rūpas* or *lakṣaṇas*) of the probans—(1) *pakṣe sattvam eva* ; (2) *sapakṣe eva sattvam* ; and (3) *vipakṣe asattvam eva*. The Naiyāyikas laid down two more characteristics, viz. *avādhitaviṣayatvam* and *asatpratipakṣatvam*. The Jaina logicians reject these on the ground that these do not constitute the complete set of conditions to establish the *avinābhāva*. Thus in the case of inference—All is momentary, since existent—which is the most predominant argument of the Buddhists, the probans 'existent' is held by them to be valid, though it does not occur in a homologue, sinces every existent is included in the subject (*pakṣa*) and there is nothing outside which could serve as an example. The Jaina logician therefore asserts that the triple or the quintuple characteristic would not serve any additional purpose, if the incompatibility with the contradictory be present ; nor would it be of any avail, if the incompatibility with the contradictory be absent.[2]

The Jaina logician has propounded *antarvyāpti* (internal concomitance). When the necessary concomitance of the probans with the probandum is demonstrated with reference to the subject (*pakṣa*) itself, it is a case of internal concomitance. When, however, the concomitance is sought to be proved by an example outside the subject, it is a case of *bahirvyāpti* (external concomitance).[3] The principle of *tathopapatti*, which is the same as *anyathānupapatti*, explained above, is based on the acceptance of internal concomitance.[4]

The *avinābhāva*, that is, 'non-occurrence (of the probans) in the absence (of the probandum)' stands for 'the universal necessity of synchronous and successive occurrence of such events as are found to

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1. स्वार्थं स्वनिश्चितसाध्याविनाभावैकलक्षणाद् साधनाद् साध्यज्ञानम् । Ibid., 1.2.9.
2. अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वं यत्र तत्र त्रयेण किम् ।
नान्यथानुपपन्नत्वं यत्र तत्र त्रयेण किम् ॥
अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वं रूपैः किं पञ्चभिः कृतम् ।
नान्यथानुपपन्नत्वं रूपैः किं पञ्चभिः कृतम् ॥ Ibid., pp. 40-41.
3. पक्षीकृत एव विषये साधनस्य साध्येन व्याप्तिरन्तर्व्याप्तिः, अन्यत्र तु बहिर्व्याप्तिरिति । *Syādvāda-ratnākara*, 3. 39.
4. Ibid., 3. 18. p. 520.

occur simultaneously or in succession'. For instance, the colour and the taste of a fruit are produced simultaneously by a common set of causal conditions and as such their synchronous occurrence is governed by necessity. A mango tree is necessarily a tree, because the two ('mango tree' and 'tree'), being species and genus, stand in the relation of *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka*. These are the instances of events which occur simultaneously. As regards the events which occur in succession, we may refer to the case of the starry clusters of *kṛttikā* (pleiades) and *rohiṇī*, which, though not related as cause and effect, necessarily rise in succession. Smoke and fire are related as effect and cause and occur in succession.

The knowledge of the *avinābhāva* is achieved by means of *ūha* (inductive reasoning), as we have already mentioned.

We have now seen that the only essential characteristic of a probans (*sādhana*) is its *avinābhāva* with the probandum, and this *avinābhāva* is ascertained by *anyathānupapatti* and not the three or five characteristics as laid down by the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas respectively. Furthermore, the *avinābhāva* is available between the concurrent as well as two successive events, and is determined by *ūha* or inductive reasoning, which is a unique organ of proof, postulated by the Jaina logicians.

Now we come to the five possible types of probans. These are : (1) essential identity (*svabhāva*), (2) cause, (3) effect, (4) coexistent in the same substratum (*ekārthasamavāyin*), and (5) opposite (*virodhin*).[1] The first four prove facts which are positive in nature, while the last proves a negative probandum. 'Being a product' (*kṛtakatva*) as a probans for the inference of impermanence of a word (*śabdā'nityatva*) is an example of the first type. When there is doubt as to whether the indistinct object in front is a volume of vapour or smoke, the cognition of fire (which is the cause of smoke) leads to the inference of smoke. This is an instance of the second type of probans. Inference of fire from smoke is an instance of the third type. The fourth type is illustrated by the inference of colour from taste, both of which belong to the same fruit.

1. स्वभावः कारणं कार्यमेकार्थसमवायि विरोधि चेति पञ्चधा साधनम् । *Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā*, 1. 2. 12.

The absence of any of these four types of probans serves as the ground for the inference of the absence of the corresponding probandum.

The fifth type of probans, called *virodhin* (opposite), is what is opposed to the negatum (*pratiṣedhya*), or to the effect of the negatum, or to the cause of the negatum, or to the determinant concomitant (*vyāpaka*) of the negatum; or what is the effect of the opposed probans. The inference of 'absence of cold touch' from 'fire' is an example of the probans opposed to the negatum (namely, 'cold touch'). Here cold touch is the negatum whose absence is inferred from the presence of fire. Similarly, when the 'absence of the unobstructed conditions of cold touch' is inferred from 'fire', it is an example of the probans opposed to the effect of the negatum. Here 'cold touch' is the effect of the negatum, viz., the 'unobstructed conditions of cold touch'. The 'cold touch' again is opposed to the probans, viz. fire. In the same way, the inference of the absence of 'horripilation' (*romaharṣa*) and 'feel of snow' (*tuṣārasparśa*) from fire are the examples of probans opposed to the cause and determinant concomitant (*vyāpaka*) of the negatum. If 'smoke' is substituted for 'fire' in the instances cited above, it will give rise to cases of inference on the basis of the effect of the opposed probans. The opposed probans is 'fire', and the effect of fire is 'smoke'.

We do not here propose to give the definitions of *pakṣa* and *dṛṣṭānta* in the interest of brevity.

We have now discussed the *svārthānumāna*. As regards the *parārthānumāna* or syllogistic inference, it is requisitioned for dispelling the ignorance of others. Only two members, viz., the thesis (*pratijñā*) and the probans (*hetu*) endowed with positive and negative concomitance constitute the syllogism. The Buddhists considered the statement of the probans alone as sufficient to convince the learned people. In recognition of the requirements of the pupils, the full set of five members, viz. *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*—was admitted by the Jaina logicians.[1] We have already spoken of the ten members (the traditional five plus their *śuddhis*) enumerated by Ācārya Bhadrabāhu.

The Jaina logicians have recognized three *hetvābhāsas* viz., *asiddha*, *viruddha* and *anaikāntika*. There is also an ancient Jaina tradition

1. Ibid., 2. 1. 10.

that Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara postulated only the *asiddha*, Ācārya Mallavādin only the *viruddha*, and Ācārya Samantabhadra only the *anaikāntika hetvābhāsa*.[1] This is explained as follows :—Take the inference "The word is impermanent exclusively, because of its 'being a product', like a jar."[2] Now, here the probans 'being a product' cannot be true of or exist in (*asiddha*) an absolutely impermanent subject, viz., word. The reason is that a product, according to the non-absolutist philosopher, is permanent-cum-impermanent. The same probans can also be viewed as contradictory (*viruddha*) because it would prove the word to be permanent-cum-impermanent which is the antithesis of absolute impermanence. Similarly, the probans is also inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) because it is also predicable of what is permanent, that is, the heterologue (*vipakṣa*).

The Jaina logicians have elaborately discussed the definitions and varieties of *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*, *dūṣaṇa*, *dūṣaṇābhāsa*, *vāda*, *jaya*, *nigraha* etc. But it is not possible to discuss them in this article. Some of these as found in the Jaina Āgamas have already been mentioned at the beginning.

3(e)(ii).5. The fifth category of non-perceptual cognition is *āgama* (verbal testimony) which is defined as the knowledge that is derived from the words of the *āpta*, that is, a person who knows the object as it is and also speaks in accordance with his knowledge.[3] The *āpta* is either *laukika*, such as the parents, or *alaukika*, such as the *tīrthaṅkara*. In this connection, the Jaina logicians discuss at great length the Mīmāṁsā conception of the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedas and also the conception of Personal God as the revealer of truth. Complete books such as the *Āptamīmāṁsā* of Samantabhadra and the *Āptaparīkṣā* of Vidyānanda are devoted to the consideration of these problems.

The Jaina Logicians

4. In this brief account of Jaina logic, we have not traced the historical evolution of Jaina logic in relation to other schools of logic

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1. असिद्धः सिद्धसेनस्य विरुद्धो मल्लवादिनः ।
   द्वेधा समन्तभद्रस्य हेतुरेकान्तसाधने ॥
   Nyāyāvatāravārtika-vṛtti, 3. 53.

2. अनित्य एव शब्दः, कृतकत्वाद् घटवत् ।
3. अभिधेयं वस्तु यथावस्थितं यो जानीते यथाज्ञानं चाभिधत्ते स आप्तः ।
   Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra, 4. 4.

to which the former is in debted for its origin and development. Akṣapāda's *Nyāya-sūtra* is the basis of the Buddhist and Jain logic. Vācaka Umāsvāti classified the traditional five *jñānas*—viz., *mati*, *śruta* etc.—into two groups, including the first two under *parokṣa* and the rest three under *pratyakṣa*. We have already given the reason [vide 1(a)]. He also mentions the four *pramāṇas* of the Nyāya school,[1] and says that such *pramāṇas* should be included under *mati* and *śruta*.[2] We have already explained the concept of *sāṁvyavahārika pratyakṣa*. Umāsvāti conceives *mati-jñāna* as including *smṛti*, *saṁjñā*, *cintā* and *abhinibodha*. A beginning was thus made by him towards a theory of knowledge recognizing *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* as two separate kinds of knowledge, each having more than one variety. The Jainas however entered the field of logic proper after the advent of Dignāga, and Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara was perhaps the first Jaina philosopher whose *Nyāyāvatāra* contains the rudiments of Jaina logic. *Pramāṇa* is defined as an uncontradicted cognition illumining itself and its object.[3] It is stated to be of two kinds, viz., *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, on account of the twofold character of the object, and the *parokṣa* is divided as *anumāna* and *āgama*. Along with the *pramāṇa*, *pramātā*, *pramāṇa-viṣaya* and *pramiti* have also been defined by Siddhasena Divākara. Inferential knowledge is distinguished as *svārtha* and *parārtha* and its constituents such as *hetu*, *vyāpti* (including *antar-vyāpati* and *bahir-vyāpti*), *pakṣa*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *hetvābhāsa*, *dṛṣṭāntadoṣa* etc. are defined and explained. In short, tne *Nyāyāvatāra* contains all the elements of logic in a nutshell. Next we come to Ācārya Mallavādin and Ācārya Samantabhadra. The former was reputed to be a great debator, and his work *Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra* bears testimony to his reputation. All the tenets of philosophy that were available to him were incorporated by him in his treatise under one or the other of the twelve *aras* (standpoints) propounded by him. Ācārya Samantabhadra extensively utilized the *Nyāya-sūtra* to define Jaina concepts and effectively use the logical apparatus to establish the doctrines of *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda* on a firm basis. He endorses[4] Siddhasena Divākara's definition of *pramāṇa*. *Pramāṇābhāsa*, *pratijñā*-

1. *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* 1. 6.
2. Ibid., 1. 12.
3. प्रमाणं स्वपराभासि ज्ञानं, बाधविवर्जितम् *Nyāyāvatāra*, 1.
4. *BSS*, 63.

doṣa and *hetudoṣa* are recognized.[1] He also mentions the necessity of *dṛṣṭānta* in debate[2]. *Naya* is defined on the pattern of the Nyāya definition of *hetu*.[3] Samantabhadra appears to be familiar with Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*.[4] He is conversant with the conception of *anyathānupapatti*.[5] The task of systematizing Jaina logic was however left to Akalaṅka who came after Dharmakīrti. He can be considered to have given almost a final shape to the categories of knowledge and the concept of inference in Jaina logic. Attempts were made by him to include the sources of knowledge, such as *upamāna*, *abhāva*, *arthāpatti*, and the like, recognized in other schools, under the categories postulated by the Jainas themselves. Akalaṅka was followed by Vidyānanda who flourished after Vācaspati Miśra and was a complete master of all the schools of philosophy of his time and made an extensive application of *anekānta* for the assessment of non-Jaina concepts. He composed a separate treatise on *pramāṇa*. Then we come to Māṇikyanandin, the author of the *Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra*. Akalaṅka's logical treatises were commented upon by Anantavīrya, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra and Vādirāja. Prabhācandra's *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* and *Nyāya-kumuda-candra* deserve special attention in this connection. Vādideva's *Syādvāda-ratnākara* is an encyclopaedic work which utilized up-to-date literature in the field of antology, epistemology und logic, including the works of Udayana. Ācārya Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā* is a compendium of Jaina logic, which however is avilable in an incomplete form. Jaina logic was reoriented in the light of Navya Nyāya by Yaśovijaya of the seventeenth century A. D.

1. *Āpta-mīmāṁsā* 79-80.
2. *BSS*, 54.
3. *Āpta-Mīmāṁsā* 106.
4. Ibid., 5, 27, 65.
5. Ibid., 17-18.

अतीतानागतज्ञानोपायः

बदरीनाथ शुक्लः

अतीतानागतज्ञानं शास्त्रेषु बहुशः श्रुतम् ।
तत्साधनप्रकारोऽत्र प्रबन्धे प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

पदार्था द्विविधा नित्या अनित्याश्च; नह्याभ्यां प्रकाराभ्यां भिद्यत एकोऽपि पदार्थः। तेषु नित्याः, कामं ते प्रवाहिनित्याः, परिणामिनित्याः, स्वरूपनित्याः, कूटस्थनित्या वा स्युः, सदा वर्तमाना एव। नैकोऽपि नित्यः कदाचिदनागतोऽतीतो वा भवितुं कल्पते। अनित्येषु ये भावभूतास्ते त्रिविधाः। ते हि सर्वे प्रथममनागतास्ततो वर्तमानास्ततश्चातीता जायन्ते। ये चाभावभूता अनित्यास्ते द्विविधाः प्रागभावो ध्वंसश्च। तयोः प्रागभावो वर्तमानोऽतीतश्च भवति न पुनः कदाप्यनागतः। ध्वंसश्चानागतो वर्तमानश्च भवति न कदाप्यतीतः। ये खल्वभावस्य पदार्थान्तरत्वं, प्रागभावस्य प्रामाणिकत्वं, ध्वंसस्य चाविनश्वरत्वं च न मन्यन्ते तेषां तद्विषये भिन्न एव पन्था यस्य नात्र समीक्षाऽवसरः।

साङ्ख्याः पुनः 'नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः' इति सिद्धान्तमुद्घोषयन्तः पुरुषव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्यानागतवर्तमानातीततास्तिस्रोऽवस्थाः परिकल्पयन्तो नूत्नयैव दिशा विशदयन्ति वेद्यजातम्। नैतन्मतमपि युक्तायुक्ततया विमर्शस्पर्शमर्हति। अत्र तु स्वरूपेणावस्थया वाऽतीतानागतयोर्वस्तुनोर्ज्ञानोपायमात्रं चिन्तनीयतया प्रस्तुतमिति तत्रैव वाचं चटुलयितुं किञ्चिदुपक्रम्यते।

अतीतानागते वस्तुनी सजातीयं वर्तमानं पुरस्कृत्य शब्देनानुमानेन च सुखं संवेद्ये इति प्रायो निर्विवादम्। न केवलं ते परोक्षवेद्ये एवापितु सामान्यलक्षणया ज्ञानलक्षणया च प्रत्यासत्त्या प्रत्यक्षवेद्ये अपीत्यपि न्यायवैशेषिकविदो वदन्ति। परमाभ्यां प्रत्यासत्तिभ्यां प्रसूयमानं प्रत्यक्षं गृह्यमाणसामान्यविशेषाकारेणैवातीतमनागतं च वस्तु गोचरयति न तु तदीयैः समग्रविशेषैरपीति विस्पष्टम्। परं पुराणादिषु प्रचुरं पठ्यते 'निःशेषविशेषैरप्यतीतानागतौ साक्षात्कृतवन्तो बभूवुर्बहवो महापुरुषा' इति। ते कथन्तथाऽकल्पन्तेत्यस्ति निर्धारणीयम्। सन्ति प्रभूतान्यञ्जनौषधप्रभृतीनि भौतिकानि साधनानि यदुपयोगेन मानवः सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टानप्यर्थाननायासं साक्षात्कुरुते। परम-

तीतानागतवस्तूनामविकलस्वरूपदर्शनं तु योगेन, तपसा, देवाराधनया, योग्यादिदत्तया दिव्यदृशैव वा समासादयितुं शक्यमिति सुनिश्चितप्रायम्। न हि योगादीननुपास्य कश्चिदतीतमनागतं वा याथातथ्येन प्रत्यक्षयितुं क्षणमपि क्षमते।

कस्तावदतीतानागतप्रत्यक्षप्रसवपटीयान् योगः? कथं च सोऽधिकर्तुं शक्यः इति जिज्ञास्यते चेद् दीयतां दृष्टिश्चतुष्पादे पातञ्जले योगशास्त्रे यस्य प्रथमपादीयेन द्वितीयेन सूत्रेण सम्यगलक्षि योगः—'योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध' इति।

चित्तम् अन्तःकरणं, बुद्धिः, सत्त्वं, महदिति समे पर्यायाः। चित्तमेव सर्वेषां ज्ञानानामायतनम्। तच्च सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपत्रिगुणात्मकतया ज्ञप्तिशीलं प्रवृत्तिशीलं स्थितिशीलं च।

तस्य प्राधान्येन पञ्च वृत्तयः प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतिरूपाः प्रजायन्ते। तत्र प्रमाणवृत्तिस्त्रिधा प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागमश्च। इन्द्रियप्रणालिकया बाह्यवस्तुना सम्बद्धस्य चित्तस्य सामान्यविशेषात्मकस्य तद्वस्तुनः सामान्यमंशं गौणतया विशेषमंशं च प्रधानतयाऽवधारयन्ती वृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षम्। अनुमित्सितधर्मविशिष्टधर्मिस्वरूपस्य पक्षात्मकानुमेयस्य साध्यसामान्यवत्तया सजातीयेषु सपक्षेष्वनुवृत्तो विजातीयेभ्यः विपक्षेभ्यश्च व्यावृत्तो यः साध्यहेत्वोर्व्याप्त्याख्यः सम्बन्धस्तद्विषया सामान्यावधारणप्रधानासामान्यरूपेणैव साध्यहेतुसम्बन्धान् मुख्यतया गोचरयन्ती वृत्तिरनुमानम्। आप्तेनात्मनोऽर्थदर्शनमर्थानुमितिं वा पुरुषान्तरे संक्रमयितुं प्रयुज्यमानात्पदकदम्बकाज्जायमानाऽर्थसामान्यग्राहिणी वृत्तिरागमः।

विपर्ययो नाम मिथ्याज्ञानं, यत् प्रमाणबाध्यतया गृह्यमाणप्रकारेण धर्मिणः प्रतिष्ठापनेऽपटु पञ्चपर्वकं च। पर्वाणि चाविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्रमेण तमोमोहमहामोहतामिस्रान्धतामिस्रनामानश्चित्तमलाः।

शब्दज्ञाननिबन्धनी वस्तुशून्या व्यवहारमात्रनिर्वर्तननिपुणा चित्तवृत्तिर्विकल्पः।

प्रस्वापप्रागभवैरनुभवैरुद्भावनानर्हस्य प्रस्वापोत्तरमुत्पततः सुखस्वापादिप्रत्यवमर्शस्य निर्वाहिका प्रस्वापकालिकी चित्तवृत्तिर्निद्रा।

पूर्वानुभवस्य मर्यादाया अतिक्रमणे पङ्गुभूता तस्मात्तदर्थाच्च भिन्नं ग्रहीतुमक्षमा तदुभयग्राहिणी चित्तवृत्तिः स्मृतिः।

सर्वा इमाः सत्त्वरजस्तमःस्वरूपतया सुखदुःखमोहात्मिकाः क्लेशरूपाः। सर्वासामासां निरोधो योगसिद्धिकामस्य लक्ष्यः। आसु सात्त्विकवृत्तिपरिवर्जनेन रजस्तमो-

मयीनां सर्वासां निरोधश्चित्तस्य यस्मिन्नवस्थाविशेषे सम्पद्यते स सम्प्रज्ञातो योग आख्यायते। यस्मिंश्चावस्थाविशेषे सात्त्विक्योऽपि वृत्तयो निरुध्यन्ते सोऽसम्प्रज्ञातो योगो निगद्यते। अयमुभयविधोऽपि योगोऽभ्यासवैराग्यपूर्वकाद् यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधिरूपाणामष्टाङ्गानां समीचीनानुष्ठानात्सिध्यति।

तत्र यमाः पञ्च—अहिंसा, सत्यम्, अस्तेयं, ब्रह्मचर्यम् अपरिग्रहश्च। अहिंसा हि योगप्रासादस्य प्रथमा शिला, योगपादपस्य मूलबीजम्। तामपरिपाल्य यत्किमपि क्रियेत तत्सर्वं कृतमप्यकृतकल्पं भवति, तां विनाऽन्यस्य कस्यापि फलयोगासम्भवात्। सा च सर्वथा सर्वदा च सर्वभूतानामनभिद्रोहः। सत्यं नाम कस्याप्यर्थस्यान्यथाऽचिन्तनमवचनं च। योऽर्थो यथा भवति तस्य तथैव चिन्तनं वचनं च सर्वभूतहितं सत्यं संज्ञायते। शास्त्रस्य शिष्टलोकस्य च दृष्टावनुचितेन प्रकारेण द्रव्यमधिकर्तुं स्पृहाचेष्टयोरभावोऽस्तेयम्। इन्द्रियाणां विशेषेण गुप्तेन्द्रियस्य संयमो ब्रह्मचर्यम्। जीवनरक्षार्थं यावानर्थोऽपेक्षितस्तावतोऽतिरिक्तस्य न्याय्यस्यापि संग्रहाद् वैमुख्यमपरिग्रहः।

नियमाः पुनः—शौचं, सन्तोषः, तपः, स्वाध्याय ईश्वरप्रणिधानं च। शौचं नाम बाह्यानामाभ्यन्तराणां च मलानामपनयनम्। न्याय्यात्प्राणत्राणसाधनादधिकस्यानुपादित्सा सन्तोषः। शीतोष्णबुभुक्षापिपासादिभिरव्याकुलीभावस्तपः। विषयासक्तितिरस्करणप्रवणोपदेशगर्भग्रन्थानां सावधानमध्ययनं स्वाध्यायः। परमगुरौ परमात्मनि सर्वकर्मार्पणमीश्वरप्रणिधानम्।

स्थिरः सुखावहोऽसौविध्यविरोध्युपवेशनप्रकार आसनम्।

आसनसिद्धौ श्वासप्रश्वासयोर्गतिनियन्त्रणं प्राणायामः। स च सर्वोत्तमं तपः। तपो न परं प्राणायामात्। ततो विशुद्धिर्मलानां दीप्तिश्च ज्ञानस्य। सोऽयं प्राणायामो मार्कण्डेयपुराणे लघुमध्यमोत्तमभेदैस्त्रिधा वर्णितः। निमेषपातात्मिकाभिर्द्वादशमात्राभिरुपेतः स्वेदविजयफलो लघुः। चतुर्विंशतिमात्राभिर्युक्तः कम्पविजयफलो मध्यमः। षट्त्रिंशन्मात्रायुतो विषादविजयफलश्चोत्तमः। स च प्रत्येकं ध्वस्तिप्राप्तिसंवित्प्रसादेतिचतुरवस्थः। ध्वस्तौ शुभाशुभकर्मणां क्षयश्चेतोवासनानां विलयश्च सिध्यति। प्राप्तौ समग्रा भोगकामना म्लायन्ते। साधकः स्वात्मारामः सम्पद्यते। संविदि साधकोऽपरिमितैः प्रभावैर्विकसमानोऽनन्तज्ञानसम्पदा समुद्भासमानश्च सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टार्थदर्शने प्रभुर्जायते। प्रसादे परिपुष्टप्राणः प्रसन्नमनाः परितृप्तेन्द्रियग्रामः सम्प्राप्तसमस्तविषय इव सम्प्रहृष्टोऽवद्योतते। सिद्धे प्राणायामे सति चिन्तानिरोधे च इन्द्रियाणां स्वतः सिद्धो

निरोधः सोऽसौ प्रत्याहारः। विषयान्तरेभ्य आकृष्य कस्मिंश्चिद् अभिमते देशविशेषे चित्तस्यावस्थापनं धारणा। अवस्थापितचित्तके वस्तुनि प्रत्ययस्य यः प्रत्ययान्तरेणापरामृष्टः सदृशः प्रवाहस्तद् ध्यानम्। ध्यानमेव यदा स्वस्वरूपमनवभासयद् ध्येयमात्राकारेण प्रवहति तदा समाधिस्वरूपं प्रपद्यते। समाधिसिद्धश्च सर्वमभीप्सितमवितथं जानाति देशान्तरे कालान्तरे च।

एषां योगाङ्गानां यथाविध्यनुष्ठानाद् योगः पूर्णतां व्रजति। एषु धारणाध्यानसमाधित्रयमेकत्र प्रवर्तमानं संयमः संज्ञायते। संयमोऽयं यथा यथा स्थिरपदो भवति तथा तथा प्रज्ञाया आलोको विकसति विशदश्च भवति।

संयमोऽयं यदा योगिभिर्वस्तूनां धर्मलक्षणावस्थारूपेषु त्रिषु परिणामेषु परिनिष्ठाप्यते तदा तदीया प्रज्ञाऽतीतानागतानां प्रत्यक्षं प्रसूते। यथोक्तं पातञ्जलदर्शनस्य विभूतिपादीयेन षोडशेन सूत्रेण 'परिणामत्रयसंयमादतीतानागतज्ञानम्'। परिणामो नाम 'अवस्थित-द्रव्यस्य पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः'। अयमाशयः—धर्मी तावन्मूलभूतः पदार्थः; स च त्रिधा परिणमति धर्मैः लक्षणैरवस्थाभिश्च। तेषु धर्मात्मकः परिणामः साक्षाद् धर्मिगतः। लक्षणात्मकः परिणामो धर्माश्रितः, अवस्थात्मकश्च परिणामो लक्षणगतः। यथा पृथिव्यादेर्धर्मिणो गवादयो धर्मपरिणामाः। गवादीनामनागतवर्तमानातीतत्वानि लक्षणपरिणामाः। वर्तमानलक्षणोपेतानां तेषां बाल्यकौमारयौवनादयोऽवस्थापरिणामाः।

इत्थं सर्व एव धर्मी किञ्चिद्धर्मात्मना परिणमति, स च धर्मोऽनागतवर्तमानातीतलक्षणैर्युज्यते, वर्तमानदशायां विभिन्नाभिरवस्थाभिराश्लिष्यते च। यो धर्मो यदा धर्मिण्यव्यक्तं सन्नपि स्वीयमर्थक्रियाकारि रूपं न प्राप्तस्तदा सोऽनागतलक्षणः। यदा चार्थक्रियाकारिरूपेणोपपन्नस्तदा वर्तमानलक्षणः, यदा चार्थक्रियाकारिणो रूपाद् विमुक्तस्तदाऽतीतलक्षणः। वस्तुतस्त्वेक एवावस्थापरिणामो धर्मलक्षणयोरप्यवस्थाभेदरूपत्वात्। त्रित्वाभिधानं तु तेषामन्योन्यव्यावृत्तरूपाभिप्रायेण।

एषु त्रिषु परिणामेषु संयम्यमानं चित्तं तानखिलान् प्रत्यक्षयत् तदन्तर्गतावतीतानागतावपि निष्प्रत्यूहं प्रत्यक्षयतीति सुव्यक्तम्।

तदित्थं योगदर्शनस्य सर्वदर्शनानां शेषतया तदुक्तपरिणामत्रये चित्तसंयम एव सर्वदर्शनसम्मतोऽतीतानागतज्ञानोपायो वक्तुं शक्यत इति कृतं विस्तरेण।

THE NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY

DR JATIL COOMAR MOOKERJEE

Kathā

We propose in what follows to give a clear intelligible account of philosophical enquiry as conceived by the Indian Naiyāyika. The term which the Naiyāyika uses as equivalent to a philosophical enquiry is *kathā*. *Kathā* is not any or every kind of enquiry but a kind of controlled enquiry i. e., enquiry limited by a specific end or purpose. The Naiyāyika holds that the purpose in a philosophical enquiry may be the attainment of knowledge by shifting pros and cons of a problem or problems, or attainment of victory in the open debate by any means, or again a purely negative end of refutation of every positive thesis that is proffered. The technical names for these three types of controlled enquiry are *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. *Vāda* is a philosophical discussion with the specific end of attaining knowledge. It may be a discussion between a teacher and a student, or between two fellow students or two experts. But it is never an enquiry carried on by a single individual, where the issues, for and against, are imagined and examined by the same individual. For the Naiyāyika limits such type of enquiry to a discourse where there are at least and not less than two participants.[1] In Nyāya text however the technical term *vāda* is used to mean a philosophical enquiry between a teacher and a student for the purpose of attainment of knowledge. In its meaning and import it comes very near to catechism of Christian theology in which instructions were imparted to the enquirers in the form of question and answer. *Jalpa* is another variety of philosophical enquiry (*kathā*). Here the purpose that controls the enquiry is victory in the debate by any means. It presupposes at least two disputants arguing a philosophical problem from different standpoints. It also presupposes presence of judges who will weigh the arguments of both the parties and give their verdict in favour of one and against the other. There is yet a third type of *kathā* and its technical name is *vitaṇḍā*. The purpose which dominates such discourse is refutation of every

1, *Vādaḥ khalu nānāpravaktṛkaḥ*—the Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya.

argument that is presented. The object of *vitaṇḍā* is thus neither victory nor attainment of truth, but the negative one—the refutation of every positive thesis that is offered. Victory, if it can be called so, is negative based on the failure of the opponent to prove his point. Victory should consist in the successful proof of one's own position by logically demonstrating that all the objections and contrary opinions are untenable and devoid of cogency. The person engaged in such type of discourse (*vaitaṇḍika*) has no position of his own to defend and his only object is to assail every position and smash its defence. It is a sort of wrangling where the disputant may simply brawl and engage himself in confused argument or altercation. He is thus a philosophical free-lancer who has nothing to lose and who believes in attack for the sake of attack. Whether scepticism in this extreme sense is possible is however a moot question.

Kathā is thus any one of these three varieties of discourse—*vāda, jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. It is obvious that in *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* in particular the arguments used need not be logically sound. In *vāda* also there is room for arguments which may fail to be in accordance with strict logic. But such arguments may be matter of consideration only for the purpose of refutation, so that the ground may be made clear for the attainment of real truth about a problem. *Kathā* therefore seems to have a wide scope, and it includes not merely the forms of logically sound discussions, but also aberrations of valid reasoning that may enter into discussion with spurious truth-claim. The Nyāya philosophy discusses the aberrations in reasoning under the heads of *chala, jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*. *Chala* is an ambiguous argument consisting in deliberate misunderstanding of the meanings of the opponent's words. The fallacies of ambiguous middle, major and minor of the traditional logic are *chala* in Nyāya terminology. While *jāti* is an unfair sophistical rejoinder based on false analogy, *nigrahasthānas* are the various vulnerable points in the arguments or the procedural behaviour of the disputants.

It may be pointed out in this connection that *kathā* is equivalent to *vicāra*,[1] and both *vicāra* and *kathā* are synonymous terms. Again

1. Caraka-saṁhitā—P.
M. M. Dr. Yogendranath Bagchi—The Art of Philosophical Disputation published in 'The Cultural Heritage of India—Vol III.
Śaṁkara Miśra—The Vādi-vinoda.
cf. the *Ātmatattvaviveka* of Udayana.

the *Caraka-saṁhitā* describes this controlled enquiry as *saṁbhāṣā* which literally means discourse. This *saṁbhāṣā* or discourse, according to Caraka, is of two kinds, *sandhāya saṁbhāṣā* or friendly discussion, and *vigṛhya saṁbhāṣā* or aggressive debate. The former, also called *anuloma saṁbhāṣā*, is what is called *vāda* and the latter includes within it both *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. While extolling *saṁbhāṣā*, the *Caraka-saṁhitā* lays down that this form of controlled enquiry increases the ardour and critical acumen of the enquirer, strengthening his cogitative power and promoting his prospects for acquiring reputation as a skilled debater. Moreover by this form of controlled enquiry, doubt is dispelled, firmness of conviction is gained, and new knowledge is added to the pre-existent stock. The *Caraka-saṁhitā* further mentions that the aggressive debate or *vigṛhya saṁbhāṣā* should not be entered into with one's preceptor, or men of kindred status, and the friendly discussion of the *sandhāya saṁbhāṣā* is the only form of debate permissible in such cases. Caraka is definitely against the idea of entering into an aggressive debate with persons of eminence.

Śaṁkara Miśra in his *Vādi-vinoda* also points out that *kathā* aims at the knowledge of a hitherto unknown truth, the conservation of this knowledge, the repeated exercise of this knowledge with a view to maturing one's conviction and its transmission to honest enquirers of truth who are open to conviction. He has also laid down certain conditions which the enquirers should satisfy before they resort to such enquiries. First, they must not go against their experience, must have unimpaired powers of perception, must not be quarrelsome, and lastly they must be able to maintain their position against the onslaughts of the opponent and expose the weakness of the opposite point of view.

Hemacandra, a representative of Jaina school of logic, while accepting the Naiyāyika's classification of *kathā* into *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* refutes the claim of the last two varieties to have their place in legitimate discourse which is held by him to be the only permissible form of *kathā*. The *jalpa* and the *vitaṇḍā* forms of debate, since they very often have recourse to quibble or *chala* and sophism or *jāti*, and other forms of unfair and illegitimate rejoinders, should have no place in *kathā* which is a fair and legitimate form of discourse. Hemacandra writes "It is improper to secure refutation of the opponent with unfair arguments. High-souled persons do not seek to attain as a matter of established practice either victory or fame or wealth by unfair

means. Even conceding that resort to *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* seems very often necessary for vanquishing a powerful opponent, particularly when one's position, fame and religion are in jeopardy, this cannot be regarded as a consideration powerful enough to vindicate the justice of *their* being considered as distinct *types* of debate."[1] Hemacandra concludes that *vāda* is the only form of legitimate discourse and is of course entitled to be considered as the only form of controlled enquiry or *kathā*.

We conclude that of these three types of *kathā*—*vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*—the *vāda* seems to be the best form of debate charged with ethical and spiritual purity and quite in consonance with the philosophical spirit of India. In it there is no show of arrogance, no sophistry and no wrangling. Excellent is the person who leads the discussion and speaks in such debate, and equally excellent is the enquirer who puts forward questions with the ardent desire for advancement of learning. It is indeed an excellence and Lord Kṛṣṇa while preaching the Gītā[2] before Arjuna, his disciple, regards it as such and declares that He Himself is the *vāda*. Śaṁkarācārya in his commentary thereon suggests that the Lord while using this term obviously has in his view both *kathā* and its threefold variety, and since *vāda* has for its aim ascertainment of truth, it is accepted by the Lord as one of His excellences.[3] Śrīdharasvāmī accepts Śaṁkara's interpretation *totidem verbis* and states that persons in a *vāda* debate are all morally too pure and spiritually exalted to be actuated by power, motives of cheap ability or mometary gain. They are induced into a discussion purely with a spirit of detachment, and for no other purposes. They are engaged in such pursuits only for ascertainment of truth, and as it is the best form of debate, the preference of the Lord has naturally fallen on it.

1. *Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā*—Eng. Trans. by Dr S. Mookerjee pp. 174-175.
2. *The Gītā*—Chap X verse 32.
3. *Vādo'rthanirṇaya-hetutvāt pradhānam, ataḥ so'ham asmi*—Śaṁkara—*The Gītā* Chap. X verse 32.
3. *Vādas tu śiṣyācāryayor anyayor vā tattvanirūpaṇaphalaḥ, ato'sau śreṣṭhtvāt madvibhūtirityarthaḥ*—*Śrīdharasvām*, Chap. X, verse 32.

मीमांसादर्शनम् ईश्वरवादश्च

अ० सुब्रह्मण्य शास्त्री

सर्वेष्वास्तिकेषु नास्तिकेषु च दर्शनेषूपपादनीयतया निरसनीयतया वेश्वरस्य चर्चा वरीवर्ति। ये तु तार्किका न्यायवैशेषिकप्रस्थानभेदेन भिन्नास्त उभयेऽपीश्वरमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति; तत्र चानुमानं प्रमाणयन्ति—क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकं कर्तृजन्यं कार्यत्वात् घटवदिति। स च कर्ता स्वोपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानकृतिमान् अतएवास्मत्तोऽतिरिच्यते। एवमनुमानप्रमाणेनेश्वरं प्रसाधयन्तस्तदुपोद्बोलकतया "द्यावा पृथिवीं जनयन्देव एकः, विश्वस्य कर्ता भुवनस्य भोक्तेत्यादिका उपन्यस्यन्ति। स एव वेदस्य कर्ता सर्गादावस्मान्नुपदिशति। अतएव शाब्दबोधं प्रति तात्पर्यज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वेन वेदेऽपीश्वरीयं तात्पर्यं कारणमित्युपपद्यते। अतस्तर्कशास्त्रेऽनुमाननिरूपणस्येश्वरसिद्धिरप्येकं प्रयोजनमिति।

एवं योगशास्त्रमपि क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वर इतीश्वरं ब्रुवन्तः प्रकृतेः जडत्वेन सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिमान् ईश्वरोऽस्मदतिशेते। अतो योगिनां मतेऽपीश्वरोस्तीति।

वेदान्तदर्शनमपि "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते येन जातानि जीवन्ति यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद् ब्रह्मे"ति[1], "सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म"[2], "एतस्माज्जायते प्राणः मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च। खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापः पृथिवी विश्वस्य धारिणी॥"[3] इत्यादिश्रुत्यनुसारेण "जन्माद्यस्य यतः"[4] इति ब्रह्मसूत्रेण जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिलयहेतुत्वं ब्रह्मणो लक्षणमाचक्षाणम् ईश्वरतत्त्वं विवेचयति। यो हिरण्यगर्भं जायमानं ज्ञानचक्षुषा पश्यति, वेदान् तदङ्गानि चोपदिशति स एव वैदिकै कर्मभिराराध्यते। आराधितश्च स ईश्वर आराधयित्रे यजमानाय फलं प्रयच्छतीति "फलमत उपपत्ते" इत्यादि-सूत्रेषु ईश्वरः समर्थितः।

उपनिषदोऽपि सृष्ट्याद्युपन्यासमुखेनेश्वरतत्त्वमवान्तरतात्पर्येण प्रतिपादयन्त्यो महातात्पर्येणेश्वरतत्त्वं विविच्य प्रतिपादयन्ति।

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१. तैत्ति० उप० ३।१।
२. तत्रैव, ३।१।१।
३. मुण्ड० उप० २।१।३।
४. १।१।२।

एवं नास्तिकदर्शनेष्वपि निरसनीयतयेश्वरस्योपन्यासो दृश्यते। तेषु पुरुषपरीक्षेति-नामाङ्कितेन प्रकरणेनेश्वरतत्त्वं सपरिकरमुपन्यस्य दूष्यते, बुद्धस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते। अतो नास्तिकदर्शनेषूपपादनीयतयेश्वरतत्त्वस्यानुपन्यासेऽपि निरसनीयतयेश्वरतत्त्वमुल्लिख्यत एव। अतएव न्यायाचार्य उदयन :—ईश्वरो नास्तीति व्यासेधतेश्वरतत्त्वमङ्गीकर्त्तव्यम् निषेधज्ञानार्थं निषेध्यज्ञानस्यावश्यकत्वात्। अतएवाभियुक्ताः कथयन्ति निषेध्यबोधाद्धि निषेधबोध इति।

अवशिष्यते च कापिलं सांख्यदर्शनं जैमिनीयमध्वरमीमांसादर्शनञ्च। कापिले सांख्ये सत्त्वरजस्तमसां त्रयाणां गुणानां साम्यावस्था प्रधानं प्रकृतिर्वेति व्यपदिश्यते। अनेनैवोत्पत्तिस्थितिलयादिकमुपपद्यते पुरुषसन्निधानमात्रेण। अत्र पुरुषपदेन क्षेत्रज्ञो विवक्षितस्तस्माच्चदतिरिक्तमीश्वरतत्त्वं नास्ति; अतएव "ईश्वरासिद्धेः"[1] इति कापिलं सूत्रम्। अनेन सूत्रेणेश्वरासिद्धिः प्रतिपाद्यते, यद्यपीदं सूत्रं वेदान्तगन्धिना विज्ञानभिक्षुणा प्रमाणाभावादिति पदाध्याहारेणेश्वरसिद्धिपरतया सूत्रमिदं व्याख्यातम्। इदञ्च पूर्वोत्तराननुगुणमिति तद्ग्रन्थपरामर्शशीलानां पुरतो न किञ्चिद् वक्तव्यमवशिष्यते। अतः प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेचनार्थं प्रवृत्तं सांख्यशास्त्रमीश्वरं न साधयति प्रत्युत प्रतिषेधति। अतएव कापिला निरीश्वरवादिनः पप्रथिरे।

इदञ्च जैमिनीयं मीमांसादर्शनमीश्वरं तार्किकादिशास्त्रवत् न साधयति, अतो मीमांसकमते ईश्वरो नाङ्गीक्रियते। अतएव निरीश्वरवादिनोऽध्वरमीमांसका इति लौकिकी प्रसिद्धिः। यद्यपि शब्दार्थसम्बन्धस्य पौरुषेयत्वपूर्वपक्षवर्णनावसरे शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धकर्त्ता ईश्वरो भवतु—इति पूर्वपक्षे कश्चन प्रकार उद्भावितः। भाष्यकृता शबरस्वामिना "शब्दार्थसम्बन्धकर्ता अपि ईश्वरो भवितुं नार्हति सिद्धवदुपदेशात्"[2] इति भाष्येण समाधानमुक्तम्। तद्-व्याख्याने सम्बन्धकर्त्ता ईश्वरो न भवतीति प्रतिपादनावसरे वार्त्तिककृता—

"यदा सर्वमीदं नासीत् क्वाऽवस्था तत्र गम्यताम्।
प्रजापतेः क्व वा स्थानं किं रूपञ्च प्रतीयताम्॥
ज्ञाता च कस्तदा तस्य यो जनान् बोधयिष्यति।
उपलब्धिं विना चैतत्कथमध्यवसीयताम्॥"[3]

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१. सांख्यसूत्र, १।९२।
२. द्र०—मीमांसा, १।१।५ (भाष्य)।
३. श्लोकवार्त्तिक १।४५,४६।

इत्यादिभिरनैकैः श्लोकैः सम्बन्धकर्ता ईश्वर इति पक्षोऽपि नोपपद्यते; अतः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धो नित्य इति व्यवस्थापितः। इदमेव (लौलिकया) लोकायतिका निरीश्वरवादिनो मीमांसका इति मूलमिति वयं मन्यामहे। तन्मूलकेषु शास्त्रदीपिकादिषु सम्बन्धकर्त्ता ईश्वरो न भवति महासृष्टिमहाप्रलययोः सद्भावे न किञ्चित्प्रमाणं प्रक्रमते। या तु मन्त्रार्थवादेषु सृष्टिप्रलयादिप्रक्रिया, सा अवान्तरसृष्ट्यवान्तरप्रलयविषया। अस्य च गमकं मत्स्यपुराणादिष्वस्तीति मन्तव्यम्। अतः प्रायश इयमेव रीतिः सर्वेषु ग्रन्थेषु दरीदृश्यते। वैदिकशिरोमणिभिर्वार्तिककारैः श्लोकवार्तिकारम्भे—

"विशुद्धज्ञानदेहाय त्रिवेदिदिव्यचक्षुषे।
श्रेयःप्राप्तिनिमित्ताय नमः सोमार्द्धधारिणे॥" इति

पद्येन मङ्गलाचरणं कृतम्। अनेन भगवांश्चन्द्रशेखर उमासहितो नमस्कृतो वार्तिककृता। अनेन सुस्पष्टमवगम्यते यत् वार्त्तिककार ईश्वरमभ्युपगच्छतीति। इदञ्च पद्यं सप्तशत्याः पूर्वाङ्गेषु पठ्यते। अत्र विद्वांसो विवदन्ते :—मार्कण्डेयपुराणस्थमिदं पद्यं कुमारिलभट्टेन गृहीतं वा कौमारिलमेव पद्यं केनचिद् विदुषा कीलके योजितमिति।

अत्र वयं ब्रूमः—तत्रत्यमेव पद्यं श्लोकवार्तिकस्योपक्रमे योजितमिति। अत्र च प्रमाणं भास्कररायदीक्षितस्य वचनमेव। यतो हि दीक्षित-महाभागः सप्तशत्या गुप्तवतीं नाम टीकाङ्कके। तत्र पूर्वोक्तं विवादमुपस्थाप्य मार्कण्डेयपुराणान्तर्गतकीलकस्तोत्रस्यादिमं पद्यमेव कुमारिलभट्टेन योजितमिति सिद्धान्तितवान्। विस्तरस्तु तत्रैव द्रष्टव्य इति।

मीमांसकपरम्परायां श्रूयते यत् तत्रभवान् कुमारिलभट्ट ईश्वरमङ्गीकरोति—इत्यत्राभियुक्ता पद्यमेकमुदाहरन्ति—

"यदीयशक्त्यनाविष्टं जगत्स्पन्दितुमक्षमम्।
युक्तिभिस्तमपह्नोतुं कः शक्तः परमेश्वरम्॥" इति।

अनेन पद्येनेदमवगम्यते—कुमारिलभट्टेनेश्वरोऽङ्गीक्रियते इति। तदीयं मतमवलम्ब्यैव शास्त्रदीपिकादिपरिभाषान्तेषु ग्रन्थेष्वीश्वरनमस्कारात्मकं मङ्गलाचरणमनुष्ठितं दृश्यते।

नव्यमतम्

अत्र केचन मीमांसकाः—वेदप्रतिपाद्यमीश्वरमङ्गीकुर्वन्तस्तार्किकाभिमतमानुमानिकमीश्वरं निराकुर्वन्ति। तेषामयम्भावः :—यत्रेश्वरनिरासो दृश्यते तत्र सर्वत्राऽपि ईश्वरसाधकानुमानस्यैव निरासः; अर्थादानुमानिकस्येश्वरस्य निरासो न तु वेदसिद्धस्य। अतो मीमांसकमते वैदिक ईश्वरो वर्त्तते एव।

/ ईश्वरनिरासस्यानुमानिकेश्वरविषयत्वेन न कोऽपि विरोध इति। अतएव भवनाथमिश्राः प्रभाकरविजये एवं ब्रवीति "यदीश्वरेऽनुमानं निरस्तं नत्वीश्वरोऽपि निरस्त इति"। एवं नव्यमीमांसकः खण्डदेवोऽपि नावमिके देवताधिकरणे सिद्धान्तोपसंहारे ब्रवीति---शब्दमात्रं देवता; मम त्वेवं वदतो वाणी दूष्यतीति हरिस्मरणमेव शरणमिति। एवं सति "वन्दे मुकुन्दं सदा" इत्यादिमङ्गलाचरणदर्शनमुपपद्यते इति। अत्रेदं चिन्त्यते---ईश्वरतत्त्वमधिकृत्य पारमार्थेषु सूत्रेषु बीजरूपेणेश्वरतत्त्वमुपक्षिप्तं प्रतिक्षिप्तमिति। तत्र "चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः", "औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थें सम्बन्धः", "चोदना पुनरारम्भः" इत्यादि[1] सूत्राणां स्थालीपुलाकन्यायेन परामर्शे सतीश्वरतत्त्वं निषिध्यत इति सुव्यक्तमवगम्यते। तथाहि चोदनासूत्रे वेदैकसमधिगम्यत्वे सति श्रेयस्साधनं धर्मस्य लक्षणमिति भाट्टमतम्। वेदार्थः कार्यरूप इति प्राभाकरमतम्। उभयत्राऽपि कार्यं धर्मो वा वेदैकसमधिगम्यः न प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणान्तरगोचरः। यदीश्वरः स्यात् स च सर्वज्ञ इत्यङ्गीकर्त्तव्यः। तस्य धर्मविषयकं ज्ञानमस्तीति उररीकर्त्तव्यः। अन्यथा सर्वज्ञत्वस्य संकोचः स्यात्। यदीश्वरमङ्गीकृत्यापि धर्मविषयकं ज्ञानं तस्य नाङ्गीक्रियते तर्हि सर्वज्ञत्वे न्यूनता स्यात्। यदि धर्मविषयकं ज्ञानं तस्याङ्गीक्रियते तर्हि वेदैकसमधिगम्यत्वमिति प्रतिज्ञा दिवं गता; एकं संधित्सोरपरं प्रच्यवते इति न्यायात्। अतो वेदैकसमधिगम्यत्वमिति प्रतिज्ञां समर्थयितुं प्रवृत्तस्य अस्य सूत्रस्येश्वरनिषेधे तात्पर्यमस्तीत्यवश्यमभ्युपेतव्यम्। एवमौत्पत्तिके सूत्रे शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धः प्रत्याय्यप्रत्यायकभावलक्षण इति व्यवस्थापितम्।

अनित्यत्वपक्षे येन शब्देन सम्बन्धग्रहः प्रतिपाद्यते तस्य शब्दस्यापि सम्बन्धग्रहः शब्दान्तरेणेति वक्तव्यम्। तस्याप्यन्येन तस्याप्यन्येनेत्यनवस्थापत्तिः। अतोऽनवस्थां परिजिहीर्षता सूत्रकृता सम्बन्धस्य नित्यत्वं समर्थितम्। अत ईश्वरनिरासोऽपि सूचितः। एवं वेदापौरुषेयत्वाधिकरणे वेदकर्तृत्वेनापीश्वरस्य स्वीकारो नोपपद्यते इति। यत्नतः प्रतिषेध्या नः पुरुषाणां स्वतन्त्रता इति।

[2]एवं "स्वर्गकामो यजेत" इत्यादौ यागस्य स्वर्गसाधनत्वमवगम्यते। यागस्य देवतोद्देशेन द्रव्यत्यागात्मकत्वात् क्षणिकत्वं सिद्धमेव। अतः क्षणिकस्य यागस्य कालान्तर्भाविस्वर्गसाधनत्वं भवितुं नार्हति। श्रूयते यागस्य स्वर्गसाधनता। श्रुतस्य यागसाधनत्वरूपस्यार्थस्योपपत्तये कालान्तरस्थायि स्वर्गजनकं किञ्चिदस्तीत्यङ्गीकर्त्तव्यम्। सा

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१. मीमांसा, २।१।५; १।१।५; १।१।२।
२. यजुर्वेद।

योग्यतारूपा, यागस्योत्तरावस्था, फलस्य पूर्वावस्था वेत्यन्या कथा। तादृशतत्त्वमर्थापत्तिप्रमाणसिद्धं भाट्टमते प्राभाकरमते चानुमानिकम्, अदृष्टस्वलक्षणम्। अतः यागस्यापूर्वद्वारा फलसाधनत्वमुपपद्यते। ईश्वरोऽस्तु मा वा। अतः कर्मण एव फलजनकत्वं, मन्त्रमयी देवतेति मीमांसकसम्मतस्य सिद्धान्तद्वयस्य समर्थनं भवति; किमन्तर्गडुना ईश्वरतत्त्वाभ्युपगमेन। अतः प्रणिहितेन मनसा सूक्ष्मेक्षया पारमर्षाणि सूत्राणि अक्षीणि निमील्य यदि परामृष्यन्ते तर्हि सुस्पष्टमवगम्यते यदीश्वरनिरासबीजं तत्र तत्रोपक्षिप्तमिति निबन्धकलेवरगौरवभिया संक्षेपेण विवेचितोऽयं विषयः।

अत्रोच्यते—

पूर्वोक्तया विचारशैल्या भाट्टप्राभाकरप्रस्थानभेदेन भिन्नानां मीमांसकानां ईश्वरसद्भावविषये ईश्वरनिरासबीजस्य सूत्रेषु तत्र तत्रोपलम्भोऽर्वाचीनानां मीमांसकानां वैदिक ईश्वरस्वीकार ईश्वरसाधकानुमाननिरासश्चेत्यादिकं विवेचितम्। साम्प्रतमिदं विचार्यते, निरीश्वरसांख्यदर्शनं यथा प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेचनाय प्रावर्तिष्ठ तथा मीमांसाशास्त्रमपि कर्मतत्त्वमधिकृत्य प्राधान्येन प्रवृत्तम्; वेदवाक्यतात्पर्यनिर्णयमुखेन वर्णाश्रमनिबन्धनत्वात् कर्मसिद्धान्तस्योपासनापरपर्यायज्ञानसहितं कर्मतत्त्वं विवेचयति। तदुपपादनाय क्षेत्रज्ञस्य कथं संसारे आगमनं, तत्र कथं वर्त्तितव्यं, किं वा कार्यं किमकार्यं वा, तस्य कर्मणा कः सम्बन्धः, कथं मुक्तिस्तत्साधनं किमित्यादि-दार्शनिकतत्त्वान्यात्मसात्कुर्वत्प्राधान्येन धर्माधर्मतत्त्वं विवेचयति। ईश्वरविचारादिकं तु प्रासङ्गिकमत ईश्वरतत्त्वविवेचनं न प्राधानिकम्। अतएव नैषधकाव्ये एकादशसर्गे क्रौञ्चद्वीपाधीश्वरवर्णनप्रसङ्गे शास्त्रकविरयं श्रीहर्षमिश्रो यथामीमांसाशास्त्रमीश्वरविषये मौनमुद्रां धत्ते स्म तथैव तस्य राज्ञो विषये दमयन्ती न किंचिदप्युक्त्वाऽग्रेऽगमत्। यथा—

वेदैर्वचोभिरखिलैर्धृतकोर्तिरत्ने हेतुं विनैव धृतनित्यपरार्थयत्ने।
मीमांसयेव भगवत्यमृतांशुमौलौ तस्मिन्महीभुजि तयानुमतिर्न मेजे ॥[1]

अनेन चेदमवगम्यते यत् मीमांसादर्शनमीश्वरविषये न किञ्चिदप्यभिधत्ते स्मेति, अर्थान्मौनमुद्रामेव धारयते स्मेति।

नैवं सति मीमांसकानां नास्तिकत्वमाशङ्कनीयम्। नहीश्वराङ्गीकारेणास्तिकत्वं, न वा तदनङ्गीकारेण नास्तिकत्वमिति। अपितु वेदप्रामाण्याभ्युपगन्तृत्वेनास्तिकत्वं, तन्निन्दकत्वेन नास्तिकत्वमित्येवास्तिकनास्तिकयोर्निर्वचनम्। "नास्तिको वेदनिन्दक" इति वाक्यमप्युपर्युक्तमेवार्थं परिपोषयति। तस्मान्मीमांसादर्शनमीश्वरसद्भावविषये उदास्ते इति शम्।

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१. नैषध ११।६४।

A STUDY OF THE NATURE OF DREAM-CONSCIOUSNESS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ITS EXPLANATION GIVEN IN THE PALI LITERATURE

DR. U. DHAMMARATNA

Dream-experience is a universal phenomenon common to man in various stages of life and civilization. Thus a child as well as a grown-up man, a savage as well as a civilized man dream. One-third of our life is spent in sleeping and dreaming. Dreams are as much an integral part of our life as the activities of our waking consciousness. Therefore the study of the nature of dream-consciousness is a study of an integral part of our life. In the present study an attempt has been made to give an idea of principal dream-explanations through the ages with special reference to that given in the Pali literature.

Significance of Dreams in Ancient Times

For the people of the ancient world the universe with all its phenomena was a great mystery. This was true of dreams also, which are of illusive nature. We can have some idea of the nature of their beliefs from the ancient records that have come down to us.

It was generally believed that dreams were caused either by external forces, i.e., spirits, ghosts and so on, or internal forces, i. e., the souls. The conception of these forces differed from country to country, from age to age. They assumed a simple form or a developed form according to the level of the civilization of the people concerned.

It was believed that when a man is in deep sleep his soul could leave the body, wander about in the external world, undergoing various experiences and then return to it. A similar conception of the soul existed among Indo-Āryans also. This conception of the soul led to the belief that a person in deep sleep should not be awakened all of a sudden, lest the soul should not have returned to the body.[1] According to them the experiences of the soul thus wandering in the atmosphere formed the basis of dreams. In keeping with this conception it was believed that when the image of a person was seen in dream, that image was not one of mere imagination but was the material and substantial image of the soul.

1. *The World of Dreams*, pp. 72, 96.

According to a belief prevalent in the Roman world in the first century B. C., the soul consisted of infinitely small particles from every cell of the body. These particles were capable of passing through the pores of the skin as freely as water passes through a sieve. Even when separated from the body, they possess the power of maintaining their form and relation intact, thus conveying messages to their centre in the body. These messages form the basis of dreams.[1] Thus similar explanations of dreams have been given in relation to similar conceptions of the soul. All these explanations, whether they are ascribed to an external or internal agency, have got a supernatural element about them.

It is clear from the above account that though the ancient people differed in their conceptions of spirits and souls, there was full agreement among them regarding the nature of dreams. All dreams were significant for them. They occured either for good or evil. They were the shadows cast by coming events. As such, for them all dreams were prophetic in nature.

There were wise men who could interpret these dreams. They devised ways and means for averting the evil effects of inauspicious dreams, and hastening the occurrence of good effects of auspicious dreams. Elaborate ceremonies were performed for the same.

Dreams and Rationalism

Man did not remain long in the infancy of his knowledge. With advancement in experience he began to realize that there are also natural causes, in addition to the supernatural ones, which give rise to these phenomena. A man goes to sleep with a heavy heart. Disturbing thoughts, in a similar form or a different form, appear in dream. He goes to sleep after taking a heavy meal with disagreeable feelings. In a state of sleep he experiences unpleasant dreams. It was further observed that similar phenomena take place under similar conditions. So he came to the conclusion that there are also natural causes, both external and internal, which can account for dream phenomena. These conceptions were still of a vague nature. Conclusions of a definite nature had yet to be reached.

From the age of faith and belief we come to the age of rationalism which gave rise to the scientific movement. Observation and experi-

1. *Dreams : What They Are and What They Mean*, p. 15.

ment became the two main pillars of the new movement. They constituted what is known as the scientific method of study.

Now all branches of human knowledge came to be studied in a new light according to the scientific method. The tangible things of the physical world were subjected to this new method in the first instance. This paved the way for the development of physical sciences. The scientific discoveries made in course of these few centuries have greatly enriched the knowledge of man regarding the physical universe.

It was only recently that the study of psychology was put on a scientific basis. Here it has to be remembered that people were greatly impressed with the development of physical sciences. Their results were of such an absorbing nature that at one stage in certain circles all importance was attached to matter. When the study of psychology was started according to the new method, this tendency came to bear upon it also. Accordingly mind was regarded as a by-product of matter. This new concept gave rise to a school of psychology called behaviourism which came to explain mental phenomena in terms of the functions of organic matter. Thus dream phenomena were interpreted as revelations of cerebral impressions.

According to this theory, by the automatic activities of the nerve cells of the brain, memories are worked up and visualized into new combinations, and dreams are revivals of actual sensory impressions either in whole or in part. Here the mental components of a dream are represented as the expressions of a random stimulation of various cortical areas by the physical process during sleep. Therefore according to this theory dream is regarded as a meaningless product of an irregular and diminished cerebral functioning.[1]

This ingenious method could not probe into the secrets of mind—the greatest of all mysteries. It lost sight of its significance. It was soon realised that though the mind is closely related to the body and (for that matter) brain, it is a world by itself with its own laws. It is a tremendous force with great possibilities. Moreover it is the physical world that is studied in terms of mind and not vice versa. So in the light of these considerations, the study of the whole subject-matter had

1. *Dreams*, pp. 17-18.

to be reorientated. It was realised that mind should be studied from a really psychological point of view and not a physiological one.

This new approach to the study of the nature of mind was also made within the limits of the scientific method. As a result, soon several new factors were brought to light. Among them the discovery of the existence of subconscious states is very important. It paved the way for that very useful branch of psychology called psycho-analysis, which has greatly helped the treatment of mental ailments. This new discovery also gave the clue to the study of the nature of dream-consciousness. Different psychologists have advanced different theories for its explanation. Among them the theory advanced by Freud is the most remarkable. He developed a technique of his own.

According to him dreams are the expressions of ungratified desires that remain latent in an unconscious state of mind. There are two aspects of a dream—the manifest content and the latent content. What appears in dreams is the manifest content. What remains behind the mind, so to say, and prompts it is the latent content. So the manifest content is a kind of projection of the latent content.

There are certain natural tendencies such as passion which arise in the mind from time to time. They are quite objectionable from the accepted social and moral standards. They are not able to function in the presence of the censorship exercised by the super-ego. They exist within the unconscious areas of the mind and give rise to wishes, longings and obsessions. During waking hours the tendencies that exercise the censorship are in full force. So they do not get outlet for their expression. However, during sleep the resistence of censorship is diminished. Here the repressed ideas get an opportunity for their expression. But it has to be noted that even here the censorship is not totally absent. So the repressed ideas cannot appear in their true form. They appear in disguise and thus evade censorship. This is the reason for the distortion of ideas in the manifest content as distinct from those in the latent content.

According to Freud, dreams are wish-fulfilments. So unlike for those psychologists who interpet dreams in terms of physiology, dreams are meaningful for him.[1]

1. *Psycho-analysis*, pp. 217-225; *Elements of Psycho-analysis*, pp. 58-98; *Psycho-analysis To-day*. pp. 151,170; *The world of Dreams*, pp. 589-580.

Here we have referred to some of the main points in the technique of dream-explanation given by Freud. He has traced the origin of most of the dreams to sex-instinct. For this reason he has come in for a lot of criticism. It is true that the system evolved by Freud is not perfect. All the same it has got to be admitted that it is comprehensive as far as it goes, and sheds light on certain types of dream which are the result of the subconscious or rather the unconscious processes of mind.

In course of this short account reference has been made to some of the principal theories of dreams prevalent from very ancient times up to the present day. In the beginning, the origin of dreams was traced to supernatural causes. They were all believed to be prophetic in nature. But with the advancement of knowledge, people came to understand that there are also natural causes, both external and internal, which give rise to certain dreams. However these conceptions were rather vague. It was on entering the age of rationalism that people came to have a clear conception of these natural causes. Next we come to the modern age in which the study of all departments of knowledge was started on a scientific basis. The study of psychology on modern lines is of recent origin. Various schools of psychology, based on different theories, came into existence. Among them some tried to account for dream-phenomena in terms of physiological explanations. But they were found unsatisfactory in many respects. Others, including Freud, gave psychological explanations with reference to the subconscious processes of mind. Even these explanations are not comprehensive. But then they have taken a step in the right direction. What is notable about the scientific explanations is that they do not give any importance to the significance of what are known as prophetic dreams. They have been explained away as mere coincidences.

With this outline of the general theories of dreams, we would now proceed to give a short account of the materials on the subject-matter as found in the Pali literature.

Dreams in the Pali Literature

In the Canonical literature there are only a few references to dreams. The post-canonical literature is more informative. The explanations given in the *Milindapañha* may be said to be the earliest and the most representative of the traditional beliefs. They may be

characterised as *Suttantika* in character. The *Sammohavinodanī*, the commentary on the *Vibhaṅga* gives an explanation of dreams from the *Ābhidhammika* point of view. In course of its comments the *Sammohavinodanī* also takes into consideration the explanations given in the *Milindapañha*. So the two accounts may be treated together here.

The dream phenomenon was one of the topics that came in for discussion between Nāgasena Thera and King Milinda. The following are the main points round which the discussion took place: 1. What is a dream? 2. How many kinds of dreams are there? 3. What is the nature of dream-consciousness?

In answering the first point, Nāgasena Thera says that dream is a suggestion that comes across the path of mind.

With reference to the second point, he says that there are six kinds of dreams, and for that matter, six kinds of people who dream—the man who dreams under the influence of *Devas* or deities, or of windy humour, or of a bilious one, or of a phlegmatic one, the man who dreams under the influence of his own mental habits, and the man who does so in the way of prognostication.[1]

The *Sammohavinodanī* includes the three kinds of dreams ascribed to the three humours in one category. So according to it there are only four kinds of dreams.[2]

According to *Milindapañha* dreams that come within the last category alone produce results. But according to the *Sammohavinodanī* certain dreams of the third category also become fruitful. It points out that those under the influence of *Devatās* or deities may dream good or bad dreams according to the purpose of the latter. In this connection it relates how a certain deity wrecked vengeance on a Thera by giving a false suggestion to him in dream. Further it also points out those who are under the influence of humours of falling from mountains, journey through space, and being surrounded by wild animals, robbers and so on.[3]

As for the third category of dreams, it is mostly the sights and sounds seen and heard in a waking state, that are experienced under the influence of mental habits. Here it is the thoughts that are most predominant in a subconscious state that appear in dream.

1. *The Questions of King Milinda*, Part 11, p. 157.
2. *Sammohavinodanī*, pp. 410-411, 3 Ibid.
3. *Jātaka-nidānakathā*, p. 64.

Dreams of the fourth and the last category, which are of a prophetic nature, are the most significant. By way of illustration, the three classical dreams recorded in the Pali literature are being cited.

The first refers to the dream of Māyā Devī on the occasion of the conception of prince Siddhārtha; the second refers to the dream of the Bodhisattva on the eve of his enlightenment[1]; and the third is ascribed to king Prasenajit of Kośala[2].

With reference to dreams of this category Nāgasena Thera says: When a man dreams a dream, that is a prognostication, his mind does not seek the dream, neither does any one else come and tell him of it. Prognostication comes of its own accord into his mind. It is like the case of a looking glass which does not go anywhere to seek for the reflection; neither does any one come and put the reflection on the looking glass. But the object reflected comes from somewhere or other across the sphere or over which the reflecting power of the looking glass extends.

With reference to the time of dreaming, which is related to the third point, the Thera says: A man does not dream either in a state of wakefulness or in deep sleep. During the one his mind is busy with all kinds of objects both internal and external. During the other, his mind has returned into itself (*bhavaṅga*), and as such it is not responsive either. Just as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will fall even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his mind has returned into itself, and it does not act, and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream. Dreams are dreamt in an intermediate state just before falling asleep and just when the mind is being overtaken by drowsiness. In this state it is able to respond to certain objects. In other words dreams are dreamt in a subconscious state of mind. Therefore it has been compared to the monkey's sleep (*kapi-niddā*) which is of a light nature.

Now we may take into consideration the relevant implications of the three main points discussed here. The first point is—what is a dream? From the answer, it is clear that it is a mental process and not a physical one.

1. *Aṅguttaranikāya*, IV, pp. 480-482.
2. *Jātakaṭṭhakathā*, No. 77.

The second point is—how many kinds of dreams are there? According to the *Milindapañha* there are six kinds of dream, and according to *Sammohavinodanī* they are only four. Materially there is no difference between the two explanations. The difference in number is due the difference in the method of classification.

The last and the third point is—what is the nature of dream-consciousness? In answer to this, it has been made clear that a man does not dream either in a state of wakefulness or in deep sleep, but in a subconscious state of drowsiness.

These dream-explanations may be compared with the principal dream theories, both ancient and modern, which have been mentioned in the beginning. The dream experiences under the influence of deities come within those explained by the most ancient theory based on supernatural causes. Those ascribed to the three-fold humour are external in nature. They are among the natural causes discovered by man at a later stage. Dreams that arise under the influence of mental habits come close to the modern psychological explanations based on the subconscious and unconscious processes of mind. The last explanation is based on the *karman* theory. It explains what are known as prophetic dreams. According to it, in a state of dream a person receives suggestions regarding the nature of coming events. They are shadows, so to say, cast by future events. These events are conditioned by his past deeds. The dreams may be auspicious or inauspicious according to the nature of deeds. The future events, thus forcast, have their causes in the past. As such they have to be included in a separate category distinct from that of the supernatural causes.

Referring to the response of mind to future events, one writer has remarked—if the inventive genius of Signor Marconi can create such a wonderful apparatus as that wireless telegraphy which includes an instrument so finely and delicately made as to be capable of catching up transmitted messages from a distance, surely the mind of man which created it, and which is therefore so much more wonderful than the apparatus or the instrument it creates, can catch up and receive from afar the transmission of thoughts.[1]

Significance of Dream Symbols

Dreams speak through symbols. Just as human language differs from country to country, so also the language of dreams differs from

1. *Dreams*, p. 40

people to people according to the symbols and the significance attached to them. This is evident from dream-records that have come down to us since very ancient times.

For instance in those countries where elephants are found, the appearance of a white elephant in dream is regarded as very auspicious. It is believed to forcast the occurrence of a very happy event of a rare nature. The dreams of the mother of prince Siddhārtha is a case in point. In India the male members of a family shave their heads on the death of their close relatives. So the occurrence of this incident in dream is an indication of the death of a near and dear one. Symbols of this nature indicate the significance of what are known as prophetic dreams.

Coming to modern times, different psychologists have interpreted dream symbols in various ways. In keeping with his own theory Freud gave almost all the symbols a sexual significance.[1] While his interpretations may be applicable to a few cases where dreams of a sexual nature are concerned, it cannot be said to be true of others. Therefore other interpretations of dream symbols have to be taken into consideration in order to account for all types of dreams.

The Ethical Value of Dreams

According to modern psychology dreams only reflect the nature of the under-current of thoughts working in the subconscious regions of mind. As such they are illusory in nature. For instance a man commits a murder in dream. On waking up he finds himself quite innocent. Therefore they come to the conclusion that dreams are illusory and without any value whatsoever. This is how one writer has put it : "In these dreams, indeed good actions are useless, and crimes harmless ; for we shall no more be condemned for visionary acts of sin, than we shall be crowned for imaginary martyrdom".[2]

The *Abhidhamma* differs a good deal from this point of view. It would contend, it is true that dreams do not correspond to the reality situation. All the same, they are mental acts. As such, though they have got no legal value, some of them have got an ethical value.

According to the *Abhidhamma* all deeds, both mental and physical, can be divided into three categories—moral, immoral and non-

1. *The Theory of Symbolism*, pp. 87-152.
2. *The World of Dreams*, p. 132.

moral. Those dreams in which a person receives suggestions of coming events belong to the non-moral category. The dreams given rise to by the predominance of the three humours may also be included in this category. On the contrary dreams given rise to by moral and immoral thoughts have ethical value. As such they have to be included in the first and second categories as the case may be. To take the above example of murder in dream, there is no actual commission of crime in it, which is a physical act. Therefore the appearance is illusory. But mentally the act has been committed to some extent. It has to be so charaterised because it takes place not in a conscious state, but in a sub-conscious state of mind.

Taking into consideration this aspect of the case, the *Abhidhamma* makes a distinction between the moral value of thoughts in a conscious state of mind on the one hand and that of a sub-conscious state of mind on the other. The thoughts in a conscious state of mind work in full force, whereas those of a sub-conscious state are weak in nature. Therefore the former alone are said to be capable of giving rise to *paṭisandhi-citta* or rebirth-consciousness, whereas the latter would bear fruits only in course of the life process (*pavatti*).[1]

Further, the nature of the moral value of dreams may be compared to that of the habitual actions. These actions are the result of doing the same thing again and again. In the beginning they are done with full awareness. In course of repetition they assume a mechanical character. All the same, the agent is responsible for results of the actions. The dreams bear somewhat a similar relation to those thoughts whose reactions they are. These thoughts point to *cittācāra* or the direction in which the mind of a person works. Therefore they have their importance in the totality of the character of a person.

What the Buddha Said About Dreams

In certain discourses of the Buddha, there are references to dreams. In the *Brahmajāla* and *Sāmaññaphala suttas*[2], the profession of dream-interpretation has been included in the list of wrong livelihoods. Those who followed such professions have been characterised as cheats and charlatans. He advised his disciples not to follow such practices and professions. In the *Tuvaṭaka-sutta* he says—*āthabbanaṁ supinaṁ*

1. *Sammohavinodanī*, p. 412.
2. *Dīghanikāya*, I, pp. 10, 59.

lakkhaṇaṁ, no vidahe atho pi nakkhattaṁ[1]—among other things the disciple is not to take to the practice of dream-interpretation.

Here the question may be raised that when there are such clear statements of the Master on the subject-matter, is it not contradictory to ascribe dream interpretations to him[2] ? This may be answered as follows : if the sayings ascribed to the Buddha are his own, it means that he also believed that there are certain dreams which are prophetic in nature. This can be reconciled with the *karman* doctrine, which is one of the essential principles of Buddhism too. If so, why did he condemn dream-interpretation ? Several reasons may be advanced for this attitude :

In the first place, when practised as a profession, there is much scope for exploitation in such matters as dream-interpretation. Even in medical profession which is based on science there are quacks. In matters like dream-interpretation, which cannot be subjected to the strictest of the canons of scientific explanation, there is scope for obscurantism. As a result the unscrupulous persons make them a profession to exploit the credulous people. Even in this modern age of science there is no dearth of such persons. We could just imagine how large their number would have been in the 5th century B. C.

In the second place, granted that there is some truth in the predictions made by those who are well-versed in it, reliance on them makes the mind weak and takes it away from human effort. When we go through his discourses, it becomes quite clear that the Buddha was always against such practices which would make a man morally weak.

After all, the people in general are anxious to know about future events destined to affect them, in order to ward off their evil effects by performing certain rites and rituals suggested by those who are supposed to be versed in them. Now according to the Buddha evil has to be counteracted by good. To use the traditional expression, *akusala* has to be overcome by *kusala*. The external performances have a significance, if any, only so far as they have a bearing on the cultivation of *kusala*. Therefore he used to say—be good and do good, and the rest will take care of themselves.

In the light of the above remarks, we can understand the significance of the interpretation of the sixteen dreams ascribed to Lord

1. *Khuddakanikāya*, I, p. 412.
2. Interpretations of dreams mentioned in the *Mahāsupina-jātaka* are ascribed to the Buddha. *Jātaka*, I, pp. 18-19.

Buddha in the *Mahāsupina-jātaka.*[3] They emphasise the fact that so long as the rulers, sages and the people in general are on the right path, they need not fear the higher powers.

Whether these interpretations in question were made by the Buddha or put into the mouth of the Master by the later disciples, they are in keeping with the spirit of the tradition. This is the only case of dream-interpretation ascribed to the Buddha. A significant reference to dreams has been made by the Buddha in the *Mettasutta.*[1] While explaining the good results that would follow from the practice of *mettā-bhāvanā*, he says : *sukhaṁ supati sukhaṁ paṭibujjhati, na pāpakaṁ supinaṁ passati*—one who practises loving kindness would sleep happily, wake up happily and would not have bad dreams. Here the obvious reference is to the influence of *mettā-bhāvanā* on the subconscious state of mind.

The Persons Who Do Not Dream

The Pali tradition has given thought to this point also. According to it all those who haven't realised the true nature of things, and for that matter the ultimate reality, are subject to dream-experiences. Of course, the nature of their dreams would differ according to the degree of their moral and spiritual development. In other words, those who are still under delusion have to undergo these experiences. This again means that those who are in *sammoha-niddā* or the sleep of delusion have dreams, whereas the Awakened Ones do not have them. Accordingly no dreams have been ascribed either to the Master or the *arahantas*, his enlightened disciples.[2] This position is supported by all the Indian systems with the exception of that of the Cārvākas who believed in the reality of the empirical world alone.

1. *Aṅguttaranikāya*, iv, p. 388.
2. *Sammohavinodanī*, p. 411.

A PERSPECTIVE FOR THE STUDY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

DR K. K. DIKSHIT

The study of Indian philosophy is an inter-disciplinary venture; but the fact is seldom seriously realized. Indian philosophy is a product of the Indian society as it has evolved during the course of so many centuries (rather millennia) and that is why its study ought to form a part of the study of Indian history in general. Similarly, insofar as philosophization is one of the cultural activities that a people might possibly undertake, the study of Indian philosophy ought to form a part of the study of Indian culture in general. Again, since almost the entire philosophical literature of India is in Sanskrit, the study of Indian philosophy ought to form a part of Sanskrit studies in general. Lastly, since Indian philosophy grapples with the very same problems as all philosophy is supposed to, the study of Indian philosophy ought to form a part of philosophical studies in general. But this is what ought to be while as it stands the situation is rather different and disturbing. For in our country it is too often taken for granted that study of a general historical or a general cultural background has little to do with the study proper of a philosophfcal system, Indian or otherwise. And yet it is a fact that some of the most conspicuous features of Indian philosophy—as of any other philosophy that deserves serious study—are due to the specific histories—cultural features of the environment in which the philosophers concerned took up their task. Then there is the neglect of the language aspect on the part of certain students of Indian philosophy whose superficial acquaintance with Sanskrit compels them to behave as if all that is worthwhile in an Indian philosophical text is concentrated in its those few sentences which they have somehow managed to follow. Lastly, there are specialists in Sanskrit who would seek to square out meaning from the words of an Indian philosophic text, working under the serious misimpression that the problems dealt with by Indian philosophers are unique in an absolute sense of the term, that is, in the sense that they bear no resemblance to those dealt with by philosopers elsewhere. How to make this dismal reality move in the direction of the cherished ideal is a problem of some magnitude.

Let us work out in brief the precise manner in which a student of Indian history, a student of Indian culture, a student of Sanskrit and a student of philosophy can join hands with a view to enriching our understanding of the contents of Indian philosophy. To take the four disciplines one by one :

(1) The students of Indian history should give thought to the question if in the case of each different period of Indian history the specific features of the social situation were not somehow responsible for the specific features exhibited by the philosophy rather philosophies produced in this period. On close study it will be found that the two sets of features are definitely related but that the relationship is full of complexities. It is these complexities that are going to be the researcher's feast.

(2) Similarly the students of Indian culture should try to see if the performance of our artists and literateurs—that is, of our architects, sculptors, painters. musicians. dramatists, poets, rhetoricians, grammarians—has any light to throw on that of our philosophers. And in this case too the search will be doubtless rewarding. For in India, as elsewhere, the philosophical activities of people have been a part and parcel of their cultural activities in general.

(3) Again, the students of Sanskrit should classify the Indian philosophical texts on the basis of their relative maturity of expression. This will reveal how rich and varied—both from the point of view of style, of composition and from that of content—our philosophical heritage has been.

(4) Lastly, students of philosophy should examine the findings of Indian philosophers. Naturally, these students will be having their own likes and dislikes so far as philosophical standpoints are concerned, but a scholarly appraisal of the systems of Indian philosophy undertaken by those sympathising with the different philosophical standpoints of our times—e. g., by those sympathising with neo-Kantianism, neo-Hegelianism, Logical Positivism, Existentialism, neo-Thomism, Marxism—will be a task well worthwhile.

The details of this fourfold task are to be formulated by the students of Indian history. Indian culture, Sanskrit and philosophy in intimate co-operation with one another, However, a few broad

hints in this connection will not be out of place even now. To take the four aspects of the task one by one :

(1) The students of Indian history are quite familiar with the problem of periodizing Indian history, but few students of Indian philosophy suspect that the history of Indian philosophy too needs periodization and one that is closely linked with the periodization of Indian history in general. As is the case with every growing organism, with the passage of time India's socio-political structure became more and more complex and the same is true of the content of India's philosophical literature. But just as India's socio-political structure as it emerged in a particular period of her history had its unique type of complexity, so also did the content of India's philosophical literature as it came to be composed in a particular period of her history has its unique type of complexity. Thus in the history of Indian philosophy (rather in the self-conscious phase of the history of Indian philosophy) the age of early Upaniṣads. Buddha and Mahāvīra, the age of Uddyotakara, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, the age of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Gaṅgeśa, and our own modern age have run parallel to the corresponding ages of India's history in general. In what precise sense the philosophical literature of these various ages is a product appropriate to its time is a matter worthy of serious investigation.

(2) Nor is the growth of India's philosophical literature unrelated to the growth of other cultural pursuits undertaken by her illustrious sons. As a matter of fact, a student of India's art, fine literature and literary sciences will be benefied much if he studies how in there various fields there were manifested the contemporary social reality on the one hand and the contemporary philosophical outlook on the other. To take the example of fine literature, the age of early Upaniṣads, Buddha and Mahāvīra is also the age of Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa the age of Uddyotakara, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti also the age of Kālidāsa, Bhāravi and Bhavabhūti the age of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Gaṅgeśa also the age of Māgha, Śrīharṣa and the vernacular Bhakta poets ; and that this should be so is hardly accidental.

(3) Broadly speaking, India's philosophical literature is the creation of three long-standing traditions—viz., Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jaina—and the major part of it is in Sanskrit (the exception being the Pali philosophical works of the Buddhists and the Prakrit

philosophical works of the Jainas). And the noteworthy thing is that this threefold philosophical literature is not only written in one and the same language but it also follows one and the same style of argumentation—which may rarly be called the 'Indian style of philosophical argumentation'. To master this 'style'—so as to be able to translate an Indian philosophical text into the spoken languages of our times—is a special task of those who specialise in Sanskrit.

(4) However, the Indian philosophical texts need not only translation into the spoken languages of our time but also translation into what may be called the 'philosophical language' of our times. And this latter type of translation is a special task of those who specialise in philosophy. Needless to say, this 'philosophical language' is not a monopoly of some particular school of philosophy but a common property of all the Schools of philosophy, however critical of one another.

These hints should go some way to give concrete form to the perspective that is here being placed before the students of Indian philosophy.

SELF-LUMINOSITY

DR SITANATH GOSWAMI

A thing can be said to exist only if we are aware of it. We are not entering into the problem whether a thing can exist independently of the knower, that is to say, unknown by any person. It is the position of the idealist that the existence of a thing is constituted by the knowledge of it and a thing unknown by any mind is an impossibility. This is rather a metaphysical question and has very little bearing on the epistemological problem viz., what makes existence known. If we are not aware of anything and have no means to be aware of it, we shall not be in a position to make any assertion regarding its existence or otherwise. It is a truism that when a thing is known it is known to be existent. The proof of the existence of the thing, therefore, consists in the knowledge of it (*mānādhīnā meya-siddhiḥ.*)

The position seems too obvious. But what about the knowledge which is supposed to furnish the proof of the knowledge of the thing known by it ? Knowledge is also a fact and existent. What is the proof of its existence ? Does its existence require to be proved by another cognition as is the case with the object of it ? If one cognition requires another cognition to prove its existence the question will be shifted to the second cognition. Does it require a third cognition to make itself konwn ? If so, the result will be a *regressus ad infinitum*[1].

The logician of the Nyāya school maintains that the proof of a fact lies in the cognition of it. A cognition is likewise a fact and as such is subject to the same necessity. Yet, this does not involve infinite regress. When a person perceives a pen he becomes aware of the pen's existence and by virtue of it he can affirm "The pen exists". This assertion of the pen's existence pertains only to the pen and is non-committal with regard to the cognition though it is a proof of it. It is enough that the cognition occurs and it is not necessarily known. The cognition and the object are equally hard facts so far as their self-existence is concerned. Neither of them can certify by itself its own existence. This can be done by their cognition. A pen can be asserted to exist when one knows it. So also with regard to the

1. अनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वेऽनवस्थापातात्—चित्सुखी, पृ० १५ ।

cognition of the pen. It can be asserted to exist only if that cognition is cognised. The cognition in question is as much unable to cognise itself as the pen.

But how can an unknown cognition make its object known? The Naiyāyika asserts that a cognition does not require to be cognised by itself or another cognition in order to be able to make its object known. The mere occurrence of the cognition is the sufficient condition. It is the proof of the pen but the proof does not require to be proved. So far as its capacity for proving the object is concerned it is inherent in the cognition and the proof of the cognition is entirely irrelevant.

But the problem does not seem to admit of such an easy and facile solution. If the cognition remains uncognised while it reveals the object, what is then the warrant for positing its occurrence as a fact? Certainly a fact which is unknown cannot be supposed to exist. A fact of which a person is unaware is as good as non-existent to him. How can any assertion, positive, or negative, be possibly made regarding a fact of which there is no evidence at all? Udayana, of course, has anticipated this difficulty and in defence of an unknown cognition argues that though the cognition may not be known when it is at work, it is not unknowable. It can be known, if an enquiry arises by inference or memory. But this defence does not ease our scruples. What is the basis of this inference? The object is supposed to be made known by an unknown cognition. If it be supposed that the act of revelation of the object is the effect of the unknown cognition, then, of course, the cognition may be inferred. But what makes the causal relation between them known to us? If the cognition be not known at the time of its occurrence and when it actually throws light on a previously unknown object, we shall have no means to relate the two events as cause and effect. As regards memory, that also does not seem to be of any help. There can be recollection of the object known before but not of the cognition which remained unknown.

Let us suppose that introspection proves the cognition in question. Introspection is a cognition of the cognition. But we feel impelled to ask the logician whether a cognition is known by introspection as a matter of universal necessity. If so, the first cognition must be known at the second moment. But the supposition that the first cognition is known by the second cognition and not by itself must have a *raison d' etre*. Why should we posit it at all? As we have observed the postula-

tion of a thing is justified only by its awareness. But as the second cognition is supposed to remain unknown we have no reason to suppose that it is a fact. So, the theory of introspection only shifts the centre of gravity one step further and our problem remains as it is.

Let us waive the question of the proof of the second cognition and assert for the sake of argument that the second cognition necessarily springs up at the rear of the first cognition immediately after its occurrence. This supposition will explain that a cognition is necessarily known and thus there will be no difficulty regarding the retrospection of the cognition and its content. But this admission will take away all the force of the plea that an unknown cognition is necessarily known to reveal its object by another cognition after its occurrence. This will virtually amount to the admission that a cognition is cognised along with its object, which is the position of the Vedāntists and others. The interval of a moment is psychologically indiscernible. And logically also it does not help the Naiyāyika maintain his position that an unknown cognition reveals an object. The question of the proof of existence of an unknown cognition has constrained him to point to a second cognition as the proof of the first. But the postulation of a second cognition unknown is again open to the same difficulty. The second cognition is an unproved assumption and if a third cognition is to be posited in order to prove the second, the former will also be an unwarranted supposition standing in need of a proof. So, no improvemeut is effected by the postulation of a series of cognitions in which the last is bound to remain unknown and unproved. If the last cognition is also to be known, it will not be the last and will only end in a vicious infinite series.

This difficulty was realised by Udayana. He accordingly contended in defence that there is no necessity for a cognition being known in order to make the object known. An unknown cognition will serve the purpose. But it does not mean that an unknown cognition is without a proof. The proof is found if there is an enquiry and desire for it in the second cognition. And if there be again a desire for finding a proof of the latter, the third cognition will furnish the same. So, it does not necessarily lead to a vicious infinite series.

This seems to be a plausible explanation. But the defence is only an apparent show. The proof of an unknown cognition is supposed to be furnished by the second cognition if there be an enquiry

about it. But an inquiry is not possible with regard to a fact which is absolutely unknown. An inquiry is a desire to know and one can desire for only a specific knowledge of a fact which is known in general. But the first cognition is supposed to remain unknown when it occurs. *Ex hypothesi* the first cognition is unknown in its entirety. So, how can a person feel a desire for it ? The concession that a desire is felt amounts to the admission that it (the cognition) is not unknown. So, this contention is suicidal.

The theory that a cognition is known by another cognition is thus found to be riddled with insuperable difficulties. So, it must be admitted that if a cognition is to be known by another cognition, the existence of cognition will remain unproved. Thus the postulation of an unknown cognition involves self-contradiction. That a cognition does not go uncognised as soon as it is born is proved by a scrutiny of psychological evidence. If a cognition remained uncognised at the time that it makes the object known, it might give rise to doubt or opposite conviction or conviction of its non-existence. Thus after the occurrence of a cognition, an inquisitive person may entertain doubt whether a cognition has occurred or not. Or, it may be possible to suppose that he may have an opposite belief or a belief that no such thing has happened. But all these suppositions are belied by evidence of psychology. Thus, when a person is asked whether he has seen a horse running, he answers in the affirmative that has had such an experience. He does not waver or make an opposite assertion. This shows that a cognition as soon as it occurs is *eo ipso* known.[1] As it is not known by another cognition or even by itself it must be held to be self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*). If, on the other hand, it is held to be known by a subsequent cognition as a matter of necessity, the emergence of a *regressus ad infinitus* would become inevitable. The knowing cognition must not be unknown since an unknown cognition is unproved and unprovable and the postulation of such a fact is unwarranted on all accounts.

Now, what does the word self-luminosity or *svaprakāśatva* exactly signify ? Is it the co-ordination of the two constituents of the

1. "अनुभूतिरर्थप्रकाशनसमये यदि न प्रकाशेत तथा सत्यनन्तरक्षणे जिज्ञासोस्तत्र सन्देहो विपर्ययो वा विपरीतप्रमा वोदियात् । न च कश्चिदमुमद्राक्षीस्त्वो वा भवानिति पृष्टोऽनन्तरक्षणे सन्दिग्धे विपर्यस्यति संविदभावं वा प्रमिणोति, किन्तु निश्चिनोत्येव 'इदमहमद्राक्षम्' इति । तेन प्रकाशमानैवानुभूतिरर्थव्यवहारं जनयतीति युक्तम् ।" चित्सुखी, पृ० १६ ।

word *sva* meaning existence and *prakāśa*, meaning illumination—in one single entity[1] ? Our objects of experience though existent lack the quality of illumination and accordingly lose the status of self-luminosity. Knowledge being existent as also luminous comes under the domain of this definition. This definition is refuted on the ground that the Naiyāyikas also, admitting knowledge to be cognisable by introspection, will be able to recognise it (knowledge) as *svapakāśa* on the basis of its possessing the necessary attributes of existence and illumination. But in this case, the definition will be bereft of its very essence which marks off *svaprakāśa* from *paraprakāśa*—one being independent of another knowledge and the other being dependent.

Another attempt is made to give an appropriate definition. That which is its own illumination is *svaprakāśa* i. e., one at the same time both illuminant and illumined becomes self-luminous.[2] This is not tenable on the ground that one single object can never be the subject as well as the object of one and the same action at one and the same time.[3] The potter being the creator of the pot cannot be the object of that very act of pot-making. And the object of the act i. e., the pot can in no way also happen to be the subject of that act. To think of this and to argue in this line will betray sheer ignorance of the opponent.

The third definition put forward is that self-luminous is something which is not illuminated by any homogeneous illumination.[4] Our objects of experience e. g., pots and tables being illuminated by knowledge fail to fulfil the condition of lacking in the quality of being illuminated by any illumination. The word, *sajātīya* serves an important purpose in demarcating self-luminous from the known or cognised knowledge of the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas contend that knowledge or awareness being cognised or illumined by introspection possesses, in common with its illuminator (introspection), the attribute of awareness, as introspection is nothing but an awareness of awareness. The knowledge of the Naiyāyikas being thus illuminated by homogeneous illumination is excluded from the scope of this definition which will exclusively mean the knowledge uncognised.

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1. स्वञ्चासौ प्रकाशश्च स्वप्रकाशः—चित्सुखी, पृ० २ ।
2. स्वस्य स्वयमेव प्रकाशः—चित्सुखी, पृ० ३ ।
3. कर्मकर्तृभावविरोधेन लक्षणस्यासम्भवात्—चित्सुखी पृ० ४ ।
4. सजातीयप्रकाशाप्रकाश्यत्वम्—चित्सुखी, पृ० ३ ।

To this the opponents urge that this definition also suffers from defects. In the first place, the lamp being itself luminous requires no homogeneous (*sajātīya*) lamp for its own illumination. So, the definition is too wide. Again, the pot, being illuminated by the lamp or the knowledge of the pot, becomes illumined no doubt but as this lamp or knowledge is not homogeneous to the pot, it is evident that the pot is not illuminated by *homogeneous* illumination. The heterogeneity of the lamp and the pot or the knowledge of the pot and the pot is proved by the fact that one possesses the quality of pot-hood whereas the other lacks it. This deficiency has been done away with by contending that the homogeneity between the pot and lamp or the pot and its knowledge in possessing the attribute of existence can easily be shown and thereby the definition may prove fruitful. But this measure also can in no way be helpful inasmuch as the adjunct *sajātīya* in that case becomes useless. The word *prakāśa* in this definition serves that purpose as illumination without existence is an impossibility.

The fouth definition is placed with necessary modifications but unfortunately this also cannot stand the test of the opponents' inquiries. *Svaprakāśa*, they plead, is that whose very existence cannot go without illumination.[1] The objects like the jars and cloths are not necessarily luminous but they are so only on the occasion of their relation with any luminous object like the lamp or the sun. Such dependent luminosity is distinguished from the independent luminosity of the sun or the lamp. This definition also falls to the ground; for happiness and sorrow also come under the fold of ;this definition. They being illuminable by Sākṣin, which is ever-present, are illuminated without exception.

Next, another definition is presented, which characterises *svaprakāśa* as something which becomes the condition of its own use, combining with it the quality of luminosity.[2] This attempt also of defining *svaprakāśatva* has become abortive since the lamps etc. also become the condition of their own use and also contain the quality of luminosity. If in countenance to the above definition it is held that the word '*sva*' in the definition signifies knowledge, then though it is relieved of this defect, another creeps in. The introspection of the Naiyāyikas becoming a condition of the awareness of the knowledge

1. स्वसत्तायां प्रकाशव्यतिरेकविरहितत्वम्—चित्सुखी, पृ० ३-४।
2. स्वव्यवहारहेतुप्रकाशत्वम्—चित्सुखी, पृ० ४।

and itself being luminous makes the definition once more polluted. Again, in the judgement "It is the knowledge of the lamp", the object of knowledge i. e., the lamp also becomes one of the conditions of the knowledge and possesses its character of illumination. So, it is again refuted. Further, it is questioned whether this quality of forming the conditions (of knowledge) is a necessary attribute or merely casual ? The first alternative is untenable because in time of salvation or total annihilation (*pralaya*) all things and attributes being extinct, this one cannot be an exception to that. And is this attribute of casual attribute (*upalakṣitatva*) again necessary or casual or its own nature ? In the first alternative, the previous defect will recur. In the second, accidens being accident will involve the defect of *regressus ad infinitum*. In the third, the attribute of forming the condition (of knowledge) being casual and this attribute in casual attribute being its nature, the attribute of forming the condition (of knowledge) will submerge with knowledge and the definition will be reduced to the following shape—knowledge is illumination. It is superfluous to mention that this definition will defeat the very purpose of it, as the Naiyāyikas also in their turn will admit it.[1]

That which is not the object of any knowledge is called self-luminous.[2] This definition apparently seems to be free from defects. *Svaprakāśa*, as opposed to *paraprakāśa*, is something which is not illumined by any other agent. This definition also exhibits that self-luminous is not the object of any knowledge i.e., not illumined by any other knowledge.

The most serious criticism levelled against this definition is that an entity which cannot be the object of any knowledge is *a fortiori* cannot be the object of perception or inference or any other valid means of knowledge and the absence of which will nullify the very existence of the entity. Again, this is exposed to an obvious criticism that anything like a barren woman's son cannot be called *svaprakāśa* on the ground that it is incapable of being the object of any sort of knowledge. And, now it is argued that such epithets must carry some meaning

1. व्यवहारहेतुत्वं विशेषणमुपलक्षणं वा ? नाद्यः, मुक्तिप्रलयादावप्राप्तेः। न द्वितीयः, उपलक्षितत्वस्यापि विशेषणत्वे प्रागुक्तदोषानुषङ्गात्। स्वरूपमात्रत्वे तु ज्ञानं प्रकाश इत्येव स्यात्। तथा सति न लक्षणसिद्धिः।—चित्सुखी, पृ० ५।
2. ज्ञानाविषयत्वम्—चित्सुखी, पृ० ४।

otherwise how could we use the epithet, had it been bereft of any meaning ? To this it is held that such epithets are known as *vikalpa* and have the semblance of meaning only.

In order to get rid of this charge when the definition is a little mended it assumes the following form—that which is not the object of any knowledge but perceived is self-luminous.[1]

It is needless to mention that such definition is not tenable ; for mutual contradiction is involved in the two parts of the definition—*jñānāviṣaya* and *aparokṣa*. Anything perceived is necessarily an object of knowledge. And that which is not an object of knowledge can in no way be perceived.

With a bit amendment this definition is again presented. "That which is object of empiric usage and is not the object of any knowledge is defined to be self-luminous". But such effort is of no avail as the object of empiric usage necessarily becomes object of knowledge. It is absurd to maintain that I use this even without any knowledge of it. Usage presupposes knowledge. So, this definition suffers from the defect of impossibility. Further, the Supreme consciousness i.e., Brahman being not object of any usage will be excluded from this definition. The Vedāntins in this case will be in a piteous condition inasmuch as their only self-luminous being i.e., Brahman will be excluded from the scope of this definition. Again, according to the Prābhākara school, the unison of the silver and the conch-shell though object of usage is not the object of knowledge as they hold that the lack of knowledge of the absence of the union is the object of knowledge. So, this union of the silver and the conch-shell comes under this definition.

The ninth definition reaches towards perfection and contains the essential element or quintessence of *svaprakāśatva* viz., *avedyatva*. Self-luminous though not an object of knowledge is capable of being an object of perceptual use.[2]

The obvious charge against this definition consists in its possessing both the contradictory qualities like "not being an object of knowledge" and "being object of perceptual cognition". Again, this quality of "being an object of perceptual use" being an attribute fails to remain

1. ज्ञानाविषयत्वे सत्यपरोक्षत्वम्—चित्सुखी, पृ० ४।
2. व्यवहारविषयत्वे सति ज्ञानाविषयत्वम्—चित्सुखी, पृ० ४।

present in Brahman, the only defined of the definition of *svaprakāśa* and consequently renders the definition too narrow or rather impossible.

Similarly, "capable of being an object of perceptual use" is not a fruitful amendment. But the negative approach of explaining it to be "non-substratum for the eternal and absolute negation of the capability of perceptual use" is deemed by Citsukhācārya faultless.[1]

Such capability may be absent during the time of total annihilation or salvation but its presence at any time will establish that it is a non-substratum for the *eternal* and absolute negation of capability. The Naiyāyikas also had to have recourse to such negative approach in defining a substance. Substance, they define, is substrate of a quality. But his definition is open to exception inasmuch as the jar at the moment of its production lacks any sort of quality. Logical necessity has compelled the Naiyāyikas to postulate such a qualitiless stage of the jar. The jar being the material cause of the qualities e. g., colour and shape, taste etc. must precede those qualities at least by one moment (*kṣaṇa*). The jar of this moment involves the defect of too narrow definition, for at that moment it is divested of any sort of quality. The Naiyāyika then makes his way out by explaining the expression "substrate of a quality" in the following manner. That which is not the substrate of the absolute negation of quality is called a substance (*guṇātyantābhāvānadhikaraṇam*). The jar at the moment of production may be qualitiless but absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) of quality is not possible in regard to the jar. The absence of quality in the first moment does not necessitate the absence of the quality for ever. So it cannot be said to be a substrate of the absolute negation of quality.

It may very well be mentioned here that the Naiyāyikas like Udayana etc. hold that absolute negation cannot have its stay in the substrate of destruction and pre-negation (*prāgabhāva*). The quality of the jar is absent for the first moment only. At the second moment the quality will appear. So, the absence of this quality can never be opined as absolute absence or absolute negation of quality.

Nṛsimhāśramamuni, the author of *Advaita-dīpikā*, finds out

1. अवेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यतायास्तल्लक्षणत्वात्। न च योग्यतालक्षणधर्माङ्गीकारेऽव्याप्तिर्मोक्षदशायां तदसम्भवादपसिद्धान्तापत्तिश्चेति शङ्कनीयं, योग्यतात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणत्वस्य तत्त्वात्।—चित्सुखी, पृ० ६।

objections in this definition also in so far as it shows that Brahman, the only *svaprakāśa* entity, does not possess the enternal and absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) of capability (of perceptual use) i. e., *yogyatā*. This capability being distinct from Brahman should necessarily be a false entity i. e., it should remain absent in its own locus, Brahman, as the silver in its own locus, shell. To eradicate this charge, the author of *Advaita-dīpikā* upholds that this eternal and absolute negation is worldly, *vyāvahārika* and thus is presumed to be absent in the Supreme entity. But in that case it is incumbent on us to admit that there is a real absolute negation in Brahman in which case Monism is lost. Thus the definition of *svaprakāśatva* remains vulnerable.[1] Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaita-siddhi* seeks an explanation by characterizing this eternal and absolute negation as incompatible with capability (*yogyatvavirodhī*). That the negation which is found in the negation of shell-silver is not incompatible is proved from the fact that negation of silver resides in the locus of silver.[2] Now, what does the word "*avedya*" or "not being an object of knowledge" exactly signify ?

In the Vedānta system, in every perceptual knowledge two-fold functions are acknowledged. The act of rending the veil of ignorance (*āvaraṇā'bhibhava*) is known as the object of *vṛtti* and the union with manifest knowledge (*abhedā'bhivyakti*) is called the consequence or result (*phala*). The "*avedyatva*" in the definition of *svaprakāśa* connotes the attribute of not being the object of the result (*phalā'vyāpyatva*). The opponents animadvert that if this be the meaning of *avedya* then the jar before me being object of *vṛtti* fails to become the object of the result and becomes *avedya*. But the charge falls to the ground by the simple observation that the jar in the time of being object of *vṛtti* becomes the object of the result also. Without the portion of *avedya* the jar etc. would have been in the fold of this definition. Again, the first part only cannot constitute the definition of *svaprakāśa* because in that case the past and the future objects, also *dharma* and *adharma* being incapable of any perceptual knowledge would have to be ipcluded in this definition. Some oppose that these merits and demerits (*dharmādharma*)

1. न च व्यावहारिको योग्यतात्यन्ताभावो ब्रह्मणि नेति वाच्यम्, ब्रह्मातिरिक्तस्य तस्य व्यावहारिकत्वात् ।—अद्वैतदीपिका, पृ० ४१३ ।
2. योग्यत्वविरोध्यत्यन्ताभावस्य विवक्षितत्वात्, स्वाश्रयनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावस्य मिथ्यात्वप्रयोजकस्य स्वाश्रयनिष्ठत्वेनैवाविरोधित्वात् ।—अद्वैतसिद्धि, पृ० ७६८ ।

cannot be held to to be incapable of being the object of any knowledge (*avedya*) because Scriptures reveal these things before us. The Vedāntist makes him acquitted of the charge on the plea that *phala-vyāpyatva* or being the object of the result should be the only criterion for *vedyatva*. Nor can anybody vilify this definition maintaining that the merits and demerits are capable of the perception of the ascetics. The ascetics can see only things which are visible but they cannot create visibility in the invisible. So, they cannot transgress the natural barrier of invisibility[1]. Thus to save the definition from being too wide the latter part must be inserted.

The concept *phala-vyāpyatva* has been defined by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī as being endowed with an excess produced by the knowledge reflected on the *vṛtti* or as being the object of the manifest locus knowledge by the function of *vṛtti* or by the function of the knowledge reflected on the *vṛtti*. Neither the rending of the veil nor the usage is meant by the excess produced by the knowledge. The relation with the unveiled knowledge is the exact meaning of *phala-vyāpyatva*. The self being knowledge itself remains indistinct from this unveiled knowledge and so cannot be in relation with this unveiled knowledge since relation will presuppose the divergence between the two related. Again, the self, which is incapable of being the object of knowledge, remains *phalāvyāpya*.[2]

Now let us resume our discussion on the definition of self-luminosity. The definition of Citsukhācārya is vitiated by Nṛsiṁhāśramamuni on the ground that the attribute of not being the locus of eternal negation (*atyantābhāvānadhikaraṇatva*) is absent during salvation since in salvation there is total absence of all attributes. Thus the definition offered by Citsukha is proved vicious. Again, Brahman being the locus of each and every object, which is false, there will necessarily be the eternal negation (*atyantābhāva*) of each and every object in

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1. यत्राप्यतिशयो दृष्टः स स्वार्थानतिलङ्घनात् ।
दूरसूक्ष्मादिदृष्टौ स्यान्न रूपे श्रोत्रवृत्तिता ॥—श्लोकवार्तिक, चोदनासूत्र, का० ११४ ।

2. वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचिज्जन्यातिशययोगित्वं वृत्त्या तत्प्रतिफलितचिता वाऽभिव्यक्ताधिष्ठानचिद्विषयत्वं वा फलव्याप्यत्वम् । चिज्जन्यातिशयश्च नावरणभङ्गो नापि व्यवहारो विवक्षितः, किन्तु भग्नावरणचित्सम्बन्धः । स च घटादावस्ति, नात्मनि; सम्बन्धस्य भेदगर्भत्वात् । एवमुक्तचिद्विषयत्वमपि भेदघटितं, नात्मनि ।
—अद्वैतसिद्धि, पृ० ७६९ ।

Brahman. Falsity means the presence of its eternal negation in its own locus. For example, when we say the silver is false, it means that there is the eternal negation of the silver in its own locus (shell). So when everything of this world including 'capability' (*yogyatā*) is admitted to be false, and when only Brahman will be the locus of this false capability, it is necessary that there will be the eternal negation of capability in its locus, Brahman. Thus Brahman becomes the locus (*adhikaraṇa*) of the eternal negation of capability whereas in the definition of self-luminosity it is urged that Brahman will *not* be the locus of the eternal negation of capability (*yogyatātyantābhāvānadhikaraṇa*). In this way the definition proposed by Citsukhācārya is proved faulty.

Nṛsiṁhāśrama proposes a definition which is completely new. "That which is not the object of knowledge is self-luminous"—is the definition presented by Nṛsiṁhāśramamuni in his *Advaita-dīpikā*.[1] Everything except knowledge itself may be the object of knowledge. So only knowledge can come under the domain of this definition. Knowledge is one and without a second. Knowledge, in order to be the object of knowledge, necessitates the acceptance of some duality in it, which is inadmissible.

A pertinent question may now be asked—how can the merits and demerits (*dharma* and *adharma*) and the future events be excluded from the fold of this definition ? In answer it is said that the merits and demerits and the future events also are objects of knowledge inasmuch as some sort of *vṛtti* (mental metamorphosis) originates in those cases also. The *vṛtti* in the shape of the merits and demerits or the future events being determinant (*avacchedaka*) of knowledge is a medium through which these merits etc. have become determinant of knowledge itself. Hence these have become objects of knowledge and no question arises of their being self-luminous.

Nṛsiṁhāśramamuni, however does not totally cancel the definition of Citsukhācārya. The first portion of Citsukhācārya's definition viz., "That which is incapable of being an object of knowledge and is capable of being an object of perceptual use" should be known as the definition of self-luminosity and the latter half should be conjoined only to avoid the defect of a too narrow definition.[2] The definition, as it

1. संविदविषयत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वम्—अद्वैतदीपिका, पृ० ४२३ ।
2. अथवाऽवेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यतात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणत्वमित्याचार्यीयमपि लक्षणमस्तु । तत्र च योग्यतान्तं लक्षणम् । अत्यन्ताभावानधिकरणत्वांशस्तु ब्रह्मणि लक्षणस्यासम्भवं व्यावर्तयति ।—अद्वैतदीपिका, पृ० ४२३-२४ ।

has been shown before, may be too narrow but still in that case also i.e., even if the latter half is not combined, the defect does not degrade it from the rank of a definition. Here the definition should be treated as merely an accident which only helps to know the object defined for a particular moment. The house of Devadatta may be distinguished from those of others by means of a crow upon its roof. But that is an accident and may not continue to distinguish the house of Devadatta in the next moment ; still there is no doubt that it helped at least once in recognizing the house of Devadatta. The definition of self-luminosity, as propounded by Citsukhācārya, is a definition of that nature only. Technically, in Indian philosophy, such definitions are known as *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa* or *upalakṣaṇa*. But *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* always remains in the defined. In the opinion of Nṛsiṁhāśramamuni *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* of self-luminosity will be the definition shown before. (That which is not the object of knowledge is self-luminous.)

Madhusūdana, on the contrary, has admitted the definition of Citsukhācārya as the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*. The inconsistency as shown before in the definition of Citsukhācārya is warded off by holding that the real absolute negation also is the nature of Brahman and nothing new.[1]

Establishing the definition of Citsukhācārya and eradicating all the charges against it, Madhusūdana forms a new definition in tune with Ācārya Nṛsiṁhāśrama. "That which is of the *nature* of not being the object of knowledge is self-luminous".[2]

This definition is marked in one point from that of Nṛsiṁhāśrama. By the word "nature" in the definition the chimera is excluded from the fold of this definition since it has no nature at all ; it is absurd.[3]

Madhusūdana offers two new definitions of self-luminosity, which may now be discussed in brief. The first of these two is : "Anything which for its own use does not depend upon any knowledge different from itself is self-luminous".[4] A jar is not self-luminous since it depends for its own use on a knowledge which is different from the jar.

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1. न च मोक्षेऽव्याप्तिः, अनधिकरणत्वस्य स्वरूपतया तदापि सत्त्वाद्—अद्वैतदीपिका पृ० ७६८ ।
2. चिदविषयस्वरूपत्वमेव स्वप्रकाशत्वम्—अद्वैतसिद्धि, पृ० ७७१ ।
3. तुच्छस्य निःस्वरूपत्वेन नाव्याप्तिशङ्का—अद्वैतसिद्धि, पृ० ७७१ ।
4. स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्तसंविदनपेक्षत्वम्— पृ० ७७१ ।

Brahman itself being knowledge does not depend for its own use upon a knowledge different from Brahman. The difference of one from the other is established only when the two entities are found possessed of different attributes or properties (*dharma*). Brahman or Consciousness, which is admitted to be bereft of all attributes cannot, by virtue of this attributelessness, be proved to be different from something else.

The incongruity of the assumption of any property in Consciousness may further be pointed out. Should the property of Brahman, which is consciousness per se, be of the same nature as consciousness or different from consciousness ? In the first alternative the absurdity of the self-same phenomenon being attribute (*dharma*) and its locus (*dharmin*) at the same time is obvious. The admission of an attribute and its locus presupposes the admission of difference between these two (attribute and locus). This is a position for the establishment of which this discussion was started. The sort of argument with which we are now confronted is : In order to establish the difference of consciousness from something else some sort of attribute of consciousness must be admitted and again in order to prove the existence of some attribute in consciousness the difference of consciousness from this attribute must be demonstrated. In this way there occurs a vicious circle.

The inconsistency of the admission of the second alternative, viz., the attribute of consciousness would be different from consciousness, may be shown in the following manner: Anything different from consciousness is a brute fact (*jaḍa*) and the acceptance of a brute fact being the attribute of consciousness entails logical incompatiblity inasmuch as the relation between the brute attribute and consciousness, the locus, would be possible only by superimposition (*adhyāsa*). The brute attribute is super-imposed on consciousness. Anything that is superimposed is not real and consequently the difference between one real entity (viz., consciousness) and another unreal one (viz., the brute attribute) cannot be established since any real entity can be differentiated only from another real entity and not from any unreal phenomenon.

Difference from Brahman being logically inadmissible, Brahman for its own use cannot depend upon a knowledge different from Brahman. So Brahman is self-luminous.

The second of the two above-mentioned definitions put forward by Madhusūdana is : "Anything which for its own use does not depend

upon any knowledge determined by itself is self-luminous[1]". This definition is in all sizes and styles similar to the previous one. The table for its own use depends upon a knowledge, viz., 'It is a table', which is determined by the table. Unlike this, Brahman cannot be dependent upon any knowledge determined by Brahman. The expression "knowledge determined by itself" really means "a knowledge which contains itself as its object." But the same thing being subject and object involves a breach in the Law of Contradiction being tantamount to the proposition–A is both A and not-A.

Further, knowledge being an object of knowledge loses its very character of being consciousness and, on the contrary, it becomes known i.e., brute (*jaḍa*). This is a position which an Advaitin refutes with sound reasons which we are not going to deal here in detail. To be brief, if consciousness also turns brute, then contrary to our experience we will have to admit the lotal absence of any sort of illumination in this world (*jagadāndhya*).

1, स्वव्यवहारे स्वावच्छिन्नसंविदनपेक्षत्वम्—अद्वैतसिद्धि, पृ० ७७१ ।

सारस्वतोणादिपरिशीलनम्

डा० रामावधपाण्डेयः

विविधविद्याविचे भारतविषयेऽस्मिन् चिरादेव शब्दशास्त्रपरिशीलनपरिपाटी-पाटवमक्षिलक्ष्यीभवति। पाणिनीया पाणिनीयेषु सत्स्वप्यनेकेषु समृद्धेषु शब्दशास्त्रेषु सम्प्रत्यपि शब्दशास्त्रं यथा सुबोधमल्पसमयसाध्यञ्च भवेत् तथाऽत्र देशे विदेशेऽपि बहवो विद्वांसो यतमाना विलोक्यन्ते। एतादृश एव खलु कश्चन् प्रयत्नः सारस्वतं शब्दशास्त्रं प्रासोष्ट। कस्यचिदपि शब्दशास्त्रस्य सर्वांगीणता-सम्पादनाय सूत्रपाठः धातुपाठः, गणपाठः, उणादिपाठः, लिङ्गानुशासनमित्येतानि पञ्चाङ्गान्यपेक्ष्यन्ते।[1] अपेक्ष्यमाणेषु तेषु पञ्चस्वङ्गेष्वन्यतमं सारस्वतव्याकरणोणादिमङ्गमधिकृत्य प्रेक्षावतां पुरः किञ्चित्प्रस्तूयते।

तदत्र प्रकृतव्याकरणस्यास्य समस्तासूपलब्धटीकासु तासाञ्च समस्तानां संस्करणानां त्रीणि पुस्तकानि प्रतिनिधित्वेन स्वीकृतानि सन्ति यथा—

१—चन्द्रकीर्त्तिटीकासहितं सारस्वतव्याकरणम्[2]।

२—मूलं सारस्वतव्याकरणम्।[3]

३—माधवकृतविवरणोपेतं सारस्वतव्याकरणम्।[4]

सारस्वतव्याकरणभूमिकायाम्[5] उद्धृतात्—"स्वकण्ठसंराजितहारगर्भात् सूत्राणि सा सप्तशतानि दत्त्वा। अन्तर्दधे......" इति-पद्यात् ज्ञायते यत् प्रसीदन्ती भगवती वाग्देवता सप्तशतान्येव सूत्राणि दत्त्वाऽन्तर्दधाविति। परन्त्विदानीन्तु कस्मिंश्चिदपि मूलात्मकस्य सटीकस्य वा सारस्वतशब्दशास्त्रस्य संस्करणे चतुर्दशशतेभ्यो न्यूनानि सूत्राणि न सन्तीति महदाश्चर्यम्! प्रकृतशब्दशास्त्रमिदं कथमिमां दशां प्रापदिति समस्येयमत्रावसराभावादन्यत्रोपयुक्तमवसरं प्रतीक्षमाणोपशाम्यतु तावत्।

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१. समर्थितञ्चैतत्पालिभाषावैयाकरणेनापि मोग्गलानेन मोग्गलानव्याकरणान्ते—

सुत्तधातुगणोण्वादिनामलिङ्गानुसासनं।
यस्स तिट्ठति जिव्हग्गे सो व्याकरणकेसरो॥

२. वेङ्कटेश्वरमुद्रणालयात्, बम्बई, सं० १९८५।

३. निर्णयसागरमुद्रणालयात्, सन् १९५२।

४. वेङ्कटेश्वरमुद्रणालयात्, बम्बई सं० १९५२।

५. सा० व्या० (चौखम्बा संस्कृत सीरीज) भूमिका, श्लोक १२।

उक्तेषु प्रतिनिधित्वेन स्वीकृतेषु त्रिषु पुस्तकेष्वपि मिथः पर्यालोचने भूयांसः सूत्रपाठसूत्रक्रमादिभेदाः दृष्टिपथमवतरन्ति ।

मू० सा० पुस्तके "उ प्रत्ययः" इति सूत्रानन्तरं "गमेर्डोः", "ग्लानुदिभ्यां डौः", "स्त्यायते ड्रू ट्" एवं "लक्षतेरं मुटच"—इतीमानि सूत्राणि पठ्यन्ते ।[1] तेषु केवलं प्रथमे द्वे एव "सौकर्ये कलिमः" इत्यनन्तरं च० की० पुस्तके पठ्येते नान्तिमे ।[2] एवमेव "कादीनाभिः", "मनेरत उच्च", "पु कुषन्", "मा प्रभृतिभ्यः सः", "मादिभ्यो यः" "दधातेर्नुट्" तथा "पतिचण्डिभ्यामालञ्"—इतीमानि सप्त सूत्राणि[3] पुस्तके नोपलभ्यन्ते । मू० सा० पुस्तके "अस्य गुणः" इति सन्नपि वृत्त्यंशः सूत्रत्वेन परिगृहीतः । तदित्थं च० की पुस्तके ३८, मू० सा० पुस्तके ३४ सूत्राणि विद्यन्ते । मा० पुस्तके च केवलमष्टोणादि-सूत्राण्यभिमतानि । मा० पुस्तके "इमन् त्रनस्काः" इति सूत्रव्याख्यानानन्तरम् "ईष्टे इति ईश्वरः वरप्रत्ययः स्थावरः" इति पठितमस्ति ।[4] अत्रेदं विचारणीयमस्ति यत् च० की० पुस्तके कृदन्तप्रकरणे "स्थादेर्वरः"[5] तथा मू० सा० पुस्तके तत्रैव "वरः"[6] इति समान-प्रत्ययविधायकेन सूत्रद्वयेन तत्र तत्र शीलार्थकौ स्थावरेश्वरशब्दौ निष्पाद्येते । मा० पुस्तके यथाऽत्र सूत्रेऽपरिगणितस्याप्रासङ्गिकस्यापि प्रत्ययस्योदाहरणं दीयते तथैवान्यत्रापि बहुत्र । च० की०, मू० सा० पुस्तकयोः पठितानाम् "अतिबृंहिभ्यां मनिण्"[7] "घृघृपदो मः"[8] "भविष्यदर्थे णिनिः"[9] इति सूत्राणां मा० पुस्तके सत्यप्यभावे "ब्रह्मन्", "घर्म", "आगामी", "भावी" इत्यादीन्युदाहरणानि दृश्यन्ते । एवमेव यद्यपि पुष्पादिशब्दसाधनार्थं मा० पुस्तके "पुष्पादेरः" इति सूत्रं[10] नास्ति तथापि "इदि चदि"[11] इत्यनन्तरम् "इमन् त्रनस्काः" इति सूत्रं विद्यते तदनन्तरञ्च "सर्वधातुभ्यः" इति । अत्रैव 'क'-प्रत्ययान्ताः पुष्पफल-

१. मू० सा० १७,१८-२१ ।
२. च० की० २६, मू० सा० ३४ ।
३. च० की० ३२-३८ ।
४. माधवकृत विवरणोपेतं सारस्वतव्याकरणम्, ६ ।
५. च० की०, पृ० ५०२ ।
६. मू० सा० १२६४ ।
७. च० की० तथा मू० सा० ५ ।
८. तत्रैव, ७ ।
९. „ ११ ।
१०. „ १६ ।
११. „ १५ ।

मूलशब्दाः निष्पाद्यन्ते। वस्तुतस्तु सूत्रमिदं चिन्त्यमेव पूर्वेणैव सिद्धेः, च० को० मू० सा० पुस्तकयोः पठितस्यापि "पुष्पादेः" इति सूत्रस्यास्वीकारे मानाभावाच्च।

केषुचन सूत्रेषु सूत्रत्वाभावः

सारस्वतशब्दशास्त्रस्य टीकाकृतः सम्पादका वा पूर्वापरपरिशीलनापटुतया जातु पूर्वेषां वैयाकरणानां ग्रन्थेभ्यो वृत्त्यंशं सूत्रत्वेन निर्धारयन्ति। यद्यपीयमवस्था सम्पूर्णेऽपि व्याकरणे दृष्टिगोचरीभवति तथापि ममात्र सम्बन्धः केवलमुणादिप्रकरणेन सह वर्तते। ततस्तत्प्रकरणादेव कानिचिदुदाहरणानि प्रस्तूयन्ते यथा—'सदोणादयः' इति प्रथमसूत्रानन्तरम् एकं सूत्रं पठ्यते—"कृवापाजिमिस्वदिउगं शूङ् एभ्य प्रत्ययो भवति"। इदं हि प्रथमसूत्रस्य पाणिनीयोणाद्यनुसारं[1] व्याख्यानमेव प्रतिभाति न सूत्रम्, सूत्रकारैस्तादृशशैल्याः कुत्राप्यनङ्गीकारात्। प्रथमसूत्रोपात्तस्य 'सदा'-शब्दस्य केनचित् टीकाकृतो 'कालत्रितये' अन्येन च 'बहुलमुणादयो भवन्ति' इत्यादिषु सत्सु व्याख्यानेषु केभ्यो धातुभ्यः के प्रत्ययाः इति शङ्कायां जागरूकायां प्रमाणभूतपाणिनीयोणाद्यनुसारं व्याख्यानभूतानि कानिचन वाक्यानि सम्प्रति सूत्रत्वेन परिगृहीतानि। एवम् "सितनि गमि मसि सचि अवि हि धाञ् कुशि एभ्यस्तुन् प्रत्ययो भवति" इतीदमपि तद्व्याख्यानमात्रम्। "ऋ स्तु सु हु हु मृ क्षि क्षु भा मा या वा जक्ष रै नी श्यैङ पद एभ्यो मः प्रत्ययो भवति" इत्यष्टमं-सूत्रमपि "घृघृपदो मः" इति पूर्वसूत्रस्य व्याख्यानभूतमेव[2], मप्रत्ययविधायिनोरुभयोरेकयोगेनापीष्टसिद्धौ सूत्रद्वयपठनगौरवापत्तेर्दुर्वारत्वात्, एकस्यैव पद्मशब्दस्योभयत्र साधनस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वाच्च। ननु पाणिनीयोणाद्यनुसारं सूत्रद्वयमिति चेत्, न, तत्र तु "ञ्नित्यादेर्नित्यम्"[3] इति नित्स्वरार्थकस्य 'मन्'-प्रत्ययस्य गुणवृद्धिनिषेधार्थकस्य 'मक्'-प्रत्ययस्य च[4] पृथक् पाठस्यौचित्यात्। अत्र हि व्याकरणे स्वरस्यानादृतत्वात् 'म'-प्रत्यये गुणवृद्धिनिषेधार्थं बाहुलकस्यैव शरणीकृतत्वाच्चैकयोगे न काचनापि विप्रतिपत्तिः। इत्थं "शसादेः करणे त्रक्" इति सूत्रं[5] व्यर्थम्, "सर्वधातुभ्यस्त्रमनौ"[6] इत्यनेनैव गतार्थत्वात्, कित्करणस्य

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१. पाणिनीयोणादिरित्यस्य पाणिनिसम्मतोणादिरिति तात्पर्यं ननु पाणिनिनिर्मितोणादिरिति।

२. मू० सा० तथा च० को०, ७।

३. पाणिनीयसूत्राणि ६. १. १९७।

४, उज्ज्वलदत्तव्याख्यातोणादि सूत्राणि तद् व्याख्या च, १,१३९ एवं १,१४८

५. मू० सा० तथा च० को०, १२।

६. तत्रैव, १३।

प्रयोजनाभावेन सर्वधातुसाधारणप्रत्ययविधानेन करणार्थस्य सौलभ्येनाकिञ्चित्करत्वाच्च। "सर्वधातुभ्यस्त्रमनौ" इतीदमपि "इस्मन्त्राग्घुकः सर्वधातुभ्यः"[1] इति सूत्रेणैव गतार्थत्वात् व्यर्थमेव। सम्भवत एतस्मादेव कारणात् माधवेन ते द्वे अपि सूत्रे परित्यक्ते। पाणिनीयोणादौ 'मघवन्' शब्दो निपात्यते।[2] उज्ज्वलदत्तेन निपातनप्रकारश्चेत्थं-प्रदर्शितः—"√मह + कनिन्, महेर्हकारस्य घकारोऽवुगागमश्च। मघवा इन्द्रः।" सारस्वतोणादौ पठितस्य "राजादेः कन्" इत्यस्य[3] व्याख्यानावसरे पाणिनीयोणाद्यनुसारमनूदितमपि "अस्य घान्तादेशो वुगागमश्च निपात्यते कन् प्रत्यये परे" व्याख्यान-वाक्यं यत्सूत्रत्वेन परिगृहीतम्, तदविचारितरमणीयमेव।

एवम् "वचादेरस्" इति सूत्रानन्तरम् "पिबतेरपि" इति वृत्त्यंशः सूत्रत्वेन स्वीकृतः।[4] यत्तु कुत्रचित् पुस्तकेषु "पिबतेरसिः" इति पाठस्तत्प्रामादिकः, अस्-प्रत्ययस्यानुवृत्तिसौलभ्यात्। सूत्रस्यास्य वृत्तिश्चेत्थम्—"पिबतेर्धातोरसुन्-प्रत्ययो भवति इकारान्तादेशश्च। पीयत इति पयः।" अत्रासुन्-प्रत्ययस्य निर्देशो भ्रममूलकः, पूर्वसूत्रतोऽस्-प्रत्ययस्यैव लाभात्, प्रकृतव्याकरणे नित्त्वस्य प्रयोजनाभावाच्च। वस्तुवस्तु पाणिनीयोणादिवृत्तिकृत उज्ज्वलदत्तस्यानुकरणादेवायं भ्रमः। उज्ज्वलदत्तेन "रपेरत एच्च" इति सूत्रवृत्तौ लिखितम्—"बहुलमन्यत्रापि। पिबतेरसुन्निकारस्यान्तादेशः। पयः......।"[5] अत्रत्य उज्ज्वलदत्तोपि चिन्त्य एव। तथाहि—प्रक्रियालाघवात्, "रपेरत एच्च" इति सूत्र एदितिपाठाच्च, बाहुलक-बलेन पाधातोराकारस्य एकारविधानमे-वोचितम्। अन्यथा ह्रस्वेकारविधानसामर्थ्याद् गुणाभावापत्तिर्दुर्वारैव स्यात्। अस्माद्धेतो-रेव रेपस्-शब्दसिद्धये ह्रस्वेकारविधानेन गुणे कृते इष्टसिद्धिसम्भावनायां सत्यामपि सूत्रकारेणाकारस्य एकारादेश एव विहितो न ह्रस्वेकारः। दशपाद्यां "पिबते रि च" इति निर्विभक्तिकं सूत्रं पठ्यते। अत्रापि पूर्वोक्त एव दोषः। श्वेतवनवासी,[6] नारायणः[7] तथा दशपाद्या एको हस्तलेखश्च "पिबते री च" इत्येतादृशं सूत्रं स्वीकुर्वन्ति। इदन्तु सर्वथाऽवैज्ञानिकं प्रतिभाति, प्रथमोपस्थितत्वाद्ध्रस्वेकारविधानेऽपि गुणेनेष्टसिद्धेः।

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१. तत्रैव, २६ एवं २१ (क्रमशः)।
२. उ०द० १,१५८।
३. सू०.सा० तथा च० कौ०, २२ तथा १८ (क्रमशः)।
४. तत्रैव, २७ तथा २२; २८ तथा २३ (क्रमशः)
५. उ०द० ४.१८६
६. श्वेतवनवासिव्याख्यातोणादिसूत्राणि तट्टीका च, ४. १९५।
७. नारायणव्याख्यातोणादिसूत्राणि तट्टीकाच, ४, १९७।

भोजस्य[1] दशपाद्या हस्तलेखद्वयस्य च "पिबते रिच्च" इति पाठोऽपि चिन्त्यप्रयोजनः तपरकरणप्रयोजनाभावात्। कातन्त्रोणादिः,[2] सिद्धान्तकौमुदी,[3] प्रौढमनोरमा,[4] तथा वेदान्तिमहादेवश्च[5] 'पीङ् पाने' इत्यस्मादेव धातोः "सर्वधातुभ्योऽसुन्" इत्यसुन्प्रत्यये पयः-शब्दं निष्पादयन्ति, नतु 'पा पाने' इत्यस्मात्। केवलन्तत्त्वबोधिनीकारः 'पय गतौ-' धातुमपि निर्दिशति। हेमचन्द्रोणादौ तु पयस्पयौ सान्तादन्तौ द्वौ शब्दौ निष्पाद्येते। अदन्तपयशब्दसाधनं नाम हेमचन्द्रस्यैव वैशिष्ट्यम् कुत्राप्यन्यत्र व्याकरणेऽस्य साधनाभावात्। तत्र 'पां पाने' इति धातोः "स्वादिभ्यः कित्" इत्यनेन 'अय-' प्रत्ययेऽदन्तपयशब्दस्य तथा तस्मादेव धातो रस्-प्रत्यये "पाह्वाकृभ्यां पयह्वौ च" इति पयादेशे पयस्-शब्दस्य निष्पादनप्रकारो दर्शितः।[6] पूर्ववैयाकरणानुसारं 'पीङ् पाने' इत्यस्मात् 'पय गतौ' इत्यस्माद्वा "अस्" इत्यनेन[7] अस्-प्रत्यये सान्तपयश्शब्दसिद्धिसम्भावनायां सत्यामपि यदाचार्येण वैज्ञानिकः सरलश्च पन्था उद्घाटितस्तत्तस्य बुद्धिवैशद्यमेव ख्यापयति।

एवमेव "धनार्तिचक्षिङ्पृवपितपिजनियजिभ्य उस्-प्रत्ययो भवति"। इति सारस्वतव्याकरणोणादेः[8] सप्तविंशतितमं सूत्रमधीयते। इदमत्रानुसन्धेयमस्ति यदेकतः "चक्षिङ्-धातोरुसि-प्रत्यये सति स्वयं सारस्वतव्याकरणतिङन्तप्रकरणे पठितेन "चक्षिङोऽनपि" इति—सूत्रेण[9] प्राप्तस्य ख्यानादेशस्य परिहारार्थं बाहुलकस्यैव शरणीकृतत्वात्, अन्यतः "प्रत्ययो भवति" इति सूत्रांशस्य सूत्रस्वरूपमर्यादातिक्रान्तत्वाच्चास्य सूत्रत्वमनिर्दुष्टमेव।

कानिचन सूत्रत्वेन गृहीतान्यपि वार्तिकानि प्रतीयन्ते

न केवलमुणादिप्रकरणेऽपि तु सम्पूर्णे सारस्वतशब्दशास्त्रे तत्र तत्र वार्त्तिकानि पठ्यन्ते। प्रसङ्गेनात्रोणादिपठितानि कानिचन परीक्ष्यन्ते। प्रकृतव्याकरणे

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१. भोजीयोणादिसूत्राणि तद्व्याख्या च, २. १. ३२२।
२. कातन्त्रोणादिसूत्राणि, तद्व्याख्या च, ४. ५६।
३. पृ० ४८३४।
४. पृ० ८८४।
५. श्लोक ६८०।
६. हेमचन्द्रोणादिसूत्राणि तद् व्याख्या च, ३६७,९५२।
७. तत्रैव, ९५२।
८. मू० सा० ३२ तथा च० की० २७।
९. मू० सा० ९१९।

पठितानीमानि वार्त्तिकानि किमनुभूतिस्वरूपाचार्यकर्तृकाण्युत वाऽन्यदीयानीति निश्चय-नमत्रानवसरत्वादन्यत्र करिष्यते ।

सूत्रैर्यत् कार्यमवशिष्यते तद् वार्त्तिकैः सम्पाद्यते । तानि च वार्त्तिकानि प्रायः "वाच्यम्", "वक्तव्यम्", "उपसंख्यानम्" इत्यादिपदघटितानि दृश्यन्ते । यथा पाणिनीयशब्दशास्त्रे "श्रविष्ठाफल्गुन्यनुराधा... ..." इति[1] सूत्रेणासिद्धानामभीष्टानां परिपूर्त्तये क—"फल्गुन्यषाढाभ्यां टानौ वक्तव्यौ," ख—"श्रविष्ठाषाढाभ्यां छणपि वाच्यः", ग—"लुक् प्रकरणे चित्रारेवतीरोहिणीभ्यः स्त्रियामुपसंख्यानम्" इत्यादीनि वार्त्तिकान्यभिधीयन्ते । प्रकृतोणादौ हि सामान्यतः 'कन्'-प्रत्ययविधायकेन "राजादेः कन्" इति सूत्रेण[2] राजन्नित्यादिशब्दानां सिद्धावपि 'षप्', 'अश्' धातुभ्याङ्कन्-प्रत्यये कृते ऽपि सप्तन्नष्टन्-शब्दयोरसिद्ध्या किति प्रत्ययेऽनयोर्धात्वोस्तुग्विधानार्थं सूत्रवद् वार्त्तिकं पठ्यते—"षपेरशेः किति तुग्वक्तव्यः"।[3] एवमेव 'रजस्'-शब्दनिष्पादनार्थं "रञ्ज रागे" इति धातोः "वचादेरस्" इत्यनेन[4] अस् प्रत्यये कृते "रञ्जेर्न लोपो वा" इति सूत्रेण[5] वा न-लोपे प्राप्ते नं बाधित्वा नित्य-न-लोपार्थम् "असि न लोपो वाच्यः"[6] इति वार्तिक-वत् सूत्रं पठ्यते ।

एवं सान्तछदिश्शब्दसिद्धये 'छद अपवारणे' इति चौरादिकधातोः "अर्चिरुचिशुचिहुसृपिच्छदिच्छादिभ्य इस् प्रत्ययो भवति" इति सूत्रेण इसि प्रत्यये कृतेऽपि ह्रस्वाभावात् तद्विधानार्थमेकं वार्तिकं पठ्यते—"छादेरिस्मन्त्रन्क्विषु" इसि ।[7] पाणिनिनाप्यत्र ह्रस्वविधानार्थं सूत्रं पठितम्[8] "इस्मन् त्रन् क्विषु" इति । प्रतीयते, व्याकरणेऽस्मिन् तत्तत्कार्याभावमवलोक्य पश्चाद्भाविना केनचिद्विदुषेमानि वार्त्तिकानि योजितानि यानीदानीं भ्रमात्सूत्रत्वेन परिगृह्यन्ते ।

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१. पाणिनीय सूत्राणि, ४. ३. ३४ ।
२. मू० सा० २२ तथा च० की० १८ (क्रमशः) ।
३. तत्रैव, २३ तथा १९ (क्रमशः) ।
४. तत्रैव, २७ तथा २२ (क्रमशः) ।
५. मू० सा० ११९४ ।
६. मू० सा० तथा च० कौ०' २९ तथा २४ (क्रमशः)
७. तत्रैव, ३१ तथा २६ (क्रमशः)
८. पा० ६.४.९७ ।

कानिचन सूत्राणि पाणिनीयसूत्रैरभिन्नानि

यद्यपि पाणिनीयोणादिसूत्रैः सारस्वतोणादिसूत्राणां मिथस्तुलनयैतत्तु सुस्पष्टं यत्सर्वतोऽधिकांशतोंऽशतो वा प्रकृतानि सूत्राणि प्रायोऽनुकृतय एव तथापि कानिचन समानानुपूर्वीकाणि। यथा—

च० की०	मू० सा०	मा०	ऊज्ज्वलदत्त (पाणिनीयोणादिः)
गमेर्डोः[1]	१८	×	२, ६७
ग्लानुदिभ्यां डौः[2]	१९	×	२, ६४
पतिचण्डिभ्यामालञ्[3]	×	×	१, ११६
×	स्त्यायतेर्ड्रट्[4]	×	४, १६५
×	लक्षतेरीमुट्च[5]	×	३, १६०

इमानि सूत्राणि सम्भवतः पश्चात्संगृहीतानि। एतस्मात् कारणादेव मा० पुस्तके सर्वाणि पञ्चापि परित्यक्तानि।

केषुचित्सूत्रेषु सारस्वतपुस्तकेष्वेव पाठभेदाः

स्वयं सारस्वतस्यैव विभिन्नसंस्करणेषु केषाञ्चन सूत्राणां पाठभेदाः क्रमभेदाः न्यूनताधिकताश्च दृश्यन्ते। यथा च० की०, मू० सा० पुस्तकयोः "ध्वादेरुलिक्"[6] इति सूत्रं पठ्यते, मा० पुस्तके च "ध्वादेरुलिः" इति। च० की० पुस्तकटीकायां—"ध्वादेर्धातोरुलि प्रत्ययो भवति किच्च।" किन्तु मा० पुस्तकपठितसूत्रानुसारं गुणाभावाभावमाशङ्क्योत्तरति—"धूलिरिति, 'सदा'-शब्दस्य बहुलार्थत्वान्न गुणः"। अयं हि 'धूलि' शब्दः केवलं भोजीयोणादौ हैमोणादौ च लिक्-प्रत्यये साधितो[7] नान्यस्मिन् कस्मिंश्चिदपि व्याकरणे।

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१. ३०।
२. ३१।
३. ३८।
४. २०।
५. २१।
६. च० की०, मू० सा० १०।
७. भो० २. १. २३३।

यत्र च० कौ०[1] मू० सा०[2] पुस्तकयोः "राजादेः कन्" इति सूत्रं पठ्यते तत्रैव मा० पुस्तके "राजादेरन्" इति पठित्वा 'राजन्' 'युवन्' इति द्वे उदाहरणे पठ्येते। 'युवन्'-शब्दसिद्धिप्रसङ्गेन च विवरणकारो माधवो लिखति— "यु मिश्रणे, उवादेश इति 'नु धातोः' गुणस्तु[3] न भवति 'सदा'-शब्दस्य बहुलार्थत्वात्"। इदमत्रानुसन्धेयम् भवति यल्लाघवात् 'कन्'-प्रत्ययस्यैव पाठ उचितः, कालवाचकसदा-शब्दस्य बहुलार्थत्वप्रकल्पनपुरःसरं गुणाभावप्रकल्पने गौरवापत्तेर्दुर्वारत्वात्। न केवलम् एतावानेव लाभोऽपि तु "कनिन् यु वृषितक्षि राजिधन्विद्युप्रतिदिवः"[4] इति पाणिनीयोणादिपरिगणितास्तथात्र सूत्रे प्राक् प्रत्ययनिर्देशादन्ये परिगृहीता धातवः च० कौ०, मू० सा० पुस्तकयोः राजादिगणे संगृहीताः सन्ति, तेषु च प्रायः किन्त्वप्रयोजनमावश्यकं परिलक्ष्यते तत्र सर्वत्रानुवृत्तिलभ्य किन्त्वस्य सौलभ्यमपि सङ्गच्छेत।

च० कौ० मू० सा० पुस्तकयोः[5] "इस्मन् त्रासुकः सर्वधातुभ्यः" इत्येकं सूत्रं पठ्यते। एतदेव किञ्चित्परिवर्तनेन मा० पुस्तक इत्थं पठ्यते—"इमन् त्रनस्काः" इति। सूत्रस्यास्य वृत्तौ पठति—सर्वधातुभ्य एते प्रत्यया भवन्ति।" इप्रत्ययविधानेन माधवः कवि-बलि-रवि-शब्दान् निष्पादयति। एते हि शब्दाः च० कौ० पुस्तके "कादीनामिः" इतिसूत्रेण[6] निष्पन्नाः। च० कौ० मू० सा० पुस्तकयोः 'उस्'-प्रत्यये पठितेऽप्यस्योदाहरणानि न प्रस्तुतानि। माधवेन स्वसूत्रानुसारं सर्वधातुभ्य इप्रत्ययो विधीयते, परन्तु च० कौ० पुस्तकानुसारम् इप्रत्ययः सर्वधातुभ्यो न विधीयतेऽपि तु केवलं कादिगण-पठितेभ्यो धातुभ्य एव। च० कौ० मू० सा० पुस्तकयोरत्र त्र-प्रत्ययस्य मा० पुस्तके च त्रन्-प्रत्ययस्य विधानं निर्दिष्टम्। अत्रानुसन्धेयमिदमस्ति यत् ययोः पुस्तकयोः त्रप्रत्ययो विधीयते तयोरेव "सर्वधातुभ्य-स्मनौ" इत्यपि सूत्रं[7] पठ्यते, एवं हि सर्वधातुभ्यस्त्रप्रत्ययविधानार्थं सूत्रद्वयं सर्वतोभावेन व्यर्थमुपेक्ष्यञ्च। यच्च माधवस्य त्रन्प्रत्ययविधानन्तदप्यसमीचनमेव नित्त्वस्य स्वरातिरिक्त-प्रयोजनान्तराभावेन स्वरोपेक्षके लौकिके शब्दशास्त्रेऽस्मिन् तत्फलोपपादनस्य दुःश-

१. १८।
२. २२।
३. मू० सा०, ७७६।
४. उ० द० १.१५६।
५. २१ तथा २६ (क्रमशः)
६. च० कौ० ३२।
७. च० कौ०, मू० सा० १३।

कत्वात्। एवमेव च० की० मू० सा० पुस्तकयोः 'असुक्'-प्रत्यय उपदिश्यते, किन्तु मा० पुस्तके 'अस्' तथा 'क' इति द्वौ प्रत्ययावुपदिश्येते। 'असुक्'-प्रत्ययस्योदाहरणप्रस्तावाभावेन निश्चित्य किञ्चिद् वक्तुं कश्चिन्न प्रभवेत् परन्तु माधवपक्षे विचारणीयमेतद् भवति यन्माधवः 'अस्'-प्रत्ययस्य तेजस्, नभस्-इत्युदाहरणद्वय-प्रस्तावानन्तरम् "राजादेरन्" इति सूत्रपठनानन्तरमपि पुनः 'अस्'-प्रत्ययविधायकं "वचादेरस्" इति सूत्रं पठति। यदि प्रकृतसूत्रेण सर्वधातुभ्योऽस्-प्रत्ययो विधीयत एव सदा "वचादेरस्" इत्यस्य सूत्रस्य किं प्रयोजनम्?

केषुचित्सूत्रेषु पाणिन्युणाद्यनेकसूत्राणामेकत्र संग्रहः

सारस्वतव्याकरणोणादौ कानिचनैतादृशानि सूत्राणि सन्ति येषु पाणिनीयोणाद्यनेकसूत्राण्येकत्र[1] सङ्गृहीतानि वर्तन्ते। यथा—"इस्मन्त्रनस्कः सर्व-धातुभ्यः"[1] इत्येकस्मिन्नेव सूत्रे "अर्चिशुचिहुसृपिच्छादिच्छर्दिभ्य इसिः"[2] इत्यतः 'इस्' प्रत्ययस्य, "सर्वधातुभ्यो मनिन्"[3] इत्यतो 'मन्' प्रत्ययस्य, "सर्वधातुभ्यः ष्ट्रन्"[4] इत्यत 'त्रन्' प्रत्ययस्य तथा "सर्वधातुभ्योऽसुन्"[5] इत्यतो 'ऽस्' प्रत्ययस्य संग्रहो दृष्टिगोचरीभवति। इदमेवात्र विचारणीयमस्ति यत् पाणिनीयोणादिसूत्रानुसारं कदाचित् केभ्यश्चिदेव धातुभ्यः 'इस्' प्रतीयते परन्तु प्रकृत-व्याकरणोणाद्यनुसारेण सर्वेभ्य इति।

कानिचिन्निर्विभक्तिकानि सूत्राणि

प्रकृतसारस्वतशब्दशास्त्रे हि बहूनि निर्विभक्तिकान्यपि सूत्राणि पठ्यन्ते। यद्यपीयमवस्था कदाचित्पाणिनिसूत्रेषु[6] पाणिनीयोणादिसूत्रेषु च[7] बहुधा दृश्यते, यस्याः 'छन्दोवत् सूत्राणि भवन्ति' इत्यभियुक्तोक्त्यनुसारं व्याख्यानादन्यदपि व्याख्यानं यथाकथञ्चिदुपपादयितुमन्वेष्टुं वा प्रयतन्ते केचन, तथापि क्लिष्टकल्पनाबलेन तादृश-

१. च० की० २१, मू० सा० २६।
२. उ० द० २,१०९।
३. तत्रैव ४, १४४।
४. „ ४,१५८।
५. „ ४,१८८।
६. हनो वध लिङि, पा० २, ४,४२ आदिषु।
७. 'खरु शङ्कु पीयु नीलङ्गुलिगु' उ० द० १, ३७, 'हनो वध च' उ० द० २,३६ 'ध्मोधम च', उ० द० २,३५; 'अजेरज च', उ० द० २,४८, इत्यादिषु।

व्याख्यानोपपादनान्वेषणानुधावनापेक्षया सविभक्तिकपाठस्यैवौचित्यप्रकल्पनप्रतिपादनमुचितम्, लाघवात्। सारस्वतोणादिषु निर्विभक्तिकमेकं सूत्रं यथा "मन्युपधाया ऋ रः"[1] इति। च० की० मू० सा० पुस्तकयोरस्य वृत्तिर्यथा—"मनिण् प्रत्यये परे उपधाया ऋकारस्य रो (रेफो) भवति" तथा मा० पुस्तके च "मनि-प्रत्ययस्योपधाभूतस्य ऋकारस्य रो भवति।" इति। मा० पुस्तके हि 'मनि-प्रत्ययस्य' इत्यस्य मनि-प्रत्ययान्तस्येत्यर्थः स्वीकर्त्तव्यः, प्रत्ययस्य तस्योपधाभूतस्य अकारस्यैव सत्त्वेन ऋकारस्य दुर्लभत्वात्। एवं सूत्रार्थविचारे कृते "मन्युपधाया ऊ रः" इति पाठः समुचितः प्रतिभाति। मुद्रणदोष इति चेत्, न, सर्वत्र संस्करणेषु अस्य हस्तलेखेष्वपि "ऋ रः" इत्येवमेव पाठस्वीकारात्।

पूर्वव्याकरणानुकरणजाः काश्चनाव्यवस्थाः

सारस्वतशब्दशास्त्रस्य सामान्यतः प्राग्भवानि शब्दशास्त्राणि विशेषतः पाणिनीयं शब्दशास्त्रमुपजीवन्तीति तत्र तत्र लेखेऽस्मिन् प्रतिपादितम्। प्रकृतोणादिसूत्राण्यपि नियमस्यास्यापवादभूतानि न सन्तीत्यपि सुनिश्चितम्। परन्तु प्रभावो वा भवतु अनुकरणं वा भवतु तज्जन्याः काश्चनाव्यवस्थाः साक्षात्क्रियन्त एव। यथा—सारस्वतोणादेर्द्वितीयेन सूत्रेण हि तुन्-प्रत्ययो विहितः। अत्र तुन्-प्रत्ययस्य नित्त्वं चिन्त्यप्रयोजनम् इति प्रागेव प्रतिपादितम्। इदं नित्त्वं हि पाणिन्युणादेः "सितनि गमि मसिसच्यविधाञ् कुशिभ्यस्तुन्।"[2] इति सूत्रानुकरणस्यैव फलम्। इत्थं "भीष्वोर्वामक्"[3] इति सूत्रे 'वा' ग्रहणमनुकरणादेव प्रयोजनाभावेऽपि विराजते। अत्रेदं वक्तव्यमस्ति यद् भीमभीष्मशब्दयोर्निष्पादनार्थं "भियःषुग्वा"[4] इति वाषुग्भवतीत्येतदर्थकम् पठ्यते। तत्र तस्य चारितार्थ्येऽप्यत्र फलाभावेन विना पूर्वापरसंगमनश्रममत्रापि वाहरणमन्धानुकरणमेव। प्राक् प्रतिपादितं यत् "शसादेः करणे त्रक्"[5] तथा "सर्वधातुभ्यस्त्रमनौ"[6] इति सूत्रद्वयम् अन्यसूत्रेण गतार्थत्वान्निष्प्रयोजनं सदप्याधानुकरणस्यैव फलभूतम्। सम्भवत इदं मनसि निधायैव मा० पुस्तके सूत्र

१. च० की० मू० सा० ६।
२. उ० द० १,३७।
३. च० की०, मू० सा० ९।
४. उ०द० १,१४७।
५, च० की०, मू० सा० १२।
६. तत्रैव, १३।

द्वयमपि परित्यक्तम् । पूर्वप्रतिपादितरीत्या "अस्य घान्तादेशो वुगागमश्च निपात्यते क्नू प्रत्यये परे"[1] इत्युज्ज्वलदत्तस्य निपातन-प्रकारोऽप्यत्र सूत्रतां गत इत्यहोऽन्धानुकरणमाहात्म्यम् ! नेयन्दशा केवलमत्रैव शब्दशास्त्रेऽपितु पाणिनीयेऽपि शब्दशास्त्रे कदाचित् सूत्राणि वार्त्तिकत्वेन, वार्तिकानि च सूत्रत्वेन पठितानि, कदाचिच्च निपातनप्रकारा अपीदानीं सूत्रतां भजन्तो विराजन्ते, का कथा सूत्रवार्त्तिकयोः पाठभेदानां क्रमभेदानां परिवर्तनानां वा । यथा—काशिकायां "वृद्धस्य च पूजायाम्", "यूनश्च कुत्सायाम्"[2] इति सूत्रद्वयं पठ्यते । सिद्धान्तकौमुद्यां हि "वृद्धस्य च पूजायाम्" "यूनश्च कुत्सायां गोत्रसंज्ञेति वाच्यम्"[3] इति ते एव काशिकापठिते सूत्रे वार्त्तिकत्वेन पठ्येते । वस्तुतस्तु द्वयमिदं वार्तिकमेव, भाष्ये तथैव स्वीकारात् । एवमन्यत्रापि काशिकायां "कौपिञ्जलहास्तिपदादण्", "आथर्वणिकस्येकलोपश्च"[4] इति सूत्रद्वयं पठ्यते परन्तु सिद्धान्तकौमुद्यां तदेव सूत्रद्वयम् "कौपिञ्जलहास्तिपदादण् वाच्यः", "आथर्वणिकस्येकलोपश्च"[5] इति वार्त्तिकत्वेन पठ्यते । अत्र कैयटो वदति—"कौपिञ्जलेति—गोत्रे वुञि प्राप्तेऽण्विधिः... ...अण् वक्तव्य इति, कौपिञ्जल हास्तिपदादणित्यस्यापाणिनीयत्वात्" ।[6] ग्रन्थादस्मात् कैयटमते प्रथमस्य वार्त्तिकत्वं स्पष्टम् । द्वितीयसम्बन्धे तूष्णींस्थितत्वात् कैयटस्य तस्य सूत्रत्वं प्रतीयते, किन्तु हरदत्तमतेऽस्यापि वार्त्तिकत्वमेव । यतो हि हरदत्तमतेऽस्मिन् सूत्रे चकारेण वार्तिकस्थस्याणः संग्रहे क्लिष्टत्वादस्यापि वार्त्तिकत्वं सुस्पष्टम् । अत एवोक्तां समस्यां ध्यायता भट्टोजिदीक्षितेन इमे द्वे अपि वार्तिकत्वेन स्वीकृते । एतादृशान्यन्यानि बहूनि स्थलानि सन्ति, येषां स्वतन्त्ररूपेण परीक्षाऽपेक्षिता ।

भट्टोजिदीक्षितेन सिद्धान्तकौमुद्याम् उणादिसूत्राण्यपि व्याख्यातानि । तत्र चतुर्थपादे "अञ्जेरसिरिरुडागमश्च", "सर्त्तेरप्पूर्वादसिः"[7] इति सूत्रद्वयं पठ्यते । पूर्वसूत्रतोऽसित्यस्यानुवृत्तिलाभेऽप्युत्तरसूत्रेऽसिग्रहणं सर्वतोभावेन भ्रममूलकमेव ।

१. उ० कौ० २०, मू० सा० २५ ।
२. का० पा० ४, १, १६६-१६७ ।
३. सि० कौ० १५६७, १५६८ ।
४. का० पा० ४, ३, १३२-१३३ ।
५. सि० कौ०, २०८४, २०८५ ।
६. म० भा०, प्रदीप, पा० ४,३,१३१ ।
७. सि० कौ० ४८८१-४८८२ ।

पूर्वसूत्रे चापि "मिथुनेऽसिः पूर्ववच्च सर्वम्"[1] इत्यतोऽनुवर्त्त्यमानोऽसिप्रत्ययो यथा अतः पूर्वतनेषु सर्वेषु सूत्रेषु योज्यते तथैव योगस्य सुकरत्वात्, असिप्रत्ययस्य पुनः पाठश्चिन्त्य एव। इदानीञ्च न केवलं सिद्धान्तकौमुद्याः सर्वेषु संस्करणेषु अपि तु इमामाधृत्य विरचितायाः मध्यसिद्धान्तकौमुद्याः सर्वेषु संस्करणेष्वपि तादृशे एव सूत्रे पठ्येते। अत्रेदमनुसन्धेयमस्ति यत् सिद्धान्तकौमुद्याः प्राचीनतम एकस्मिन् हस्तलेख उज्ज्वलदत्तव्याख्यातोणादिसूत्रेषु च 'अङ्गिराः' 'अप्सराः'[2] इत्येवमेवेदं सूत्रद्वयं पठ्यते। अनयोर्वृत्तौ हि उज्ज्वलदत्तो निपातनप्रकारं प्रदर्शयति यथा— "अयं शब्दो निपात्यते। अङ्गतेरसिः। इरुडागमः। अङ्गिरा ऋषिभेदः,। तथा 'अयं शब्दो निपात्यते। सर्त्तेरप्पूर्वादसिः। अप्सरस उर्वशीमुखाः' इति। प्रतीयते, केनचित् पश्चाद्भवेन विदुषा भ्रमात् सूत्रवृत्त्योर्भेदमबुद्ध्वैव निपातनप्रकारः सूत्रत्वेन पठितः। तस्यैव भ्रमस्य साम्राज्यं स्वीकुर्वन्तो वैयाकरणम्मन्यमाना वयं विचराम इत्येतन्महदाश्चर्यकरम्।

'पिबतेरपि'[3] इति सूत्रस्य "पिबतेर्धातोरसुन्-प्रत्ययो भवति इकारान्तादेशश्च। पीयत इति पयः" इति वृत्तेरुपरि उज्ज्वलदत्तानुकरणाज्जाताव्यवस्था पूर्वमेव चर्चिता। एवमेव "पुः कुषन्"[4] इत्यत्र नित्प्रत्ययविधानमप्यविचारितानुकरणस्यैव फलम्, नित्करणस्यात्र प्रागुक्तरीत्या निष्प्रयोजनत्वात्। पाणिनीयोणादिषु "पुरः कुषन्"[5] इति सूत्रं पठ्यते। तत्र व्याकरणे तु स्वरापेक्षत्वात् स पाठ उचित एव। यत्तु कुत्रचित्सारस्वतपुस्तकेषु "कुषन्नादेशो भवति" इति पठ्यते तन्न, तस्य सर्वथा भ्रममूलकत्वात्।

पूर्वाचार्याणां प्रभावानुकरणस्यैवेदं माहात्म्यं यत् सम्पूर्णेऽपि व्याकरणे पाठभेदाः, सूत्राभावः, अर्थभेदादयश्चोपलभ्यन्ते। अतएव च कुत्रचित् २८, अन्यत्र ३४ अपरत्र ८ सूत्राणि पठ्यन्ते।

काश्चन धातुप्रयुक्ता विप्रतिपत्तयः

सारस्वतव्याकरणस्य तत्तत्पुस्तकेषु पठितानां धातूनां तदर्थानाञ्च बह्व्यः

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१. तत्रैव, ४८६८।
२. उ० द० ४, २३५-२३६।
३. च० की० २३, मू० सा० २८।
४. च० की० ३४।
५. तत्रैव तथा उ० द० ४, ७४।

विप्रतिपत्तयो विद्यन्ते। इदानीञ्च सारस्वतधातुपाठाभावात्तदनुपलम्भाद्वा तासां निराकरणं सुदुष्करम्।

उदाहरणं यथा—सारस्वतव्याकरणोणादेः द्वितीयसूत्रव्याख्यायामेको धातुः पठ्यते— "मि कौटिल्ये"। अत्रानुसन्धेयमस्ति यत् प्रक्षेपणार्थकस्य "डुमिञ्" इति धातोः सत्त्वेऽपि कौटिल्यार्थकस्य 'मि'-धातोः पाठः कस्यापि व्याकरणस्य धातुपाठे नास्ति। ह्विटनी-महाशयेन "डुमिञ'-धातोः पृथक् स्वतन्त्रो 'मि'-इत्येको धातुः पठ्यते किन्तु सोऽप्यन्यार्थको यथा—अस्यार्थो (डैमेज) नाशः इति। तृतीयसूत्र-व्याख्यायाञ्चैको धातुः पठ्यते, यथा—"मसी परिमाणे रक्षणे च।" क्षीरस्वामी[1] "मसी परीणामे इति, सायणमैत्रेयरक्षितौ[2] "मसी परिमाणे' इति, वोपदेवश्च[3] "मसिर-वई परिणामे परीणामे" इति पठन्ति। कुत्रचिदपि धातुपाठे रक्षणार्थकस्य 'मसी" इति धातोरदर्शनात् पाठोऽयं चिन्त्य एव। तत्रैव व्याख्यायामेकोऽन्यो धातुः पठ्यते यथा—'षच सम्बन्धे' इति[4]। 'षच सेचने' इति लिखित्वाऽस्य व्याख्यानप्रसङ्गेन "षच समवाये" इति पठति। अस्तु, 'षप समवाये[5] इत्यस्य व्याख्यायां "सचेति चान्द्रः[6] सचति सचिवः इति पठति। सायणः[7] "षच सेचने' अयं सेवनार्थोऽपि"। तथा "षच समवाये"[8] इति। मैत्रेयरक्षितः 'षच सेचने'[9] तथा 'षच समवाये"[10] इति। पाठकः श्रीधरश्च "षच सेचने सेवने च"[11] तथा "षच समवाये"[12] इति पठतः। 'अकथितं च'[13] इति सूत्रव्याख्यानावसरे काशिकाकारोऽत्रत्यो न्यास-कारश्च "समवाय" इत्यस्य सम्बन्ध इत्यर्थं स्वीकुरुतः[14]। प्रतीयते, प्रकृतव्याकरणे हि

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१. ४, १५५।
२. मा० धा० ४,११३, धा० प्र० ४,११५।
३. कवि० ३३९।
४. क्षी० १,९९।
५. तत्रैव १,२८५।
६. चा० धा० १,१४०।
७. मा० धा० १,१६१।
८. तत्रैव, १,९७७।
९. धा० प्र० पृ० १९।
१०. तत्रैव, ७३।
११. १६३।
१२. ९७७।
१३. पा० १,४,५१।
१४. यत्सचते... ...यत्सम्बध्यते, का० पा० १,४,५१; अत्रत्यो न्यासो यथा—सम्बध्यत इति सचत इत्यस्यार्थ-कथनम्।

'समवाय' इत्यस्य स्थाने 'सम्बन्ध' इत्यस्याप्यौचित्यात् सम्बन्ध एवार्थः स्वीकृतः। वोपदेवेन तु "षचङ् सेवने', 'षच सम्बन्धे' इति पठित्वा सम्बन्ध इत्यर्थः स्पष्टं स्वीकृतः।

पञ्चदशसूत्रव्याख्यानप्रसङ्गेनैको धातुः पठ्यते, यथा—"इदि चदि आह्लादने दीप्तौ च"। इदमत्र विचारणीयमस्ति यत् कुत्रचिदपि धातुपाठे 'इदि'-धातोरिमावर्थौ न परिगृहीतौ। सारस्वतव्याकरणतिङन्तप्रकरण एव[1] "इदि परमैश्वर्ये" इत्येवं पठितम्। प्रतीयते यदत्रत्यः पाठः कदाचित् "इदि परमैश्वर्ये" "चदि आह्लादने दीप्तौ च" इत्येवमासीत्, किन्तु मुद्रणादिदोषात् कस्यचिद् प्रमादाद्वा "परमैश्वर्ये" इति पाठस्य त्रुटितत्वात् 'इदि'-धातोरपि दीप्त्याह्लादाभ्यामर्थाभ्यां सम्बन्ध इदानीं स्थापितः।

एवं षोडशसूत्रव्याख्याने "मूल व्याप्तौ' इति धातुः पठ्यते। परन्तु सर्वेष्वपि धातुपाठेषु 'प्रतिष्ठा' 'रोहण' इत्यर्थद्वयातिरिक्तस्यास्यादर्शनादयं पाठश्चिन्त्य एव। अष्टादशसूत्रव्याख्यावसरे च "षप सम्बन्धे" "षप गणने" इतिधातुद्वयं पठ्यते। क्षी०[2] सायणश्च[3] 'षप समवाये' इति पठतः। तत्र सायणः "समवायः सम्बन्धः सम्यगवबोधो वा" इत्युक्त्वा सम्बन्धरूपोऽर्थः स्वीकृतः किन्तु 'षप गणने' इत्यस्य तु पाठश्चिन्त्यमूलक एव अन्यत्र कुत्राप्यदर्शनात्। अष्टाविंशतितम-सूत्रवृत्तौ पठ्यते 'तन्त्रि धारणे' परन्तु सर्वत्र धातुपाठेषु 'तन्त्रि कुटुम्ब-धारणे' इत्येव पठ्यते। केवलं वोपदेवः पठति—'तन्त्रिकङ् धारणे'[4]। अत्रैवान्यो धातुर्यथा—"कण्ठ अवधारणे"। क्षीरस्वामी[5] वदति "मठि कठि शोके। शोकोऽत्राध्यानम्"। सायणश्च[6] "मठि कठि शोके; इह शोक आध्यानम्।" इति। युधिष्ठिरो मीमांसक आध्यानमिति पदमित्थं व्याचष्टे—"आध्यानमुत्कण्ठापूर्वस्मरणम्"। परन्तु कुतश्चिदपि 'अवधारण' इत्यर्थानुपलम्भात्, इदं चिन्त्यमूलमेव। अत्रैव मू० सा०[7] पुस्तकस्य "स्तृञ् आच्छादने, स्तृणोतीति स्तरीः" इति पाठो मुद्रणदोषादेव, दीर्घ-ऋकारवतः स्तॄञ्धातोः क्रैयादिकत्वात्।

१. मू० सा० ७८४।
२. १,२८५।
३. १,३१७।
४. कवि क० २६६।
५. १,१६७।
६. मा० धा० १,१५१।
७. मू० सा० ३२।

धातुषु गणभेदप्रयुक्ताः प्रश्नाः

सारस्वतव्याकरणपठितेषु धातुषु कदाचिद् गणभेदात् काश्चन विप्रतिपत्तयः सम्भाव्यन्ते। यथा—प्रकृतोणादिद्वितीयसूत्रवृत्तौ धातुरेकः पठ्यते 'साध् संसिद्धौ'। अयं हि धातुः पाणिनीयधातुपाठानुसारेण सौवादिकः। सारस्वतव्याकरणस्य दिवादौ "राध् साध् संसिद्धौ" इति पठ्यते। दिवादित्वाचास्य रूपं 'साध्यति' इति पठ्यते। अत्र स्थले पाणिनीयधातुपाठेन विवदमानः प्रकृतव्याकरणग्रन्थः कथं संगच्छतामिति विचारणायामिदं वक्तुं कश्चित् प्रभवति यत् काशकृत्स्नधातुपाठेऽस्य धातोर्दैवादिकत्वमपीति पश्चाद्भाविमिश्चान्द्रकातन्त्रकविकल्पद्रुमैरप्यस्य दैवादिकत्वं स्वीकृतम्। तेषु कमप्यन्यतममनुसृत्यात्रापि धातुरयं दैवादिकः स्वीकृतो भवेत्। एवमेवाष्टमसूत्रवृत्तौ पठ्यते—"क्षि निवासगत्यो क्षयतीति क्षेमः" इति। अत्रानुसन्धेयमिदमस्ति यत् 'क्षि'-धातुश्चतुर्धा पठ्यते यथा— 'क्षि क्षये'[1] 'क्षि ऐश्वर्ये'[2] 'क्षि हिंसायाम्'[3] तथा 'क्षि निवासगत्योः'[4] इति। अत्राद्ययोर्द्वयोर्भौवादिकत्वात् 'क्षयति' इति तृतीयस्य सौवादिकत्वात् 'क्षिणोति' इति चतुर्थस्य च तौदादिकत्वात् 'क्षियति' इति रूपाण्यभीष्टानि। सर्वस्यापि धातुपाठस्यानुसारं क्षि निवासगत्योरित्यस्य तौदादिकत्वेनान्तरङ्गत्वादस्यैव[5] मान्यत्वेन 'क्षियति' इति रूपस्यैव सौलभ्यात्, अत्र 'क्षयति' इति पाठो भ्रममूलक एव। ननु मुद्रणदोष इति चेत् न सर्वत्र तथाविधस्य मुद्रणदोषस्यानुवृत्तिकल्पने मानाभावात्।

केषुचिद् धातुषु परस्मैपदात्मनेपदपरिवर्त्तनम्

सारस्वतव्याकरणोणादिषु केचन परस्मैपदिनो धातवः आत्मनेपदित्वेन केचनात्मनेपदिनः परस्मैपदित्वेन च पठ्यन्ते। यथा—द्वितीयसूत्रव्याख्यानावसरे पठति—आश्नोतीति आशुः। "अशूङ् व्याप्तौ" इत्ययं धातुः सर्वत्र धातुपाठेषु आत्मनेपदित्वेन पठितोऽपि यत् परस्मैपदित्वेन पठितस्तच्चिन्त्यमेव, कस्यापि प्रमाणस्यासम्यक्त्वात्; धातोरस्य ङित्त्वाद् "अनुदात्तङित..."[6] इति सारस्वतव्याकरणपठितसूत्रानुसारमप्यात्मनेपदित्वस्यैव स्वीकर्त्तव्यत्वाच्च। प्रकृतव्याकरणानुसारं विरचितस्य "सिद्धान्त-

१. क्षी० १,१४९।
२. तत्रैव, १,६७७।
३. क्षी० ५,३३।
४. तत्रैव, ६,१०८।
५. नु धातोः मू० सा० ७७६।
६. मू० सा० ६८४।

चन्द्रिका"-नाम्नो व्याकरणस्य सुबोधिन्यभिधेयायां टीकायामपि पठति—"अशूङ् व्याप्तौ। अश्नुते इत्याहुः।"

'राजादेः कन्'[1] इतिसूत्रवृत्तौ पठति—राज्, धन्व, यु, द्यु, प्रतिदिव्, वृष, तक्ष, दंश, पचि, षप्, अशूङ्, नु, मह एते राजादयः" इति। अत्रेदं विचारणीयमस्ति यत्—नारायणः "धन्वि सौत्रः"[2] पेरुसूरिः "गत्यर्थोऽयं धविर्धातुरिति (धन्विधातुरिह) सूत्रैकगोचरः"[3] तथा दशपाद्युणादिश्च "धन्व इति सौत्रो धातुः। धन्वति धन्वा कुत्सितो देशः"[4] इति पठन्ति। यत्त्वेषां धातोरस्य सौत्रत्वस्वीकारस्तन्न, गत्यर्थकस्यास्य धातोः पाणिनीयापाणिनीयेषु प्रायः सर्वेषु धातुपाठेषु[5] समानरूपेण पाठात्।

केचन धातुगणाः पठिताः

सारस्वतोणादौ केषुचित् सूत्रेषु धातुगणाः पठ्यन्ते। यथा—दशमे सूत्रे 'ध्वादिः', द्वादशे 'शसादिः', षोडशे 'पुष्पादिः', अष्टादशे 'राजादिः', द्वाविंशतितमे 'वचादिः', द्वात्रिंशत्तमे 'कादिः', पञ्चत्रिंशत्तमे "मा' प्रभृतिः, षट्त्रिंशत्तमे च 'मादिः', एतेषां धातुगणानाम् अग्रे वक्ष्यमाणानाञ्च धातूनामवलोकनात्, व्याकरणेऽस्मिन् गणपाठोणादिदर्शनाच्च कल्प्यतेऽत्रापि कश्चन् स्वतन्त्रो धातुपाठोऽभिमतो भवेदिति।

सारस्वतव्याकरणोणादिप्रत्ययाः

अत्र प्रकृतव्याकरणोणादौ हि त्रिंशतः प्रत्ययानां विधानं क्रियते। तत्र षट् अनुबन्धाः विद्यन्ते, येषु उण्, मनिण्, णिनि, इत्यत्र णित्, आलञ् इत्यत्र ञिच्च वृद्धि-प्रयोजनाः। 'तुन्' 'कुषन्' इत्यनयोर्नित्त्वं व्यर्थं, प्रयोजनाभावात्। पाणिनीयोणादावनयोर्नित्त्वदर्शनान्नित्त्वं सयुक्तिकमिति चेत् न, लौकिक-वैदिकोभयसामान्ये स्वरापेक्षके हि पाणिनीयव्याकरणे आद्युदात्तार्थं नित्त्वस्यावश्यकत्वात्। मुक्, मक्, उलिक्, त्रक्, कन्, असुक्, केलिम, कुषन्-इत्यनुबन्धेषु कित्त्वनाम

१. च० कौ० १८, सू० सा० २२।
२. नारा० १,१४५।
३. पे० सू० १,७६७।
४. द० पा० ६,५१।
५. क्षी० १,५१३, मै० १,५१७, सायणः १,५८६, चा० धा० २०५, जै० ७४६, शा० ४७५, है० ४५८, तथा वो २१२ श्लो०।

गुणवृद्धिनिषेधार्थम्। डुट-इत्यत्र टित्वं 'ष्टून्नितः'[१] इत्ययेन स्त्रीलिङ्गे 'ईप्'-प्रत्यय विधानार्थम्। डो-डौ-डुट्-इत्यत्र डित्त्वं हि 'डितिटेः' इत्यनेन टिलोपार्थम्। अत्र चत्वारश्चागमाः पठ्यन्ते, यथा-मुट् तुक् वुक् (अवुक् ?) एवं नुट् चेति।

अर्थ-निर्देशः

सारस्वतव्याकरणोणादौ हि 'भविष्यदर्थे णिनिः'[२] 'शसादेः करणे त्रक्'[३] इति सूत्रद्वयं विहाय कुत्राप्यर्थनिर्देशो न विहितः। 'भीम'-शब्दसाधनार्थं पठिते "भीष्वोर्मक्"[४] इत्यत्राप्यर्थनिर्देशो न दृश्यते। एतदर्थमेव पाणिनिना स्वतंत्रमेकं सूत्रं पठ्यते। यथा—'भीमादयोऽपादाने'[५] इति। एवमेव बहुत्र पाणिनीयोणाद्यनुसारं यत्रार्थनिर्देशो वर्त्तते तत्रार्थनिर्देश।उपेक्ष्यते।

बाहुलकमाहात्म्यम्

'सदोणादयः' इति प्रथमसूत्रे कालवाचकस्य 'सदा'-शब्दस्य पाठेन कालत्रितयस्यानुसन्धानं भवति। माधवस्तु 'सदा'-शब्दो बहुलार्थक इत्यपि स्वीकरोतीति पूर्वमेव प्रतिपादितम्। तत्र सन्ति बहूनि कार्याणि यानि विना बाहुलकसाहाय्यं कदापि न सेत्स्यन्ति। प्रकृतोणादौ तृतीय-सूत्रव्याख्याने पठ्यते—"अव रक्षणे। अवतेर्वकारस्य उकारः। अवतीति ओतुः।" अत्र वकारस्योकारः इति विधानं बाहुलक-बलादेव सिध्यति। 'अग्नि'-शब्दसाधनार्थं चतुर्दशसूत्रवृत्तौ पठ्यते—"अङ्गतेऽसौ अग्नि" इति। अत्र 'अगि'-धातोः 'नि'-प्रत्यये कृतेऽपि नलोपार्थं बाहुलकमेव शरणम्। अत एवोज्ज्वलदत्त एतत्साधनार्थम् "अङ्गेर्नलोपश्च"[६] इति सूत्रे स्पष्टं नलोपं विदधाति। अन्यथा 'अगि'-धातोरिदित्त्वात् सारस्वतव्याकरणानुसारमपि "इदितो नुम्"[७] इत्यनेन नुमः प्राप्त्या नुमो नकारस्य श्रवणापत्तिर्दुर्निवारा। एवमेव 'चक्षुष्'-शब्दसाधनार्थं सप्तविंशतितम-सूत्रानुसारेण "चक्षिङ्" धातोः 'उस्'-प्रत्यये कृते "चक्षिङोऽनपि"[८] इत्यनेन ख्याञादेशस्य दुर्वारत्वे बाहुलकान्निवारणम्।

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१. सू० सा० ३७४।
२. च० की०, सू० सा०, ११।
३, तत्रैव, १२।
४, तत्रैव, ६।
५. पा० ३,४,७४।
६. उ० द० ४,५०।
७. सू० सा० ७४५।
८, तत्रैव, ६१६।

सारस्वतव्याकरणं हि लौकिकम्

सारस्वतव्याकरणं लौकिकं संस्कृतमेव विषयीकुर्वद् वैदिकीं प्रक्रियामुपेक्षते। अतएव गुणवृद्धिविधिनिषेधादिप्रयोजना एवानुबन्धा दृश्यन्ते। ये च तुन्-कुषन्नादि-प्रत्ययेषु नित्त्वाद्यनुबन्धास्ते चिन्त्यप्रयोजना इति तत्र तत्र पूर्वमेव प्रतिपादितम्। एतस्मादेव कारणात् कदाचित् सारस्वतव्याकरणाद्यनुसारं[1] यदा "हेतु"-इति तुन्नन्तस्तदैव पाणिनीयोणाद्यनुसारं[2] 'तु'-प्रत्ययान्त एव साधितः। सारस्वतव्याकरणोणादिसप्तमाष्टमाभ्यां सूत्राभ्यां साधिताः सर्वे शब्दाः 'म'-प्रत्ययान्ताः परन्तु त एव पाणिनीयोणाद्यनुसारं[3] मन्-मक्-प्रत्ययान्ताः। तत्र नित्त्वस्य स्वरसाधनत्वम्, कित्त्वस्य गुण-वृद्धिनिषेधार्थत्वं स्पष्टम्। प्रकृतव्याकरणस्य स्वरानपेक्षत्वात्, गुणवृद्धिनिषेधस्य च बाहुलकेनैवोपपादयितव्यत्वात् निरनुबन्धकस्य 'म' प्रत्ययस्य पाठः समुचित एव। एवमेव सारस्वते 'केलिम'[4]-प्रत्ययः किन्तु पाणिनीये[5] 'एलिमच्'-प्रत्ययः; सारस्वते[6] 'य' -प्रत्ययः परन्तु पाणिनीये[7] 'यत्'-प्रत्ययो विधीयते। तत्र च कानुबन्धस्य 'चितः'[8] इत्यन्तोदात्तार्थत्वं तकारानुबन्धस्य च 'तित्स्वरितम्'[9] इति स्वरितार्थत्वं स्पष्टमेव।

प्रकृतोणादिसाधिताः केचन शब्दाः

सारस्वतव्याकरणोणादौ[10] 'ओम्'-शब्दः साध्यते। तत्र "ओम् ओमौ, ओमः" इति रूपाण्यपि प्रदर्श्यन्ते। अयमेव शब्दः पाणिनीयोणादौ[11] अव्ययत्वेन पठ्यते। तथा हि—'कृदतिङ्'[12] इत्यनेनोणादिप्रत्ययाः कृतः सन्ति। "कृन्मेजन्तः"[13]

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१. च० की० ३।
२. उ० द० १,७३।
३. तत्रैव, ११३८ तथा १४८।
४. च० की० २९।
५. उ० द० ४, ३७।
६. च० की० ३७।
७. उ० द० ५, ४८।
८. पा० ६,१,१६३।
९. तत्रैव ६,१,१८५।
१०. च० की० सू० सा० ४।
११. उ० द० १,१४१।
१२. पा० ३,१,९३।
१३. तत्रैव, १,१,३९।

इत्यनेनाव्ययत्वसिद्धिः सुस्पष्टा। एवमेव सारस्वतव्याकरणोणादौ "चाण्डाल"-शब्दः साध्यते। स च पाणिनीयोणादावपि[1] सिद्धः। इदमत्रानुसन्धेयमस्ति यदुभयत्राप्यादिवृद्धिर्दुष्प्रापैव। उज्ज्वलदत्तो वदति—"……चण्डालः पापकर्मा चण्डमलं मूषाऽस्येत्यपि चण्डालः। प्रज्ञादित्वादणि 'चाण्डाल' इत्यपि"। परन्तु चाण्डाल-शब्दस्य प्रज्ञादिगणे पाठाभावात् गणस्यास्याकृतिगणत्वाभावाच्चात्रस्य उज्ज्वलदत्तश्चिन्त्य एव। तथाच संवदति भट्टोजिदीक्षितः—प्रज्ञादित्वादणि चाण्डालोऽपीत्युज्ज्वलदत्तः, तन्न, 'कुलाल-वरुण-कर्मार-निषाद-चण्डाल-मित्रामित्रेभ्यश्छन्दसि'[2] इति चण्डाल-शब्दादणं विदधता वार्त्तिकेन च सह विरोध इति बोध्यम्।[3] स्वयं भट्टोजिदीक्षितो वार्त्तिकमिदं सिद्धान्तकौमुद्यां न व्याचष्ट इति त्वन्यदेतत्। सारस्वते हि[4] "पति चण्डिभ्यामालञ्" इति सूत्रं पठित्वा 'चाण्डाल' इत्युदाहृत्याप्यत्र वृद्ध्युपायं न निरदिक्षत्, अतः कल्प्यते बाहुलकाद् वृद्धिः सुप्रापेति। अन्यथा 'चडि' धातोरालञि विहिते सारस्वतव्याकरणानुसारमपि "इदितो नुम्"[5] इति नुमि चण्ड+आल इति जाते "अत उपधायाः"[6] इत्यनेनोपधाभूताकाराप्राप्त्या वृद्ध्यप्राप्तिर्दुर्वारैव। मम तु पाणिनीयोणादावुपर्युक्त-वार्त्तिकानुसारमत्राण्विधानेन 'चाण्डाल'-शब्दस्य साधनं कदाचित् सुकरम् अणभावे च 'चण्डाल'-शब्दस्यापीति रूपद्वयं साध्वेव। अत एव शब्दभेदप्रकाशिकायां[7] "चाण्डालोऽपि च चण्डालो……" इति पठ्यते।

सारस्वतोणादौ 'धूलि'[8]-शब्दः साध्यते। अयं हि शब्दः केवलं भोजीयोणादौ[9] तदनुसारिहैमोणादावपि[10] सिध्यति। अत्रोणादिद्वयेऽपि 'लिक्'-प्रत्ययः, सारस्वतोणादौ[11] उलिक्-प्रत्ययः तथा मा०' पुस्तके 'उलि'-प्रत्ययः पठ्यते। यत्र 'उलि'-प्रत्ययः तत्र बाहुलकादेव गुणनिषेधः।

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१. उ० द० १,११६।
२. पा० ५,४,३६,१।
३. प्रौ० म० पृ० ८३०।
४. च० की० ३८।
५. मू० सा० ७४५।
६. तत्रैव ७५७।
७. श० भे० प्र० ६।
८. च० की०, मू० सा० १०।
९. भो० उ० २,१,२३२।
१०. है० च० उ० ७:१।
११. च० की०, मू० सा० पुस्तकयोः।

विग्रहा यत्र पूर्वाचार्यैर्विवदन्ते प्रकृतोणादिः

सारस्वतव्याकरणोणादौ केषाञ्चन शब्दानामेवं विग्रहो दृश्यते यत्र प्राचीनाचार्य-सम्मतोऽन्यादृशो विग्रहः सुस्पष्टः। यथा—"इदि चदि शकिरुदिभ्यो रः"[1] इति सूत्रे 'रुद्'-धातुं पठित्वा रोदितीति रुद्रः इत्युच्यते। अस्यैव 'रुद्र'-शब्दस्य सिद्धये पाणिनीयोणादौ "रोदेर्णिलुक् च"[2] इति 'रोदि' ण्यन्तो धातुर्विवक्षितः। यास्कोऽप्यत्र[3] संवदति यथा—"रुद्रो रौतीति सतः, रोरूयमाणो द्रवतीति वा, रोदयतेर्वा, यदरुदत्तद्रुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वम् इति काठकम्, यदरोदीत्तद्रुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वम् इति हारिद्राविकम्"।

सारस्वतव्याकरणोणादेरुपजीव्यम्

यद्यपि प्राक् समये समये प्रदर्शितदिशा ज्ञातुं शक्यते यत् सारस्वतोणादावुज्ज्वलदत्तव्याख्यातपाणिनीयोणादेः क्वचित् सम्पूर्णसूत्राणां कचिच्च सूत्रांशानां ग्रहणात्, स्वरानपेक्षकेऽपि प्रकृतव्याकरणे निदनुबन्धपठनात्, उज्ज्वलदत्तीयनिपातन-प्रकारस्यैव सूत्रत्वेन ग्रहणात् पाणिनीयोणादेरुपजीव्यत्वं सुस्पष्टं तथापि उज्ज्वलदत्तपठितेष्वपि धातुषु धात्वर्थस्वातन्त्र्य-गणपरिवर्तन-परस्मैपदात्मनेपदपरिवर्तनैः, "धविर्गत्यर्थः" इति पठतोज्ज्वलदत्तेन धातुपाठे स्वीकृतस्यापि 'धवि'-धातोः सौत्रत्वस्वीकारेण, उज्ज्वलदत्तेन सिद्धेष्वपि शब्देषु साधनप्रकारेऽत्र स्वातन्त्र्याचरणेन, पूर्वाचार्यसम्मतानामुज्ज्वलदत्तेनापि स्वीकृतानां विग्रहाणामुपेक्षणेन, भोजीयोणादावेव (तदनुसारिहैमोणादावपि) साधितस्य धूलिशब्दस्य साधनेन चोज्ज्वलदत्तोपजीव्यत्वविषये मनो दोलायते।

अपि च यथा प्रागुक्तं, पुरुषशब्दसाधनार्थं सारस्वतव्याकरणोणादौ "पुः कुषन्"[4] इति पठ्यते। तदर्थमेव पाणिनीयोणादौ "पुरः कुषन्"[5] इति। अत्रोज्ज्वल-दत्तः 'पुर अग्रगमने' इति धातुं निर्दिशति परन्तु सारस्वतोणादौ "पॄ पालनपूरणयोः" इति। यद्युज्ज्वलदत्त एव सारस्वतोणादिं प्राभावयिष्यत्तदाऽवश्यं प्रकृतोणादिः "पुर अग्रगमने" इति धातुं समग्रहिष्यत्। अत्र सूत्रे 'पुः' इति पाठोऽपि चिन्त्य एव, "ऋत

१. तत्रैव, १५।
२. उ० द० २,२२।
३. अ० १० ख० ४।
४. च० की० ३४।
५. उ० द० ४,७४।

उत्"[1] इत्यत्र तपरकरणेन ङसिङसोरत उदादेशाभावात्। वस्तुतस्तु पॄ+अस् इति स्थिते यणादेशेन 'प्रः' इत्यनेनैव भाव्यम्। अत एव पाणिनेः 'प्रो यङि'[2] इतिनिर्देशः सङ्गच्छते। अत्रेदमप्यनुसन्धेयं यत् श्वेतवनवासी 'पुरः कुषन्'[3] तथा 'विदिपुरोश्च'[4] इति सूत्रद्वयेन पुरुषशब्दं वारद्वयं साधयति। पूर्वसूत्रे "पॄ पालनपूरणयोः" इति तथोत्तरसूत्रे 'पुर् अग्रगमने' इति धातुद्वयं निर्दिशति। प्रसङ्गेन पूर्वसूत्रवृत्तौ निरुक्त-मुद्धरति यथा 'पुरि वसति'—इति पुरुषः इति नैरुक्ताः।

तुलनीयं निरुक्तम्—"पुरुषं पुरिशय इत्याचक्षीरन्[5] पुरुषः पुरिषादः। पुरिशयः। पूरयतेर्वा। पूरयत्यन्तर······"[6]। तत्र पूर्वसूत्रे 'पुरः' इत्यस्य 'पॄ' इत्यस्माद्येव साधनार्थं यत्नोऽपि विधीयते यथा—"अनुकार्यानुकरणयोर्भेदात्, अर्थस्य विवक्षितत्वात्, अर्थवत्त्वे प्रातिपदिकत्वेऽनुकरणस्याधातुत्वात्, अधातुरिति निषेधाभावे च पञ्चम्येकवचने उत्वे च पुर इति निर्देशः।" वस्तुतस्तु अत्रत्यः श्वेतवनवासिग्रन्थश्चिन्त्य एव, प्राक् प्रतिपादितदिशोत्वस्य सर्वथा दुष्प्रापत्वात्, यथाकथञ्चिदुत्वस्वीकारेऽपि 'पुरः' इत्यस्य दौर्लभ्याच्चेति कृतं विस्तरेण।

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१. पा० ६,१,१११।
२. पा० ८,२,२०।
३. श्वे० व० ४,७६।
४. तत्रैव, ४,७७।
५. अ० १, ख० १३।
६. अ० २, ख० ४।

चित्तवीथि

डा० महेश तिवारी,

चित्तवीथि—शब्द दो पदों से व्युत्पन्न है। वे हैं—चित्त तथा वीथि। जो आरम्मण (अर्थात् विषय) का चिन्तन करता है, वह चित्त है।[1] वीथि का अर्थ मार्ग या प्रक्रिया है। अतः चित्तवीथि का शब्दगत अर्थ है—विषयचिन्तन-प्रक्रिया। प्राविधिक रूप में यह शब्द ज्ञानप्राप्ति-प्रक्रिया (process of cognition) के लिए प्रयुक्त होता है।

बौद्धदर्शन द्रष्टा श्रोता या किसी प्रकार के कर्त्ता के रूप में आत्मा, जीव या वेदगू का अस्तित्व नही स्वीकार करता है।[2] धर्म का स्वभाव प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्न है। इदं-प्रत्ययता या कार्यकारण-नियम से आबद्ध सारी क्रियायें प्रवृत्त होती रहती हैं।[3] वस्तु के ऐसे स्वरूप के अन्तर्गत ही दर्शनश्रवणादि समस्त क्रियायों की व्याख्या उपलब्ध है।

विविध रूपों में अभिव्यक्त ज्ञेय पदार्थ असंख्य होते हुए भी अभिधर्म-दर्शन के अनुसार छ विषयों में सीमित हैं। वे हैं—रूप, शब्द, गन्ध, रस, स्प्रष्टव्य तथा धर्म।[4] सभी दृश्य पदार्थों को रूप, श्रव्य पदार्थों को शब्द, घ्रेय पदार्थों को गन्ध, स्वाद्य पदार्थों को रस, स्पृश्य पदार्थों को स्प्रष्टव्य तथा चिन्त्य पदार्थों को धर्म कहते हैं। इन छ विषयों का ज्ञान चक्षु, श्रोत्र, घ्राण, जिह्वा, काय तथा मन नामक छ इन्द्रियों द्वारा होता है। प्रत्येक इन्द्रिय का कार्य करने का एक सुनिश्चित क्षेत्र तथा ग्रहण के लिए व्यवस्थित विषय होता है। कार्यक्षेत्र को आपाथ (range) तथा विषय को आलम्बन या आरम्मण (content) कहते हैं। इन्द्रियों द्वारा क्षेत्र या विषयगत अतिक्रमण इष्ट नहीं है।

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१. आरम्मणं चिन्तेती ति चित्तं...।—अ० सा० पृ० ५३।

२. परमत्थतो पनेत्थ पुग्गलो नूपलब्भती ति।—मि० प०, पृ० ३०।
न हेत्थ वेदगू उपलब्भती ति।—मि० प०, पृ० ५९।

३. इमस्मिं सति इदं होति, इमस्स उप्पादा इदं उप्पज्जति, इमस्मिं असति इदं न होति, इमस्स निरोधा इदं निरुज्झति।—न० टी०, पृ० १४०।

४. अ० सं०, पृ० ५६।

इस प्रकार दृष्टि परिधिपरिव्याप्त प्रदेश चक्षु इन्द्रिय का आपाथ है। शब्दागमन का श्रवणपथ में जहां जाकर विराम हो जाता है, वहां तक श्रोत्र का आपाथ है। घ्राण, जिह्वा तथा काय के आपाथ उन उन इन्द्रियविशेष के काय तक सीमित हैं। इस दृष्टि से चक्षु तथा श्रोत्र को असम्प्राप्तविषयग्राही तथा घ्राण, जिह्वा एवं काय को सम्प्राप्तविषयग्राही कहा जाता है।[1] मन का आपाथ उसका अन्तः-प्रदेश है। प्रत्येक इन्द्रिय द्वारा अपने आपाथगत विषय को ग्रहण करने की दृष्टि से ज्ञानप्रक्रिया के छ प्रकार हैं, यथा चक्षुद्वारवीथि, कायद्वारवीथि घ्राणद्वारवीथि, जिह्वाद्वारवीथि, श्रोत्रद्वारवीथि तथा मनोद्वारवीथि। तद्गत विज्ञान की दृष्टि से उन्हें ही चक्षुविज्ञानवीथि श्रोत्रविज्ञानवीथि आदि कहते हैं।[2] इनमें प्रथम पांच वीथियां बाह्य आलम्बन को लेकर प्रवृत्त होती है, अतः उन्हें पञ्चद्वारवीथि कहते हैं। मन के द्वारा प्रत्ययात्मकविषय ग्रहण किये जाने के कारण उसकी प्रक्रिया को मनोद्वारवीथि कहते हैं। इन छ वीथियों द्वारा केवल 'कम्म', 'कम्मनिमित्त', एवं 'गतिनिमित्त' नामक तीन आलम्बनों को छोड़ कर विश्व के समस्त पदार्थों का ज्ञान प्राप्त किया जा सकता है।

पञ्चद्वारवीथि

व्यावहारिक जीवन में ऐसा देखा जाता है कि कोई विषय सामने आया कि अविलम्ब हम कह उठते है कि यह अमुक वस्तु है। किसी के द्वारा कोई शब्द उच्चरित हुआ कि हम उसका अर्थ, आकार प्रकार झट समझ जाते हैं। ऐसा समझना तथा उसके सम्बन्ध में कुछ कहना अविलम्ब तथा सरल प्रतीत होता है पर वैसा करने में मन तथा इन्द्रियों को चित्तप्रवाह की कई सरणियों से अग्रसर होना पड़ता है। इसे ही ज्ञान प्राप्ति की प्रक्रिया (process of cognition) कहा जाता है।

पञ्चद्वारवीथि चक्षुद्वार-श्रोत्रद्वार आदि पांच इन्द्रिय द्वार से प्रवृत्त वीथियों का सम्मिलित नाम है। उदाहरणस्वरूप चक्षुद्वारवीथि को लिया जाय। प्रश्न सीधा सा है—सामने एक पद्मपुष्प है। मनुष्य उसे आंखों से देखता और कह

१. चक्खादिद्वयं असम्पत्तवसेन, घानादित्तयं सम्पत्तवसेनाति।—अ० सं०, पृ० ११५।
२. अ० सं०, पृ० ६५।

उठता है कि यह पद्म है उसके ऐसा कहने के पूर्व निम्नलिखित मानसिक एवं इन्द्रियगत क्रियायें हुई रहती हैं।

१. भवंग—चक्षु इन्द्रिय के आपाथ में रूपालम्बन के आने के एक क्षण पूर्व तक मन उस अनागत विषय से अबाधित हो उद्वेगरहित प्रवाहरत रहता है। मन की ऐसी दशा को भवंग या अतीत भवंग कहते हैं।

२. भवंगचलन—विषय के इन्द्रिय आपाथ में आते ही मन का वह अबाधित प्रवाह प्रकम्पित हो उठता है। यथा शान्त एवं अनाविल प्रवाह में पत्रिमात्रक पुष्पपत्र या मृत्तिकापिण्ड-प्रक्षेपन उस पर परिस्पन्दनात्मक रेखा अंकित कर देता है, उसी प्रकार चित्त प्रवाह पर आगत आलम्बन का कृत्य समझना चाहिए। मन की ऐसी अवस्था का नाम भवंगचलन है।

३. भवंगविच्छेद—भवंगचलन के अनन्तर उपस्थित आलम्बन के कारण मन का पूर्व प्रवाह व्यवच्छिन्न हो जाता है। यहां तक की दशा भवंगोच्छेद कही जाती है।

४. पञ्चद्वारावज्जन—भवंगविच्छेद के अनन्तर चित्तप्रवाह आपाथगत आलम्बन की ओर अभिमुख हो जाता है। तत्रोन्मुख होते ही पांचो इन्द्रियां उसे उसके ग्रहण के लिए जागरूक हो उठती हैं। उनकी यह दशा वैसी ही है यथा रणस्थल के शिविरों में प्रसुप्त योद्धागण आपद्रव को सुनते ही तुरत सजग हो उठते हैं कि—वस्तुस्थिति क्या है तथा किसे क्या करना है। मन तथा इन्द्रियों की ऐसी दशा का नाम पञ्चद्वारावज्जन है।

५. चक्खुविञ्ञाण—यस्मात् आपाथगत आलम्बन रूप अर्थात् कोई दृश्य पदार्थ रहता है, अतः चक्षु इन्द्रिय उसे स्वविषय जान कार्यरत हो उठती है। इस प्रयास में चक्षु द्वारा रूप का स्पर्शात्मक दर्शनमात्र चक्खुविञ्ञाण कहलाता है। इसे न्याय के शब्दों में निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष के समान कहा जा सकता है।

६. सम्पटिच्छन—चक्षु द्वारा जिस आलम्बन का दर्शनमात्र हुए रहता है, मन के द्वारा अब उसी को ग्रहण की प्रवृत्ति होती है। इसका यह सक्रिय प्रयत्न विषय के आच्छादनात्मक होता है। बाह्य स्थित 'यह कुछ है'—इतना मात्र ही वह जान पाता है[1]। मन का यह क्रम सम्पटिच्छन कहलाता है।

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१. चक्खुविञ्ञाणादीहि विञ्ञातस्स आरम्मणस्स समा पटिच्छनं, गहणं ति वुत्तं होति।—न० टी० ४८।

७. सन्तीरण—सम्यक् मीमांसा को सन्तीरण कहते हैं। मीमांसा का अर्थ सम्पठिच्छन अवस्था में तथागृहीत आलम्बन के आकार प्रकार वर्ण संस्थान विषयक चिन्ता। पूर्व अनुभूतियों की पृष्ठभूमि में मन अब उस आलम्बन के स्वरूप विनिश्चय के लिए तत्पर हो उठता है। उसकी यह क्रिया साम्यविभेद नीति पर आधृत विनिश्चयात्मक कही जा सकती है।

८. वोट्ठपन—यह व्यवस्थापन या निर्धारण का अधिवचन है। सन्तीरण की अवस्था में मन जिस आलम्बन के स्वरूप निरूपण में तत्पर था, वोट्ठपन क्षण में तत्सम्बन्धी निश्चय पर पहुंच जाता है। वह दृढ़ता के साथ जान लेता है कि अमुक नाम से अभिव्यक्त व्यवहार का विषय यह 'रूप' है। इसका लक्षण, रस, प्रत्युपस्थान, पदस्थान इस प्रकार है। मन की ऐसी विनिश्चयात्मक प्रवृत्ति वोट्ठपन कहलाती है।[१]

९. जवन—त्वरा के साथ गमन को जवन कहते हैं। प्राविधिकरूप में परिभोग का यह पर्याय है। वोट्ठपन क्षण में ज्ञात आलम्बन के प्रति मन को जो परिभुञ्जनात्मक क्रियायें होती है, उसे जवन कहते हैं। यह क्रिया ग्रहणत्यागसंमिश्रित होती है। परिज्ञात आलम्बन के इष्ट होने से ग्रहणात्मक तथा अनिष्ट होने से त्यागात्मक समझना चाहिए। इस क्षण में मन और विषय का परिभोगात्मा सीधा सम्बन्ध हो जाता है।

१०. तदारम्मण—वह जिसका आलम्बन हो, उसे तदारम्मण कहते हैं। इसका अर्थ यह है जवन क्षण में मन जिस आलम्बन का परिभोग करता है, तदारम्मण क्षण में तज्जन्य कटु मधु अनुभूतियों को भवंग में अंकित करता है। अतः तदारम्मण का व्यावहारिक अर्थ अंकन, निबन्धन आदि ही है। परिभुक्त विषय का आकार, प्रकार, गुण, दोष, स्वादुअस्वादुभावपूर्ण विवरण के साथ इस क्षण में भवंग में अंकित हो जाते हैं। इसके बाद भवंगपात हो जाता है अर्थात् तद्विषयगत वीथि का अवरोध हो जाता है।

इस प्रकार चक्षु के आपाथ में आये रूपालम्बन के ज्ञान के लिए चक्षुद्वारवीथि प्रवृत्त होती है जिसमें भवंग से लेकर तदारम्मण तक दस अवस्थायें होती हैं। इन समस्त सरणियों से अग्रसर होते हुए अन्त में हम यह जान पाते हैं

१. नवनीतटीकाकार ने इसे—'तस्सेव आरम्मणस्स ववत्थपनं' (४८) तथा विभावनीकार ने—'रूपं सुट्ठु सल्लेक्खेन्तं विय' (९२) कहकर व्याख्या की है।

कि यह---'पद्मपुष्प' है या अमुक् 'रूप' है। श्रोत्रद्वारवीथि घ्राणद्वारवीथि आदि को भी इसी न्याय से समझना चाहिए।

अब यहां विचार्य यह है कि चक्षुद्वारवीथि जैसा नाम होते हुए भी यह प्रक्रिया केवल चक्षु इन्द्रिय से ही सम्पन्न नहीं होती है, बल्कि यहाँ चक्षु तथा मन का समान योग है। चक्षु रूप को नहीं देख सकता है, यदि मनसे उसका संयोग न हो। उसी प्रकार मन भी रूप को नहीं देख सकता है, यदि चक्षु से उसका योग न हो।[1] एतदर्थ दोनों का पारस्परिक कर्मण्यभाव वांछनीय है। वीथि का नामकरण प्रवृत्त द्वार वश होता है।[2]

पञ्चद्वारवीथि और काल

उत्पत्ति स्थिति और भंग से अभिव्यक्त कालगत परित्र अवधि का नाम एक चित्तक्षण है। ऐसे सतरह चित्तक्षण चक्षुद्वारवीथि के सफल पर्यवसान में लगते हैं। भवंग से लेकर वोट्ठपन तक प्रत्येक अवस्था में एक एक चित्तक्षण होते हैं। जवन में सात तथा तदारम्मण में दो चित्तक्षण होते है। कुल सतरह चित्तक्षणों में वीथि की परिपूर्ति समझी जाती है[3]।

विषयग्रहण समन्वय

बौद्धदर्शन के अनुसार वस्तु का स्वरूप नदी के प्रवाह के समान है जिसमें प्रतिक्षण उत्पत्ति एवं विनाश का क्रम कार्यरत रहता है। कोई भी पदार्थ नित्य नहीं है। वस्तु मात्र स्वरुपतः अनित्य हैं। इस अनित्यप्रवाहमयता को लक्ष्य कर यह

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१. चक्खु रूपं न पस्सति अचित्तकत्ता, चित्तं रूपं न पस्सति अचक्खुकत्ता···

चक्खुना हि हत्थविकारादिवसेन विप्फन्दमानं वण्णारम्मणमेव पस्सति। विञ्ञति पन मनोद्वारिकचित्तेन चिन्तेत्वा 'इदञ्चिदं चेस कारेति मञ्ञे' ति जानाति।—अ० सा० पृ० ६१।

ननु च चक्खुना रूपं दिस्वा ति वचनतो चक्खुन्द्रियमेव दस्सनकिच्चं साधेति न विञ्ञाणं ति? न यिदमेवं, रूपस्स अन्धभावेन रूपदस्सने असमत्थभावतो··· ।—वि० टी० पृ० ९२।

२. चक्खुना ति पनेत्थ तेन द्वारेन करणभूतेनाति अधिप्पायो। वि० टी० पृ० ९२।

विञ्ञाणादीनं उप्पज्जनट्ठानानि विञ्ञाणद्वारं फस्सद्वारं असंवरद्वारं संवरद्वारंति नामं लभन्ति।—अ० सा० पृ० ९०।

३. एत्तावता चुद्दस वीथिचित्तुप्पादा द्वे भवंगचलनानि पुब्बे वातीतकमेकचित्त क्खणं ति कत्वा सत्तरस चित्तक्खणानि परिपूरेन्ति, ततो परं निरुज्झति। न० टी० पृ० ७०।

प्रश्न उत्पन्न होता है कि जब चित्त एवं रूप दोनों क्षण क्षण परिणमित होते हैं तो चित्त द्वारा रूप का ग्रहण कैसे होता है। इसके उत्तर में अभिधर्मदर्शन में दर्शाया गया है कि चित्त एवं रूप के परिणमन की गति में अन्तर है। जिस अवधि में चित्तप्रवाह में सतरह बार परिणमन हो जाता है तब तक रूप एक रस बना रहता है। इसका अर्थ यह है कि चित्त की गति रूप की गति से सतरह गुणी अधिक है[1]। ऐसा होने के कारण चित्तद्वारा रूप का ग्रहण इष्ट है।

वीथिचित्त

पञ्चद्वारवीथि में भवंग से लेकर आरम्मण तक दस अवस्थायें देखी जाती हैं। इन अवस्थाओं पर चित्त की दृष्टि से विचारने से ये केवल सात चित्त की अभिव्यक्ति मात्र हैं। भवंग, भवंगचलन तथा भवंगविच्छेद नामक प्रथम तीन अवस्थायें वीथि के पूर्वकृत्य हैं। इनकी गणना चित्त में नहीं होती है। पञ्चद्वारा-वज्जन से लेकर तदारम्मण तक की सात अवस्थायें चित्तमात्र हैं। इनमें पञ्चद्वारा-वज्जन अहेतुक क्रिया चित्त है चक्खुविञ्ञाण, सम्पटिच्छन, एवं सन्तीरण अहेतुक विपाकचित्त हैं; वोट्ठपन अर्थात् मनोद्वारावज्जन अहेतुक क्रियाचित्त है, जवन उनतीस कामावचर जवनचित्तों का अधिवचन है तथा तदारम्मण आठमहाविपाक तथा तीन अहेतुक विपाक सन्तीरण चित्तों का नाम है। इस प्रकार पंञ्चद्वारावज्जन से लेकर तदारम्मण तक सात चित्त पंचद्वारवीथि में आते है। यस्मात् जवनचित्त सात सातबार तथा तदारम्मण दो बार उत्पन्न होते हैं, इसलिए चित्तुप्पाद की दृष्टि से चौदह होते हैं। विशेषतः कामावचर के बारह अकुशल, अठारह अहेतुक तथा चौबीस शोभन—सब मिलाकर चौवनचित्त पञ्चद्वारवीथि में उत्पन्न हो सकते हैं[2]।

विषयप्रवृत्ति

व्यावहारिक जीवन की दैनिक अनुभूतियों में ऐसा देखा जाता है कि जीवन के विविध क्षणों में रूप शब्दादि विषयों के ज्ञान होते हुए भी सबके ज्ञान एक समान नहीं होते हैं। किसी विषय का ज्ञान हमें पूर्ण रूप से हो पाता है

१. 'तानि पन सत्तरस चित्तक्खणानि रूपधम्मानमायु'।—अ० सं० पृ० ६८।

२. वीथिचित्तानि सत्तेव चित्तुप्पादा चतुद्दस।
चतुपञ्ञास वित्थारा पञ्चद्वारे यथारहं॥—अ० सं० पृ० ७१।

तो किसी का अधूरा ही। अत्यधिक स्पष्ट, स्पष्ट तथा अस्पष्ट रूप से विषय सर्वथा देखे जाते हैं। उदाहरणतः हम प्रतिदिन कई व्यक्तियों को देखते हैं पर सबके विषय में जानकारी एक सी नहीं हो पाती है। किसी को देखकर हम झट पहचान लेते हैं पर किसी के सम्बन्ध में केवल इतना ही कह कर रुक जाते हैं कि ये परिचित व्यक्ति हैं। अतः प्रश्न यह उत्पन्न होता है कि ऐसी विशदता एवं अविशदता जन्य अन्तर क्यों?

अभिधर्मदर्शन में इसका उत्तर इस प्रकार उपलब्ध होता है। इन्द्रियों के आपाथ में विषय का आगमन भवंग के अतीत होते ही होता है या अधिक क्षणों के व्यतीत होने पर।[1] उसके आगमन के अनुरूप ही चित्तवीथि की प्रग्राहमयता देखी जाती है। यदि रूपालम्बन एक चित्तक्षण व्यतीतकर अर्थात् भवंग के अनन्तर आपाथ में आता है तो उस पर चित्तवीथि तदारम्मणक्षण तक प्रवाहरत रहती है। भवंग से लेकर तदारम्मण तक वीथि के प्रवाहरत होने का अर्थ चित्तवीथि का परिपूर्ण अवस्था तक बने रहना है। ऐसी दशा में विषय ज्ञान भी पूर्णरूप से होता है। ज्ञान क्रम में विषय के वर्ण संस्थानादि में कहीं भी न्यूनता नहीं रहती है। वीथि की ऐसी प्रवृत्ति का नाम तदारम्मणवार है। इस रूप से परिज्ञात विषय को अतिमहन्त आरम्मण कहते हैं। पुनः जब भवंग के अतिरिक्त दो चित्तक्षणों के व्यतीत होने पर आपाथ में विषय का आगमन होता है, तो वीथि जवन तक पहुँच कर विरमित हो जाती है। तदारम्मण की उत्पत्ति नहीं हो पाती है। ऐसी दशा में विषय का परिभुञ्जन तो हो जाता है पर तज्जन्य अनुभूतियों का अंकन नहीं होता है। फलतः विषय का सुग्रहण होते हुए भी उसके आकार-प्रकार विषयक विशदता नहीं हो पाती है। वीथि के ऐसे क्रम को जवनवार तथा इससे ज्ञात विषय को महन्त आरम्मण कहते हैं। जब भवंग के बाद नव चित्तक्षणों के व्यतीत होने पर विषय आपाथ में आता है तो वीथि केवल वोट्ठपन तक जाकर ही रुक जाती है। जवन की उत्पत्ति भी नहीं हो पाती है। ऐसी दशा में विषय का निर्धारण तो अवश्य हो जाता है पर उसका परिभुञ्जन या तद्गत विशेषताओं का भवंगानुबन्धन नहीं हो पाता है। फलस्वरूप विषय ज्ञान अस्पष्ट सा होकर रह जाता है। यह वीथिक्रम वोट्ठपनवार कहलाता है तथा इस

१. एकचित्तक्खणातीतानि वा बहुचित्तक्खणातीतानि वा ठितिप्पत्तानेव पञ्चारम्मणानि पञ्चद्वारे आपाथमागच्छन्ति।—अ० सं० पृ० ६८।

रूप से ज्ञात विषय का नाम परित्तारम्मण है कमी-कमी अनेक चित्तक्षणों के व्यतीत होने पर विषय इन्द्रिय के आपाथ में आता है। ऐसे विषय को लेकर चित्तवीथि का प्रारम्भ तो अवश्य हो जाता है पर वह भवंगविच्छेदादि तक जाकर ही क्षीण हो जाती है। ऐसा होने से आगत विषय की एक धूमिल रेखा मात्र ही पड़कर रह जाता हैं, उसकी किसी प्रकार की जानकारी नहीं हो पाती है। वीथि का यह क्रम मोघवार कहलाता है।[1] इसमें गृहीत विषय का नाम अति परित्तारम्मण है। इस प्रकार पञ्चद्वारवीथि के प्रसंग में इन्द्रिय आपाथ में विषय के आगमन की दृष्टि से विषय ज्ञान में न्यूनाधिकता देखी जाती है।

मनोद्वारविथि

मन के विषय को धर्म कहते हैं। धर्म प्रत्ययात्मक होता है। इसके अन्तर्गत प्रसाद, सूक्ष्मरूप, चित्त, चैतसिक, निर्वाण तथा प्रज्ञप्ति छः प्रकार के विषय आते हैं। ऐसे विषयों को जानने के लिए मनोद्वार पर जो ज्ञान प्रक्रिया प्रवृत्त होती है, उसका नाम मनोद्वारवीथि है।

मन के आपाथ में केवल ऐसे ही विषयों का आगमन होता है जो पूर्व ज्ञात सुनिश्चित एवं परिचित रहते हैं। हम किसी भी ऐसे विषय के सम्बन्ध में चिन्तन नहीं कर पाते हैं जो अज्ञात हो। अज्ञात विषय वस्तुतः मन का विषय हो ही नही सकता है। अतः मनोद्वारवीथि में वे अवस्थायें नहीं हैं, जिनका अवतरण विषय व्यवस्थापन के पूर्व होता है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि मनोद्वारवीथि विषयव्यवस्थापन से ही प्रारम्भ होती है। इसलिए इसमें भवंग, भवंगचलन, भवंग-विच्छेद, मनोद्वारावज्जन जवन तथा तदारम्भण नामक छः अवस्थायें हैं। इनमें मनोद्वारावज्जन को छोड़कर सभी नाम पञ्चद्वारवीथि के प्रसंग में आये हुए हैं। मनोद्वारावज्जन पञ्चद्वारवीथी के वोट्ठपन का पर्याय है।[2] अतः स्वरूप और कार्य में इसे तद्रूप ही समझना चाहिए।

मनोद्वारवीथि की सफल परिसमाप्ति में तेरह चित्तक्षण लगते हैं। भवंग से लेकर मनोद्वारावज्जन तक की प्रत्येक अवस्था में एक एक चित्तक्षण लगते हैं।

१. सब्बथा पि पञ्चद्वारे तदारम्मण-जवन-वोट्ठपनमोघवारसङ्खातानं चतुन्नं वारानं यथाक्कमं आरम्मणभूता विसयप्पवत्ति चतुधा वेदितब्बा।—अ० सं० पृ० ७०-७१।

२. मनोद्वारावज्जनमेव पञ्चद्वारे वोट्ठपनकिच्चं साधेति।—अ० सं० पृ० ५०।

जवन में सात तथा तदारम्मण में दो चित्तक्षण होते हैं। कुल तेरह चित्तक्षणों में यह वीथि समाप्त हो जाती है।

चित्त की दृष्टि से मनोद्वारवीथि में मनोद्वारावज्जन, जवन तथा तदारम्मण नामक तीन चित्त होते हैं। इनमें मनोद्वारावज्जन एकबार, जवन सात बार तथा तदारम्मण दो बार उत्पन्न होता है, अतः चित्तुप्पाद यहाँ दस होते हैं। पुनः इस चित्तों के आने की समर्थता पर विचार करने से उनतीस कामावचर जवन, एकादस तदारम्मण तथा एक मनोद्वारावज्जन—कुल एकतालीस चित्तों की सम्भावना कही जा सकती है।[1]

मनोद्वारवीथि में भी परिज्ञात विषय की स्पष्टता या अस्पष्टता उपलब्ध होती है। इस दृष्टि से यहा दो प्रकार के आलम्बन कथित हैं। वे हैं—विमूत और अविमूत।[2] विमूत का अर्थ है सम्यक् रूप से गृहीत अर्थात् स्पष्ट या प्रकट। इससे भिन्न का नाम अविमूत है। जब विमूत आलम्बन मन के आपाथ में आता है तो भवंगचलनादि के साथ साथ वीथि प्रारंभ हो तदारम्मण तक प्रवाहरत रहती है। ऐसा होने से विषय का सम्यक् परिमार्जन हो जाता है। परिमार्जित हो वह प्रकर्ष के साथ ज्ञात होता है। पुनः यदि अविमूत आलम्बन आपाथ में आता है तो वीथि का प्रवाह जवन तक पहुँच कर रुक जाता है। तदारम्मण की उत्पत्ति नहीं हो पाती है। ऐसी दशा में विषयपरिभोग क्रिया तो हो पाती है पर तज्जन्य अनुभूतियों का आवर्जन एवं अनुबन्धन नहीं हो पाता है। फलतः विषय ज्ञान धूमिल रह जाता हैं।

इस प्रकार वाह्य एवं धर्मात्मक (आन्तर) विषयों के ज्ञान के लिए अभिधर्म दर्शन में पञ्चद्वारवीथि तथा मनोद्वारवीथि नामक दो ज्ञान प्रक्रियायें बतलायी जाती हैं।

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१. वीथिचित्तानि तीणेव चित्तुप्पादा दसेरिता।
विस्थारेन पनेत्थेकचत्तालीस विभावये॥
—अ० सं० ७२ पृ०।

२. मनोद्वारिकचित्तानं अतीतानागतम्पि आरम्मणं होति ति तेसं अतिमहन्तादिवसेन विसय-ववत्थानं कातुं न सक्का ति विभूताविभूतवसेनेवेतं नियमेतुं........वुत्तं।—बि० टी० पृ० ९८।

वर्णस्फोट निरूपण

प्रो० स्वामी ब्रह्मानन्द

स्फोटवाद के सम्बन्ध में 'तपरस्तत्कालस्य'[1] सूत्र के भाष्य में ऐसा प्रसङ्ग आता है कि—द्रुता, मध्यमा तथा विलम्बिता इन तीन वृत्तियों में वर्णोच्चारण के कालभेद हो जाने से उनके काल का निश्चय होना असम्भव है।[2] 'द्रुता' वृत्ति में तपर वर्ण का उच्चारण स्वीकार करने पर कालभेद होने से 'मध्यमावृत्ति' और 'विलम्बितावृत्ति' में तत्कालग्रहण का उपसंख्यान करना पड़ेगा। इसी प्रकार 'मध्यमावृत्ति' में तपर का उच्चारण मानने पर 'द्रुता' तथा विलम्बिता वृत्ति का तथा विलम्बितावृत्ति में तपर का उच्चारण स्वीकार करने पर 'द्रुता' और 'मध्यमा' वृत्ति का उपसंख्यान कर पड़ेगा। प्रश्न यहां यह होता है कि क्या कारण है कि वृत्तियों के भेद होने से तत्काल का ग्रहण नहीं सिद्ध होता है? इसका उत्तर यह है कि द्रुतावृत्ति में जो वर्ण हैं, वे मध्यमावृत्ति में त्रिभागाधिक हैं। अर्थात् द्रुतावृत्ति के काल का तीसरा हिस्सा और मिलाने पर मध्यमावृत्ति में उच्चरित वर्ण का काल होता है। मध्यमावृत्ति के जो वर्ण हैं, वे विलम्बितावृत्ति में त्रिभागाधिक हैं[3]।

वार्तिककार ने वर्णों को स्थिर मानकर इस प्रश्न का समाधान किया है और कहा है कि विभिन्न व्यक्तियों या एक ही व्यक्ति द्वारा विभिन्न वर्णों के विलम्ब या शीघ्रता से बोलने के कारण कालभेद हो जाता है। द्रुता, मध्यमा, और विलम्बिता इन वृत्तियों में वर्ण वस्तुतः स्थिर ही रहते हैं, केवल वक्ता के विलम्ब या शीघ्रता से बोलने के कारण कालभेद प्रतीत होता है। कोई बोलने वाला व्यक्ति शीघ्रता से बोलता है, कोई देरी से और कोई और भी अधिक देरी से बोलता है। जिसप्रकार

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१. अ. १. १. ७०।

२. म. भा. ५६०।

३. श्लोक या मन्त्र का शीघ्र उच्चारण करने में ब्रह्माण्डसम्बद्ध अमृतबिन्दुस्राविणी सुषुम्नानाड़ी के नव बिन्दु गिरते हैं, मध्यमावृत्ति में बारह बिन्दु, विलम्बिता वृत्ति में सोलह बिन्दु गिरते हैं,—यह कैयट का मत है।

नागेश कहते हैं कि वस्तुतः भाष्य के अनुसार द्रुता से चौगुना काल मध्यमा में और मध्यमा से चौगुना काल विलम्बिता में लगता है। वस्तुतः कैयट का कथन अधिक युक्तिसंगत प्रतीत होता है।

एक ही मार्ग को कोई शीघ्रगति से पार करता है, कोई देरी से और कोई अधिक देरी से। यथा रथ के द्वारा शीघ्र जाता है, घुड़सवार उसकी अपेक्षा देरी से नियत स्थान पर पहुँचता है और पैदल चलने वाला व्यक्ति अत्यधिक देरी से उसी स्थान पर पहुँचता है। यद्यपि मार्ग की लम्बाई एक ही रहती है किन्तु साधनों के भेद से उसको पार करने में समय कम या अधिक लगता है। वर्णों की उत्पत्ति के पक्ष में भी उन वर्णों की उपलब्धियों के ही काल के भेद से तीन प्रकार की वृत्तियां होती हैं। वर्ण, वृत्तिभेद में भी एक रूप ही है। वस्तुतः वर्णों की नित्यता के सिद्धान्त में भी ऐसा कहा जा सकता है कि वर्ण स्थिर हैं, उनकी अभिव्यञ्जक ध्वनियों के भेद से वृत्तियों में भेद है, यह वार्तिककार का अभिप्राय है।

भाष्यकार उपर्युक्त मार्ग के दृष्टान्त से सहमत नहीं हैं। क्योंकि मार्ग गमन क्रिया का आधार है। ऐसी स्थिति में यह संभव नहीं कि आधार में वृद्धि या ह्रास हो। अतः भाष्यकार इस प्रश्न का इस प्रकार समाधान करते हैं कि स्फोट अर्थात् ध्वनियों के द्वारा स्फुटित या अभिव्यक्त होने वाला वर्ण का प्रारम्भिकरूप ही शब्द का यथार्थ रूप है और इसी का 'तपरस्तत्कालस्य' सूत्र में ग्रहण किया गया है। ध्वनि तो उस स्फोट की अभिव्यक्ति का साधन है। जैसे घड़े को बार बार देखने पर भी उसमें किसी प्रकार का परिवर्तन नहीं होता है, उसी प्रकार विलम्बितावृत्ति में भी आकार की ही पुनः पुनः उपलब्धि होती है, वृत्तियों में भेद होने पर भी वर्ण में भेद नहीं होता है। अतः वे सभी वृत्तियों में समानकाल ही है। ह्रस्व, दीर्घ और प्लुत स्वतः भिन्न होते हुए ही भिन्न भिन्न ध्वनियों से व्यक्त होते हैं। अतः यह निश्चय किया जाता है कि इनमें कालभेद है। इसकी तुलना भेरी बजाने वाले से की गई है। जिस प्रकार कि कोई भेरी बजाने वाला भेरी को डंडे से प्रहार कर भावावेश में बीस डेग जाता है, कोई तीस डेग और चालीस डेग।' किन्तु जिस प्रकार बीस तीस और चालीस डेग जाने से भेरी की आवाज में कोई अन्तर नहीं होता है, उसी प्रकार शब्द की अभिव्यक्ति की साधन ध्वनियों में भिन्नता होने पर भी उन ध्वनियों से अभिव्यक्त होने वाला शब्द का मूलरूप स्फोट उतना ही रहता है, केवल ध्वनि की वृद्धि या ह्रास होता है।

भर्तृहरि ने वाक्यपदीय में स्फोट को कालातीत बतलाया है। यथा—

"अध्याहृतकलां[1] यस्य, कालशक्तिमुपाश्रितः।
जायन्तेऽमी विकाराः षड् भावभेदस्य योनयः॥ १,३,

1. अध्याहृताः कला भस्य........।

जिस शब्द की कालशक्ति में भेद का आरोप करके भावभेद के कारण भूत, जायते, अस्ति, विपरिणमते, वर्द्धते, अपक्षीयते और विनश्यति—ये छः विकार होते हैं। यद्यपि स्फोट को यहां कालातीत कहा गया है तथापि 'तपरस्तत्कालस्य' इस सूत्र में वर्णस्फोट के प्रथमग्रहण के कारणभूत प्राकृतध्वनि का कालग्रहण किया गया है। वैकृतध्वनि तो प्राकृत ध्वनि से अभिव्यक्त वर्णस्फोट की ही पुनः पुनः उपलब्धि का कारण है। अतः इसका कालग्रहण नहीं किया गया है। यही कारण है कि ह्रस्वादि अकारों में यद्यपि अकारस्फोट एक ही है, तथापि उसमें प्राकृतध्वनिभेद से भेद का आरोप करके ह्रस्व, दीर्घ, प्लुत का भिन्नकालत्व माना जाता है।

द्रुता आदि वृत्तियों में वैकृतध्वनिजन्य भेद है। अतः उन वृत्तियों के कारण भिन्नकालत्व नहीं समझा जाता है। शुद्धस्फोट के कालातीत होने से उसका यहां ग्रहण संभव ही नहीं है। अतः प्राकृतध्वनि से युक्त ही वर्णस्कोट का यहां ग्रहण है। और उस प्राकृतध्वनि का ही कालग्रहण किया जाता है। वैकृतध्वनि के काल को इसलिए ग्रहण नहीं किया जाता है कि शब्द के यथार्थरूप स्फोट के कालातीत होने पर जब व्यवहार के लिए आवश्यक होने से आरोपितध्वनि से युक्त ही उस स्फोट का ग्रहण करते हैं तो न्यूनतम आरोप का ग्रहण करना ही युक्ति-संगत होगा। अतः इस सूत्र में शब्द के स्फोट रूप के अभिव्यक्ति की लिए न्यूततम अपेक्षित प्राकृतध्वनि का ही कालग्रहण किया जाता है। द्रुता आदि वृत्तियों की जनक वैकृतध्वनि के काल का मानाभाव के कारण यहां ग्रहण नहीं किया जाता है।

यद्यपि वाक्यपदीय के ब्रह्मकाण्ड में भर्तृहरि ऐसा कहते हैं—

"पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते, वर्णेष्ववयवा न च।
वाक्यात् पदानामत्यन्तं प्रविवेको न कश्चन" ॥[1]

इसके अनुसार वैयाकरणों के मत में वाक्यस्फोट ही यथार्थ है, तथापि शास्त्रीय प्रक्रिया के लिए वर्णस्फोट को मान लिया जाता है।

पुनः वर्णस्फोटवाद का उपसंहार करते हुए भाष्यकार कहते हैं:—

१. १.७३।

"ध्वनिः स्फोटश्च शब्दानां ध्वनिस्तु खलु लक्ष्यते।
अल्पो महांश्च केषाञ्चिदुभयं तत्स्वभावतः ॥"[1]

शब्दों के ध्वनि और स्फोट दो रूप होते हैं। शब्दों का मूलरूप स्फोट है। उसको अभिव्यक्त करनेवाला श्रोत्रग्राह्य शब्द ध्वनि है।

वाणी के चार भेद बताये गये हैं। वे हैं—परा, पश्यन्ती, मध्यमा और वैखरी[2]। परावाणी मूलाधार चक्र में रहने वाली है। पश्यन्तीवाणी नाभिप्रदेश में रहती है। ये दोनों वाणियां योगियों के द्वारा ही जानने योग्य हैं। योगी दो प्रकार के होते हैं—युक्त और युञ्जान। इन में से जो पूर्ण सिद्धावस्था को प्राप्त कर चुके हैं वे युक्तयोगी कहलाते हैं। अतः परावाणी को वे ही जानते हैं। पश्यन्तीवाणी को युञ्जान अर्थात् सिद्धिप्राप्ति के लिए अग्रसर योगी भी अनुभव करते हैं। मानसिकवाणी को मध्यमावाणी कहते हैं। इस वाणी को सभी साधारण व्यक्ति जानते हैं। कण्ठताल्वादि के अभिघात जन्य वाणी को वैखरी वाणी कहते हैं। यह ध्वन्यात्मक है। सामान्य व्यक्तियों के लिए मध्यमावाणी ही स्फोट का रूप है श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय ग्राह्य होने के कारण ध्वनि प्रतीत होती है। किसी शब्द की ध्वनि वक्ता की इच्छा और प्रयत्न की विशेषता के अनुसार अल्प और अधिक होती है। शब्द का नित्यरूप स्फोट और अनित्य रूप ध्वनि—दोनों स्वभाव से ही सिद्ध है।

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१. म. भा. १.१.७०।
२. वही १.१.१-४१।

न्याय-वैशेषिकयोः स्मृतेः अप्रमात्वम्

श्री नारायण मिश्रः

ज्ञानं हि द्विविधम्—अनुभवः स्मृतिश्च। तत्र अनुभवो नाम अनुभवामीति-प्रतीतिसिद्धानुभवत्व-जातिमान् प्रत्ययः। स्मृतिश्च पूर्वानुभवविषय-विषयकं पूर्वानुभव-समानाधिकरणं ज्ञानम्।[1]

तत्र आत्म-संयुक्त-मनः-संयुक्तेन्द्रियादेः पदार्थेन सह सम्बन्धादिनाऽनुभवो जायते। स्मृतिश्च आत्म-मनसोः संयोग-विशेषम्[2] असमवायि-कारणत्वेन, पूर्वानुभवं तज्जन्य-संस्कारञ्च निमित्ततया स्वोत्पत्तौ अपेक्षते। संयोगे विशेषश्च संस्कारोद्बोधकानाम् प्रणिधानादीनाम् सन्निधानमेवेति प्रणिधानादि-सहकृतात् आत्ममनः-संयोगाख्यादसम-वायिकारणात् तस्याः उत्पत्तिः सिध्यति। यद्यपि अत्रत्योपस्का[4]रावलोकनेन प्रथमतः भ्रान्तिः प्रतीयते इव तथापि पूर्वापरपर्यालोचनया उक्तार्थे एव उपस्कार-कृतामपि सम्प्रतिपत्तिः स्पष्टा; इतरथा हि प्रणिधानादीत्यादि-शब्द-ग्राह्याणाम् सुख-दुःखादीनामपि असमवायिकारणत्वम् युक्ति-सम्प्रदाय[5]-विरुद्धम् आपद्येत।

अस्यां च स्मृतौ पूर्वानुभवः स्व-जन्य-संस्कार-द्वारा प्रयोजकः इति अनुभवस्य

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१. स्मरणं खलु पूर्व-ज्ञातस्य समानेन ज्ञात्रा ग्रहणम्।

न्याय-भाष्यम्—३। २। ३९॥

२. आत्म-मनसोः संयोग-विशेषात् संस्काराच्च स्मृतिः॥

वैशेषिक-सूत्रम्—९। २। ६॥

३. प्रणिधान-निबन्धाभ्यास-लिङ्ग-लक्षण-सादृश्य-परिग्रहाश्रयाश्रित-सम्बन्धानन्तर्य-वियोगैक-कार्य-विरोधातिशय-प्राप्ति-व्यवधान-सुख-दुःखेच्छाद्वेष-भयार्थित्व-क्रिया-राग-धर्माऽधर्म-निमित्तेभ्यः॥

न्याय-सूत्रम्—३। २। ४२॥

......तेन आदर-प्रत्ययावपि सङ्गृहीतौ भवतः।......
उन्मादादयोऽपि स्मृति-हेतवः लोक-सिद्धाः ......॥

तात्पर्य-टीका (उक्त-सूत्रस्य)।

४. संयोग-विशेषः प्रणिधानादि-सन्निधानम्, एतस्मादसमवायि-कारणात् आत्मनि समवायिनि स्मृतिः विद्याविशेषः उत्पद्यते इत्यर्थः। उपस्कारः—९। २। ६॥

५. अत्रार्थे व्योमवती (पृ० ४३८-३९), न्याय-कन्दली (पृ० २४५) च द्रष्टव्या।

व्यापारित्वं वदद्भिः मिश्रैः[1] स्पष्टीकृतोऽर्थः। तत्रापि अनुभवस्य अनुभवत्वेन रूपेण हेतुता ज्ञानत्वेन रूपेण वेति प्राचीन-नवीन-मत-विमर्शः तत्त्वचिन्तामणेः अनुमिति-प्रकरणस्य दीधितौ तद्व्याख्यासु च निपुणं निरूपितः। परन्तु अनुभवात्संस्कारः संस्काराच्च स्मृतिः; न तु अनुभव-स्मृत्योः कार्य-कारण-भावः इति तु तात्पर्य-टीका-कृतां मतम्प्रतीयते।[2] गङ्गेशोपाध्याया[3] अपि मतमेतदनुवदन्ति। वस्तुतः तात्पर्य-टीका-कृदादीनामपि उपस्कार-कृदुक्त एवार्थः सम्मतः; प्रत्यभिज्ञा-वारणाय च स्मृतेः संस्कार-मात्र-जन्यत्वमुक्तम् इति ध्येयम्।

तदेतदुभयविधमपि ज्ञानं द्विविधम्—यथार्थम् अयथार्थं च। तत्र यथार्थत्वं नाम फलवत्प्रवृत्ति-जनकत्वम्। जनकता च फलोपधायकता स्वरूपयोग्यता च यथास्थलं ग्राह्या। तद्भिन्नत्वं च अयथार्थत्वम्।

प्रकारान्तरेणाऽपि ज्ञानं द्विविधम्—प्रमा अप्रमा च। प्रमा च तत्त्वानुभवः इति शिवादित्य-मिश्रादयः।[4] उदयनाचार्याः[5] चिन्तामणिकृतश्चाप्येन-मेवार्थमुरीचक्रुः। यद्यपि गङ्गेशोपाध्यायैः बहूनि प्रमा-लक्षणानि विवृतानि तथापि संक्षेपतः तदवगमाय संयोगेन घटे घटत्ववद्विषयक-ज्ञानस्य प्रमात्व-वारणाय च सम्बन्ध-घटितं प्रमा-लक्षणम्[6] उक्तं पक्षधरमिश्रैः। प्रमा-भिन्नं च ज्ञानम् अप्रमेति तु स्पष्टमेव।

अत्रेदमवधातव्यम्—केचिद्धि यथार्थ-शब्दं प्रमा-पर्यायत्वेन मन्यन्ते; अपरे पुनः उभयोः भिन्नार्थकत्वमेव। परन्तु न्याय-वैशेषिक-दर्शनयोः अन्त्य एव पक्षः

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१. चकारेण व्यापारी पूर्वानुभवः समुच्चीयते।
उक्त-सूत्रस्योपस्कारः।

२. लोकश्च संस्कार-मात्र-जन्मनः स्मृतेः अन्याम् उपलब्धिम् अर्थाव्यभिचारिणीं प्रमामाचष्टे इति न स्मृति-हेतौ (= संस्कारे) प्रसङ्गः।
तात्पर्य-टीका, पृ० २१।

३. संस्काराऽसाधारण-कारणकत्वेन स्मृतित्वात्।
तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ सविकल्पक-वादः, पृ० ८४३।

४. तत्त्वानुभवः प्रमा। सप्त-पदार्थी, सूत्रम्—२१३।

५. यथार्थानुभवो मानम्। न्याय-कुसुमाञ्जलिः, ४।१।
समीचीनो ह्यनुभवः प्रमेति व्यवस्थितम्। तत्रैव ४।५।

६. यत्र यदस्ति तत्र तस्यानुभवः प्रमा। तत्त्वचिन्तामणिः, भागः—१, पृ० ४०१।

७. येन सम्बन्धेन यत् यत्रास्ति तत्सम्बन्ध-पुरस्कारेण एव तत्र तज्ज्ञानं प्रमा।
समवाय-वादालोकः, पृ० ६५७।

प्रामाणिकः । अत एव वैशेषिकाचार्यैः स्मृतेरपि विद्यात्वम् सर्वत्र उक्तम् । यद्यपि सफल-प्रवृत्ति-जनकत्वम् यथार्थत्वमेव प्रमात्वम् तथापि ज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्न-निष्ठं यथार्थत्वम् अनुभवत्वावच्छिन्न-निष्ठं च प्रमात्वम् इति न सङ्करः ।

तत्र कथम् अनुभवत्व-समानाधिकरणमेव यथार्थत्वम् प्रमात्वम् न स्मृतित्व-समानाधिकरणम् इत्यत्र प्रसङ्गे स्मृतेरनर्थजत्वेन स्मृतित्व-समानाधिकरणस्य यथार्थत्वस्य न प्रमात्वमिति जयन्त-भट्टानां[1] मतम् । अनर्थजत्वं च प्रागेव स्मृतेः अतीत-विषयत्वं प्रतिपादयद्भिः प्रशस्त-पादाचार्यैः[2] व्यवस्थापितम् । व्योमशिवाचार्येणापि तदीय-व्याख्यान-समये स्मृतेः निर्विषयत्वम् सयुक्तिकं व्यवस्थापितम् ।[3]

यद्यपि निर्विषयत्वेन स्मृतेः अप्रामाण्ये सति अतीतानागत-विषयानुमित्यादेरपि अप्रमात्वापत्तिः इति प्रतीयते तथाऽपि साध्यस्वरूप-धर्म-विशिष्ट-धर्मिणः एव अनुमिति-विषयत्वम्, धर्मिणश्च सत्त्वमेवेति नानुमितेः अनर्थजत्वम् । स्मृतिश्च मृत-पित्रादि-विषयत्वेन असद्विषया एव । यत्रापि विषयस्य कुत्रचित् सत्त्वम् तत्रापि देशान्तरस्थितस्य तस्य न स्मृतौ अर्थ-जन्यत्व-साधकतेति स्मृत्यनुमित्योः वैषम्यमिति न्यायमञ्जरीकृतां सिद्धान्तः ।[4] स च एष 'पक्षे व्याप्यम्' इत्यस्मात् 'पक्षो व्याप्यवान्' इत्यस्माच्च परामर्शात् 'पक्षः साध्यवान्' इत्येवानुमितिरिति मतानुसारेण उपपद्यते ।

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१. न स्मृतेरप्रमाणत्वं गृहीत- ग्राहिता -कृतम् ।
अपि त्वनर्थ-जन्यत्वन्तदप्रामाण्य-कारणम् ॥
न्याय-मञ्जरी, प्रमाण-प्रकरणम्, पृ० २१ ।

२. अतीत-विषया स्मृतिः । प्रशस्तपाद-भाष्यम्, पृ० ६२० ।

३. अथ अर्थजत्वमेव स्मृतेः कस्मान्न इष्यते ? अर्थ-विनाशेप्युत्पादात् । न च यद्देश-कालालिङ्गिते अनुभव-ज्ञानमुत्पन्नं तदालम्बनमेव न्याय्यम्, स्मृति-काले तस्याऽविद्यमानतया विषयत्वाभावात् । बाह्येन्द्रियाणाञ्च स्मृति-जन्मनि प्रत्येकम् व्यभिचारात् अन्तः-करणस्य व्यापारो निश्चीयते । न च तस्य स्वातन्त्र्येण बहिर्विषये व्यापारः सम्भवतीति अनर्थजत्वमेव न्याय्यम् । अवश्यं चार्थजत्वे सति अव्यभिचारित्वादि-धर्मोपेतत्वात् प्रमा-रूपतायां स्मृतेः प्रमाणादुत्पत्तिः वाच्या । अनुमानादेश्च व्यापारानुपलब्धेः, अन्तःकरणस्य स्वातन्त्र्येण तदुत्पत्तौ प्रामाण्ये सति स्मृतेः अपरोक्षत्वं स्यात् । न चैतदस्ति । तस्मात् निर्विषयमेव ।
व्योमवती, पृ० ६२१ ।

४. नद्यास्य एव धर्मी वृष्टिमदुपरितन-देश-संसर्ग-लक्षणेन धर्मेण तद्वाननुमीयते, विशिष्ट-सलिल-पूर-योगित्वात् । स चानुमान-ग्राह्यो धर्मी विद्यते एवेति न अनर्थजमनुमानम्, ...स्मरणन्तु निर्दग्ध-पित्रादि-विषयमनपेक्षितार्थमेव जायमानं दृष्टमिति । अन्यत्र देशान्तर-स्थितार्थ-स्मरणे तदर्थ-सत्त्वम् अकारणमेव ।
न्याय-मञ्जरी, प्रमाण-प्रकरणम् , पृ० २१ ।

परन्तु 'पक्षे व्याप्यम्' इति परामर्शात् 'पक्षे साध्यम्' इत्याकारिकैव अनुमितिः इति मन्यमानाः प्राञ्चः न अनर्थजत्वम् अप्रामाण्य-कारणं मन्तुमिच्छन्ति । किञ्च अतीतानागत-व्यवहिताव्यवहित-साधारणं विषयम् अवगाहमानस्य महा-विषयस्य शब्दस्य प्रमाणत्वं तज्जन्यज्ञानस्य प्रमात्वं च विलुप्येत सति अनर्थजत्वस्य अप्रमात्वप्रयोजकत्वे इति नानर्थजत्व-प्रयुक्तमप्रमात्वम्; अपि तु लोक-प्रसिद्ध्यभावादेव स्मृतेः तथात्वमवसेयम् इति वाचस्पति-मिश्राणां[1] सिद्धान्तः ।

न्यायकन्दलीकृतः अपि स्मृतेः[2] अनर्थजत्वं न इच्छन्ति, परन्तु स्मृतेः अप्रामाण्ये कुमारिल-भट्टानां मतमेव स्वीकुर्वन्तः पूर्वानुभव[3]-पारतन्त्र्यमेव स्मृतेः अप्रमात्वस्य प्रयोजकमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । एतेषां हि मते अनर्थजत्वघटकार्थ-शब्दः देश-कालानवच्छिन्ने पदार्थ-मात्रे दत्तभर इति तु जयन्तोल्लेखादपि[4] ज्ञायते एव ।

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१. न चार्थ-सहकारि प्रमाणम् इति संस्कारस्यार्थ-सहकारिता-विरहात् अप्रामाण्यमिति साम्प्रतम्, नदी-पूरस्य पिपीलिकाण्ड-सञ्चरणस्य च अतीतानागत-वर्ष-लिङ्गस्य शब्दस्य अतीतानागत-गोचरस्य अर्थ-सहकारिता-विरहिणः अप्रमाणत्व-प्रसङ्गात् । ज्ञापकत्वेन कार्यत्वेन वा कथञ्चिदर्थ-सम्बन्धे संस्कारस्यापि तत् समानमिति तस्यापि स्मृति-रूपोपलब्धिहेतोः प्रामाण्यमप्रसक्तम्? मैवम्, प्रमाण-शब्देन तस्यापास्तत्वात् । प्रमा-साधनं हि प्रमाणम्, न च स्मृतिः प्रमा । लोकाधीनावधारणो हि शब्दार्थ-सम्बन्धः । लोकश्च संस्कारमात्र-जन्मनः स्मृतेः अन्याम् उपलब्धिम् अर्थाव्यभिचारिणीं प्रमामाचष्टे । तस्मात्तद्धेतुः प्रमाणमिति न स्मृतिहेतौ प्रसङ्गः ।

तात्पर्य—टीका, पृ० २०—२१ ।

२. (क) अन्ये तु.........अनर्थजायाश्च स्मृतेः व्युदासार्थम् 'तद्धि द्रव्यादिषु पदार्थेषूत्पद्यते' इत्यावर्त्तयन्ति, तदयुक्तम्,.........अनर्थजत्वात् स्मृति-व्युदासे च अतीतानागत-विषयस्य लैङ्गिक-ज्ञानस्यापि व्युदासप्रसङ्गात् ।

(ख) ये तु अनर्थजत्वात् स्मृतेरप्रामाण्यमाहुः तेषामतीतानागत-विषयस्यानुमानस्य अप्रामाण्यं स्यादिति दूषणम् । न्याय-कन्दली, पृ० ४७७, ६२८ ।

३. (क) स्मृतिरपि अर्थ-परिच्छेदिका न भवति, अनुभवपारतन्त्र्यात्......... ।

(ख) अत एव न प्रमाणम्, तस्याः पूर्वानुभव-विषयत्वोपदर्शनेन अर्थे[1] निश्चिन्वत्याः अर्थ-परिच्छेदे पूर्वानुभव-पारतन्त्र्यात्.........यथा चेदमाहुः कारिकायाम्—

तत्र यत्पूर्व-विज्ञानं तस्य प्रामाण्यमिष्यते ।
तदुपस्थान-मात्रेण स्मृतेश्च चरितार्थता ॥ इति ॥

न्याय-कन्दली, पृ० ४७७, ६२७ ।

४. स्मरणन्तु निर्दग्ध-पित्रादि-विषयम् अनपेक्षितार्थमेव जायमानं दृष्टमिति । अन्यत्र देशान्तरस्थितार्थ-स्मरणे तदर्थ-सत्त्वम् अकारणमेव ।

न्याय-मञ्जरी, प्रमाण-प्रकरणम् पृ० २१ ।

अनर्थजत्वेन अप्रामाण्याभ्युपगमे स्मृतेः प्रायः पूर्व-विवृतामेवानुपपत्तिं मन्यमानाः उदयनाचार्यास्तु स्मृत्यप्रामाण्य-प्रयोजकत्वेन प्रामाणिक-व्यवहारं[1] पूर्वानुभवपारतन्त्र्यं च अभ्युपगच्छन्ति। परन्तु पूर्वानुभव-पारतन्त्र्य-विवरणावतरणे एवं स्थिते तर्क्यतेऽपीति आचार्योल्लेखात् प्रतीयते यदेषामाग्रहः वाचस्पति-परिष्कृते प्रथम-पक्षे एव विश्राम्यतीति। आचार्य-पादानेवानुसरन्ति लीलावतीकृतोऽपि।[2]

तत्र वाचस्पति-मिश्रैः प्रस्तुते पक्षे उदयनाचार्याणां न्यायलीलावतीकृताञ्च विवरणस्य अवलोकनेन स्पष्टं ज्ञायते यत् अत्र मते नैयायिक-वैशेषिकाणामेव व्यवहारः प्रामाणिकः नान्येषामित्यवष्टम्भ एव केवलम् इति शङ्का उदयनाचार्याणाम् लीलावती-कृतां च चेतसि लब्धपदा, यस्याः अपह्नवाय आचार्यैः गुरुः प्रयासः, अक्षपादादीनां विशेषण-दान-मुखेन लीलावतीकृद्भिश्च दृष्टान्त-प्रतिदृष्टान्त-मुखेन गुरुतरः प्रयासो विहितः। परन्तु एतावतापि तस्याः अपह्नवः नैव समपद्यत इत्यत्र तु एतदेव परमं प्रमाणम् यत् महामनीषिभिः तत्त्वचिन्तामणिकृद्भिः पक्षस्यास्य चर्चाऽपि न कृता।

तदेतावता प्रबन्धेन अनर्थजत्वे स्मृत्यप्रामाण्य-प्रयोजकत्वस्य निरस्त-प्रायत्वे प्रामाणिक-व्यवहारे च तदप्रामाण्य-प्रतिपादकत्वस्य निरभिप्रायत्वे व्यवस्थिते पूर्वानुभव-पारतन्त्र्यमेव स्मृत्यप्रामाण्य-साधने स्वातन्त्र्यं भजतीति हेतोः गङ्गेशोपाध्यायैः अस्य पक्षस्य सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तता[3] प्रख्यापिता। परन्तु चिन्तामणिकृतः पुनरपि अनर्थ-जत्वम् स्मृत्यप्रामाण्य-प्रयोजकपदे प्रकारान्तरेण अभ्यषेचयन्।

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१. यथार्थो ह्यनुभवः प्रमेति प्रामाणिकाः पश्यन्ति.........न च स्मृति-हेतौ प्रमाणा-भियुक्तानाम् महर्षीणाम् प्रमाण-व्यवहारोऽस्ति, पृथगनुपदेशात्।.........एवं व्यवस्थिते तर्क्यतेऽपि—यदियम् अनुभवैक-विषया सती तन्मुख-निरीक्षणेन तद्य-यार्थत्वाऽयथार्थत्वे अनुविधीयमाना तत्प्रामाण्यमव्यवस्थाप्य न यथार्थतया व्यवहर्तुं शक्यते इति व्यवहारेऽपि पूर्वानुभव एव प्रमितिः, अनपेक्षत्वात्, न तु स्मृतिः, नित्यं तदपेक्षणात्। असमीचीने ह्यनुभवे स्मृतिरपि तथैव।

न्याय-कुसुमाञ्जलिः ४।१॥

२. ईश्वरेच्छा-परतन्त्र-प्रमाण-शब्द-वाच्यत्वस्य तदभियुक्त-पुरुष-व्यवहार-गम्यत्वात्। प्रमाणाभियुक्तानाञ्च अक्षचरण-कणभक्षादीनां स्मृतौ प्रमाण-व्यवहाराऽभावात्, इन्द्र-पाणिनि-प्रभृति-व्यवहारात् वाचकता-नियमवत्।

न्याय-लीलावती, पृ० ६२४—२५।

३. ...संस्कार-हेत्वनुभव-प्रामाण्य-पारतन्त्र्येण यथार्थत्वेऽपि स्मृतिः अप्रमा इति सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तः।

तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ सविकल्पक-वादः पृ. ८४४।

एतेषां मते हि अनुभव-स्मरणयोः समानविषयत्वेन अनुभवे यः कालः यो धर्मश्च वर्त्तमानत्वेन विषयः स एव स्मृतेरपि विषयः। तथाच अतीतं विषयं देश-कालादि च वर्त्तमानत्वेन विषयीकुर्वतः स्मरणस्य न प्रमात्वम्[1] इति सुव्यक्तमेव। परन्तु वर्त्तमानत्वस्य स्मृति-विषयत्वेऽपि इदम्पद-प्रयोगः तत्र न भवति, अपि तु तत्पदस्यैव,[2] संस्कार-जन्य-ज्ञानस्य तच्छब्द-प्रयोग-हेतुत्वात्। अत एव प्रत्यभिज्ञानेऽपि तच्छब्द-योगः उपपद्यते। तदेतत्समाधानम् प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः संस्कार-जन्यत्वम् इति [3]प्राचीन-मतानुसारि। यदि तु तत्ता-स्मृति-जन्यमेव प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् न तु संस्कार-जन्यम्, तथा सति संस्कारद्वारा पूर्वानुभवस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञान-करणत्वे ज्ञान-करणकस्य तस्य अप्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तिरिति तत्ता-स्मृतेरेव निर्व्यापारायाः करणत्वाभाववत्याः प्रत्यभिज्ञान-जनकत्वमिति तस्यापरोक्षत्वमपि सूपपादमिति नव्य-[4]परिष्कृत-पक्षः एव आश्रीयते, तर्हि अनुभवाऽवृत्त्यात्मविशेषगुणमात्रवृत्तिधर्मावच्छिन्नकारणताकत्वस्यैव ज्ञाने तत्त्वोल्लेख-प्रयोजकत्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति न स्मृतौ नापि प्रत्यभिज्ञाने तच्छब्द-प्रयोगानुपपत्तिः। तदेतस्मिन् मते अनर्थजत्व-घटकम् अर्थ-पदम् न पदार्थ-मात्र-परम् तत्र दत्त-भरं वा किन्तु पदार्थ-विशेषणीभूते काले देशे च प्राधान्यमर्पयति इति व्यक्तमेव।

परन्त्वत्रापि मते अतीतानागत-विषयस्य अनुमित्यादेः विषयं विषयीकुर्वतः स्मरणस्य कथं न प्रामाण्यम् इति विवेचनीयमेव। 'पक्षः साध्यवान्' इत्येवानुमितिः नियमतः सत्यपि 'पक्षे व्याप्यम्' इत्याकारके परामर्शे 'पक्षः व्याप्यवान्' इत्याकारके वेति धर्मिणः एव साध्य-धर्म-विशिष्टस्य वर्त्तमानस्य अनुमिति-विषयत्वमिति रीत्या उक्तापत्ति-वारण-सम्भवेऽपि सार्वभौमं मतमेतदेव यत् पूर्वानुभव-पारतन्त्र्यात् स्मृतिः न प्रमेति सुधीभिर्विभावनीयम्।

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१. अनुभवे कालो धर्मान्तरम्वा यो वर्त्तमानत्वेन विषयः स एव स्मरणस्य...एवञ्च स्मृतेः तथाभूतस्य वर्त्तमानता विषयः। तत्र विशेष्यस्य विशेषणस्य वा वर्त्तमानत्वाऽभावात् स्मृतिः अयथार्थैव(= अप्रमैव)।
तत्रैव, पृ. ८४३, ८४५।

२. अनुभव-स्मरणयोरेक-विषयत्वेपि स्मरणे तत्र तच्छब्द-प्रयोगः, संस्कारज-ज्ञानस्यैव तच्छब्द-प्रयोग-हेतुत्वात्।
तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ सविकल्पक-वादः, पृ. ८४३।

३. (क) अस्ति च संस्कार-सहितम् इन्द्रियम् अस्याः प्रतीतेः करणम्।
न्याय-मञ्जरी, प्रमेय-प्रकरणम्, पृ. ३१।

(ख) कारणान्तर-निरपेक्षेण संस्काराधिक-सन्निकर्षवता इन्द्रियेण जनितत्वात्।
न्याय-कुसुमाञ्जलिः, ४।४।

४. न्याय-कुसुमाञ्जलि-प्रकाशः, पृ. ४७४।

सांख्यदर्शन-समीक्षा

डा० भक्तिसुधा मुखोपाध्याय

नमः शुद्धाय बुद्धाय कैवल्यैकस्वरूपिणे ।
नियन्त्रे प्रकृतेश्चैव अकर्त्रेऽपरिणामिने ॥
त्रिगुणायै नमस्तस्यै, प्रकृत्यै विश्वहेतवे ।
अचेतनापि योद्दिश्य पुरुषार्थं प्रवर्तते ॥

सांख्यं हि नाम आदिविदुषा जन्मन एव परिपक्वशेमुषीकेन कपिलेनोदीरितं शास्त्रम् । वैदिककालेऽपि बृहदारण्यक[1]च्छान्दोग्य[2]कठ[3]श्वेताश्वतर[4]प्रश्नादिषू[5]पनिषत्सु सांख्यशास्त्रप्रतिपादितानि मतानि दर्श्यदश्यन्त एव । महाभारते, स्मृतिग्रन्थे, पुराणेष्वपि सांख्यदर्शनस्य तत्त्वान्यालोचितान्यङ्गीकृतानि च । सांख्यतत्त्वानामुल्लेखः, सांख्यमतोद्भासिता भावाः यद्यपि प्राप्यन्त एव सुप्राचीनात् कालात् तथापि सांख्यदर्शनालोचनप्रसंगे न हि प्राप्यते शास्त्रस्यास्य महान् ग्रन्थसम्भारः ।

षडध्यायात्मकं सूत्रग्रन्थरूपेण परिचितं सांख्यप्रवचनसूत्रं सामान्यतः कपिलाचार्यविरचितमिति कथ्यते । तत्त्वसमासनाम्नि ग्रन्थे सांख्यस्य तत्त्वान्येव समासेन विचार्यन्ते। अस्यापि ऋषिः कपिलाचार्य एवेति श्रूयते किन्तु अस्ति महन्मतवैसंवाद्यं विदुषां तयोस्तथाविधप्राचीनत्वविषये ।

प्रवचनसूत्रस्य अनिरुद्धवृत्तिर्विज्ञानभिक्षुकृतं भाष्यं चास्ति । आसीत् कश्चित् शास्त्रग्रन्थविशेषो यो हि लुप्त एव पश्चात् । पञ्चमशताब्दीप्राये समये ईश्वरकृष्णेन अद्यत्वेऽस्माभिरुपलब्धः प्रामाणिको ग्रन्थः सांख्यकारिका निर्मिता । अस्य कारिकाग्रन्थस्य गौडपादभाष्यं तत्त्वकौमुदी टीका च प्राप्यते । कारिकाया अन्या टीका माठरवृत्तिः । एतदेव संक्षेपेण सांख्यग्रन्थानां परिगणने कृतम् ।

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१. बृहदा० ३।४, २; ५, १; ७, २३ ।
२. छान्दो० १, ३; ४, ४; ५, ७; ६, ३ ।
३. कठ० २।३७-८ ।
४. श्वेत० ४।५, ६, ११ ।
५. प्रश्न०, १०७-११७ ।
६. मनु० १।१३-१४ ।

यथा अन्येषु शास्त्रेषु तथैव सांख्यशास्त्रेऽपि सृष्टितत्त्वं बन्धमोक्षादिकञ्च प्रकाममालोचितं, सिद्धान्तश्चास्य व्यवहारिको मनोविज्ञानसम्मतश्च।

एतन्मते वैचित्र्यपूर्णं जगदिदं सत्त्वरजस्तमोमय्यास्त्रिगुणायाः प्रकृतेरेव विकारः। अस्य स्थूलजगतो मूलकारणमन्विच्छन्तो यदा वयं प्रतिलोमक्रमेण स्थूलतत्त्वात् सूक्ष्मतत्त्वं, सूक्ष्मात् सूक्ष्मतरं, तस्मादपि सूक्ष्मतरं तत्त्वं यामस्तदा प्रकृतिरेव सुसूक्ष्मतममन्तिमं तत्त्वमुपलभ्यते। न हि प्रकृतिरनुभवगोचरा तथाप्युपलभ्यमानस्य सूक्ष्मतमस्य महत्तत्त्वस्यापि कस्मिन्नपि हेतौ स्वीकृते प्रकृतिरिति मूलकारणं सिद्धान्तानुरोधेनैव स्वीकृतम्, महदादीनां गुणमयानां कार्याणामस्तित्वं दृष्ट्वा तत्-कारणस्य गुणमय्याः प्रकृतेरपि अस्तित्वमनुमानेनैव प्रमाणीक्रियते। तटिन्याः स्रोतस्तरंगमहोर्मय इव प्रकृत्या एव अनेकवैचित्र्यचित्रितं जगदिदमाविर्भूतम्।

दर्शितं हि सांख्यशास्त्रे यदा वयं जगत्स्वरूपचिन्ताकाले जडवर्गं षोडशविकारं महदादिसप्तके प्रविलाप्य महदादिसप्तकं पुनः प्रकृतौ प्रविलापयामस्तदा प्रकृत्याः परतरं किंचिदपि तत्त्वं पुनर्नावशिष्यते। ननु सैद्धान्तिकमेवेदं सर्वं, तत् स्वीकृते बुद्धेः कारणेऽव्यक्ते प्रधाने वा कथं तस्य पुनः कारणं नान्विष्यते? अत्र त्वेवमेव समाधानं यत् कारणपरम्परायाः कुत्रापि अन्तः स्वीकर्तव्य एव, अन्यथाऽनवस्थादोषप्रसंगः[2]।

सांख्यसिद्धान्तो द्वैतवादं घोषयति। प्रकृतिः पुरुषश्च द्वे चरमे तत्त्वेऽस्मिन् शास्त्रे। जडवर्गमध्ये प्रकृतिरेवैकं चरमं तत्त्वम्। यदा प्रकृतेः साम्यावस्था तदैव प्रकृतिः प्रकृतिः, वैषम्ये तु प्रकृतेः परिणामेण तस्याः सर्वे भेदा एव व्यक्तरूपेण दृश्यन्ते।

के पुनर्भेदाः? अव्यक्तात् प्रधानाद्वा प्राङ् महांस्ततोऽहंकारस्तस्मात् पञ्चतन्मात्राण्येकादशेन्द्रियाणि च; पञ्चतन्मात्रेभ्यः पुनः पञ्चमहाभूता इत्यादिक्रमेण तत्त्वेभ्यस्तत्त्वान्तराणि परिणमन्ति। सर्वतत्त्वानां मूलकारणं प्रकृतिरेव कल्प्यते, तस्याः पुनः कारणं तु नान्वेष्टव्यम्। उक्तं च सांख्यसूत्रे—'मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलम् इति'[3]

एतज्जगतो मूलकारणमव्यक्तं प्रधानं प्रकृतिर्वा। या हि सत्त्वरजस्तमोमयी प्रकृतिः सृष्टेः प्रागात्मानं संकोच्य साम्यावस्थायां वर्तते सैव पुरुषेण संयोगाद् गुणत्रयक्षोभात् स्पन्दनं लभमाना आत्मानं महत्तत्त्वादित्रयोविंशतिक्रमेण परिणमयति, प्रसारयति

१. सांख्यसूत्रम् १।६१।
२. तत्रैव, ६८; १३७।
३. तत्रैव, ६८।

वा। यथा कूर्मः स्वाङ्गानि संहृत्य तिष्ठति अवसरे प्राप्ते च तान्येव प्रसारयति तथैव प्रकृतिरपि करोति। पुनर्यथाकूर्मस्तान्यङ्गानि स्वस्मिन्नेव प्रतिसंहरति तथैव प्रकृतिरात्मीयान् विकारानात्मन्येव प्रविलापयति। सृष्टिविकासात् प्राक् गुणमय्याः प्रकृतेर्गुणैः समपरिणामेन समरूपेण शान्तभावेन च स्थीयते। एषा प्रकृतेः साम्यदशा सजातीय-परिणामो वा। ते हि गुणाः पुनर्वैषम्यं प्राप्ता द्विभागरजस एकभागसत्त्वेनैकभाग-तमसा च मेलनेन अथवा सत्त्वस्य रजसो वा सार्धद्विभागेन अपरयोर्द्वयोः प्रत्येकस्य त्रिचतुर्थांशेन मिश्रणेन वा उपमर्दकोपमर्द्यभावेन स्थिता विक्षोभं प्राप्तास्तत्त्वान्तरेण परिणमन्ति। एष प्रकृत्या विजातीयपरिणामः।[1]

शुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः पुरुषो नित्यो विभुश्च। प्रकृतिश्चापि नित्या विभुरपि। तयोः संयोगः पुनः किंविधः? संयोगस्तु अप्राप्तप्राप्तिरूपः सम्बन्धविशेषः। एष संयोगोऽत्र न पुनर्देशगतः किन्तु भावगत एव। अत्र य एव प्रत्ययो यदेव ज्ञानं जीवस्य भवति तत् स्वस्वामिसम्बन्धेन भावगतसंयोगजन्यमेव, ज्ञानस्य संयोगोत्तरोद्भूतत्वात्[2]।

यद्धि श्रीमद्भगवद्गीतायां 'पुरुषः प्रकृतिस्थो हि भुङ्क्ते प्रकृतिजान् गुणा[3]-नित्यादि उच्यते तत्रैवंविधस्याभिमानाख्यसंयोगस्य[4] प्रकृतिस्थतारूपसंयोगहेतुतैव प्राप्यते।

यद्येवं, तर्हि पुरुषस्य प्रकृत्या संयोगः शाश्वतिक एव भवेदिति चेन्न। अविवेक एव संयोगस्य स्थायित्वे कारणम्। यदा पुनर्बुद्धिरूपया प्रकृत्या स्वामि-पुरुषाय स्वतनुः विविच्य दर्शिता भवति तदैव विवेकख्यात्या संयोगहानिसम्भावना। सांख्यकारिकायामेतत्-सम्बन्धे एका अतिमनोज्ञा उपमा दीयते। पुरुषस्य प्रकृत्या संयोगः पङ्ग्वन्धवदेव कथ्यते। पुरुषोऽपरिणामी अतोऽविकारित्वेन पंगुः प्रकृतिरपि अचेतनत्वादन्धा। एताभ्यां कुत्रचिद् गम्यते पृथग्भावेन स्वतन्त्ररूपेण वा किन्तु प्रत्यावर्तनकाले प्रदोषान्धकारप्रसरणात् तयोर्भवति परस्परसाहाय्यापेक्षा। तदा तौ अन्योन्यं साहाय्यं कर्तुं प्रवृत्ताते। अन्धा प्रकृतिः पङ्गुं पुरुषं स्वस्कन्धे ऊढ्वा तेनावबोधितमार्गा गृहं गता; पुरुषोऽपि स्वस्थानं प्रापितः[5]। संयुक्तयोस्तयोर्गृहं गतयोश्चरितार्थत्वात् न पुनः अन्योन्यापेक्षा अतः वियुक्तावेव तौ। अनेनोदाहरणेन स्पष्टीकृतमेव पुरुषस्य बन्धो

१. सांख्यकारिका, १२; १६, सांख्यसूत्रम् ६।४२।
२. सांख्यसूत्रम् ६, ६७, ६८।
३. भगवद्गीता १३।२१, भाग० ३।७।१।
४. सांख्यसूत्रम् ६।५४; भगद्गीता ३।२७।
५. सांख्यकारिका, २१।

न हि सार्वकालिक इति। हंसस्य चञ्चुरेव यथा नीरक्षीरविभेदायालं तथैव विवेकख्यातिरेव प्रकृतिपुरुषवियोगाय समर्था।[1] अत एव संयोगो यद्यप्यनादिः (जीवपक्षे) तथापि सान्त एव।[2] यथानादिरपि प्रागभावो नश्यति तथा प्रकृतेर्बन्धः विवेकज्ञानानन्तरं नश्यति। यदा विवेकख्यातिर्निश्चला भवति तदैव मोक्षः कैवल्याख्यो भवति।

एष प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगः स्वयमेव भवति। नात्र पुरुषो हेतुस्तस्यापरिणामित्वात्नापि प्रकृतिस्तस्याः संयोगपारतन्त्र्यात्। यथा तथा भवतु, संयोगमूलादविवेकादेव धर्मादिर्भवति, तेन रागादिभिश्च पुरुषो बध्यते। एष एव पुरुषस्य भोगः। चिज्जडयोस्त्वधुना भेदाग्रहो भवति। अपरिणामिनः पुरुषस्य भोगेन स्वोत्कर्षं साधयितुमस्ति प्रकृतेरपेक्षा, जडाया प्रकृतेरपि परिणामाख्यपुरुषप्रयोजनसाधनाय अस्ति पुरुषोऽपेक्षितः। अतः सृष्टेर्विकासार्थं, पुरुषस्य (जीवरूपेण) भोगार्थं, प्रकृतिः पुरुषश्च परस्परापेक्षया वर्तेते।

साम्यदशायां या प्रकृतिः निवातचञ्चला नदीवदासीत् सैव पुरुषेण स्वस्वामिभावेन सम्बद्धा परिणन्तुं प्रभवति। तस्याः प्राथमिके परिणामे नद्यां सुमन्दवायुप्रवाहेण ईषच्चाञ्चल्यसृष्टिवत् बुद्ध्यपरनाम्नो महत्तत्त्वस्य स्फुरणं भवति। बुद्धिसर्गो भौतिकसर्गश्चेतीह द्विविधः सर्गः। महत्तत्त्वादेव बुद्धिसर्गस्य प्रारम्भः। ततः पुनः सात्त्विकराजसतामसभेदेन त्रिविधोऽहंकार उत्पद्यते यस्य सात्त्विकादिन्द्रियाणि तामसात् पञ्चतन्मात्राणि जायन्ते राजसेन पुनरुभयोः प्रवृत्तिर्भवति[4]। पुरुषार्थसम्पादनार्थमेव एष सर्वः परिणामः प्रारभ्यते।

ज्ञानस्वरूपस्य पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थमेव—औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थमेव प्रकृतेः सर्वः प्रारम्भः। पुरुषाधिष्ठानादेवैतत् सर्वं सिध्यति। सर्वं दृश्यजातं पुरुषज्ञानमपेक्षते, तद्विना नास्ति जडस्य दृश्यजातस्य कापि सार्थकता। चैतन्यस्वरूपस्य पुरुषस्यापि सर्वस्य ज्ञेयवस्तुनोऽपेक्षा वर्तते यथाचक्षुरिन्द्रियस्य रूपापेक्षा, कर्णेन्द्रियस्य शब्दापेक्षेत्यादयः। ज्ञेयस्वरूपायाः प्रकृतेश्चरमज्ञानलाभादेव ज्ञातुरौत्सुक्यस्य निवृत्तिर्भवति नान्यथा। यथा परिदृश्यमानं समस्तं जगत् पुरुषस्य ज्ञानोत्कर्षायैव विचित्ररूपेण परिणमति तथैव पुरुषोऽपि सर्वं ज्ञान एव पर्यवसाय्य आत्मोत्कर्षस्य शिखरमधिरोहति। प्रकृतिपुरुष-

१. सांख्यसूत्रम् ४।२३।
२. तत्रैव, २।७; ६।६७; ३।६२।
३. तत्रैव १।१०६
४. सांख्यकारिका २५।

योरविवेकेन यदा पुरुषस्य दर्शनं भोगो वा भवति तदैव तस्य ज्ञातृत्वभानं भवति— सर्वेषां ज्ञेयानां ज्ञानञ्च संजायते। पुनरेष भोग अपवर्गायापि अलम्[1]। सर्वेषु ज्ञेयेषु सम्यग् ज्ञातेषु 'परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिन[2]' इति रागादिकं सर्वं विसृज्य, सर्वेभ्यो विषयेभ्यो मनः प्रतिसंहृत्य ज्ञाता ज्ञातृत्वं परित्यज्य ज्ञान एव प्रतिष्ठितो भवति। अतः प्रकृतिर्महत्तत्त्वान्महाभूतपर्यन्तं स्वविकासपरम्परां पुरुषाय प्रदर्श्य रंगस्य दर्शयित्वा नर्तकीव निवृत्ता भवति 'वियोगान्तः संयोग[3]' इति न्यायेन। ज्ञेयज्ञातृभावस्यावसाने विज्ञानस्वरूपश्चैतन्यं एव तदा तिष्ठति।

यद्येवं, तर्हि किं प्रकृत्याः प्रवृत्तेश्चिराय निवृत्तिर्भवितुमर्हति? नैव। प्रकृतिर्वराकी तु अनलसा प्रतिपुरुषार्थं प्रवर्तते। एकस्य पुरुषस्य मोक्षे सति यदा स केवली भवति तदा सा अपरार्थं प्रवर्तते। एवमसंख्यपुरुषाणां भोगापवर्गसाधनार्थं सूर्यस्य प्रतिदिन-मुदयास्तगमनमिव शाश्वतिक एव तस्या आरम्भः[4]। अतः कियत्पुरुषमोक्षे सत्यपि पुरुषान्तरमोचनार्थमनन्तो हि प्रचलति सृष्टिप्रवाहः।

अचेतनायाः प्रकृतेः पुरुषाधिष्ठातृत्वे किं प्रमाणम्? प्रकृतिरेव एकमेवाद्वितीयं तत्त्वमिति स्वीकारे का हानिः? उच्यते। यदि प्रकृतिरेव एकमात्रं तत्त्वं स्यात् तर्हि कथं पुनर्जगति प्राणिमात्रे चैतन्यस्योपपत्तिर्भवति? पुरुषाधिष्ठानं विना चैतन्यस्फुरणं कदापि न सम्भवति यतः जगति एतदतिरिक्तं सर्वं जडमेव। चैतन्यं हि जडव्यावर्तकं जडप्रकाशकं च। जडस्य दृश्यजातस्य कथं सम्भवति ज्ञानं चैतन्यं विना? अतः प्रकृतेः ज्ञातृभोक्तृदर्शकत्वेन तदतिरिक्तया चिच्छक्त्या अवश्यमेव भाव्यम्। उक्तं च सांख्यसूत्रे—'शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः पुमान्' इति।[5]

जडप्रकृतेः संहतत्वाद् भोक्त्रधिष्ठात्रपेक्षमानत्वाच्च पुरुषसिद्धिर्भवत्येव। स्पष्टी-कृतमेतत् पूर्वमेव यत् प्रकृतिश्चतुर्विंशतितत्त्वानां संहतिरेव; तस्यां जगतः सर्वेषामेव तत्त्वानामन्तर्भावो भवति। नास्ति संघातस्य स्वतः कापि उपयोगिता, परार्थमेव अस्यास्तित्वं पत्रावलीसंहितस्य पुस्तकस्य पाठकापेक्षावत्; अन्यथा कर्मकर्तृविरोधात्। एवं जडा प्रकृतिः स्वयं प्रवर्तितुं न प्रभवति नियन्तुस्तु अपेक्षाऽस्या अस्त्येव। विश्वस्मिन्

१. सांख्यसूत्रम्, १।१०४; ६।५५।
२. पातञ्जलयोगसूत्रम् २।१५।
३. सांख्यकारिका, ५९।
४. तत्रैव ५६।
५. सांख्यसूत्रम्, १।१३९।

भुवने त्रिगुणमयं सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं खलु सर्वं दरीदृश्यते तथापि कदाचित् कुत्रचित् सुखदुःखमोहातीतस्य कस्याप्यस्तित्वमनुभूयत एव। अतएव जडस्य सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वाज्जडातिरिक्तस्य चैतन्यस्यास्तित्वं प्रमाणीभवत्येवात्र।

अन्ते चैकं गरिष्ठं प्रमाणं विद्यते पुरुषस्य अस्तित्वविषये। इह संसारे मानवेषु दुःखत्रयाभिघातात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रयत्न अनादिकालाद् दरीदृश्यत एव। आद्याः ऋषयस्तेषां शास्त्राणि च मानवान् चिराय कैवल्यार्थं प्रोत्साहयामासुः। अनेन एतदेव बोद्धव्यमस्ति शरीरमनोबुद्धिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मेति। यदि नास्ति सुखदुःखमोहस्वभावाया प्रकृतेरतिरिक्तं किमपि तर्हि कथं पुनः ततो मुक्तये समीहा? न हि स्वभावात् वियोजयितुं शक्यते दुःखात्मकं जडजगत्। अत अस्त्येव जडातिरिक्तः शुद्धबुद्धमुक्तचैतन्यस्वरूपः पुमान्।[१]

चैतन्यस्य पुरुषस्य वा ताटस्थ्ये स्वीकृतेऽपि पुरुषापेक्ष एव सर्गक्रमः सांख्यशास्त्रे। प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगजन्यं स्पन्दनमेव सर्वविकारप्रवर्तकम्। पुरुषाधिष्ठानादेव अयस्कान्तमणिसन्निधानाल्लौहे स्पन्दनवत् प्रकृत्या स्पन्दनमारभ्यते। अचेतनापि प्रकृतिश्चिच्छायापत्त्या चेतनायमाना भवति। व्यक्तस्य अवस्थितेर्यथा अव्यक्तस्यास्तित्वमनुमीयते तथैव प्रकृत्या अवस्थितेः पुरुषस्य प्रकृत्यधिष्ठातृत्वमनुमानगम्यमेव। यथा ऋतौ प्रवृत्ते तत्कालजातानि फलपुष्पादीनि वीक्ष्य कोऽयं ऋतुरित्यनुमातुं पार्यते तथा जडस्य चेतनाधिष्ठितत्वमवधार्य पुरुषस्य अस्तित्वमनुमीयते।[२]

उक्तं हि प्राङ् महान् बुद्धिर्वा प्रथममनुभवयोग्यं तत्त्वं प्रकृतेरतिसूक्ष्मत्वादननुभवयोग्यत्वाच्चेति। अतो व्यवहारे तु प्रकृतिरित्युक्ते बुद्धिरेव प्रथमत्वेन प्रधानत्वेन चावबुध्यते।

ज्ञानस्वरूपाया विशुद्धायाश्चिच्छक्तेः सम्पर्कात् सत्त्वप्रधानं महत् जडमपि चेतनायमानं भवति। नास्त्यत्र कापि असम्भाव्यता। यथोभयोर्जडत्वेऽपि निर्मलविशदत्वाद् दर्पणमेवादित्यं प्रतिविम्बयितुं समर्थो न तु कुड्यं तथा प्रकृतेः स्वच्छतमः सूक्ष्मतमश्चादिमो भेदो निर्मलं बुद्धिसत्त्वं जडमपि आत्मनि चैतन्यं प्रतिविम्बयितुं समर्थं न परवर्तिनः स्थूलविकाराः। बुद्धितत्त्वप्रतिसंक्रान्तप्रतिविम्बो द्रष्टा स्वयमपरिणाम्यपि अप्रतिसंक्रमशीलोऽपि प्रतिसंक्रान्तवत् प्रतीयते। यथार्थतः स परिणन्तुं

१. सांख्यकारिका, १७।

२. महा० मोक्षधर्म०, २०५, २६–२७।

प्रतिसंक्रमितुं च न प्रभवति। दृश्यस्य परिणामेण तु तद्भावभावितो चित्तवृत्तीनां विषयानां वा ज्ञाता भवति तदुपरागोपरक्तत्वात्। चित्स्वरूपः पुरुषो निर्लेप एव किन्तु बुद्धौ चिच्छायापत्त्या चितेश्च बुद्ध्युपरागेण योऽविवेकोऽविशेषमानं वा भवति तेनोदासीनोऽपि पुरुषो बुद्धिविषयकान् सर्वान् विकारानात्मन्युपचर्य 'अहं सुखी, अहं दुःखी'-ति मन्यते, बद्धश्च भवति। गगनमध्यस्थो भास्वरो भास्करः कक्षमध्यस्थदर्पणात् स्वरूपतोऽत्यन्तभिन्न एव; किन्तु तस्मिन् दर्पणे सूर्यविम्बप्रतिविम्बनात् न केवलं किरणप्रतिफलनं किन्तु औष्ण्यादिकी सर्वा सूर्यस्य क्रियाऽपि सम्भवति। तथैव चित्प्रतिविम्बिता स्वच्छा बुद्धिरचेतनापि चैतन्यमयीव प्रतिभाति। अहंकारविमूढात्मा पुरुषोऽपि प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि कर्माण्यात्मनो मन्यमानोऽविवेकवशादात्मानं प्रकृतिं च कथमपि विवेक्तुं न पारयति।[1]

प्रकृतिं तत्परिणामश्चैतद् द्वयमवलम्ब्यैव समग्रजगता स्थीयते। सर्वैस्तत्त्वैः प्रकृतेरेवाविर्भूयत, अन्ते च तस्यामेव लीयते च। परिणामशीलं खलु सर्वं पदार्थजातम्। न हि दृश्यते नित्यता कस्मिन्नपि पदार्थे। स्रोतस्विन्याः शान्तकल्लोलमालादर्शनेन चित्तं रमयितुं यामश्चेन्नहि दृश्यते कल्लोलिनी परक्षणे तथा यथा सा दृष्टा पूर्वमिन् क्षणे, यतस्ते हि कल्लोलास्ते हि जलप्रवाहा गता एव। अन्य एव दृश्यन्ते परमुहूर्ते। शिशुं दृष्ट्वा पितरौ प्रसन्नौ भवतः, पालयन्तौ चैनं नन्दतः दिने दिने शशिकलामिव तं वर्धमानं दृष्ट्वा। किन्तु न हि दृश्यते स नवीनः कुमारो यदा स बालोऽन्यैर्बालैः सह क्रीडन्नास्ते, पुनः यदा स विद्यालयं गच्छति च। स एव शिशुः परिणमति बालके, किशोरे तदनु तरुणे प्रौढे च। एवं स दशायाः दशान्तरं प्रापितोऽस्ति। अनेन प्रकारेण मृत्पिण्ड एव घटो भवति, ध्वंसाभावे स एव कपालादौ परिणमति च। एवं जगतः मूलीभूता प्रकृतिरपि प्रपञ्चात्मके जगति सदैव परिवर्तमानैवास्ते।

अनेन प्रसंगेन कार्यं सदिति स्फुटमेव। सत्याः प्रकृत्याः सर्वं सञ्जायते। अत एव उच्यते सांख्यशास्त्रे 'सतः सञ्जायते' इति। अस्माभिरनुभूयते व्यवह्रियते वा न वा किन्तु सर्वैः कार्यैः सदैव स्थीयत एव। कार्यं न किमपि नवीनमुत्पन्नं किन्तु कारणस्य परिणाम एव। प्रागभावस्तिरोभावो वा नात्यन्तोच्छेदः किन्तु सुप्तरूपेण सूक्ष्मरूपेण अभिभूतरूपेणैव वावस्थानम्।

सांख्यशास्त्रानुसारेण पदार्थस्तत्त्वतः सदैव तिष्ठतीति कथं सिध्यति? अत्र

१. भगवद्गीता ३।२७

गुणा एव वक्ताव्यक्तयोर्मध्ये सद्वस्तु। आदितः अन्तपर्यन्तं तेषां नित्यत्वं प्रकृत्या सर्वस्मिन्नेव भेदे दरीदृश्यत एव। प्रकृत्यपरनामभाजोऽपरिणामिनो गुणा धर्मिरूपेण स्थिताः प्रागभाववर्तमानतातिरोधानानि भजन्ते। एवं कार्यं सद्रूपेण नित्य-रूपेणास्त एव, तेषां परिणामस्तु अनित्यत्वात् तानवस्थाभेदान् प्राप्नोति। सांख्यशास्त्रिभिर्मुहूर्तमपि परिणामहीनं वस्तु चिन्तयितुं न शक्यते। कुतः? क्षणमपि परिणामस्य स्पन्दनस्य वा अस्वीकारे सत्कार्यहानिप्रसंगः। अतो यदा प्रकृतेः साम्यावस्था तदा गुणेषु शान्तरूपेण सत्स्वपि तत्रापि तेषामुपकार्योपकारकतया, परस्पराश्रयत्वेन परस्परसंहत्या वा कोऽपि परिणामः प्रचलतीति स्वीकर्तव्यम्। कथ्यते चैष सदृशपरिणामः। सदृशपरिणामे स्वीकृते पश्चाद् विक्षोभात् परिणामक्रमेणैव पुनः विसदृशपरिणामात्मिका सृष्टिविकासपरम्पराङ्गीक्रियते अन्यथोत्पत्तिवाद्ापतनशंका।

परिणामिण्याः सत्याः प्रकृत्याः प्रसारसंकोचावेव विश्वस्य सृष्टिप्रलयौ। 'नासतः सज्जायते'। सत् कार्यं सति कारणे सदैव वर्तते। सर्वं कार्यं मूलतः कारणे वर्तत एव, कारणव्यापारेण तत् प्रकटीभवति, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं चापद्यते। कारण-व्यापारात् पूर्वमेव कार्यं सत् किन्त्वस्माकं पक्षे तदसदेव यतस्तेनास्माकमुद्देश्यसिद्धिर्न भवति। दुग्धे दधि सदेव किन्तु दधिरूपप्राप्तेः प्राङ् न तदस्माकमर्थकारि। घटो मृत्तिकापिण्डे सन्नेव किन्तु कुलालव्यापारेणैव स जलानयनरूपार्थक्रियाकारित्वमावहति यथा संकुचितः कटः प्रसारणरूपव्यापारेणैव शयनोपवेशनयोग्यार्थक्रियाकारितां भजति।

अस्य सत्कार्यवादस्य सिद्ध्यर्थमीश्वरकृष्णेन सांख्यकारिकायां पञ्च सूपन्यस्ततर्का दीयन्ते। त एवमेव—

१. असदकरणात्, २. उपादानग्रहणात्, ३. सर्वसम्भवाभावात्, ४. शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्, ५. कारणभावात्।[1]

बौद्धानामसत्कार्यवादस्तावत् सांख्यशास्त्रिभिः प्रथमेनैव तर्केण निरस्तः। असत् कदापि सत् न जायते। ननु असदऽपि सद्वस्तु कर्तुं पार्यते कृतिभिरिति चेन्न। अत एव उच्यते 'असदकरणा'न्न तु असदभावात्। उक्तमेव वाचस्पतिमिश्रेण 'न हि नीलं शिल्पिसहस्रेणापि पीतं कर्तुं शक्यते'। अन्यथा वन्ध्यापुत्रः शशविषाणौ खपुष्पमपि समुत्पद्यरेन्।

द्वितीयस्मिन् तर्के उच्यते 'उपादानग्रहणात्'। कार्यमुपादाने कारणे अविभागेन

१. सांख्यकारिका, ७-८।

तिष्ठति, कारणाधिष्ठितत्वेनैव परिणमति च। मृद्येव घटस्तिष्ठति, तन्तावेव पटः। यद् यस्योपादानकारणं तदेव तत्कार्यं नान्यत्। यथा दुग्धमेव दधिरूपेण परिणमति न नीरम्।

असम्बद्धस्य चोत्पत्तिमिच्छतो न व्यवस्थितिरित्यतस्तृतीयेन तर्केणैषाव्यवस्थिति-र्निरस्यते। शक्तिसम्बन्धयुक्तं कारणमेव शक्तिसम्बन्धान्वितं कार्यं जनयति यच्चैवं न तत् तत्कार्योत्पादनसमर्थम्। अतोऽत्र व्यतिरेकेण 'सर्वसम्भवाभावादि'त्युक्त्वा सर्वस्मिन् सर्वकार्याणामसम्भाव्यत्वमेव प्रतिपाद्यते। यद्येवं तर्ह्यस्त्येव कारणविशेषः कार्यविशेष-जननसमर्थः।

उक्तप्रसंगमेव गृहीत्वा चतुर्थस्तर्क उपन्यस्यते शक्तस्य शक्यकरणादिति। तदेव तत्कर्तुं प्रभवति यत् कारणं यत् कर्तुं समर्थं शक्तं वा। शक्तिभेदेनैव भिद्यते कार्योत्पादनं यथा मृदेव घटं जनयति, तिलमेव तैलमुत्पादयति।

सार्वत्रिकमेवैतद् दृश्यते यत् कार्यं समन्वयसम्बन्धेन कारण एव तिष्ठति, प्रकटीभूयाविर्भवति पुनस्तिरोभावकाल अधिष्ठानात्मके कारण एव लीयते। एतत् प्रतिपादयितुं पञ्चमस्तर्कोपन्यासः 'कारणभावादि'ति। प्रकटनात् पूर्वमपि घटो मृत्तिकायां, कुण्डलं हिरण्ये वर्तत एव कुलालस्वर्णकारव्यापारापेक्षो हि तयोराविर्भावः। असति पदार्थे न कुतोऽपि तस्योत्पत्तिसम्भावना।

ननु स्वीकृताः सर्व एव तर्काः किन्तु सतोऽपि वस्तुनः कथमनुपलब्धिः ? उच्यते—

अतिदूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवधानात्।
सौक्ष्म्याद् व्यवधानादभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥
सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात्[1]।

व्यवहारिके जीवने एवं सूक्ष्मव्यवहित-विप्रकृष्टत्वेत्यादीनि कारणान्युपलभ्यन्त एव अनुपलब्धेः।

यदुच्यते नैयायिकानामिवाविर्भावस्योत्पत्तावेवान्तर्भावो भवतु तदप्ययुक्तम्। आवि-र्भावो नोत्पत्तिः, किन्तु सूक्ष्मस्य अभिभूतस्य वा न्यग्भावं परित्यज्य प्रबलभावग्रहणम्। दूरत्वसूक्ष्मत्वादिकां बाधामभिभूय यदा पदार्थः प्रकटीभवति तदैव तस्याविर्भावः।

१. तत्रैव, ६।

कथितं पूर्वमेव यद्बुद्धिरेव प्रत्ययसर्गस्य प्रथमं प्रधानं च तत्त्वम्। भोगः बुद्धेरेव भवति। एतस्य बुद्धेर्भोगस्य पुरुष उपचारमात्रं भवति। विषयाकारेणःपरिणता बुद्धिस्तदाकारायै चितिशक्त्यै विषयमादर्शयति, भोगश्चास्य तदुपरागेणैव सम्पद्यते। बुद्धिरित्युक्त अहंकारमनसोरप्युपलक्षणं भवति यतोऽहंकारमनसी विना बुद्धिरेकाकिनी किमपि कर्तुं नालम्। बुद्धेः पुनः ज्ञानमज्ञानं धर्मोऽधर्मः, वैराग्यमवैराग्यमैश्वर्य-मनैश्वर्यञ्चेति अष्ट भावा भवन्ति[1]। ज्ञानवर्ज्यमेतेषां सप्तभावानां सम्प्रसारणेनैव पुरुषस्य संसारो भवति। बुद्ध्यहंकारैकादशेन्द्रियपञ्चतन्मात्रात्मके लिङ्गशरीरे भावैर-धिवासिते सति पुरुषो बध्यते, संसरति, अन्ते ज्ञानेनैव मुच्यते।

स्पष्टमेतावत्याऽऽलोचनया बन्धमोक्षौ तत्त्वतः पुरुषस्य न किन्तु प्रकृतेरेवेति। यथा यद्यपि उत्तप्तायोगोलकसम्पर्केण दह्यते शरीरं तथापि तद्दग्धृत्वं साक्षाल्लोहस्य न किन्तु अग्नेरेव तथाऽविवेकवशात् पुरुष उपचर्यमाणयोरपि बन्धमोक्षयोस्तत्त्वतो विश्लेषणे कृते तौ प्रकृतेरेवेति बोद्धुं पार्यते।

यतोऽविवेकेनैव एतावत्-कालं चित्संक्रान्तायाः प्रकृतेर्बन्ध आसीदतो ज्ञानेन—विवेकज्ञानेनैव——प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्विलक्षणताबोधो विवेकख्यातिर्वा भवति। यथा कोऽपि सूदः प्रभोः कृते पाकं सम्पाद्य निवृत्तो भवति तथैव विविक्तबोधानन्तरं प्रकृतिस्तत्पुरुष-पक्षे विरमत्येव। इतरपुरुषाणां कृते तु तस्याश्चेष्टा प्रचलत्येव। एवं दृश्यते प्रतिपुरुषस्य बन्ध अनादिः सान्तश्च। अविवेकवशादभेदसाक्षात्कारेण भोगो भवति, भोगस्य च पुनः विवेकसाक्षात्कारेणापवर्ग एव पर्यवसानम्। अधुना सतोरपि प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्द्वयोः मुक्तपुरुषे नास्ति प्रकृत्याः कोऽपि प्रभावः। स न पुनः कदापि प्रकृतिस्थो भवति किन्तु स्वस्थः सन् निर्लेपो निर्विकारोऽसंगश्चास्ते। उक्तं च

निर्गुणोऽपि परो देवो ह्यज्ञानाद् ज्ञानवानिव।
विभात्यज्ञाननाशे तु यथापूर्वं व्यवस्थितः॥[2]

महाभारते प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरविवेकेन भोगं परस्परवियोगान्मोक्षं च व्याख्यातु-मेकमुत्तममुदाहरणं व्यवहृतम्। तत्र उच्यत उदुम्बरस्य उदरे मशकस्तिष्ठत्येव। न हि प्रभवति कोऽपि मशकोदुम्बरयोर्भेदावधारणे; किन्तूदुम्बरफले त्रुटित एव मशक उच्चैरुड्डीयते तदा मशकोऽन्य उदुम्बरश्च अन्य[3] इति विविक्तबोधो भवति।

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१. तत्रैव ४४–४५।
२. बृहन्नारदीय ३१। १४७। सांख्यकारिका, ६५; भागवत० ३।२७।२४।
३. महा० मोक्षधर्म० ३१५, १३।

केवलज्ञानं तु विवेकख्यातिमात्रेणैव न भवति। प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्विवेकज्ञाने सति —तत्त्वज्ञाने प्राप्ते—तस्य वारंवारमभ्यास एव कर्तव्यः। यदा विवेकख्यातेर्निरन्तराभ्यासात्—संशयविपर्ययविमुक्ततत्त्वाभ्यासाद् विशुद्धं ज्ञानं प्रकटीभवति, यदा विपर्ययेनासम्भिन्नत्वात् पुनरन्यथाख्यातिसम्भावनापि नास्ति, तदा नेति नेति कृत्वा 'न मे, नाहं नास्मी'त्याकारकं केवलं ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते।[1] उपर्युक्तक्रमेण अस्मिन् चरमे ज्ञाने प्राङ् ममत्वबुद्ध्या, ततः कर्तृत्वबोधेन, ततः पुनरस्मीत्याकारकव्यापारबोधेनापि अन्तर्धीयते, पुरुषस्तु स्वस्वरूप एव तिष्ठति। अस्माकं व्यवहारज्ञाने विश्लेषित एवमेव ज्ञायते। स्थूलज्ञाने तु ममत्वबुद्ध्या एव प्राबल्यं यतो यत्र यत्र 'घटज्ञानवानहमी'त्याकारकं ज्ञानं भवति तत्र तत्र मम घटज्ञानमस्तीति-स्वामित्वमूलकवृत्त्या ममत्वबोध एव अङ्गीक्रियते अस्मिन् ज्ञाने; यत् खलु आलोच्यते अत्राहमधिकृतः, मदर्था एव विषया, मत्तो नान्योऽत्राधिकृतः कश्चिदस्तीति बोधात्। पुन'रहं जानामी'त्यत्र ज्ञानक्रियायाः कर्तृत्वाभिमानो व्यज्यते 'ज्ञा'-धातोः कर्तृत्वेन 'अहं'पदस्य स्थितत्वात्। अत्र'हमत्र शक्त'इति अभिमानो विद्यते। एषा ज्ञानस्य सूक्ष्मतरा दशा। 'अस्मी'त्युक्ते सत्तामात्रात्मको व्यापारबोध एव अभिमानस्य अवशिष्यते। नात्रान्यवस्तूपरि स्वामिता न व्यापारे कस्यचित् कर्तृता किन्तु 'अहन्ताममता'विवर्जितं विशुद्धं ज्ञानमेव बुद्धेस्तिष्ठति। एतद्धि अभिमानस्य बुद्धेर्वा सत्त्वप्रधानं विशुद्धं रूपम्। ज्ञानमत्र सुसूक्ष्मतरां दशां भजति।

यथा तथा भवतु सत्त्वप्रधानं ज्ञानमपि वृत्तिरेव। अतः यावच्चित्तवृत्त्या स्थीयते तावत् न कैवल्यं भवति। यदा केवलज्ञानाधिकारानन्तरं—विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा जायते, तस्याः निश्चलत्वान्न पुनः व्युत्थानसम्भावना तदा विवेकज्ञानेनापि अन्तर्धीयते। इदानीं केवलज्ञानाधिकारे सति पुरुषः स्वस्थो भवति। एतस्य पुरुषस्य कृते पुनः प्रकृतेः परिणामो न भवति। 'दृष्टा'स्मीति बुद्ध्या नवोढकुलवधूवत् सा चिराय निवर्तते।

नास्ति प्रकृतिबन्धनाशादेव शरीरबन्धान्मोक्षः। शरीरभाजा मुक्तपुरुषेणेदानीमपि कर्म क्रियते एव, 'न हि कश्चित् क्षणमपि जातु तिष्ठत्यकर्मकृदि'ति श्रीभगवदुक्तदिशा। न पुनस्तस्य धर्माधर्मकर्माणि बन्धनाय भवन्ति। प्रारब्धकर्मणां क्षयायैव तेन शरीरं ध्रियते किन्तु तस्य तु तेभ्यः कर्मभ्यः पुनः संस्कारा न उत्पद्यन्ते। अत संस्कारजबन्धनमपि न भवति। यथा दग्धबीजानां प्ररोहो न भवति तथा अविद्यादिक्ले-

१. सांख्यकारिका, ६४।

शानां क्षयान्न पुनस्तस्य योगिनः संसारसम्भावना। अन्ते शरीरभेदे सति प्रधानस्य चरितार्थत्वाच्च पुनर्लिङ्गशरीरस्य शरीरान्तरधारणाशङ्का।[1] तदनन्तरं योगिनः लिङ्ग-शरीरेण सह देहनाशे सति तस्यैकान्तिमात्यन्तिकं च कैवल्यं भवति।

न केवलं स्वप्रारब्धकर्मक्षयायैव योगी चक्रभ्रमिवद्धृतशरीर आस्ते किन्तु लोकानुकम्पा अपि तमेवं स्थातुं प्रवर्तयति। यदि तत्त्वज्ञानप्राप्तिमात्रेणैव योगिन आत्यन्तिकमैकान्तिकं कैवल्यं भवति तर्हि कः पुनरज्ञानान्धकारावृतेभ्यो ज्ञानोपदेशं दद्यात्। अतएव एते जीवन्मुक्तास्तत्त्वज्ञानिन न ब्रह्मनिर्वाणमृच्छन्ति, जगद्धितार्थं ते चिराय व्यापृतास्तिष्ठन्ति।

सांख्यदर्शनस्य एवम्विधसिद्धान्तो महाभारतपुराणादीनां प्रसङ्गेन दृढ़ीकर्तुं शक्यते। कपिलसांख्यसिद्धान्तात् पौराणिकसांख्यसिद्धान्त एकदेश एव भिन्नः; निरीश्वरं हि कपिलसांख्यशास्त्रम्। यद्यपि स्फुटरूपेणेश्वरस्य अस्तित्वं नानङ्गीकृतं कुत्रापि तथापि पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वानां कुत्रापि ईश्वरस्यागणनादनुल्लेखाद्वा स्पष्टीभवत्येव अस्य शास्त्रस्य निरीश्वरत्वम्। अत्रेश्वरस्य किमपि कार्यं नास्ति। पञ्चविंशतमेन तत्त्वेन पुरुषेण प्रकृतिः स्वयं संयुज्यते ततो गुणत्रयक्षोभाच्च सृष्टिक्रमः स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते।

पौराणिकसांख्यमते त्वीश्वर एव प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगनियामकः। अतो जगत्सृष्टि-कर्तृत्वं तस्यैव। यथोक्तं विष्णुपुराणे—

प्रधानं पुरुषं चैव प्रविश्यात्मेच्छाया हरिः।
क्षोभयामास सम्प्राप्ते सर्गकाले व्ययाव्ययौ॥ २४

मत्स्यपुराणे तु सांख्यतत्त्वनिर्देशे एवमेवोक्तम्—

'सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्थैव प्रकृतिरिति गीयते। एषैव प्रजासृष्टिं करोति विकरोति च। प्रधानस्य विकारे जाते तत्र प्राथमिकविकारो महत् तथा तस्मात् सांख्य-शास्त्रप्रोक्तान्यन्यानि तत्त्वान्युद्भूतानि। चतुर्विंशतितत्त्वेभ्योऽन्यः पञ्चविंशतिमः पुरुष एतान् सर्वान् भुङ्क्ते अनुपश्यति वा। स हि अविवेकोपहतः पुरुषो जीवात्मा च कथ्यते। षड्विंशतमतत्त्वमीश्वरस्तु अस्य जीवात्मनः पुरुषस्य वा प्रकृतेरपि नियामकत्वेनास्ते'[3]। महाभारतेऽपि एवमेव स्वीकृतम्।

१. तत्रैव ६७।
२. विष्णु १।२, २९।
३. मत्स्य, २।१४—२८।

महाभारतपुराणेषु सांख्यशास्त्रीयपञ्चविंशतत्त्वस्थाने षड्विंशतत्त्वानि परिगणितानि। पौराणिकसांख्ये सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य संख्यातेर्वा प्राक् पञ्चविंशतिनमं तत्त्वं जीवात्मेति गीयते। 'उपाधिर्भिद्यते न तु तद्वानित्यनेन जीवात्मानः अनेके, षड्विंशतमः पुरुषश्चैक एव। जीवात्मा संख्यातिं प्राप्य चित्स्वरूपः परमात्मा भवतीश्वरश्चाभिधीयते। अशुद्धाया जडायाः प्रकृतेः सेवनात् शुद्धोऽपि बुद्धोऽपि निर्गुणोऽपि आत्मा उपहितज्ञानोऽज्ञो वा तिष्ठति। स ह्येव विवेकज्ञानं लब्ध्वा प्रकृतिं तद्विकारांश्चात्मनः पृथग् विविच्य, विवेकख्यातेर्निरन्तराभ्यासे सति अहंममाकारां सर्वां भावनां परित्यज्य केवली भवति।[1] स स्वस्वरूपं प्राप्य विश्वस्य नानात्वदर्शनं परित्यज्य आत्मसाक्षात्कारं करोति, नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः परमात्मरूपेण आस्ते। 'स एव परमात्मा परमेश्वरो वा जगत्कर्तृरूपेण सर्वं करोती'ति स्वीकृतं महाभारतादिष्वपि[2]।

अन्यच्च, सांख्यसिद्धान्ते गुणत्रयक्षोभात् प्राङ् महांस्ततो रजस्सत्त्वतमसामेकैकस्य प्राबल्यात्त्रिविधोऽहंकारो जायते। मत्स्यपुराणे तु गुणानां क्षोभादेषां प्रतिनिधित्वेन ब्रह्मविष्णुमहेश्वराख्या गुणमया देवा वर्तन्त इति उररीकृतम्[3]। तेषु ब्रह्मणो जगत्स्रष्टृत्वं, विष्णोः पालनकार्यं, संहारकार्यं च महेश्वरस्येति श्रूयते।

सांख्यदर्शने पौराणिकसांख्ये च सर्वत्रैवैतत् स्वीक्रियते यत् संयोगोन्मुखत्वेन गुणानां क्षोभस्तद्विकाराश्च पुरुष उपचर्यन्ते यथा जपाकुसुमसन्निधानात्तस्य रक्तिमा स्फटिकमणावुपचर्यते। पुरुषस्य चैतन्यं च निर्मले बुद्धिसत्त्वे प्रतिबिम्बितं भवति यथा उपाधियोगादयोगोलकेऽग्निरुपलभ्यते। उभाभ्यामेवं स्पष्टमुपलभ्यते चिच्छक्तेर्महत्तत्त्वस्य च अन्योन्यसंक्रमणाच्चिज्जडान्तर्गतत्वेनैव सर्वं जगत् परिणमतीति। अविवेकोपहतचेतसाहंकरोमीत्यभिमानवता पुरुषेणाधिष्ठिता कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वविरहिता प्रकृतिरेव सर्वं सृजति। उक्तं च भगवता श्रीकृष्णेन श्रीमद्भगवद्गीतायाम्—

'मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम्।'[4]

यथा कोशकारः कीटः स्वतन्तुभिरात्मानं समवरुणद्धि तथाऽविवेकवशात् पुरुषोऽपि प्राकृतान् गुणानात्मीयानिति मत्वा तेनाज्ञानेनाविवेकेन वा बद्धो भवति[5]।

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१. महा, मोक्षधर्म ३१५, ७५–८०।
२. तत्रैव, १०५, २७; ३१६, ७७, ८०।
३. मत्स्य० २।१६।
४. भगवद्गीता, ९।१०।
५. सांख्यसूत्रम्, ३।७२।

निर्गुणोऽपि त्रिविधान् गुणानभिमन्यमानः प्रकृतिजान् शीतोष्णादिद्वन्द्वमङ्गीकृत्य रागद्वेषादिदोषानुत्पाद्य वासनावागुराबद्धः परं क्लेशमवाप्नोति ।

एवमबुद्धोऽविवेकी पुरुष आकैवल्यं चन्द्रस्य सहस्रवारं कलावृद्धिक्षयवत् पुनर्जन्मादिकं प्राप्नोति । एवं लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेः पुरुषो बद्धस्तिष्ठति ।[१]

प्रकृतिरपि एकपुरुषस्य भोगापवर्गं निष्पाद्य पुनरन्यस्यार्थे यतते । एवमनन्त-कालायैव प्रवर्तते । तस्या आरम्भो यथा प्रतिदिनं स्वकर्तव्ये निवृत्तेऽपि नास्ति सूर्यस्य निवृत्तिः, किन्तु प्रत्यहं पृथक् पृथग्रूपेण चिररात्रायैव प्रचलति अस्य दिनरात्रिसंघटनकार्य-परम्परा ।

एतदेव संक्षेपेण 'सांख्यदर्शनसमीक्षेति' शम् ।

१. सांख्यकारिका, ५२, ५५ ।

UDAYANA'S ARGUMENTS FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE

HEM CHANDRA JOSHI

The Sāṁkhya, the Yoga, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and the Uttara-Mīmāṁsā (also known as the Vedānta) are known as the six orthodox or 'āstika' *darśanas*. They are known as such not because they believe in the existence of God or Īśvara but because they uphold the authority of the Vedas. One who rejects the authority of the Vedas is known as 'nāstika' (*nāstiko veda-nindakaḥ*), while one who accepts their authority is known as 'āstika'. The Sāṁkhya, as detailed in the 'Kārikās' of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the extant Sūtras, has hardly any place for Īśvara. The Yoga of Patañjali does admit Īśvara-praṇidhāna only as an alternative method of *citta-vṛtti-nirodha*. The Mīmāṁsakas also do not feel obliged to postulate Īśvara. Among the various schools of the Vedānta, the Advaita also is hesitant to accord any absolute position to Him (Śaṁkara's hymns, however, give a direct lie to it). It is the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas who ardently argue in favour of God's existence. Even in the case of these two darśanas, there are scholars who are inclined to believe that theism or Īśvara-vāda did not originally form a part of their belief. Nevertheless belief in the existence of God became an inalienable doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika at quite an early stage of their development.

Udayana, the Naiyāyika par excellence, in his far-famed work, the Nyāya-kusumāñjali, has shown in great detail how it is possible to prove the existence of God. He has also shown with great skill how the position of the *an-īśvara-vādins*, like the Mīmāṁsakas, is untenable. Broadly speaking, there are five objections advanced by the *an-īśvara-vādins* against postulating God. Udayana has answered these objections in the five chapters or the 'stavakas' of the Nyāya-kusumāñjali. The fifth objection (*vi-prati-patti*) is that there is no proof for the existence of God (*tat-sādhaka-pramāṇābhāvāt ca*). As a refutation of this objection Udayana has put forth arguments to establish the existence of God in the fifth chapter of the said work.

He says that there are good many arguments to prove God's existence. It is none of the fault of a *sthāṇu* (a branchless trunk) if the blind is unable to see it. By double entendre it also means that

Lord Śiva (Sthāṇu) is not to blame if the ignorant is unable to see Him. And the Ācārya sums up his arguments in the following *kārikā* which has since become classical :—

> '*kāry-āyojana-dhṛtyādeḥ, padāt pratyayataḥ śruteḥ*
> *vākyāt saṁkhyā-viśeṣāc ca, sādhyo viśva-vid avyayaḥ.*'[1]

What this *kārikā* means and what these arguments are, are more or less known. But Udayana himself has construed the *kārikā* in a different manner[2] as an alternative interpretation, a fact which is not so well known. According to the alternative interpretation, all the arguments are based on the different aspects of the Vedas and thus, in a way, are addressed to those who accept the authority of the Vedas, especially the Mīmāṁsakas. But in a way they can be looked upon as addressed to all the *an-īśvara-vādins* ; for, Udayana has shown in the first chapter of the Nyāya-kusumāñjali how the authority of the Vedas cannot be questioned. We shall try to explain briefly the arguments enumerated in the *kārikā* quoted above according to the alternative interpretation.

1. Kārya

The first ground for belief in the existence of God is *kārya*. The Naiyāyikas believe that the Vedas are concerned primarily with something that is to be accomplished (*bhāvya-artha*). Their teaching is two-fold, either to enjoin us to do something (*pravṛtti*) or to desist from doing something (*nivṛtti*). That part of the Vedas, like the Upaniṣads, that deals with accomplished facts (*bhūtārtha*) like the 'ātman' and the Brahman, may not directly enjoin us to do, or desist from doing, something. It is, however, eventually injunctive or prohibitive. One may not feel inclined to follow a particular injunction that 'one who is desirous of attaining heaven or *svarga* (*yajeta svarga-kāmaḥ*) should perform yāga', out of aversion. Or one may not resist the temptation of eating *kalañja* due to intense craving, knowing, as he does, the prohibitive statement. In such cases, what are called *artha-vādas* strengthen the force of the Vedic injunctions or prohibitions. We know that people engage in acts which are praised and desist from doing things which are condemned. The word *kārya* in the *kārikā* means this two-fold teaching viz. *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* which is understood from the purport or *tātparya* of the Vedas.

1. N. K. V. I.
2. अथवा कार्यैत्यादिकमन्यथा व्याख्यायते । N. K. V. p. 70.

The Vedas too have some purport like any other sentence. Udayana says that from the fact of *kārya-tva* or the *tātparya* of the Vedas we infer the existence of God.[1] To understand how we may do so we should know as to what is meant by purport or *tātparya*. The word can be explained as follows :—

tad eva paraṁ yasya, tad idaṁ tat-paraṁ, tasya bhāvaḥ, tat-tvaṁ | tad yad-viṣayam, sa tātparyārthaḥ |

That is *tat-param* which has *tat* or 'that' as its *param* or on which it is intent. The abstract noun from *tat-paraṁ* is *tātparyaṁ*. And that to which *tātparya* refers is *tāt-paryārtha*. But the question is : 'What is it that is meant by *tat* or 'that' which is *param* in this case ? The question is not so easy to answer as it apparently seems to be. *Tat* may mean any one of the following four, viz. *sādhya* (that which is to be accomplished), *pratipādya* (that which is conveyed), *prayojana* (what is desired) or *uddeśya* (purpose). According to Udayana it is *uddeśya* which is the *tātparya-artha*.[2] But first he shows that the word *tātparya* cannot have any of the first three meanings. We shall see how !

Sādhya cannot be looked upon as the connotation of the word *tātparya*. The Vedas, which are looked upon as one of the four means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*), are of the nature of sentences. As such any kind of action or *sādhya* cannot be their *tātparya*. A *pramāṇa* can never be the cause of either the object of the knowledge that it produces or of any kind of action.[3] Thus it cannot cause *pravṛtti* or *nivṛtti*. Nor can, therefore, the Vedas would become devoid of any *phala*. For, conveying some particular meaning would very much constitute their *phala*. It cannot be urged that the *artha-vāda* sentences first convey their meaning either in the form of extolling or condemning something and thus indirectly cause *pravṛtti* or *nivṛtti*. What has the opponent to say about the purport of the sentence viz. "the hamlet is situated on the Ganges" ? The word 'Ganges' conveys its intended meaning viz.

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1. आम्नायस्य हि भाव्यार्थस्य कार्ये पुरुषप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती। भूतार्थस्य तु यद्यपि नाहत्य प्रवर्त्तकत्वं निवर्त्तकत्वं वा, तथापि तात्पर्यतस्तत्रैव प्रामाण्यम्। तथा हि, विधिशक्ति-रेवावसीदन्ती स्तुत्यादिभिरुत्तम्भ्यते। प्रशस्ते हि सर्वः प्रवर्त्तते निन्दिताच्च निवर्त्तते इति स्थितिः। NK. Pr. V p. 71.
2. उद्देश एव तात्पर्यम्········· NK. V 6.
3. तत्र न प्रथमः, प्रमाणेनार्थस्य कर्मणोऽसाध्यत्वात्। फलस्य च तत्प्रतिपत्तितोऽन्य-स्याभावात्। NKP. V. p. 71.

its bank. The 'bank' is neither of the nature of *pravṛtti* nor of *nivṛtti*. It is not something to be accomplished either. Nor can it be said that as *pravṛtti* or *nivṛtti* is to be accomplished in respect of the bank, the bank is considered as *para* in this case. It may be possible to state a past fact, such as, when one says, "There was a hamlet on the Ganges" where neither *pravṛtti* nor *nivṛtti* would be possible.

The second meaning of the word could be *pratipādya*. That is to say that the Vedas are *karma-para* would amount to saying that the Vedas teach *karman* or that their meaning is *karman*. But this one cannot maintain. In the case of a sentence such as "The god Vāyu is the quickest of all", one cannot say that what has been taught is some kind of *karman*. The fact of the matter is that the individual words in a sentence convey their own meaning while the sentence as a whole expresses the relation (*saṁsarga*) thereof.[1] It cannot be said that while *karman* viz. a particular sacrifice in favour of the god Vāyu is neither the meaning of any individual word constituting the sentence quoted above nor is it understood by the force (*śakti*) of the relation of the meaning of different individual words; it is, however, the *pratipādya* of the sentence, being invariably concomitted with the god Vāyu. Whatever is invariably concomitted with something which is the connotation of a particular word cannot be regarded as the *para* or *pratipādya* of that word. For, were it so, it would lead to unwarranted results. For instance, if one said, "There is water in the Ganges" the word 'Ganges' would convey the idea of its bank since the two are invariably associated. It cannot be said that something associated with the primary meaning is understood only when the latter (i.e., the primary meaning) is incompatiable and that since the primary meaning of the word 'Ganges' in the sentence "There is water in the Ganges" is not incompatiable, it would not convey the idea of the bank. For, sometimes even when the primary meaning is not incompatiable, something that is not the primary meaning is meant to be conveyed. For instance, when it is said, "My Love, Go if you so desire ! May your path be auspicious ! May I be born in the same place whither you are bound !", there is no incompatibility in the primary meaning. And yet the intention of the speaker is to convey to the person addressed to 'that he should not go.' Moreover, the *para* (i. e., that which is meant to be understood) is not necessarily the 'pervader' (*vyāpaka*) in relation to

1. न द्वितीयः । पदवाक्ययोः पदार्थतत्संसर्गौ विहाय प्रतिपाद्यान्तराभावात् । Ibid.

the primary meaning. As for instance, when it is said, "The cradles are crying", what is meant is that the babies (lying on the cradle) are crying. In this case neither are cradles and babies universally associated nor are babies always associated with crying.

That *prayojana* cannot be the connotation of the word *tātparya* can be shown as follows :—The *prayojana* may have reference to the person addressed to (*pratipādya*) or to the speaker himself (*pratipādaka*). It cannot be the former, as the 'verbal means of right knowledge' (*śabda-pramāṇa*) does not depend upon the *prayojana* of the person addressed to. Were it so, it would lead to unwarranted results (*atiprasaṅga*) viz. that the same sentence would have different purports for different persons according to their differing *prayojana*-s. Nor can it be urged that only that which is the *sādhya* of the meaning of the sentence (*vākyārtha*) can be regarded as the *prayojana* in this context and that thus the *sādhya* would constitute the purport. For, *sādhya* itself is of two kinds viz. *kārya* (effect) and *jñāpya* (that which is revealed or made known) and each of the two itself could be of various kinds according to the person addressed to. This would result in the defect (*doṣa*) called *vākya-bheda*. For instance, smoke has many effects, such as the blackening of the spot where it rises, dispelling of mosquitos and the like. Similarly it reveals several things such as, the fact of the fuel being wet (*ārdrendhana-saṁyoga*) and the like. Thus if one said, "Smoke is rising in this place", it would be difficult to determine the purport of the sentence, for one would not be able to make out the *prayojana-s* of the different listeners. Nor can the *prayojana* of the speaker be regarded as the purport, as the Mīmāṁsaka does not admit that the Vedas have had any speaker (= author).[1]

The last alternative viz. *uddeśya* is the meaning of the word *tātparya* or purport. The purport of a word or a sentence is that which is intended by the speaker or the author. That is what we find

1. नापि तृतीयः। तद्धि प्रतिपाद्यापेक्षितं, प्रतिपादकापेक्षितं वा स्यात्। नाद्यः। शब्दप्रामाण्यस्यातदधीनत्वात्। तथात्वे वाऽतिप्रसङ्गात्। यस्य यदपेक्षितं, तं प्रति तस्य परत्वप्रसङ्गात्। तदर्थसाध्यत्वेनाऽपेक्षानियम इति चेत्। न। कार्यज्ञाप्यभेदेन साध्यस्य बहुविधत्वे भिन्नतात्पर्यतया वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात्। धूमस्य हि प्रदेशश्यामलतामशकनिवृत्त्याद्यनेकं कार्यम्। आर्द्रेन्धनदहनाद्यनेकं ज्ञाप्यम्। तथा चेह प्रदेशे धूमोद्गम इत्यभिहिते तात्पर्यतः को वाक्यार्थो भवेत्। चेतनापेक्षाया नियन्तुमशक्यत्वात्। नापि प्रतिपादकापेक्षितं, वेदे तदभावात्। Ibid., p. 72.

in actual practice. When somebody utters a laudatory sentence what he means thereby is that the hearer should go in for the thing commended (*pravṛtti, upādāna*). Such a sentence has *upādāna* or *pravṛtti* for its purport. Similarly a sentence which seeks to condemn something has for its purport desisting from (*nivṛtti, hāna*) that thing. Similar is the position of Vedic sentences. Otherwise, what are known as *artha-vāda-s* would become meaningless. This *uddeśya* or intention is nothing but a desire (*icchā*) of the speaker or the author and is variously termed as *vyavasāya, adhikāra, abhiprāya, bhāva* or *āśaya*. Thus it follows that the Vedas must have an author whose intention or desire (=*abhiprāya*) they seek to convey, Such an author is no other than God Himself. Thus may one argue :—

The Vedic laudatory sentences (*praśaṁsā-vākyāni*) presuppose the desire (*abhiprāya*) (of the speaker) viz. going in for (*upādānābhiprāya-pūrvakāṇi*), for they are laudatory sentences (*praśaṁsā-vākya-tvāt*), like ordinary sentences, such as, "the ripe mangoes are full of sweet juice" (*pariṇati-surasāmra-phalam-ity-ādi-loka-vākya-vat*). Similarly, the Vedic condemnatory sentences (*nindā-vākyāni*) pre-suppose the desire (of the speaker) viz. desisting from (*hāna-abhiprāya-pūrvakāṇi*) ; for, they are condemnatory sentences (*nindā-vākya-tvāt*), like ordinary sentences, such as 'the ripe jack-fruit has a bad taste' (*pariṇati-virasaṁ panasa-phalam-ityādi-vākya-vat*).

And it has been already pointed out that in case this is not admitted all *artha-vāda-s* would become meaningless.[1]

2, 3, 4. Āyojana dhṛti-ādi

The word '*āyojana*' means 'interpretation'. Unless the Vedas are correctly interpreted one cannot understand their meaning. Nor can, therefore, it be possible to carry out their injunctions. Therefore, they must be correctly interpreted. The Vedas deal with transcendental things. Their bulk is vast and there are statements that are apparently mutually contradictory. It is not possible to make out the

1. चतुर्थस्तु स्यात् । यदुद्देशेन यः शब्दः प्रवृत्तः स तत्परः । तथैव लोकव्युत्पत्तेः । तथाहि—प्रशंसावाक्यमुपादानमुद्दिश्य लोके प्रयुज्यते, तदुपादानपरम् । निन्दावाक्यं हानमुद्दिश्य प्रयुज्यते, तद्धानपरम् । एवमन्यत्रापि स्वयमूहनीयम् । तस्माल्लोकानुसारेण वेदेऽप्येवं स्वीकरणीयम् । अन्यथा अर्थवादानां सर्वथैवानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् । स चोद्देशो व्यवसायोऽधिकारोऽभिप्रायो भाव आशय इत्यनर्थान्तरमिति तदाधारप्रणेतृपुरुषधौरेयसिद्धिः । Ibid.

correct meaning of a short sentence if it is heard in part. Therefore it is necessary that the first interpreter of the Vedas should be all-knowing (*sarva-jña*), who should have gone through the whole of the Vedic literature, which also implies that he should know the extent of the Vedic literature. In other words, he should know that "this much constitutes the Vedas". Such an all-knowing interpreter of the Vedas is no other than God. Knowing that "this much constitutes the Vedas" is called *dhṛti* (*iyattā, avadhāraṇam*). So *āyojana* and *dhṛti* together constitute two other grounds for postulating God.

It cannot be urged that those who perform the various rites prescribed by the Vedas can interpret them and that thus there is no need to postulate God. We cannot rely on the interpretation of one who is not omniscient. Nor can the tradition of performing Vedic rites be looked upon as beginningless (*anādi*); for, that would mean that the tradition has had no sound basis. In fact, the correct performance of rites itself could not have been possible unless it had been initiated by a person whose competence was unquestionable. God only could initiate this tradition of performing Vedic rites. Thus 'performance' (*anuṣṭhāna*) of Vedic rites also constitutes one of the grounds for postulating God. The word *ādi* (=etcetra) in *dhṛti-ādi* occuring in the *kārikā* quoted earlier stands for *anuṣṭhāna* (=performance).[1]

5. Pada

Words like *Om*, *Īśvara* are used in the Vedas. That there is God is understood from the use of such words in the Vedas. Such words as *Īśvara* and the like are not devoid of meaning; for, they have been

1. (a) व्याख्या विश्वदृशः सती । NK. V. 6.

(b) आयोजनाद् खल्वपि । न हि वेदादव्याख्याताद् कश्चिदर्थमधिगच्छति । न चैकदेशदर्शिनो व्याख्यानमादरणीयम् । पौर्वापर्वपरामृष्टः शब्दोऽन्यां कुरुते मतिम्, इति न्यायेनानाश्वासाद् । त्रिचतुरपदकादपि वाक्यादेकदेशश्राविणोऽन्यथार्थप्रत्ययः स्याद्, किमुतातीन्द्रियादन्तरान्तरवाक्यसम्भेददुरधिगमाद् । ततः सकलवेदवेदार्थदर्शी कश्चिदेवाऽभ्युपेयोऽन्यथाऽन्धपरम्पराप्रसङ्गात् । स च श्रुताऽधीतावधृतस्मृतसाङ्गोपाङ्गवेदवेदार्थस्तद्विपरीतो वा न सर्वज्ञादन्यः सम्भवति । को ह्यप्रत्यक्षीकृतविश्वतदनुष्ठान एतावानेवायमाम्नाय इति निश्चिनुयाद् । कश्चाऽर्वाग्दृगृनिःशेषाः श्रुतीर्ग्रन्थतोऽर्थतो वाऽधीयीत, अध्यापयेद्वा । अत्रापि प्रयोगः । वेदाः कदाचिद् सर्ववेदार्थविद्व्याख्याताः अनुष्ठातृमतिचलनेऽपि निश्चलार्थानुष्ठानत्वाद् । यदेवं तत्सर्वं तदर्थविद्व्याख्यातं, यथा मन्वादिसंहितेति । NKP. V p. 75.

used as conveying some meaning in the Vedas, Smṛtis and Itihāsas, like other words. Statements like

uttamaḥ puruṣastv-anyaḥ paramātmety-udāhṛtaḥ.
yo loka-trayamāviśya, bibhartyavyaya īśvaraḥ..

tell us what God or Īśvara is like. Similarly after teaching *Īśvara-praṇidhāna* it is said :

Sarvajñatā tṛptir-anādi-bodhaḥ
svatantratā nityam alupta-śaktiḥ.
ananta-śakiś ca vibhor vidhi-jñāḥ
ṣad āhur aṅgāni Maheśvarasya..

So just as we believe in the transcendental things connoted by words like *svarga* used in the Vedas, even so we ought to believe in the existence of God who is designated as *Īśvara, Param-ātman* etc. in the Vedas. It is unwarranted to say that the words like *Īśvara, Param-ātman* and the like are used figuratively. Moreover, if words like *Īśvara* and *Param-ātman* were devoid of any meaning, they would not have been used in a sentence together with other words (which have meaning) in the Vedas.[1]

Besides, the word 'I' (*asmad*) is used in the Vedas in such sentences as "One should worship Me". In the ordinary sentences in everyday life (*loka*) the word 'I' does not connote any of the insentient things, for it is never used to refer to such things. Nor does it mean the individual 'self', for otherwise it would as well be used with reference to the self of others. In fact, it is used by one who is the independent speaker (=author) of a sentence with reference to oneself. This is always so. Therefore it follows that just as in everyday life the word 'I' is used by an independent speaker of a sentence, even so the word 'I' as used in the Vedas should refer to their author. Were it not so, it would not have occured there at all. It will not do to argue that the word 'I' refers to the person who merely utters the word, as he

1. (a) ईश्वरादिपदं सार्थं लोकवृत्तानुसारतः। NK. V. 6.
(b) पदात् खल्वपि। श्रूयते हि प्रणवेश्वरेशानादिपदम्। तच्च सार्थकम्। अविगानेन श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासेषु प्रयुज्यमानत्वात् घटादिपदवदिति। NKP. V p. 76.
(c) अत्रापि प्रयोगः। यः शब्दो यत्र वृद्धैरसति वृत्यन्तरे प्रयुज्यते स तस्य वाचकः। यथा स्वर्गशब्दः सुखविशेषे प्रयुज्यमानस्तस्य वाचकः। प्रयुज्यते चायं जगत्कर्त्तरीति। अन्यथा निरर्थकत्वप्रसङ्गे सार्थकपदकदम्बसमभिव्याहारानुपपत्तिरिति।
Ibid, p. 77.

repeats the particular sentence. Otherwise the statement viz. "One should worship me" would mean that the person repeating the sentence would become an object of worship. The sentences viz. "I am the origin of everything in this universe. Everything proceeds from Me" when repeated by the successive teachers and their pupils would make them think that they were endowed with the power to create the universe etc. All such worship would turn out to be a big hoax and all activity would come to a stop. Therefore the person who merely repeats (*anu-vaktā*) the word 'I' is not the person connoted by it but the independent author thereof (*svatantra-uccārayitā*). In fine, we infer the existence of God as connoted by such words as *Om*, *Īśvara*, the first person pronoun 'I' and the like occuring in the Vedas.[1]

6. Pratyaya

The word *pratyaya* here stands for *vidhi-pratyaya* suffixed to verbal roots to express the optative mood. Sometimes the idea of the optative mood is also expressed by using the present indefinite form of the verbal root. *Svarga-kāmo yajeta* and *dadhnā juhoti* are two injunctions that illustrate the two cases respectively. Now the question is : 'What is the meaning of the *vidhi-pratyaya* ? Udayana says that the intention (*abhiprāya*) of the trustworthy person (*āpta*) or the speaker (*vaktā*) is the meaning of the *vidhi-pratyaya*. When some trustworthy person utters an injunctive sentence, he wants the hearer either to do something or to desist from doing something. And the hearer would infer, in the first case, that doing the thing in question would enable him to achieve his object, and, in the other case, that by not desisting from the thing prohibited he would reap some very highly undesirable reward. This is so when the injunctive sentences have human authors. The Vedic injunctions are no exception to this rule. There also the *vidhi-pratyaya* must express the intention of the trustworthy person who is their author. Thus the use of *vidhi-pratyaya* in the Vedas also presupposes a trustworthy person as their author whose

1. अपि च । अस्मत्पदं लोकवद्वेदेऽपि प्रयुज्यते । तस्य च लोके नाचेतनेष्वन्यतमदर्थः । तत्र सर्वथैवाप्रयोगात् । नाप्यात्ममात्रमर्थः । परात्मन्यपि प्रयोगप्रसङ्गात् । अपि तु यस्तं स्वातन्त्र्येणोच्चारयति, तमेवाह । तथैवान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामवसायात् । ततो लोकव्युत्पत्तिमनतिक्रम्य वेदेऽप्यनेन स्वप्रयोक्तैव वक्तव्यः । अन्यथाऽप्रयोगप्रसङ्गात् ।... तस्मान्नानुवक्ताऽस्य वाच्योऽपि तु वक्तैवेति स्थिते प्रयुज्यते । वेदे अस्मच्छब्दः स्वप्रयोक्तृवचनः, अस्मच्छब्दत्वाल्लोकवदिति । Ibid, p. 77.

abhiprāya is expressed by the *vidhi-pratyaya*. It is God whose *abhiprāya* is expressed by the injunctive verbal suffix.[1]

The Mīmāṁsaka cannot urge that although this rule regarding the meaning of the *vidhi-pratyaya* may be all right, it is, however, not applicable to Vedic *vidhi-vākyas*, for the Vedas have no author. The use of *vidhi-pratyaya* itself proves otherwise. Moreover, as Udayana has shown in the second chapter of the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, the authority of the Vedas was acceptable only if they were composed by an Omniscient author whom the Naiyāyikas called God. The Naiyāyikas hold that validity depends on extraneous factors. Just as the fact of an unmarried woman being pregnant presupposes her connection with some male person, even so the use of *vidhi-pratyaya* in the Vedas cannot be explained except on the supposition that they have had an author. It cannot be assumed that *vidhi-pratyaya* expresses the intention of the speaker in the case of ordinary sentences while in the case of a Vedic sentence it expresses some other thing, for that would militate against the general rule that the words have the same connotation whether in ordinary parlance or in the Vedas. The *vidhi-pratyaya* does not express the 'intention' of the teachers of the Vedas ; for, in fact, they merely repeat (*anuvaktāraḥ*) the Vedic injunctions in course of their teaching. A parrot might also repeat an injunctive sentence. But that does not mean that the *vidhi-pratyaya* therein expresses some 'intention' or desire of the parrot. Were it so, then, by the same logic one would say that a royal proclamation, when read out by some person entrusted with the task, would express the 'intention' of the person making the announcement. But, surely, the proclamation is meant to express the desire of the king and not of the announcer.[2]

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1. विधिर्वक्तुरभिप्रायः प्रवृत्त्यादौ लिङादिभिः।
अभिधेयोऽनुमेया तु कर्त्तुरिष्टाभ्युपायता ॥ NK. V. 15.

2. लौकिक एव वाक्ये अयं प्रकारः कदाचिद् बुद्धिमधिरोहति न तु वैदिकेषु, तेषु पुरुषस्य निरस्तत्वात् इति चेन्न, निरासहेतोरभावात्। तदस्तित्वेऽपि प्रमाणं नास्तीति चेत्। मा भूदन्यत्, विधिरेव तावद् गर्भ इव पुंयोगे प्रमाणं श्रुतिकुमार्य्याः किमत्र क्रियताम्। लिङो वा लौकिकार्थातिक्रमे य एव लौकिकास्त एव वैदिकास्त एव चैषामर्था इति विप्लवेत।'''तथापि वक्तॄणामुपाध्यायानामेवाभिप्रायो वेदे विधिरस्तु कृतं स्वतन्त्रेण वक्त्रा परमेश्वरेणेति चेन्न, तेषामनुवक्तृतयाऽभ्यासाभिप्रायमात्रेण प्रवृत्तेः शुकादिवत् तथाविधाभिप्रायाभावात्। भावे वा न राजशासनानुवादिनोऽभिप्राय आज्ञा, किं नाम राज्ञ एवेति लौकिकोऽनुभवः। NKP. V. p. 139.

7. Śruti

The Mīmāṁsakas admit the authority of the Vedas. The Vedas or Śrutis also speak of God and his various attributes. In fact, Udayana says that the Vedas as a whole speak and sing the glory of God. The Puruṣa-Sūkta[1] speaks of God as the Creator of the universe, the Rudra-Sūktas speak of His glory. We know Him as Śabda-Brahman from the Maṇḍala-Brāhmaṇas. The Upaniṣads first describe the nature of the external world and then point out that He transcends the external world. Such portions of the Vedas (like those mentioned above) as speak of matters other than *karman* are no less authoritative than those that teach *karman*. The *arthavādas* may eventually have to be looked upon as having bearing on one *karman* or the other but that too having first expressed their own meanings. The fact that something teaches or does not teach *karman* does not make it authoritative or un-authoritative. The Buddhist and Jaina scriptures also teach *karman* but that does not entitle them to be regarded as authoritative. The authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*) of *śabda* depends upon the merit of the speaker or the author (*vaktṛ-guṇa*).[2]

8. Vākya.

A sentence expresses the mutual relation (*saṁsarga*) between the individual words or their meanings. But it is found that the knowledge of the mutual relation of the meaning of individual words constituting the sentence is acquired by the author of the sentence independently of the sentence. For instance, if 'X' is the author of a particular sentence then 'X' must have had the knowledge of the *saṁsarga* independently of that particular sentence. The Vedas also (sentences as they are) express particular relation of words or their meanings. This presupposes their author who had the knowledge of that particular relation inde-

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1. RV. X 90.
2. (a) श्रुतेः खल्वपि
   कृत्स्न एव हि वेदोऽयं परमेश्वरगोचरः ।
   स्वार्थद्वारैव तात्पर्य्यं तस्य स्वर्गादिवद्विधौ ॥ NK. V 16.

   (b) न सन्त्येव हि वेदभागा यत्र परमेश्वरो न गीयते । तथाहि। स्रष्टृत्वेन पुरुषसूक्तेषु, विभूत्या रुद्रेषु शब्दब्रह्मत्वेन मण्डलब्राह्मणेषु, प्रपञ्चं पुरस्कृत्य निष्प्रपञ्चतयोपनिषत्सु, यज्ञपुरुषत्वेन मन्त्रविधिषु, देहाविर्भावैरूपाख्यानेषु, उपास्यत्वेन च सर्वत्रेति । सिद्धार्थतया न ते प्रमाणमिति चेन्न तद्धेतोः कारणदोषशङ्कानिरासस्य भाव्यभूतार्थसाधारणत्वात् । NKP. V p. 140.

pendently of the Vedas. That they would not be authoritative, if they were not composed by a trustworthy person, has been pointed out repeatedly. Therefore it cannot be maintained that they are beginningless (*an-ādi*) and that it is needless to postulate God. Thus *vākya-tva* is also a ground for postulating God.[1]

9-10. Saṁkhyā-viśesa

In the ordinary sentences the number (*saṁkhyā*) expressed by the verbal form in the first person is construed with the speaker. The same is applicable to Vedic sentences as well. For instance, in the sentence '*eko'ham bahu syām*' (May I, who am one, become many !) the singular number expressed by the verbal form *syām* is to be construed with the original speaker of the sentence. Therefore, one must admit some author of the Vedas. God alone can be their author.[2]

Or the word *saṁkhyā* stands for *saṁjñā* or *samākhyā*, which means a 'name'. Therefore, the word *saṁkhyā-viśeṣa* occuring in the *kārikā* would mean the names like 'Kāṭhaka' etc. by which the different recensions of the Vedas are known. Now the point to be considered is : Why are the different recensions of the Vedas known by names such as *Kāṭhaka* and the like ? The answer is that it was God who having embodied himself as Kaṭha etc. taught those recensions to the *ṛṣis* for the first time. The names of these recensions are derived from the different names that God assumed when he embodied himself as Kaṭha etc. The different names by which the different recensions are known are not after the names of those teachers that taught those recensions ; for there have been innumerable teachers.

Thus we see that according to the alternative interpretations of the *kārikā* as detailed above, Udayana has adduced ten arguments to prove the existence of God.

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1. वाक्यादपि । संसर्गभेदप्रतिपादकत्वं ह्यत्र वाक्यत्वमभिप्रेतम् । तथा च यत्पदकदम्बकं यत्संसर्गभेदप्रतिपादकं, तत् तदनपेक्षसंसर्गज्ञानपूर्वकं यथालौकिकं, तथा च वैदिकमिति प्रयोगः । विपक्षे च बाधकमुक्तम् । NKP. V p. 144.

2. सङ्ख्याविशेषादपि—
स्यामभूवं भविष्यामीत्यादिसङ्ख्या च वक्तृगा ।
समाख्याऽपि न शाखानामाद्यप्रवचनादृते ॥ NK V. 17.

BHAKTI CULT WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ACINTYA-BHEDĀBHEDA

Dr Bhakti Bhattacharya

From time immemorial, man's quest has been to make a probe into the mysteries of life and the world. Man's sorrows have stimulated it. He has gone into the question of external world of physical nature. But his principal concern has been the pursuit of truth in respect of inner life. The Ṛṣis of the Upaniṣads cultivated a superior power of vision inherent in us. They gave us wisdom. Truths sprang from their life and direct experience, They embodied the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality and spiritual life. The Hindus inherited these truths, the revelations of the ancient seers.

With the rise of materialism and scepticism, things took a different turn. Materialism denied God without qualification. It was directly opposed to the accepted tradition. It questioned the validity of the past wisdom. The formidable array of arguments of the Cārvāka materialists was successfully met by the exponents of Buddhism and Jainism. But the latter ethical systems promulgated the doctrine that by refraining from all evil in thought, word and deed, man can escape the miseries ; it was immaterial whether God or any other divine power existed or not. Logic came to the forefront, poetry and religion had to make room for cold reason and hard analysis.

In this hour of grave crisis, the conservative minds had perforce to retrace their steps. They had to fight the destructive criticism of their opponents and to re-establish, by reason and experience, what they had accepted in good faith. The attack on Hindu belief gave impetus to the six important schools of philosophy—Nyāya Śāstra of Gautama, Vaiśeṣika of Kaṇāda, Sāṅkhya of Kapila, Yoga of Patañjali, Pūrva-mīmāṁsā of Jaimini and Uttara-mīmāṁsā or the Vedānta of Bādarāyaṇa. They were all directed to the ultimate goal of life, freedom from attachment. For this, one needed the ordering of life and controlled action. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika believed in atomic pluralism but they differed on the basis of philosophy. Nyāya would stress the necessity of logic as the basis, while Vaiśeṣika would emphasise the constitution of the physical world. Sāṅkhya like

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsā recognised periodic creation and dissolution of the world. But it argued against the Vaiśeṣika view to establish its own that nature and consciousness being opposed to each other, nature could not generate consciousness. Vaiśeṣika and Yoga laid stress on religious experience. They admitted the existence of God but did not accept him as the Creator of the universe. Both Pūrva-mīmāṁsā and Vedānta laid stress on ethics and religion while Vedānta considered the relation between nature and mind as the Ultimate problem. The Mīmāṁsaka spoke of God but denied His importance and efficiency in the moral ordering of the world. But whether it is realism of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the dualism of Sāṅkhya or the monism of Vedānta, the approach of all is for the realisation of truth. All the systems concentrate upon the spiritual. They conceive man to be spiritual in nature and concerned primarily with his spiritual destiny. Practical application of philosophy to life is, therefore, the keynote of every school of thought. Thus the philosophical speculations are united as links in the chain of history. They agree although they vary in methods of approach as also in conclusions.

Of these, Vedānta, rich in philosophical value and religious experience, is a living force with the Hindu thinkers. In it, we find dual characters of the Reality. It is Brahman, the one without any second, pure identity without difference.[1] It is indeterminate (*nirviśeṣa*), unmanifest (*avyakta*), formless (*amūrta*), immortal (*amṛta*). The Ṛg-Veda says—"The Reality is one, sages speak of Him differently."[2] It is the Brahman of the Upaniṣads ; and Brahman is Ātman, the Reality of reality.[3] It is the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of all created beings. Again, it is limited (*mūrta*), empirical (*vyavahārika-sat*), perishable, mutable. It is a person possessed of infinite powers and qualities. Many gods are also mentioned in the Upaniṣads. The ultimate aim of life is realised in becoming one with Brahman, as well as in residing in the abode of God. Thus we see that the Upaniṣads give series of truths viewed from different angles. They are neither consecutive nor codified, nor form a consistent whole. Not being systematic, they admit of different interpretations, and thus allow themselves to be handled and fashioned in different ways by

1. Ch. U. VI. 8, 4 ; Bṛh. U. IV. 4. 19 ; V. 3. 23 ; Śvet. U. III 9.
2. एकं सद् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति Rg. V. 1- 164.46.
3. सत्यस्य सत्यम् Bṛh. U. II. 1. 20.

different schools of thought. In consequence, we have the absolute monism of Śaṅkara, Qualified monism (Viśiṣṭādvaita) of Rāmānuja, Dualism of Mādhva, Dualistic monism (*dvaitādvaita*) of Nimbārka, Pure monism (*śuddhādvaita*) of Vallabha, Acintyabhedābheda of Caitanya, Śaivism, Śāktism etc.

Philosophy is the art of moral life and the art of spiritual living. It starts from the practical problems of life and tries to solve them. It, therefore, caters to man's practical needs in making man what he is, divine, kind and compassionate. As a practical guide, philosophy teaches man to perform his duties under all circumstances. The system of thought which fails to achieve this end has no appeal to man.

Śaṅkara's absolute monism has stirred the intellectual world. His splendour of thought as well as probe into metaphysics have hardly any parallel. "His system alone can reconcile and ennoble the different sides of life into ideal joy and happiness." Although Śaṅkara opens a vista of life arresting and reassuring, practical and sublime, yet his system is too high to satisfy the cravings of the common man.

Human heart longs for a God who, like loving parents, accepts and rewards passionate devotion; who is a friend, helper and savior. The Mīmāṁsakas could have met these needs as the sacrificial cult allowed devotional worship of the Supreme through symbols. Unfortunately, however, the Brahmanical cult was more interested in building a stable society suffering from disintegration of Buddhism. Consequently, it introduced rigorous caste system and did not allow the Śudras, the lowest class, to perform sacrifice. The result was that the Śūdras were left to their own cults. They thus helped the growth of the theistic religions of Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Śāktism. These religions looked upon all men, high or low, as children of God, the same father, entitled to equal treatment.

Bhakti Cult and its growth.

Bhakti or devotion includes forms of worship from the lowest to the highest. It covers a large number of sects or sampradāyas, traditional and revolutionary, social and a-social. It is divided into three main streams—Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Śāktism, with two subdivisions of each, the mystic school and the Ācārya school. The religious experiences of the mystics, specially the Ālvars of South India, who like the seers of the Upaniṣads contemplated God, paved the way for

reconciliation at a later date of the traditional Vedānta with the Bhakti cult. Even Śaṅkara's Advaitism comes within the fold of this cult. In śloka 31 of the Viveka-cuḍāmaṇi Śaṅkara says "of all the instruments and conditions laid down for emancipation, the most important is Bhakti. Constant attempt to live up to one's own Real Nature is called single-pointed devotion". Out of the three main streams referred to above, sprang a large number of cults owing to their allegiances to the theological schools they belonged to. Bhakti centers round Rāma as the supreme Lord in Rāmānanda, Kabīr, Tulsīdas, Nabha Das, Muluk Das, Dadu & others. Jñāneśvara, Nāmdeva, Eka-Nātha, Tukā-rām worship Kṛṣṇa and Rukmiṇī, while Nimbārka, Viṣṇumuni, Vallava and Caitanya worship Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā.

It (Bhakti Cult) has its origin in the remote past. In the Ṛgveda we find that gods were invoked by prayer. "All my thoughts, seeking happiness, extol Indra, longing for him. They embrace him as wives embrace a fair young bridegroom, him, the divine giver of gifts. He may help me".[1] Devotional worship through symbols formed an essential part of the sacrificial cult. In the *Bhāgavata*, the most popular work in the devotional literature in India, *bhakti* is defined as a "surging emotion which thrills the whole frame, chokes speech and leads to trance". It lays down that love for God must be absolutely unselfish and free from any desire for reward. In the Nārada-sūtra, *Bhakti* has been defined as the most sincere love for God. It generates love for all, removes hatred and confers eternal peace. Bhakti is worship as also realisation. It is the path as well as the end of it. The path of devotion is preferable to that of action, knowledge or yoga.[2]

Probably the best definition of the term *bhakti* comes from Prahlāda, the prince of the devotees. According to him, *bhakti* is as great an attachment to God as an impudent man feels for the sense objects. Bhakti is thus uninterrupted single-minded devotion to God. Union with God is the divine right of every individual irrespective of caste and creed. According to the Vaiṣṇava religion, the highest values of life can be achieved through this path alone. Sin is separation from

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1. Rg. X. 43. 1.
2. (a) सा तस्मिन् परमप्रेमरूपा Naradīya-bhakti-Sūtra 1.2.
   (b) सा न कामयमाना निरोधरूपत्वाद् । Ibid 2. 7.
   (c) स्वयं फलरूपेति ब्रह्मकुमारः Ibid. 4.30.
   (d) सा तु कर्मज्ञानयोगेभ्योऽप्यधिकतरा Ibid 4.25.

God. Real atonement consists in union with God first and service to all creatures thereafter.

The chief advocates of theistic Vedānta are Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka, Vallabha and Caitanya. They all believe in personal God who could be worshipped with all passions and love. But difference of opinion exists between Rāmānuja and Madhva on one side and Nimbārka, Vallabha and Caitanya on the other. The difference is radical. Viṣṇu is the God of Rāmānuja and Madhva. Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa resides in Vaikuṇṭha. His power and consort is Lakṣmī. Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī represent magnificence of Bhagavān (God). The Jīva (individual soul) must stand at a respectable distance to worship him with awe and reverence. Kṛṣṇa is the God of Nimbārka, Vallabha and Caitanya. Rādhā is his power, his consort. Here the Jīva (individual soul) stands in intimate human relation with Kṛṣṇa who is a child, a friend or a lover. This intimate relation of affection, friendship and love is superior to and more blissful than that of fear, obedience and regard.

Rāmānuja in his Vedārtha-saṁgraha and Śrī-bhāṣya says that his system is based on the old teachings of Dramiḍa, Taṅka, Guhadeva and the Bodhāyana. In the teachings of Nāmmalvār, the best mystic of the Vaiṣṇava school, are traced the essentials of Rāmānuja's doctrine. The Vaiṣṇava mystics and saints go by the name of Ālvārs. They were wandering singers of God like the Bauls of Bengal, Of them Nāmmalvār and Tirumangai Ālvārs held positions of high esteem. The devotional songs of the Ālvārs are known as Prabandam. The Ālvārs did not believe in the distinctions of caste, rank and sex. By love and complete resignation every man and woman can realise the ultimate reality and enjoy infinite bliss. After the Ālvārs came the Ācāryas. Mystics and poets were followed by scholars and thinkers. Nāthamuni (born 824 A. D.) a follower of the Bhāgavata school of Northern India, in his book, the Ubhaya-Vedānta, raised the status of the divine songs of the Ālvārs, composed in Tamil language, to the level of Vedānta. The real spiritual language is not what we say but what comes from within—what we feel in the core of our heart. The next teacher of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school is Ālvandar, a grandson of Nāthamuni, who commented on Pāñcarātra in the light of the Vedānta. Next to him comes Rāmānuja (born 1017 A. D.) the best commentator of the Viśiṣṭādvaita. Śaṅkara places a new interpretation

of Bauddha-Nirvāṇa and thereby proves the validity of Advaita. Bhāskara follows Śaṅkara and refutes Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyā, by the recognition of adjunct and identity in difference (bhedābheda). Bhāskara is followed by Yādava who offers a more objective interpretation of the bhedābheda doctrine. Rāmānuja comes next to Yādava and diverts the philosophical speculation into a new channel by his doctrine of synthetic love. Rāmānuja made sincere attempts to rouse religious consciousness of the lower classes and succeeded to an appreciable extent in giving them Vaiṣṇava faith. He, however, did not extend the same facilities to the lowest classes due to his anxiety to respect the ancient caste restrictions. Rāmānuja did not find any difference between the philosophy of the Vedānta and that of the Tamil Prabandha. The important Ācarya of Vaiṣṇavism of the south India next to Rāmānuja was Vedānta Deśika.

Shortly after Rāmānuja's death in 1137 A. D., two branches of the Vaiṣṇava cult gained in prominence. The southern branch known as Tengalai was founded by Pillai Lokācarya while the Northern school known as Vadagalai was led by Vedānta Deśika. There was serious difference of opinion between the two branches. The Northern school considered the Vedānta more important than the Tāmil Prabandha and held that God's merey was spontaneous and not limited by any condition. According to the latter, both God's mercy and complete resignation to God (*āpatti*) were necessary although both the branches admit that God himself is both the means and the end. The difference in outlook came to a pitch due to the insistence of Pillai Lokācarya. In the medieval age Northern India witnessed the influence of Islam. To check mass conversion to Islam a large number of Vaiṣṇava reformers under the able leadership of Rāmānanda, a desciple of Rāmānuja, took upon themselves the task of revitalising Hindu religion. Of the desciples of Rāmānanda, Kabīr, Dadu and Tulsīdas were very popular. Kabīr by his teachings and conduct as also by emphasis on agreement between Vedānta and Sufism made great efforts towards Hindu Muslim unity. Dadu used to meet Akbar often for the same purpose. Tulsīdas made himself immortal by making a Hindi version of the Rāmāyaṇa. Close connection exists between the śuddhādvaitavāda of Vallabha and Vaiṣṇava mysticism, specially that which relates to the Kṛṣṇa's sports with gopīs. A striking feature of mysticism introduced by some Ālvārs was the love story of Kṛṣṇa and the gopīs.

It bore close resemblance to the unselfish sincere love of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, the theme of the Vaiṣṇava school of Bengal started by Caitanya.

Acintya-bhedābheda-vāda of Caitanya

Caitanya (1485-1533) did not write any book. It is, however, believed that he composed the Daśamūla-śloka. Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja wrote an authoritative biography of Caitanya (1616 A. D.). Caitanya's discussion with Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma is recorded in it. This as also the Daśamūla-śloka bring out Caitanya's philosophical doctrine. Jīva Gosvāmī (1600 A. D.) also explained Caitanya's philosophical doctrines in his Ṣaṭsandarbha. Later on (1800 A. D.) Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa also brought out the philosophical views of the Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavisḿ in his Govindabhāṣya on the Brahma-Sūtra. He also wrote Prameya-ratnāvalī which contains a summary of Caitanya's philosophy. This book was well received by the Vaiṣṇavas. The Siddhānta-ratnāvalī is also ascribed to him.

From the Daśamūla-śloka as also from the account of Caitanya's instructions left by his disciples, it would appear that Caitanya's spiritual teachers were the followers of Madhva sect. He was deeply influenced by the followers of Madhva. Caitanya considered himself a member of the Mādhva school, and thought that he was preaching Madhva dualism. But in reality the philosophical doctrines, he preached, was a kind of bhedābhedabāda closely resembling that of Nimbārka.

Caitanya's philosophy is not unmixed dualism. While it lays stress on eternal differences among God, the soul and the world as laid down in Madhva's commentary on the Brahmasūtra, it also emphasises eternal non-difference among them. This special type of unity in difference is beyond the scope of human intellect. It is a special kind of non-dualism (advayavāda) that reconciles or harmonises all differences, in an unconceivable manner.

The supreme Reality

According to Caitanya, the supreme Reality is Hari i. e., Bhagavān or Parameśvara. He is determinate (*saviśeṣa*), has form, and is not indeterminate (*nirviśeṣa*) and formless (*nirākāra*) as maintained by Śaṅkara. He is the personal God of love and grace. His essence is being (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*). He is the embodiment of bliss (*ānanda-vigraha*). He is both attributeless (*nirguṇa*) and

possessed of attributes (*saguṇa*). He is *nirguṇa* because he is beyond the influence of the attributes of Prakṛti and *saguṇa* because he is Omniscient and Omnipotent. He combines in him the powers of Lordship and is the concrete expression of inconceivable powers. There are six such powers :—(1) infinite beauty (2) infinite pomp and glory (3) infinite fame (4) infinite strength (5) infinite knowledge and (6) infinite detachment i.e., absolute freedom from passion. Of all these qualities, Śrī or infinite beauty is the highest attribute ; the rest are secondary. The relation between Śrī and other qualities is that of the whole and its parts; body and its limbs. Thus pomp, strength and fame are his subordinate qualities. Knowledge and detachment (non-attachment) are radiations of his fame. They are thus the attributes of one of his secondary qualities viz., fame. Lustre of his spiritual body is the indeterminate (*nirviśeṣa*) Brahman of Śaṅkara. Paramātman is the indwelling spirit of the world. He is only a part of the essential power (*svarūpa*) of (Bhagavān) Hari.

Apparently such conception of the supreme reality is a challenge to the Advaitavāda of Śaṅkara. Infinite knowledge and non-attachment are his essential characteristics. Saguṇa of Śaṅkara is Brahman, conditioned by māyā, and as such it is inferior to Brahman and not superior to Brahman as held by the Vaiṣṇava Schools. According to them, indeterminate (*nirviśeṣa*) Brahman of Śaṅkara is not an independent Reality but an attribute of Sat-cit-ānanda. Adoption of a concrete form does not limit Hari's Omnipresence or his will power. The body of God is spritual and so Bhagavān (God) may be present in person in all places at the same time. Supra-logical attributes of God make for his supernatural mind, body and sense organs. His powers are special features of His manifested form. They are his essential powers (*svarūpa*) as also attributes of his different powers. The relation that subsists between his essential nature (*svarūpa*) and his different powers is supralogical. God can harmonise these conflicting powers. Apart from powers, He has transcendent nature which never exhausts itself in the various manifestations of his essential nature (*svarūpa*).

Hari with his two attributes, (1) infinite grandeur and (2) infinite power or strength, has created māyā or ignorance and entered into it in the form of Kṛṣṇa, by only a part of his essential power. Although a part of Hari, Kṛṣṇa, the world-soul (*jagad-ātmā*), the inner controller

of the world and individual souls, is not in any way inferior to Bhagavān Hari, in respect of fulness and abundance of attributes, for the reason that even a part of the infinite spiritual truth shares the infinitive character of the whole.

Kṛṣṇa, when identical with the ultimate reality exercises his essential power (*svarūpa-śakti*) in three different ways :—(1) Cit-śakti (2) Jiva-śakti and (3) Māyā-śakti, also known as (1) Viṣṇu-śakti, (2) Kṣetrajña-śakti and (3) Avidyā-śakti. They are various manifestations of svarūpa-śakti.

The First :—Cit-śakti is the manifestation of his divine energy, his eternal power. By this power, he manifests his nature as intelligence and will. It is superior to the other two powers. Since Kṛṣṇa (Hari) is *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*, his cit-śakti consists of the corresponding powers of "being" (*sandhinī*), that is the power to make Ātman manifest, of *cit* i. e., consciousness (*saṁvit*) and of *ānanda* i.e., bliss (*hlādinī*), the power of enjoyment.[1] The highest manifestation of the cit-śakti of Kṛṣṇa is the power of bliss or delight. Rādhā is the essence of delight-giving power.[2] Cit-śakti which is also called eternal power (antaraṅga-śakti) may be taken as the power of experiencing many as one and one as many.

The Second is Jīva-śakti, His inessential or accidental power (taṭastha-śakti). God's cit-śakti presents before us the whole truth and his māyā-śakti gives us a perverted version of truth. Jīva-śakti occupies a middle place and serves as a connecting link between the two. It is the essential power of God in the shape of limited individual soul or ātmans. Since Jīva-śakti has its place in between truth and the distorted imitation of it (truth), it expresses itself as the power that can generate two kinds of feelings. This is why, the limited Jīva has a dual nature, animal as well as divine. In other words the Jīva-śakti is that power of God by which he transforms himself into individual souls.

The Third is māyā-śakti. It is just the opposite of jīva-śakti. It is also an expression of God's essential power, an external power (bahiraṅga-śakti). By this power God transforms himself into the world of manifested objects. As already stated, cit-śakti manifests

1. Caitanya-caritāmṛta, Madhyamalīlā Ch. VIII.
2. कृष्णस्वरूपिणी परमानन्दरूपिणी Brahma-Vaivarta-purāṇa.

the real nature of God. As the spiritual power it is competent to unite all differences and at the same time excel them. Māyā-śakti, however, runs counter to it. It hides the real nature of truth and shows us a distorted imitation of it. On the contrary, cit-śakti reveals to us the full implications of truth. Māyā-śakti conceals the fact that the individual objects have no separate existences of their own independent of God and are only parts of an integrated whole and show that they are separate existences independent of the whole.

Kṛṣṇa resides in the highest heaven, over which prakṛti has no jurisdiction. Kṛṣṇa is unconditioned (*turīya*) and absolutely free from the influence of māyā. He is manifest in four vyūhas, Vāsudeva. Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. He is both transcendental (*avyakta*) and immanent (*vyakta*). The four vyūhas and incarnations are his own parts (*svāṁśa*) and these are non-different from him.[1]

Jīvas : Individual souls

God is the lord of Māyā. The jīva is overcome by the power of māyā and is therefore subject to it (*māyādhīna*). The individual souls spring from the jīva-śakti of God. The jīva is a conscious power of God. Jīvas are parts of God and different from Him (*vibhinnāṁśa*). Although parts originating from the same source, they are not identical with one another, nor are they non-different from God. The jīva is thus a manifestation of *sat, cit* and *ānanda* nature of God though in a limited scale. Devotion to God is the highest goal for him.[2]

The world : God creates world and prakṛti out of it. God is transformed into the world and in this he does not undergo any change (modification) whatsoever. The world is not an appearance (*vivarta*) of Brahman as maintained by Śaṅkara. It is real but it is mutable and distructible. It is an energy of matter. The world's importance lies in the fact that it is the training ground of man.

Theory of knowledge : The Daśamūla-śloka, as its name implies, contains ten stanzas (*ślokas*). The first *śloka* deals with the means (*karaṇa*) of true (*samyak*) knowledge. For the realisation of spiritual truth,. the Vedas which give an account of the highest transendent revelations of the ancient seers, are the only guide ; other forms of proof such as direct experience through sense organs, inference etc. are

1. Caitnya-caritāmṛta Madhyamalīlā, Ch. XXII.
2. Ibid., Ch. VI.

acceptable only when they are in conformity with the principal doctrines of the Vedas. Logic falls short of its attempt to realise the spiritual truth which reveals only to the higher intuitions of the Ṛṣis.

Bondage and emancipation

As a spark is a part of the burning fire and its exact epitome, all the forces that work in fire have their counterparts in the spark. So is the relation of the jīva to God. This is why the jīva is both different and non-different from God. Because of his divine nature arising as it does from God's power, the jīva in non-different from God. He is different from God because he is a part of God and has thus a limited existence while God is unlimited existence. God's māyā-śakti works in two ways: On the one it creates the inanimate universe of infinite multiplicity and on the other it acts as the power of ignorance by which it induces the jīva to forget his real nature that he is eternally related to God and to pose that he is free from all such limitations. According to the followers of Caitanya, the highest aspiration of the jīva is to know his real nature and he should conduct his life accordingly. This life is the life of bhakti, self-sacrifice and love. Man's worldly life is selfishness and material concern. Through the illusion of ignorance he conceives himself limited and conditioned by wants. He works for the satisfaction of his wants which in turn bring him sufferance and failure. Continuous strain of life forces him to a sense of incompetence and powerlessness. At this stage, he starts realising his mistake and takes to a life of dependence on God. Then his devotion to God gradually changes into yearning for God, which again culminates in selfless love. In true love there is very little sensual. Passions and longings are the very nature of the individual soul. The dovotee is required to redirect to God all the warmth of his feelings that he has for things mundane. A true devotee is advised to completely surrender himself to God, because through prayer, love and devotion, the nobler and diviner as yet obscure and dormant in him may come to manifest. Bhakti thus teaches us to stoop and conquer. Even a woman in love accepts humiliation gracefully, embraces poverty with pleasure for the sake of her beloved and comes gradually to surrender her ego, the vanity of false values in her and attachments to her body, mind etc.. We have instances of such love in Sītā, Śāvitrī, Damayantī, Mīrā Bāi and others. The beauty and charm inherent in the path of bhakti is that instead of killing our natural feelings that vibrete in us,

it lifts them from the mundane to the celestial plane, diverts them from the gross sensual enjoyment to pure mental delight. In the highest form of this love, Kṛṣṇa is to the devotee the only male, the rest are all women, anxious for union with Him. Salvation is enjoyment of eternal bliss.[1] Study of the Vedas, Bhāgavata-Purāṇa and the like help the aspirants for truth in growing bhakti in them. A Vaiṣṇava is asked to surrender himself to the Gurū (the spiritual guide) to enable him to attain release from bondage and consequent rebirth. Salvation can be attained by chanting and reciting the name of God.[2]

Comments

No philosophy, howsoever great and sublime, has escaped adverse criticism. When such criticism is healthy, it helps build that philosophy on a firmer foundation. Adverse criticism has likewise been levelled against the theistic schools. Acintyabhedābheda is no exception to this. The main criticism is that it assumes the existence of a supralogical relation among God, individual souls and the world. Further, it holds that God is capable of exercising powers of opposite nature, through his essential powers (svarūpa-śakti). It is urged that the Jīva-śakti and Māyā-śakti being mutually contradictory cannot emanate from the same source (viz., his essential powers). The followers of Caitanya answer that God has transcendental powers and as such exercise by him of the contrary powers does not in any way affect His transcendental power which suffers no change. Another objection is that God's three powers (cit-śakti, jīva-śakti and māyā-śakti) are not separately intelligible nor are their relations to God liable to logical analysis. It is therefore contended that assumption of the supralogical relation is the crux of Caitanya's philosophy. The followers of Caitanya may point out that all the schools of thought specially those evolving from the Vedas recognise that the highest truth cannot be realised by logic. Logic is of help only at the inital stage of the process. Truth is revealed only to intuition. This is why Caitanya accepts the authority of the Vedas as final and is prepared to accept the validity of logic only in so far as it is in conformity with the essential principles of the Vedas. What about Śaṅkara's Advaitism? How is māyā related to Brahman? Śaṅkara himself evades or dismisses the issue by treating the question as an illegitimate one (atipraśna). Because Brahman is

1. सच्चिदानन्दरसे भक्तियोगस्तिष्ठति Gopala-Tāpanī.
2. Caitanya-caritāmṛta, ādilīlā, Ch. VII.

the only Reality and māyā is not real, so the question of any relation between them does not arise. The theists may similarly say that the Ultimate Reality being omniscient, omnipresent and omnipotent, it is within His competence to exercise powers which are inconceivable to human intellect. Caitanya's life was the expression of the eternal longing of the human soul for the Infinite. The eight ślokas (verses), Śrī Caitanya used to recite, bear glowing testimony to this. A moment's separation from Kṛṣṇa is so painful to him that it seems that he has not seen his lover for ages. Tears roll down from his eyes in abundance like incessant rain. His sense of loneliness is so devastating that the world is meaningless to him. His yearning for union with Kṛṣṇa is beautifully expressed in the last verse: "My love, you are my only lord, and none else. My surrender to you is so complete that it has reached me to a point of no-return. It is now up to you my beloved, to spurn and trample me under your feet or to take me in your loving embrace and fill my life with eternal bliss.[1]

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1. आश्लिष्य वा पादरतां पिनष्टु माम्
अदर्शनाद् मर्महतां करोतु वा ।
यथा तथा वा विदधातु लम्पटो
मत्प्राणनाथस्तु स एव नापरः ॥

THE PROBLEM OF ERROR

O. P. Jaiswal

The exposition of the philosophical doctrine of the Buddhist idealism is bound to remain incomplete and imperfect without a survey of the theory of error as was propounded by the idealist thinkers. For the purpose of proper understanding of the heart and spirit of the theory of Indian philosophy, a complete and thorough grasp of the theory of error, charactristic of the system is indespensable. The different theories of error bear unmistakable individuality due to differences in the outlook of the philosophers of the different branches of Indian thought. Barring the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsists all the philosophers of the different schools are unanimous on the possibility of error. Only in the Prābhākara system of thought error has been disvowed and dismissed with meticulous care. The adhrents of Prābhākara, so far the theory of error is concerned, are usually designated Akhyātivādins. We abstain from pursuing the chain of argument concerning Prābhākara's refutation of the theory of error as it is beyond the scope of our present investigation.

The usual procedure is to arrange the theories of error into the following fivefold order : (1) *ātma-khyāti*, (2) *asat-khyāti*, (3) *a-khyāti*, (4) *anyathā-khyāti*, (5) *anirvacanīya-khyāti*. But this classification is not satisfactory as it is not comprehensive. In this fivefold arrangement there is no mention of *sad-asat-khyāti* which has been referred to by Vijñānabhikṣu, the celebrated exponent of Sāṁkhya philosophy. Again, *alaṅkika-khyāti* does not find a place in this scheme of classification, although Bhojarāja in his *Tattvaprakāśa* has clearly alluded to it. We propose to adopt a new method of fourfold classification of error. It may be stated in the following way : (1) *sat-khyāti* (2) *asat-khyāti*, (3) *sad-asat-khyāti*, (4) *sad-asat-vilakṣaṇa-khyāti*. Whatever may be the nature of error, it will be comprised under any one of these four types.

The *Sat-khyāti* which we have already mentioned in our scheme of classification may again be subdivided into the following fourfold order : (1) *a-khyāti*, (2) *anyathā-khyāti*, (3) *ātma-khyāti*, and (4) *sat-khyāti* as admitted by Rāmānuja. Amongst these four types of *sat-khyāti*, one is *ātma-khyāti*. The Buddhist idealists have upheld the theory of *ātma-*

khyāti. They held that consciousness only is revealed and is the real entity. Śaṅkarācārya in his Adhyāsa-bhāṣya has elucidated *ātma-khyāti* in the following words : "They say that it is the superimposition of the attribute of one upon the another".[1] Vācaspati in his comment has made it clear that the attribute of one presupposes the attribute of consciousness, which (attribute) is not anything but a form of consciousness.[2] No other attribute resides in consciousness save and except its form. According to the idealistic viewpoint there is no distiction between an attribute and its substratum. As a consequence, consciousness is identical with its form. This form is imposed upon the other, i. e., on the outer externals. The Sautrāntikas have affirmed the reality of external objects. They constitute the substrata upon which the superimposition of the form of consciousness takes place. But according to the idealists there is no outward object extrinsic to consciousness. So external *per se* are unreal. Duly due to the influence of the predisposition of ignorance, one remains *ab aeterno* under the delusion that external things exist. And the beginninglessness of ignorance accounts for the eternity of its predisposition.[3] So the primeval disposition of ignorance is responsible for the appearance of the unreals as reals and upon them the unconscious aspiration of the form of consciousness is usually imposed. The content of superimposition (*āropya*) viz., the form of consciousness is the truth. The reality of the form is due to the reality of consciousness. The idealists hold that the self is not something distinct from consciousness but consciousness itself. The form of consciousness also is one and the same with the self. So the superimposition of the form of consciousness is tantamount to the superimposition of the self *qua* consciousness and is usually termed *ātma-khyāti*.[4]

In the doctrine of the Buddhist idealists, cognition that is supposed to take into account external content stands on par with *ātma-khyāti*. Error as such is equivalent to *ātma-khyāti* in the view of idealism. External objects are the forms of consciousness. But to this an objection has been raised. If external objects were mere forms of consciousness (which is identical with the self), then they ought to have assumed subjective character making their representation in the form of 'I'. Object (*viṣaya*) and subject or the ego (*viṣayin*) are usually

1. तं केचिदन्यत्र अन्यधर्माध्यास इति वदन्ति । ŚB, p. 18.
2. Bhāmatī, p. 26.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

represented by the expressions 'this' and 'I' respectively. Now if the extrinsic things *per se* are sheer forms of consciousness *qua* self, then they ought to have been represented as 'I am blue', 'I am yellow', 'I am pencil'. But this is not borne out by the testimony of actual expression. In answer to this, the idealists observe that this is a frivolous objection. Due to the influence of the predisposition of ignorance, instead of making themselves known in subjective reference, things appear in objective character formally expressed as 'this is blue', 'this is yellow', or 'this is a pen'. This objectivisation is itself a case of error. The presence of predisposition of ignorance acts as an impediment in the way of subjective revelation. So form appears as *this*. The Upaniṣad also declares: "This entire universe is nothing but the self".

Now what is the basis of presupposing that external objects which are felt as not selves are nothing but forms of consciousness *qua* self ?[1] The idealists rejoin that the real nature of an object is not what is perceived. The real nature in unfolded by subsequent proof. After an illusory cognition of conchshell as silver, there arises the invalidating cognition usually expressible in the form of the judgement: 'This is not silver'. This knowledge of contradiction exhibits that the silver which appeared as the content of error is nothing but a form of consciousness. The negative judgement also sublates the attribute *thisness* which appears in the silver. The content of perception presents two distinct aspects viz., *thisness* and *inness*. Thisness is the outward and inness is the inward aspects. Now by negating thisness the negative judgement results in the affirmation of its internal aspect. If the negative judgement is held to negate the silver, the locus of *thisness*, then both the silver the locus and also its attribute *thisness* will be liable to sublation. This will entail useless complexity in the negative judgement. The economy of thought demands that *thisness* of silver be discarded by the negative judgement. As a result, the silver remains uncontradicted.

In fact the silver is not liable to sublation. For as a form of real consciousness the silver is real. Now in the real silver *thisness* (that is, *outwardness*) was superimposed due to the influence of the beginningless predisposition of ignorance. But on the denial of extraneousness, the silver reverts to inner consciousness. And this brings

1. Ibid.

about the assertion of the idealists that the form of consciousness is superimposed in the shape outwardness.

While indicating the varieties of perverted or erroneous cognition Vācaspati Miśra has made the following observation in his *Tātparya-ṭīkā*: "Some say that consciousness with its form referring to the outward content is called error." In course of elucidating this view Vācaspati has mooted the query: Does direct experience bear out that the silver and so forth are forms of consciousness and not outer things? Or do we simply infer that the silver is a form of consciousness?[1] In the first case, is this experience of the nature of affirmative judgement: 'This is silver' or a negative judgement 'This is not silver'? The affirmative judgement clearly states that the silver is not-self. Otherwise, the judgement would have taken the form 'I am silver' and not 'This is silver'. If the silver is held a form of consciousness it should find its expression through the judgement, 'I am silver', which however is an obvious absurdity.[2]

To this the Buddhist idealists answer that the judgement 'I am silver, represents cognition and so it is not erroneous. But the judgement 'This is silver' is false in so far as it expresses the silver in terms of extrinsic character. In this case, the silver despite its being a form of consciousness does not appear as such in the erroneous cognition.[3]

But this position of the idealists is liable to further interrogation: "Does the negative judgement only repudiate the position that the silver is an objective reality; or does it go further to prove *pari passu* that the silver is a form of consciousness? The idealists maintain that the subsequent cognition denied outward existence of the silver. It further leads to the conclusion that the silver *must* be a form of consciousness.[4]

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Bhāmatī, p. 26. vide also Tātparyaṭīkā, pp. 72-73.

विधिस्वरूपविमर्शनम्

श्री महाप्रभुलाल गोस्वामी

कुसुमाञ्जलौ पंचमस्तवके ईश्वरानुमानार्थं कार्यायोजनेत्यादिहेतुप्रदर्शनं कृतम्। हेतुषु प्रत्यय इत्यपि ईश्वरसाधको हेतुः। अत्र प्रत्ययशब्दस्य अर्थः विधिप्रत्ययः। 'स्वर्गकामोऽश्वमेधेन यजेत' इत्यादिवेदवाक्यस्थं 'यजेत' इति पदं लिङ्बोधकप्रत्यय-घटितम्। यज्-धातोः लिङ्प्रत्यये सति यजेत इति। अत्र यज् + ईत = यजेत इत्यत्र ईत लिङर्थबोधक-प्रत्ययः। लिङ्-प्रत्ययः विधिप्रत्ययः। विधिप्रत्ययस्यार्थश्चात्र आप्ताभिप्रायः। आप्ताभिप्रायो नाम वेदवक्तृपुरुषाभिप्रायः। आचार्यस्य मते आप्ताभिप्राय एव विधिप्रत्ययस्यार्थः। प्रथमतः वेदः अल्पज्ञजीवोच्चरितो न भवितुमर्हतीति स्यवधारितम्। आप्ताभिप्रायार्थकविधिप्रत्ययेन यस्यायमभिप्रायोऽनुमितो भवति स एव ईश्वरः। अनुमानाकारः—वैदिकविधि-प्रत्ययः आप्ताभिप्रायबोधकः विधिप्रत्ययत्वात्।

आचार्यः पाणिनिः 'विधिनिमन्त्रणामन्त्रणाधीष्टसंप्रश्नप्रार्थनेषु लिङ्' इतिसूत्रेण विध्यादिष्वर्थेषु लिङ्विधानं करोति। प्रवर्तनात्वस्य विध्यादिषु चतुर्षु अनुस्यूतत्वात् तेन रूपेण प्रवर्तना एव लिङर्थः। प्रवृत्त्यनुकूलः व्यापारः प्रवर्तना। प्रवृत्तिः शिष्यादिनिष्ठा। तदनुकूलव्यापारस्तु प्रेरणात्मकः प्रवर्तयितृगुर्वादिनिष्ठः।

प्राभाकरमते विधिप्रत्ययस्यार्थः नियोगः। नियोगशब्दः कर्तृवाच्ये घञ्-प्रत्यये निष्पन्नो भवति—नियुङ्क्ते इति नियोगः। नियोगः नियोज्यं पुरुषं नियोगस्य सिद्धये नियोगविषये नियुक्तं करोति—'स्वसिद्धये नियोज्यं स्वविषये नियुञ्जानः नियोग इति'। 'कार्य्यम्', 'अपूर्वम्' इत्यादयः शब्दाः नियोगशब्दस्य समानार्थकाः। नियोगः स्वसिद्धये पुरुषं नियुञ्जानः नियोग इत्यभिधीयते।[1] नियोगस्य अपरं नाम कार्य्यं, कार्य्यं हि कर्तुः कृतिसाध्यमर्थात् कर्तुः कृतेरुद्देश्यम्। कृतिसाध्यत्वादेव कार्य्यमित्युच्यते। कार्य्यमेव स्वसिद्धये नियोज्यपुरुषस्य नियोगं करोतीति नियोगनाम्नाऽभिधीयते। अतएव 'स्वसिद्धये स्वात्मनि नियुञ्जानो नियोग' इति। विधिवाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं यः पुरुषः इदं मत्कार्य्यमित्यवगच्छति स एव नियोज्यः। 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत'[2]

१—पुरुषं नियुञ्जानः नियोग इति व्यपदिश्यते। न्यायक० पृ० ५३।

२. आपस्तम्ब गौतम सू० १०।२।८।

इति वाक्ये साध्यस्वर्गकामनावान् पुरुष एव स्वर्गकामः। स्वर्गकामनावान् पुरुषः तादृशकर्मण्येव नियोज्यो भवति यद्धि कार्यं स्वर्गकामनावतः पुरुषस्य काम्यस्वर्गस्य साधकं भवितुमर्हति।

काम्यस्वर्गफलाव्यवहितप्राक्काले विद्यमानं वस्तु एव स्वर्गफलस्य साधनं भवितुमर्हति; यागक्रिया च क्षणविनाशिनीति कालान्तरभाविनः स्वर्गफलस्य अव्यवहित-प्राक्क्षणे न विद्यते इति यागरूपक्रियाकार्यत्वेनाभिमते स्वर्गे स्वर्गकामरूपनियोज्यरूपेण पुरुषोऽन्वितो न स्यात्। यत् काम्यफलस्य साधनं नास्ति तादृशकार्ये कदापि स्वर्गकामः पुरुषः नियोज्यरूपेणान्वितो न भवितुमर्हति। अतएव 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यत्र यागक्रिया-तिरिक्तं प्रमाणान्तरावेद्यं कार्यमेव लिङादिप्रत्ययेन अभिधीयते। तादृशकार्यस्यैवा-भिधायकः लिङादिविधिप्रत्ययो भवति यद्धि कार्यमेतद्वाक्यातिरिक्तेन केनापि प्रमाणेन विदितं न भवति। प्रमाणान्तरावेद्यत्वादेव अपूर्वमिदम् इति जेगीयते कार्यस्य विषय एव करणम्। कार्यस्य स्वरूपप्रतीतौ यत् विषयरूपेण भासते तदेव कार्यस्य स्वरूपनिर्वर्तकरूपे करणरूपेण भासते। कार्यप्रतीतौ यद्धि विषयरूपेणापेक्षितं तदेव कार्योत्पत्तौ करणं भवति। कार्यं कृतिघटितशरीरम्, कृतिसाध्यमेवं कृतिं प्रति प्रधानीभूतमेव कार्यम्। ज्ञानं यथा नियतं सविषयकम् तथैव कृतिरपि नियतसविषयिका। तथाच कार्यस्य प्रतीतौ कृतेर्विषयस्यापेक्षा वर्तते। विषयमन्तरा कृतेः प्रतीतिरेव न स्यात्। उत्पत्तिक्रिया सकरणिकैव। करणं विना क्रिया न भवितुमर्हति। धात्वर्थरूपकरणेन नियोज्य-पुरुषरूपः कर्ता कार्यस्योत्पादको भवति। कार्यमुत्पद्यमानमर्थात् निर्वर्त्यम्, कार्यस्य निर्वर्तयिता नियोज्यः; एवं करणं धात्वर्थः। यस्य पूर्वं कार्यस्य विषयरूपेण प्रतीतिस्त-स्यैव कार्यस्य उत्पत्तौ करणरूपेण प्रतीतिः। प्रथमतः नियोज्यपुरुषस्य समीपे विधिवाक्येन प्रतीतिरनन्तरं नियोज्यरूपकर्तृपुरुषेण कार्यं निर्वर्त्यं—निष्पाद्यं स्यात्।

कृतिसाध्यं वस्त्वेव कार्यं तस्मात् कृतेर्ज्ञानं विना कार्यस्य ज्ञानं न सम्भवति। यद्धि कृतिसाध्यं कृतिं प्रति प्रधानीभूतन्तदेव कार्यम्। यद् वस्तु उद्दिश्य कृतिर्जायते तदेव कृतिं प्रति प्रधानीभूतम्, नियोज्यरूपकर्तृपुरुषस्य कृतिः कार्यस्य सिद्ध्युद्देश्येन प्रवर्तते। कृतिर्हि चेतनस्य आत्मनः गुणः। चेतन एव नियोज्यो भवति। यत्र कार्ये चेतनः पुरुषः अप्रधानरूपेण प्रतीयते तदेव कार्यम्। कार्यस्य स्वरूपसिद्ध्यर्थमेव चेतनः प्रयत्नवान् भवति। कार्यं हि कृतेरुद्देश्यमिति कार्यं प्रधानम्। अत्र कृतिरप्रधाना। एवं

कृत्याश्रयः पुरुषोऽपि अप्रधानभूतः। ज्ञानं यथा सविषयकं तथैव कृतिरपि नित्यं सविषयिका। विषयमन्तरेण कृतेः स्वरूपनिरूपणं न भवितुमर्हति। कृतेः विषयः पुरुषव्यापारः—चेष्टा, यागः, दानं, होमादिकम्। क्रियाविषयिणी कृतिः अपूर्वाख्यकार्य-मुद्दिश्य प्रवर्तते, तथाच नियोज्यपुरुषस्य कृत्या अपूर्वं सिद्ध्यति। यागादिविषयिणी या कृतिस्तया कृतिसाध्यं कृतिं प्रति प्रधानीभूतमपूर्वं कार्यं जायते। कार्यं कृतिं विना न सम्भवति, कृतिश्च क्रियां विना न सम्भवति इति कृतिः क्रियाविषयिणी। तथा अनया कृतिप्रणाल्या यजेत इति कथिते यागविषयकं कार्यमित्यर्थोऽवगम्यते। विपूर्वकस्य बन्धनार्थक-"षिञ्"-धातोः अच्-प्रत्यये विषयः। विषिण्वन्ति विषयिणं बध्नन्ति स्वेन रूपेण निरूपणीयं कुर्वन्तीति विषयाः। ज्ञानादीनां विषयः विषयिणं बध्नाति। विषयनिरूपणाधीनमेव ज्ञानं निरूपणीयं भवति। घटादिविषयः स्वविषयकं ज्ञानमितर-विषयकज्ञानात् व्यावर्तयति, अत एव घटादिः ज्ञानस्य विषयः जायते। एवमेव कार्यमपि इतरकार्याद्व्यावर्तयति इति धात्वर्थरूपक्रिया कार्यस्य बन्धनकारिका। कृतिः क्रियाभिन्न-निरूपिता न भवति। धात्वर्थ एव क्रिया। धात्वर्थरूपक्रियाविषयककृत्या लिङर्थकार्यस्य निष्पत्तिर्भवति। यागविषयकं कार्यमित्यत्र धात्वर्थयागक्रिया लिङर्थकार्यस्य बन्धनं व्यवच्छेदकं विशेषणं वा भवतीति कार्यस्य विषयो जायते। स्वर्गकामो यजेत एतादृशवाक्यस्य यथा नियोज्यः स्वर्गकामनावान् पुरुषः, तथैव लिङर्थकार्य एव पुरुषः नियोज्यरूपेणान्वितः इति कार्यरूपः लिङर्थः नियोज्यपुरुषकाम्यस्य स्वर्गस्य साधनं भवतीति। कार्यं लिङर्थः एव नियोज्यकाम्यस्य स्वर्गस्य साधनम्। तथाच लिङर्थकार्य-विषयः धात्वर्थक्रिया नियोज्यपुरुषकाम्यफलस्य साधनम्।

अत्रेयमाशङ्का यत् लिङर्थः कार्यं नियोज्यपुरुषस्य यत्काम्यं फलन्तस्य साधनमत एव नियोज्यः पुरुषः लिङर्थकार्यस्य सिद्ध्यर्थं प्रवृत्तो भवति। लिङर्थः कार्यं यदि नियोज्यपुरुषस्य यत्काम्यं फलन्तस्य साधनं न स्यात् तदा नियोज्यः पुरुषः कदापि लिङर्थकार्यस्य सिद्ध्यर्थं प्रवृत्तो न स्यात्। तस्मात् गुरुमते कार्यं नियोज्य-पुरुषस्य काम्यफलस्य साधनम्। तथाच कार्यं फलस्य जनकमिति कार्यमप्रधानं फलञ्च प्रधानम्। विधिवाक्ये कार्यस्यैव मुख्यविशेष्यत्वमित्यपि न संघटते, यतः अप्रधानभूतं कार्यं मुख्यं विशेष्यं न भवितुमर्हति इति कार्यस्यैव समस्तवाक्य-प्रधानीभूतत्वं न संगच्छते।

अत्र गुरुमतानुयायिनः कथयन्ति—कार्यं स्वसिद्ध्यर्थमेव नियोज्यं नियुनक्ति।

तथाच कार्य्यं नियोगो वा स्वसिद्ध्यनुकूलनियोज्यप्राप्त्यर्थमेव फलसाधनतामात्मनि स्वीकरोति न तु फलसिद्ध्यर्थं फलसाधनतां स्वीकरोति। कार्य्यं स्वसिद्ध्यर्थमेव नियोज्यं प्रेरयति नियोज्योऽपि काम्यफलस्य असाधने नैव प्रवृत्तो भवतीति नियोगः कार्य्यं वा नियोज्यपुरुषकाम्यफलसाधनतां स्वीकरोति, फलतः कार्य्यं स्वसिद्ध्यनुकूल-नियोज्यपुरुषलाभार्थं नियोज्यपुरुषस्य यत्काम्यं फलन्तस्य साधनं भवतीति कार्य्यस्य नियोगस्य वा प्राधान्यहानिर्न जायते।

शब्देन विधेर्ज्ञानमनायासेनैव सर्वेषां यदि जायते तदा साधनत्वेन ज्ञाते कर्मणि प्रवृत्तौ सत्यां निष्पादितक्रिये कार्ये साधनस्य अनुपपत्तिरेव स्यात्, शब्दात्प्रसि-द्धस्य प्रतिपादनं वृथैव भवति, इति शब्देन विज्ञातं वस्तु नैव जिज्ञासितं भवति। विधिश्च सर्वथाऽप्रसिद्धस्तदा अप्रसिद्धत्वादेव वेदार्थतया प्रतिपाद्यं तन्न स्यात्। विधिः शब्देन अवगम्यते इति प्रसिद्ध एव; तथापि विधौ वर्तन्ते दार्शनिकानां काश्चन विप्रति-पत्तय इति संशयमापन्नः विधिः जिज्ञासितो भवति। तत्र सतीषु बह्वीषु विप्रतिपत्तिषु इयं हि विमतिर्जायते लिङादि-लिङादिरूपादन्यशब्दात् भिद्यते इति शब्दभेद एव विधिः। यथा अयस्कान्तमणिस्वरूपे वस्तुनि अस्त्येव स्वस्वभावजन्यः तादृशः कश्चिदतिशयः यद्वशात् सः अचेतनं लौहं प्रवर्तयति तथैव लिङादावपि तादृशोऽतिशयः कश्चिद् वर्तते यद्वशात् सः चेतनं पुरुषं कर्मणि प्रवर्तयति। लिङादेर्व्यापारातिशयो वा चेतनस्य प्रवृत्ति-कारणं स्वीक्रियते। किंवा शब्दभेदवदर्थभेद एव विधिरभ्युपेयते। यद्यप्यत्रेयं शङ्कोदेति यत् अर्थभेदस्य विधित्वे शब्दे विधिव्यवहारः कथमिव स्यात्, दृश्यते च शब्देऽपि विधिव्यवहारः। यथा—'चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनम्' इति 'विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वात् स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः' इति च। उभयत्रापि शब्दे एव विधिशब्द-व्यवहारः दृश्यते नार्थे। चोदनेतिशब्दस्यैव क्रियायाः प्रवर्त्तकत्वं प्रतिपादितम्, तथैव एकवाक्यता च वाक्यरूपेण शब्देन वाक्यान्तरस्य शब्दस्याभिहितम्। सत्यं; परमियमा-शङ्का नैव दुष्परिहरा। विध्यर्थाभिधायके शब्देऽपि विधिशब्दव्यवहारो भवति।

मण्डनमिश्रस्य मते इष्टसाधनत्वमेव विध्यर्थः। कृतिसाध्यत्वं हि लोकादेव अवगम्यत इति न तत्र विध्यपेक्षा। यागो मत्कृतिसाध्यः, मत्कृतिसाध्यविरोधिधर्मान-धिकरणत्वात् इत्यनुमानेनैव कृतिसाध्यत्वस्य लाभात्; तथा कृतिसाध्यत्वज्ञानस्य प्रवर्त्तकत्वेऽपि 'अनन्यलभ्यो हि शब्दार्थः' इति न्यायेन प्रदर्शितरीत्या अनुमानेनैव कृतिसाध्यत्वज्ञानस्य प्रवर्त्तकत्वलाभात् न तत्र विधेः शक्तिरस्ति। स्वर्गादीनामिष्टसाधन-

त्वन्तु प्रमाणान्तरेणावगन्तुं न शक्यतेऽपि तु आम्नायवाक्यादेव तदवगम्यते इत्यनन्यलभ्यत्वात्तत्र विधेः शक्तिः स्वीक्रियते। केचित्तु 'अनन्यलभ्यो हि शब्दार्थः' इति न्यायस्य तत्रैव प्रवृत्तिर्यत्र पदान्तरलभ्योऽर्थः भवति—पदान्तरलभ्ये हि अर्थे पदस्य शक्तिः न भवति, अन्यथा कुत्रापि शक्तिर्न सिध्येत्, सर्वस्यैवार्थस्य शब्दातिरिक्तप्रमाणान्तरवेद्यत्वात्। अनन्यलभ्यन्याये प्रदर्शितरीत्या कृतिसाध्यत्वे विध्यर्थनिषेधास्वीकारेऽपि कृतिसाध्यत्वज्ञानं न प्रवर्त्तकं, कृत्यसाध्यत्वेन निश्चिते प्रवृत्तिस्तु न जायते। कृत्यसाध्ये इष्टाभावेन वृथा श्रमजनकत्वेन द्वेषादेव प्रवृत्तेरभावात्। यद्यपि प्रदर्शितरीत्या कृतिसाध्यत्वज्ञानं प्रवर्तकं न भवेत् तथापि कृतिसाध्यत्वज्ञानं विना कृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारकेच्छात्मिका या चिकीर्षा सा नैव जायेत। चिकीर्षाया अभावे च प्रवृत्तिरपि नैव स्यादिति कृतिसाध्यत्वज्ञानस्य प्रवर्तकत्वमावश्यकम्। लोकव्यवहारेण एव तस्यानुगमात् चिकीर्षोपपत्तेः चिकीर्षानुरोधेन कृतिसाध्यत्वे शक्तिकल्पनमनावश्यकम्।

अत्रेयमाशङ्का भवति—अनिष्टजनके उदासीने च कर्मणि वृथाश्रमजनकतया द्वेषादेव प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात्; तथाच इष्टसाधनत्वज्ञानस्य विध्यर्थत्वाभावेऽपि इष्टसाधने एव कर्मणि प्रवृत्तिः स्यान्नान्यत्र। इष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वाभावे इष्टजनके कर्मणि यत्र आन्तरालिकश्रमो वर्तते तत्र द्वेषाभावसत्त्वेऽपि प्रवृत्तिर्न भवतीति सकलजनसम्मतोऽयं विषयः; इदानीमिष्टसाधनत्वज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वानभ्युपगमेऽत्र प्रवृत्तिः दुर्निवारा स्यात्। इष्टसाधनत्वज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वाभ्युपगमे तु प्रदर्शित-स्थले इष्टसाधनत्वात्मकस्य प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वस्याभावादेव प्रवृत्तिर्न भवतीति सर्वं सुसमञ्जसम्। इष्टसाधनत्वज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वञ्च न मदंशरहितस्यापि तु मदिष्टसाधनमितिज्ञानस्यैव प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्, अन्यथा मदंशस्य विधिवाक्यादलाभेन मदिष्टसाधनेऽपि यागादौ प्रवृत्तेरनुदयात्।

अयमाशयः—लिङादिप्रत्ययेभ्यो प्रवर्त्तना प्रतीयते। सर्वापि चेष्टा मानसिकी भवतु कायिकी वा—प्रयत्नपूर्विकैव भवति। प्रयत्नो हि रागपूर्वक एव। विना रागं न कस्मिंश्चिदपि कार्ये प्रेक्षावतां प्रवृत्तिर्भवति। रागो हि नैव दुःखे नाप्यसुखे, अपि तु सुखानुशयी राग इति सुखे सुखसाधने वा एव रागो भवति। दुःखे द्वेषादेव तत्र रागो न, असुखदुःखात्मनि उपेक्षयाञ्च न रागः। सुखस्य चान्येच्छानधीनेच्छा-विषयत्वमिति सर्वानुभवसिद्धम्। क्रिया च दुःखात्मिका इत्यत्र नास्ति केषामपि सचेतसां विमतिः, लोकानुभवसिद्धत्वात्। क्रियायां लोकाः प्रवर्त्तन्ते इत्यवश्यमेव क्रियायां सुखसाधनत्वमवगन्तव्यम् अन्यथा सुखार्थिनस्तत्र नैव प्रवर्तेरन्। वैदिकक्रियाश्च नैव साक्षात्

सुखसाधिका इति प्रेक्षावतां वैदिकव्यापारोपरमप्रसङ्गः समापतति इति दुःखरूपास्वपि क्रियासु सुखसाधनत्वमवश्यमेवाभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। सुखसाधनतैवेच्छोपहारमुखेन सुखोपायत्वात् क्रियासु प्रवर्त्तयितुमीष्टे। यदि शब्दः सुखसाधनतां न प्रतिपादयेत् तदा न कोऽपि क्रियायां पुरुषं प्रवर्त्तयेत्। लिङा शब्देन इष्टसाधनतामात्रमभ्युपगम्यत इति कथमिवास्मात् प्रवर्त्तनायाः प्रतीतिः स्यात्, प्रवृत्तिसमर्थस्तावत्कश्चिद्भावातिशयो व्यापार एव प्रवर्त्तना।[1] एतन्मते केवलं परिस्पन्दनमेव व्यापारशब्देन नोच्यते येन परिस्पन्दनातिरिक्ते व्यापारशब्दस्य प्रयोगो न भवेत्। तस्मादिष्टसाधनत्वस्य परिस्पन्दनातिरिक्तत्वेन अप्रवर्त्तनात्मत्वं स्यात्, भावधर्म एव कश्चित्समीहितसाधनानुगुणो व्यापारपदार्थः। यथा कश्चित् ज्ञानजनने प्रवृत्तो भवति तदा भावधर्मः नैव सामान्यतः परिस्पन्दः भवति। अपि मनःसंयोग एवाऽयं भावधर्मः, तथैव स्पन्देतरः इष्टसाधनत्वाख्यः भावधर्म एव प्रवृत्तिजननेऽनुकूलतया व्यापारविशेषः प्रवर्त्तना। शब्दः तद्भावना वात्र न भवति प्रवर्त्तना। यतः न अपेक्षितोपायत्वप्रतिपादनं विना कोऽपि क्रियासु प्रवर्तते।[2] अत्रेयमाशङ्का जागर्ति यत् राज्ञः सेवकः यत्र यत्र कर्मणि प्रवर्तते तत्र सर्वत्रापेक्षितोपायत्वनिबन्धनैव प्रवृत्तिर्भवतीति वक्तुं न शक्यते, राजाज्ञया अनपेक्षितोपायेऽपि प्रेक्षावतां राजसेवकानां प्रवृत्तिर्दृश्यते इति अपेक्षितोपायतां प्रतिपद्यैव क्रियासु प्रवृत्तिरिति सैव प्रवर्त्तना इति न सार्वत्रिकम्। सत्यम्, भवति आज्ञादिभ्यः प्रवृत्तिः क्रियायां तथापि केनापि रूपेणापेक्षितोपायनिबन्धतामाश्रित्यैव सा प्रवृत्तिर्जायते। यद्यपि यत्र आज्ञादिना कस्यां-श्चित्क्रियायां प्रवृत्तिर्भवति तत्र नियोक्तुरेव अर्थकर्माणि इति नियोक्तुरेवापेक्षितोपाय-निबन्धना आज्ञादयो वर्तन्ते, तथापि नियोज्यस्य पुरुषस्य या तद्विषयसम्पादने प्रवृत्तिर्भवति सा नियोज्यापेक्षितनिबन्धनैव भवति। यतः नियोज्यः प्रेक्षावान् आज्ञाद्यनन्तरं मनसि परिकल्पयति एतत्कार्यसम्पादनान्तरं कार्यसम्पादनेन सम्यक्तोषितः ममाज्ञापयिता अभीष्टं महत् प्रयच्छति ममाहितं वा न विदध्यात् इति समीहितलाभरूपमहितविनिवृत्तिरूपं वा अपेक्षितमुपाश्रित्यैव भृत्यस्य नियोज्यस्य स्वनियोक्तुराज्ञाविषयसम्पादने प्रवृत्तिर्भवति नान्यथा। अत एव यस्य हितप्राप्तौ अहितपरिहारे वा नैव यत्नो विद्यते तस्य आज्ञामपि नैवासौ नियोज्यः अनुरुणद्धि इति आकामेनापि एतत्स्वीकर्तव्यं यत्

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१. प्रवृत्तिहेतुं धर्मं च प्रवदन्ति प्रवर्त्तनाम्॥

विधिविवेक पृ० २४३।

२. सा च क्रियाणामपेक्षितोपायतैव—न्यायकणिका–२४३।

नियोज्यार्थसमुद्देशेन नियोज्यस्य प्रवृत्तिरानुषङ्गिकी आज्ञाविषयस्य स्वापेक्षितत्वादेव प्रवृत्तिरिति लिङादिभ्यः प्रवर्त्तनावगतिर्नानुपपन्ना।

केचन वेदं प्रति अतिशयश्रद्धावन्तः इदं मम कर्तव्यमिति ज्ञानानन्तरमेव प्रवृत्तिरित्यवोचन्। कस्यचित्कर्मणः दर्शनोत्तरं कर्तव्यतामेव प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वेनावगच्छन्ति। स्तनन्धयस्य बालस्य या तावदादौ प्रवृत्तिर्भवति सापि न समीहितोपाय इत्येतावतैवापि तु कर्तव्यमेतदिति। तस्मात् कर्तव्यतैव प्रवृत्तिहेतुरिति लिङादिश्रवणानन्तरं प्रवृत्तिः कर्तव्यताभिधानमेव लिङादीनां संसाधयति। लौकिकवचनं हि न निरपेक्षं प्रवृत्तिजनकं भवत्यपि तु प्रामाणान्तरापेक्षम् अपेक्षितोपायप्रतीतिपुरस्सरमेव। क्रिया हि दुःखरूपा। तथा च दुःखरूपायां क्रियायां प्रवृत्तिर्न स्वाभाविकी नापि केवलं कर्तव्यत्वज्ञानसापेक्षा, परम् इयं हि प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षैव प्रवृत्तिरिति दुःखरूपक्रियाकर्तव्यतावगतेरपेक्षितोपायतां तत्प्रमाणभूतामन्तर्भाव्य कर्तव्यतावगतिः। वेदो हि अपौरुषेय इति निरपेक्षत्वात् न स्वार्थं प्रमाणान्तरमपेक्षेत इति अपेक्षितोपायावगतेरपेक्षा तत्र न जायते। तथाच अपेक्षितोपायतावगमनिरपेक्ष एव कर्तव्यतावगमहेतुः। कर्तव्यता हि वेदे लिङादि-प्रयोगेनाभिधीयते। यथा लोके लिङादिश्रवणानन्तरं प्रवृत्तिः कर्तव्यताभिधानमेव लिङादीनामापादयति। अवगतसङ्गतितया लिङादयो वेदेऽपि कर्तव्यतामेवाभिदधते। वेदे लिङादिनावगम्यमाना कर्तव्यता अनुष्ठानकर्तारमधिकारिणं नियोज्यं पुरुषमपेक्षते। तत्र तत्र कश्चिद्विधिः साध्यः यथा—स्वर्गकामो यजेत। अत्र यदा नियोज्यः साध्यविशिष्टस्तदा साध्यविवृद्धिर्भवति। यत्र तु नियोज्यः निमित्तवान् यथा "यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्" तत्र भावविषयं कार्यं हितसाधनतावगमनिरपेक्षोऽपि अवगमयन्प्रवृत्तिं जनयति। यत्र वा "न कलञ्जं भक्षयेदिति" तत्र भगवानाम्नाय एव निरस्ताखिलदोषाशङ्को हितसाधनतावगमनिरपेक्ष एव नञर्थविषयं कार्यमवगमयन् निवृत्तिं विधत्ते इति अपेक्षितोपायतायाः प्रवृत्तिं प्रति साधनत्वस्वीकारे न किमपि फलम्।

एतस्य पूर्वप्रदर्शितस्य शङ्काग्रन्थस्य समाधाने न्यायकणिकायामेतदभिहितं यत् अपेक्षितोपायताम-(इष्टसाधनत्वम-) न्तरेण कर्तव्यमिति शतशोऽभिधीयमानमपि न कार्यप्रवृत्तये समर्थो भवति। शब्दो हि कर्तव्यतायां विदितसंगतिरवश्यमेवापेक्षितोपायतामव-गमयति, अपेक्षितोपायतावशादेवानुष्ठाने प्रवृत्तिर्भवति; अर्थात् इष्टसाधनत्वादेव प्रमाणान्त-रानपेक्षादाम्नायादवगता कर्तव्यता अनुष्ठानमाक्षिपति। एवमेव नैमित्तिकविधौ निषेधविधौ च प्रतीयमाना अपेक्षितोपायसाधनता न शक्या नेति वक्तुम्। कर्तव्यताज्ञानस्य हि

अपेक्षितोपायतानान्तरीयकत्वात्, कर्तव्यताज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वेऽपेक्षितोपायत्वज्ञानस्यैव प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वं सेत्स्यति। अन्यथा कर्तव्यमिति प्रतिपद्यमानोऽपि कथं न तत्र प्रवर्त्तते।[1] तस्मादीप्सितस्योपायतैव कर्तृप्रवृत्तिहेतुः।

अत्र पूर्वपक्षिणा एतदुच्यते यत् कर्तव्यतावगमादेव कर्त्ता कर्मणि प्रवर्त्तते इति कर्तव्यतैव प्रवृत्तिहेतुरिति। इयं कर्तव्या का? न निरालम्बनं ज्ञानं भवति। कमपि विषयमवलम्ब्यैव ज्ञानं भवति, निरालम्बनं ज्ञानं च न भवति इति कर्तुरीप्सितोपायतैव प्रवृत्तिहेतुः कर्तव्यताज्ञानस्यालम्बनम्। कृतिव्याप्यतागोचरं कर्तव्यत्वज्ञानन्तद्विपरीतगोचरं हि अकर्तव्यत्वज्ञानमिति, तत्कथं समीहितसाधनत्वमेवं तद्विपरीतसाधनत्वं गोचरयितुमर्हतः? कर्तव्यत्वसमीहितसाधनत्वयोस्तादात्म्यं नास्ति। यतः एकस्य सिद्धत्वादपरस्य च साध्यत्वात् दहनतुहिनवदुभयोः स्वभावविरुद्धत्वात्। यथा शुक्लः प्रत्यय इत्यत्र शुक्ल एवार्थः प्रत्ययेऽन्वेति इति शुक्ल एव शुक्लप्रत्ययस्य विषयो भवति समीहितोपायतां तद्विपरीतां चानुयातौ कर्तव्यमकर्तव्यमिति-प्रत्ययौ प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिहेतू लौकिकानाम्। तथाच अपेक्षितोपायतासत्त्वे कर्तव्यत्वप्रत्ययः, अपेक्षितोपायताभावे चाकर्तव्यत्वप्रत्ययः। कृतिसाध्यतामात्रं कर्तव्यतापरं कृतिसाध्यतामात्रं नैव प्रवृत्तिहेतुः समीहितस्यापि कर्तव्यतया समीहितस्यापि प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वप्रसङ्गात्। फलं हि कर्तव्यस्य कृतिसाध्यस्य सुखं; सुखसाधनं प्रवृत्तिगोचरः स्यादेवेति कर्तव्यतायाः प्रवृत्तिगोचरत्वं स्यादेव। सत्यम्, इष्टसाधनत्वं प्रवृत्तिहेतुः न तु कर्तव्यतामात्रमपि तु कर्तुरिष्टसाधनं प्रवृत्तिहेतुः। तथाच कर्तव्यतैकार्थसमवायिनी समीहितसाधनता प्रवृत्तिहेतुः सैव च कर्तव्यताज्ञानस्यालम्बनमभिमता। अत्रोच्यते—कर्तव्यतामात्रोपयोगिनी या समीहितसाधनता वर्तते सा नैव प्रवृत्तिहेतुः स्वीक्रियतेऽपि तु कर्तव्यतैव प्रवृत्तिहेतुर्भवति; सा च कर्तव्यता क्वचित्साधनतयाऽवगम्यते क्वचिच्च सा कर्तव्यता शब्दतः कृतिसाध्यत्वेन रूपेण प्रवृत्तिहेतुर्भवति। तथाचासत्यामपि समीहितसाधनतायां कृतिसाध्यत्वरूपा कर्तव्यतैव प्रवृत्तिहेतुरिति इति कर्तव्यतामात्रमेव प्रवृत्तिहेतुरिति। समीहितोपायता हि कृतेर्योनिः। अयमाशयः—समीहितोपायता हि प्रमाणान्तःपातिनी इत्यत्र नास्ति ममापि विमतिः; परं एतादृशमप्यस्ति किञ्चित्प्रमाणं यस्य प्रमाणस्य अभावात् प्रमेयं निवर्त्तते। यदि कोऽपि भावः पदार्थः अनित्यो भवति तदाऽवश्यमेवासौ कृतकोऽपि भवति। तथाच कृतकत्वन्तत्र भावानामनित्यत्वे प्रमाणम्। कृतकत्वाभावादनित्यत्वं निवर्त्तते। कदाचिदपि कस्मिंश्चिद्भावे

१. ननु कर्तव्यमिति प्रतिपत्तेः प्रवृत्तिः। कथं हि तथा प्रतिपद्यमानो न प्रवर्त्तते। विधिविवेक, पृ० २४५, २४६।

एतन्नैव भवितुमर्हति यदसौ भावोऽकृतकः सन्नपि अनित्यो भवेत्। एवमेवात्रापि कार्यत्वं नाम कृतिव्याप्यत्वं; तथाच सति कार्यत्वे कृतिरवश्यमेव स्यात्; कृतिः चेतनप्रयत्नः पुरुषप्रयत्नो वेति। सा च कृतिः इच्छाजन्या अर्थात् इच्छाद्वेषजीवनयोनिस्तथा च इच्छाद्वेषात्मकयोः कृतियोनिभूतयोः निवृत्तौ कृतिरपि नैव भवति। ज्ञानजन्या भवेदिच्छा इच्छाजन्या कृतिर्भवेदित्यंशे न कस्यापि विमतिः। तस्मात्समीहितसाधनतायाः निवृत्तौ प्रवृत्तिर्नैव भवितुमर्हति, समीहितसाधनत्वस्यस्य कृतियोनित्वात्। तस्मात्कर्तुः समीहितसाधनतैव कर्त्तव्यता कर्त्तुरपेक्षितोपायताविपरीता ह्यकर्तव्यता।[1] यः पुरुषः यदिच्छति तदेवासौ करोति नान्यत् इति भावनायाः प्रारम्भः इच्छैव भवति। प्रारब्धया इच्छया च भावनाप्रयत्नः जायते, इच्छापूर्वकत्वात्प्रयत्नस्येति पूर्वमेव प्रतिपादनात्। इच्छापूर्वकत्वात् प्रयत्नस्य इच्छाकर्म एव भावनासाध्यमिति सिद्धोऽपि स्वर्गः इच्छाकर्मतया साध्यात्मनैव भावनायामन्वेति समीहितसाधनतैवैतन्मते लिङर्थः इति संक्षेपः।

नव्यमते विधिविवेकः

वेदो हि आचारमूलम्, आचारश्च प्रवृत्तिः; तथाच जनकतासम्बन्धेन प्रवर्तकज्ञानवत्त्वं वेदस्य, प्रवृत्तिप्रयोजकत्वादेव प्रवर्तकज्ञानं नितान्तमपेक्षितं भवति।

भाट्टमते हि लिङादीनामर्थः अभिधा। विधेः व्यापारीभूतः विधिसमवेतः भावनाख्यः अतिरिक्तपदार्थविशेषः अभिधा। अस्याश्चाभिधायाः ज्ञानं प्रवर्त्तकम्। भावनायाञ्च भावनात्वरूपेण विधिशक्तिः। प्रयोजनज्ञानं प्रवृत्तिज्ञानं भवितुमर्हति। एवमेव प्रयोजनज्ञानस्याहेतुत्वे विश्वजिद्यागादौ फलकल्पनमनुपपन्नं स्यात्। यागविषयकभावनाजन्यो भवति पुरुषव्यापारः। तत्र यागविषयकव्यापारेऽभिधाजन्यत्वस्य अन्वये व्यापारनिष्ठं यदिष्टसाधनत्वन्तद्धि अन्वयप्रयोजकं जायत इति योग्यताबलादेवात्र लिङर्थे इष्टसाधनत्वज्ञानस्य भानं भवति इति अन्यथालभ्ये इष्टसाधनत्वे लिङादीनां न शक्तिग्रहो भवति। यागविषयकभावनाजन्यः पुरुषव्यापारः; आख्यातसामान्यशक्तिबललभ्ये कृतिरूपव्यापारे जन्यत्वसम्बन्धेन भावनायाः अन्वयसिद्ध्यर्थं व्यापारनिष्ठेष्टसाधनत्वस्यान्वयप्रयोजकत्वम् इति योग्यतयैव तदिष्टसाधनत्वस्य भानं भवति। अथ वा विधिबलादेव स्वर्गादिसाधनत्वस्य बोधो जायते इष्टसाधनत्वञ्च प्रवृत्तिरूपव्यापारे आख्यातार्थेऽन्वेति, प्रवृत्तौ च इष्टसाधनताज्ञानमेव हेतुः। नचात्रेदं चिन्तनीयं यत्-

१. तस्मात्कर्तव्यतापि नान्या कर्तुः समीहितोपायतायाः।

विधिविवेक, पृ० ३०४।

न्यायमतेऽपि इष्टसाधनत्वमेव विध्यर्थं इति कोऽनयोर्विशेषः। न्यायमते क्रियागतेष्टसाधनत्वं विध्यर्थः, भाट्टमते तु प्रवृत्तिगतमेव तदिष्टसाधनत्वमिति विशेषः। भाट्टमते चाभिधाया अभ्युपगमः, न्यायमते अभिधाया अनभ्युपगमश्चेति वर्तते विशेषः। अत्रेयमाशङ्का जागर्ति यत् अभिधानामकस्य व्यापारस्याभ्युपगमः किमिति क्रियते ? व्यापारभिन्नस्य इतरनिष्ठव्यापारजनकत्वं स्वनिष्ठव्यापारद्वारा भवति। यथा दण्डः चक्रनिष्ठस्पन्दनाख्यव्यापारजनकः, दण्डश्च स्वनिष्ठस्पन्दनाख्यव्यापारार्जनं विना न भवति चक्रनिष्ठस्पन्दनजनकोऽपि तु दण्डस्य स्वनिष्ठस्पन्दार्जनद्वारा चक्रनिष्ठस्पन्दजनकत्वम्। व्यापारो हि परनिष्ठव्यापारजनको भवतीति। तत्रापि स्वनिष्ठः कश्चिद्व्यापारोऽवश्यमेवाभ्युपगन्तव्य इति व्यापारभिन्नस्येत्युक्तम्। व्यापारिणः स्वनिष्ठव्यापारजनने व्यापारपेक्षायान्तु तस्यापि स्वनिष्ठव्यापारजनने व्यापारापेक्षेति तस्य तस्येति क्रमेण अनवस्थापत्तेर्दुर्वारत्वादिति परनिष्ठेत्युक्तम्। तावतापि ज्ञानद्वारैव लिङादीनां प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वमिति शब्दाश्रिता सा अभिधा न सेत्स्यति इत्यत उक्तं स्वनिष्ठव्यापारद्वारेति। सा च अभिधाख्या भावना यदा शब्दाश्रिता तदा शब्दाश्रितत्वादियं भावना शाब्दी भावनेत्युच्यते। अयमाशयः :— भाट्टमते लिङ्-लोट्-तव्यादियुक्तवाक्ये द्विविधभावना प्रतीयते...एका शब्दभावना अपरा च अर्थभावना। आख्यातमात्रमर्थभावनामवगमयति लिङ्लोडादयश्च शब्दभावनां प्रत्याययति। अयमेवाभिधाभावनामाहुः इत्यादिवार्त्तिकानुसारिसुचरितमिश्रमतम्।

मण्डनमिश्रादीनां मते तु 'श्रेयःसाधनता ह्येषां नित्यं वेदात्प्रतीयते' इति वार्त्तिकानुरोधेन इष्टसाधनत्वमेव विध्यर्थः।

लोके लिङादीनामाप्तेच्छायां शक्तिग्रहो वर्तत इति वेदेऽपि नियोगः प्रवर्त्तनीयत्वेन इच्छा तादृशार्थवाचकोऽत्र लिङादिर्भवति। नियोगः[1] प्रवर्त्तनम् प्रयोजनं वा। अत्रैव लिङादीनां शक्तिग्रहः। वेदे चास्मदादीनामिच्छा न सम्भवतीति इच्छाश्रयत्वेनात्र ईश्वरस्य सिद्धिर्जायते। इच्छा हि आत्मविशेषगुणः। स च समवाय-सम्बन्धेनात्मनि वर्तते। यदाश्रिता च वेदार्थे इच्छा स एव ईश्वरः। नियोगो हि आचार्यमते आप्ताभिप्राय एव।

विधिवादे इच्छा यदि प्रवृत्तिशब्दस्यार्थः स्यात्तदा 'स्वर्गकामोऽश्वमेधेन यजेत' इत्यादिविधिवाक्यश्रवणानन्तरमश्वमेधयज्ञादौ इच्छा स्यात्, इच्छामात्रेणैव पुरुषः चरितार्थः भवेत्। यतः इच्छैव विध्यर्थः स्वीक्रियते। अयमभिप्रायः —कस्यापि शब्दस्य शक्तिग्रहे प्रदर्शितेषु बहुविधेषु कारणेषु व्यवहारस्यैव प्राधान्यं वरीवर्ति।

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१. नियोगः प्रवर्तनम् प्रयोजनमर्थो येषां ते। आमोद पृ० ३१०।

अयमाशयः—व्यवहारो हि शब्दप्रयोगात्मकस्तेनापि घटादिपदानामर्थमजानानस्य जिज्ञासोर्बालस्य शक्तिग्रहो भवति। यथा ज्येष्ठवृद्धेन घटमानय इति शिष्याय उक्तं ज्येष्ठप्रयोजकवृद्धवाक्यं श्रुत्वा प्रयोज्यशिष्यादिना घटः आनीतः। तत्र समीपस्थः व्युत्पित्सुर्बालः घटाद्यर्थेऽगृहीतशक्तिकोऽपि प्रयोजकवृद्धोच्चारितवाक्यं श्रुत्वा प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्य गमनं दृष्ट्वा घटानयनं च दृष्ट्वा प्रयोज्यवृद्धसमवेतप्रयत्नसाध्यघटानयनक्रिया, प्रयोजकवृद्धोच्चरितघटमानयेति-पदज्ञानजन्यशाब्दबोधजन्येति अनुमिनोति। घटानयनक्रियया प्रवृत्त्यनुमानञ्चेत्थम्भवति—घटानयनक्रिया प्रयत्नपूर्विका, विलक्षणक्रियात्वात् स्वीयक्रियावत्। प्रवृत्त्या च शब्दबोधानुमानं जायते—घटानयनविषयकप्रवृत्तिः, घटानयनविषयकज्ञानजन्या, तद्गोचरप्रवृत्तित्वात् या यद्गोचरा प्रवृत्तिः सा तद्गोचरज्ञान—जन्या, स्वीयस्तन्यपान-प्रवृत्तिवदित्यनुमानेन घटानयनविषयक-शाब्दबोधमनुमायानन्तरं घटानयनगोचरज्ञानम्, घटमानयेतिवाक्यजन्यम्, तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वात्। यद् यदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायि तत् तज्जन्यं, यथा तन्त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायी पटः इत्येवमानयनक्रियान्विते घटपदार्थे शक्तिं विनिश्चिनोति। इत्येवं क्रियान्वितघटादौ शक्तिग्रहानन्तरं घटं नय गां बधान, गां विसृजेत्यादि-प्रयोजकवृद्धवाक्यात् कस्यचित्पदस्य संग्रहेण, कस्यचित्पदस्य त्यागेन क्रियान्वितगवाद्यर्थे शक्तिमनुमिनोति।······घटानयनकार्यम् घटमानयेति-शब्दप्रयोज्यम् तादृशशब्दश्रवणशून्यकालीनप्रवृत्त्यविषयत्वे सति प्रवृत्तिविषयत्वात्। एवं क्रमेण क्रियान्वितघटादौ शक्त्यवधारणानन्तरं क्रियान्वितघटत्वाद्यपेक्षया घटत्वादेरेव शक्यतावगच्छेदकत्वे लाघवेन अनन्यलभ्यतयैव शब्दार्थतया अन्वयस्य संसर्गमर्यादया भानेन च क्रियान्वितघटत्वे घटादिपदशक्यतावच्छेदकत्वस्य परित्यागौचित्यात् लाघवज्ञानादिसहकृतमनसा घटादिपदं क्रियान्वितघटादिशक्तमिति न कार्यान्वितघटत्वं शक्यतावच्छेदकम्।

लिङः शक्तिविचारेऽपि व्युत्पित्सुर्बालः यद्धि स्वप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वेनावधारयति तत्रैव तस्य शक्तिरिति निश्चिनोति। विना इच्छां न कस्मिन्नपि कर्मणि कोऽपि प्रयतत इति इच्छामेव लिङर्थमवधारयति। तथाच इच्छैव लिङर्थ इति केषाञ्चिन्मतम्[1]।

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१. अन्ये तु व्यवहारेण व्युत्पित्सुर्बालः स्वप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वेनावधारिते शक्तिं कल्पयति, तादृशीच्छैवेति सैव लिङर्थ इत्याहुः। तत्त्वचिन्तामणि टीका पृ० ७।
आद्या प्रवृत्तिरिच्छैव इति प्रयोगाद् यद्यपीच्छा अन्यत्र प्रवृत्तिशब्दार्थः।
कुसुमा० विवृति पृ० १२०।

पूर्वोक्तेन प्रसङ्गेन एतत्प्रतिपादितं यत् प्रवृत्तिशब्दस्यार्थः प्राथमिकेच्छा प्रयत्नो वेति। किन्तु इच्छा यदि प्रवृत्तिशब्दस्यार्थो भवेत्तदा "स्वर्गकामोऽश्वमेधेन यजेत" इति वैदिकविधिवाक्यश्रवणानन्तरमश्वमेधयज्ञादौ इच्छामात्रेनैव पुरुषः चरितार्थः स्यात् इच्छामात्रेणैव विध्यर्थस्य निर्वाहेण इच्छामात्रादेव फलस्य स्वर्गादेरुत्पत्तौ कर्मणो यागादेरननुष्ठानप्रसङ्ग एव भवेत्। बहुवित्तव्ययायाससाध्ये यागादिकर्मणि न कोऽपि कृतिं कुर्यात् यागादीनामकरणेऽपि विध्यर्थस्य निर्वाहेण पुरुषस्य कृतकृत्यताप्रसङ्गात्, तथाच यागाद्यकरणप्रसङ्गः समापतति।[1] क्रियमाणयागस्य न कोऽप्युपयोगः स्यात्केवलं जलताड़नादिवद् वृथायासः एतस्मिन् संभवति। दृश्यते च लोके "स्वर्गकामोऽश्वमेधेन यजेत" एतद्वाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं पुरुषः यज्ञादौ प्रवृत्तः सन् यत्नवान् वा भवति। तस्मात् कृतिर्यत्नो वा विध्यर्थः न तु इच्छामात्रम्। कृतिर्हि फलपर्यवसाना भवति। तथाच फलपर्यवसानायाः कृतेर्विधिकार्यतया क्रियमाणस्य यागस्य उपयोगः सम्भवत्येव। विधिवादे हि न कायपरिस्पन्दमात्रं कृतिर्यथान्यत्र चेतनपुरुषस्पन्दस्य व्यापारस्य कृति-शब्दवाच्यत्वेन व्यवहारो भवति। प्रवृत्तिः हि विधिज्ञानकार्या। तथाच कृतेः विध्यर्थत्वे मोक्षकामस्य पुरुषस्य कृते ज्ञानविधौ[2] भूतेषु दयाविधाने च चेष्टारूपायाः कृतेः शरीरपरिस्पन्दस्याभावेऽपि विधेः दर्शनान्न कृतिः विध्यर्थः। आत्मज्ञानं हि न स्पन्दाद्यधीनं यतः ज्ञानस्य आत्ममनःसंयोगजन्यत्वात् न स्पन्दाद्यपेक्षा तत्र वर्तते। कर्तृधर्मस्य स्पन्दस्य ज्ञानमेतादृशविधिस्थले न भवति। तथाच स्पन्दनं चेष्टा वा न विध्यर्थः।

भवतु नाम। स्पन्दाख्यायाः कृतेरात्मज्ञानादौ अभावात् विधित्वासम्भवेऽपि प्रयत्नः विध्यर्थः कस्मान्न भवति? श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनादिकं हि प्रयत्नसाध्यमेव भवति भूतदयादीनामपि प्रयत्नविषयत्वमस्त्येव। उच्यते—एतावता प्रयत्नो नैव विध्यर्थः। यत्नो यदि विध्यर्थः स्यात्तदा वैधकर्मणि अप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्ग एव स्यादिति संक्षेपः।

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१. इच्छामात्रेण विध्यर्थनिर्वाहे बहुवित्तव्ययायाससाध्ये यागाद्यकरणप्रसङ्गात्।
न्या० कु० प्रका० पृ० ५२५।

२. आत्मा वाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यश्चेत्यत्र आत्मानं विजानीयात्।

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS OF INDIAN SYSTEMS

ARUNA HALDAR

Introduction

Philosophy is a formidable weapon for turning society. India remained peacefully absorbed in herself through ages, under the protection of the great Himalayas and the nurture of the bountiful Indo-Gangetic plains. This easy life to some extent accounts for non-materialistic and over-spiritualistic nature of her philosophy. Further, India assimilated her conquerors, the Austric and the Dravadians for instance, who had invaded India for her wealth. The Aryan culture accepted also the materials of the conquered peoples.

The Hindu culture thus became composite in nature. In later days, royal patronage was enlisted both by the Hindus and the Buddhas for about 1,000 years (C. 300 B.C. to C. 700). So, conflict continued between the two within the framework of Indian culture. Buddhist philosophy was eventually banished from India, the land of its origin, and Hinduism thrived enriched by materials from Buddhism. The later phase of Buddhism is marked by compromise with Hinduism through the Tantras to which the two subscribed. Jainism always remained friendly to Hinduism by adopting most of the norms from the latter and avoiding direct conflict with it.

The single exception is the philosophy of Cārvāka. We do not unfortunately have much materials for studying it. Some of the modern scholars (e. g., Professor D.P. Chatterji, the author of the *Lokāyata*) press Cārvāka materialism into service for social anthropology. The *Cārvāka-ṣaṣṭhi*, a basic text, appears to point out that materialistic ideas and attitudes came from a people who never accepted the well-known traditions and dogmas of the Vedic or Hindu philosophy even in ancient time. A kind of healthy materialism or realism might have influenced even Buddha to develop his positivistic philosophy on rational and humanistic basis. Judged dialectically, the Cārvākas provided the antithesis to Vedic Idealism and Hindu otherworldliness. Although spiritualistic ideas always got the upper hand, Indian philosophy in the main continued to be a tentative synthesis of theistic Hinduism and atheistic thought. Idealistic philosophy was there tinctured with materialistic view of human existence.

Common Characters and Inter-Relation :

Indian philosophy presents the picture of continuous attempt at synthesis in face of diversity in life and society. Each system of Indian philosophy, Vaidika and A-vaidika (with the exception of the Cārvākas) starts with a common problem: the beginning and end of life and proposes an answer of its own. Thus the Sāṁkhya takes Prakṛti the primary staff, and liberation for a *soul* or Puruṣa his absolute withdrawal from this world show. For Buddhism, the origin of the universe is caused by the spontaneous integration and disintegration of the elementary materials or the atomic properties, and Nirvāṇa or the cessation of this existence is achieved by the voluntary effort of the Pudgala or the individual. This suggests that Indian systems are directed to a practical end irrespective of their affiliation, theistic or atheistic.

Indian systems are *Darśanas*. Philosophy in India is not merely intellectual exercise. Intellectual inquiry must lead to clear comprehension of the problems of life, followed by deep psycho-physical effort with a view to realising the ultimate goal of life. Even the Cārvākas hold that philosophy has practical meaning. They only tackle the problems of life from realistic point of view—plain living and high thinking in happy unison.

All the systems of Indian philosophy, including the Cārvākas, admit of pain and seek to get rid of it. They of course vary from one another in point of the methods to be adopted for this purpose. Iśvara Kṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* starts with these lines : "The enquiry starts as the individual is stricken with three kinds of suffering—*ādhyātmika* (bodily and mental sufferings of the individual) *ādhibhautika* (natural impersonal sufferings) and *ādhidaivika* (sufferings caused by super normal agents like gods or ghosts).

Ādhyātmika sufferings mean sufferings caused to a person, bodily and mentally. *Ādhibhautika* sufferings are those caused by the material or the physical world outside. *Ādhidaivika* sufferings are caused by supernatural elements, the non-physical and non-personal agents. In other systems also the *Tri-tāpa* or 'three kinds of suffering' are mentioned. The Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems are allied. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems hold that *sukha* (pleasure) and *duḥkha* (pain) are not intrinsic to the soul. Suffering cannot in any way affect the permanent

continuity of the soul. The individual can get rid of suffering by removing ignorance (*mithyā-jñāna*) about the nature of the soul. Śaṁkara Vedānta emphasises Supreme Reality as *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*; and sufferings are held to be illusory.

Of the non-Vedika and the atheistic systems, the Buddhists posit suffering as a '*positive fact of life*, invariably associated with *bhava* or becoming. Life process is a phenomenan, impure and full of suffering (*kleśa-sāsrava*), which multiplies in vicious circle. Old life gives place to new but suffering continues unabated. Suffering ends when *nirvāṇa* or cessation of existence (*bhava-viccheda*) is achieved. The Buddhist analysis of suffering is as follows :

1. *Duḥkha* : (suffering) which is like a *roga* or illness.
2. *Duḥkha-samudaya* : (constituent causes of suffering) or *Nidāna* which means diagnosis.
3. *Duḥkha-nirodha* (noncausing or stopping suffering) which means *ārogya* or cure.
4. *Duḥkha-nirodha-mārga* : (the way by which the stopping of suffering is achieved) or *bheṣaja* or medicine which is to be administered.

These four are the 'fourfold Noble Truth' of Buddhism or *catvāri Ārya-satyāni*. The four constitute in a nutshell the philosophy of Buddhism : the world, the cause of the world and the origin and annihilation of the individual's suffering. Any fact in order to occur must have a cause ; for, we all know "ex nihilo nihil fit" or "nothing is uncaused". The fact of suffering and the cause of suffering are recognised in the first and the second noble truths. It is possible to remove the effect. This is the third truth or *Duḥkha-nirodha*. Just as the effect is produced by a cause, so the removal of the effect also is due to a cause. The fourth noble truth takes cognizance of this by conceiving suffering as a disease. So, suffering is the *roga* or disease. It should have *nidāna* or diagnosis then. One attains *ārogya* or cure by proper *bheṣaja* or remedy.

The view that Indian philosophy is pessimistic does not stand to reason. Sāṁkhya and Buddhist philosophies, for example, point out that suffering is not the finality. Suffering is the starting point but the goal is the end of suffering. Suffering is a fact of human life and

has to be faced squarely. Indian philosophy strikes the note of optimism as it holds that every body is able to make his life better, free from sorrow. Man is the architect of his salvation.

Thus Indian systems, except that of the Cārvāka, are one on the doctrine of the Grand Moral Law known as Karma-vāda. The Karma-vāda may be understood in three different aspects :

A. the metaphysical aspect;

B. the ethical aspect;

and C. the theological and personal aspect.

A. In the metaphysical aspect, the doctrine of Karman stands for the principle of justice. The idea may be traced to Vedic times. In the Vedas it has been mentioned as *ṛta* or truth as opposed to *anṛta* or untruth. *Ṛta* was also understood as the perfect value-sense, the highest insight into the way or Law achieved by individuals. In the days of the Upaniṣads, the sense of *ṛta* was modified to mean *niḥśreyasa* or the Principle beyond good and evil. As a typical value-sense, this Principle is absolute, eternal and noumenal. At a still later period, we meet with *adṛṣṭa* or 'the unseen power' used by the Nyāya; *apūrva* or an 'unprecedented phenomenon' used by the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā; Māyā or 'the magical illussory power' used in the cosmic sense by the Vedānta; and Prakṛti or the 'primordial non-conscious Nature' used by the Sāṁkhya school. In the Mahābhārata and the Gītā, this power has been actually given a metaphysical colouring in face of the battle of Kurukṣetra. Kṛṣṇa's advice to Arjuna reveals this side in the Śrīmad-bhāgavad-Gītā : Every being is moved by the wheel of Illusion and cannot escape its grip. So, Karman is an inevitable force. Accumulated from life to life it follows the individual.

B. Karman is the ethical law as well.

The duties and activities of the Cāturvarṇya (four castes) and Caturāśrama (four stages of life) have been repeatedly mentioned in Vedic literature. These activities are again of three different kinds, viz., *sañcita karman* or accumulating activities, *prārabdha karman* or activities already bearing fruit and *kriyamāna karman* or activities being performed of the huge stock of action accumulated in previous births. Some action bears fruit at the time of death and that determines

the next birth. Actions performed in that birth add to the stock. So life continues from birth to birth.

The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā posits of three kinds of activity. These are : *nitya-karman*, *naimittika-karman* and *kāmya-karman*. *Nitya-karman* means everyday duties to be done. If not done such duties would lead to evil. As for example, the prescribed duties in the Vedas are to be done regularly and without fail. *Naimittika-karman* is the activity done on an occasion e.g., performance of putreṣṭi on the birth of a son. The third is *kāmya-karman* or the voluntary activities. They may be controlled, modified and willfully done. *Kāmya-karman* or voluntary actions are the real actions which might shape one's destiny if done with purpose and guidance.

The doctrine of Karman is no doubt ethical, but is rather crude. The theory rests on the "Tooth for Tooth or Eye for Eye" or "As you sow, so you reap" principle. It appears that the theory stresses the rigidity of the law of Karman rather than the freedom of action.

C. The third aspect of the doctrine of Karman is psychological. It consists of *daiva* or fate and *puruṣakāra* or individual effort. In its *daiva* aspect, Karma-vāda rests on God. It invests God with the power of veto on one's existence. God is supposed to be the *kartā* (agent), *bhoktā* (enjoyer) and *karma-phala-dātā* (giver of one's own dues in terms of merit and demerit of one's actions). The doctrine exalts Divine mercy. For, God can do anything, He may relax the plan for Himself and others at His will. A similar idea is found in the philosophy of Martineau.

In the aspect of Puruṣakāra, Karma-vāda asserts that the individual is the maker of his own fate. What a man does determines his future. Individual freedom is subject to this determinism. For, except that of the Cārvāka, determinism is sometimes taken to mean '*Daivāyattam kule janma madāyattam tu pauruṣam*', i. e., my birth is dependent on fate but my achievement depends on my efforts. The Cārvākas, however do not believe in any accumulation of activities bearing upon past, present and future lives.

The doctrine of Karman is hinged upon the concept of a permanent soul so that karman may have some locus operandi. Indian philosophy, the Vedic and non-Vedic, proceeds on the basis of this principle. The Bauddhas, however, denied permanance of soul. Nevertheless, they

believed in the Karma-vāda which accounts for the merit and demerit in spiritual life. Karma-vāda as blind determinism seems to damage the foundation of the theory of individual freedom without which the moral life of the individual would become pointless and empty.

All the systems of Indian philosophy have a moral approach towards the universe. So the world is taken as a stage planned for the purgation of the individual. The show acts like cathersis and helps to bring out the moral nature of the individual. And the individual is to realise it as a show and not a reality. Such knowledge helps to take a detached view of life and the world. The relation between the individual and the world thus becomes a cultivated attitude of non-involvement rather than willing participation.

Such an attitude, however, tends to develop a sense of a partition between reality and its correct interpretation. There is the danger of falling into abstraction and inactivity if one attaches too much importance to this kind of explanation. Sometimes God is introduced into this plan and makes the position more vulnerable to reason and healthy world-view. The alleged passivity of Indian people is sometimes traced to this kind of philosophy and world-outlook.

The systems of Indian philosophy recognise ignorance as the initial evil which causes all suffering and hold that this ignorance has got to be eradicated. Every system elaborately discusses the problem of ignorance. In the words of Socrates "knowledge is virtue" and "ignorance is vice". Indian philosophy recognises the superiority of abstract knowledge. The Upaniṣad declares *jñānāt paratarań nahi* (there is nothing more than and beyond knowledge). Śaṁkara affirms : *Kurute Gaṅgāsāgara-gamanam vrataparipālanam athavā dānam. Jñāna-vihīne sarvam anarthaṁ muktir na bhavati janmaśatena..* (If one performs austerities, charity and goes to pilgrimage in different places, and if one does all these without knowledge or insight, one never is liberated).

Ātmānaṁ viddhi. Realisation of knowledge remains the goal for every Indian system. The search for truth begins with the realisation of limitation of 'not-knowing', Nescience or *ajñāna*. The individual acknowledges his limitation and approaches a Guide to help him to the right path. Hard struggle tears the veil of ignorance first partially and then completely.

The Sāṁkhya system recognises ignorance as *avivēka* or non-discrimination between reality and unreality—confusion between the Puruṣa (Consciousness) and Prakṛti (Matter). The Vēdānta takes ignorance as Māyā (Illusion) at the cosmic level and as Avidyā (wrong knowledge) at the individual level. The Nyāya system calls ignorance *mithyā-jñāna* or wrong knowledge. The Bauddhas take it solely responsible for every '*kleśa*' or suffering. Ignorance, according to them, is *moha* (bewilderment) or *dṛṣṭi* (wrong attitude), *kuprajñā* (wrong comprehension), *anuśaya* (impurities of mind). All the systems agree that ignorance creates troubles and one must finish it up.

Presumption of ignorance goads man to action. It further suggests that ignorance is not his destiny. It also puts premium on reason and enlightenment. To know himself (*Ātmānaṁ viddhi*) leads to man's metaphysical goal—removal of ignorance.

Every Indian system prescribes a course of practice or *sādhanā*. Indian philosophy rolls epistemology, metaphysics and ethics into one practicable whole. Philosophy is only an exercise, in case intellect is without bearing on life. Even Cārvāka materialism condemns uncritical faith. Nyāya philosophy starts with knowledge, determines the knowable—the world, the soul and God, but finally relates every thing to a goal. This last phase suggests a path of discipline leading to realisation. Thus realisation is preceded by logical comprehension and ethical application.

Every system of Indian philosophy has its *methodology* and its *goal*. Methodology consists of epistemology and ethics. Epistemology and logic constitute a discipline, while ethical application constitutes another. Thus psychological and ethical disciplines are taken into account. Specially Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Vēdānta and Buddhism emphasise this psycho-ethical side. They maintain that unless the individual is mentally purified he cannot approach truth. The Nyāya also has a similar course of discipline. The Jainas have their own course of Jaina-yoga. Buddhist enumeration of virtues and vices is based on psycho-ethical analysis of the *sanskāras*. Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā analysis of virtues and vices is ethical and not religious. The Yoga and Vēdānta schools prescribe virtues and vices :

(1) *Santoṣa, śauca, satya, dama, śama, vivēka, vairāgya, ahiṁsā, uparati, titikṣā. brahmacarya, svādhyāya, tapas, ārjava, kṣānti, asteya, aparigraha, samādhi* etc. ;

(2) *Manuṣyatva, mumukṣutva, mahāpuruṣa-saṁsrava ;*

(3) *Yama, niyama prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, āsana, dhyāna, dhāraṇā, samādhi* etc.

The psychological ethics found in Indian system is remarkably unique. But over-emphasis of virtues and vices derail life and thought, by equating truth and half-truths. Negative virtues may lead to denial of life and the world.

The Cārvākas make no exhibition of ethics or religion. But they are liable to anti-social Hedonism.

With the exception of the Cārvākas, all the systems believe in some kind of metaphysical goal, culmination of its philosophical query. Thus, the *Nyāya* speaks about *apavarga* pure and natural state of existence free from pleasure and pain. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga speaks of a pure state of consciousness or *kaivalya* marked by discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The Vēdanta talk of a blissful state (*ānanda*). The Buddhists have mooted the idea of *nirvāṇa* or cessation of existence. The earlier Buddhists recognised that state as *śūnyatā* par excellence. The later Buddhists, however, interpreted it as something full, devoid of phenomenality. For Rāmānuja, liberation was experiencing God's grace and enjoyment of Lord's nearness as His *dāsa* (servant). The individual is thus completely subordinated to God.

In the systems of Indian thought, faith and reason are intermingled. They are basic to all the systems of Indian philosophy except the Cārvākas who deny the possibility of such a state.

KUNTAKA'S APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF POETIC EXPRESSION

PROF. DR RAMARANJAN MUKHERJEE

The Saṁskrit Ālaṁkārikas usually make the combination of sound and sense the starting point of their enquiry and define poetry as an association of language and thought. As this association is traced in ordinary linguistic expression as well, poetic expression has to be endowed with a speciality or *vaiśiṣṭya*. The search for the reason which leads to this speciality continues. Bhāmaha recognises the importance of the poetic figure. Daṇḍin lays equal stress on the literary excellence and the poetic figure. Vāmana recognises diction or *Rīti* brought about by the combination of literary excellences. The learned Dhvanikāra, on the other hand, lays premium on the suggested content.

Coming to Kuntaka, emphasis shifted from external appendages and the unexpressed content to the imaginative faculty of the poet. Kuntaka is the only critic to include creative faculty in the definition of kāvya white others have taken it as one of the causal factors of poetic creation. On the lines of Bhāmaha he defines poetry as a combination of sound and sense, arranged in a composition, shining with strikingness of expression, effected by the skill of the poet—a composition that gives delight to the connoisseurs of poetic art.[1] Kuntaka maintains that as the ability to cause delight is present both in language and ideas, as is oil in each seed, so both language and ideas are of equal importance. He further asserts that in kāvya sound and sense are arranged in perfect unison—the language going to render the meaning charming and the meaning trying to make the language attractive. A piece of poetic creation in which beauty of sound alone flatters the ear or the depth of import alone captivates the mind is not, for this reason,

1. शब्दार्थौ सहितौ वक्रकविव्यापारशालिनि ।
बन्धे व्यवस्थितौ काव्यं तद्विदाह्लादकारिणी ॥

शब्दार्थौ काव्यं । वाचको वाच्यं चेति द्वौ सम्मिलितौ काव्यम् । द्वावेकमिति विचित्रैवोक्तिः ।...तस्माद् द्वयोरपि प्रतितिलमिव तैलं तद्विदाह्लादकारित्वं वर्तते, न पुनरेकस्मिन् ।

Vakroktijīvita. 1, 7 & Vṛtti thereon.

regarded as a specimen of good poetry. A lofty idea, conveyed through an expression, not befitting it, Kuntaka says, is as good as dead, and in a similar manner a beautiful expression, significant of an idea but not suiting the occasion, is a disease. Among the synonymous words, the word used by a poet alone conveys the intended idea and the meaning presented by him alone causes delight by its own nature.[1] What lies behind the harmonious blending of language and meaning is, *Kuntaka* points out, Vakrokti, a mode of expression to which charm is imparted by the skill of the poet. Thus in the doctrine of Kuntaka, ultimate emphasis is laid on the imaginative faculty of the poet. It gives a new turn to expression and arranges language and meaning in unison. Taking this broad connotation of Vakrokti, Kuntaka maintains that Vakrokti constitutes the only embellishment or Alaṁkāra of poetry. In so for as *Alaṁkāra* is an integral part of poetry, it is not proper to say that *Alaṁkāra* belongs to kāvya, for in that case it is possible for a poetry to exist without Alaṁkāras.

Kuntaka speaks of six types of *vakratā*, created by *kavi-vyāpāra*; *varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā* *pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā*, *pada-parārdha-vakratā*, *vākya-vakratā* *prakaraṇa-vakratā* and *prabandha-vakratā*. The first consists in peculiar use of letters; the second of synonyms, conventional words, words used in their secondary meanings, attributive words, covert expressions, compounds and suffixes, roots, gender and verb; the third of tense, case, number, voice, person, particles and indeclinables; the fourth of charming presentation of *Rasa*, attractive description of *Svabhāva* and pleasing introduction of *Alaṁkāras*; the fifth and the sixth types of topic and strikingness of composition.

The emphasis laid by him on *vakratā* of which *Rasa* is only one aspect leads scholars to believe that Kuntaka develops a new system, opposed to the doctrine of *Dhvani*. In fact, Ruyyaka categorically mentions that Kuntaka comprehends the concept of *Dhvani* under such varieties of *vakratā* as *upacāra-vakratā* and the like, and thereby ventures the suggestion that he belongs to that group of scholars opposed to the theory of Dhvani, who would like to equate *Dhvani* with Lakṣaṇā. A careful analysis of Kuntaka's work, however, reveals that

1. शब्दो विवक्षितार्थैकवाचकोऽन्येषु सत्स्वपि ।
अर्थः सहृदयाह्लादकारिस्वस्पन्दसुन्दरः ॥
तदेवंविधं विशिष्टमेव शब्दार्थयोर्लक्षणमुपादेयम् ।

Vakroktijīvita, 1. 9 & Vṛtti thereon.

he is an out and out a *Dhvani-vādin* who not only recognises the supreme importance of *Rasa* and *Svabhāva*, but at the same time realises the truth of Ānandavardhana's doctrine that propriety constitutes the secret of all composition. For this reason, while defining *varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā*, he expresses his opinion that letters appropriate to the contest only are to be inserted and certain sounds though unsuited to certain situations are capable of helping the idea and *Rasa* in other situations. This reminds one of the observations of the learned Dhvanikāra that such defects as unmelodiousness and the like are *anitya-doṣas*, detrimental as they are to the manifestation of the Erotic and the Tragic but favourable to the Heroic and the Furious, and testifies to his conviction that such letters are to be used as are competent to bring *Rasa* into comprehension.[1] Then again, his observation that such alliteration in the creating of which a poet does not stand in need of taking recourse to strenuous effort and in which repeated letters are often changed creates a case of *varṇa-vakratā*—echoes practically the doctrine of Ānandavardhan that a figure for the improvisation of which special effort is necessary on the part of the poet is not organic to poetic art, and that the same sound-effect is not to be continued at great length.[2] In elaborating this principle of *varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā*, Kuntaka further states that though the poetic figure *yamaka* is recognised as a case of one such *vakratā* yet it lacks in beauty in other respect ; and as such, he refrains from discussing this element in detail. Here, he continues, no life other than strikingness of expression is traced. This observation which is nothing but an expansion of Ānandavardhana's thesis that such obscure figures as *yamaka* and the like are incapable of being related intimately to poetic art because for their improvisation a good deal of effort is necessary on the part of the poet who has to search after suitable words—brings to the fore his idea that other than strikingness of expression there is an entity that gives the very life to a poetic creation.[3]

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1. वर्गान्त-योगिनः स्पर्शा द्विरुक्तास्त-ल-नादयः ।
शिष्टाश्च रादिसंयुक्ताः प्रस्तुतौचित्यशोभिनः ॥ Vakroktijīvita, 2. 2.

2. नातिनिर्बन्धविहिता नाप्यपेशलभूषिता ।
पूर्वावृत्तपरित्यागनूतनावर्तनोज्ज्वला ॥ Ibid, 2. 4.

3. यमकं नाम सोऽप्यस्याः प्रकारः परिदृश्यते ।
स तु शोभान्तराभावादिह नातिप्रतन्यते ॥
अस्य च वर्णविन्यासवैचित्र्यव्यतिरेकेणान्यत्किञ्चिदपि जीवितान्तरं न परिदृश्यते ।
Ibid, 2. 7 & Vṛtti thereon.

Then again while concluding his discussion on *viśeṣaṇa-vakratā*, Kuntaka maintains that application of adjectives, suited to the situation, renders a poem charming because it brings *Rasa* to a relishable state and helps in the manifestation of the emotional mood.[1] By extending recognition to *saṁvṛti-vakratā* which consists in concealment of an idea and its expression through another mode with the help of pronouns and the like in order to create charm as one of the main types of *vakratā*, Kuntaka accepts the principle of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta that charm is associated with concealment, and consequently while suggestion makes an idea charming', denotation makes it unattractive.[2]

Ānandavardhana mentions suggestiveness of a suffix and following him Kuntaka also enumerates *pratyaya-vakratā* as one of the varieties of *vakratā*. This *vakratā*, he says, consists in use of proper suffixes as are competent to suggest the intended idea or emotion. Kuntaka thinks that of a number of synonymous words used in different genders, the one used in feminine is to be preferred because the gender itself is charming and is able to bring *Rasa* into comprehension even though other forms of strikingness are not there. He introduces, in this connection, the topic of *liṅga-vakratā* which consists in use of a gender that suits the occasion by means of its effectiveness in suggesting the intended emotion.[3]

In a similar manner, Kuntaka's *Kāla-vakratā* and *saṁkhyā-vakratā* consist respectively in the propriety of tense and number or, in other words, in their effectiveness in suggesting the idea or emotion. With reference to *pada-vakratā*, he says that it is indication of an emotional mood through prefixes and indeclinables in such a way that

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1. एतदेव विशेषणवक्रत्वं नाम प्रस्तुतौचित्यानुसारि सकलसत्काव्यजीवितत्वेन लक्ष्यते, यस्मादनेनैव रसः परां परिपोषपदवीमवतार्यते ।
Vakroktijīvita, Vṛtti on Kārikā 2. 15.

2. यत्र संव्रियते वस्तु वैचित्र्यस्य विवक्षया ।
सर्वनामादिभिः कैश्चित् सोक्ता संवृतिवक्रता ॥
......तत्कार्याभिधायिना तदतिशयाभिधानपरेण वाक्यान्तरेण प्रतीतिगोचरतां नीयते ।
Ibid, 2. 16 & Vṛtti, thereon.

3. सति लिङ्गान्तरे यत्र स्त्रीलिङ्गञ्च प्रयुज्यते ।
शोभानिष्पत्तये यस्मान्नामैव स्त्रीति पेशलम् ॥
......स्त्रीत्यभिधानमेव हृदयहारि । विच्छित्त्यन्तरेण रसादियोजनयोग्यत्वात् ।
Ibid, 2. 22 & Vṛtti thereon.

the mood manifested flashes forth as the sole life of the expression. This statement clearly shows that he considers *Rasa* as the main end of a poetic creation.[1]

It is interesting to note that a number of verses, quoted by Ānandavardhana as examples of different types of Dhvani, are cited by Kuntaka to illustrate different varieties of *Vakratā*. Thus Ānandavardhana's own verse: *'tālā jāanti guṇā'* etc. as well as the stanza: *'snigdhaśyāmalakānti'* etc. cited by Ānandavardhana as instances of *arthāntara-saṁkramita-vācya-dhvani* are given as examples of *rūḍhi-vakratā*; the expression—*'Kusuma-samaya-yugam'* etc. quoted as an illustration of *śabda-śakti-mūla-dhavani* is cited as an instance of *paryāya-vakratā*; and the stanza: *'Gaaṇaṁ ca mattamehaṁ'* given as an example of *atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya-dhvani* is quoted as an illustration of *upacāra-vakratā*. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that Kuntaka proceeds to formulate the doctrine of *Vakrokti* after taking the existence of *Dhvani* for granted.

In explaning *vastu-vakratā*, he describes it as the presentation of a charming all-important natural attribute of a thing by a suitable language. Another form of this *Vakratā*, he says, consists in drawing a new form of an object—a form that surpasses all worldly limits and shines as it receives a touch of poetic intuition or that of a poet's culture and training. In support of his thesis that a poet is competent to give a new shape to a thing, Kuntaka quotes the well-known verse: *'Apāre Kāvyasaṁsāre'* etc. found in the Agni-purāṇa and cited by Ānandavardhana.

As regards *vākya-vakratā*, he maintains, that like the skill of a painter realised as something distinct from the board, colour and other ingredients, this type of *vakratā*, also, is something different from use of words, meanings, literary excellences and poetic figures, and is identical with the skill of the poet. In explaining this proposition, he states that although the skill of the poet gives life to *Rasa*, *Svabhāva* and *Alaṁkāra* yet it is essential in case of an *Alaṁkāra* because a figure not inserted skillfully in a proper place does not cause delight to

1. रसादिद्योतनं यस्यामुपसर्गनिपातयोः ।
वाक्यैकजीवितत्वेन सापरा पदवक्रता ॥
यस्यां वक्रतायामुपसर्गनिपातयोर्वैयाकरणप्रसिद्धाभिधानयो रसादिद्योतनं शृङ्गारप्रभृतिप्रकाशनम् । Vakroktijīvita, 2. 33 Vṛtti thereon.

connoisseurs of poetic art. In conclusion, he maintains, further, that the entire assemblage of *Rasa*, *Svabhāva* and *Alaṁkāra* is rendered fresh and charming when introduced properly by a dexterous poet.[1] This classification of an element introduced in poetry into three categories shows unmistakably the influence excercised by the threefold classification of *Dhvani* into *Vastu*, *Alaṁkāra* and *Rasa*, as drawn by Ānandavardhana.

Kuntaka speaks of three different types of *Svabhāva*, pertaining to various beings and things and tenders advice to adopt different ways for their presentation. Thus when a conscious rational being is described, such of his natural attributes as are competent to bring permanent moods to a relishable state are to be painted. And when an animal is described, such qualities as suit its own class are to be delineated so that they may please the refined readers by causing a suspension of disbelief.[2] An insentient being, he says, becomes a fit object of description in poetry only when it causes charm by its capacity to awaken *Rasa*.[3] This observation reminds of the proposition of Ānandavardhana that in every work of poetic art there must be some human element present, however predominantly descriptive it might be of unconscious phenomena of nature, in explaining which Abhinavagupta maintains that everything depicted in poetry—whether it is conscious or unconscious—is intimately related to human feeling inasmuch as it either excites or ensues from that.

The important place assigned to *Rasa* in the system of Kuntaka is evident from his attitude to the figure *Rasavat*. He does not regard

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1. मनोज्ञफलकोल्लेखवर्णच्छायाश्रियः पृथक्।
चित्रस्येव मनोहारि कर्तुः किमपि कौशलम् ॥
रसस्वभावालङ्कारा आसंसारमपि स्थिताः ।
अनेन नवतां यान्ति तद्विदाह्लाददायिनीम् ॥
Vakroktijīvita, 3-4 & Vṛtti thereon.

2. मुख्यमक्लिष्टरत्यादिपरिपोषमनोहरम् ।
स्वजात्युचितहेवाकसमुल्लेखोज्ज्वलं परम् ॥ Ibid, 3. 7.

3. रसोद्दीपनसामर्थ्यविनिबन्धनबन्धुरम् ।
चेतनानाममुख्यानां जडानां चापि भूयसा ॥
रसाः शृङ्गारादयस्तेषामुद्दीपनमुल्लासनं परिपोषस्तस्मिन् सामर्थ्यं शक्तिस्तया विनिबन्धनं निवेशस्तेन बन्धुरं हृदयहारि ।
Vakroktijīvita, 3. 8 & Vṛtti thereon.

it as an *alaṁkāra*, because the *Rasa* is awakened not for the purpose of embellishing expression and content but for its own sake. So he maintains that it is an *alaṁkārya*.[1] But *Rasa* plays greatest part in what Kuntaka calls *prabandha-vakratā* and *prakaraṇa-vakratā*. It is said that such incidents as do not bring into light the greatness of the hero and as such are not conducive to the sentiment, intended to be depicted, are to be eschewed; and others that are not traced in the source but are favourable to manifestation of sentiment are to be inserted. It is also asserted that the creation of a poet lives not by matter or plot but by the beauty imparted to it by continuous flow of *Rasa*.[2]

These observations based on similar propositions of Ānandavardhana point out definitely to the idea of Kuntaka that in poetry *Rasa* is of paramount importance. Although this learned critic evolves a new system of *vakrokti* and gives the skill of a poet, that contributes behind a poetic creation its due share, it is always emphasised that *Rasa* is the guiding principle that prompts a poet to insert suitable expressions and present pleasing meanings and that the test of *vakratā* lies in *aucitya* of the various elements with reference to *Rasa*, the depiction of which constitutes the main end of the poet.

The problem as to whether Kuntaka accepts the essentiality of *Rasa* in kāvya or not makes an interesting study. Although he draws a difference among poetry, describing *Svabhāva-saukumārya*, that delineating *Rasa* and that abounding in *Alaṁkāra*, and thus apparently maintains that apart from *Rasa*, *Svabhāva* and *Alaṁkāra* are capable of being presented in poetry[3], yet elsewhere he gives his opinion in favour of depiction of such *Svabhāva* as is competent to bring *Rasa* into com-

1. अलङ्कारो न रसवत् परस्याप्रतिभासनात् ।
स्वरूपादतिरिक्तस्य शब्दार्थासङ्गतेरपि ॥ Ibid, 3.11.

2. (a) इतिवृत्तान्यथावृत्तरससम्पदुपेक्षया ।
रसान्तरेण रम्येण यत्र निर्वहणं भवेत् ॥ Ibid, 4. 16.

(b) निरन्तररसोद्गारगर्भसन्दर्भनिर्भराः ।
गिरः कवीनां जीवन्ति न कथामात्रमाश्रिताः ॥ Ibid, Vṛtti on Kārikā 4.6.

3. तथाच भावस्वभावसौकुमार्यवर्णने शृङ्गारादिरसस्वरूपसमुन्मीलने वा विविधविभूषण-विन्यासविच्छित्तिविरचने च परः परिपोषातिशयस्तद्विदाह्लादकारितायाः कारणम् ।
Vakroktijīvita, Vṛtti on Kārikā 3. 3.

prehension, and gives such illustrations of poems abounding in poetic figures as are characterised by manifestation of *Rasa.* Thus the stanza : '*Kiṃ tāruṇyataroḥ*' etc., cited as an example of *vākya-vakratā*, presents the Erotic, and so do the other two stanzas : '*Asyāḥ sarga-vidhau*' etc. and '*Uddeśo'yam sarasa-kadalī-śreṇi-śobhātiśāyī*' etc. These make the conclusion probable that from the point of view of theory Kuntaka admits three elements introduced in *Kāvya—Svabhāva, Alaṁkāra* and *Rasa*, but his leaning is definitely towards the last one. In this respect he is similar to Ānandavardhana who though accepting in theory the existence of three types of suggested centent betrays unmistakably his partiality towards the unexpressed emotional mood.

The close relation existing between *dhvani, aucitya* and *vakratā* is noticed by Mahimabhaṭṭa whose comments throw a new light on Kuntaka's doctrine. Mahimabhaṭṭa accepts the essentiality of *Rasa* in kāvya. He says that *Rasa* constitutes the soul of a poetic creation and on this score he is quite in agreement with Ānandavardhana. He differs from the learned Dhvanikāra only in point of process of comprehension. While the latter postulates the function of suggestion in order to explain its cognition, he thinks that *anumāna* is competent enough to bring *Rasa* into comprehension. Mahimabhaṭṭa is of opinion that *aucitya* of *Rasa* and *Prakṛti* is the greatest *guṇa*—most essential for a kāvya. Absence of this *aucitya*, on the other hand, constitutes the greatest defect and forms the basis of all flows that flow from it. In criticising the theory of Kuntaka, he says that the peculiar turn given to an expression by the skill of the poet to which so much importance is attached by the learned writer of the Vakrotijīvita, is capable of being resolved either into *aucitya* or into *dhvani*. Clearly, Kuntaka's doctrine might mean that *aucitya* which figures so largly in his treatment of *vakrokti*, constitutes the soul of poetry. Or, it might mean that *dhvani* forms the essence of kāvya. No third alternative is possible because a specimen of poetic art that conforms to the principles of literary criticism cannot do without these two elements. Of these two alternatives—*aucitya* and *dhvani*, the special mention of the first one is unnecessary because no opposition to *aucitya* is ever found in real poetry ensouled by *Rasa* whose secret lies in propriety. The second alternative renders the stand of Kuntaka identical with that of the *Dhvanikāra*. In fact, for this reason, the former quotes the same passages as are cited by the latter

as illustrations of Dhvani-kāvya.[1] This observation of Mahimabhaṭṭa is one of his great contributions to the speculations of *alaṁkāra-śāstra*. By asserting that *vakratā* is capable of being resolved into *aucitya* or *dhvani*, he shows that these three are but different aspects of *Rasa*, or to quote Dr. Raghavan, 'the more specific names for the *Camatkāra* in a certain point.

1. यतः प्रसिद्धोपनिबन्धनव्यतिरेकित्वमिदं शब्दार्थयोरौचित्यमात्रपर्यवसायि स्यात्, प्रसिद्धाभिधेयार्थव्यतिरेकि प्रतीयमानाभिव्यक्तिपरं वा स्यात् ? तत्राद्यस्तावत् पक्षो न शङ्कनीय एव, तस्य काव्यस्वरूपनिरूपणसामर्थ्यसिद्धस्य पृथगुपादानवैयर्थ्यात्...... द्वितीयपक्षपरिग्रहे पुनर्ध्वनेरेवेदं लक्षणम्... Vyaktiviveka, I. pp 126-127.

ELUCIDATION OF THE FIGURE, SELF-COMPARISON

DR MANGALPATI JHA

The definition of self-comparison has been formulated by the older rhetorician in the following fashion: 'When the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison is accorded exclusively to one entity, it is called self-comparison.'[1] In this context the apprehension of the one and identical act of similization originates from the term *eva* exclusively employed in the body of the definition. As a result, the definition escapes the charge of unwarranted extension to two cases of poetic figures, viz., (1) reciprocal simile and (2) girdle simile. An instance of reciprocal simile may be cited: 'Water is like the sky and the sky is like water'. And the example of girdle simile is: 'Your mind is like the speech and the action is like the mind' etc. Both these instances possess two independent similes. They can be exhibited by bisecting each of the two instances: (1) water is like the sky and (9) the sky is like water; and (1) your mind is like the speech and (2) the action is like the mind. Each of the two instances stands for two numerically different acts of similization. Consequently the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison does not take place in these two cases of Alaṁkāra with reference to the self-same entity. So both these cases are ruled out.

The examples of self-comparison are cited seriatim: (1) 'the sky is like the sky itself and the sea is like the sea itself' etc. The fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison concerns only one entity, viz., the sky in the first and (2) the sea in the second instance. So these instances conform to the defintion. It is worth-noting that the property belonging to the sky *qua* the object of comparison and the sky *qua* the standard of comparison is not expressed by any word. But it stands implied. Examine again the following verse "Not only that the lady with high hip and possessed with exquisite beauty shines like herself with high hip; in fact, her amorous gestures which are the stage for dancing of one with the weapon of amorous gestures (i.e., Cupid) shine like her own amorous gestures".[2] The verse

1. PR, p. 67; AM, p. 244 (reads *syād ananvayaḥ* for *ananvayo mataḥ*).
2. KP, p. 582; KNS, p. 288.

contains two examples of self-comparion. The two common properties are (1) possession of exquisite beauty and (2) providing the stage for dancing of Cupid. They pertain to the two entities. The first relates to the lady with high hip and the second to her amorous gestures. In this example common properties are expressed in words.

A case may be examined : 'Having passed over, in this way, the period of living in the forest under the command of his father and with his kingdom reinstated, Rāma observed the equal treatment towards virtue, wealth and worldly enjoyment, in the self-same way as towards his own younger brothers'.[1] It is regarded an example of conjoint simile. This simile subsists in equal treatment of Rāma towards virtue, wealth and worldly enjoyment and towards his younger brothers. Equal treatment towards all is here intended to be conveyed. The example does not exclude other similar things.

Take another instance : 'I will forsake the daugther of Videha (i. e., Sītā) like the earth bounded by the sea (which I left before), in accordance with the command of the father.'[2] In this case, comparison takes place with reference to the two entities, viz., (1) the forsaking of the earth (*kṣiti*) in accordance with the command of the father and (2) forsaking of Sītā on the ground of scandal. The act of forsaking stands on two distinct grounds (1) 'the command of the father' and (2) 'scandal'. Another verse may be examined : 'The thousand-rayed (i. e., the sun) bore the novel umbrella constructed by the maker of divine implements (*tvaṣṭṛ*) for the sake of him (Hara) ; and he (Hara) on his part, with his crest in proximity to the very linen cloth of it (umbrella) appeared, as it were, with the head upon which the Ganges was falling down'. In this instance one entity viz., Hara has been clearly portrayed as possessed with the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison under the domain of one simile. Yet it is not a case of self-comparison. In none of the above three instances, the substantive has been described as possessing the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison.

Now when the substantive appears incompatible with the action occasioned by the verb in the same sentence, the adjective of the substantive comes into prominence and becomes syntactically connected with the action. As for example, 'One possessed of sacred tuft of hair

1. RV, Canto 14. *sl.* 21.
2. Ibid. *sl.* 39.

was shaved'—(*śikhī muṇḍitaḥ*). In this case the substantive, viz., the person *per* *se* cannot be shaved. So the sacred tuft of hair (*śikhā*) standing as the adjective of the person was shaved. This shows that two distinct adjectives belonging to a substantive may have the status of the standard and the object of comparison as in the above three cases. But as the definition is strictly confined to the substantive, these three cases have to stay out.

Definition proposed in the Citra-mīmāṁsā

The author of the *Citra-mīmāṁsā* has proposed the definition in the following form : 'Where the similarities of an entity with its own self appears based on one and the same property, it is called the figure, self-comparison (*ananvaya*). The proviso viz. 'similarity of an entity with its own self' is inserted in the definition with a view to avoiding the charge of 'overlapping' with two figures, viz., (1) girdle simile and (2) reciprocal simile. No entity has not been similized with its own self in any of these two figures of speech. On the contrary, the act of similization takes place in connexion with two numerically distinct entities in the instances of both these figures of speech.

It is worthy of attention that mere self-comparison (*ananvaya*) cannot be regarded as a part of the definition of self-comparison. Self-comparison must be based on one and identical abiding property. The apprehension of peerlessness springing from self-comparison (*ananvaya*) is supported by presence of the only one property. Self-comparison *qua* poetic figure was proposed by Bhāmaha : The figure in which the property becoming the standard and the object of comparison of an entity with its own self takes place with the purpose of importing its peerlessness, is called self-comparison'. Now the employment of the adjective, viz., 'the property of becoming the standard and the object of comparison of an entity with its own self' rules out the figure, Hyperbole, as in the verse '*Ubhau yadi*' *et seq.*[1] As peerlessness is suggested due to its own non-compliance with the adjective stated above, this instance does not come under the scope of self-comparison. Further, the figure Hyperbole contains two distinct entities for the standard and object of comparison. So the property of becoming the

1. The English rendering of the verse : 'If both the streams of the Heavenly Ganges in distinction were to pour out in the sky, then alone his chest blue like the tamāla (leaves) and wearing the necklace of pearls can be similized with it (sky).

standard and the object of comparison of only one entity is wanting in this case.

Self-comparison may also be suggested rather than expressed. Take the example : 'O Govinda ! The delight which was produced in my mind by your arrival at my house today would be produced in my mind again by your very arrival after the lapse of long time.[1] In order to exclude suggested self-comparison, the adjective, 'the fact of being non-suggested' should embody the definition.

The standpoint of the Rasagaṅgādhara

While accepting definition together with its illustrations, Jagannātha has challenged the instance of suggested self-comparison. 'The delight to be produced by your arrival in the next time is similar to this delight produced by your present arrival'. There are two delights—the delight to be produced and the delight already produced'. Therefore the present instance is a case of suggested simile. It is, of course, a different matter that the comparison between the two delights implies peerlessness of the delight occasioned by the arrival of Śrīkṛṣṇa. So what Dīkṣita thought to be a case of suggested self-comparison is in reality a case of suggested simile,[2] because the instance under reference refers to two individual delights determined by the two points of time. The simile subsisting between two factors of comparison is sufficient for the realization of the peerlessness of the present undifferentiated delight.[3]

In this context, another case may be examined : 'Although this wide world is filled by thousands of beautiful damsels, O fortunate one ! the left portion of the body of that lady imitates the right portion of her body.'[4] In this instance the simile relates to the right portion of her body and the left portion of her body. Such comparison results in the apprehension of peerlessness of the lady. In the present verse beginning with 'Although this wide world' *et seq* !, the apprehension of similarity of the lady with her own self is definitely the intermediate stage through which the process of comparison finally leads to the sense of peerlessness.

1. KV, Chap. 3, *sl.* 5 ; KD, Chap. 2, *sl.* 276 ; RG, p. 208.
2. RG, pp. 208-209.
3. RG, p. 209.
4. Ibid.
5. GS, p. 15-2 (reads *Etāvanmātre jagati* for *Etāvati prapañce*, O *bhṛte* for *bharite* and *Kevalaṁ* for *subhaga*).

But the above contention has no substance. The apprehension of peerlessness may be arrived at through a source other than self-comparison. An instance will render it evident: 'O friend, his word is like the sky-flower' *et seq.* The standard of comparison (viz., the sky-flower) is in this case a mental construction yet such fictitious comparison (Kalpitopamā) results in the apprehension of the peerlessness of his word.

Jagannātha has quoted the definition of self-comparison as has been formulated by Ratnākara along with its threefold classification and illustrations. The verse beginning with 'O Govind' etc. conforms to the definition of the second variety of self-comparison, as set forth by Ratnākara. This second variety of self-comparison propounded by Ratnākara borders on suggested self-comparison. But Jagannātha stands on his own. He would not accept suggested self-comparison as a case of *Ananvaya* at all. Suggested self-comparison is met with in the *Gaṅgāstava* of Jagannātha: 'Tell, O Ganges, which of the rivers flowing down from the mountains resided in the matted knot of hair of the destroyer of Pura (i. e., Hara), or which other else has washed the foot of the husband of Śrī (Viṣṇu) with its own water and with which O mother, the poets may describe as having the slightest similarity of yours'. In this verse the phrase 'which other else' (*itarayā*) suggests self-comparison: 'Your similarity is borne by you own self'. And this comparison leads to the apprehension of peerlessness of the river Ganges. Another example may be cited on the issue: 'Although the three worlds are filled up by men, gods and demons, no other will be nor is nor had become, O the supporter of the earth ! the bearer of your resemblance'. In this verse the phrase 'no other' (*aparaḥ*) suggests self-comparison: 'You are but the bearer of your own resemblance'. Such self-comparison signifies peerlessness of the king. A doubt arises. Nevertheless Jagannātha takes this second example under the figure Unequal (*asama*) in so for as it is the negation of similarity in all possible ways.

AN EXPOSITION OF THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SELF-COMPARISON

Dr P. Upadhyay

Self-Comparison (*Ananvaya*) is a figure of speech recognised by Bhāmaha. The Figure was considered by subsequent writers beginning with Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa. In the *Alaṅkāra-sarvasva* Ruyyaka takes up this figure for discussion immediately after the treatment of Simile (*Upamā*). Ruyyaka first discovered the logical relationship of the figures. *Upamā* is based on similarity of the object of comparison (*Upameya*) and the standard of comparison (*Upamāna*), which must be numerically different, since similarity can relate only to two different objects. Similarity is a species of relation. And relation is possible only between two terms. Self-Comparison (*Ananvaya*) is a figure in which a thing is compared to its own self without reference to qualitative or functional difference. Such being the case, the basis of *Ananvaya* cannot be similarity. Yet Ruyyaka defends the treatment of *Ananvaya* immediately after *Upamā* on the ground that *Ananvaya* bears close similarity to *Upamā* both in form and content. Though the same thing is made the *Upamāna* and the *Upameya*, the formal statement of the two terms exactly in the manner of Simile gives it the appearance of being based on similarity. And so far as the expressed meaning is concerned, it also has *prima facie* affinity with Simile. It is only when the logical implication of the Figure is taken into consideration, the incongruity of the same thing being the *Upamāna* and *Upameya* becomes apparent. This formal affinity has led the author to insert the treatment of this figure after *Upamā* and in the context of Figures based on similarity.

The apparent incompatibility inherent in self-comparison suggests that the thing is unique and incomparable. This implication is the very life and soul of the Figure. The mere identity of the individual compared with himself does not constitute this figure. Examine the example given by Jayaratha: "Now to me who have been carrying on the task of protection of my subjects in pursuance of the command of my spiritual master, old age has arrived turning grey my hair at the temples. The master still commands me as a boy as he did

in the past.' It evinces his extraordinary solicitude for me."[1] Here Rāmacandra in his old age is compared to himself in his childhood. The personal identity is obvious. But the difference of temporal situation and qualitative difference entailed by long experience between childhood and old age of the same person does not make self-comparison logically incompatible. In *Ananvaya* the identity must be complete without the slightest hint of difference, numerical, qualitative and functional.

The Figure *Ananvaya* lacks in syntactical construction. The excellence of *Upamāna* is an accomplished fact; it is yet to be established with regard to *Upameya*. But in excellence is self-comparison does not take into account this difference of status between the *Upamāna* and *Upameya*. On the contrary, it equates between the two. The logical contradiction resolves into the suggestion that the *Upameya* is incomparable.

Appaya Dīkṣita makes the following observation in point of logical propriety of such a situation: "The *Mīmāṁsakas* do not endorse the possibility of Simile in the case of identity of the terms. And so they put different constructions on the propositions: 'the war between 'Rāma and Rāvaṇa is like the war between Rāma and Rāvaṇa', 'the sky is like the sky' and 'the sea is like the sea'. They maintain that the war of the present day is like the war in the past, and so on; because the same or similar events may be repeated in different cycles of creation.[2] Similarly, in the verse quoted above although Rāma in his childhood is compared with Rāma in his old age yet the comparison is not related to the same individual but between two different states. For, "Affirmation or negation, if incompatible with the substantive, will hold between the adjectives.[3]"

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1. तस्याज्ञयैव परिपालयतः प्रजा मे, कर्णोपकण्ठपलितङ्करणी जरेयं ।
यद् गर्भरूपमिव मामनुशास्ति सोऽयमद्यापि तन्मयि गुरोर्गुरुपक्षपातः ।

Alaṅkārasarvasva, Vimarśinī, p. 38.

2. वाक्यमीमांसका ह्यभेदे उपमानोपमेयभावनिर्देशनैव नास्तीति मन्यमाना रामरावणयोर्युद्धमित्यादावद्यतनस्य पूर्वेद्युस्तनं युद्धं उपमानं ; एतद्-कल्पगगनस्य कल्पान्तरगगनमुपमानमित्यादि कल्पयन्ति ।

Citra-mīmāṁsā, p. 49.

3. सविशेषणे हि विधिनिषेधौ सति विशेष्ये बाधे विशेषणमुपसङ्क्रामतइति ।

Citra-mīmāṁsā, Footnote, p. 49.

But whatever the Mīmāṁsakas might say on this issue, the *Ālaṅkārikas* maintain that in *Ananvaya* the same thing is compared with itself and logical incompatibility is met by the suggestion that the thing is incomparable. This is the aesthetic solution as against the logical solution. When the poet asserts that his sweetheart's face is the moon, he does not stand in nsed of the logician's admonition that the two are not identical. To him, the identity of the face with the moon is a verity, a poetic truth.

In *Ananvaya* there are thus two essential factors: that (1) the *Upamāna* and *Upameya* must be one and the same thing and that (2) the object of comparison is suggested incomparable.

The first factor viz., assertion of similarity is to suggest the second factor that the object is unique. But the second implication may be secured otherwise. Take for instance a poem of Jagannātha: "The curly hair dangling upon the breast of the lady from the temple appears like a serpent upon the golden mountain (*Meru*) from the disc of the moon."[1] The *Upamāna* is the 'Serpent' descending from the moon on the slopes of the mountain. Such serpent is imaginary. It simply suggests that the lady is incomparable. But it is not a case of *Ananvaya* because it is not a case of Self-comparison but a comparison based on a standard which is impossible.

Take another example: "The youth is as handsome as he is clever". The youth is compared with himself. But the handsome youth and the clever youth are not qualitatively identical. Hence comparison in this case is not impossible. So the question of uniqueness of the youth does not arise in this case. It is a simple case of Simile.

In order to give the apprerance of similarity *Ananvaya* must have the formal aspects of a Simile. Thus there has to be a common property on which comparison is based. Such common property may be expressed or implied as in Simile: "Thou art like thyself, O Mother Gaṅgā! in triumphing over other deities in that thou redeemest all

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1. स्तनाभोगे पतन् भाति कपोलात्कुटिलालकः ।
सुधांशुबिम्बतो मेरौ लम्बमान इवोरगः ॥

Rasagaṅgādhara, p. 270.

sorts of sinners who are left aside by others".[1] Here the common property 'triumph over other' is expressed. In the poems, "the sky is like the sky; the sea is like the sea; and the war between Rāma and Rāvaṇa is like the war between the two',[2] the common property is implied.

The common property must be identical formally and materially in both *Upamāna* and *Upameya* and *not* analogous. In *Upamā* the common property may not be *paima facie* identical. But the similarity is so close that the two are felt to be identical. Thus in the example of *Upamā* in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*: "The monk clad in ochre-coloured vasture and besmeared with saffron looks like the dusk covered with red cloud and shimmering with the mellowed rays of the sun",[3] no common property is formally expressed. But the red vesture corresponds with the red cloud and saffron corresponds with the mellowed rays of the sun and the two are felt to be identical. The identification of two similar attributes may be erroneous. But the strong resemblance may pass for identity. Hence, the two conditions of Simile are complete. This is what is called the *bimba-pratibimba-bhāva.*[4]

Close similarity of the attributes of the *Upmeya* and that of the *Upamāna* forms the basis of *Upamā*. In *Ananvaya* similarity is not the point but the uniqueness of the object under consideration.

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1. कृतक्षुद्राघौघानथ सपदि संतप्तमनसः
   समुद्धर्तुं सन्ति त्रिभुवनतले तीर्थनिवहाः ।
   अपि प्रायश्चित्तप्रसरणपथातीतचरिता-
   न्नरान्दूरीकर्तुं त्वमिव जननि त्वं विजयसे ॥

   Ibid.

2. गगनं गगनाकारं सागरः सागरोपमः ।
   रामरावणयोर्युद्धं रामरावणयोरिव ॥

3. कोमलातपसोणाभ्रसन्ध्याकालसहोदरः ।
   काषायवसनो याति कुङ्कुमालेपनो यतिः ॥

   Rasagaṅgādhara, p. 206.

4. बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावापन्नो धर्मस्त्वत्र नास्ति । तस्मिंश्च सति किञ्चिद् धर्मावच्छिन्नत्वेन सादृश्यस्य स्वस्मिन्ननन्वये बाधकाभावात् सादृशान्तरव्यवच्छेदाप्रतिपत्तेश्चानन्वय एव न स्यात् ।

   Ibid., p. 271.

AN ACCOUNT OF VĀRĀṆASĪ AS DEPICTED IN THE SKANDA-PURĀṆA

By

UMAKANT THAKUR

Vārāṇasī transcends others by dint of its spiritual majesty. Dr P. V. Kane[1] has rightly observed that there is hardly any city in the world that can claim greater antiquity, greater continuity and greater popular veneration than Vārāṇasī. It has been a holy city for at least thirty centuries. Innumerable verses are found in the Purāṇas and the Epics in praise of this holy city. Several volumes have been written about Vārāṇasī during the last hundred years. It is not possible to do justice here to this vast mass of literature on Vārāṇasī.

In the Skanda-purāṇa a separate section has been devoted to the glorification of this holy place. It bears the title of Kāśī-khaṇḍa. According to this Purāṇa[2] it is situated on the north bank of the Ganges which falls into the Eastern Ocean, i.e., the Bay of Bengal. The city of Vārāṇasī was built by Viśvakarman as the permanent dwelling place of Gaurī by the order of Lord Śiva. Its situation extends over an area of ten miles. It contains beautiful places. Since this city of temples is never abandoned by Lord Śiva, it bears the significant name of *A-vimukta*. It is one of the seven sacred cities of India, which are considered as the bestowers of spiritual emanicipation.[3] The area of ten miles[4] lies between the rivers *Varuṇā* and *Asī*, and this fact lies in the bottom of the name of Vārāṇasī (Varuṇā + Asī). The super-sanctity of this place has been repeatedly emphasised by all the Purāṇas. It has been stated that even the immortal deities[5] cherish the ardent desire of dying at Vārāṇasī, not to speak of mortal human beings.

1. History of Dharmashastra IV pp. 618-642.
2. Sk. Vai. P. M, 12. 35-42.
3. Sk. Ka. 6. 68.
4. असीवरुणयोर्मध्ये पञ्चक्रोश्यां महाफलम् ।
   अमरा मृत्युमिच्छन्ति का कथा इतरे जनाः ॥
   Sk. Vai. B. M. 1. 29.
5. Ibid.

The highly praised reservoirs like Maṇikarṇikā,[1] Jñāna-vāpī, Viṣṇupada and Pañca-nada-hrada are located at the different parts of Vārāṇasī.

According to the Skanda-purāṇa,[2] Lord Viṣṇu will leave this earth after the expiration of ten thousand years of Kaliyuga. And after the expiration of five thousand years, the river Jāhnavī will leave this earth. And after two and a half thousand years, the deities will bid farewell to this earth. But the holy place like Kāśī will never perish, and hence the Ganges flows towards the northern direction here in order to maintain its contact with this sacred place. It is due to its association with Kāśī that the Ganges finds it possible to remove the sins.[3] The Skanda-purāṇa[4] narrates that there are several islands (Dvīpas) on this earth. Amongst them Jambū-dvīpa is the best of all. This Jambūdvīpa in its turn comprises nine different countries which bear the name of Varṣa and Bhārata-varṣa is the best of all of them. It is a place in which performance of meritorious deeds has gained ascendancy over other things. Hence even the deities of heaven prefer to be born on this land. The area of this Bhārata-varṣa has been asserted to be nine thousand *yojanas*, i. e., seventy-two thousand miles, and is situated to the south of Meru. There are so many places of pilgrimage in Bhārata-varṣa. But A-vimukta[5], i. e., Vārāṇasī surpasses all the holy places scattered over her soil. There are innumerable sub-tīrthas in Vārāṇasī including phalluses, reservoirs and images of Gaṇeśa and other deities. It is a holy place not only for the Śivaite, but the Viṣṇuite also holds it in deep reverence. It is an obvious fact that innumerable temples and images of Viṣṇu in different forms are found in Vārāṇasī.[6]

N. L. Dey[7] observes that Kāśī was properly the name of the country of which Benares was the capital. Aśvaghoṣa[8] appears to

1. मणिकर्ण्यां ज्ञानवाप्यां विष्णुपादोदकं तथा। ह्रदे पञ्चनदे स्नात्वा न मातुस्तनपो भवेत्॥

Ibid., 1. 30.

2. Sk. Vai. M. 4. 37-40.
3. *Ibid.* Verses 43-44.
4. Sk. Ka. 22. 52-61.
5. Sk. Ka. 22. 81-83.
6. Sk. Ka. 61. 207-208.
7. Geog.-Dic. p. 95.
8. वाराणसीं प्रविश्याथ भासा सम्भाषयन् जिनः।
चकार काशीदेशीयान् कौतुकाक्रान्तचेतसः॥

Buddhacarita 15. 101.

have identified Vārāṇasī with Kāśī. He has made the following pertinent observation in his Buddhacarita—"Having entered Vārāṇasī, the Jina (Buddha) illumining the city with his light filled the minds of all the inhabitants of Kāśī with excessive interest". The Buddhacarita has further narrated that Buddha took shelter under the shadow of a tree near Vaṇārā,[1] which is probably the Varaṇā. It is thus clear that Vārāṇasī and Kāśī became synonyms at least sometime about the first century A. D. In the Vāyu-purāṇa[2] Kāśī—Kośalāḥ figure among the countries of Madhya-deśa. According to the Skanda-purāṇa the names Kāśī, Vārāṇasī, and A-vimukta are employed as synonyms. It is also known as Ānanda-kānana, Śmaśāna and Mahā-śmaśāna. The name Kāśī[3] is derived from the root *Kāś*, to shine. The city of Kāśī became famous by that name because it sheds light on the way to Nirvāṇa. Or the word Kāśī is significant of the fact that the supreme Lord Śiva shines there with divine splendour.

The derivation of the word Vārāṇasī[4] has been furnished by several Purāṇas. They are unanimous in maintaining that the formation of it should be sought in the two rivers namely—Varaṇā and Asī. It is worth-while to mention that these two rivers are respectively the northern and southern boundaries of the modern city, Vārāṇasī.

In the Liṅga-purāṇa[5] another derivation is suggested—*avi* means sin, and *mukta* means free—the holy place devoid of sin. It is clear that Vārāṇasī was that strip of land, the four boundaries of which were the Ganges to the east, Asī to the south, the shrine of Dehali-vināyaka to the west and the river Varaṇā to the north.

In the seventh century[6] Hiouen Thsang, the Chinese pilgrim, notes that Banaras was 18 Lis in length and about five or six Lis

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1. S. B. E. Vol. 49, Part I, p. 169.
2. Vāyupurāṇa 45. 110.
3. काशतेऽत्र यतो ज्योतिस्तदनाख्येयमीश्वरः ।
   अतो नामापरं चास्तु काशीति प्रथितं विभो ॥
   Sk. Ka. 26. 67.
4. Skanda-purāṇa Kāśī-khaṇḍa.
5. अविशब्देन पापस्तु वेदोक्तः कथ्यते द्विजैः ।
   तेन मुक्तं मया जुष्टमविमुक्तमतोच्यते ॥
   Liṅga-purāṇa 1. 97. 143.
6. Beal's-B.R.W.W. Vol. II p. 44, referred to by Dr Kane; vide History of Dharmashastra IV p. 629.

(a little more than a mile) in breadth. This makes it clear that the city was then girded as now by the Varaṇā and the Asī.

The Matsya-purāṇa[1] narrated the story of Vyāsa who begged alms from door to door at Vārāṇasī. But he failed to receive his response. Thereupon he uttered curse against the holy city.

It is remarkable[2] that a little to the north of Kāśī, Viṣṇu allotted a dwelling place to him called Dharma-kṣetra. It is in that place that Viṣṇu assumed the form of Buddha. This is a clear reference to Sāranātha about five miles by road to the north of Vārāṇasī. Buddha delivered his first sermon there.

From time immemorial this holy land has been the chief seat of learning in India.

1. तीर्थं चातीर्थतां यातु नगरं शापयाम्यहम् ।
मा भूत् त्रिपौरुषी विद्या मा भूत् त्रिपौरुषं धनम् ॥
मा भूत् त्रिपौरुषं सख्यं व्यासो वाराणसीं शपन् ।
अविमुक्ते निवसतां जनानां पुण्यकर्मणाम् ॥
विघ्नं सृजामि सर्वेषां येन सिद्धिर्न विद्यते ।

Matsya-purāṇa, 185. 21-23.

2. किञ्चित् काश्या उदीच्यां च गत्वा देवेन चक्रिणा ।
स्वस्थित्यै कल्पितं स्थानं धर्मक्षेत्रं इतीरितम् ॥

Sk. Ka. 58. 71.

THE *MĀNAVA* PRINCIPLE IN MANU AND NIETZCHE'S APPRAISAL

DR KRISHNAGOPAL GOSWAMI

The *Manu-smṛti* is the brilliant product of a master mind. It represents the consummation of the genesis and genius of reflections as to how human behaviour has to be adapted to an 'order' which is just and valid. Dharma or Law stands for the self-subsistent principle of the ordering harmony, the great ratio-maker. It is impregnated with the notion of truth and righteousness. It induces natural conviction that man, abiding by this valid 'order', conforms to the most efficient ways of 'right living' and 'right doing'. It leads human life to flourish in all its potentialities. It involves the things of mind, spirit and soul of human life and its external existence in myriads of interests and values. The problems of life cannot sedulously be set apart; they must meet at a point. Manu was keenly alive to this comprehensive character of Law. Yet he pressed into service the dominance of the rationale of humanism, the benign *mānava* principle which suggests its affinity with the significance of his name.

In Manu, religion is looked upon as being essentially the symbol of the social bond and the fulfilling of the obligations connected with veneration to the gods, sages and fathers. The unity of God and the consequent brotherhood of humanity are registered in our conscience. They form part of religious notion which is more or less bound up with our human nature. But it is largely in the context of practical problems of life and in the matrix of society that ethics or religion is brought to bear upon the rules of conduct in their grand total coherence.

There is hardly any transcendental hocus-pocus breaking into our lives from without. There is no doubt beckonning to a life beyond, and from the viewpoint of eudaemonistic doctrine, it is of the nature of striving towards 'being' with a purpose to attain the goal, the *summum bonum*. In our attempts for fulfilment of the purpose of rising higher and higher, we have evidently a part to play. And in this scheme we can effectively play the role of *nara*, the true actor in the stage of the world.

In the teaching of Manu, there is no denial that one cannot attain the perfect moral and religious life in and through the course of this life. Nor there is whispering of doubt and despair that we cannot rise or fall by our own responsibilities. We do not hear Manu speak of the original sin loaded upon us from some unknown past for no fault of ours. Manu's theory of law, as we can guess from the code, supplies basic force or energy of directing the development of human conduct to the goal of ascending life. Manu makes duty a matter of joy, and not a tyrant. Havell[1] rightly observes that "religion in India is hardly a dogma but a working hypothesis of human conduct adapted to different stages of spiritual developments and different conditions of life."

The Code of Manu seems to have abundantly inspired the great philosopher of the West, Nietzche whose Dionysian cult is one of the latest great forces in world culture. The entire cult is nursed and nourished on humanism and energism. He deems Manu far superior to the Bible for its elevating humanism. His admiration for Manu is expressed in his typical picturesque phrasing and in a style, at once romantic and dynamic. Nietzche asserts that "old India has contributed its hoary Manu as the master-builder in order to boss the supermen who are to architercture the Occident of the twentieth century".[2] I shall try to find out clues to the grounds of Nietzche's admiration for Manu by critical examination of his basic doctrines. The sage-legist of India directed the conduct of mankind to a purpose of cosmic design. The notion of culture presupposes a mind—a highly developed faculty of the 'super-organic' universe as Herbert Spencer calls it. Manu starts with the postulate that the entire universe existed in the mind and emerged as purposeful. The self-existing Energy, itself undiscernible, was manifested into the perceptible world through the urge of a Mind Supreme[3] and law is an emanation from the Supreme Mind. It is implanted in divine essence of the highest reason and preserved in the traditions of the *Śruti* as the sole source of its authority,[4] and accordingly, absolutely valid and just. Man fulfils the

1. *Aryan Rule of India*, p. 170.
2. Neitzche's works are : Beyond Good and Evil, Twilight of the Idols, The Dwan of Dav, Thus Spake Zarthustra. The Will to Power etc. Will Durant's 'Story of Philosophy' gives an idea of some of his views.
3. Manu, I.5-8.
4. 'धर्मं जिज्ञासमानानां' प्रमाणं परमं श्रुतिः, Manu. II. 13 ; cf also II. 7.

ideal of dharma, if he chooses to act conformably to its requirement. But on the other hand, if he chooses to act in a way not commensurate with dharma, he sins ; and suffering is the wages of sin. It induces in man the strong sense of duty and of right doing, and by right doing, he believes that he attains prosperity and progress as its own reward. He is taught to regulate the pattern of his behaviour within certain clearly recognised ends that he may develop his true powers and potentialities, which, he is capable of, both socially and individually. He should disdain and discard the conceits of extreme individualism as well as fanatic excesses of collective ultruism or totalitarianism, and follow the golden mean in realising meaningful components of values rise higher and higher.

Human good, in true sense of the term, consists in Dharma which is the sustaining and forward-tending force of life. Law is all that it ought to be. From times immemorial, it has proved abundantly efficacious and purposeful in the affairs of human interaction and Manu preserves it as the recorded wisdom of old. The ordering of human relations, according to this view, assumes overwhelming importance in terms of 'duty' and we scarcely hear of 'right'. Our culture proceeded chiefly from the tradition of duty in which lies the ultimate guarantee of right. But duty is conceived not as dull exacting and dreary. It is so essential for the development of one's potentialities. It registers a sense of 'must' and we carry it out with joy and dignity.

But in the ordering of our life, we must not let loose the reins of our inferior passions exclusively for self-interest. For that is incompatible with larger ends. All sensible things which attract with the bait of pleasure or terrify by pain should not be the basis of the motive force of our desire. The Kaṭhopaniṣad[1] says : "The good is different, the pleasurable is different. He who takes up the good attains well-being, but he who selects the pleasurable misses it." Manu[2] does not disavow desire, for, without desire, there can be no endeavour. Nor does Manu make the individual utterly subordinated to the general and the only good of the majority. But the interest of the individual for self-development is only circumscribed. The only interest that law claims from man is that he should sustain '*Śreyas*' or good as distingui-

1. I. 2. 2.

2. अकामस्य क्रिया काचिद् दृश्यते नेह कर्हिचित्। II. 4.

shed from '*preyas*' or mere pleasure. Manu[1] says that he who persists in discharging duties in the right manner reaches deathless state and even in this life obtains the fulfilment of all desires he may have conceived. Here the highest aspiration is directed to the attainment of immortality by means which are, however, mortal and material. The realisation of this vaster perspective is assured in Manu by the wonderful scheme of co-ordination between the *varṇa* and *āśrama* phases of life.

The patternisation of the four-fold socio-cultural groups (*varṇas*) is evidently based on natural and bio-psychic differences of mankind. It is really a huge experiment in the domain of India's social organisation. It affords scope for unfoldment of hereditary efficiency of the typical traits and qualities of character according to inherent potentialities. It has helped the growth of a dedicated class of teachers and philosophers, the torch-bearer of the culture of the race made up of Brahmins. The noble race of the warriors forms the class of the Kṣatriya, while the trading and agricultural community of the Vaiśya builds up the economy of the people, and Śūdras form the manual service personnel of its society. If this system denied the freedom of the *laissez faire* principle as in the modern age of articulated industries, it assured, through occupational differentiations fixed by birth, opportunities of employment for one and all; it saved the society from the worst evils of profit motive and baneful drudgery of strife and competition to which the world is victim today. Manu today lives in a paradox of want even in midst of affluence; for society even in the West with lives void of faith has become a deadly trial of frustrations and anxieties.

It is true that varṇa-theory does not recognise the artificial equality or exact sameness of men, but it admits that each individually has a worth which is to be duly respected in the co-ordinated human relations. Yet, equality in the spiritual plane is not ruled out altogether. Moreover, it extends facilities and opportunities of equal care, security and protection for the worth of each forming the inseparable part of the same 'body social'. It holds out hopes and expectations that each individual could steadily rise to the improved station of life ethically and spiritually by virtue of progressive accul-

1. तेषु सम्यग् वर्तमानो गच्छत्यमरलोकताम् ।
यथा सङ्कल्पितांश्चेह सर्वान् कामान् समश्नुते ॥ II. 25.

turation. And there are certain virtues of non-violence, truthfulness, freedom from anger, purity, restraint of senses and so forth which are common to all.

Varṇa-scheme is an integrated social order of great significance conducive to two-fold requirements, unity and diversity. It is the system of the four classical castes, *Varṇas*, which furnished the frame within which the highly complex net-work of multiple castes and sub-castes has been developed with the progress of times. This helped consolidation through further division of labour. Though their individual caste activities are different, they are mutually useful and contribute to the common good of social solidarity. Speaking of the beneficence of Indian caste system, Sidney Low[1] so eloquently remarks: "there is no doubt that it is the main cause of the fundamental stability and contentment by which Indian Society has been braced up centuries against the shocks of politics and cataclysms of Nature. It provides every man with his place, his career, his occupation, his circle of friends. It makes him at the outset a member of a corporate body; it protects him through life from the canker of social jeolousy and unfulfilled aspirations; it ensures him companionship and a sense of community in like case with himself. The caste organisation is to the Hindu his club, his trade union, his benefit society, his philanthropic society". Manu seeks to emphasise natural biological endowments, the hereditary efficiency of the different traits and aptitudes and the innate life-force of an individual. The *Varṇa* division of Society gives to its members particular facilities of 'nature' and 'sustenance' for the development of those traits and aptitudes which they share in common with the people of their own group. Yet they are conscious of their overall unity with the society, for they satisfy their needs by an exchange of service. The social bond among them grows the stronger, the more sharply are they individualised in their occupations. Varṇa organisation in India has subserved, for ages, dynamic equilibrium and steady co-ordination of social and individual energers leading to the infinite manifestation of culture and crafts.

It is true that varṇa-pattern of gradation gives rise to hierarchic stratification of the classes. This is what it should be, for the power of society is, of necessity, unequally divided among its members.

1. *Vision in India* (Ed. 1907), pp. 262-3.

The more the sphere of society expands in its richness, variety and intensity, the greater and greater will be the difference in the parts assigned to the members of the society, and fewer in proportion to the mass will rise in the scale of power with aristocratic virtues or superior productiveness.

Nietzche laments that the aristocratic virtues and valuations, as contemplated by Manu, are dying out. To him, democracy is "a mania for counting noses. It means drift. It means permission given to each part of an organism to do just what it pleases. It means the worship of mediocrity, and the hatred of excellence".[1] Superman cannot arise in such a soil. "Not the superior men but the majority man becomes the ideal and the model; everybody comes to resemble everybody else; even the sexes approximate—the men become women and women become men".[2] Nietzche, like Manu, advocated a superrace. The varṇa-system is a well-devised social structure within which it was possible for the growth of the superrace in the soil of India in a measure of conspicuous success.

The Āśrama-ethics of Manu envisages an effective plan and programme for the training and discipline of the individuals through four well-co-ordinated stages of life. The initial formative part of the career, called *brahmacarya*, is devoted to the task of receiving cultural and behavioural training at the house of the teacher. As soon as a student has finished the course of his study and attained manhood, he passes to the next stage where he marries and builds up a life of family economics as a full-fledged member of the group and society. He satisfies the desire for sex, progeny and property, but within socially accepted limits. The life of the householder marks the joy of living. It starts with marriage as a ceremony which is an institutional expression of sex-life, and integrated, in the Indian tradition, with a number of interests and values which are not merely conjugal, parental, aesthetic and ethical, but also spiritual and even metaphysical. Marriage is viewed as a sacrament (*saṁskāra*) predominantly for the cultivation of the best qualities of human native. To discharge a number of obligations in the consecrated wedded life, and to create a type in the progeny for perpetuation of the specific aims and ethos of the culture, to which one is born, are significant in the ideals of Hindu

1. See *The Story of Philosophy*, Cardinal Edn., p. 432.
2. See Will be Power, I. to pp. 382-4.

marriage in its ethical and spiritual frame of reference. The wisdom of Manu has offered a visualised solution of how the sex can be purged of its elemental dross, and be elevated to the highest horizon of spiritual bliss and love. But the idealistic excess did not blur the vision of its exponent to ignore the positive and empirical concerns of life. Manu was not only a sage-legist, but also a socialogist. He knew that the problems of life in the earthly social drama acted and reacted on human relations in a number of ways. The root of human nature is sunk deep in the soil of the earth, whatever be the height, to which its sprouts may aspire to reach. Accordingly the considerations of *artha* (material means) and *kāma* (desire), which epitomise the elemental needs and motives of human nature, are not detached from the matrix of marital and familial life in the Hindu thought, though these are sought to be co-ordinated with *dharma* (spiritual efficiency) as but a means to an end. This explains why even the inferior forms of marriage and marriage union had to be given recognition though they were normally condemned.

Having fulfilled humanistic interests of diverse kind with lively zeal and joy in married life and having discharged obligations of life in either real or symbolic service to gods, seers and fathers, to society, State and mankind and also to the inferior living being,[1] when at last a householder advances to the threshold of old age, he retires to a life of quiet seclusion to take shelter in the enviorns of sylvan of shade far off from the'madding crowd. Then, in the fourth and the last phase, forsaking all attachement to the transitory realites of the world, and focussing all attention and thought to the point of realising spiritual identity with Absolute Truth, Brahman, he attains liberation from the death-doomed cycle of births and rebirths.

The voice of individual conscience in this scheme of discipline claims the observance of duty in terms of high holy law, first as factor for the acquisition of individual force, felicity and energy. A person in this scheme hopes to be equipped with power and personality to satisfy great variety of his needs which are physical as well as ideal in character. But secondly, as development is the sign of life, the strength vigour and purity of his character, already acquired, seek to transmute themselves into a kind of ideal virtues which make him free from sordid material motives. He rises higher and higher to be ultimately

1. This has been discussed at length in my paper a 'Philosophy of the Panca-Yajñas' published in the *Calcutta Review*, Nov. 1937.

either a sage, seer or superman, or one with god. This is the attainment of the deathless state as pointed out by Manu. In other words, it is the realisation of immortal joy without which life, according to the Upanisad, is little worthwhile. From what we have already observed, it seems clear that Manu largely stressed the individual development of power and personality. But such development is the sum total of the conditions of human nature and its external existence, heredity, invironment and training. The ethics of Manu sought to regulate the course of human conduct with concerns for the proper balance of *tri-varaga*, but finally leading to *apavarga*, the higest spiritual salvation.

The Varṇa and Āśrama theory is a unique combination of 'nature' and 'nurture', a grand co-ordination of 'sociable' and 'individual' good—both as 'real' and 'ideal'. It is a matchless blend of matter and spirit of values, human and divine. Every social development depends largely on throughness of the useful activity of mankind and an increase in its availability. Two different kinds of activity are to be assessed in this regard : the activity of individuals, which proceeds directly from the motives of interests of the individuals for themselves, and social activity which keeps the individual activity within recognised limits to secure the liberty of the activity of other individuals. The Varṇāśrama furnishes the necessary incentives for the fostering of these two-fold forces of activity in their vastness, depth and variety.

It is interesting that Nietzsche, the illustrious philosopher of the West, inculcates the need of "thoroughgoing transvaluation of values" from inspiration that we may have had from Manu. He prescribes the study of the code of 'Manu as indispensable ; it supplies the means of promoting the cause of "the re-humanising of humanity". To discipline one's own self is the keystone of the philosophy of Manu. The power of personality cannot develop in the least without it. According to Nietzche, "energy, intellect and pride—these make the superman. But they must be harmonised : the passions will become powers only when they are selected and unified by some great purpose which moulds a chaos of desires into the power of a personality."[1] It is the weakling who follows his impulses. He is not strong enough to

1. See *The Story of Philosophy*, p. 427.

say No; he is a discord, a decadent. To discipline one's self—that is the highest thing.

Nietzche's philosophy is directed to the aims of creating a particular race of a desirable and noble type of the Superman. According to him, the standard of the prevalent morality instead of creating a desirable superrace is debasing humanity and stunting man's development. He hurls slashing indictment against Christian morality as dope for a decadent generation, but bursts into rhapsody of praise for Manu for its elevating religion. In the context of the superrace, he says: "The most significant example of this is offered by Indian morality and is sanctioned religiously as the Law of Manu. In this book the task is set of rearing no less than four races at once, a priestly race, a warrior race, a merchant and agricultural race and finally a race of servants the Śūdras. It is quite obvious that we are no longer in a circus watching tamers of wild animals in this book. To have conceived even such a breeding scheme presupposes the existence of a man who is a hundred times midler and more reasonable than the mere lion-tamer. One breathes more freely after stepping out of the Christian atmosphere of hospitals and prisons into the more salubrious, loftier and spacious world. What a wretched thing the New Testament is beside Manu, what an evil odour hangs about it."

Nietzche extols Manu as the propounder of affirmative religion, the religion of the 'deification of power', while he condemns the Bible and Christianity as breeders of its antithesis, debasing Will to Power by 'slave morality' or *Chaṇḍāla* values[1]. Niezsche observes: "The fact that in Christianity, holy ends are entirely absent constitutes my objection to the means (of falsehood) it employs. Its ends are only bad ones: the poisoning, the calumniation, and the denial of life, the contempt of the body, the degradation and self-pollution of man by virtue of the concept of sin—consequently its means are bad as well. My feelings are quite the reverse when I read the law-book of Manu, an incomparably superior and more intellectual work, which it would be a sin against the spirit even to mention in the same breath with the Bible. You will guess immediately why: it has a genuine philosophy behind it, in it not merely an evil-smelling Jewish distillation of Rabbinism and superstition—it gives something to chew even to the most fastidious psychologist. And not to forget the most important point at all,

1. *Twilight of the Idols.*

it is fundamentaly different from every kind of Bible; by means of it, the noble classes, the philosophers and warriors guard and guide the masses; it is replete with noble values, it is filled with a feeling of perfection, with a saying of Yea of life and a triumphant sense of wellbeing in regard to itself and to life—the sun shines upon the whole book. All those things which Christianity smoothers with its bottomless vulgarity: procreation, woman, marriage are here treated with earnestness, with reverence, with love and confidence."

It is the secular outlook, the positive attitude of humanism embodying the joy of living which, according to Nietzche, breathes in Manu with, all its verve, vigour and vitality. As a teacher of political science also Manu is preferred to the philosophers of the Western world. Nietzche says: "Manu's[1] words again are simple and dignified, virtue could hardly rely on her own strength alone. Really it is only the fear of punishement that keeps man in their limits and leaves every one in the peaceful possession of his own".

In the appraisal of international politics also, the philosopher gives Manu better place and says: "Rather what Manu[2] says is probably truer: We must conceive of all the states on our frontiers and their allies as being hostile, and for the same reason we must consider all of their neighbours as being friendly to us".

Manu was keenly alive to the aberrations of human nature and its animality; its external existence, surroundings and institutional settings, its strife, trials and tribulations. Yet Manu's vision was instinct with the prophetic power of inspired knowledge. Manu discovered, by philosophic divination, the very 'divine order' necessary for the defication of the power and personality of man on the one hand, and the consolidation of society to its vaster perspective on the other.

There is no denying that the worth of a culture consists not only in its power to raise and enlarge the internal man, the mind, the soul, the spirit, but also to mould and modulate his external existence and make of it a "rythm of advance towards high and great ideals". This shaping of man's external existence means a sound political, economic

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1. दण्डस्य हि भयात् सर्वं जगद् भोगाय कल्पते VII. 22.
2. अनन्तरमरिं, विद्यादरिसेविनमेव च।
   अरेरनन्तरं मित्रमुदासीनं तयोः परम्॥ VII. 158.

and social life enabling the people to survive, to grow and to move firmly and securely towards collective perfection. Manu's philosophy of law supplies the means and method of sustaining this rythm of advance towards the perfect ends of culture. In the words of Sri Aurobindo : "The ideals that governed the spirit and body of Indian society were of the higher kind, its social order secured an inexpugnable basic stability, the strong life force that worked in it was creative of an extraordinary energy, richness and interest, and the life organized remarkable in its opulence, variety, in unity, beauty, productiveness and movement". The critics who read into Indian life only an incompetence for any free and sound political organization and view her as constantly a divided nation really read the feature of her decadance backward into her past history. It represents an erroneous view also arising out of an exaggerated glorification of the success of Western democracy and industrialism. Western man in the middle of the twentieth century is in drift, the very ground of civilisation are breaking up under his feet. Frustration is the hallmark of the century everywhere—the frustration of triumphant science and rampant technology. It is true, as Sri Aurobindo says, that "India never evolved either the scrambling and burdensome industrialism or the parliamentary organisation of freedom and self-styled democracy characteristic of the bourgeois or Vaishya period of the cycle of European progress".

I believe no one will deny the greatness of the achievment of India and the greatness of the endeavour of the master-builder Manu in designing and moulding the magnificant edifice of human culture to its noblest execution. In the words of Lord Zetland[2] we may say : "The cavillings of the critics break down before the height and largeness and profundity revealed when we look at the whole and all its parts in the light of a true understanding of the spirit and intention and a close discerning regard on the actual achievment of the culture".

1. *The Renaissance of India.*
2. *Introduction to the Legacy of India*, p. xi.

